Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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1. Embassy - The ground occupied by US embassy is in fact the territory of the USA to
which the premises belong through possession or ownership. A person who committed a crime
within the premises of an embassy will be prosecuted under the law of Philippines because of
the principle of territoriality (See: Reagan vs. Commission on Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968,
En Banc; Answers to 2009 Bar Examination Questions by UP Law Complex). However,
jurisdiction of the Philippines over the embassy is limited or restricted by the principles of
inviolability of diplomatic premises, which is a generally accepted principle of international
law. Warrant of arrest cannot be served inside US embassy without waiver of American
government of its right under the principle of inviolability.
2. English rule - There are two fundamental rules in International Law regarding
crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel (not military vessel), if the same is within
the 12-mile territorial water (not internal or archipelagic water or high seas) of the Philippines
to wit: (1) French rule - Crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel within the
territorial water of the Philippines are subject to the jurisdiction of the flag state (extraterritoriality principle) unless their commission affects the peace and security of our country.
(2) English rule Crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel within the territorial
water of the Philippines are subject to jurisdiction of the Philippines (territoriality principle)
unless their commission does not affect its peace and security, or has no pernicious effect
therein. It is the English rule that obtains in this jurisdiction.
3. Convention of the law of the Sea - Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea,
the flag state of foreign merchant vessel passing through the territorial sea has jurisdiction
over crimes committed therein. However, the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction to arrest any
person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the
ship during its passage in the following cases: (1) if the consequences of the crime extend to
the coastal State; (2) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good
order of the territorial sea; (3) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by
the master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or (4) if
such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances.
4. Drug trafficking - Following the English rule, the Philippines has no jurisdiction
over transportation of opium in a foreign vessel in transit in territorial water of our country
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South African athlete Oscar Pistorius has been found guilty of culpable homicide after
the judge found he killed his girlfriend by mistake. The judge said the athlete had acted
"negligently" when he fired shots through a toilet door, but in the "belief that there was an
intruder". If the case happened here, should the athlete be convicted of homicide or reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide?
Answer: The athlete should be held liable with homicide with privilege mitigating
circumstance of defense of property.
In mistake of fact, which negates dolo, it is important requisite that that act would have
been lawful had the fact been as the accused believed them to be. If there was really an
intruder inside the toilet, it would be considered as unlawful aggression against his property,
which would allow him to use reasonable means to repel it in accordance with the self-help
doctrine under Article 429 of the Civil Code and defense of property under Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, the means employed by him firing shots through the toilet door is
not reasonable; and hence, he is only entitled to privileged migrating circumstance of
incomplete defense of property (See: People vs. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983).
In sum, the act would have been attended by the privilege mitigating circumstance of
incomplete justification had the facts been as the accused believed them to be.
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In Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014 - The petitioner climbed on top
of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her
breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet,
inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be
highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being fully
manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double interpretation"
(People v. Lamahang). Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by
her to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple
seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him) could also be ultimate felony.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
Proximate cause is the primary or moving cause of the death of the victim; it is the
cause, which in the natural and continuous sequence unbroken with any efficient intervening
cause produces death and without which the fatal result could not have happened. It is the
cause, which is the nearest in the order of responsible causation (Blacks Law Dictionary).
Intervening cause - The direct relation between the intentional felony and death may be broken
by efficient intervening cause or an active force which is either a distinct act or fact absolutely
foreign from the felonious act of the offender. Lightning that kills the injured victim or tetanus
infecting the victim several days after the infliction of injuries, or voluntary immersing the
wounds to aggravate the crime committed by accused is an intervening cause. Thus, the
accused is liable for physical injuries because of the intervening cause rule. On the other
hand, carelessness of the victim, or involuntary removal of the drainage, lack of proper
treatment is not an intervening cause. Hence, the accused is liable for the death because of
the proximate cause rule.
If the victim died due to tetanus of which he was infected when the accused inflicted
injuries upon him, the crime committed is homicide (People vs. Cornel, G.R. No. L-204, May
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2. Evident premeditation- In case of aberatiu ictus and error in personae, the SC did
not appreciate evident premeditation since the victim, who was actually killed, is not
contemplated in the premeditation of the accused (People vs. Trinidad, G.R. NO. L-38930,
June 28, 1988; People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil., 967; People vs. Trinidad, G.R. No. L-38930,
June 28, 1988). However, praeter intentionem and evident premeditation can be independently
appreciated. there is no incompatibility between evident premeditation and no intention to
commit so grave a wrong since the latter is based on the state of mind of the offender while
the former manner of committing the crime (Reyes; People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536).
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SPECIAL LAW - B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the supplementary
application of the provisions RPC including the rule on conspiracy. Hence, such rule may be
applied supplementarily. Thus, a non-issuer of bum check can be held liable for violation of
BP Blg. 22 on the basis of conspiracy. (Ladonga vs. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17,
2005). The principle of conspiracy may be applied to RA No. 9262. Thus, a person (such as
mother-in-law), who has no marital, sexual or dating relationship with the victim, can be held
liable for violence against woman on the basis of conspiracy (Go-Tan vs. Go, G.R. No. 168852,
September 30, 2008)
Anti-graft law - May a private person be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died
prior to the filing of the Information? Answer: Yes. The death of the public officer does not
mean that the allegation of conspiracy between him and private individual can no longer be
proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by
the death of the public officer is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime
nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private individual
(People vs. Go, GR NO. 168539, March 25, 2014, en banc).
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A child, who are already serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of RA 9344. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this
Act or other applicable law (Section 68 of RA No. 9344; People vs. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507,
January 30, 2013).
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Right of possessor or user of dangerous drugs to apply for probation - The rule under
Section 24 of RA No. 9165, which disqualifies drug traffickers and pushers for applying for
probations, does not extend to possessor of dangerous drugs. In Padua vs. People, G.R. No.
168546, July 23, 2008, it was held that: The law considers the users and possessors of illegal
drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug
traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the law on
probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to
mend their ways.
Right to apply for probation even if the penalty for possession of dangerous drug is more
than 6 years Under Section 9 of PD 968, one is sentenced to suffer a penalty (maximum
indeterminate penalty) of more than is not qualified to apply for probation. However, under
Section 70 of RA No. 9165, a first time minor offender can apply for probation for the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drug even if the penalty is higher than 6 years of imprisonment.
5. Agricultural camp or other training facilities - The child in conflict with the law
may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities
in accordance with Section 51 of RA No. 9344 (People vs. Mantalba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20,
2011; People vs. Salcedo, GR No. 186523, June 22, 2011; People vs. Arpon, G.R. No. 183563,
December 14, 2011, Justice De Castro).
6. Full credit of preventive imprisonment - Under Article 29 of RPC, a convicted
recidivist is not entitled to a full or 4/5 credit of his preventive imprisonment. However, if the
convict is a child, the applicable rule for crediting the period of commitment and detention is
not Article 29 of RPC but Section 41, RA 9344. Under the said provision, the full time spent in
actual commitment and detention of juvenile delinquent shall be credited in the services of his
sentence (Atizado vs. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010.
IMBECILITY
In exempting circumstance of minority under Section 6 of RA No. 9344, what is
important is the chronological age of the accused. If the actual age of the child is 15 years or
under, he is exempt from criminal liability. In People vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 04,
2014 - In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly
refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of ones birth date, and not the mental age.
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Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention
to commit, in order to prosecute him." It differs from entrapment which is the employment of
ways and means in order to trap or capture a criminal. In instigation, the criminal intent to
commit an offense originates from the inducer and not from the accused who had no intention
to commit and would not have committed it were it not for the prodding of the inducer. In
entrapment, the criminal intent or design originates from the accused and the law enforcers
merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by using ruses and schemes. Instigation
results in the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment may lead to prosecution and
conviction.
Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention
to commit, in order to prosecute him. It differs from entrapment which is the employment of
ways and means in order to trap or capture a criminal. In instigation, the criminal intent to
commit an offense originates from the inducer and not from the accused who had no intention
to commit and would not have committed it were it not for the prodding of the inducer. In
entrapment, the criminal intent or design originates from the accused and the law enforcers
merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by using ruses and schemes. Instigation
results in the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment may lead to prosecution and
conviction (People vs. Espiritu, G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013).
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Moreover, a police officers act of soliciting drugs from appellant during the buy-bust
operation, or what is known as the "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not
invalidate the buy-bust operation. in a prosecution for sale of illicit drugs, any of the following
will not exculpate the accused: "(1) that facilities for the commission of the crime were
intentionally placed in his way; or (2) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the
decoy or poseur-buyer seeking to expose his criminal act; or (3) that the police authorities
feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisted in its commission."
Hence, even assuming that the PAOCTF operatives repeatedly asked her to sell them
shabu, appellants defense of instigation will not prosper. This is "especially true in that class of
cases where the offense is the kind that is habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnished evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the police officer will not shield
the perpetrator, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or instigation of
the police officer."
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
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The evidence shows that the appellants were arrested when the police officers manning
the checkpoint stopped the passenger jeepney driven by appellant Ronald and arrested the
appellants. The fact that the appellants did not resist but went peacefully with the peace
officers does not mean that they surrendered voluntarily (People vs. Castillano, G.R. No.
139412, April 2, 2003).
VOLUNTARY CONFESSION - A plea of guilty made after the prosecution had begun
presenting its evidence cannot be considered voluntary since it was made only after the
accused realized that the evidence already presented by the prosecution is enough to cause his
conviction. It is not required that the prosecution must have presented all its evidence when
the plea of guilty was made to negate the appreciation of mitigating circumstance of voluntary
confession (People vs. Montinola, G.R. No. 131856-57, July 9, 2001, En Banc).
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Generic aggravating circumstances has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime
to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must
always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order
to be appreciated. Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance (People vs.
De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009).
It is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be
expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be
considered by the trial court in its judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial
(Sombilon, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009, Justice De Castro)
Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court has expressly required that qualifying and
aggravating circumstances be specifically alleged in the information. Due to such requirement
being pro reo, the Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of even those charged
with felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000, which is the date of the effectivity of the
2000 revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that embodied the requirement (People vs.
Dadulla, G. R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011).
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF POSITION - The mere use of service firearm is not enough to
constitute taking advantage of public position. Fact that accused made use of firearms which
they were authorized to carry or possess by reason of their positions, could not supply the
required connection between the office and the crime.The crime in question, for example, could
have been committed by the defendants in the same or like manner and with the same case if
they had been private individuals and fired with unlicensed weapons (People vs. Mandolado,
G.R. No. L-51304, June 28, 1983; People vs. Joyno, G.R. No. 123982, March 15, 1999, En
Banc; People vs. Villa, Jr., G.R. No. 129899, April 27, 2000; People vs. Villamor, G.R. Nos.
140407-08 and 141908-09, January 15, 2002, En Banc; and People vs. Fallorina, G.R. No.
137347, March 4, 2004, En Banc).
IGNOMINY - After killing the victim, the accused severed his sexual organ. Should
ignominy be appreciated? No. For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be
committed in a manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating, thus adding to the
victims moral suffering. Where the victim was already dead when his body or a part thereof
was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the accused (People vs. Cachola, G.R.
Nos. 148712-15, January 21, 2004)`
TREACHERY To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a)
the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted
(People vs. Duavis, GR No. 190861, December 07, 2011).
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As a general rule, nighttime is aggravating because the darkness of the night facilitated
the commission of the crime or insured impunity. Thus, nighttime cannot aggravate the crime
if it is committed in a lighted place although at the wee hours of the night (People vs. Clario,
G.R. NO. 134634, July 31, 2001). The darkness of the night and not nighttime per se is
important in appreciating it as modifying circumstance (People vs. Banhaon, G.R. No. 131117,
June 15, 2004). But if the offender purposely selected the wee hour of the night when
neighbors and occupants of the house including the victim were sleeping to facilitate the
commission of the crime or to afford impunity, nighttime is appreciable even if the place of
commission is lighted. (People vs. Demate, G.R. No. 132310, January 20, 2004, En Banc).While
accused were already outside the victims house at around 11:00 p.m., they purposely waited
until 2:00 a.m. before breaking into the residence so as not to call the attention of the victims,
household members and/or their neighbors. Taking advantage of the fact that the victim and
household members were asleep, accused entered the well-lighted bedroom and killed the
victim. Nighttime should be appreciated since accused took advantage of the silence of the
night (People vs. Ventura and Ventura, G.R. No. 148145-46, July 5, 2004, Per Curiam).
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The circumstances of disregard of sex, age or rank should be taken singly or together.
But the circumstance of dwelling should be considered independently from the circumstance
of disregard of age, sex and rank since these circumstances signify different concepts. In the
latter, the disrespect shown by offender pertains to the person of the offended due to her rank,
age and sex. In the former, the disrespect pertains to the dwelling of the offended party due to
the sanctity of privacy which the law accords it. In People vs. Puno, G.R. No. L-33211, June
29, 1981, En Banc - Disregard of rank and dwelling were appreciated independently.
AID OF ARMED MEN: Aid of armed men or persons affording immunity requires (1)
that the armed men are accomplices who take part in minor capacity, directly or indirectly
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CRUELTY: The crime is not aggravated by cruelty simply because the victim sustained
ten stab wounds, three of which were fatal. For cruelty to be considered as an aggravating
circumstance there must be proof that, in inflicting several stab wounds on the victim, the
perpetrator intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering of the victim. The number of wounds
inflicted on the victim is not proof of cruelty (Simangan vs. People, G.R. No. 157984. July 8,
2004).
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ACCOMPLICE AND CONSPIRATOR - In People vs. PO1 Eusebio G.R. No. 182152,
February 25, 2013 - It noted that victim had only three gunshot wounds despite the many
shots fired at him. Since Bongon shot victim thrice at very close range, causing him to fall, it
appears that it was only Bongon who inflicted those wounds. And, considering that the
prosecution evidence did not show that the shots three other accused fired from their guns
made their marks, there is doubts that the three agreed beforehand with Bongon to kill victim.
It cannot rule out the possibility that they fired their guns merely to scare off outside
interference.
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Because witnesses are rarely present when several accused come to an agreement or
conspired to commit a crime, such agreement is usually inferred from their "concerted actions"
while committing it. On the other hand, accomplices are the persons who, not being principals,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
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Article 29 of RPC
RA NO. 10592 and its implementing rules
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b. Full time credit - An accused who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
credited with the full time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment if;
a. He agrees voluntarily, in writing, to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners; and
b. Such undertaking is executed with the assistance of the counsel.
c. 4/5 time credit - An accused who has undergone preventive imprisonment and who
does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon prisoners convicted by
final judgment shall be credited by the service of his sentence with four-fifths (4/5) of the time
during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment if;
a. He shall do in writing
b. With the assistance of counsel.
In sum, the detainee must execute a written waiver, which is called detainees waiver
defined as a written declaration of a detained prisoner, with the assistant of a counsel, stating
his refusal to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon a prisoner convicted by final
judgment and thus be entitled to a credit of four-fifths (4/5) of the time during preventive
imprisonment.
d. Full time credit for child in conflict with the law - If the offender is a child, the
applicable rule for crediting the period of commitment and detention is not Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code but Section 41, RA 9344. Under the said provision, the full time spent in
actual commitment and detention of juvenile delinquent shall be credited in the services of his
sentence.
2. Immediate release Under Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592,
whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the
imposable maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and
his case is not yet decided, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review, except
for the following:
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If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be
released after thirty (30) days of imprisonment.
3. Good conduct time allowance (GCTA) Before, only prisoner service sentence is
entitled to allowance for good conduct. However, under Article 94 of RPC as amended by RA
10592, the following shall be entitled to good conduct time allowance:
a. A detention prisoner qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment for his good
conduct and exemplary behaviour; and
The good conduct time allowances under Article 97 as amended are as follows:
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances
for good conduct.
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Special law - In Escalante vs. People, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013 - The penalty
for election offense is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years.
Under ISLAW, if the offense is punished by special law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same. Applying the ISLAW, the imposable penalty for violation of the election gun ban should
have a maximum period, which shall not exceed six (6) years, and a minimum period which
shall not be less than one (1) year.
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Old rule: (1) Where the accused kidnapped the victim for the purpose of killing him,
and he was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime committed was the complex crime of
kidnapping with murder as the kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of committing
the murder. (2) Where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was
subsequently slain as an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were
committed. Present rule: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed, nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime (People vs. Ramos, G.R. No.
118570, October 12, 1998, En Banc, People vs. Larranaga, 138874-75, February 3, 2004, En
Banc; People vs. Montanir, GR No. 187534, April 04, 2011; People vs. Dionaldo, G.R. No.
207949, July 23, 2014)
However, where there is no actual detention (People vs. Masilang, 1986) or intent to
deprive liberty (People vs. Estacio Jr., G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009, En Banc) killing the
person is murder. Demand for ransom will not convert the crime into kidnapping.
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COMPLEX CRIME
There are two kinds of complex crimes. The first is known as compound crime, or when
a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is known as
complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other
(People vs. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011).The underlying philosophy of complex
crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the
accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The rationale being,
that the accused who commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser
perversity than when the crimes are committed by different acts and several criminal
resolutions (People vs. Gaffud, Jr., G.R. No. 168050, September 19, 2008)
COMPLEX CRIME AND COMPOSITE CRIME - A composite crime, also known as a
special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a
single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a
specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law. The distinctions between a composite
crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound crime under Article 48 are as follows: (1)
In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; In a complex or
compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave
and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other; (2) For a
composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex
or compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be
imposed in the maximum period; and (3) A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is
absorbed; a light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime
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In Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of RPC because of the
impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons killed by each accused. Since conspiracy
was not proven therein, joint criminal responsibility could not be attributed to the accused.
Each accused could not be held liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence
showing the number of persons actually killed by each of them.
In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as though each one performed the act
of each one of the conspirators. Each one is criminally responsible for each one of the deaths
and injuries of the several victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article
48. The applicability of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional
phrase "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies." To apply the first half
of Article 48, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not
written into the law.
Single purpose rule - In People vs. Abella, 93 SCRA 25, the Lawas principle was
applied despite the presence of conspiracy. In the said case, sixteen prisoners, who are
members of the OXO gang, were able to break into the cell of Sigue-Sigue gang and killed
fourteen (14) inmates. All accused were convicted for a compound crime. It was held: Where a
conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a
complex offense. Various acts committed under one criminal impulse may constitute a single
complex offense. Basis - The single purpose rule was actually adopted in consideration of the
plight of the prisoners. Requisites -There are two requisites to apply the Abella principle: (1)
there must be a conspiracy, which animates several persons to commit crimes under a single
criminal purpose; and (2) the offenders committed crimes in prison against their fellow
prisoners (People vs. Pincalin, et al., G.R. No. L-38755, January 22, 1981).
In People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500. September 11, 2012 - The application of the
Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin, thus: where several killings on the same
occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is
to say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses. If the killings did not involve
prisoners or it was not a case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners, Abella would not apply.
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DOCTRINE OF ABSORPTION - What is the effect of the elimination of the overt acts of
violence in Article 135 by RA No. 9668? In People vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-6025, July 18,
1956 The Supreme Court justified the doctrine of absorption in rebellion since murder,
robbery, and arson are just a part of the engaging in war against the forces of the
government", "committing serious violence", and destroying property in Article 135. However,
RA No. 6968 eliminated the phrases "engaging in war against the forces of the government",
"committing serious violence" and destroying property in Article 135. According to Florenz
Regalado, the amendment of Article 135 does not affect the accepted concept of rebellion and
these overt acts of violence are deemed subsumed in the provision on rebellion in Article
134. Under this principle of subsumption, engaging in combat against the forces of the
Government, destroying property or committing serious violence is an essential ingredient of
rebellion.
If the accused committed robbery, but thereafter, they detained the victims to forestall
their capture by the police, the crime committed is robbery only. Robbery absorbs kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. The detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery,
and although in the course thereof women and children were also held, that threats to kill were
made, the act should not be considered as a separate offense (People vs. Astor, G.R. Nos. L71765-66, 29 April 1987). If the accused committed robbery, but thereafter, they detained the
victims to demand additional money, and later forestall their capture by the police, the crime
committed is complex crime of robbery through kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The
detention was availed of as a means of insuring the consummation of the robbery. The
detention was not merely a matter of restraint to enable the malefactors to escape, but
deliberate as a means of extortion for an additional amount. Hence, the Astor principle is not
applicable (People vs. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163 April 26, 1990). If the accused committed
robbery by band, but thereafter, they took one of the victims and detained him for seven days
in another place for purpose of demanding ransom, they are liable of separate crimes of
robbery by band and kidnapping for ransom (People vs. Basao, G.R. No. 189820, October 10,
2012, Justice De Castro).
ABDUCTION AND MULTIPLE RAPES
Main objective is to rape If the main objective of the accused is to rape the victim,
the crime committed is rape. Forcible abduction (People vs. Mejoraday, G.R. No. 102705, July
30, 1993; People vs. Almanzor, G.R. No. 124916, July 11, 2002) or illegal detention (People vs.
Nuguid, G.R. No. 148991, January 21, 2004), which is incidental to the commission of rape, is
absorbed. The doctrine of absorption rather than Article 48 of RPC is applicable since forcible
abduction or illegal detention is an indispensable means to commit rape.
Abduction with lewd design If forcible abduction is a necessary means to commit
rape, this is a complex crime proper under Article 48 of RPC. However, multiple rapes were
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a. Single criminal impulse to steal - In People vs. Tumlos, G.R. No. 46428, April 13,
1939, En Banc - The theft of the thirteen cows owned by six owners involved thirteen (13) acts
of taking. However, the acts of taking took place at the same time and in the same place;
consequently, accused performed but one act. The intention was likewise one, namely, to take
for the purpose of appropriating or selling the thirteen cows which he found grazing in the
same place. The fact that eight of said cows pertained to one owner and five to another does
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b. Single criminal impulse to commit robbery - In People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. L1745, May 23, 1950, it was held that ransacking several houses located within the vicinity of a
sugar mill while two of the bandits guarded the victims with guns leveled at them is a
continued crime of robbery. Several acts of robbery were made pursuant to general plan to
despoil all those in the said place, which is an indicative of a single criminal design.
Accused intended only to rob one place; and that is the Energex gasoline station. That
they did; and in the process, also took away by force the money and valuables of the employees
working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these circumstances are the series of
acts which were borne from one criminal resolution. A continuing offense is a continuous,
unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent
force, however long a time it may occupy. The perpetrated acts were not entirely distinct and
unconnected from one another. Thus, there is only single offense or crime (People vs. De Leon,
GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009).
c. Single criminal impulse to satisfy lust - In People vs. Aaron, G.R. NOS. 13630002, September 24, 2002 - The accused inserted his penis into the victims vagina; he then
withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted
again his penis into the victims vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the
victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again
his penis into the victims vagina and continued making pumping motions. Accused is
convicted of only one count of rape. Accused thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the
private part of victim. However, the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of
rape in which the accused obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. Accused decided to
commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault merely because of his lustful desire
to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed.
In People vs. Lucena, GR No. 190632, February 26, 2014 - Accused thrice succeeded in
inserting his penis into the private part of victim. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after
the other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the accused would rest after satiating his
lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape the victim.
When the accused decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon
victim, he was not motivated by a single impulse, but rather by several criminal intents. Hence,
his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.
d. Foreknowledge doctrine - In Gamboa vs. CA, G.R. No. L-41054, November 28,
1975 - Accused cannot be held to have entertained continuously the same criminal intent in
making the first abstraction on October 2, 1972 for the subsequent abstractions on the
following days and months until December 30, 1972, for the simple reason that he was not
possessed of any fore-knowledge of any deposit by any customer on any day or occasion and
which would pass on to his possession and control. At most, his intent to misappropriate may
arise only when he comes in possession of the deposits on each business day but not in
future, since petitioner company operates only on a day-to-day transaction. As a result, there
could be as many acts of misappropriation as there are times the private respondent
abstracted and/or diverted the deposits to his own personal use and benefit (People vs.
Dichupa, G.R. No. L-16943, October 28, 1961).
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In violation of BP Blg. 22, the crime is consummated upon the dishonor of the check
by the drawee bank (Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, July 6, 2001). However,
the period of prescription for such crime commences to run from the date of the expiration of
the five-day period from receipt of notice of dishonor by the drawer. Prior to that date, the
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Moreover, the running of prescription for crime punishable under special law shall be
interrupted upon filing of complaint with prosecutor office for preliminary investigation. It
would be absurd to consider the prescriptive period for crime under BP Blg. 22 as already
running even prior to the expiration of the grace period despite the fact that the complainant
could not cause its interruption by filing a complaint for preliminary investigation since it is
not yet actionable.
In People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012 - This Court reckons the
commencement of the period of prescription for violations of BP Blg. 22 imputed to accused
sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the accused was notified
by the private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days
grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private complainant then had, pursuant to Act
3326, four years there from or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information
against the petitioner before the proper court.
Blameless ignorance doctrine - Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to
run on the day the crime is committed. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance"
doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of
limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a
cause of action. Considering that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
assail the legality of the transactions involving cronies such as behest loan, it would be
unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to
1986 (Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24 and 174764-65, September 11, 2013).
Hence, the prescriptive period for violation of RA No. 3019 commenced from the date of its
discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation (Presidential Ad hoc
fact-finding committee vs. Hon. Desierto, G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011)
INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION Under Act No. 3326, the running of the
prescription of offense punishable under special law shall be interrupted when judicial
proceedings for investigation and punishment are instituted against the guilty person. The
proceeding is described as judicial since when Act No. 3326 was passed on December 4,
1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace.
Considering that preliminary investigation in criminal case for purposes of prosecution has
become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term proceedings should now be
understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. Hence,
institution of proceeding, whether executive or judicial, interrupts the running of prescriptive
period (Panaguiton vs. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008).
Thus, the commencement of the following proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offense charged: (1) Filing of
complaint for violation of BP 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor (Panaguiton vs.
Department of Justice, supra); (2) Filing of complaint for violations of the Revised Securities
Act and the Securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC vs. Interport
Resources Corporation, G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc); and
(3) Filing of complaint for violation of RA No. 3019 with the Office of the Ombudsman (Disini
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24 and 174764-65, September 11, 2013)
Exceptions:
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MARRIAGE IN RAPE
There are two rules under Article 334 of RPC in connection with marriage as a mode
of criminal extinction. First, in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and
rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. Second, the provisions of this
paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the
fact of the abovementioned crimes.
According to Regalado, since rape is now a crime against person, it should be
considered ad deleted from the text of Article 334. In case of rape, the applicable rule is
Article 266-C of RPC as amended by RA 8353. Under this provision, subsequent marriage
between the offender and offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or penalty. It
seems that RA 8353 adopted the first rule in Article 344 of RPC but not the second rule.
Hence, marriage between the offender and offended party will not extinguish the criminal
liability of the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of the crime of rape
PROBATION
Probation distinguished from parole and pardon (1) Grant of probation is judicial while
that of parole and pardon is executive. (2) Probation and parole are suspension sentence while
pardon is remission of penalty. (3) Offender can only apply for probation within the period of
perfecting an appeal; offender is eligible for pardon after conviction by final judgment; offender
is eligible for parole after serving the minimum of the indeterminate penalty. (4) Offender, who
was sentenced to suffer a penalty of more than 6 years of imprisonment, is disqualified to
apply for probation. Offender, who was sentence to suffer reclusion perpetua or death penalty,
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Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused (People
vs. Gamez, GR No. 202847, October 23, 2013).
MURDER
Murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed
him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide (People vs. Camat, G.R. No. 188612,
July 30, 2012
ATTEMPTED MURDER - Accused opened the door of his vehicle and then drew a gun
and shot victim once, hitting him just below the left armpit. Victim immediately ran at the back
of the car, while accused sped away. Is the accused liable for attempted murder? No. Accused
only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latters body. If he intended to kill
him, accused could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the
car. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not
attempted murder but physical injuries only (Pentecoste, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 167766, April
7, 2010).
EXCESSIVE CHASTISEMENT
X tied his son to a coconut tree and, there after hit on his right eye and right leg. As a
consequence, his son sustained injuries that would heal in one week upon medication. Is X
liable for slight physical injuries despite the fact that his intention in beating his son is merely
to discipline him? Yes. X cannot evade criminal culpability by the circumstance that he
merely intended to discipline his son (People vs. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011).
RAPE
INTIMIDATION - It is a well-entrenched law that intimidation in rape includes the
moral kind of intimidation or coercion. Intimidation is a relative term, depending on the age,
size and strength of the parties, and their relationship with each other. It can be addressed to
the mind as well. For rape to exist it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed
be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the force or
intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.
Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of
the rape and not by any hard and fast rule. It is therefore enough that it produces fear -- fear
that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would
happen to her at the moment or thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports
the incident. Intimidation would also explain why there are no traces of struggle which would
indicate that the victim fought off her attacker (People vs. Leonardo G.R. No. 181036. July 6,
2010).
Tenacious resistance - Among the amendments of the law on rape introduced under
RA No. 8353 is Section 266-D, which provides Any physical overt act manifesting resistance
against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so
situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in
the prosecution rape (People vs. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012). The legislators
agreed that Article 266-D is intended to soften the jurisprudence on tenacious resistance
(People vs. Dulay, G.R. Nos. 144344-68, July 23, 2002, En banc). Failure to shout should not
be taken against the victim (People vs. Rivera, GR No. 200508, September 04, 2013; see: People
vs. Rubio, G.R. No. 195239, March 7, 2012; People vs. Penilla, GR No. 189324, March 20,
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Accused was charged in the Information with rape of a demented person with mental
capacity below 18 years old. Evidence however shows that the victim is not demented but
mentally retarded. Mistake in the information will not exonerate the accused he failed to raise
this as an objection, and the particular facts stated in the Information were protestation
sufficient to inform him of the nature of the charge against him (People vs. Ventura, Sr. GR. No.
205230, March 12, 2014).
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of
of
of
of
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Sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements: (1) the accused
commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18
years old.
Sexual abuse and lascivious conduct - "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use,
persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another
person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution,
or incest with children;
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The averments in the information against the accused clearly make out a charge for
sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 although the caption charged him with child
abuse under Section 10 (a). However, the character of the crime is not determined by the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated (People vs. Rayon, G.R. No. 194236, January 30, 2013)
Sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult
exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the
free exercise of the offended partys free will (Caballo vs. People, GR No. 198732, June 10,
2013).
Accused (23 years of age) repeatedly assured the victim (17 years) of his love for her, and
even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that she would not get pregnant
since he would be using the "withdrawal method" for safety. These were meant to influence her
to set aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with accused, with which he
succeeded. The age disparity between an adult and a minor placed accused in a stronger
position over the victim so as to enable him to force his will upon the latter. An important factor
is that the victim refused accused's incipient advances and in fact, asked him to leave.
However, the victim eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put in a
situation deprived of the benefit of clear thought and choice. The actuations of the accused
may be classified as "coercion" and "influence" within the purview of Section 5 of RA 7610.
Hence, accused is guilty of sexual abuse (Caballo vs. People, GR No. 198732, June 10, 2013).
The Information alleged that accused committed acts of lasciviousness upon the person
of victim, a minor subjected to sexual abuse. Can the accused be convicted for sexual abuse
under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610? Answer: No. Under the law, committing lascivious conduct
upon a child under coercion or influence of an adult or group is sexual abuse. There is no
allegation of coercion or influence, which is an indispensable ingredient of this crime. It does
not contain the essential facts constituting the offense, but a statement of a conclusion of
law. Thus, accused cannot be convicted of sexual abuse under such Information. The
information is void for being violative of the accuseds constitutionally-guaranteed right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (People vs. Pangilinan, GR No.
183090, November 14, 2011, ).
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Child under 12 years Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That
when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape
and for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal
in its medium period (Section 5).
X taking advantage of his ascendancy committed sexual intercourse with his daughter
(9 years of age). What crime can X be prosecuted for? The child, who is under the influence of
an adult, is under 12 years of age. Hence, X should be prosecuted for statutory rape. Section 5
(b) of RA No. 7610 provides that when the victim (child subjected to sexual abuse) is under 12
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape (People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos.
132875-76, November 16, 2001).
Accused was convicted of rape through sexual assault committed against a 4 year old
child. There is no allegation in the Information that the child is indulged in lascivious conduct
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group. Accused was punished under RPC. In sum, the penalty under RA 7160 was
not imposed since the information failed to allege that the victim is exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse (Pielago vs. People, GR No. 202020, March 13, 2013)
Rape through sexual assault and sexual abuse - X forced A, a minor, in an isolated
place and inserted his finger into her vagina. (a) For what crimes can X be prosecuted if A is 17
years of age at the time?
Answer: X committed rape through sexual assault, or object or instrument rape under
RPC since he inserted object, his finger, into the vaginal orifice of A by using force. The crime of
sexual abuse under Section 5 of RA No. 7160 is also committed since A is indulged in
lascivious conduct under coercion of an adult. However, X can only be prosecuted either for
rape or sexual abuse.
(b) Would your answer be the same if the age A is 10 years old?
Answer: Since A, who is a child indulged in lascivious conduct under coercion of an
adult, is under 12 years of age, X should be prosecuted for rape through sexual assault under
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CHILD ABUSE
Under Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610, child abuse or cruelty is committed by any person
who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those covered by Article 59 of
PD No. 603 but not covered by the RPC.
Under Section 3 (b), "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not,
of the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect,
cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3)
Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4)
Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
Section 10 (a) punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of PD No. 603, but
also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. We stress that Section 10
refers to acts of child abuse other than child prostitution and other sexual abuse under Section
5, attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 6, child trafficking under Section 7,
attempt to commit child trafficking under Section 8, and obscene publications and indecent
shows under Section 9 (People vs. Rayon, G.R. No. 194236, January 30, 2013).
In Bongalon vs. People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013 - Accused saw the victim and
his companions hurting his minor daughters. Angered, accused struck minor-victim at the
back with his hand and slapped his face. Since the accused committed the act at the spur of
the moment, they are perpetrated without intent to debase his "intrinsic worth and dignity" as
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In Rosaldes vs. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014 - Although the accused, as a
schoolteacher, could duly discipline her minor student, her infliction of the physical injuries on
him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at
her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him.
Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code,
which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority. Accused was
convicted of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
ESTAFA
ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION The elements of estafa under Article 315,
par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) that money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there
be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and (d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender (Tabaniag vs. People,
GR No. 165411, June 18, 2009; Magtira vs. People, G.R. No. 170964, March 7, 2012). However,
demand is not necessary if there is evidence of misappropriation.
Misappropriation as an element of the offense of estafa connotes an act of using, or
disposing of, anothers property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. Failure to account upon demand for funds or property held in
trust without offering any satisfactory explanation for the inability to account is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation. Demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and the
failure of the accused to account are similarly circumstantial evidence that the courts can
appreciate (Magtira vs. People, G.R. No. 170964, March 7, 2012).
The essence of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and
"misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's
own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate
for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every
attempt to dispose of the property of another without right (Tabaniag vs. People, GR No.
165411, June 18, 2009).
X received from A jewelry with obligation to return the same if unsold or deliver the
proceeds of sale. In the acknowledgement receipt, X is prohibited from selling jewelry the
jewelry on credits or giving it for safekeeping. X transferred the jewelry to Y, a subagent. Y
failed to return the jewelry. Is X liable for estafa through conversion?
Answer: No. It must be pointed out that the law on agency in our jurisdiction allows the
appointment by an agent of a substitute or sub-agent in the absence of an express agreement
to the contrary between the agent and the principal. In the case at bar, the appointment of
sub-agent was not expressly prohibited by A. Neither does it appear that X was verbally
forbidden by A from passing on the jewelry to another person. Thus, it cannot be said that X's
act of entrusting the jewelry to Y is characterized by abuse of confidence because such an act
was not proscribed and is, in fact, legally sanctioned.
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OTHER DECEIT- Other deceit under Article 316 (a) of RPC is committed by any person
who, knowing that the real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such
encumbrance be not recorded. The law was taken from Article 455 of the Spanish Penal Code.
However, the words "como libre" in the Spanish Penal Code, which means "free from
encumbrance" do not appear in the English text of RPC, nonetheless, the same are deemed
incorporated in the RPC. The gravamen of the crime is the disposition of legally encumbered
real property by the offender under the express representation that there is no encumbrance
thereon. Hence, for one to be criminally liable for estafa under the law, the accused must
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THEFT
QUALIFIED THEFT - The elements of the crime of theft are: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things. Theft becomes qualified "if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse
of confidence, or if the property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists
of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance (People vs. Bayon, GR No. 168627, July 02,
2010).
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE - To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition of the
penalty for qualified theft, there must be an allegation in the information and proof that there
existed between the offended party and the accused such high degree of confidence ]or that the
stolen goods have been entrusted to the custody or vigilance of the accused. In other words,
where the accused had never been vested physical access to, or material possession of, the
stolen goods, it may not be said that he or she exploited such access or material possession
thereby committing such grave abuse of confidence in taking the property (Viray vs. People, GR
No. 205180, November 11, 2013).
In Zapanta vs. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013 - Accused betrayed the trust
and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction
materials from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the
owner of the construction materials. He is liable for qualified theft.
Taking committed by accused cannot be qualified by the breaking of the door, as it was
not alleged in the Information. Moreover, the same breaking of the door does not constitute the
qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence. The very fact that accused forced open the
main door because he was denied access to complainants house negates the presence of such
confidence in him by private complainant. Without ready access to the interior of the house
where the properties were taken, it cannot be said that complaint had a firm trust on
accused and that the same trust facilitated taking of the personal properties (Viray vs. People,
GR No. 205180, November 11, 2013).
If the subject matter of a crime against property was money, identity of the offended
party is material and necessary for the proper identification of the offense charged. Since
money is generic and has no earmarks that could properly identify it, the only way that it
(money) could be described and identified in a complaint is by connecting it to the offended
party or the individual who was robbed as its owner or possessor. Thus, the erroneous
designation of the offended party would also be material, as the subject matter of the offense
could no longer be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged
(Senador vs. People, GR No. 201620, March 06, 2013).
If the subject matter of a crime against property is specific or one described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous designation of the
offended party is not material and would not result in the violation of the accuseds
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such
error would not result in the acquittal of the accused (Senador vs. People, GR No. 201620,
March 06, 2013).
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Assuming that robbery was indeed committed, the prosecution must establish with
certitude that the killing was a mere incident to the robbery, the latter being the perpetrators
main purpose and objective. It is not enough to suppose that the purpose of the author of the
homicide was to rob; a mere presumption of such fact is not sufficient. Stated in a different
manner, a conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and objective of
the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
What is crucial for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to
firmly establish the offenders intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of
the time when the homicide is actually carried out (People vs. Gatarin, GR NO. 198022, April
07, 2014).
b. Intent to kill and rob - However, the law does not require that the sole motive of the
malefactor is robbery and commits homicide by reason or on the occasion thereof. In one case,
it was ruled that even if the malefactor intends to kill and rob another, it does not preclude his
conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The fact that the intent of
the felons was tempered with a desire also to avenge grievances against the victim killed, does
not negate the conviction of the accused and punishment for robbery with homicide (People
vs. Daniela, G.R. No. 139230, April 24, 2003).
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d. One of the robbers is the victim of homicide - It is immaterial that the death
would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of
the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the
felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide. The word homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide,
thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide (People vs. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5,
2011; (People vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635, November 15, 2010; People vs. De Leon, GR No.
179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Diu, GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013).
In People vs. Concepcion, G.R. No. 200922, July 18, 2012 - Accused snatched victims
shoulder bag which was hanging on her left shoulder. No violence, intimidation or force was
used in snatching her shoulder bag. Given the facts, the snatching of shoulder bag constitutes
the crime of theft, not robbery. Accuseds co-conspirator, who was driving the motorcycle, died
because he lost control of the motorcycle and crashed in front of a taxi. Since accused as
passenger in the motorcycle, did not perform or execute any act that caused the death of his
companion, he cannot be held liable for homicide.
e. Homicide through reckless imprudence - In robbery with homicide, the original
criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of
human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the
result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration.
There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple
negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be
consummated (People vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635, November 15, 2010; People vs. De Leon, GR
No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Diu, GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013).
f. Failure to present the stolen property - Intent to rob is an internal act but may be
inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property. When the fact of taking has
been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is justified even if the
property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may
have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner.
The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount
stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the
victim is of no moment because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount
or value involved (People vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635, November 15, 2010; People vs. De Leon, GR
No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Diu, GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013).
g. Direct connection between robbery and homicide - Essential for conviction of
robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection between the
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ARSON
Is it necessary for the prosecution to prove wrongful intent to burn on the part of the
accused to establish arson? No. Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of arson, it
may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the
natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a
building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent. If
there is an eyewitness to the crime of arson, he can give in detail the acts of the
accused. When this is done the only substantial issue is the credibility of the witness (People
vs. De Leon, G. R. No. 180762, March 4, 2009).
What is the crime committed if the offender burned the building and there is person
who died? In the classification of crimes committed by fire involving the killing of the victim,
attention must be given to the intention of the author. Main objective of the offender
determines the kind of crime committed. (a) Intent to burn If the main objective is the
burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the
crime is simply arson (qualified by dead of the victim), and the resulting homicide is absorbed.
(b) Intent to kill If the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or
edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed
is murder only. When the Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it
intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder
without a design to take life. Murder qualified by means of fire absorbs the crime of arson since
the latter is an inherent means to commit the former (People vs. Baluntong, G.R. No. 182061,
March 15, 2010; People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994) (c) Intent to conceal If
the objective is to kill, and in fact the offender has already done so, and arson is resorted to as
a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of two separate crimes of either
homicide or murder, and arson.
Article 320 of RPC contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and
private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. Section 3 of PD
No. 1613, on the other hand, currently governs simple arson. P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the
malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article
320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This law punishes simple arson with a
lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political,
and national security implications than destructive arson (People vs. Macabando, GR No.
188708, July 31, 2013). Burning of inhabited house or dwelling is simple arson under Section
3 of P.D. No. 1613, and not destructive arson under RPC. Burning personal property is also
simple arson under Section 1 of PD No. 1613.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The
Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for
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KIDNAPPING
As for the crime of kidnapping, the following elements, as provided in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, must be proven: (a) a person has been deprived of his liberty, (b) the
offender is a private individual, and (c) the detention is unlawful. (People vs. Jovel, G.R. No.
189820. October 10, 2012).
The crime has the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of
detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it
is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped
or detained is a minor, female or a public official (People vs. Jacalney, GR No. 168552, October
03, 2011).
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty,
coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a
person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of
time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or
detention, or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move (People vs. Jacalney, GR No.
168552, October 03, 2011).
X dragged A, a minor, to his house after the latter refused to go with him. Upon
reaching the house, X tied her hands. When A pleaded that she be allowed to go home, he
refused. After more or less one hour, X released A and instructed her on how she could go
home. What is the crime committed? Answer: The crime committed is kidnapping and serious
illegal detention. When X tied the hands of A, the former's intention to deprive the latter of her
liberty has been clearly shown. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is
restrained from going home. Because of her tender age, and because she did not know her way
back home, she was then and there deprived of her liberty. This is irrespective of the length of
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SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. The use of a loose
firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code
or other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the
crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum
penalty which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for illegal possession of
firearm, the penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for
the crime charged:Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm
is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that imposed under the
preceding section for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the Revised
Penal Code or other special laws of which he/she is found guilty.
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d etat,such violation shall be absorbed as
an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation of
this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.
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Under PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294, the rules, if the offender killed a person with
the use of unlicensed firearm, are as follows: (1) offender is liable for homicide or murder with
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm; and (2) the crimes of murder or
homicide and illegal use or possession of firearm are integrated into a single offense.
In People vs. Bergante, G.R. No. 120369-70, February 27, 1998 - The violation of PD
No. 1866 should have been punished separately conformably with our ruling in the case of
Quijada G.R. No. 115008-09, July 24, 1996, En Banc. Nevertheless, fortunately for appellant,
PD No. 1866 was recently amended by RA No. 8294, which provides that if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. In short, only one offense should be
punished, viz., either homicide or murder, and the use of the unlicensed firearm should only
be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In Celino vs. CA, G.R. No. 170562, June 29, 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that:
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MARKING - Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized
dangerous drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for
the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of
the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the
time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching, planting or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of
initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires (People vs.
Constantino, Jr. GR No. 199689, March 12, 2014)
The rule requires that the marking of the seized items should be done in the presence of
the apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation to ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence. There are occasions
when the chain of custody rule is relaxed such as when the marking of the seized items
immediately after seizure and confiscation is allowed to be undertaken at the police station
rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an accused in
illegal drugs cases. However, even a less-than-stringent application of the requirement would
not suffice to sustain the conviction in this case. There was no categorical statement from any
of the prosecution witnesses that markings were made, much less immediately upon
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Drug peddling in schools is prevalent; the scenario attending this case is likely to be
repeated many times. To impose on school personnel the observance of the same procedure
required of law enforces (like marking) processes that are unfamiliar to them is to set a
dangerous precedent that may eventually lead to the acquittal of many drug peddlers. To our
mind, the evidentiary value of the seized specimen remains intact as long as the school
personnel who had initial contact with the drug/s was able to establish that the evidence had
not been tampered with when he handed it to the police (Marquez vs. People, G.R. No. 197207,
March 13, 2013)
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court
thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper
discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form
of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous
drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges
for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate
quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the
accused as provided for in Sec. 15.
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If the accused sell the child to another for purpose of prostitution on a single occasion, the
crime committed is child prostitution under Section 5 (a) of RA No 7610 (People vs. Dulay, GR
No. 193854, September 24, 2012). If the accused maintained the child for prostitution, the
crime committed is qualified trafficking in person under Section 4 and 6 of RA No. 9208 (People
vs. Casio).
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for
both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative (People vs.
Chua, G. R. No. 187052, September 13, 2012).
BP BLG. 22
What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a worthless check.
The law did not look either at the actual ownership of the check or of the account against
which it was made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. Also,
that the check was not intended to be deposited was really of no consequence to her incurring
criminal liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Resterio vs. People, G.R. No.
177438. September 24, 2012).
The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the
second element arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up but also affords the
offender due process. The law thereby allows the offender to avoid prosecution if she pays the
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In San Mateo vs. People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013 - Complainant tried to serve
the notice of dishonor to the accused two times. On the first occasion, complainants counsel
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Nevertheless, accuseds acquittal does not entail the extinguishment of her civil liability
for the dishonored checks. An acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not preclude the award of civil damages. For this reason, the trial courts directive for San
Mateo to pay the civil liability in the amount representing the total value of the checks plus
12% interest per annum from the time the said sum became due and demandable until fully
paid, stands.
In Campos vs. People. G.R. No. 187401, September 17, 2014 - Exerting efforts to reach
an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks which she issued were dishonored by
the drawee bank is a circumstantial evidence of receipt of notice of dishonor. Accused would
not have entered into the alleged arrangements if she had not received a notice of dishonor
from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds with the bank and
the dishonor of her checks.
Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 166810, June 26, 2008, Justice De Castro -Under Section
114(d) of the Negotiable Instruments Law, notice of dishonor is not required to be given to the
drawer in either of the following cases where the drawer has no right to expect or require that
the drawee or acceptor will honor the check. Since petitioner's bank account was already closed
even before the issuance of the subject check, he had no right to expect or require the drawee
bank to honor his check. By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, petitioner is not entitled
to be given a notice of dishonor.
The crime involved in Lopez vs. People is estafa through issuance of bouncing check.
However, it is submitted the Lopez principle can be applied to violation of BP 22.
PAYMENT - In Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014 - The fact that the
issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after having received
the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the
Information in court. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Big. 22, is the protection of the
credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who
have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before
charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of
the informations has already attained the purpose of the law.
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Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well
differentiated from cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d)
of the Revised Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said case of estafa,
damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the check is merely the
accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check
will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the
crime but not the criminal liability.
Answer: Yes. X was formally notified of the dishonor of the checks. Yet, it was only more
than three months after, that the SEC issued order for the suspension of all pending actions
for claims against Z corporation. Thus, X was not precluded from making good the checks
during that three-month gap when he received the letter and when the SEC issued the order
(Tiong Rosario vs. Co, G.R. No. 133608, August 26, 2008)
(b) Would your answer be the same if the order of suspension was issued before the
presentment for payment of the check when the drawee bank and the sending of notice of
dishonor?
Answer: No. X is not liable for violation of BP Blg. 22. Considering that there was a
lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed suspended. When a contract is suspended,
it temporarily ceases to be operative; and it again becomes operative when a condition occurs or a situation arises - warranting the termination of the suspension of the contract. When a
contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity commences
only if and when the event that constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, at the
time A presented the check for encashment, it had no right to do so, as there was yet no
obligation due from X (Gidwani vs. People, GR No. 195064, January 15, 2014).
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On the other hand, Section 8 of RA No. 6713 provides: SECTION 8. Statements and
Disclosure. Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth
and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children
under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. (A) Statements of Assets and
Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. All public officials and employees, except those who serve
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The rule directing full disclosure of wealth in the SALN is a means of preventing said
evil and is aimed particularly at minimizing if not altogether curtailing the opportunities for
official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. By the SALN,
the public is able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; it serves as a valid
check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth (Gupilan-Aguilar vs.
Office of the Umbudsman, G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014).
It is imperative that every public official or government employee must make and
submit a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress any
questionable accumulation of wealth. This serves as the basis of the government and the
people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of public officials and employees in compliance
with the constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, to promote transparency in government,
and to ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives, with the
end in view of curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service (OCA vs. Usman, A.M. No. SCC-08-12,
October 19, 2011). In fact, filing SALN is a constitutional duty. Article 11, Section 17 of the
1987 Constitution provides: Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth.
Failure to file SALN as required by law is a violation of Section 8 of RA No. 6713 and
Section 7 of RA No. 3019 (Concerned Taxpayer vs. Doblada, A.M. No. P-99-1342, June 8,
2005). Since both laws provide a penalty for failure to file SALN, the offender should only be
prosecuted and punished either under one or the other.
However, it is submitted that Section 7 of RA No. 3019 has been modified by Section 8
of RA No. 6713. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that public officers are now
submitting SALN in compliance with Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees issued by the Civil Service Commission. They are
required to file the SALN on or before April 30, of every year as required under RA No. 6713
and not within the month of January of every other year as mandated under RA No. 3019.
Section 8 of RA No. 6713 excludes public officials and employees, who serve in an
honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers from the requirement of filling
SALN. If these public officers are excused from filling SALN under RA 6713, it would be absurd
to criminally make them responsible under RA No. 3019 for failure to file it. By parity of
reasoning, if a public officer filed a SALN in April of a certain year in compliance of RA No.
6713 he should not be made criminally liable under RA No. 3019 which requires that the SALN
should be filed within the month of January.
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RA No. 3019 is enacted in 1960 or prior to the 1987 Constitution, while RA No.6713 is
passed precisely to implement the constitutional provision on SALN. Section 8 of RA No. 6713
is the latest legislative expression that gives spirit and substance to State policy of
transparency and public accountability. Hence, the time regulation and the exclusionary rule
under RA No. 6713 regarding the filing of SALN is controlling even if the accused is charged for
failure to file SALN under Section 7 of RA No. 3019.
SECTION 13 - Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information for crime of corruption under RA 3019, crimes committed by public
officer under RPC or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Usurpation of public
authority (Miranda vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 154098, July 27, 2005, En Banc) and
election offense (Juan vs. People, G.R. No. 132378, January 18, 2000) are offenses involving
fraud upon the government. Falsification of document (voucher) is offense involving fraud upon
public funds or property (Bustillo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 146217, April 7, 2006).
Ex post facto law - Article 24 (3) of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that
suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute
proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a
result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits, which he failed to receive during suspension.
This is merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a penal provision,
therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial, of the public officer charged with crimes
mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the
constitutional provision on ex post facto law (Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-61776 to L61861, March 23, 1984).
Pre-suspension hearing - While the suspension of a public officer under this provision
is mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine the validity of the
information filed against him, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences
of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction. The accused public
officials right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be
issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the
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In Luciano vs. Mariano, G.R. N L-32950, July 30, 1971 Where the preliminary
investigation was for falsification, the office of the prosecutor could not validly charged the
petitioner with the graver crime of violation of RA No. 3019. Thus, he is entitled to a new
preliminary investigation. The ruling on the validity of the information is to be held in abeyance
until after the outcome of the preliminary investigation of violation of RA No. 3019, and hence
no suspension order can issue. Should the fiscal find no case, he will then so inform the trial
court and move to dismiss the case. In the contrary case, respondent court will then have to
hear and decide petitioners' pending motion to quash before it, which squarely raises question
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and are not punishable under section 3 (a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, contrary to the information's averment.
Procedure - Upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order
with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why
he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to 13 of RA No. 3019. Where either
the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn
files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause
order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial
court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information,
and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it
uphold the validity of the information or withholding such suspension in the contrary case.
No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state
that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of
the criminal proceedings against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due
preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised
Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the
Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court (Miguel vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 04,
2012)
Period of preventive suspension- Even though the law is silent on the duration of the
preventive suspension, the suspension should not be indefinite. Section 13 of RA No. 3019
does not provide the period of preventive suspension. Hence, the duration of suspension under
the Administrative Code, which provides that the suspension may not exceed 90 days (Layus
M.D. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134272, December 8, 1999) may be adopted in fixing the
duration of suspension under RA 3019. The said 90-day maximum period for suspension shall
apply to all those who are validly charged under RA 3019, whether elective or appointive officer
or employee (Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96131, September 6, 1991).
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CYBERLIBEL
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally
protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals
from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in
relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4)
above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing
libel.
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However, the place where libelous article was accessed by the offended party in the
internet is not equivalent to the place where the libelous article is printed and first
published within the contemplation of the rule on venue under Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code.
To rule otherwise is to allow the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article
360, and that was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant,
isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an
accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the
offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite
or the need for revenge.
To equate the first access to the defamatory article on website with "printing and first
publication of the article" would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the
RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos
that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who
posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private
complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
At any rate, Article 360 still allow offended party to file the civil or criminal complaint
for internet libel in their respective places of residence (Bonifacio vs. RTC, Makati, Branch
149,G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010)
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