Introduction:

I.

The difference between pure and empirical knowledge

That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt,
for how is it possible that the inherent capability of mind of thinking
could start than by any other means than by objects which affect our
senses and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse
our powers of understanding to compare connect or separate objects
and convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a
knowledge of objects which we term experience? In respect of time
therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience but begins
with it. But though all our knowledge begins in experience it by no
means follows that all our knowledge comes from experience.
He defines empirical knowledge to be, a compound of that which
we receive through impressions and that which the inherent capability
of mind supplies from itself an addition which we cannot distinguish
until long practice has made us attentive to and skillful in separating it.
It is therefore a question which requires close attention and is not to be
answered at first sight whether there exists a knowledge altogether
independent of experience and even of all sensuous impressions?
Knowledge of this kind is called a priori in contradistinction to empirical
knowledge which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in
experience. But the expression, a priori is not as yet definite enough
adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above
stated. For in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in
experience, we are wont to say that this or that may be known a priori
because we dont derive this knowledge immediately from experience
but from a general rule, which however we have itself borrowed from
experience (32). Thus if a man undermined their house we may say,
he might know a priori that the house would have fallen; that is, he
needed not to have waited for the experience that it did actually fall.
But still, a priori, he could not know even this much. For, that bodies
are heavy, and consequently that they fall when their supports are
taken away must have been known to him previously by means of
experience.
By the term knowledge a priori, therefore, we shall in the
sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of
experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to
this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a posteriori,
that is through experience. Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure.
Pure knowledge a priori is that which no empirical element is mixed up.
For example, the proposition, Every change has a cause, is a
proposition a priori, but impure because change is an idea which can
only be derived from experience.

II. The Human intellect, even in an unphilosophical state is in

possession of certain thinkings a priori.
The question now is as to a criterion, by which we may securely
distinguish a pure from an empirical thinking. Experience no doubt
teaches us that this or that object is constituted in such a way, but not
that it could not possibly exist otherwise. Now in the first place, if we
have a proposition which contains the ide of necessity in its very
conception, it is a if, moreover it is not derived from any proposition,
unless from one equally involving the idea of necessity, it is absolutely
a priori. Secondly, an empirical judgment never exhibits strict and
absolute, but only assumed and comparative universality (by
induction). Therefore the most we can say is- so far as we have
hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or that rule. On the
other hand if a judgment carries with it strict and absolute universality,
that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not derived from
experience, but is valid absolutely a priori. Empirical universality is
therefore, only an arbitrary extension of validity from that which may
be predicted of a proposition valid in most cases to that which is
asserted of a proposition which holds good in all; as for the example,
All bodies are heavy. When, on the contrary, strict universality
characterizes a judgment it necessarily indicates another peculiar
source of knowledge, namely a faculty of thinking a priori. Necessity
and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing
pure from empirical knowledge and are inseparably connected with
each other. But in the use of these criteria the empirical limitation is
sometimes more easily detected than the contingency of the
judgment, or the unlimited universality which we attach to a judgment
is often a more convincing proof than its necessity it may be advisable
to use the criteria separately each being by itself infallible.
Now, that in the area of concern of thinking we have judgments which
are necessary, and in the strictest sense universal, consequently pure
a priori, it will be an easy matter to show. If we desire an example from
the sciences, we need only take any proposition in mathematics. If we
cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the understanding,
the proposition, Every change must have a cause, will amply serve
our purpose. In the latter case, indeed, the idea of a necessity of
connection with an effect and of a strict universality of the law that the
very notion of a cause would entirely disappear were we to derive it
like Hume from a frequent association of what happens with that which
precedes and the habit thence originating of connecting
representations- the necessity inherent in the judgment being
therefore merely subjective. Refuting empiricism.

Space and substance are a priori conceptions (34).

III. Philosophy stands in need of a science that will determine the
possibility, principles and extent of human knowledge a priori.
Of far more importance than all that has been above said is the
consideration that certain of thinking rise completely above the area of
concern of all possible experience, and by means of ideas, to where no
corresponding object can be found in experience seem to extend the
range of our judgments beyond its bounds.
He states that a priori reason evaluates the information we already
have from experience, and this is where we often err (37 left).
IV. Difference between analytic and synthetic judgments:
In all judgments wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is
formed in thought for affirmative judgments can be formed analytically
and synthetically. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as
somewhat which is containted (though covertly) in the formed idea, A;
or in the predicate B lies completely out of the formed idea of A,
although it stands in connection with it, I term the judgment analytical
and the latter synthetical. Analytic judgments (affirmative), are
therefore those judgments in which the connection of the predicate
with the subject is formed in mind through identity; those which are
formed in thought without identity are termed synthetic judgments.
The former may be called explicative the latter augmentative
judgments; because the former add in the predicate nothing to the
conception of the subject, but only analyse it into its constituent
conceptions which were thought already in the subject although in a
confused manner; the latter add to our conceptions of the subject a
predicate which was not contained in it, and which no analysis could
ever have discovered therein. For example, All bodies are extended is
an analytical judgment. For I need not go beyond the idea of a body in
order to find extension connected with it, but merely analyse the
formed idea, that is become conscious of the manifold properties which
I think in that idea in order to discover the predicate in it: it is therefore
an analytical judgment. On the other hand, when I say, All bodies are
heavy, the predicate is something totally different from that which I
think in the mere conception of a body. By the addition of such a
predicate, therefore, it becomes a synthetical judgment.
Judgments of experience as such are always synthetical
He states experience is a synthesis of intuitions and that all synthetic
judgments are grounded in experience, not conceptions.

Propositions in natural science are a priori synthetical, same with

metaphysics.
Intuitions are given to the understanding by sensibility?
Human knowledge relates to objects through understanding.
Introduction
I. On the difference between pure and empirical thinking:
There is no doubt whatever that all our thinking begins with
experienceAs far as time is concerned, then, no thinking in us
precedes experience, and with experience every thinking begins (136
B2).
Though all thinking begins with experience it doesnt follow that all
knowledge comes from experience. For it could well be that even our
experiential thinking is a combination of that which we receive through
impressions and that which our own cognitive faculty (merely
prompted by sensible impressions), provides from itself which addition
we cannot distinguish from that fundamental material until long
practice has made us attentive to it and skilled in separating it out.
It is therefore at least a question requiring closer investigation,
and one not to be dismissed at first glance, whether there is any such
thinking independent of all experience and even of all sense
impressions of the senses. One calls such thinkings a priori and
distinguishes them from empirical ones, which have their sources a
posteriori, namely in experience. The former expression is nevertheless
not yet sufficiently determinate to designate the whole sense of the
question stated before us. For it is customary to say of it or partake in
it a priori because we dont derive it immediately from experience, but
rather from a general rule that we have nevertheless itself borrowed
from experience.
II. We are in possession of certain a priori thinkings, and even the
common understanding is never without them.
At issue here is a mark by means of which we can securely distinguish
a pure thinking from an empirical one.
If a proposition is thought along with necessity, it is an a priori
judgment; if it is moreover, also not derived from any proposition
except one that is in turn is valid as a necessary proposition, then it is
absolutely a priori. Universality.

There are pure a priori judgements.

The idea of Transcendental Philosophy
Now it is easy to show that in human thinking there actually are such
necessary and in the strictest sense universal, thus pure a priori
judgments.
Every alteration must have a cause. He states, the concept of a
cause so obviously contains the concept of a necessity of connection
with an effect and a strict universality of rule that it would be entirely
lost if sought as Hume did , to derive it from a frequent association of
that which happens with that which precedes and a habit (thus a
merely subjective necessity) of connecting representations arising from
that association.
140- how reason goes a flight with no bearing on experience
A great part, perhaps the greatest of the business of our reason
consists in analyses of the concepts that we already have of objects.
This affords us a multitude of thinkings that although they are nothing
more than illuminations or clarifications of that which is already
thought in concepts
It appears that he wants to distinguish between thinking that clarifies
concepts, and gains knowledge of the external world, and reason that
works with this information and connects concepts purely and
synthetically.
All judgments that combine a subject and a predicate in thought do so
analytically or synthetically. Either the predicate lies in the concept or
outside of it. One could call the former judgments of clarification and
the later judgments of amplification.
I. The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. He states that gravity or
weight in the statement, All bodies are heavy cannot be found within
the concept of a body (142).
V.
Synthetic a priori judgments are contained as principles in all
theoretical sciences of reason.
Mathematical Judgments are all synthetic
He states people who study reason previously erred in assuming
mathematics is based on the principle of contradiction.

Mathematical statements invoke intuition and synthetically add them

onto concepts.
He states that physics
He states concerning metaphysics on p.146, we want to amplify our
thinking a priori; to this end we must make use of such principles that
add something to the given concepts that was not contained in them,
and through synthetic a priori judgments go so far beyond that
experience itself cannot follow us that far, e.g., in the proposition The
world must have a first beginning, and others besides, and thus
metaphysics, at least as far as its end is concerned, consists of purely
synthetic a priori propositions.
VI. The general problem of pure reason
How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?
VII. The idea and division of
That metaphysics has until now remained
P 140; Even less can one expect
First Part. Transcendental Aesthetic
SS I. Introductory.
In whatever way and through whatever means a thought may relate to
objects, that through which the thought relates immediately to them
and, at which all thought is directed as an end, is intuition. Intuition
takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn is
possible only if the objects affect the mind in a certain way. The
capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in
which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. Objects are
therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and sensibility alone
affords us intuitions; but intuitions are thought through the
understanding, and from intuitions arise concepts.
All thought has to be related to intuitions and sensibilities since there is
no other way objects can be given to us.
The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we
are affected by it, is sensation. That Intuition that is related to the
object through sensation is called empirical. The undetermined object

of an empirical intuition is called appearance. I call all that which in the

appearance corresponds to sensation the sensations matter, but that which allows
for the manifold of appearance to be ordered in relation among objects
I call the form
In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may
relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which
it immediately relates to the objects is by means of intuition (49). An
intuition can take place only insofar as the object is given to us. This,
again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object
affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving
representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are
affected by objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility,
therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone leaves us with
intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise
conceptions. But a thought must directly or indirectly relate to
intuitions;
The effect of an object on the faculty of representation (sensibility), so
far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of
intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an
empirical sensation (50).
The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called
phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the
sensation is matter. That which effects that the content of the
phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations I call its form.
The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the
mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility (49). By
means of sensibility, therefore objects are given to us, and it alone
furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought,
and from it arise conceptions. Representations of objects, (sensibility)intuitions which by the understanding are thought and from them arise
conceptions. But a thought must directly, or indirectly by means of
certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions; consequently with us, to
sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us.
The effect of an object on the faculty of representation, so far as
we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition
which relates to an object that relates to an object by means of
sensation is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of
an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the
phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that
which effects the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under
certain conditions I call its form.

That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation I term its

matter; but that which effects the content of the phenomena can be
arranged under certain relations called its form
It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori;
the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind, and consequently
can be regarded separately from all sensation
I call all representation pure in the transcendental meaning of the
word where nothing is met with that belongs to sensation
The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, I call the
transcendental asthetic (50).
Two pure forms of sensuous intuition; space and time:
Section I. Of Space:
SS 2. Metaphysical exposition of this conception
He argues space is part of a priori intuition and not a representation.
SS 3. Transcendental exposition of the conception of space:
For neither absolute nor relative determinations of objects can be
intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they belong, and
therefore not a prior:
b. Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the
external sense, that is, the subjective condition of the sensibility, under
which alone the external intuition is possible
Transcendental Aesthetic
3. Transcendental Exposition of the concept of space:
I understand by a transcendental exposition, the explanation of a concept as a principle