Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Case Digests
required by Art. 366 CC because Eagle Express acted as an agent of the freight
consolidator and not that of the carrier to whom the notice should have been
made.
Held:
Yes, Victory Liner is liable for breach of contract of carriage; consequently,
the award of damages though proper must be modified. Further, it is held that the
acts of the counsel of Victory Liner bound him. There is no gross negligence
imputed upon the counsel as he in fact filed certain pleadings; in addition, there
was contributory negligence on the part of Victory Liner when it failed to appear in
court despite notices.
Herein, the statutory presumption of negligence of the common carrier
remained unrebutted. Such presumption was shown when passengers died and
was injured. Thus, Victory Liner is without doubt guilty of breach of contract of
carriage.
However, the award of damages must be modified:
1. Indemnity for damages P50K
2. Compensatory damages deleted because respondent Rosalito merely
testified that the deceased was 39 y.o. and a Section Chief of the BIR;
hence, such testimonial evidence alone is insufficient to justify an award
for loss of earning capacity, especially if such does not fall within the
exception.
3. Temperate Damages P50K as the fact of loss has been established and
in lieu of damages for loss of earning capacity which was not
substantiated by the required documentary proof.
4. Moral P100K due to breach of contract of carriage and failure of
common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence
5. Exemplary P100K
6. Attorneys fees 10% of the total amount adjudged against Victory Liner
7. Interest as damages for breach of contract of carriage computed upon
finality of this decision at 12% per annum upon satisfaction.
Report without formal offer as evidence cannot be the basis of the judgment of the
trial court.
Likewise, the award for moral and exemplary damages is proper as Mrs.
Ongs arm could not function in a normal manner and that, as a result, she suffered
mental anguish and anxiety. However, as petitioner failed to present expert
testimonial evidence regarding the feasibility or practicability and the cost of a
restorative medical operation on her arm, there is no basis to grant her P48,000
for such expense. Likewise, the actual damages cannot be given as her bare and
unsubstantiated assertion that she usually earned P200 a day from her market stall
is not the best evidence to prove her claim of unrealized income for the eightmonth period that her arm was in plaster cast. Lastly, the award for attorneys fees
is without basis as such is an indemnity for damages ordered by a court to be paid
by the losing party to the prevailing party, based on any of the cases authorized by
law. It is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless the two have agreed
that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part
thereof. Herein, as the counsels performance does not justify the award of
damages, such must likewise be denied.
contract and the fact of its non-performance by Northwest, it is thus entitled to the
award of compensatory and actual damages.
In the instant case, it moral and exemplary damages is likewise proper as
the evidence given show that Northwest acted in an oppressive manner towards
Chiong when it gave him a run-around at the Northwest Check-in counter and
eventually barred him from boarding the flight to accommodate an American
whose name was merely inserted in the Flight Manifest. Attorneys fees is likewise
proper.
It is without doubt that there exists a contract of carriage between JAL and
Jesus as the latter bought a ticket from the former who consequently allowed Jesus
to enter its plane. Hence, JALs act of subsequently disallowing Jesus to fly the said
plane constituted a breach of contract of carriage.
Therefore, the award for damages is sufficiently in order. It is proved that
JALs acts amounted to bad faith when its personnel summarily and insolently
shouted ordered Jesus to disembark the plane in the presence of numerous
passengers without the least courtesy while the latter was already settled in his
assigned seat. In summary, there was bad faith in securing the contract and in the
execution thereof, as well as in the enforcement of its terms. Hence, JAL is liable
for moral damages. Likewise, it is liable for exemplary damages as its abovementioned acts constitute wanton, oppressive and malevolent acts against Jesus.
bad faith; 4) exemplary damages may not be awarded because there was no
showing that plaintiff was entitled to moral damages; and 5) no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate. RTC granted the petition of Sps. Buncio and ordered
PAL to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of the suit. CA
affirmed in toto.
Issue:
WON PAL may be held liable for damages.
Held:
Yes, as the contract of carriage was breached; PAL must be held liable for
the consequent damages of moral and exemplary damages. However, attorneys
fees is not proper as such was merely cited by the dispositive portion of the
decision.
PAL and Sps. Buncio entered into a contract of air carriage when the former
purchased two plane tickets from the latter. Hence, PAL obligated itself to
transport the passengers according to the tenor of the agreement. However, as the
kids herein were unable to board their connecting flights and were subsequently
left stranded and was only able to arrive at Los Angeles via another airline,
Western Airlines, PAL clearly breached its contract of carriage with respondents.
Herein, gross negligence was attributed to PAL that it amounted to bad faith
when: 1) there was utter lack of care for and inattention to the welfare of Deanna
and Nikolai as unaccompanied minor passengers; 2) it failed to exercise slight care
and diligence in handling the indemnity bond; and 3) it was unable to prevent the
inconveniences of delay in the transportation. Thus, such act constituted radical
departure from the extraordinary standard of care required of common carriers.
Consequently, an award of exemplary damages is warranted because it is
ascertained that respondents are entitled to moral damages. However, as the trial
court only placed the attorneys fees in the dispositive portion without factual and
legal basis, the same must be deleted. Moreover, the court finds that the amount
awarded to Deanna, Nikolai, Mrs. Buncio and Mrs. Regalado was proper.
that he was not the common carrier engaged by All Commodities was fatal to his
cause. Generally, points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the lower court ordinarily will not be considered on appeal. This is
consistent with due process, because if this would be permitted, a party would be
deprived of his opportunity to controvert the theory of the adverse party.
Moreover, Canada could not now adopt this theory, because he already
admitted the existence of a contract of carriage. As a rule, judicial admissions,
written or verbal, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. It may only be contradicted if shown that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Neither was shown
in this case.
In the trial court, Canadas first defenses were that the goods arrived at
their destination, or in the alternative, if there was really loss, it was due to either
the fault of All-Commodities or due to fortuitous event. None of these defenses
were proven. The fact that the goods did not arrive at their destination was duly
established. The alternative defenses, however, were not duly established. There
was no finding of fault on the part of All Commodities, nor was there fortuitous
event.
In order to plead fortuitous event, it must be shown that: (a) the cause of the
unforeseen or unexpected occurrence was independent of human will, (b) it was
impossible to foresee such occurrence and it was impossible to avoid, (c) the
occurrence of the unforeseen or unexpected occurrence rendered the performance
of the obligation impossible in a normal manner, and (d) the person tasked to
perform must not have participated in any course or conduct that aggravated the
incident. In the case, none of these were shown by Canada.
Lastly, however, the award of Php 350,000 as actual damages was
erroneous, because based on the records, the amount was not duly substantiated.
In lieu thereof, the Court may award temperate damages, which can only be
awarded if actual damages cannot be substantiated but the Court is convinced that
there was pecuniary loss. The temperate damages of Php 250,000 was awarded.
Sulpicio v. Curso
Brothers and sisters, while being legal heirs of a deceased passenger, cannot claim
moral damages from the death, arising from an incident in breach of the contract
of carriage, because the law explicitly excludes them from those persons who have
legal personality to sue for moral damages.
Facts:
Dr. Curso (Curso) is a passenger of ill-fated vessel called MV Doa Marilyn
(Doa), owned by Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (Sulpicio). Doa was in voyage when it was
hurled by the strong waves and heavy rains caused by typhoon Unsang. It
capsized, killing hundreds of passengers including Curso.
Having no widow or issue, his alleged brothers and sisters sued Sulpicio for
moral damages for the loss of Curso. They filed a complaint for damages with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), which dismissed the complaint, because the incident
was caused by fortuitous event. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
RTC on the ground that Sulpicio failed to show proof of exercise of extraordinary
diligence as a common carrier, awarding, among others, moral damages. Sulpicio
appealed to the Supreme Court, asking whether the brothers and sisters of Curso
have the legal personality to sue for moral damages predicated on the death of
Curso.
Issue:
Do the brothers and sisters of Curso have the legal personality to sue for
moral damages on the death of Curso?
Ruling and Discussion:
No, they do not have the legal personality to sue for moral damages on the
death of Curso.
As a rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on breach of contract, unless there is fraud or bad faith. However,
where there is breach of contract of carriage and that breach results in the death
of a passenger, moral damages may be recovered.
The law applicable here is Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206. Provided in
these laws are the different circumstances from which moral damages may be
predicated and the persons who can recoverable if such circumstances exist.
Therein, only the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants
can recover moral damages. Basic is the rule that where the law deliberately
excludes a class or a person, the legislative intent is that they should be excluded.
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. And the Court does not have the power to fill in
the words of the law as its authority is to interpret it. Brothers and sisters are
deliberately excluded from the enumeration. And the fact that, in succession, they
are considered legal heirs in default of a spouse, descendant or ascendant
(whether legitimate or illegitimate), cannot qualify them to be the person who have
been given legal personality to sue for damages in case of death of a passenger in
a common carrier.
Therefore, they cannot claim for moral damages on the death of Curso.
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income - reasonable and
necessary
living expenses).
Where:
Life expectancy = 2/3 x [80 age of deceased at the time of death]
Calculation omitted.
not fall in any of the exceptions. However, it is ruled that there is proper
substantiation in this case.
The Court of Appeals deleted the award because it found the certification by
USAID to be self-serving, and thus according to jurisprudence, it cannot be a
sufficient basis for the award of loss of earning capacity. A self-serving evidence is
one refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some
place and time out of court, from which he stands to benefit from it.
First, the certification is not self-serving because it does not refer to acts or
declarations made by the heirs, but made by the USAID, the employer of Ochoa.
Second, there is no way that USAID stands to benefit from such declaration, where
it is an organization presumably fully funded by the governments of the United
States. Moreover, no jurisprudence requires that the proof be in a particular form
or government document, like an income tax return. They may be best pieces of
evidence, but they are not the sole evidence to prove it. At the very least, what is
required is an unbiased declaration from an entity or party credible to testify about
the income of the deceased. Clearly, the certification by USAID in this case
satisfies this requirement.
Philtranco v. Paras
In an action for breach of contract of carriage commenced by a passenger against
his common carrier, the plaintiff can recover damages from a third-party defendant
brought into the suit by the common carrier upon a claim based on tort or quasidelict. The liability of the third-party defendant is independent from the liability of
the common carrier to the passenger.
While generally, moral damages cannot be awarded in case of breach of contract,
by way of exception, they can be awarded where: (a) there is bad faith on the part
of the erring party or (b) the contract is a contract of carriage. Additionally, in this
case another exception is given by the Court, that is, when under the
circumstances, it is warranted.
Facts:
Felix Paras (Paras) is engaged in the buying and selling of fish. He rode a
bus owned by one Inland Trailways (Inland) and while the bus was traversing a
highway, its rear was bumped by another bus owned by Philtranco Service
Enterprises (Philtranco). Because of the accident, Paras sustained major injuries,
which caused him to be operated and admitted in the hospital. It also made him
incapable of doing his business for some time.
Because of this, Paras filed a complaint for damages against Inland for
breach of contract of carriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Inland, in turn,
with leave of court, filed a third-party complaint against Philitranco. The RTC ruled
in favor of Paras and ordered Philtranco to pay him, being adjudged as the
tortfeasor. Moral damages were awarded. This was objected to by Philtransco,
arguing that the award of moral damages is not proper because he did not die.
This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), reducing however the actual
damages to only Php 1k, the extent of the amount substantiate by receipts.
Temperate damages, however, were awarded. Inland was also granted temperate
damages as to its damaged bus. Philtranco, subsequently appealed the case, to the
Supreme Court (SC).
Issue:
Is the CA correct in affirming the RTC decision, modifying however the
actual damages?
Ruling and Discussion:
Yes, the CA is correct.
In an action for breach of contract of carriage commenced by a passenger
against his common carrier, the plaintiff can recover damages from a third-party
defendant brought into the suit by the common carrier upon a claim based on tort
PAL v. Lim
In an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party
does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All
that he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its
nonperformance by the carrier.
In the award of moral damages, there must be evidence on record, mostly
testimonial, that the plaintiff suffered moral suffering, to base the award. Also,
exemplary damages may properly be awarded, where moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages are awarded.
Facts:
Francisco Lao Lim (Lim), Henry Go (Go) and Manuel Limtong (Limtong)
were partners in a business venture with a German buyer and Chinese client. They
were given a deadline and a place where to close the deal, by reason of which they
scheduled with Rainbow Tours (Rainbow) connecting flights from Cebu to Manila,
and Manila to Hong Kong and back.
On the day of the scheduled flight, however, Lim and Go were not permitted
to board their designated flights, because it was said that their tickets were
cancelled. However, they were not informed of such cancellation. Limtong,
however, was able to board the designated flight. It was only the next day that Lim
and Go were able to fly to Hong Kong. However, their arrival was in vain, as the
German buyer already left for Germany, while the Chinese client pulled off the
deal, because she wanted to meet the three of them, and engaged with another
seller.
When they got back, they filed a complaint for damages against PAL for their
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and the unrealized deal, predicated upon
PALs failure to carry them according to their contract of carriage. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Lim and Go, stating however that Limtong did
not entitled to damages from PAL because he was carried and transported
according to their contract. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision
with modifications as to the award of damages. Thus, PAL filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court (SC).
Issue:
Are the RTC and CA correct in finding liability in PAL?
Ruling and Discussion:
Yes, they are correct in finding liability in PAL.
transpired in their bookings. On its face, the airplane ticket is a valid written
contract of carriage. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger
confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage
arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight
and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of
contract of carriage.
Clearly, Cathay breached its contract of carriage with respondents when it
disallowed them to board the plane in Hong Kong going to Manila on the date
reflected on their tickets.
On Sampaguitas Liability
Sampaguita, with whom the Reyes had a contract of service, was expected
to exercise due diligence which a reasonable man would exercise in his dealings.
However, when it failed to input the correct and valid ticket numbers in the online
booking system of Cathay, which caused the cancellation of the booking of the
tickets of the Reyeses, it failed to exercise such diligence. Because of that, it
also becomes liable for damages.
Actual damages, however, could not be awarded, because there was failure
on the part of the Reyeses, especially Wilfredo, who claimed actual damages for
the alleged unrealized deal, because the claim was not properly substantiated.
Moreover, the award of moral damages could not be given because there
was no bad faith on the part of Cathay when it did not permit them to board the
plane. In fact, the want of bad faith is seen when it allowed them to board the
plane from Australia to Hong Kong despite the absence of confirmation.
The award of nominal damages is correct. Nominal damages are recoverable
where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an
invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has
been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever
have been or can be shown.
When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasicontracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be
held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on
"Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of
recoverable damages.
II.
With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of
actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual
thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum
of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is
breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be
adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can
be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when
such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court
is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest
shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final
and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1
or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.
In the case, the claim for actual damages was not duly substantiated,
because DMC could not produce the necessary documents on the actual value of
equipment. However, its testimony as to the value, being uncontroverted by
evidence, could be the basis of the court in awarding temperate damages.
The computation, therefore, is correct when it was computed at half the
value, because it was damaged at 5 years old, when it had the useful life of 10
years.