Pobre vs Sen.

Santiago
Facts:
Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against Sen.
Santiago on her speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of the Congress
on the Senate floor insulting the Judicial Bar Council and Chief Justice Panganiban.
Issue:
Was the speech of Sen. Santiago within constitutional bounds of freedom of speech?
Ruling:
Yes. Although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally
said making them as part of her privilege speech. For the above reasons, the plea of Senator
Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken.
Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the
Rules of Court.
The Court, however, wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago,
a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional
conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly
improper in substance.

Liban Vs Gordon
FACTS: Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation on a Supreme Court decision
which ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify
him from being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC
is a private corporation and the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.The
Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation.
Respondent takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which addressed the
constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Respondent avers
that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule
that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the
PNRC statute.
HELD: Petition has merit.
Political Law: It has been consistently held in Jurisprudence that the Court should exercise
judicial restraint when it comes to issues of constitutionality where it is not the lis mota of the
case. In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised in the issue of
standing. As such, the Court should not have declared certain provisions of such as
unconstitutional. On the substantive issue, the PNRC is sui generis. It is unlike the private

corporations that the Constitution wants to prevent Congress from creating. First, the PNRC is
not organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to assist victims of war and administer
relief to those who have been devastated by calamities, among others. It is entirely devoted to
public service. It is not covered by the prohibition since the Constitution aims to eliminate abuse
by the Congress, which tend to favor personal gain. Secondly, the PNRC was created in order
to participate in the mitigation of the effects of war, as embodied in the Geneva Convention. The
creation of the PNRC is compliance with international treaty obligations. Lastly, the PNRC is a
National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is not like government instrumentalities and
GOCC. The PNRC is regulated directly by international humanitarian law, as opposed to local
law regulating the other mentioned entities. As such, it was improper for the Court to have
declared certain portions of the PNRC statute as unconstitutional. However, it is the stand of
Justice Carpio that there is no mandate for the Government to create a National Society to this
effect. He also raises the fact that the PNRC is not sui generis in being a private corporation
organized for public needs. Justice Abad is of the opinion that the PNRC is neither private or
governmental, hence it was within the power of Congress to create.

Pimentel vs Senate Committee

FACTS:
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the
Senate Ethics Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator
Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as
Senate President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its
representatives to the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate
adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.
In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the
Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics
Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the
Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of
such Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to
the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and proposed
amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against SenatorVillar, is an
indispensable party in this petition;
2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction or prior resort;

3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against SenatorVillarfrom the Ethics Committee
to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violativeof SenatorVillarsright to equal
protection;
4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is aviolativeof Senator Villarsright to due process and of the
majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and
5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for
theireffectivity.
HELD:
The petition is partially granted.
REMEDIAL LAW: Indispensable parties; doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
First issue: An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that
interest. In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the
Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of
P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part
of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator
Madrigals interest.
Second issue: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues
presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for
their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the
competence and jurisdiction of the Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:Internal rules of the Senate.
Third issue: While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or
unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively
prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the
Ethics Committee. The referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an
extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the
members of the Senate, and notviolative of the right to equal protection.
Fourth issue: The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics
Committee does not violate SenatorVillarsright to due process. The Constitutional right of the
Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this
Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, which states:"Each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings."
Fifth: The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate.
Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House
or Senate, such rules need not be published,unless such rules expressly provide for their
publication before the rules can take effect. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules

can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of
the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly
mandate their publication.
Santiago Vs Guingona
Facts: On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted
an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the
ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration
of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen.
Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan
comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged
to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven
(7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and
Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still
failed to resolve the issue.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for
quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding
and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issue: From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?

Held: WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.

Ratio: On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not

intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work.
Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene. Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold the very
duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of
the Senate.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction

Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to
settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions of
"majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the Constitution.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in
the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the
resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President.
The Court rules that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on
the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations.
Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
"Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." - 1987 Constitution
Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff
or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the aforesaid allegations of
petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their
functions and prerogatives.

In view of constitutional violation

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected
by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that
the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who
could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

Definition of minority and majority

Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority
is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority."
Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would
obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority.

Kida Vs Senate of the Philippines

HE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the
ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No.
9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular
elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional
elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30,
2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1.

Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA
No. 10153 in toto.]
1.

YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission
exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as
patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections,
starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording
and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.

2.

NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separatedays requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become
laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION
when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. The Court,
in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents certification of
necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following
our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from
having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

3.

YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in
order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to
achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the
ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those
elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3)
authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected
in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1.

1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the
incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a
holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for
the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would
effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term
and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of
appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to
remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or
implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is
evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to
make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

3.2.

2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has
no authority to order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections
may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of
Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon
orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing,
Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall
not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and
effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of
Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act
of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself
should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended
through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the
three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less
than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is
achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3.

3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is
valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153
and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the presynchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that
Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations
on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint.
These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and
consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls
under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs
under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM
executive and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the constituent political
units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed
law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more
apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a
law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153,
however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets
outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the
said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in
fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written
and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely
and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization
requires.

Tobias vs Abalos
Facts:
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with
title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be

known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the
petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion
of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.
Issues:
WON RA 7675 is in:
1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to
250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.

Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality
pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying
the act of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress.
Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill
reapportioning the legislative district.
In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Judges Vs Prado
FACTS: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the
franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration Commission
and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices while retaining the same
for the president, VP, senators The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that
their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures.
HELD: There is violation of equal protection. All persons similarly situated should be treated
alike both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It does not require universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact result in
unequal protection. What the law requires is equality among equals according to valid

classification. The postal service office claims that the expense from judiciary with regards frank
mails amounts to 73,574,864 as compared to 90,424, 175 total. The respondents are in effect
saying that franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it much at all
but not to those who need it badly. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and
withdrawing it from others especially where theres no substantial distinction. The distinction
made is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences
between the judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

Mabanag Vs Lopez
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in
the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators
and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in
order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been
considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into
the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have
been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary
three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the
furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC
cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the
said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each
House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by
the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as
already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in
section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in
the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated
copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness
advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the
correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in
conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly
certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by
the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the

Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by
their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of
the journals.
Gonzales Vs Macaraig
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Corys veto of Section
55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section
16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the
Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover
provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and
Section 16 (FY 90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the
item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that
would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of
augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law
and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the
exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions of an
Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate
provisions inserted by it must be treated as item, which can be vetoed by the President in the
exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming
arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and
Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents
veto power.

Neri vs Senate Committee

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007

hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared
in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos
of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an
order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine
of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains
important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and
policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September
26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.