Election Law Case Digest (Final)

ELECTION LAW Atty.
Gallant Soriano
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
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JUAN FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989
DOCTRINE:Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the
specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate
for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified
voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election
Code provides further that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Filipino citizenship, if previously renounced, may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
FACTS: PetitionerJuan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of Sorsogon province
on January 22, 1988 and assumed office in due time. Respondent Salvador Estuye,
president of the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, filed with the COMELEC
a petition for the annulment of the election and proclamation of Frivaldo on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States in 1983. Frivaldos American citizenship was admitted by him and was
reflected in a certification issued by a US District Court. However, he pleaded the
defense that the American citizenship was forced on him as a measure of protection
from the persecution of the Marcos Dictatorship and that by actively participating in
the elections, he automatically forfeited the same under the laws of the United
States. He further contends that by filing his certificate of candidacy he had already
effectively recovered Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE:Whether or notFrivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
HELD:NO. Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered.
Under CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.Frivaldo did not invoke
either of the first two methods and it cannot also be said that he was repatriated
because even if he lose his naturalized citizenship by filing a certificate of candidacy
with the COMELEC, it did not and could not have the effect of automatically
restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.The reason
for resolving Frivaldos citizenship at the time of his election is the provision in
Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe
ACHAS . BONIFACIO . BERNABE . CALVO . DELOS SANTOS . FERNANDEZ . HABIJAN . HOFFMAN
MABAN . MANLANGIT . NIPAL . PASA . REYES . TAMONDONG . TOQUERO
ELECTION LAW Atty. Gallant Soriano

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the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement
in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office
must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides further that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article
V, Section 1, of the Constitution.Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of
the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.The fact
that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. Hence, Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
RAMON L. LABO, JR. VS. COMELEC


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G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989

DOCTRINE:The will of the electorate cannot change the requirement of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution as would permit a foreigner owing his total
allegiance to the Queen of Australia or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their
city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.The
probability that many of those who voted for the public official with alleged lack of
citizenship may have done so in the belief that he was qualified, only strengthens
the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the
office held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of
them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.
FACTS:Petitioner Ramon Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on
January 20, 1988. Questioning Labos citizenship as a qualification for his office,
private respondent LuizLardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto on January 26,
1988, but the filing fee was paid only on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days
after his proclamation.Labocontends that the petition should not be given due
course as it was filed beyond the reglementary period of ten days under Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code.Prior to the filing of the petition for quo warranto,
two administrative decisions were rendered on the question of the Labos
citizenship. The first was rendered by the COMELEC finding Labo to be a citizen of
the Philippines on the ground that there was no direct proof that he had been
formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. The second was rendered by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, acting upon Labos application for the
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration.It ruled that he was not a citizen of
the Philippines based on the official statement of the Australian Government that
Labo was an Australian citizen by reason of his naturalization in 1976.
However,Laboclaims that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship, but instead it made him a dual
national. He further argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a futile technicality
that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him
by a majority.
ISSUE:Whether or not Petitioner Labois eligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio
City.
HELD: NO. Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It did
not appear in the record, nor did the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.For this reason, Labos claim for
recognition as a citizen of the Philippines must be denied. Labo was not a citizen of
the Philippines on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988. He was not
even a qualified voter under the Constitution because of his alienage. He was

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therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the
Local Government Code which provides that An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a
qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province
where he proposes to be elected Moreover, even if Labo was elected by the
majority, the people of that locality could not change the requirements of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless
individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over
them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over
their countrymen.The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner
may have done so in the belief that he was qualified, only strengthens the
conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the
office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any
of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the
case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but
were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner
was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified
to serve as such.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
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DOCTRINE: For the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with

domicile. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; (2) A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and (3) Acts which correspond with the purpose.
FACTS:Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and Cirilo Roy Montejo were candidates for the
Congressional seat in the First District of Leyte. Montejo filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" against Marcos on the ground that the latter did
not meet the constitutional requirement for residency, which is not less than one
year immediately preceding the election. Marcos declared in her certificate of
candidacy that she has been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be
elected for seven months only. Marcos filed an Amended certificate of candidacy
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the
amended certificate but the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte rejected the
certificate on the ground that it was filed out of time. Marcos went ahead and filed
the same certificate with the COMELECs Head Office in Manila. She contends that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. Thereafter,
the 2nd division of the COMELEC granted Montejos petition for disqualification and
cancelled Marcos original certificate of candidacy. It held that In election cases, the
term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which
imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Furthermore, it held
that when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, she chose San Juan, Metro Manila
as her residence. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not
Tacloban.
After the May 1995 elections, the COMELEC issued two resolutions, the first allowed
Marcos proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the
highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte,
but such resolution was reversed on the same day it was issued and directed that
Marcos proclamation be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest
number of votes.
Marcos filed a petition averring that she won the elections for the congressional seat
in the First District of Leyte based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board
of Canvassers.
ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as
mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution
SC RULING: YES
The court ruled that Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a
person in a given area, community or country. However,for the purposes of election
law, residence is synonymous with domicile. The court ruled that it is the fact of


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residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive

in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. It further held that Marcos merely committed
an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residency qualification requirement. An individual does not lose his domicile even if
he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Marcos held various
residences for different purposes during the last four decades but none of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte.
Lastly, it ruled that domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) An actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; (2) A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) Acts which correspond with the
purpose. All the three requirements must concur, otherwise, the presumption of
continuity of residence cannot be rebutted.
Aquino vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

DOCTRINE:
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Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change ofdomicile,

petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
FACTS:
Agapito Aquino is a candidate for a congressional post in the the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, he declared that he
is a resident in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for a period of 10
months. Thereafter, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo
Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a
petition to disqualify on the ground that latter lacked the residence qualification as
a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the
Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The following day, Aquino filed another
certificate of candidacy where he declared that he resided in the constituency
where he sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days. During the
hearing of the case against Aquino, the latter presented among others, a lease
contract between him & Feliciano. In May 6, 1995, The COMELEC declares Aquino
eligible to run for the Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of
Makati City. Move Makati &Bedon filed a motion for reconsideration.
After the elections were held, Aquino garnered the highest number of votes as
against his two other competitors. Therafter, Move Makati &Bedon filed an Urgent
Motion to suspend Aquinos proclamation. On May 15, 1995, the COMELEC issued an
Order suspending Aquinos proclamation.
Aquino filed a motion to lift the suspension, and on June 2, the COMELEC resolved to
proceed with the proclamation. However, on the same day, the COMELEC reversed
the May 6 resolution and declared Aquino ineligible to run for office and thus
disqualified as a candidate.
Hence this present petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioner failed to comply with the residency requirement mandated
by the Constitution?
SC RULING: YES
The Court agreed with the COMELEC that in order that Aquino could qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must
prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. It held that
the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home," where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.

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The Court upheld the COMELECs findings that Aquino is a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion Tarlac for 52 years immediately preceding the 1992 elections, that his
birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents. It
is therefore clear that domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most
recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Furthermore, Aquinos intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City
was evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. Domicile of
origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change ofdomicile, petitioner must
prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose.
Dela Torre vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 121592.
July 5, 1996
Doctrine:
In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude the

Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes in mala in se

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involve moral turpitude while crimes in mala prohibita do not.

Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances
surrounding the violation of the statute.
Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received is
stolen displays a degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful
property as that which animated the robbery or theft which by their
very nature are crimes of moral turpitude.
The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the
sentence.
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Facts:
On May 6, 1995, Comelec declared Ronaldo Dela Torre disqualified from running
as the Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8, 1995 citing Sec. 40 (a) of RA 7160
(Local Govt. Code 1991) that a person who is sentenced by final judgement for an
offence involving moral turpitude for an offense by 1 year or more of imprisonment
within 2 years after serving sentence is disqualified from running for any elective
local position. Comelec further held that Dela Torre was found to be guilty of
violation of the Anti fencing law by the Municipal Trial Court on June 1, 1990 and the
decision was later affirmed on appeal in the RTC and became final by January 18,
1991. Comelec held that there exist a legal ground to disqualify Dela Torre to run as
a candidate since the nature of the offence of the Anti Fencing Law certainly
involves moral turpitude.
Dela Torre claims that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not
apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC on December
21, 1994 which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other
legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.
Issue:
1.
Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.

2.
Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)s
applicability.
Held:
1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
From Sec 2 of PD 1612 fencing may be committed when The accused knows
or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft
Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the
fence of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree
of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the
robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.
And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in
point in time and in degree, both the fence and the actual perpetrator/s of

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the robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain - thus
deliberately reneging in the process private duties they owe their
fellowmen or society in a manner contrary to x x x accepted and
customary rule of right and duty x x x, justice, honesty x x x or good morals.
2. No. Dela Torres conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a
crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification
found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation
Moreno vs. COMELEC and Mejes

G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006
DOCTRINE:
In harmonizing the LGC and the Probation Law, the Courts deem that the
Probation Law is an exception to the LGC. Sec. 40(a) which provides that those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position
and this should not include probationers since they do not serve the sentence


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adjudged to them since probation suspends it and final discharge of probation shall
operate to restore him all civil rights lost or suspended.
FACTS:
In this Petition dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the
ResolutionCOMELEC which disqualified him from running for the elective office of
Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and SangguniangKabataan Elections. The disqualification
was an off shoot of a petition filed by Norma L. Mejes on the ground that the latter
was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2)
Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan,
Samar on August 27, 1998. Moreno filed an answer claiming that the petition states
no cause of action because he was already granted probation. But the COMELEC
since he was only released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification
shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thereafter thus he is still
disqualified for the upcoming elections.
Petitioner argues that the disqualification applies only to those who have
served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the
adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to
the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to
probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent
election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous
misconduct.Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running as Punong Barangay.
SC RULING: NO
The Probation Law is an exception to the provision of the LGC as the
legislature did not intend the inclusion of probationers in the disqualification as it
can be gleaned from its act when it can, through its legislative wisdom and power,
include Probationers since those covered by the disqualification also covers those
who can apply for Probation.
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first
glance. The phrase service of sentence, understood in its general and common
sense, means the confinement of a convictedperson in a penal facility for the
period adjudged by the court. COMELEC has broadened the coverage of the law to
include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were
granted probation.
It is to be noted that those who have not served their sentence by reason of the
grant of probation which, the Court reiterates, should not be equated with service of
sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office
because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code does not even begin to run. Moreover, Sec. 4 of the Probation
Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the


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sentence and during the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the
penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order.

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Grego v. Comelec and Basco

G.R. No. 125955 June 19, 1997
DOCTRINE:Absent any express provision in the Law, a newly enacted statute

applies prospectively and not retroactively. There is no provision in the statue which
would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. Lexprospicit, non
respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. Thus, the LGC only applies to
instances that occurred on January 1, 1992 and thereafter.
FACTS:
The instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition impugns the
resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPA No. 95-212
dated July 31, 1996, dismissing petitioners motion for reconsideration of an earlier
resolution rendered by the COMELECs First Division on October 6, 1995, which also
dismissed the petition for disqualificationfiled by petitioner Wilmer Grego against
private respondent HumbertoBasco.
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff
by no less than this Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative
complaint lodged by a certain NenaTordesillas. The Court held:
WHEREFORE, FINDING THE RESPONDENT DEPUTY SHERIFF HUMBERTO BASCO OF
THE CITY COURT OF MANILA GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE FOR THE
SECOND TIME, HE IS HEREBY DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF
ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY
POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES
AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES,
OR
GOVERNMENT-OWNED
OR
CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS.


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Basco ran for councilor of the Second District of Manila and won in the three
elections he participated in, respectively the Jan. 18, 1988 elections, May 11, 1992
synchronized National Elections and May 8, 1995. His second election was
contested due to the Tordesillas ruling but was dismissed. On his third election,
Grego filed for his disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case
on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda.Before the parties could comply with this directive, however,
the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco on May 17, 1995, as a duly elected councilor
for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied
for the seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma.
Ruby Bithao-Camarista, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.
Petitioner herein, comes to the Court for relief and anchors his basis for
disqualification of Basco on the retroactive effect of the LGC, the irregularity of the
implied condonation of the electorate, the invalidity of the proclamation of Basco
because it was. He asks thatRomualdoMaranan, the 7 th in the elections and next to
Basco be proclaimed as the winner of the last slot.
ISSUE:Whether or not respondent is disqualified because he was removed from
office due to an administrative case which removed him from Office in 1981.
SC RULING: NO
The court proclaimed that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction evinced by COMELEC in dismissing the petition for
disqualification of Basco. In answering the contentions of Grego, the Court ruled
that in construing Sec. 40 (b) of the LGC, which provides for the disqualification
from running in an elective office of people removed from office as a result of an
Administrative Case which was promulgated and took effect on January 1, 1992.
Absent any express provision in the Law, a newly enacted statute applies
prospectively and not retroactively.

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REYES vs. COMELEC

GR No. 120905, March 17, 1996
DOCTRINE: The filing of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not
prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of
certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal
action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding; a
case shall not be rendered moot and academic if dilatory tactics were employed to
render such case moot and academic; the second highest in votes cannot be
proclaimed winner if should it appear that the candidate with the highest votes was
declared disqualified.
FACTS: Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. An administrative complaint was filed against him
with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. After learning that the Sanggunian had
terminated the proceedings in the case and WAS ABOUT TO RENDER JUDGMENT,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional
Trial Court, alleging that the proceedings had been terminated without giving him a
chance to be heard. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN found petitoner guilty.
A temporary restraining order was issued by the court, enjoining the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with the case. As a result, the decision
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be served upon Reyes. Following the
expiration of the temporary restraining order and without any injunction being
issued by the Regional Trial Court, an attempt was made to serve the decision upon
petitioners counsel in Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the decision.
Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon petitioner himself also failed, as he
also refused to accept the decision.
Petitoner filed a certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC in Bongabong. A
complainant sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing
the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) which states that persons removed from
office as a result of an administrative case are disqualified from running for any

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elective postition. Nonetheless, because of the absence of any contrary order from
the COMELEC, petitioner Reyes was voted for in the elections held on May 8, 1995.
COMELECs Second Division issued the questioned resolution, which found
the petitioner DISQUALIFIED from running for public office, in conformity with the
Local Government Code. Julius M. Garcia, who obtained the second highest number
of votes next to petitioner Reyes intervened in the COMELEC, contending that
because Reyes was disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled to be proclaimed mayor of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong,
apparently unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed
him the duly-elected mayor.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of petition for certiorari prevented the Sangguning
Panlalawigan from attaining finality.
2. Whether or not Reyes' reelection rendered the administrative complaint against
him moot and academic.
3. Whether or not Garcia is entitled to be proclamed mayor of Bongabong.
RULING:
1. No. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not
prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of
certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal
action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.
Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of
the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court.
In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The
temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on,
there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner. The
net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory.
2. No. Herein respondent Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian a period of
sixty one (61) days to file his verified answer however, he resorted to dilatory
motions which in the end proved fatal to his cause. Veritably, he neither filed nor
furnished the complainant a copy of his answer. Failure of the respondent to file his
verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the complaint shall be
considered a waiver of his rights to present evidence in his behalf (Art. 126 of Rules
and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991). All persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the Contitution).

2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
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Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer.
He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be
presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date set, he failed to appear. He would say
later that this was because he had filed a motion for postponement and was
awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to
render the case against him moot by his election.
3. No. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is
just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a
majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate
the results under the circumstances.
Garcias plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes
cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified
and for that reason can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The
subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the
elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.

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2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015

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2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
MERCADO vs. MANZANO and COMELEC

GR No. 135083, May 26, 1999
DOCTRINE: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The prohibition in

Section 5 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution) was not with dual citizens per se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No.
7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance.
FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano
were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Eduardo B. Manzano (si Kuya Edu!) obtained the highest votes; followed by Ernesto
S. Mercado and Gabriel Daza. The proclamation of private respondent (Kuya Edu)
was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain
Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States. [Born in the US (jus soli), of Filipino parents (jus
sanguinis)]
In its resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of
Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
for any elective position.
Kuya Edu filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending
even until after the election held on May 11, 1998. Accordingly, pursuant to the
above COMELEC Resolution, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for
vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner sought to intervene in the case. However, this motion was not
resolved by COMELEC. Instead, COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second
Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City
of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Pursuant this resolution of the COMELEC en
banc, the board of canvassers, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the
City of Makati. Petitioner filed certiorari before SC.
ISSUE:

2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
RULING:
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1. Whether or not Kuya Edu is disqualified from running for any elective position on
the ground of dual citizenship under the LGC. NO
1. No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such
a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine
of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some POSITIVE ACT, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals
volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides:
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance - and I reiterate a dual allegiance - is larger and more threatening than
that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on
foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
Clearly, in including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d)
and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject
to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines.

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2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Lopez vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 182701.
July 23, 2008
Doctrine:
Citizen Retention and Reaquisition Act of 2003 expressly provides for

the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may
run for public office in the Philippines. i.e. that they make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a
disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
Facts:
Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay
Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.
On October 25, 2007, Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial
Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of
petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from
running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American,
by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Thus possessing all the qualifications to
run for Barangay Chairman. After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed,
petitioner emerged as the winner.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition
for disqualification of Lopez,
ruling that he was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship in the manner provided
by law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the


2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Issue:
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elections, petitioner should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship which he failed to do.
Is Lopez a qualified candidate in the elections?
Held:
No. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who reacquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section
5(2) of the said law states that those who retain or reaquire their citizenship and
seek elective public office must meet the qualification for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
While Lopez re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law, the law explicitly
provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. Lopez failed to comply with this
requirement. There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent
complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225.
The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all
foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopezs
failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit
that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to
comply with the positive mandate of law. Absent such proof Lopez cannot be
allowed respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to
discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of
his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of
a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory
provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.

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2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Case no. 11
Rodriguez v. COMELEC
Doctrine: The Marquez Decision defining "fugitive from justice includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. Obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or
punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted
indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
Facts:
Petitioner won the Gobernatorial post in Quezon City Province during the May, 1992
elections. Respondent Marquez then challenged such victory contending that
Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice which is a ground for his
disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code.
Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the US where a charge, filed on November
12,1985 is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for
fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal
property.
Petitioner on the other hand contends that long before the felony complaint was
allegedly filed, he was already in the Philippines and he did not know of the filing of
the same nor was he aware that he was being proceeded against criminally. He
cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice, because to be so, one must be aware of
the filing of the criminal complaint, and his disappearance in the place where the
long arm of the law, thru the warrant of arrest, may reach him is predicated on a
clear desire to avoid and evade the warrant.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice as comprehended in the
Marquez Decision
Held:
No. The Marquez Decision defining "fugitive from justice includes not only those
who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution The intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates
one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent
to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject
of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.


2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
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Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in
the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, preceded the filing of the felony
complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on
even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost 5 months. It
was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint
and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and
arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time.
Case no. 12
Mateo Caasi v. CA
Doctrine: To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." The waiver of an
immigrant status must be manifested by some act/s independent of and done prior
to the filing of candidacy for elective office in the country for without such prior
waiver, he is disqualified to run for any office.
Facts:
Respondent Merito Miguel won as the Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the 1988
local elections. Petitioner Caasi sought Meritos disqualification on the ground that
the former is a green card holder, hence a permanents resident in US and not
Bolinao. Merito contended that although he holds a green card, he is not a
permanent resident in US but in Bolinao, that he obtained the green card only for
convenience, and that he was able to vote in all previous elections including the
plebiscite, ratification of the Constitution and the Congressional elections in 1987.
Issue:
W.O.N. Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident/or of immigrant to
USA prior to local elections in 1988?
Held:
NO. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires
that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country", Sec. 68 of BP 881. The
waiver of an immigrant status must be manifested by some act/s independent of
and done prior to the filing of candidacy for elective office in the country for without
such prior waiver, he is disqualified to run for any office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least
one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42,
Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification
because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao
for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on
January 18, 1988.
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2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
CASE TITLE: Villaber V. COMELEC

GR NO. 148326 DATE: November 15, 2001
DOCTRINE: The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In
People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda, we held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the
landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap, transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to
the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of
valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and
the public interest.
FACTS:
Both petitioner Pablo Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cougas were
rival candidate for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao Del Sur dating
the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Congressman on Feb. 1, 2001 file Cagas filed his on Feb. 28, 2001. On March 4 ,
2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, COMELEC,
Davao Del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter
COC. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber
was convicted by the RTC of Manila for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 and was
sentenced to suffer 1 year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of
P100,00.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), he is disqualified to run for
any public office. In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly
that his conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed
Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence.
Further, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it
cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not
involve moral turpitude.
ISSUE:
WON violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude
HELD:
Yes, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, because its
violation imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person. A drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges
on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contract to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or food morals.

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2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
CASE 14
CASE TITLE: De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union
GR NO. L-24721 DATE: November 3, 1925
DOCTRINE: When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a
prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake
or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to
observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent
practices or for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free
and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held directory and such
departure will be considered a harmless irregularity.
FACTS: Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court
seeking to compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union to annul the votes counted
in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him as the duly elected governor of La Union
based on the fact that certificate of candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not made
under oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the Election Law. Lucero filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction on
the subject-matter of the complaint; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the
person of the members of the board of canvassers; and (3) the petition failed to
state a cause of action.
ISSUE: WON the failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy under oath
was fatal to his proclamation as the duly elected governor of La Union
HELD: No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Luceros certificate of candidacy
does not invalidate his election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven
by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal
votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that
his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. In the case of Gardiner
vs. Romulo, it was held that The provisions of the Election Law declaring that a
certain irregularity in an election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of
the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by
a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are mandatory. When the
Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal
and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the
Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure
has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of
voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the
popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a
harmless irregularity. And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, it was held that he rules and

2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
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regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but
when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be directory
only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent
voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and
numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their
participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object. When
the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply
because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the
purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal
action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of the
honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.

CASE 15
28

2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Page
CASE TITLE: RODILLAS vs. COMELEC

GR NO. 119055 DATE: July 10, 1995
DOCTRINE: The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of
law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed
from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to
appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provision of the law.
FACTS: Petitioner (Roy Rodillas) and private respondent (IsabeloDotimas) were both
candidates for Punong Barangay in Barangay San Rafael, San Nicolas, Pangasinan in
the May 9, 1994 elections. Petitioner obtained 65 votes as against private
respondent's 61 votes. An election protest was consequently filed by respondent
with the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayug San Nicolas presided by
respondent Judge. After due hearing, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered its
judgment on May 27, 1994 finding private respondent to have obtained 68 votes as
against petitioner's 66 votes. On May 31, 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal
with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and paid P150.00 as appeal fees with the
Regional Trial Court, Tayug, Pangasinan. On June 14, 1994, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court forwarded the records of the case to the COMELEC. At the same time,
petitioner paid with the COMELEC the amount of P510.00. On July 20, 1994, the First
Division of the COMELEC denied the appeal for petitioner's belated filing of the
appeal and legal research fees. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
appeal outright when the most it could have done was to refuse to take action on
the case until the fees were paid in full
HELD: No, The procedure for perfecting an appeal from the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court in a barangay election protest case is set forth in the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as follows: Sec. 3. Notice of Appeal. Within five (5) days after
promulgation of the decision of the court, the aggrieved party may file with said
court a notice of appeal, and serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the
adverse party (Rule 22). Sec. 3. Appeal fees. The appellant in election cases shall
pay an appeal fee as follows: (b) Election cases appealed from courts of limited
jurisdiction. . . . P500.00. Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. If the fees above
prescribed are not paid, Commission may refuse to take action until they are paid
and dismiss the action or proceeding (Rule 40). The mere filing of the notice of
appeal was not enough. It should be accompanied by the payment of the correct
amount of appeal fee Petitioner had only five days from receipt of the decision of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court or until June 5, 1994 to perfect his appeal. While he
timely filed his Amended Notice of Appeal on June 2, 1994, he paid the amount of
P510.00 representing the appeal and legal research fees only on June 14, 1994. It is,
therefore, evident that petitioner belatedly paid said amount. Besides, the correct
amounts of the appeal and the research fees are P500.00 and P20.00 respectively,
or P520.00 not P510.00 as paid by petitioner.

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2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
PNOC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARCELINO TONGCO,

petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MANUEL S. PINEDA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 100947 May 31, 1993


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DOCRTINE: Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and

employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized
under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an original or
legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under
the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of
employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.
FACTS: Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the PNOC-EDC (a subsidiary of PNOC)
as Geothermal Construction Secretary. Pineda decided to run and eventually
proclaimed elected to, the office of councilor. Despite so qualifying as councilor, and
assuming his duties as such, he continued working for PNOC-EDC as the latter's
Geothermal Construction Secretary.
Upon inquiry by Tongco (Dept Manager PNOC-EDC), the Legal Department rendered
an opinion to the effect that Manuel S. Pineda should be considered ipso facto
resigned upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy in November, 1987, in
accordance with Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Pineda, invoked that while the government-owned or controlled corporations are
covered by the Civil Service Law (as is taken to mean in Sec. 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code of 1985), the subsidiaries or corporate offsprings are not."
ISSUE: Whether or not an employee in a government-owned or controlled
corporations without an original charter (and therefore not covered by Civil Service
Law) nevertheless falls within the scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
HELD: YES. Sec. 66. Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
It was no doubt aware that in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987
Constitution: (a) government-owned or controlled corporations were of two (2)
categories those with original charters, and those organized under the general
law and (b) employees of these corporations were of two (2) kinds those
covered by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations because employed in
corporations having original charters, and those not subject to Civil Service Law but
to the Labor Code because employed in said corporations organized under the
general law, or the Corporation Code. Yet Congress made no effort to distinguish
between these two classes of government-owned or controlled corporations or their
employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related statutes,
particularly as regards the rule that any employee "in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy."
What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even those
organized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an
original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service
Law but under the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for

2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
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termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as

amended.
REP. MA. CATALINA L. GOvs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 147741
May 10, 2001
DOCTRINE: An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or

repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Such requirement is merely directory,
and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional.
FACTS: On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of
the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay,
Leyte.On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial
election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of
candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she
attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of

2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
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32
her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. However, the
provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal
and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the
municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of
candidacy for mayor.
At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing
certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time
from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit
of withdrawal by fax to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the
same to the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March
2001.5 On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received
the original of the affidavit of withdrawal.
ISSUE: Is there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal
mayor of Baybay, Leyte?
HELD: YES.
The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at
12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the
law.
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, provides that:
"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same
election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall
not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the
filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has file more than one certificate
of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible
and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal
must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be
withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the
COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the
provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved
belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on
20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer
of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed,such requirement is merely
directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An
administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or
supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal
of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte
sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. the COMELEC thus acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it declare petitioner ineligible for both positions for which
she filed certificates of candidacy.
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Luna v COMELEC
G.R. No. 165983 April 24, 2007
Doctrine: If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should
occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by
the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Facts: Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor of
Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of
candidacy on the same date. Ruperto Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan, Abra
removed the name of Hans Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name
of Luna. Private respondents filed a petition for the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy or disqualification of Luna. They alleged that Luna made a false material
representation in her certificate of candidacy because Luna is not a registered voter
of Lagayan, Abra but a registered voter of Bangued, Abra. They also claimed that
Lunas certificate of candidacy was not validly filed because the substitution by
Luna for Hans Roger was invalid and that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on
Election Day and, therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be
substituted by Luna. COMELEC affirmed the finding that Hans Roger, being
underage, may not be validly substituted by Luna. It also ruled that Lunas right to
due process was not violated because Luna was notified of the petition and was
given the opportunity to be heard. However, the COMELEC ruled that Luna was a
registered voter of Lagayan, Abra. Hence, this petition.


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Issue: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.
Ruling: YES. Section 77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of
an official candidate of a registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is
disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy.
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If
after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file
a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of the election. If the
death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the
case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that
Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna
can validly substitute for Hans Roger. In this case, there was no petition to deny due
course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger For if the COMELEC
cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy after the proper proceedings, then
he is no candidate at all and there can be no substitution of a person whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course. However, Hans
Rogers certificate of candidacy was never cancelled or denied due course by the
COMELEC. Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy
before the COMELEC declared that he was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless
Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in
accordance with Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Rogers certificate of
candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.

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Monsale v. Nico
G.R. No. L-2539
May 28, 1949
Doctrine:The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filling of certificates of
candidacy and in fixing a time limit therefor are (a) to enable the voter to know, at
least sixty days before a regular election the candidate among whom they are to
make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of
the votes cast; for if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voter to
duly registered candidates, there might be as many person voted for as there were
voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious person as a mark to
identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.
Facts:Monsale withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, but on
November 7, attempted to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal. The COMELEC,
however, rules on November 8 that Monsale could no longer be a candidate in spite
of his desire to withdrawal. A canvass of the election returns showed that Paulino M.
Nico received 2,291 votes; another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao126, votes; and the
protestant Jose F. Monsale, none, evidently because the vote cast in his favor had
not been counted for the reason that he was not a registered candidate.
Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected.
Issue: Whether a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy may
revive it, either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or by filling a new certificate
of candidacy, after the deadline provided by law for the filling of such certificate.
Ruling: No. Section 31 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180)
providesthat "no person shall be eligible unless, within the time fixed by law, he
files a duty signed and sworn certificate of candidacy." Section 36 provides that "at
least sixty days before a regular election and thirty days at least before a special
election, the . . . certificates of candidacy for municipal offices shall be filed with the
municipal secretary, who shall immediately send copies thereof to the polling place
concerned, to the secretary of the provincial board and to the Commission on
Elections." Section 38 further that "if, after the expiration of the time limit for filling
certificate of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should
die or become disqualified, any legally qualified citizen may file a certificate of

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candidacy for the office for which the deceased or disqualified person was a
candidate in accordance with the preceding section on or before midday of the day
of the election, and, if the death or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and the midday of election day, said certificate may be filed with
any board of inspection of the political division where he is a candidate or in the
case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate, with the Commission on
Elections."
Therefore, thirty-one days before the election, the protestant ceased to be
candidate by his own voluntary act. When he withdrew his withdrawal of his
certificate of candidacy, can only be considered as a new certificate of candidacy
which, having been filed only four days before the election, could not legally be
accepted under the law, which expressly provides that such certificate should be
filed at sixty days before the election.
The only instance wherein the law permit the filling of a certificate ofcandidacy after
the expiration of the time limit for filing it is when a candidate with a certificate of
candidacy duty filed dies or becomes disqualified.The Commission on Election was,
therefore, right in holding as it did that the protestant "can no longer be a candidate
in spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal."

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CASE TITLE: CIPRIANO VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 158830
August 10, 2004
DOCTRINE: The denial of due course or cancellation of ones certificate of
candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather
calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ellan Marie Cipriano filed with the COMELEC her certificate of
candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections. On
the date of the elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 adopting the
recommendation of the Commissions Law Department to deny due course to or
cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the SK elections,
including petitioner. The ruling was based on the findings of the Law Department
that petitioner and all the other candidates affected by said resolution were not
registered voters in the barangay where they intended to run. Despite this, her
name was not deleted on the list and she later on landed as the winner. After
learning of Resolution No. 5363, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a motion for
reconsideration of said resolution. Petitioner claimed that she was denied due
process when her certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the Commission without
notice and hearing. The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu proprio deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on its broad administrative
power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC, in the exercise of its administrative power
erred in disqualifying petitioner.
HELD:
YES. It was an error on the part of the COMELEC to disqualify a
candidate while in the exercise of its administrative power.
The COMELEC as an independent Constitutional Commission is clothed with
the three powers of government - executive or administrative, legislative, and
quasi-judicial powers. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. On the
other hand, where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial
nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is
conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.The
Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his
certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and

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acknowledge its receipt. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the
certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of said body.
The denial of due course or cancellation of ones certificate of candidacy is
not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The determination whether a material
representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the determination
whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in
support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a
deprivation of ones right to run for public office, or, as in this case, ones right to
hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified
of the proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the
allegations against him.

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CASE TITLE: ABCEDE VS IMPERIAL

March 18, 1958
Page
G.R. No. L-13001
41

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DOCTRINE: in the absence of clear and positive provision to such effect in the law,
the COMELEC cannot pass upon the question as to whether a candidate is qualified
to run for the aspired position.
FACTS:
In anticipation of the upcoming presidential election, petitioner Alfredo
Abcede filed before the COMELEC a certificate of candidacy for presidency. After
which, the COMELEC celled its attention together with other candidates to appear
before the same on "to show cause why their certificates of candidacy should be
considered as filed in good faith and to be given due course". After due hearing, at
which Abcede appeared and introduced evidence, the Commission issued a
resolution, ordering that the certificates of candidacy of including that of said
petitioner, "shall not be given due course. The commission reasoned that with
petitioners platform of redeeming the Japanese war notes which is in violation of
Fraud Order No. 2 issued by Bureau of Posts, his filing of certificate of candidacy was
attendant with bad faithas he was engaged in a scheme to obtain money from the
public by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Commission is convinced that
the certificate of candidacy of Alfredo Abcede was filed for motives other than a
bona fide desire to obtain a substantial number of votes of the electorate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in denying the certificate of
candidacy of petitioner.
HELD:
Yes. The COMELEC erred in denying petitioners certificate of
candidacy. The Revised Election Code in Section 36 and 37 mandates the
commission to accept certificate of candidacy and shall order the preparation and
distribution of copies for the same to all the election precincts of the Philippines.
The laws give the Commission no discretion to give or not to give due course to
petitioner's certificate of candidacy. On the contrary, the Commission has,
admittedly, the "ministerial" duty to receive said certificate of candidacy.
As the branch of the executive department to which the Constitution has
given the "exclusive charge" of the "enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections," the power of decision of the Commission is
limited to purely "administrative questions." (Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the
Philippines.) It cannot therefore rule as to who whether among the individuals who
equally possess the minimum requirements of the law can run and pursue its
candidacy. The question whether in order to enjoy those benefits a candidate
must be capable of "understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true
significance of election," and must have over a month prior, to the elections "the
tiniest chance to obtain the favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the
electorate," is a matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law,
which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative
functions. Apart from the absence of specific statutory grant of such general, broad

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power as the Commission claims to have, it is dubious minate and undefined

manner necessary in order that it could pass upon the factors relied upon in said
resolution and such grant must not he deemed made, in the absence of clear and
positive provision to such effect, which is absent in the case at bar.
Hence, it was an error on the part of the COMELEC to deny petitioners
certificate of candidacy.
Case No. 22
Garvida v. Sales

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43
G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997

Page
Doctrine:
The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must
not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is
when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. The SK official
must hot have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423 (b)
together with Section 428 of the Local Government Code, the latest date at which
an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum
age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day.
Facts:
On April 13, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position
of Chairman, Sangguning Kabataan, Brgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The
election officer disapproved petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that
she exceeded the age limit. The COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the
Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of
petitioner in the event that she won. Petitioner garnered 78 votes as against
respondents votes of 76. In accordance with the COMELEC order, the Board of
Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was eligible to run as SK Chairman.
Held:
No.
In the case at bar, petitioner was 21 years old, 11 months and 5 days on the
day of the election. If the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the
election, he is ineligible. In view whereof, petitioner is declared ineligible for being
over the age qualification for candidacy and is ordered to vacate her position as SK
Chairman.
Case No. 23
Loong v. Comelec
G.R. No. 93986. December 22, 1992.
Doctrine:


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Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that in case a filing a

certificate of candidacy has committed false representation, a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy may be filed within 25 days from the time the certificate
was filed. Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure which provides that
the petition for disqualification may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a
certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation cannot apply.
Facts:
Petitioner Loong filed his certificate of candidacy on 15 January 1990 (the last
day for the filing of the same) for vice-governor of the Muslim Mindanao
Autonomous Region. Private respondent filed the petition (SPA 90-006) to disqualify
candidate Loong on the ground that petitioner made a false representation as to his
age only 49 days from the date Loongs certificate of candidacy was filed, and 16
days after the election itself.
Issue:
Whether the petition for disqualification was timely filed.
Held:
No.
certificate
certificate
certificate
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that in case a filing a

of candidacy has committed false representation, a petition to cancel the
of the aforesaid person may be filed within 25 days from the time the
was filed. Clearly SPA 90-006 was filed beyond the 25-day period.
We do not agree with respondents contention that the petition for

disqualification may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a certificate of
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, applying Section 3, Rule 25
of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. The petition filed to disqualify petitioner on the
ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as
to his age does not fall under the grounds for disqualification in Rule 25. Moreover,
Section 3, Rule 25 is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission
which has no legislative power. Thus, it cannot supersede Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.
Case No. 24
Lanot v. Comelec
G.R. No. 164858. November 16, 2006.
Doctrine:
The essential elements of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are (1) a
person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate; (3) the act is
done outside the campaign period. The second element requires the existence of a

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candidate. Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who has filed a certificate of
candidacy to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of
candidacy, he is not a candidate.
Facts:
On 19 March 2004, petitioners filed a petition for disqualification under

Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Vicente Eusebio before the
Comelec. Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in
various forms on various occasions outside the designated campaign period. The
Comelec granted the petition, but later on reversed the same with the issuance of
another order.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent was guilty of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Held:
No.
Because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of
official ballots, Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003.
Congress, however, never intended the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2
January 2004 to make the person filing to become immediately a candidate for
purposes other than the printing of ballots.
Under Section 3(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, the campaign period for
local officials commences 45 days before election day. For the 2004 local elections,
this puts the campaign period on 24 March 2004. This also puts the last day for
filing of COCs on 23 March 2004. Eusebio is deemed to have filed his COC on this
date for purposes other than the printing of ballots because this is the interpretation
of Section 80 most favorable to the one charged with this violation. Thus, Eusebio
became a candidate only on 23 March 2004. Acts committed by Eusebio prior to
his becoming a candidate even constituting election campaigning or partisan
election activities are not punishable under Section 80.
BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 103956. March 31, 1992
DOCTRINE: COMELEC cannot impose prohibitions which will curtail rights enshrined
under the Constitution.
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347.
Petitioner BloUmparAdiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections

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now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals
and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. Sec 21(f) RA
2134.
ISSUE: whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the
posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their
location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
RULING: The COMELEC's prohibition is null and void on constitutional grounds. First
the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). In the National Press Club, case, the
Court had occasion to reiterate the preferred status of freedom of expression even
as it validated COMELEC regulation of campaigns through political advertisements.
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or
party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions
intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and
COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. Prohibition did not pass the clear and
preset danger rule. Second the questioned prohibition premised on the statute
and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. It is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privatelyowned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed
by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
Third the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate
equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated
by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section
4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and
other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers
on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of
the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in
this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000
DOCTRINE: COMELEC cannot ban exit polls.
FACTS: ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct
radio-TV coverage of the elections x xx and to make [an] exit survey of the x xx vote
during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice
President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately."[2] The electoral body
believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as
the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It


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also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake
the exit survey. COURT ISSUED RESTRAINING ORDER. APPROVED BY COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the
issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its
agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the x xx May 11
elections.
RULING: The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through
mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean,
honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls -- properly
conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of electionfixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the
Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of
exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our
people. An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified
individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable
result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they
have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results
of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give
an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or
organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been
resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.
Social Weather Stations, Incorporated and Kamahalan Publishing

Corporation, Doing Business As Manila Standard vs. Commission On
Elections
G.R. No. 147571. May 5, 2001

48

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Page
DOCTRINE: Ban on publication surveys is invalid being contrary to the Constitution.
FACTS:
Petitioner SWS is a private non-stock, non-profit social research

institution conducting surveys in various fields.Petitioner KPC publishes
the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which
features newsworthy items of information including election surveys.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Comelec
from enforcing Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which
provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published
fifteen days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates
shall not be published seven days before an election.To implement
Section 5.4, Resolution 3636, Section 24(h), dated of the COMELEC
enjoins.
ISSUE:
WON Sec.5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 and Resolution 3636 Sec. 24(h)
areinvalid?
HELD:
YES. We hold that Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an

unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the
press.
To be sure, section 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech,
expression, and the press by prohibiting the publication of election
survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of
fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election and seven
(7) days before a local election. Because of the preferred status of the
constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a
measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. The purpose
of Art. IX-C, section 4 is to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space
and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates. Hence
the validity of the ban on media advertising. It is noteworthy that R.A.
No. 9006, section 14 has lifted the ban and now allows candidates to
advertise their candidacies in print and broadcast media. Indeed, to
sustain the ban on the publication of survey results would sanction the
censorship of all speaking by candidates in an election on the ground
that the usual bombasts and hyperbolic claims made during the
campaigns can confuse voters and thus debase the electoral process.In
sum, we hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior

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restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total

suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression
is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to
be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of
freedom of expression.
Francisco I. Chavezvs. Commission On Elections, Represented By Its

Chairman, Benjamin S. Abalos, Esmeralda Amora-Ladra, In Her
Capacity As Acting Director Iv, National Capital Judicial Region,
Commission On Elections, And The Solicitor General
G.R. No. 162777. August 31, 2004
DOCTRINE: Ban on media advertising is valid to prevent premature campaign and

equalize the situation of candidates, that is, within the regulation and
supervision of the COMELEC.
FACTS:
Petitioner entered into formal agreements with certain establishments

to endorse their products. Petitioner who filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Senator was directed to comply with the
provision of Section 32 of Resolution No 6520. Petitioner, however,
requested the Comelec that he be exempted from the application of
Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere
product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for
premature campaigning under the rules. The Comelec ordered him to
remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them from
public view pending the approval of his request. Petitioner Chavez asks
this Court that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed
provision.
ISSUE:
WON Resolution No. 6520 is invalid?
HELD:
NO. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or

partisan political activity is defined as an act designed to promote
the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a

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public office. It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts
or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private
individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these
products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed
partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his
candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of
powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the
subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed,
candidates for public office whose name and image are used to
advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make
themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other
candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces
and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models.
Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next
few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image
model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and
image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a
doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature
campaigning. Under Article IX (C) (4), the COMELEC is expressly
authorized to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
media communication or information to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space. All these are aimed at the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

Page
51

2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
JUANITO C. PILAR v COMELEC

G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995
DOCTRINE:The law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the
candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate"
must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but
also to one who withdrew his candidacy.It is not improbable that a candidate who
withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even
in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not
all too remote.It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the
situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any
expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact
required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348,
it is provided that "if a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no
contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement
shall reflect such fact."
FACTS:On March 22, 1992, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.On
March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.In M.R. Nos. 932654 and 94-0065, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of P10, 000.00
for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.In M.R. No. 940594, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed
final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND
No. 94-040), which denied the petition.Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions
and expenditures after he has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy.
HELD:No.Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the
obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.Well-recognized is


2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Page
52
the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish, Ubilex non distinguitnecnosdistingueredebemos.In the case at bench, as
the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued
his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed
to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who
withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of
Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates
of candidacy."Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general
rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory,
and imposes a duty which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of
this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule.
It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a
candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a
candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a
statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that
"if a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no
expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such
fact."Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg.
881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "the filing or
withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's
withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative
fine.

Page
53

2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN v HRET

G.R. No. 129783, Dec. 22, 1997

54

2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Page
DOCTRINE:What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down
by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any
one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the
signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and, (c) in those
cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the
naked eye, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots.It is only when none of
these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject
to rejection.
FACTS:Petitioner MarcelinoLibanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were
among the candidates for the lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May
1995 elections. After the canvass of the returns was made on May 13, 1995, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to
have been duly elected Representative of the District.Petitioner Libananfiled an
election protest before the HRET. The HRET ruled in favor of respondent Ramirez.
Petitioner Libanan moved for a reconsideration of the decision of the
HRET arguingthat the absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the
ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were not those issued to the voters
during the elections. He averred that the law would require the Chairman of the BEI
to authenticate or sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter.
As regards the absence of BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the ballots, the
HRET stressed:
"Fraud is not presumed. It must be sufficiently established. Moreover, Section 211
of the Omnibus Election Code provides in part that 'in the reading and appreciation
of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good
reason to justify its rejection.' In the instant case, there is no evidence to support
protestant's allegation that the ballots he enumerated in his Motion for
Reconsideration are substitute ballots. The absence of the BEI Chairman's signature
at the back of the ballot cannot be an indication of ballot switching or
substitution. At best, such absence of BEI Chairman's signature is a prima
facie evidence that the BEI Chairmen concerned were derelict in their duty of
authenticating the ballots. Such omission, as stated in the Decision, is not fatal to
the validity of the ballots."
ISSUE:Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI in the ballots did not render
the ballots spurious.
HELD:No. Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, provides: Signature of Chairman at the back
of Every Ballot. - In every case before delivering an official ballot to the voter, the
Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall, in the presence of the voter, affix
his signature at the back thereof. Failure to authenticate shall be noted in the


2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Page
55
minutes of the Board of Election Inspectors and shall constitute an election offense
punishable under Section 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code."
There is really nothing in the above law to the effect that a ballot which is not so
authenticated shall thereby be deemed spurious. The law merely renders the BEI
Chairman accountable for such failure. The courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and embrace situations neither
provided nor intended by the lawmakers. Where the words and phrases of a statute
are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should
be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the
words, there should be no room for construction.
What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET
that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these
authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or
initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and, (c) in those cases where the
COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the
presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots.It is only when none of these marks
appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.


2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Page
56
Punzalan v. Comelec
G.R. No. 126669, April 27 1998.
DOCTRINE:
Laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of
ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities.
FACTS:
Two losing mayoralty candidates (Punzalan and Manalastas) in Pampanga
filed separate election protests before the trial court challenging the results of the
elections alleging massive fraud and illegal electoral practices against the declared
winner (Meneses).The trial court found that there was massive fraud and upon
examination of the contested ballots declared Punzalan as the winner. Meneses
elevated the case to the COMELEC with the latter annulling the trial courts decision
and affirming the proclamation of Meneses. Punzalan appealed to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
declaring as valid the ballots credited to Meneses which did not bear the
signature of the BEI Chairman?
2. Whether or not the trial courts finding on the authenticity of the
handwritings on the ballots must prevail over the findings of the
COMELEC?
HELD:
1. No. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) provides that in reading and
appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless
there is a clear and good reason to justify its rejection.
Here, the failure of the election officer (BEI Chairman) to affix his signature
at the back of the ballot does not constitute as a reason or justification to
reject the said ballot. While the law, RA 7166 An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
requires the BEI Chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot,
failure to affix the same does not invalidate the ballot.
2. No. The trial courts finding must give way to the findings of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC is a constitutional commission vested with the exclusive
original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial
and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests
involving elective municipal and barangay officials.
Here, the appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents
involves a question of fact which is best left to the determination of the
COMELEC.
.
LAGUMBAY V. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-25444, January 31 1966
57

2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Page
DOCTRINE:
The Doctrine of Statistical Improbabilities occurs when there is a unique
uniformity of tally of all the votes cast in favor of all the candidates belonging to one
party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates of all the opposing parties
appear intheelection return.
FACTS:
The election returns of certain precincts of some municipalities were being
questioned because in these certain precincts no single vote was received by any of
the eight candidates of the Nacionalista Party. The Commission on Elections
declined to reject the said election returns. Thus, the petitioner appealed to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a block voting or a zero vote is probable to be achieved in one
precinct?
HELD:
No. A block voting or zero voting is not probable.
The Supreme Court has held that election result showing no vote to any
candidate was utterly improbable and clearly incredible. It is not likely, in the
ordinary course of things that all the electors of one precinct would, as one man,
vote for all the candidates of one party, without giving a single vote to one of the
candidates of the contending party.
Here, it is clearly impossible and improbable that no one from the eight
candidates of the Nationalist Party received any vote from any voter in the said


Election Law Case Digest (Final)

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