Vda. De Tantoco v. Muncipal Council of Iloilo [G.R. No.

24950. March 25, 1926.]

FACTS
The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the two
strips of land, consisting of 592 sq.m and 59 sq.m with the amount of P42,966.40,
which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said street. CFI Iloilo ordered the said municipality to pay Mrs. Tantoco the said amount, plus its
interest. Said judgment was appealed, and was affirmed by the Supreme Court. On
account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said
judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property of
the said municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto trucks, one
police patrol automobile, the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and
Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the corresponding lots.
After notice of the sale of said property had been made the provincial
fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the CFI praying that the attachment on the said
property be dissolved, that the said attachment be declared null and void as being
illegal and violate the rights of the municipality. To which the Court agree,
declaring the attachment levied upon the aforementioned property of the
municipality null and void. Mrs. Tantoco appealed the decision of CFI Ilo-ilo.
ISSUE
Whether the Municipal properties can be executed in lieu of the unsatisfied
obligation?
HELD
The Supreme Court denied appeal and affirmed the decision of CFI Ilo-ilo
on the ground that the principle governing property of the public domain of the
State is applicable to property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal
property is similar in character. The principle is that the property for public use of
the State is not within the commerce of man and, consequently, is unalienable and
not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public use of the municipality is
not within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and,
consequently, said property is also inalienable. The rule is that property held for
public uses, such as public buildings, streets, squares, parks, promenades, wharves
landing places, fire engines, hose and hose carriages, engine houses, public
markets, hospitals, cemeteries, and generally everything held for governmental
purposes, is not subject to levy and sale under execution against such corporation.

Jose L. Chua v. CA [G.R. No. 109840. January 21, 1999.]

Second Division, Mendoza (J):
FACTS
Jose L. Chua and Co Sio Eng were lessees of a commercial unit at in
Baclaran, Paraaque for 5 years. Prior to the expiration of the lease, the parties
discussed the possibility of renewing it. They exchanged proposal and
counterproposal, but they failed to reach agreement. On 24 July 1990, Ramon
Ibarra filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners in the MTC
Paraaque, Metro Manila, which rendered a decision, giving a period of 2 years
extension of occupancy to the petitioner and Sio ordering them to pay Ibarra back
rentals and a monthly rental of P10,000.00 thereafter until the expiration of
extension of their occupancy or until the subject premises is actually vacated.
On appeal by both parties, the RTC Makati ruled that the lease was for a
fixed period of 5 years and that, upon its Chuas and Co Sio continued stay in the
premises became illegal. The court ordered Chua and Co Sio Eng to vacate the
premises and to turn over possession thereof. Chua and Co Sio Eng appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, the
petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the appellate court erred in ruling the case by affirming the decision of the
lower court?
HELD
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of CA.
After the lease terminated on 1 January 1990 and without the parties
thereafter reaching any agreement for its renewal, Chua and Co Sio Eng became
deforciants subject to ejectment from the premises. They are notentitled to a
reasonable extension of time to occupy the premises on account of the fact that the
lease contract between the parties has already expired, as there was no longer any
lease to speak of which could be extended.
Moreover, there is no provision of law which grants the lessee a right of
retention over the leased premises on the ground that the lessee made repairs and
improvements on the premises. Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article
546, which provides for full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention

of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good

faith, i.e. one who builds on a land in the belief that he is the owner thereof.
Bachrach Motors v. Talisay-Silay Milling [G.R. No. 35223.
September 17, 1931.]
En Banc, Romualdez (J)
FACTS
The Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., was indebted to the PNB and to secure
the payment of its debt, it succeeded in inducing its planters, including Mariano
Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their land to the bank. Consequently, Ledesma has
an outstanding debt to Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.
The petitioner filed a complaint against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.,
for the delivery of promissory notes or other instruments of credit as bonus in
favor of Ledesma. The complaint prays that the sugar central be ordered to render
an accounting of the amounts it owes Ledesma by and that the sale made by said
Ledesma be declared null and void.
The PNB filed a third party claim alleging a preferential right to receive
any amount which Ledesma might be entitled from Talisay-Silay Milling as bonus.
Talisay-Silay answered the complaint that Ledesmas credit belonged to Cesar
Ledesma because he had purchase it. Cesar Ledesma claimed to be an owner by
purchase in good faith. At the trial all the parties agreed to recognize and respect
the sale made in favor of Cesar Ledesma thus the trial court dismissed the
complaint and cross-complaint against Cesar Ledesma. And upon conclusion of the
hearing, the court held that the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., had a preferred right to
receive Mariano Lacson Ledesmas bonus, and it ordered the central to deliver said
sum to Bachrach Motors. PNB appealed.
ISSUE
Who has the better right over the bonus of Ledesmas property?
HELD
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First,
the rents of buildings; second, the proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the
income from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar sources of revenue.
According to the context of the law, the phrase u otras analogas refers only to
rents or income, for the adjectives otras and analogas agree with the noun

rentas, as do also the other adjectives perpetuas and vitalicias. The civil
fruits the Civil Code understands one of three and only three things, to wit: the
rent of a building, the rent of land, and certain kinds of income.
The amount of the bonus, according to the resolution of the central
granting it, is not based upon the value, importance or any other circumstance of
the mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the debt thereby secured,
according to the annual balance, which is something quite distinct from and
independent of the property referred to. As the bonus is not obtained from the land,
it is not civil fruits of that land. It is neither rent of buildings, proceeds from lease
of lands, or income under Article 355 of the Civil Code.
Leonardo Santos v. Angel H. Mojica [G.R.No. L-25450.
January 31, 1969.]
En Banc, Capistrano (J)
FACTS
On 19 March 1959, The Allanigue (brothers and sisters), brought an
action before the CFI Rizal against their sister, Lorenza Allanigue, her husband,
Simeon Santos for partition of a 360-sq. m. lot situated at San Dionisio, Paraaque,
Rizal, and for the annulment of certain conveyances involving the same.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering the partition of the lot among
the 11 plaintiffs and the defendant Lorenza Allanigue. A writ of execution was
issued on the judgment ordering the defendants to vacate the lot and deliver its
possession to the plaintiffs. Leonardo Santos, son of defendants Simeon Santos and
Lorenza Allanigue, owned a house standing on the lot. He filed with the sheriff a
third-party claim, and with the court, a motion to recall the writ of execution
insofar as his house was concerned. The motion was denied.
A period was given for the defendants and movant to remove their hose,
but they failed, to which a court order was released ordering sheriff to demolish
said houses due to the ground that the petitioner is in bad faith. The petitioner, filed
in the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Angel
H. Mojica, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal and the plaintiffs in the case, as
respondents.
ISSUE
Whether the court erred in ordering the demolition of the house of the petitioner?
HELD

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the respondent.

The owners of the land became owners of the improvement consisting of
the house built in bad faith if they chose to appropriate the accession. (Article 445
and 449, Civil Code.)
However, said owners could choose instead the demolition of the
improvement or building at the expense of the builder, pursuant to Article 450 of
the Civil Code, which, in part, provides The owner of the land on which anything
has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the

work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their
former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed. In the
present case, the Allanigue brothers and sisters chose to have the house or
improvement built by Leonardo Santos demolished pursuant to their motion for
demolition.