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criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the
period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannot
change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . .
When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned
thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been
affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper
order. But it does not follow from this cessation of
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EN BANC.
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death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the
Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold
similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the
affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by Regional
Trial Courts.
Courts Judgments The rule of immutability of final and
executory judgments admits of settled exceptionsconcededly, the
Court may suspend the execution of a final judgment when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.The doctrine has almost
invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory,
nothing else is further done except to see to its compliance since
for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to
litigations. The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control
over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court
has taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of
lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In
any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of
final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions.
Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of
a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest
of justice or when supervening events warrant it. Certainly, this
extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might
be his station, whose right to life is the issue at stake.
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Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 US 165, 172 59 S. Ct. 134, 138 83 L. ed. 104
[1938].
f
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and that the same has, on November 6, 1998 become final and
executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of
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Judgment.
Manila, Philippines.
Clerk of Court
By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP
Acting Chief
Judicial Records Office
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The former continues even after the judgment has become final for
the purpose of enforcement of judgment the latter terminates when
4
the judgment becomes final. x x x For after the judgment has
become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can
5
render the execution unjust or impossible.
____________
2
Acuna, 63 O.G. 358 Gabaya v. Hon. R. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 400 Bueno
Industrial and Development Corp. v. Encaje, 104 SCRA 388.
5
Ibid., pp. 1415 citing Molina v. dela Riva, 8 Phil. 569 Behn Meyer &
Co. v. McMicking, 11 Phil. 276 Warmer Barnes & Co. v. Jaucian, 13 Phil.
4 Espiritu v. Crossfield, 14 Phil. 588 Mata v. Lichauco, 36 Phil. 809 De
la Costa v. Cleofas, 67 Phil. 686 Omar v. Jose, 77 Phil. 703 City of
Butuan v. Ortiz, 113 Phil. 636 De los Santos v. Rodriguez, 22 SCRA 551
City of Cebu v. Mendoza, 66 SCRA 174.
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order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the
part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the
judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to
the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are
certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of
execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the
judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the
person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the
penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar,
which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be
accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be
requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a wellknown
principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the
executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the
date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under
the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways:
(1) by command of the King (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the
court and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this
principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in
absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail
the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that
show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction
of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the
execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule
that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering
the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance
arises that ought to delay the execution, and there
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49 SCRA 22.
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provided by law.
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II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents
contention that the decision in this case having become
final and
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The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the
interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The
provision is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It
also provides the authority for the President to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot
be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth,
an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed
in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who
becomes insane after his final conviction
cannot be
15
executed while in a state of insanity. As observed by
Antieau, today, it is generally assumed that due process of
law will prevent the government from executing the death
sentence upon
a person who is insane at the time of
16
execution. The suspension of such a death sentence is
undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
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b.
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SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained
that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the
Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who
hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in
the affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by
Regional Trial Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved
to issue in the abovenumbered petition a temporary
restraining order (TRO) because, among other things, of
what had been stated to be indications that Congress would
reexamine the death penalty law. It was principally out of
respect and comity to a coequal branch of the government,
i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded,
that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, a
limited time for the purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the
TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the
accused or recall the imposition of the death penalty.
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Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 645 Lipana vs. Development Bank of
Rizal, 154 SCRA 257 Lee vs. De Guzman, 187 SCRA 276 Bachrach Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128349, 25 September 1998.
2
29 Phil. 267.
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not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for
postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is
acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been
fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the Court of
First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the
execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however
a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, there is an
imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a
postponement. x x x.
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SEPARATE OPINION
The Anti Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance
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The bulk of jurisprudence precludes raising an issue for the first time
only on appeal. See, for instance, Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 249 SCRA 303, October 13, 1995 Manila Bay Club
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 715, July 11, 1995 Securities
and Exchange Commission vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 738, July 21,
1995.
However,
the
Court
resolved
to
tackle
the
question
of
In People vs. Muoz, 170 SCRA 107, February 9, 1989 the Court,
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129
Congressional
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is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as
an institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us
from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution
intended precisely to serve human life. So basically, this is the summary
of the reasons which were presented in support of the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. (italics supplied)
7
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Which became effective on December 31, 1993, per People vs. Burgos,
234 SCRA 555, 569, July 29, 1994 People vs. Godoy, 250
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Heinous Crimes
To repeat, while the Constitution limited the power of
Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to heinous
_________________
SCRA 676, December 6, 1995 People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136,
December 11, 1995.
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________________
Construction, Sixth Edition, 1984). The function of the preamble is to
supply reasons and explanation and not to confer power or determine
rights. Hence it cannot be given the effect of enlarging the scope or effect
of a statute. (C. Dallas Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction,
Fourth Edition, Volume IA, 20.03).
16
circumstances which the prosecution must prove before courts can impose
the extreme penalty. Just the same however, the law did not explain why
said circumstances would make the crimes heinous. Neither did it set
forth the compelling reasons therefor.
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743:
MR. SUAREZ. The Gentleman advisedly used the words heinous
crimes, whatever is the pronunciation. Will the Gentleman give
examples of heinous crimes? For example, would the head of an
organized syndicate in dope distribution or dope smuggling fall within
the qualification of a heinous offender such as to preclude the
application of the principle of abolition of death penalty?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President. That is one of the possible
crimes that would qualify for a heinous crime. An
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________________
other would be organized murder. In other words, yesterday there were
many arguments for and against, and they all had merit. But in the
contemporary society, we recognize the sacredness of human life andI
think it was Honorable Laurel who said this yesterdayit is only God who
gives and takes life. However, the voice of the people is also the voice of
God, and we cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it
is entirely possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we
should not preclude today. We know that this is very difficult question.
The fact that the arguments yesterday were quite impassioned and
meritorious merely tell us that this is far from a wellsettled issue. At
least in my personal opinion, we would like the death penalty to be
abolished. However, in the future we should allow the National Assembly,
in its wisdom and as representatives of the people, to still impose the
death penalty for the common good, in specific cases.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
I would like to pursue some more the Gentlemans definition of heinous
crimes.
Would the brutal murder of a rape victim be considered as falling
within that classification?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, yes, particularly, if it is a person
in authority. He would, therefore, add as an aggravating circumstance
to the crime the abuse of his position in authority.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
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is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of
heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to
determine compelling reasons for the revival of the
capital penalty. It is 22true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
preamble of RA 7659 made some attempt at meeting this
requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and
inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word
or phrase in the Constitution is
______________
Some examples of this may be taken by Congress from
Richmond vs. Lewis, 506 US 40, like gratuitous violence
or needless mutilation of the victim.
22 Paragraphs 3 & 4 of the preamble reads:
21
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1993, Volume III, No. 50, January 27, 1993, pp. 176177.
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141
141
Witness,
for
instance,
this
interesting
exchange
between
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(13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said Section (1) to the protection
of several aspects of freedom. x x x These guarantees are preserved in the
1987 Constitution, according to Fr. Bernas.
30
See, for instance, People vs. Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554, 571, October 25,
1995, and People vs. Pidia, 249 SCRA 687, 702703, November 10, 1995.
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deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of
31
law. This primary right of the people to enjoy lifelife at
its fullest, life in dignity and honoris not only reiterated
by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro
life and prohuman rights provisions. Hence, the
Constitution values the dignity of every human32 person and
guarantees full respect for 33 human rights, expressly
prohibits any form of torture which is arguably a lesser
penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life
by giving protection to the life of the34 mother and the
unborn from the moment of conception and establishes
the peoples
rights to health, a balanced ecology and
35
education.
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more
than property, for people more than the state, and for life
more than mere existence augurs well for the strict
application of the constitutional limits against the revival
of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of
society against its perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual
rights to free speech, assembly and even religion. But the
most basic and most important of these rights is the right
to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their
enjoyment, utility and expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on
the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against
the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The Profile
of 165 Death Row
Convicts submitted by the Free Legal
36
Assistance Group highlights this sad fact:
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Appellant dated September 26, 1996 filed by the Free Legal Assistance
Group in People vs. Malabago, G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996.
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death by trial courts since the effectivity of RA 7659. The Philippine Star
issue of December 9, 1996, page 17, however reports that, quoting Sen.
Ernesto Herrera, the total number of death row inmates has gone up to
267, as of November, 1996, of whom more than one half (139) are rape
convicts. Some major dailies (Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star,
Manila Standard) in their February 3, 1997 issue up the death row figure
to 300, as of the end of January 1997, with 450 as the probable number at
the end of 1997.
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