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G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent.:

G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA,
Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLASBERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution3 dated
February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 69103 which affirmed the Decision 4 dated
October 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11 (RTC) in Civil Case No. S
665 declaring the marriage of respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia (Rodolfo) and Natividad N. Rosalem
(Natividad) void on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines5 (Family Code).
The Facts
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug,
Zamboanga del Norte.6 They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2) children,
namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza), who were born on
August 20, 1969 and January 15, 1972, respectively.7
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage (complaint)
before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S665, alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations. In compliance with the Order 8 dated January 5, 1999 of the
RTC, the public prosecutor conducted an investigation to determine if collusion exists between Rodolfo and
Natividad and found that there was none.9 Trial on the merits then ensued.
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met Natividad when they were
students at the Barangay High School of Sindangan, 10 and he was forced to marry her barely three (3)
months into their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. 11 At the time of their marriage, he was 21
years old, while Natividad was 18 years of age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling
cockpits as kristo and bangkero sa hantak. When he decided to join and train with the army,12 Natividad
left their conjugal home and sold their house without his consent. 13 Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog
City where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez. 14 After
cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage on January 11, 1991 with another man named
Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in Cagayan de Oro City.15 From the time Natividad
abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza 16 and he exerted
earnest efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of Natividads psychological
incapacity that appeared to be incurable.17
For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during trial, despite service of
summons.18 Nonetheless, she informed the court that she submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr.
Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfos claims. 19 Rodolfo also underwent the same
examination.20
In her twopage psychiatric evaluation report, 21 Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were
pg. 1

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties
suffered from utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as]
deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct.22 As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed
that she lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo
failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman. Further,
Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of
marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the couples
union was bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage.23
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), filed an opposition 24 to the complaint, contending that the acts committed by Natividad
did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal
separation under the Family Code.25
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision26 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void
on the ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Zalsos, holding that
Natividads emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral pattern which in psychiatry constitutes a form of
personality disorder that existed at the time of the parties marriage but manifested only thereafter. It
likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsoss observation that Natividads condition is incurable since it is deeply rooted
within the makeup of her personality. Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad could not have known, much
more comprehend the marital obligations she was assuming, or, knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof.27
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that Natividads personality traits
constituted psychological incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that the testimony
of the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court. 28
The CA Ruling
In a Decision29 dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding that while Natividads
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily equate to
psychological incapacity, their degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has sufficiently
established a case of psychological disorder so profound as to render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.30
The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution 31 dated February 3, 2006,
hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTCs finding of
psychological incapacity.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 32 of the Family Code, should refer
to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to betruly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 6833 of the Family Code, among others,34 include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.35 In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first
declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage);
(b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c)incurability (i.e., it must be
pg. 2

incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). 37 The
Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA,38 whose salient points are footnoted hereunder.39 These guidelines
incorporate the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.40
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA,41 held that therein respondents emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to
discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity or sexual promiscuity.42 In the same light, the Court, in the case ofPesca v. Pesca43 (Pesca),
ruled against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein utterly failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let
alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage,
significantly noting that the [e]motional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity. In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate courts finding that the
petitioner therein had not established that her husband showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause
him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code;
that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his
marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity
has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is
permanent and incurable in nature.44
The Court maintains a similar view in this case. Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient
factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividads emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual
promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does
not, however, explain in reasonable detail how Natividads condition could be characterized as grave, deeply
rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to
disclose the types of psychological tests which she administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in
her report the root cause of Natividads condition and to show that it existed at the time of the parties
marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividads behavior in relation to her failure to perform
the essential marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsoss report. Further, the finding contained
therein on the incurability of Natividads condition remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and,
hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even selfserving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsoss
testimony during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of her report, also fails to convince the Court of her
conclusion that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated. Verily, although expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by
the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence. 45 After
poring over the records, the Court, however, does not find any such evidence sufficient enough to uphold the
court a quos nullity declaration. To the Courts mind, Natividads refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume
her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to
the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties marriage. Indeed, to be
declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform ones duties is
another. To hark back to what has been earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. 46 In the final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of
this nature to exist in the present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the recognition that
marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family, 47 the instant petition is hereby
granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution dated February 3,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAGR. CV No. 69103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, J., (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

pg. 3

Rollo, pp. 2852.

Id. at 5568. Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and
Normandie B. Pizarro concurring.
3
Id. at 7072.
4
Id. at 87100. Penned by Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena.
5
Executive Order No. 209, as amended, entitled THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES."
6
Records, p. 4.chanrobleslaw
7
See rollo, p. 56.
8
Records, p. 7.
9
Id. at 8A.
10
Id. at 83.
11
Id. at 8384.
12
Id. at 84.
13
Id. at 85.
14
Id. at 89.
15
Id. at 45.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 8990.
18
Id. at 1920.
19
Id. at 28.
20
See rollo, p. 94.
21
Records, pp. 3738.
22
Id. at 38.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 914.
25
See Article 55 of the Family Code.
26
Rollo, pp. 87100.
27
Id. at 96.
28
CA Rollo, p. 27.
29
Rollo, pp. 5568.
30
Id. at 67.
31
Id. at 7072.
32
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
33
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.
34
Also includes those provided under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same code in regard to parents and their children. (See Guideline 6
in Rep. of the Phils. v. CA, 335 Phil. 664, 678 [1997].)
35
Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 40 (1995).
36
Id. at 39.
37
DimayugaLaurena v. CA, 587 Phil. 597, 607608 (2008).
38
Supra note 34.
1
2

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
39

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
pg. 4

nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment
in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. (Id. at 276280.)
40 Republic v. Galang, G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 524, 535537.
41 466 Phil. 226 (2004).
42 Id. at 233.
43 408 Phil. 713 (2001).
44 Id. at 718.
45 See Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. No. 157649, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 16, 2532.
46 Republic v. Galang, supra note 40, at 535.
47 See Section 2, Article XV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

pg. 5

G.R. No. 190621, February 10, 2014 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. GLENN
SALVADOR Y BALVERDE, AND DORY ANN PARCON Y DEL ROSARIO, ACCUSED, GLENN SALVADOR Y
BALVERDE, AccusedAppellant.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190621, February 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. GLENN SALVADOR Y BALVERDE, AND DORY
ANN PARCON Y DEL ROSARIO, ACCUSED, GLENN SALVADOR Y BALVERDE, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In a buybust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the items seized
from the accused will not render his arrest illegal or the items confiscated from him inadmissible in
evidence as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the said items have been preserved.1
Factual Antecedents
For review is the Decision2 dated September 24, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR H.C. No.
03230 that affirmed in toto the January 15, 2008 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82,
Quezon City, in Criminal Case Nos. Q03120799800. The said RTC Decision found Glenn Salvador y
Balverde (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (illegal sale), and accused
Dory Ann Parcon y Del Rosario (Parcon) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11 (illegal
possession), both of Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (RA9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Information4 for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 filed against appellant in Criminal Case
No. Q03120799 has the following accusatory portion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 3rd day of September, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and
there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said
transaction, one (1) plastic sachet of white crystalline substance containing zero point zero four (0.04)
gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
While the pertinent portion of the Information6 for violation of Section 11 of Article II, RA 9165 filed
against Parcon in Criminal Case No. Q03120800 is as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
pg. 6

That on or about the 3rd day of September, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his/her possession and control one (1) plastic sachet of white crystalline substance
containing zero point zero four (0.04) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Upon motion of the prosecution,8 the cases were consolidated. On November 4, 2003, appellant and
Parcon were arraigned. They entered separate pleas of not guilty.9
During the pretrial conference, appellant admitted the following facts which the prosecution offered for
stipulation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x [T]hat [Police Inspector Leonard T. Arban (P/Insp. Arban)] is a Forensic Chemist of the PNP; that he
received a letterrequest for Laboratory Examination for certain specimen which was marked as Exhibit
A; that together with the said request is a brown envelope marked as Exhibit B; that said brown
envelope contained a plastic sachet marked as Exhibit B1 and thereafter he conducted the examination
of the said specimen and submitted a report marked as Exhibit C; the findings thereon that the
specimen was positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride was marked as Exhibit C1 and the
signature of the said police officer was marked as Exhibit C2. Thereafter, said police officer turned over
the said evidence to the Evidence Custodian and retrieved the same for purposes of the hearing
today.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Trial ensued. Parcon failed to attend the scheduled hearings, hence, she was tried in absentia.11cralawred
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented PO2 Sofjan Soriano (PO2 Soriano) to testify on the entrapment operation that
resulted in the arrest of appellant and Parcon. From his testimony,12 the following facts emerged:
While PO2 Soriano was on duty in Police Station 2, Baler Street, Quezon City on September 2, 2003, a
confidential informant (CI) arrived at around 9:00 a.m. and reported that a certain alias Bumski was
engaged in the illicit sale of dangerous drugs in Barangay Pagasa, Quezon City. PO2 Soriano immediately
relayed this information to Police Chief Inspector Joseph De Vera (P/C Insp. De Vera). A surveillance
operation conducted the same day on alias Bumski, who turned out to be the appellant, confirmed the
report. Thus, a police team was formed to conduct a buybust operation. PO2 Soriano was designated as
poseurbuyer while PO2 Richard Vecida, PO1 Alexander Pancho, PO1 Alvin Pineda (PO1 Pineda) and P/C
Insp. De Vera would serve as his backup.
At around 2:45 p.m. of September 3, 2003, the team arrived at Road 10, Barangay Pagasa, Quezon City.
PO2 Soriano and the CI proceeded to appellants house while the rest of the buybust team positioned
themselves within viewing distance. The CI introduced PO2 Soriano to appellant as a drug dependent who
wanted to purchase P200.00 worth of shabu. During their conversation, Parcon arrived and asked
appellant for shabu. Appellant gave her a small heatsealed plastic sachet that she placed in her coin
purse. Thereafter, PO2 Soriano handed to appellant the buybust money consisting of two 100peso bills
and the latter, in turn, gave him a heatsealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2
Soriano then immediately arrested appellant and recovered from his right hand pocket the buy bust
money. At this juncture, PO2 Sorianos teammates rushed to the scene. PO1 Pineda arrested Parcon and
recovered from her a plastic sachet also containing white crystalline substance.
Appellant and Parcon were then taken to the Baler Police Station. The items recovered during the buy
bust operation were marked by PO2 Soriano as SJ03 and AP03 and turned over to the designated
investigator, PO1 Vicente Calatay (PO1 Calatay). PO1 Calatay then prepared a letterrequest for laboratory
examination, which, together with the confiscated specimen, was brought by PO2 Soriano to the PNP
Crime Laboratory.
The prosecution intended to present PO1 Calatay and PO1 Pineda as witnesses, but their testimonies were
likewise dispensed with after the defense agreed to stipulate on the following
facts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
PO1 Calatay
[T]hat he was the police investigator assigned to investigate these cases; that in connection with the
pg. 7

investigation that he conducted, he took the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of PO2 Richard Vecida, PO2 Sofjan
Soriano, PO1 Alvin Pineda, and PO1Alexander Pancho marked as Exhibits F and F1; that the
specimen[s] consisting of two (2) plastic sachets marked as Exhibits B1 and B2 were turned over to
him by the arresting officers; that in connection therewith, he prepared the request for laboratory
examination marked as Exhibit A and received a copy of the Chemistry Report, the original of which was
earlier marked as Exhibit C; that the buybust money consisting of two (2) pieces of Php100.00 bill
marked as Exhibits D and E were likewise turned over to him by the arresting officer; that he
thereafter prepared a letter referral to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City marked as Exhibits
G and G1.13
PO1 Pineda
[T]hat he was part of the buybust team which conducted a buy[]bust operation on September 3, 2003
at about 2:45 a.m. at Road 10, Pagasa, Quezon City; that he acted as backup to PO2 Sofjan Soriano,
the poseur buyer in the said operation; that he was with PO2 [Richard] Vecida and PO1 Alexander Pancho
during said operation; that after the consummation of the transaction between PO2 Sofjan Soriano and
Glenn Salvador, he assisted in the arrest of accused Doryann Parcon; that upon [body] search of accused
Parcon, he recovered from the latter a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance; that said
plastic sachet was marked as Exhibit B2.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Version of the Defense
In his testimony,15 appellant claimed that at about 11:00 p.m. of September 2, 2003, he was parking his
tricycle outside his residence at 135 Road 10, Brgy. Pagasa, Quezon City when a patrol car suddenly
stopped in front of his house. Three policemen alighted, aimed their guns at him, and forced him to board
their vehicle. Already inside were two men in handcuffs sitting on the floor. The police car then proceeded
to Police Station 2 in Baler, Quezon City, where he and the two other men were taken to a room and
frisked by policemen who demanded P20,000.00 from each of them. They were told to call their relatives
to inform them of their arrest for engaging in a pot session. When appellant refused to oblige, PO2
Soriano said to him: matigas ka, hindi ka marunong makisama dapat sayo ikulong. He was thereafter
detained and no longer saw the two men he mentioned. Two days later, he was presented to the
Prosecutors Office for inquest.
Appellant accused the police officers of falsehood but could not file a case against them since his parents
were in the Unites States of America and he did not know anyone else who could help him. He denied
knowing Parcon and the arresting officers and claimed that he saw Parcon for the first time during the
inquest and the arresting officers when they arrested him.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC held that the evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of appellant and Parcon for the crimes charged. It did not find impressive appellants claim of extortion by
the police officers and instead upheld the buybust operation which it found to have been carried out with
due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. It ruled that absent proof of evil motive on the part of
the police, the presumption of regularity which runs in their favor stands. Thus, the dispositive portion of
the RTCs Decision:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused GLENN SALVADOR y
BALVERDE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 charged
in Criminal Case No. Q03120799. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand ( P500,000.00) PESOS.
On the other hand, judgment is likewise rendered in Criminal Case No. Q03120800 finding accused
DORY ANN PARCON y DEL ROSARIO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 11, Article II
of the same Act. Accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as MINIMUM to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS as MAXIMUM and to pay
a fine in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED.16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
pg. 8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.17 In his Brief,18 he imputed to the RTC the following
errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT DESPITE
THE NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS
DRUGS UNDER R.A. No. 9165.

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTIONS
EVIDENCE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE APPREHENDING TEAM TO PROVE ITS INTEGRITY.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT BASED ONLY ON PO2
SOFJAN SORIANOS TESTIMONY.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Aside from the prosecutions failure to prove the elements constituting the crime of illegal sale ofshabu,
appellant asserted that the apprehending officers failed to immediately conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same as mandated by Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165;
that the chain of custody was broken since PO2 Soriano could not determine with certainty whether the
plastic sachet allegedly seized from him was the same specimen subjected to laboratory examination; that
the prosecution was unable to substantiate its claim that the two 100peso bills were the same money
used in purchasing shabu since the said bills were neither dusted with fluorescent powder nor was he
subjected to fingerprint examination; that the failure to coordinate the buybust operation with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) was prejudicial to his substantive right; and, that PO2 Soriano
and the buybust team did not accord him due process by failing to apprise him of his rights after he was
arrested.
The People of the Philippines, on the other hand, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
asserted in its Brief20 that the Decision of the RTC must be affirmed since the guilt of appellant was
established beyond reasonable doubt; that the prosecution proved all the elements of the illegal sale of
drugs; that the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buybust operation and their positive
identification of appellant as the seller of the shabu prevail over the latters denial; that the chain of
custody of the illegal drug seized from appellant was sufficiently established; that the failure to use
fluorescent powder in the marked money does not result in a failure of the buybust operation since the
same is not a prerequisite to such operation; that the failure of the law enforcers to conduct a physical
inventory or to photograph the seized items in accordance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is not
fatal; that the failure of the buybust team to coordinate with the PDEA does not invalidate appellants
arrest; that PO2 Sorianos failure to recall the markings on the specimen shows that he was not coached
as a witness; that appellants defenses of denial and frameup are unconvincing; and that the failure to
apprise appellant of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is not fatal since such rights apply
only against extrajudicial confessions.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. Anent the defects in the chain of custody alleged
by appellant, the said court ruled that the evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that the illegal drugs
sold by appellant to PO2 Soriano was taken to the police station and marked therein and then forwarded
to the crime laboratory where it was found positive for shabu; the marked money used in the buybust
operation was the same money introduced in evidence; and that the failure of the arresting team to
faithfully observe the requirements of conducting physical inventory and coordinating the buybust
operation with PDEA are not fatal since the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were
preserved. Thus, the dispositive portion of the CAs Decision, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is perforcedismissed.
Accordingly, the assailed decision dated January 15, 2008 insofar as the accusedappellant Glenn Salvador
pg. 9

Y Balverde is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.22
On February 8, 2010, the parties were directed to file their supplemental briefs.23 The OSG opted to adopt
the brief it submitted before the CA as its appeal brief while appellant filed a Supplemental Brief 24 which,
however, contains practically the same arguments he advanced before the CA. Again, aside from
questioning the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against him, appellant questions the arresting
officers alleged failure to comply with the chain of custody rule.
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
All the elements for the prosecution of illegal sale of shabu were sufficiently established in this
case.
In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following elements must be
established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. x x x What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale
of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti25 or the illicit drug in evidence. [T]he commission of the
offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs x x x merely requires the consummation of the selling
transaction, which happens the moment the exchange of money and drugs between the buyer and the
seller takes place.26
In this case, the prosecution successfully established all the elements of illegal sale of shabu. The
testimony of PO2 Soriano reveals that an entrapment operation was organized and conducted after they
confirmed through a surveillance operation the information that appellant is engaged in drug peddling
activities. Designated as a poseurbuyer, PO2 Soriano, together with the CI, approached appellant outside
his residence. After having been introduced by the CI to appellant as a drug user, PO2 Soriano asked
appellant if he could purchase P200.00 worth of shabu. PO2 Soriano handed to appellant the marked
money consisting of two P100 bills and the latter, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. PO2 Soriano
then arrested appellant and recovered the buybust money from the latter. Immediately thereafter his
backup who were monitoring the transaction from viewing distance arrived. Forensic examination
subsequently confirmed that the contents of the sachets bought from appellant and recovered from Parcon
were indeed shabu.
Prosecutions for illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the
buybust operation. Their narration of the incident, buttressed by the presumption that they have
regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, must be given
weight.27 Here, the CA affirmed the RTCs ruling that the testimonies and facts stipulated upon were
consistent with each other as well as with the physical evidence. Thus, there is no justification to disturb
the findings of the RTC, as sustained by the CA, on the matter.
The defenses of denial and frameup are unavailing.
The Court cannot convince itself to reverse the finding of facts of the lower courts on the basis of
appellants selfserving allegations of denial and extortion/frameup.
Denial cannot prevail against the positive testimony of a prosecution witness. A defense of denial which is
unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and selfserving,
deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward
and probable testimony on affirmative matters.28
Appellant cannot likewise avail of the defense of frameup which is viewed with disfavor since, like alibi, it
can easily be concocted and is a common ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Law.29 To substantiate this defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show that the
pg. 10

buybust team was inspired by improper motive or was not properly performing its duty.30 Here, there is
no evidence that there was ill motive on the part of the buybust team. In fact, appellant himself admitted
that he did not know the police officers prior to his arrest. There could therefore be no bad blood between
him and the said police officers. Moreover, there was no proof that the arresting officers improperly
performed their duty in arresting appellant and Parcon.
Noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal.
In arguing for his acquittal, appellant heavily relies on the failure of the buybust team to immediately
photograph and conduct a physical inventory of the seized items in his presence. In this regard, Section
21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
(1)

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof;
However, failure to strictly comply with the above procedure will not render an arrest illegal or the seized
items inadmissible in evidence. Substantial compliance is allowed as provided for in Section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165.31 This provision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied).
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory
and photographed the objects confiscated does not ipso facto result in the unlawful arrest of the accused
or render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. This is due to the proviso added in the implementing
rules stating that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the evidence have not been preserved.32 What is crucial is that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved for they will be used in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.33
The links in the chain of custody must be established.
The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as long as the chain of
custody of the same are duly established.34 Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who had temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.35
There are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buybust situation, namely: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
pg. 11

officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and, fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from
the forensic chemist to the court.36
In this case, the prosecution established clearly the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscatedshabu. There is no evidence that PO2 Soriano lost possession and control of the
seized shabu from the time it was recovered from the appellant until its turnover to the police station. He
marked the seized item immediately upon arrival at the police station. He turned it over to PO1 Calatay,
the investigating officer, who prepared the letter request for the laboratory examination of the contents of
the plastic sachets. These facts were admitted by the appellant.37
On the same day, PO2 Soriano personally brought the letter request and specimens to the PNP Crime
Laboratory where they were received by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Arban who conducted the examination
on the specimens submitted. During the pretrial conference, appellant admitted the purpose for which
P/Insp. Arbans testimony was being offered.38 The marked sachet of shabu and the marked money used
in purchasing the same were both presented in evidence.
Appellants contention that the marking of the seized sachets of shabu should have been made in his
presence while at the scene of the crime instead of in the police station fails to impress. It is clear from
the earlier cited Sec. 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 that in a buybust
situation, the marking of the dangerous drug may be done in the presence of the violator in the nearest
police station or the nearest office of the apprehending team. Appellant should not confuse buybust
situation from search and seizure conducted by virtue of a courtissued warrant. It is in the latter case
that physical inventory (which includes the marking) is made at the place where the search warrant is
served. Nonetheless, noncompliance with [the] requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.39
Appellants claim that the testimony of PO2 Soriano does not deserve credence due to his failure to
identify and/or recall the markings he made on the subject specimen also fails to convince. His failure to
immediately recall the markings on the specimens only show that he is an uncoached witness.40Such
momentary lapse in memory does not detract from the credibility of his testimony as to the essential
details of the incident.41 It must also be considered that aside from the fact that police officers handle
numerous cases daily, he testified three years after appellants arrest. It is therefore understandable that
PO2 Soriano could no longer easily remember all the details of the incident.
Lastly, appellants argument that the entrapment operation is fatally flawed for failure of the buybust
team to coordinate with the PDEA deserves scant consideration. [C]oordination with PDEA, while perhaps
ideal, is not an indispensable element of a proper buybust operation; 42 it is not invalidated by mere non
coordination with the PDEA.43
Penalty
All told, there is no reason to disturb the finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA
9165. Under this law, the penalty for the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity,
is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million. However, with the
enactment of RA 9346,44 only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed.45Thus, the penalty imposed by
the RTC and affirmed by the CA is proper.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed in totothe
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 82, insofar as the conviction of Glenn Salvador
y Balverde for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No.
9346, and the penalty of life imprisonment and payment of fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon him are
concerned, is AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
pg. 12

Carpio, J., (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and PerlasBernabe, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
People v. Alviz, G.R. No. 177158, February 6, 2013, 690
SCRA 61, 70.
26

People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 198794, February 6, 2013, 690

SCRA 180,199.
1

CA rollo, pp. 125137; penned by Associate Justice

Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this court) and
concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and
Antonio L. Villamor.
2

Records, pp. 235241; penned by Judge Severino B. De

Castro, Jr.
3

Id. at 23.

Id. at 2.

Id. at 67.

Id. at 6.

See Motion for Consolidation, id. at 1.

Id. at 29.

10

Id. at 36.

11

Id. at 91.

TSN, September 6, 2004, pp. 48; TSN, January 12, 2005,

pp. 25.

People v. Llanita, G.R. No. 189817, October 3, 2012, 682

SCRA 288, 300301.
27

People v. Alberto, G.R. No. 179717, February 5, 2010, 611

SCRA 706, 714.
28

29

Id.

People v. Alviz, supra note 26 at 71, citing People v.

Capalad, G.R. No. 184174, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 717, 727.
30

31

People v. Llanita, supra note 27 at 305.

People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 182347, October 17, 2008, 569

SCRA 879, 898.
32

People v. Manalao, G.R. No. 187496, February 6, 2013, 690

SCRA 106, 119.
33

34

People v. Alviz, supra note 26 at 76.

Section 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No.

1, Series of 2002; re Guidelines on the Custody and
Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment.
35

12

13

14

15

Records, p. 155.
Id. at 162.
TSN, November 6, 2007, pp. 37.

16

Records, p. 241.

17

Id. at 264.

18

CA rollo, pp. 5168.

19

Id. at 5354.

20

Id. at 79115.

21

Id. at 137.

22

Id. at 140141.

23

24

25

Rollo, p. 20.
Id. at 2738.

People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610

SCRA 295, 307308.
36

37

See Records, p. 155.

38

Id. at 36.

Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.

9165, Sec. 21(a).
39

40

41

People v. Dilao, supra note 25 at 406.

Id.

People v. Adrid, G.R. No. 201845, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA

683, 696.
42

Id., quoting People v. Roa, G.R. No. 186134, May 6, 2010,

620 SCRA 359, 368370.
43

AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH

PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES.
44

People v. Abedin, G.R. No. 179936, April 11, 2012, 669

SCRA 322, 339.
45

People v. Dilao, 555 Phil. 394, 409 (2007).

pg. 13