(8) SPOUSES PELAGIO GULLA and PERLITA GULLA vs.

HEIRS OF ALEJANDRO
LABRADOR G.R. No. 149418 July 27, 2006
DOCTRINE:
While it is true that the salvage zone cannot be the subject of commerce, the adjoining owner
thereof, has the priority to use it. The law provides the different modes of acquiring ownership and
accession is not among the modes of acquiring ownership. Accession is a right implicitly included
in ownership, without which it will have no basis or existence. The right to accession is automatic,
requiring no prior act on the part of the owner of the principal.
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for "Cancellation of Tax Declaration and
Recovery of Possession with Damages" (accion publiciana) involving a lot and another lot abutting
the titled property. According to the respondents, the property was declared for taxation purposes
under their names and the corresponding taxes were paid thereon. In 1996, the petitioners
occupied a portion of the property fronting the China Sea, as well as the lot within the salvage area.
The respondents pointed out that whatever alleged claims the petitioners had on the property was
acquired through a Deed of Waiver of Rights executed in 1986 in their favor by another "squatter"
Alfonso Bactad. For their part, the petitioners claimed that they had been in possession of the
property, since 1984 and declared the property for taxation purposes under their names. In 1994,
they filed an application for miscellaneous sales patent which was certified as alienable and
disposable land by the barangay captain.
In 1998, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of the Labradors, ordering the spouses Gulla
to vacate the portion of the property occupied by them and the lot within the salvage zone.
According to the MTC, the Labradors were able to establish ownership over the subject property,
as evidenced by the title under their name. For their part, the petitioners failed to overcome the
evidence of the respondents, and not being the riparian owners of the lot which is within the
salvage zone, they have no right to possess the same.
On appeal, the RTC rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision. Applying Article 440
of the New Civil Code, the RTC declared that the Labradors had the right to possess the land, it
being inseparably attached to the titled property as an accessory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the possession of the area outside the titled
property of the respondents and is within the Salvage Zone.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners should be ejected even if the portion occupied by them is in the salvage
zone. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially (Article 440, Civil
Code). Accession is the right of an owner of a thing to the products of said thing as well as to
whatever is inseparably attached thereto as an accessory.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the area is outside the titled property of the
respondents and is within the salvage zone adjacent to respondents property. However, while it is
true that the salvage zone cannot be the subject of commerce, the adjoining owner thereof, the
respondents in this case, has the priority to use it. Otherwise stated, herein respondents do not
own the salvage zone but as an adjacent owner, he has the right to use it more than the petitioners
applying the basic rule as stated above. Moreover, the law provides the different modes of
acquiring ownership and accession is not among the modes of acquiring ownership. Accession is a
right implicitly included in ownership, without which it will have no basis or existence. In general,

the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner of the
principal.
(10) BALUCANAG VS. FRANCISCO122 SCRA 344
FACTS:
The petitioner bought a lot owned by Mrs.Charvet which was then previously leased by the latter to
one Richard Stohner. The said lease contract provided that the lessee may erect structures and
improvements which shall remain as lessee's property and he may remove them at any time. It
further provided that should the lessee fail to remove the same structures or improvements within
two months after the expiration of the lease, the lessor may remove them or cause them to be
removed at the expense of the lessee. Stohner made fillings on the land and constructed a house.
When he failed to pay the rent, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Stohner a demand letter
ordering him to vacate the lot. The lessee contended that he is a 'builder in good faith.
ISSUE:
Is the lessee a builder in good faith?
HELD:
No, the lessee cannot be considered a builder in good faith. The provision under Art. 448 of the
New Civil Code (Philippine) on a builder of good faith applies only to the owner of the land who
believes he is the rightful owner thereof, but not to a lessee who's interest in the land is derived
only from a rental contract. Neither can Stohner be considered a 'possessor in good faith'. A
possessor in good faith is a party who possesses property believing that he is its rightful owner but
discovers later on a flaw in his title that could indicate that he might not be its legal owner. It cannot
apply to a lessee because he knows right from the start that he is merely a lessee and not the
owner of the premises. As a mere lessee, he introduces improvements to the property at his own
risk such that he cannot recover from the owner the reimbursements nor he has any right to retain
the premises until reimbursements. What applies in this case is Art. 1678 (NCC) which provides
that, " if the lessee, makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for
which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the
lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee 1/2 of the value of the improvements
at the time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however,
cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
(12) G.R. NO.157044. OCTOBER 5, 2005ROSALES VS. CASTELLFORT
FACTS:
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales (petitioners) are the registered
owners of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 315 square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36856[4] and designated as Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision Plan
LRCPsd-55244 situated in Los Baos, Laguna. On August 16, 1995, petitioners discovered that a
house was being constructed on their lot, without their knowledge and consent, by respondent
Miguel Castelltort (Castelltort).It turned out that respondents Castelltort and his wife Judith had
purchased a lot, Lot 16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from respondent Lina Lopez-Villegas (Lina)
through her son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas (Villegas) but that after a survey thereof by geodetic
engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed to Lot17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts purchased.
Negotiations for the settlement of the case thus began, with Villegas offering a larger lot near
petitioners lot in the same subdivision as a replacement thereof. In the alternative, Villegas

proposed to pay the purchase price of petitioners lot with legal interest. Both proposals were,
however, rejected by petitioners whose counsel, by letter of August 24, 1995, directed Castelltort to
stop the construction of and demolish his house and any other structure he may have built thereon,
and desist from entering the lot. Petitioners subsequently filed on September 1, 1995 a complaint
for recovery of possession and damages with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and
preliminary injunction against spouses-respondents Miguel and Judith Castelltort before the RTC of
Calamba, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No.2229-95-C.
ISSUE:
Under Art 448, who has the right of option?
HELD:
Under the foregoing provision (Art 448), the landowner can choose between appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless
its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the builder in good faith
shall pay reasonable rent.[34] If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease,
the court must fix the terms thereof. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that
accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the
other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of
the building to remove it from the land. The raison detre for this provision has be enenunciated
thus: Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between
the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing
injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced coownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire
the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay
for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the
owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because,
by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing
(13) LUMUNGO V. USMAN25 SCRA 255
FACTS:
Dominga Usman sold and transfers her rights in and to the 3 lots in question to Jose Angeles. The
latter made the purchase with the knowledge that the property was already in dispute by
Atty.Usman, husband of Dominga, and by the plaintiffs. Angeles, upon taking possession of the
land, planted the same with coconuts, which, together with those already planted by Dominga
Usman, numbered about3,000, most of which are now fruit-bearing. In short, Angeles was a
purchaser and a builder in bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Angeles is entitled to reimbursement for the coconuts tree he planted on the
property in litigation.
HELD:
No. It should be noted that said trees reimprovements, not "necessary expenses of preservation,"
which a builder, planter or sower in bad faith may recover under Arts. 452 and 546, first paragraph,
of the Civil Code. The facts and findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals leave no
room for doubt that Jose Angeles was a purchaser and a builder in bad faith.

The provision applicable to this case is, accordingly, Article 449 of the Civil Code, which provides
that, "he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted
or sown without right to indemnity.
(14) MUNICIPALITY OF OAS V. ROA7 PHIL. 20
FACTS:
The Municipality brought the action for the recovery of a tract of land in the pueblo of Oas, claiming
that it was a part of the public square of said town, while Roa alleged that he was the owner of the
property. The defendant admitted in writing that he knew that the land is owned by the Municipality
and that Jose Castillo, whom he bought the property did not own the land. When Roa constructed
a substantial building on the property in question after he acquired the property from Castillo, the
Municipality did not oppose the construction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipality owns the land.
HELD:Yes.
The defendant was not a purchaser in good faith. The plaintiff, having permitted the erection by the
defendant of a building on the land without objection, acted in bad faith. The rights of the parties
must, therefore, be determined as if they both had acted in good faith. To the case are applicable
those provisions of the Civil Code which relate to the construction by one person of a building upon
land belonging to another. Article 364 (now Art.453) of the Civil Code is as follows: "When there
has been bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sowed, or planted on another's
land, but also on the part of the owner of the latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if they
had acted in good faith. The Supreme declared that the Municipality is the owner of the land and
that it has the option of buying the building thereon, which is the property of the defendant, or of
selling to him the land on which it stands.
(15) GOVERNMENT V. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE53 PHIL. 423
FACTS:
During the months of September to November every year, the waters of Laguna de Bay cover a
long strip of land along the eastern border of the two parcels of land in question. The claimant
Colegio de San Jose contends that the parcels of land are a part of the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasan belonging it, which has been in possession thereof since time immemorial by means of its
tenants or lessees and farmers. In contrast, the Government contends that the said two parcels of
land belong to the public domain, and its evidence tends to prove that they have always been
known as the shores of Laguna de Bay. The CFI rendered a decision in favor of Colegio de San
Jose ordering the registration of the 2 parcels of land in accordance with law. Both admitted that
the strip was formerly covered by water but since the Bay receded, it was now uncovered. The
government tried to apply Art.458 which states the adjoin estate (the College) does not acquire the
land left dry by the natural decrease of the waters.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Art. 458 is applicable.
Whether or not the property in question belongs to the public domain as a part of the bed of
Laguna deBay.
HELD:
No. Article 367 (now Art.458) provides that the owners of estates bordering on ponds or lagoons,
do not acquire the land left dry by the natural decrease of the waters, nor lose those inundated by

them in extraordinary floods. The provision refers to ponds and lagoons, and has therefore no
application to the present case, which refers to a lake, a lagoon being legally distinct in character
from a lake. Instead,Art.77 of the Spanish Law of Waters should apply, which provides: Lands
accidentally inundated by the waters of lakes, or by creeks, rivers or other streams shall continue
to be the property of their respective owners. Therefore, they must belong to Colegio deSan Jose
as part of Hacienda de San PedroTunasan, which was originally owned by it.
(17) CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY 384 SCRA 152
FACTS:
President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the
development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then
president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the ManilaCavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project. Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the
reclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the
development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any
public bidding. Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the
JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that
the lands that PEA was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title
over the Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos toform an
investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA. Petitioner now comes and contends that the
government stands to lose billions by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He
also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between the parties.
ISSUE:
W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
HELD:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. The 1987
Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources are owned by
the State and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot
be alienated. The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares
of the 750 hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still
submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the
actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be
incurred. The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public
domain, waters and other natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such,
foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as agricultural
lands of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesnt convert these
inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable and disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
(18) RACHEL C. CELESTIAL VS JESSE CACHOPERO
Gr. No. 142595. October 15, 2003
Facts:

Respondent, brother of petitioner, filed an MSA (Miscellaneous Sales Application)with the Bureau
of Lands. Petitioner filed a protest, claiming preferential right over the land. However, on an ocular
inspection, the Bureau found that the subject land was outside the commerce of man and thus,
denied the petitioners protest. Petitioner thereafter filed an ejectment case against the respondent.
Subsequently, respondent filed another MSA which the petitioner once again protested against.
The DENR Regional Executive Director declared that the land is suitable for residential purposes
and in the light of the conflicting interest of the parties, ordered that the land be sold at public
auction. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order but was denied by the
OIC Regional Executive Director of Region XII. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioner
then moved for the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The RTC denied respondents petition. The CA on the other hand, reversed and set aside the
decision of the CA and ordered the DENR to process the MSA of the respondent. Petitioner
contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the respondents petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari.
Ruling:
Yes. Petition for review of a decision of a quasi-judicial agency under rule 43 and petition for
review under rule 65 is separate and distinct. The petition filed before the RTC clearly shows that it
alleged the DENR acted with grave abuse of discretion and without or in excess of jurisdiction
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Orders through a special civil action for certiorari was within the
jurisdiction of the RTC
(19) IGLESIA NI CRISTO et.al. vs. HON. THELMA PONFERRADA et.al.G.R.
No.168943OCTOBER 27, 2006
Facts:
In October 2001, Enrique Santos et.al filed a complaint for quieting of title and/or accion
reinvidincatoria against Iglesia ni Cristo. They alleged that they are owner of a 936 sq.m. parcel of
land in Tandang Sora, Quezon City which they inherited from Enrique Sr. Iglesia filed a motion to
dismiss contending that the action has prescribed. It appears that it was able to obtain a TCT over
the same parcel of land way back in 1984-the year when the title was issued in their favor. In
support of its contention, Iglesia contended that the
accion reinvidincatoria presupposes that the plaintiff is not in actual possession of the property he
seeks to recover. Thus, this is true in this case because it (iglesia) was in possession of the
property in 1984 when the title was issued to it.
HELD:
Petitioners claim that it had been in actual or material possession of the property since 1984 when
TCT No. 321744 was issued in its favor is belied by the allegations in the complaint that
respondents had been in actual and material possession of the property since 1961 up to the time
they filed their complaint on October 24, 2001.Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative
reinvindicatory action against petitioner. An
accion reinvidincatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the actual and material possession of
the property is on defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery of such possession from
defendant. It bears stressing that an accion reinvidincatoria is a remedy seeking the recovery of
ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as well. It is an action whereby a
party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. Thus, the

owner of real property in actual and material possession thereof may file an accion reinvidincatoria
against another seeking ownership over a parcel of land including jus vindicandi, or the right to
exclude defendants from the possession thereof. In this case, respondents filed an alternative
reinvindicatory action claiming ownership over the property and the cancellation of TCT No.
321744 under the name of petitioner. In fine, they sought to enforce their jus utendi and jus
vindicandi when petitioner claimed ownership and prevented them from fencing the property.
Limitations on the right of ownership:
1. Limitations imposed for the benefit of the State- police power [ e.g. SECTION. 16.( Republic Act
No. 7160)General Welfare. - eminent domain; and Taxation
2. Limitations imposed by the Law- legal easement of waters [Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged
to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher
estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them. The owner of the lower estate
cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate
make works which will increase the burden.] (552) ]or legal easement of right of way [Art. 649. The
owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a
public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment
of the proper indemnity]
3. Limitations imposed by the owner- e.g. lease/pledge4. Limitations imposed by the grantor- donor
may prohibit partition [ e.g. Art. 1083.Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate
unless the testator should have expressly forbidden its partition, in which case the period of
indivision shall not exceed twenty years as provided in article 494. This power of the testator to
prohibit division applies to the legitime.
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates when any of the causes for
which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when the court findsfor compelling reasons that
division should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs.