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497
Joel Shinder
EARLY
OTTOMAN
ADMINISTRATION
IN THE WILDERNESS:
LIMITS
SOME
ON COMPARISON
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FOUR
Origin of thesis
THESES
IN
OTTOMAN
I. Lybyer
A (State)
Ruling Institution
2. Wittek
3. Shaw/inalcik
Devsirme Party
Devsirme
Kapl Kullarla or
Central Government
4. Inalcik/Itzkowitz/Thomas
Askeri (Rulers)
Men of the Pen
Bureaucracy
Religion/Law
Men of the Sword
Kapi Kullar
Timariots
Auxiliaries
INSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY
Intermediate Status
Miners
Guards (e.g., bridges)
Road crews
Falcon breeders
Sheep breeders, marketers
Persons in the immediateservice of the sultan, whether in the palaceitself or in the provinces
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502
Joel Shinder
the practical,the precedentof sacred law and the makeshiftdecision of the executive
order, from widening until it became unbridgeable.The pious condemnedthe ruler's
deviationsfrom the establishednorm of the Prophet's days, and in fear for their souls
they evaded his call when he summoned them to take office.
Thus the governmentof Allah and the governmentof the sultan grew apart. Social
and political life was lived on two planes, on one of which happenings would be
spiritually valid but actually unreal, while on the other no validity could ever be
aspiredto. The law of God failed because it neglected the factor of change to which
Allahhad subjectedhis creatures.[Legaltheory]had, unwittinglyperhaps,relinquished
that grandiosedream of a social body operatingperpetuallyunder the immutablelaw
which God had revealedin the fulness of time.
There is an opposition here between government or state and society, and it is
suggested that this is a uniquely Islamic phenomenon despite historical evidence
to the contrary. Because the legists of early Islam wrestled with the problem of
theory and practice for ages bereft of the Prophet's guidance, it is argued, all
subsequent states and societies, in being Islamic, suffered the same difficulty.
This is the fallacy of division, where the properties of the whole are considered
true also for the parts (assuming, of course, the validity of the properties of the
whole as described). The fallacy of composition, where the properties of the
parts are considered true also for the whole, is introduced when certain key
Islamic states, like the Abbasid, are considered models for the entire Islamic
community or umma.
When the full theme is drafted into use for the discussion of Ottoman state
and society, the fallacy of division applies. One consequence of such reasoning
is the judgment that practitioners of Ottoman government, as of any Islamic
government, uniformly displayed a total lack of administrative morality. This
comes from the uncritical reading of a spate of 'government' manuals which can
rival The Prince for the challenge they pose the literary analyst. An eleventhcentury manual urges, 'Commit no forgery for a trivial object, but [reserve it]
for the day when it will be of real service to you and the benefits substantial.'6
Noting evidence of corruption in Ottoman administrative ranks, a thinker of
this ilk - steeped, to be sure, in Oriental lore - would find his general conclusion
exonerated. The abundance of Ottoman manuals which urge probity would not
impress him. A comparative perspective, in other words, has thrown the Ottoman
child into the wilderness where, left to the devices of nature, he would thrive
on the milk of two gray wolves, the beasts of State and Society or, respectively,
symbols A and B in the chart above (p. 500). In terms of the theme, it should be
remembered, 'society' is chiefly the ulema and other popular leadership outside
the framework of the government proper. Recognizing the official status of the
ulema in the Ottoman state, the Inalcik-Itzkowitz-Thomas proposition is more
strictly functional in its askeri-reaya definition.
The Ottoman state should be fully characterized, however, as primarily
Islamic, Turkish, dynastic, monocratic, and agrarian. To the extent that it was
6
Reuben Levy, trans., A Mirror for Princes: The Qdbus Ndma by Kai Kd'uis Ibn
I95I),
p. 209.
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I9-20.
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The
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From the Abbasid ideal to Ottoman practice a yawning gap of almost five
hundred years exists. Many have tried to bridge the empirical gap through
studies on Seljuk and Ilhanid administrative organs and methods. First the
Great Seljuks in Iran and Mesopotamia, then the Seljuks of Rum in Asia Minor
proper and, finally, the Ilhanids with supremacy in both regions are held to
have mediated the Abbasid-Ottoman exchange with but a few Mongol-Turkic
variations. The full Abbasid apparatus, therefore, is seen to have been as readily
available to the Ottomans as the published traditions of the Prophet were to
Muslims of that age.
Under the first two Ottoman princes, Osman and Orhan (together, ca.
1281-1326), the structure of the Ottoman state and its administrative methods
were probably very similar to those of the other Anatolian principalities at best.
Little more than this statement of probability can be hazarded. Not even the
very officials of the early Ottoman state are clear. For example, an important
finance officer for the Seljuks of Rum was the mustawfi. His office and duties
may be a precedent for the Ottoman finance officer, the defterdar, or for the
commissioner of the cadaster, the defter emini. The inception of neither Ottoman
office, however, is known accurately. Likewise, just as the Seljuk royal council
(divan-i hdss) may be the model for and the functional equivalent of the Ottoman
council (divan-i hiimdyun), the exact functions and ranks of member officials
concerned with military, judicial, financial, and other affairs could and probably
did differ considerably.22Because the Seljuks and the Ottomans are quite alien
to the modern reader, it is easy to accept functional equivalency based on
titulature and vice versa. The faith, the culture, the language, and the civilization
seem to be the same in each case. This argument, however, would have the
Congress of the United States of America and the Parliament of the United
Kingdom functionally equivalent entities in respects going far beyond the
21
and Walther Hinz, 'Das Rechnungswesen orientalIbid., pp. 213, 250, 253-255,
ische Reichsfinanzimter im Mittelalter,' Der Islam, 29 (I950), I-2.
22 Although
many parallels may be sought, or analogues found, fundamental differences
obtain between various Seljuk offices (in functions, hierarchical position, and power) and
the later Ottoman forms. This is clear in the work of Osman Turan, Tiirkiye Selfuklularz
Hakkznda Resmi Vesikalar: Metin, Terciime ve Arastzrmalar (Ankara, I958), pp. I-62.
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I968),
p. 494.
28
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Joel Shinder
51
food and fodder for the army in a given district, the 'ulffa tax, have exact
Ottoman counterparts in the same meaning.29 Finally, the Ottoman practice of
having secular kanun/yasak regulations side by side with shari'a prescriptions is
also an Ilhanid practice.30 Moreover, Ilhanid land tenure fell into four general
categories, each of which has its Ottoman analogue: state lands; private royal
domains; lands of the religious institutions and pious endowments; private
lands (mulk).This categorization, however, preceded the Ilhanids as much as it did
the Ottomans in accordance with custom and Holy Law. Besides, the tenacity
of landed classes is a well-known historical phenomenon, and this certainly
affected classification of lands.
The evidence admits a strong case for Ottoman-Ilhanid institutional ties.
Nonetheless, even in that body of material much is left to be desired. Whether
particular officials like the Ilhanid defterdar-i memalikand the Ottoman defterdar
of the early period held similar rank and fulfilled similar roles in government is
a matter for conjecture. Moreover, the general prejudice of Orientalists for
'Islamic' governments ignores the possible influence on the Ottomans of nonMuslim Mongol-Turkic states north and east of the Black Sea. The kinds of
registers the Ottoman kept, however like those of the Ilhanids, give few clues
apart from the similarity itself to the method and timing of borrowing. Timing
is particularly difficult to establish owing to the formalism of the diplomatics
involved. As in the Seljuk case, therefore, a general structure of 'Islamic' or
'traditional Near Eastern' government cannot be assumed to presuppose
functional equivalency, however great the force of tradition and precedent.
Circumstances, policies, interests, and alignments clearly differentiate the
Ottomans from their colleagues in government throughout the Muslim world.
These considerations suggest the tendency in earlier approaches to advance
the idea of continuity in Middle Eastern governing traditions to the detriment
of innovation or change. Some kind of search for a stereotypical or paradigmatic
'Muslim government' seems to be in progress, despite the prior conclusion that
the attempt in the Muslim world to create a Muslim government has consistently
failed! A look at the institution of the vizierate is an important step in shifting
the balance to the side of change. The example is particularly crucial in that, of
the many innovations introduced by the Ottomans, the grand vizierate is outstanding for its effects on the administrative history of the empire.
The Arabic wazir - literally, one who carries a burden - has the sense of aide
or counselor.31 The office is neither a direct borrowing from Sassanian practice
nor a static tradition. By the sixth century the Sassanian equivalent, the buzurg
framdddr, was in decline or non-existent, and the Umayyads had no first minister
Petruchevsky, 'Iran under Il-Khans,' pp. 532-533.
until Ghazan's
Togan, Umumi Tirk, p. 330. The Ilhanid state was non-Muslim
conversion, and this may account for the dual legal system. The Ottomans produced
regulations under different conditions; namely, the absorption of largely non-Muslim
areas with local codes of law into a state whose leadership was Muslim.
31 Dominique
Sourdel, Le Vizirat 'Abbdside de 749 d 936 (I32 a 324 de l'Hegire), Vol. I
(Damascus, 1959), pp. 50-54.
29
30
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33
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512
Joel Shinder
protect the imdm-caliph and the umma, and he cautioned the sovereign to
maintain control over the vizier and prevent the creation of an equal and rival
power in the state. No legal framework to secure this worthy end of checks and
balances was outlined. Consequently, in practice the office depended on the
arbitrary will of the sovereign who created it.36
Under the Great Seljuk sultans, the political successors to the Abbasids, the
institution of the vizierate suffered the same weaknesses. The military acted
independently of the vizier, the cooperation of sultanate and caliphate was seldom
realized, and the attempt to link religion and state through the madrasa system
of higher education for public servants failed. The vizier's patronage function
resulted in factionalization, and the vizier's hold over the army through his
control of the treasury disappeared when direct support by land grants was
instituted. Finally, the sultans often went over the heads of their ministers by
consulting directly with subordinates in the bureaus.37
As an institution of government the Abbasid-Seljuk vizierate was not a
homogeneous unit ready for Ottoman adoption. From an advisory post it became
an office directing much but not all of civil administration. Its base was the
discretionary power of the sovereign, sultan, or caliph. In its most centralized
form of the Seljuk period it still had no substantial control over the military
forces of the state, so that even the personal prestige of a particularly able vizier
only served to excite the envy and fear of the military commanders. The Ottomans certainly accepted the title of vizier for their head of government and other
officers of state. They did not assume the burden of that office's full and turbulent history. Neither continuity nor evolution characterizes that history. Neither
continuity nor evolution may be presumed for the Ottoman vizierate. The
themes and precedents which have informed the study of Ottoman administrative history are proved misleading or fallacious. Some of the circumstances
which shaped the early Ottoman experience in administration support this
assertion.
The structure of the Ottoman state under the first two princes, it has been
stated, was similar to that of the other Anatolian principalities, successors to the
Seljuks of Rum and dependents of the Ilhanid empire. Territory in the principalities was divided among the sons of the prince and other family members.
Each member acted at will in his own lands. The leadership was elective, and
the headman was merely primus inter pares. It is thoroughly appropriate, then,
that the Ottomans are known as such, Osmanhs, followers of Osman and his
line. Osman's reign, however, was not very remarkable. His property at death
reportedly consisted of a province, but no gold or silver; a robe, some armor, a
salt cellar, a spoon-holder, some houseboots, several horses, some sheep, a few
oxen, and nothing more.38 The spectacular expansion of the family's holdings
36
88.
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Studies,
12 (I953),
237,
240.
See the lists of monuments in Ekrem Hakki Ayverdi, Osmanlz Mimarisinin Ilk Devri,
Vol. I (Istanbul, I966), passim.
48
Giese, Apz., pp. 30, 42.
'Ali, Apz., pp. I97-I98;
47
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preserved features if not the bulk of pre-Ottoman Muslim and non-Muslim law
codes and customs, such scribal groups were important additions to the state
apparatus. They had an immediate, direct influence which was not always that
of 'the traditional Near Eastern State' on the development of Ottoman administration. After a conquest the scribes employed to write up the cadasters were
often men with local knowledge, themselves natives of the places recorded and,
therefore, recent additions to the broad ruling class. One such scribe was a slave
of an Ottoman general. Another scribe rose to a field command post himself.52
Just as the ulema did not monopolize scribal positions and traditions, neither
can they clearly be set apart as hinterlanders. In Rumeli (the European province),
especially, the ghazis under their various independent leaders elected their own
kadis to handle such administrative questions as inheritance and taxation. Thus,
frontier Turks, not all of whom entered Europe by way of Muslim Iran and
Asia Minor, infiltrated the ranks of the incipient 'Ottoman' ulema.53
Administration in the formative period of the state was primarily concerned
with the sultan's financial claims. The basic unit of rural exploitation was the
timar, the usufruct of which supported both civil and military servants of the
Osmanli household - the state, so to speak.54Ottoman scribes were responsible
for developing a systematic means of registration and assignment not only for
lands falling under the timar regime but also for the lands, forests, fisheries,
49 The importance of this family in the formative period of the Ottoman state is outlined in Franz Taeschner and Paul Wittek, 'Die Vezirfamilie der Candarlyzade (I4.-I5.
Jah.) und ihre Denkmiler,' Der Islam, 28 (1929), 60-115.
50Ibid., p. 95.
51 Speros Vryonis, Jr., 'The Byzantine Legacy and Ottoman Forms,' Dumbarton Oaks
275-276.
Papers, nos. 23 and 24 (I969-I970),
52 Halil Inalclk, Hicri 835 Tarihli Suiret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid (Ankara, 1954), pp
xvii-xviii.
53 Giese, Apz., p. 50; Franz Babinger, ed., Die Friihosmanischen Jahrbiicher des Urudsch.
Nach den Handschriften zu Oxford und Cambridge ... (Hanover, 1925), pp. I2-I3.
54 Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr,
'Un Transfuge qaramanide aupres de la Porte ottomane:
reflexions sur quelques institutions,' Journal of the Economic and Social History of the
Orient, 26 (I973), I63-I64.
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56
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MINNESOTA
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