Consti Cases Secret Files

Constitutional law 1 case digest 201
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MACARIOLA vs. ASUNCION
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that Judge Asuncion violated Art.14 of the Code of Commerce. The
cited provision prohibits public officers from engaging in business.
HELD: Judge Asuncion did not, or cannot, violate it since such provision is deemed
abrogated
Although the cited provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce, it
however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship
between the government and certain public officials and employees.
Political law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with
the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the state and defines
the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory. Political law embraces
constitutional law, law of public officers and corporations, administrative law.
Specifically, Art.14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of
administrative Law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and
employees with respect to engaging in business, hence, political in essence.
Note that the Code of Commerce took effect on 1888. Upon the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to US and later from US to RP, Art.14 of the Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been automatically abrogated because where
there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign,
whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly reenacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign.
LAWYERS LEAGUE vs. AQUINO
FACTS:
The legitimacy of the Aquino Govt is questioned on the ground that it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
HELD:
Petitioners had no personality to sue and petition states no cause of action.
RULING:
a.)Legitimacy of Aquino govt belongs to realm of politics where only the people of
the Philippines are the judge (not a justiciable matter)
b.) The people have made the judgment, accepting the Aquino govt w/c is in
effective control of the entire country.
c.) Aquino govt is not merely a de facto govt but in fact and law a de jure govt..
d.) Community of nations has recognized its legitimacy.
e.) All 11 members of SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic
under Aquino govt.
The legitimacy of the Aquino admimistration is not a justiciable matter but a political
one. It is political because it belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of
the Philippines are the judge.
The Aquino government is a de jure and a de facto government for the people have
made the judgment and have accepted the government of President Aquino which is
in effective control of the entire country.
From the efforts of 4-manresa class 2013
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The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government
and all the 11 members of the Supreme Court have sworn to uphold the fundamental
law of the Republic under her government.
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
FACTS:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer,
quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article
XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in
the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the
Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to
who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President
Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7
ISSUE: WON the provision is ambiguous?
HELD: No
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of
action.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of
ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being
a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional
Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and VicePresident Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension
of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections.
Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the
second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and VicePresident under said 1986 Constitution.
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For
the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the
people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover,
the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government.
All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Lawyers League for a Better
Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al)
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis
mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and VicePresident Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and VicePresident of the Republic of the Philippines.or the above-quoted reasons, which are
fully applicable to the petition at bar,
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LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals
dated 14 November 1990.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals on 1980. On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reogranized and became the
Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to BP Blg. 129. On 1984, petitoner was
appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. Thus, he ceased
to be a member of the Judiciary. After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a
reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. A Screening
Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate Court and lower
courts recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new court of
Appeals and assigned him the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court
justices. When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's seniority
ranking changes from number 11 to 26.
Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to
"inadvertence" of the President, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of
Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction
of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and
Javellana who are affected by the ordered correction.
They alleged that petioner could not claim reappointment because the courts where
he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
ISSUE: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of
Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court exisiting before the promulgation of E.O.
No. 33.
HELD: The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court
existing prior to E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the
1987 Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was established under E.O. No. 33 is
considered as an entirely new court.
The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts
existing before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization
launched by the revolutionary goverment of Corazon Aqwuino in the aftermath of the
people power in 1986.
Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in
any country or state by those who were previously subject to it." or "as suddent.
radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."
DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners
as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Petitioner received a
Memorandum signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra designating
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respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of
Local Government."
Respondent OIC Governor also signed a Memorandum designating other respondents
as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. So the
OIC governor in the memorandum ordered the replacement of all baranggay officials
of all the baranggays in the municipality of taytay rizal
Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda be declared null and void and that
respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6)
years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors
shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. That with the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the
authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
Respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February
25,1986.
Respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted
provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the
provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to
six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the
aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution. So elective officials under the
1973 Constitution may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the
occurrence of any of the events mentioned.
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no
proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials.
ISSUE: WON the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.
HELD: Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that
February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not
December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the
aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been
overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all
previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III,
thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore,
the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of
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1982 5 should still govern. Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing
inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the
1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative.
Thus, Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor declared to be of no legal force
and effect
TANADA vs. TUVERA
FACTS:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders,
proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders.
Respondents contended that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the OG is
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC.
ISSUES: WON petitioners have legal standing? And WON various laws in question
should be published to be valid and enforceable?
HELD: The petitioners have legal standing. The SC has already decided in various
cases that a party has a cause of action when the question posed is one of public
right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty.
The people are regarded as the real party in interest and need not show that he has
any legal or special interest in the result it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws.
The SC also ruled that laws should be published. The clear object of such is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of all Presidential issuances pf a public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. PDs that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or impose a burden such as tax and revenue measures fall within this
category. Other PDs which apply only to particular persosn or calss of persons such
as AOs and Eos need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the outstanding shares of Manila Hotel. Only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% shares at P41.58/share, and a Malaysian firm, at P44.00/share.
Pending the declaration of the winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid price of
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P44.00 per share tendered by the Malaysian Firm which respondent GSIS refused to
accept. The petitioner posits that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony,
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm
invoking Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, WON Manila Hotel falls under the
term national patrimony.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, WON selling
mere 51% shares and not the land itself can be considered part of national
patrimony.
4. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
1. Yes. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
It is per se judicially enforceable The Constitution mandates that qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. Yes.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to
the natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
3. Yes. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands.
4. Yes. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by the foreign
firm, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the shares
of MHC in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with
the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm
clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence,
GSIS(respondent) is ordered to accept the matching bid of
petitioner and execute the necessary clearances for the purchase of the
subject 51% MHC shares.
Reasoning: The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
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DOMINO vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the Province of Sarangani indicating in his certificate that he had
resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2)
months immediately preceding the election. On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd
Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the
position of representative of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement
and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of
voters declaring DOMINO a resident of the province of Sarangani and not of Quezon
City acquire the nature of res judicata.
2. WON DOMINO was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year
immediately preceding the election.
3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition of
DOMINO.
4. WON, the candidate who received the next highest number of votes can be
proclaimed as the winning candidate in the light of DOMINOs disqualification?
RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion proceedings
declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final
and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained. It is not within the
competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceeding, to declare the challenged
voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over
exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of
voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in
which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification.
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.For the decision to be
a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be
between the first and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter
and identity of causes of action.
2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing
the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as
"domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be
deemed lost until a new one is established. 25 To successfully effect a change of
domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
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new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. 26 In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of obtaining the
highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate. 41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath
of office before he can be considered a member of the House of Representatives.
Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member
of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral
Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. It would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC

July 31, 2012
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the
Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court.
FACTS:
COA Opinion states that there was underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted
when 5 retired SC justices purchased from the SC the personal properties assigned to
them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to
the use by the Property Division of the SC of the wrong formula in computing the
appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property
Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, when it
should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT COA CAN IMPOSE ITS OWN COMPUTATION IN THE DISPOSAL OF
COURT PROPERTIES.
RULING: NO.
Separation of Powers
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact
that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And
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the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks
the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other
hand, extends from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to
avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped,
would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising
their respective mandates; lack of independence would result in the inability of one
branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or
others. (Angara v. Electoral Commission)
Judicial Independence
Judicial independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely
exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a
whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints
and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the
Constitution itself.
Thus, judicial independence can be broken down into two distinct concepts:
decisional independence and institutional independence. Decisional independence
"refers to a judges ability to render decisions free from political or popular influence
based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." On the other hand,
institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the
executive and legislative branches of government." Simply put, institutional
independence refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a body."
Individual judicial independence focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure
his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A
judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear
or at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his
personal morality and fitness for judicial office. Institutional judicial independence
focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects
judges as a class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence
are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the
judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority.
Fiscal Autonomy
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional
grant of fiscal autonomy.
The fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate
and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation
and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions. (Bengzon v. Drilon)
Application to the Present Case
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The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as
its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control
and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court En Bancs Resolution in
A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in
allowing the sale of the Judiciarys properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court
and the appellate courts.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to
determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed
of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are
exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of
the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the
Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs.
G.R. No. 164763
February 12, 2008
ZENON R. PEREZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
PETITIONER Zenon R. Perez seeks a review of his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Petitioner argues that the penalty meted for the crime of malversation of public funds
"that have been replenished, remitted and/or returned" to the government is cruel
and therefore unconstitutional, "as government has not suffered any damage."
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LAW RELIED UPON IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER AND THE
SENTENCE IMPOSED IS CRUEL AND THEREFORE VIOLATES SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III
(BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE CONSTITUTION.
RULING: NO. The argument is specious on two grounds.
First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property,
shall appropriate the same, or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or
through abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such
public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may
only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an
element of malversation.
Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in
harmony with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that
the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which
operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the
law. It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So,
it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or
will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such
law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of
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constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of
petitioner, must fail.
G.R. No. 171101
July 5, 2011 and
November 22, 2011 (on MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION)
HACIENDA LUISITA, vs. PARC.
FACTS:
The hacienda luisita was comprised of 6,443 hectares and owned by Compaia
General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, Tabacalera sold the land to the
Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco) owned by the Cojuancos.
In 1980 martial law administration filed a suit before the RTC Manila against Tadeco
for it to surrender the hacienda to MAR (now DAR) so the land will be distributed to
farmers. Manila RTC ruled against Tadeco. Tadeco appealed to CA.
In 1988, OSG moved to withdraw the governments case against Tadeco, et al. Thus,
the CA dismissed the case. The dismissal action was, however, made subject to the
obtention by Tadeco of the PARCs approval of a stock distribution plan (SDP) that
must initially be implemented after such approval shall have been secured and the
case will be revived if any of the conditions is not duly complied with by the TADECO.
Markedly, Section 10 of EO 229 allows corporate landowners, as an alternative to the
actual land transfer scheme of CARP, to give qualified beneficiaries the right to
purchase shares of stocks of the corporation under a stock ownership arrangement
and/or land-to-share ratio.
Like EO 229, RA 6657, Sec. 31, also provides two (2) alternative modalities, i.e., land
or stock transfer, pursuant to either of which the corporate landowner can comply
with CARP, but subject to well-defined conditions and timeline requirements.
In 2003, two separate petitions reached the DAR. In the first, respondents Jose Julio
Suniga and Windsor Andaya, identifying themselves as head of the Supervisory
Group of HLI (Supervisory Group), and 60 other supervisors sought to revoke the
SDOA, alleging violations by HLI of the SDOAs terms. They prayed for a renegotiation
of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation.
Revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands in the
hacienda were the call in the second petition. The Petition was ostensibly filed by
Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA), where the
handwritten name of respondents Rene Galang as "Pangulo AMBALA" and Noel
Mallari as "Sec-Gen. AMBALA" appeared. As alleged, the petition was filed on behalf
of AMBALAs members purportedly composing about 80% of the 5,339 FWBs of
Hacienda Luisita.
On December 2, 2006, Noel Mallari, impleaded by HLI as respondent in his capacity
as "Sec-Gen. AMBALA," filed his Manifestation and stated that he has broken away
from AMBALA with other AMBALA ex-members and formed Farmworkers Agrarian
Reform Movement, Inc. (FARM). Should this shift in alliance deny him standing, Mallari
also prayed that FARM be allowed to intervene.
ISSUES:
I.
WHETHER THE PETITIONERS THEREIN ARE THE REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST
TO FILE SAID PETITIONS.
RULING: YES.
Supervisory
Group,
AMBALA
and
their
respective leaders are real parties-in-interest
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The SDOA no less identifies "the SDP qualified beneficiaries" as "the farmworkers who
appear in the annual payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees,
who are regularly or periodically employed by HLI." Galang, per HLIs own admission,
is employed by HLI, and is, thus, a qualified beneficiary of the SDP; he comes within
the definition of a real party-in-interest under Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
meaning, one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or is
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
The same holds true with respect to the Supervisory Group whose members were
admittedly employed by HLI and whose names and signatures even appeared in the
annex of the SDOA. Being qualified beneficiaries of the SDP, Suniga and the other 61
supervisors are certainly parties who would benefit or be prejudiced by the judgment
recalling the SDP or replacing it with some other modality to comply with RA 6657.
Even assuming that members of the Supervisory Group are not regular farmworkers,
but are in the category of "other farmworkers" mentioned in Sec. 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution, thus only entitled to a share of the fruits of the land, this does not
detract from the fact that they are still identified as being among the "SDP qualified
beneficiaries." As such, they are, thus, entitled to bring an action upon the SDP.
Further, under Sec. 50, paragraph 4 of RA 6657, farmer-leaders are expressly allowed
to represent themselves, their fellow farmers or their organizations in any
proceedings before the DAR. Clearly, the respective leaders of the Supervisory Group
and AMBALA are contextually real parties-in-interest allowed by law to file a petition
before the DAR or PARC.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT SEC. 31 OF RA 6657 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RULING: NO.
FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the
corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock distribution, an
arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the fundamental right of farmers and
farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and pass
upon the constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative departments, it does
so only when the following essential requirements are first met, to wit:
(1) there is an actual case or controversy;
(2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity by a
proper party or one with locus standi; and
(3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.
Raised at the earliest possible opportunity
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, has yet to
explain its failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, since as
early as November 21, 1989 when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at
least within a reasonable time thereafter. FARM raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31
only on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental Comment with the Court. Thus, it
took FARM some 18 years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the day. The FARM
members slept on their rights and even accepted benefits from the SDP with nary a
complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were
derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional issue that
FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of
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numerous events and activities which resulted from the application of an alleged
unconstitutional legal provision.
It has been emphasized in a number of cases that the question of constitutionality
will not be passed upon by the Court unless it is properly raised and presented in an
appropriate case at the first opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly
questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657.
Very lis mota of the case
The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical
to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever
plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If
some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the
constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored. Garcia v. Executive Secretary
explains why:
Lis Mota means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality,
although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground,
such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able
to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question
raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative, or argumentative.
The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by
AMBALA (to which the FARM members previously belonged) and the Supervisory
Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to support
a plea for its revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC
acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such noncompliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends certain
constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be
resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover,
looking deeply into the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said
section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the said
provision in the SDP that is flawed.
Moot and Academic
Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA
6657 vis--vis the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part,
Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: "That after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition
shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition." Thus, for all
intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no
longer an available option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is
unconstitutional should be a moot issue.
It is true that the Court, in some cases, has proceeded to resolve constitutional issues
otherwise already moot and academic provided the following requisites are present:
First, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved;
Third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
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These requisites do not obtain in the case at bar.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE.
RULING: YES.
Applicability of the Operative Fact Doctrine
While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita subject of PARC
Resolution Nos. 2005-32-01 and 2006-34-01, the Court cannot close its eyes to
certain "operative facts" that had occurred in the interim. Pertinently, the "operative
fact" doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or executive action null and void, or,
by extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting
unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be, since rights might
have accrued in favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in
the meantime. The actual existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a
determination, an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
(a) Operative Fact Doctrine Not Limited to Invalid or Unconstitutional Laws
Contrary to the stance of respondents, the operative fact doctrine does not only
apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to
executive acts subsequently declared as invalid as embodied in De Agbayani v. Court
of Appeals.
The Chicot doctrine advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an
imperative necessity of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact
negating the acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever
was done while the legislative or the executive act was in operation should be duly
recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects.
Bearing in mind that PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2an executive actwas declared
invalid in the instant case, the operative fact doctrine is clearly applicable.
Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of the
operative fact doctrine should be limited to statutes and rules and regulations issued
by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute
or those which are quasi-legislative in nature that have the force and effect of law.
We disagree. While orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the
executive branch have fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code and
jurisprudence, the phrase "executive act" does not have such specific definition
under existing laws. It should be noted that in the cases cited by the minority,
nowhere can it be found that the term "executive act" is confined to the foregoing.
Contrarily, the term "executive act" is broad enough to encompass decisions of
administrative bodies and agencies under the executive department which are
subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court.
(b) The Operative Fact Doctrine as Recourse in Equity
Undeniably, the operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. Remarkably, it is applied
only in the absence of statutory law and never in contravention of said law.
In the instant case, respondents argue that the operative fact doctrine should not be
applied since there is a positive law, particularly, Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which directs
the distribution of the land as a result of the revocation of the SDP. Pertinently, the
last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 states:
If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the land or stock transfer
envisioned above is not made or realized or the plan for such stock distribution
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approved by the PARC within the same period, the agricultural land of the corporate
owners or corporation shall be subject to the compulsory coverage of this Act.
Markedly, the use of the word "or" under the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657
connotes that the law gives the corporate landowner an "option" to avail of the stock
distribution option or to have the SDP approved within two (2) years from the
approval of RA 6657. This interpretation is consistent with the well-established
principle in statutory construction that "the word or is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a
disjunctive word."
In its elementary sense, "or", as used in a statute, is a disjunctive article
indicating an alternative. It often connects a series of words or propositions
indicating a choice of either. When "or" is used, the various members of the
enumeration are to be taken separately.
Given that HLI secured approval of its SDP in November 1989, well within the twoyear period reckoned from June 1988 when RA 6657 took effect, then HLI did not
violate the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Pertinently, said provision does not
bar Us from applying the operative fact doctrine.
G. R. No. 180989
February 7, 2012
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA, vs.CHAIRPERSON.
FACTS:
With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government
operations, the COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, the circular in issue,
which lifted the pre-audit of government transactions of national government
agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs).
On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He
alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere
circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2
of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack of
pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been
committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550million call center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and
many others.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing.
RULING: YES. This Petition has been filed as a taxpayers suit.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution. Petitioner claims that the issuance of
Circular No. 89-299 has led to the dissipation of public funds through numerous
irregularities in government financial transactions. These transactions have allegedly
been left unchecked by the lifting of the pre-audit performed by COA, which,
petitioner argues, is its Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner has standing to file this
suit as a taxpayer, since he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public
money.
G.R. No. 185053
February 15, 2012
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EUSTAQUIO CANDARI vs. ROLAND DONASCO
FACTS:
Respondents were members of the board of directors of Dolefil Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Cooperative, Incorporated (DARBCI). They were elected into office and
their terms should have ended on 12 July 2000. However, they continued to occupy
their positions in a holdover capacity.
On 23 November 2005, respondents instituted Civil Case in RTC of Polomolok, South
Cotabato to enjoin petitioners from holding a special general assembly (GA) and an
election of officers. Respondents alleged that the process by which the GA had been
called was not in accordance with Sec. 35 of Republic Act No. 6938, otherwise known
as the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.
The RTC issued a 72-hour TRO to restrain petitioners from holding the GA. Despite the
TRO, but without the participation of petitioners, 5,910 members or 78.68% of the
total membership of the cooperative went through with the GA and elected
petitioners in absentia as new members of the board.
During the 20 December 2008 meeting, the GA ratified the Amended Articles of
Cooperation and the Amended By-Laws of the cooperative. A Certificate of
Registration to that effect was issued by Cooperative Development Authority (CDA).
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents still have a cause of action to file the case.
RULING: NO. There is no cause of action since the issue has already become moot.
In the present case, the GA has clearly expressed its intentions through the
subsequent amendment of DARBCIs Articles of Cooperation and By-Laws and
through the election of new officers.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic
or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale,
such as the case before us.
The supervening events had rendered the case moot through the voluntary act of the
GA as the highest policy-making body of the cooperative to declare the contested
positions vacant and to elect a new set of officers. As a consequence, respondents no
longer had the personality or the cause of action to maintain the case against
petitioners herein.
G.R. No. 193978
February 28, 2012
JELBERT B. GALICTO, vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
FACTS:
On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the
alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of
the Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a
government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to
meet its standing obligations.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises,
conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries,
allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs).
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Based on its findings, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 "urging the
President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently
excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the
governing boards of GOCCs and GFIs.
Pres. Aquino, issued EO 7, which provided for the guiding principles and framework to
establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and
GFIs.
The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the
implementation of EO 7. To support his claim that he has locus standi the petitioner
contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he "stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7,
which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or
increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and curtail[s] the
prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation." The
petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good standing
who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are
legally and validly issued and implemented.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149,
otherwise known as the "GOCC Governance Act of 2011." Section 11 of RA 10149
expressly authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and
GFIs.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE SHOULD PROSPER.
RULING: NO.
I.
Petitioner has no legal standing
"Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions." This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that
this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.25
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to "raise a constitutional question" when
(1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved,
or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest,
as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest."
In the present case, the petitioner has no material interest in the outcome of the
case. The curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but
be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. He has no vested rights to
salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of
legal standing to assail EO 7.
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Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioners claim that he is
instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an
interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and
validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded by the Court "as too general
an interest which is shared by other groups and by the whole citizenry."
While the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the
power of the President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with
possible implications on their officials and employees, the same cannot "infuse" or
give the petitioner locus standi under the transcendental importance or paramount
public interest doctrine. In Velarde v. Social Justice Society, we held that even if the
Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standi requirement,
such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be
resolved any way, due to procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present
case. In other words, giving due course to the present petition which is saddled with
formal and procedural infirmities, cannot but be an exercise in futility that does not
merit the Courts liberality.
II. The petition has been mooted by supervening events.
A moot case is "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value." "An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead, or when
the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties x
x x. Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x x court to resolve as its determination
x x x has been overtaken by subsequent events."
This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly
empowered the President to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs.
For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be
an academic exercise. Any further discussion of the constitutionality of EO 7 serves
no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of the enactment of R.A.
No. 10149.
G.R. No. 164987
April 24, 2012
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FACTS:
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who
have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or
social monopoly in the country, sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary of DBM from making,
and releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of Congress as "pork
barrel" funds out of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). LAMP likewise
aimed to stop the National Treasurer and COA from enforcing the questioned
provision.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MANDATORY REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW ARE MET
RULING: YES.
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The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act
or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In
our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to
the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the
Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects
is the core of the laws flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional
transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers,
LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality
would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn,
cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present
controversy.
Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The gist of the question
of standing is whether a party alleges "such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions." In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public,
asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may
be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and could be suing
as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to
sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 21 Of greater import
than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF
funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
FUNA VS. VILLAR 670 SCRA 570 (2012)

Facts: Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to
April 14, 2008 following the retirement of Chairman Carague. Villar was nominated
and appointed as Chairman of COA. He was to serve until February 2, 2011.
Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Villar as Chairman and
prays that the appointment be declared unconstitutional for violationg sec 1(2), Art
IX(D).
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Before the SC could resolve the petition, Villar vacated his position when Pres Aquino
III named Pulido-Tan as COA Chairman.
Issue: Whether or not the petition of Funa became moot and academic.
Held: Yes. A case is moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, or
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening
events, so that a resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no
practical value or use. There is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would
be entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic
petition. As a general rule, it is not within the SCs charge and function to act upon
and decide a moot case, except if: 1. there is grave violation of the Constitution; 2.
the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; 3. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 4. the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
The procedural requisites for the exercise of judicial review are: 1. there must be an
actual case or justiciable controversy before the court; 2. question before it must be
ripe for adjudication; 3. the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and 4.
the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be
the very lis mota of the case.
To have legal standing, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a
direct injury as a result of a government action or have a material interest in the
issue affected by the challenged official act. However, the Court has acted liberally
on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain individuals not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act standing to
sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule on
locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality.
The SC laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called non-traditional suitors
may be extended standing to sue: 1. cases involve constitutional issues; 2. for
taxpayers, there must be claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional; 3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in question; 4. for concerned citizens, there
must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and 5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
This case is of transcendental importance, since it has far-reaching implications and
there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in
future analogous cases.
Note: The main issues in this case were the term of office of the commissioners,
rotational plan, etc.
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CAPALLA VS. VILLAR 673 SCRA 1 (2012)

Facts: Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to
Purchase the PCOS, both software and hardware for an Automated Election System
for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections (AES Contract).
Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 to exercise the option but opted not to
exercise the same except for the 920 units of PCOS machines. Comelec seriously
considered to exercise the option and so it was given until March 31, 2012, the
extended period to exercise the option to purchase.
According to Capalla, et al the extended option to purchase the PCOS, as well as the
AES Contract is contrary to law and the Constitution.
The SC already rendered a decision on June 13, 2012 dismissing the petitions of
Capalla, et al. This case is a motion for reconsideration of the SCs decision.
Issue: Whether or not Capalla, et al were correct.
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Held: No. Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the
OTP. The option was, however, not exercised within said period. But the parties later
entered into an extension agreement giving the Comelec until March 31, 2012 within
which to exercise it. With the extension of the period, the Comelec validly exercised
the option and eventually entered into a contract of sale of the subject goods. The
extension of the option period, the subsequent exercise thereof, and the eventual
execution of the Deed of Sale became the subjects of the petitions challenging their
validity in light of the contractual stipulations of respondents and the provisions of RA
9184.
Based on the AES Contract, we sustained the parties right to amend the same by
extending the option period. Considering that the performance security had not been
released to Smartmatic-TIM, the contract was still effective which can still be
amended by the mutual agreement of the parties, such amendment being reduced in
writing. To be sure, the option contract is embodied in the AES Contract whereby the
Comelec was given the right to decide whether or not to buy the subject goods listed
therein under the terms and conditions also agreed upon by the parties.
In this case, the contract is still effective because the performance security has not
been released. Thus, not only the option and warranty provisions survive but the
entire contract as well.
For a previously bidded contract to be nullified, the amendment must be substantial
such that the other bidders were deprived of the terms and opportunities granted to
the winning bidder after it won the same and that it is prejudicial to public interest. In
our assailed decision, we found the amendment not substantial because no
additional right was made available to Smartmatic-TIM that was not previously
available to the other bidders; except for the extension of the option period, the
exercise of the option was still subject to same terms and conditions such as the
purchase price and the warranty provisions; and the amendment is more
advantageous to the Comelec and the public.
Hence, the determination of whether or not a modification or amendment of a
contract bidded out constitutes a substantial amendment rests on whether the
contract, when taken as a whole, would contain substantially different terms and
conditions that would have the effect of altering the technical and/or financial
proposals previously submitted by other bidders.
It must be pointed out that public biddings are held for the best protection of the
public and to give the public the best possible advantages by means of open
competition between the bidders, and to change them without complying with the
bidding requirement would be against public policy. What are prohibited are
modifications or amendments which give the winning bidder an edge or advantage
over the other bidders who took part in the bidding, or which make the signed
contract unfavorable to the government.
While movants may have apprehensions on the effect to government contracts of
allowing "advantage to the government" as justification for the absence of
competitive public bidding, it must be stressed that the same reasoning could only be
used under similar circumstances. The "advantage to the government," time and
budget constraints, the application of the rules on valid amendment of government
contracts, and the successful conduct of the May 2010 elections are among the
factors looked into in arriving at the conclusion that the assailed Resolutions issued
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by the Comelec and the agreement and deed entered into between the Comelec and
Smartmatic-TIM, are valid.
CHAVEZ VS. JBC 676 SCRA 579 (2012)

Facts: Art 8 sec 8 of the Constitution provides:
(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
SC composed of x x x a representative of the Congress x x x
In compliance therewith, Congress designated one representative to sit in the JBC to
act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to
both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the HR and the Senate would send alternate
representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only 1 representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
7 members, an 8th member was added to the JBC as 2 representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC- 1 from HR and 1 from the Senate, with each having of a
vote.
Chavez filed a petition alleging that JBC shall have only 1 representative from
Congress as mandated by Art 8 sec 8 par 1 of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been met in this case.
Held: Yes. Chavez seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and
a nominee to the position of Chief Justice of the SC. As a taxpayer, he invokes his
right to demand that the taxes he and the rest of the citizenry have been paying to
the government are spent for lawful purposes.
The SC disagrees with JBCs contention that Chavez lost his standing to sue because
he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that
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only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question
the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. It is not limited to the nominations for the
highest magistrate in the land. More importantly, the legality of the very process of
nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The SC
considers this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon, lest a constitutional
process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a
right to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same
time, armed with issues of transcendental importance to society.
With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to
perceive from the opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants
established in jurisprudence are attendant in this case: 1. The character of the funds
or other assets involved in the case; 2. The presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and 3. The lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of
constitutional violations in this case are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the
other brances of the government. The allegations are substantiated by facts, and
therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court.
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IDEALS VS. PSALM 682 SCRA 602 (2012)

Facts: EPIRA (RA 9136) mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale, disposition and
privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and
Independent Power Producer contracts.
On May 5, 2010, and after a post-bid evaluation, PSALMs Board of Directors
approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder,
Korea Water Resources for the sale of Angat Hydro-Electric Power including the Angat
Dam, Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed areas.
IDEALS, et al contended that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when in conducting
the bid, it disregarded and violated the peoples right to information guaranteed
under the Constitution. It also alleged that PSALM violated the constitutional
provisions on the appropriation and utilization of water limiting water rights to Filipino
citizens and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned.
PSALM prayed for the dismissal of the petition because it was rendered moot by the
issuance of a Notice of Award in favor of K-Water.
Issue: Whether or not the petition had been mooted by the issuance of the Notice of
Award to K-Water.
Held: No. Though petitioners had sought the immediate issuance of injunction
against the bidding commenced by PSALM-specifically enjoining it from proceeding to
the next step of issuing a notice of award to any of the bidders- they further prayed
that PSALM be permanently enjoined from disposing of AHEPP through privatization.
The petition was thus filed not only as a means of enforcing the States obligation to
protect the citizens right to water but also to bar a foreign corporation from
exploiting our water resources in violation of Art 12 sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution. If
the impending sale of the AHEPP to K-Water indeed violates the Constitution, it is the
duty of the Court to annul the contract award as well as its implementation.
Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not IDEALS, et al possess the requisite.
Held: Yes. Legal Standing or locus standi is a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized
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grievance. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. The SC has adopted a
liberal attitude on locus standi if the issue is of transcendental significance to the
people, as when it is of paramount importance to the public. When the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
Ensuring adequate water supply for domestic use is of paramount importance to the
public. That the continued availability of water in Metro Manila might be
compromised if PSALM proceeds with the privatization of the hydroelectric power
plant confers upon IDEALS et al such personal stake in the resolution of legal issues.
Moreover, if the petition is about the peoples right to information on matters of
public concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. Requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore,
part of the general public which possesses the right.
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ANNOTATION ON LOCUS STANDI 314 SCRA 641

In most cases filed to challenge the constitutional validity of any statute or order, the
issue as to whether the petitioners are the proper parties has been questioned. In
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRAGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO,
_______________
* Member, Board of Editorial Consultants, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
642
642
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, Petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE
HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, In
his capacity as provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as
Provincial treasurer, G.R. NO. 133064, dated SEPTEMBER 16, 1999, the Mayor of the
City of Santiago, the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City and
three residents of Santiago City filed a petition for Writ of Revision assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8028, converting the City of Santiago, Isabela
from an independent component city to a component city, the locus standi of the
petitioners was questioned. The Court in said case held that it is now an ancient rule
that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who sustained a direct
injury as a result of the endorsement.
Annotations have been made on similar issues in the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) such as Constitutionality of Statute or Action Must be Raised by
Proper Party (Taxpayers Suit) in 15 SCRA 497-501, Judicial Deference to Political
Questions in 21 SCRA 822-837, The Plebiscite CasesPolitical or Justiciable Issues in
49 SCRA 180-193, Judicial Review of the Effectivity of a New Constitution and the
Political Doctrine in 50 SCRA 393-413, and Political or Justiciable Question in 59 SCRA
652-673. The issues raised in said cases are justiciability, standing, mootness,
ripeness and political questions. This annotation will dwell on the rule of locus standi
of the petitioners in filing cases questioning the constitutional validity of statutes or
executive orders.
1. Locus Standi Defined
Locus standi generally means a place to stand. It refers to the standing of a person to
file a case. (Ballantine Law Dic643
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VOL. 314, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999
643
tionary, p.771). It is a place to stand; a standing in law or a suit. (Sanidad vs.
COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 [1976]).
2. Early U.S. Doctrines on Judicial Review
The principle of judicial review which originated in the United States restricted the
filing of cases by individuals to challenge the constitutional validity of a statute. Early
U.S. court decisions formulated the conditions needed to adjudicate a case especially
with respect to the challenge of the validity of a statute. Decisions generally limited
access by litigants to shield judges from cases that threaten their independence and
institutional effectiveness. They also try to avoid trying cases that involve politically
sensitive issues.
Chief Justice Marshall suggested that the boundaries for judicial action were quite
fixed: It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat.
264, 404 [1821]). What the Court should or should not accept is largely a matter of
judicial discretion. Reflecting on his work at the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis
confided: The most important thing we do is not doing. (Alexander M. Bickel, The
Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis 17 [1957]). The deliberate withholding
of judicial power often reflects the fact that courts lack ballot-box legitimacy.
Although couched in technical jargon, jurisdictional requirements raise fundamental
questions of democratic theory. (cited in Fisher, American Constitutional Law, p. 96
[1990]).
Judges invoked some rules to preserve public support and to avoid conflicts with
other branches of the government, and provide flexibility of action for judiciary. The
doctrines used to pursue those goals include justiciability, standing, mootness,
ripeness, political questions, and prudential considerations, all of which help protect
an unelected and unrepresentative judiciary. Although efforts are made to distinguish
these doctrines, inevitably they overlap. As noted by the Supreme Court: The
standing question thus bears close affinity to
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questions of ripenesswhether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to
warrant judicial interventionand of mootnesswhether the occasion for judicial
intervention persists. (Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n. 10 [1975]). (Fisher, Ibid.)
3. The Issue of Adverseness
To resolve a legal claim, courts need to know that parties have been adversely
affected. Abstract or hypothetical questions, removed from a concrete factual setting,
prevent courts from reaching an informed judgment. The words cases and
controversies limit the federal courts to questions presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
process. (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 95 [1968])
American courts occasionally consider a case even when both parties agree on the
issue. In United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), the Justice Department
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agreed with the plaintiff that a provision in a congressional statute was
unconstitutional. To protect its interests, Congress passed legislation to create a
special counsel. Functioning officially as amicus curiae, the counsel in effect served
as counsel for the United States to assure adverseness. (328 U.S. 303, 304 [1946]). In
other cases the courts have appointed a special counsel to satisfy the requirement
for a genuinely adversary proceeding. (Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S.
1,4 [1955]). (Fisher, Op. Cit., p. 97)
In affirming the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court, the Supreme Court also refused
to regard the case as a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding between Chadha and
the INS. As the Court noted, it would be a curious result if, in the administration of
justice, a person could be denied access to the courts because the Attorney General
of the United States agreed with the legal arguments asserted by the individual.
From the moment of Congress formal intervention as amicus, adverseness was
beyond doubt. Even prior to intervention
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there was adequate Art. III adverseness. (INS vs. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 [1983])
4. Standing to Sue
To satisfy the requirement of a case or controversy, parties bringing an action must
have standing to sue. Generalizations about standing to sue, Justice Douglas said
with customary bluntness, are largely worthless as such. (Data Processing Service
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 [1970]). After the Supreme Court announced that the
requirements of standing are met if a taxpayer has the requisite personal stake in
the outcome of his suit, Justice Harlan chided the Court: This does not, of course,
resolve the standing problem; it merely restates it. (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
121[1968]) (dissenting opinion).
To demonstrate standing, parties must show injury to a legally protected interest, an
injury that is rather than abstract or hypothetical. (OShea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
494 [1974]). Injuries may be economic or non-economic. (Data Processing Service v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 154 [1970]). They may be actual or threatened. Injuries may afflict
organizations as well as persons. (Havens v. Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
379 n. 19 [1982]; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 511[1978]). A threatened injury can be
close cousin to the hypothetical. Five members of the Supreme Court in 1973 held
that allegations of injury were sufficient to establish standing. Proof of actual injury
was not necessary. On the other hand, actual injury may be inadequate to establish
standing if the Court wishes to defer to the states. (City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 [1983]). (Cited in Fisher, op. cit., p. 100).
5. Individuals StandingA Judge-Made Rule
Individuals, functioning in the role of private attorneys general, may have standing as
representatives of the public interest. (Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC,
354 F. 2d 608, 615-616 [1965]). This principle sometimes permits one
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party to assert the rights of third parties (jus tertii). Federal courts are reluctant to
resolve a controversy on the basis of the rights of third persons who are not parties to
the litigation. There are two reasons. First, the courts should not adjudicate such
rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do
not wish them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court
litigant is successful or not . . . . Second, the third parties themselves usually will be
the best proponents of their own rights. The courts depend on effective advocacy,
and therefore should prefer to construe legal rights only when the most effective
advocates of those rights are before them. (Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-114
[1976]).
Although standing is basically a judge-made rule, courts recognize that Congress can,
by statute, confer standing upon an individual or a group, and courts may defer to
Congress on such matters. However, such statutory phrases as phrases as any
person aggrieved or adversely affected allow the courts broad discretion in
interpreting what Congress means by standing. Furthermore, Congress cannot
compel the courts to grant standing. Furthermore, Congress cannot compel the
courts to grant standing for a suit that, in the opinion of judges, lacks the necessary
ingredients of a case or controversy. Congressional efforts to confer standing are
limited by the judiciarys exclusive responsibility to determine Article III requirements.
6. Taxpayers Suit
The U.S. Supreme Court at first denied in 1923, the right of taxpayers to challenge
the validity of a statute. (Frothingham vs. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 [1923]). The Court
reasoned that the taxpayers interest as comparatively minute and indeterminable.
There must be a direct injury to evoke standing. The decision was based on a court
policy as it will mean more cases for the court to tackle. The decision was criticized
as such a doctrine would put the government in the position of conceding that a
taxpayer lacked standing even if
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Congress engaged in such palpably unconstitutional conduct as providing funds for
the construction of churches for particular sects. The Court decided to liberalize the
rule on standing but at the cost of creating substantial doctrinal confusion. It claimed
that standing focuses on the party, not the issue when standing is placed in issue
in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a
proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the
issue is justiciable. It was feared that by lowering the barrier for standing, the
Supreme Court not only encouraged more lawsuits but invited collisions with other
branches of government. In a later case, Justice Powell warned that a relaxed
standing policy would expand judicial power: It seems to be inescapable that
allowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter the
allocation of power at the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of
government. (United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 [1974]) (concurring
opinion). (Fisher, op. cit., pp. 102-103)
7. Locus Standi of a Group
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In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court also denied standing to an environmental group that
wanted to prevent construction of a ski resort in a national park. The Court was
deeply split with four Justices arrayed against three. (Sierra Club v. Morton, 404 U.S.
727 [1972]). In that same year, it refused to decide whether the Armys surveillance
of domestic activities constituted a chilling effect on First Amendment liberties. A
majority of five Justices, with four dissenting, held that there was insufficient
evidence of a direct injury to present a case for resolution in the courts.
PHILIPPINE COURT DECISIONS
a. General Rule on Judicial Review
Since 1937, in People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), reiterated in Luz Farms vs.
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
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Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990) and Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the
Philippine Supreme Court ruled that when issues of constitutionality are raised, the
Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994]).
b. Early Decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court Also Restricted the Rule on Locus
Standi
In 1945, the Philippine Supreme Court in Custodio vs. President of Senate, 42 O.G.
1243 (1945) held that a person who questions the validity of a statute or law must
show that he has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. This rule was reiterated in Manila Race Horse
Training Association vs. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951).
In People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), the Court ruled that there must be a showing
that the petitioners interests are or about to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of the ordinance in question. Unless a person is injuriously affected in
any of his constitutional rights by the operation of a statute or ordinance, he has no
standing.
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20
SCRA 849 (1967), the Court held that the invocation of petitioner as motel operators
of their alleged right to being free from reasonable search and seizure need not be
taken seriously.
c. The Relaxed Rule on Locus Standi
In Rodriguez contra El Tesoro de Filipinas, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), the Court ruled that if a
taxpayer cannot attack the validity of the executive order in question or a law
requiring
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the expenditure of public money, no one under our laws could question the validity of
such laws or executive orders.
In Joya vs. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993), petitioners having failed to show that they
were the owners of the artwork, it was held that they were not to proper parties to
enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale of old masters paintings and
antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum alleged to
be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
In Gonzales vs. Hechanova, et al., 9 SCRA 230 (1963), the petitioner, as a rice planter
with a riceland of substantial proportion and as taxpayer affected by the purchase of
the commodity effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, is entitled to a
chance to sell to the Government the rice it seeks to buy abroad and has sufficient
personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he
believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.
d. Taxpayers Suit
A partys standing before the Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In
the landmark Emergency Powers Cases (Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 [1949];
Rodriguez vs. Gella, 92 Phil. 603 [1953]), the Court said that because the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, it brushes aside technicalities of procedure. (Kilosbayan, Inc.
vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 111 [1994]).
Objections to taxpayers suits for lack of sufficient personality standing or interest
are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the
public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have
not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of
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these petitions. (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 111 [1994]).
Taxpayer-Plaintiff must sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the
judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party interest. Before he can
invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he
will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all
members of the public. (Bugnay Construction and Development Corp. vs. Laron, 176
SCRA 243 [1989]).
However, in Kilosbayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 (1995), the Court ruled that
petitioners do not possess the legal capacity to institute the action for the annulment
of the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) because they are without a present
substantial interest as distinguished from mere expectancy, or future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest. The phrase substantial present interest
means such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him,
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under substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has legal
title to defend and the defendant will be protected in payment to or recovery from
him.
Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the
valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear
legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. Joya vs.
PCGG, 225 SCRA 571 [1993]). In Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239
SCRA 386 (1994), the Court held that the petitioner KMU has the standing to sue.
Petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable
injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars
and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and
continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda,
circulars and/or orders. KMU mem651
651
bers, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly
affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are
part of the millions of commuters who compromise the riding public. Certainly, their
rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored. Assuming arguendo that
petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, the Court is ready to brush aside
the barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in
view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality is
not without judicial precedent. As early as the Emergency Powers Cases, this Court
had exercised its discretion and waived the requirement of proper party. (KMU Labor
Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]).
e. Locus Standi of Associations or Groups
When associations or groups of individuals are composed of substantial taxpayers,
and the outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed to file suit. The
petitioner, the Philippine Constitution Association, is a non-profit, civic organization
composed of several leaders from all walks of life whose main objective is to uphold
the principles of the Constitution. As taxpayers, petitioner may bring an action to
restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994]). A similar
ruling was made in Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Assn. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377
(1965).
f. Locus Standi of Public Officials as Petitioners
The Governor of the Province of Rizal, representing the most populated political
subdivisions, whose taxpayers bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation in
the Philippines justify the action. (Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]).
In Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice
President of the Philippines and a
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taxpayer, filed a case to question the validity of some Executive Orders.
In Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1962), the Court ruled that any public official
claiming to be adversely affected by a statute enacted under the police power of the
state to promote morality in public service and thereby limited in scope to officialdom
may rely on the due process clause to annul such statute or any portion thereof.
Since the police power extends to regulatory action affecting persons in public or
private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection of due
process or liberty as long as such requirement is observed. To the extent then that
the questioned section of the statute compels public officials to do a certain act,
there is an infringement on their liberty. However, under the Constitution, such a
restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.
g. The People of the Philippines as Petitioner
The People of the Philippines represented by the Solicitor General can be a proper
party to challenge the constitutionality of a statute (The Government of P.I. vs.
Springer, 50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The People of the Philippines have a substantial
interest in contesting the constitutional validity of a law. Of a greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the moral wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence,
the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. (People
vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 66).
h. Locus Standi of Members of Congress
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales vs.
Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire
membership of the Upper House of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the
presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989.
The Court then ruled that a member of the Senate, and of the House of
Representatives for that matter, has the legal
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standing question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an
item in an appropriation bill. (Id. at p. 519).
Where there is a constitutional question to resolve, a senator has usually been
considered as possessed of the requisite preconditions to bring a suit. (Tan vs.
Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 [1972]).
However, in Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, 246 SCRA 334 (1995), the
Court held that the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the
rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature,
petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as
members of Congress.
In Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998), the standing of petitioner Senator Blas Ople
was questioned. The Court said that petitioner Ople, a distinguished member of our
Senate, is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the
issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and
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member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a petitioner can also
impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds
to implement A.O. No. 308. (Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 [1998]).
i. Free Access to Courts
A means of providing guarantee to the constitutional provision of free access to
courts (Art. II, sec. 11, Philippine Constitution), any person is allowed to question the
validity of a law under the principle of taxpayers suit. However, a citizen will be
allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action, and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
(Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission
on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).
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Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. (Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA
337 [1998]).
The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does
not entitle them to bring this suit in their name as representatives of affected
companies. (Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).
o0o [Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review, 314 SCRA
641(1999)]
ANNOTATION ON LOCUS STANDI 548 SCRA 519

1.Introduction
Locus Standi means a place to standa standing in law or suit. (Sanidad vs.
COMELEC, 95 SCRA 358 [1976])
A review of recent decisions show that the Supreme Court has been liberal in
recognizing the Locus Standi of persons or entities who file actions questioning the
validity of a law or actions of the government issuances. In Planters Producers, Inc.
vs. Fertiphil Corporation, 548 SCRA 485 (2008):
_______________
* Member, Board of Editorial Consultants, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
520
520
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3
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated
under Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and distribution of
fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers,
issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital
recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the
Philippines. The LOI provides:
3.The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer
pricing formula a capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. This
capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI
viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of
fertilizers in the Philippines.
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic
market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount
collected to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI.
Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10
levy. With the return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the
amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the
RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust,
unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a
denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a
privately owned corpora521
VOL. 548,
521
tion, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI
No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability
of the fertilizer industry in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain
any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by the levy fell on the
ultimate consumer, not the seller.
The Supreme Court said that the mere fact of payment of the levy imposed by Letter
of Instruction 1465 is sufficient to acquire locus standi:
Whether or not the complaint for collection is characterized as a private or public
suit, Fertiphil has locus standi to file it. Fertiphil suffered a direct injury from the
enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required, and it did pay, the P10 levy imposed for
every bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic market. It may be true that Fertiphil has
passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify
it from attacking the constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a refund. As seller, it
bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy. It faced the possibility of severe
sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of payment is sufficient injury to
Fertiphil. Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the LOI because
it was compelled to factor in its product the levy. The levy certainly rendered the
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3
fertilizer products of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers much more expensive. The
harm to their business consists not only in fewer clients because of the increased
price, but also in adopting alternative corporate strategies to meet the demands of
LOI No. 1465. Fertiphil and other fertilizer sellers may have shouldered all or part of
the levy just to be competitive in the market. The harm occasioned on the business
of Fertiphil is sufficient injury for purposes of locus standi.
522
522
Ruling that the imposition of the P10 CRC was an exercise of the States inherent
power of taxation, the RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that
taxes can only be levied for public purpose.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals with
some modification. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
2.Meaning and Nature of Locus Standi
A party who suffered direct injury has a locus standi to challenge the validity of a law.
Rule 3, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule
as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in-interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the
relief sought. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
The Liberal trend is to allow citizens affected to file suits as interested parties. A real
party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as
a repre523
VOL. 548,
523
sentative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a
citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in
the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
3.Difficulty of Determining Locus Standi
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The difficulty in determining locus standi arises in public. The petitioner asserts a
public right.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in
public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was
held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in
a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public
funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held
by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere
public right, however . . . the people are the real parties . . . It is at least the right, if
not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly
pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied. With respect to
taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to
maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury
cannot be denied. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any
official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of
governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United States Supreme Court
laid down the more stringent direct injury
524
524
test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled
that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of
an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury
as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest
common to all members of the public. (Id.)
4.Locus Standi of petitioner in cases of mandamus
To be given due course, a petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a
party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person
which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The Court
will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party
who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal questions. Legal
standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is
being challenged. (Pimentel, Jr. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622
[2005])
Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest in such a
case that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term interest means a material
interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. (Jumamil vs. Cafe, 470
SCRA 475 [2005])
5.Locus Standi of Government Officials
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
Page 38

3
525
VOL. 548,
525
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. (Province of Batangas
vs. Romulo, 429 SCRA 736 [2004])
In relation to the claim of a member of Congress to intervene, invoking his
prerogative as legislator to curtail the disbursement without appropriation of public
funds to compensate Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well
as that as a taxpayer, it should be noted that the amount which the Court directed to
be paid by the Government to Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO),
was derived from money deposited by Manila International Airport Authority, an
agency which enjoys corporate autonomy and possesses a legal personality separate
and distinct from those of the National Government and agencies thereof whose
budgets have to be approved by Congress. (Republic vs. Gingoyon, 481 SCRA 457
[2006])
A national political party likewise meets the standing requirement, provided that it
has obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in a national elections,
which entitles it to participate in the legislative process. (Senate of the Philippines vs.
Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 [2006])
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006]; Baltazar vs.
Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74 [2006])
Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived
by the Court in the exercise of its discretion, such as in cases of transcendental
importance, or where the issues raised have far-reaching implications. (Baltazar
vs. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74 [2006])
When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen
and has an interest in the execution of the laws. (Baltazar vs. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA
74 [2006])
A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of
526
526
the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a
favorable action will likely redress the injury. (Francisco, Jr. vs. Fernando, 507 SCRA
173 [2006])
A party invoking the transcendental importance exception to the standing
requirement must show, among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition. (Francisco, Jr. vs. Fernando, 507 SCRA 173
[2006])
This is one of the right cases where the Supreme Court held a liberal recognition of
the locus standi of a private citizen.
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3
CONCLUSION
The tendency of the Court in broadcasting the concept of locus standi is in
consonance with the constitutional principle of free access to courts.
Article III, Section 11 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution reads:
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
This is only fitting as the courts of justice should be as available to the pauper as to
the affluent in the protection of their respective rights. Assuring him that the courts
will protect him but only if he is able to afford the prohibitive cost of litigation is like
spreading a Barmecide feast before the hapless indigent. It is at best a cruel
deception, at worst a cynical oppression of the impoverished suitor. (Cruz,
Constitutional Law, p. 371)
The aforesaid constitutional provision is implemented by several rules in the Rules of
Court liberal to court procedure to enable citizens free easy access to courts.
527
VOL. 548,
527
Only recently, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno addressed in a forum vowed to further
introduce reform to comply with the constitutional principle of free access to courts.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC 144 SCRA 194 (1986)

Facts: Javier and Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa
in the May 1984 elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter
contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the Javier were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad Pacificadors proclamation, Javier
went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns.
His complaints were dismissed and the Pacificadors was proclaimed winner by the
Second Division of the said body. Javier thereupon came to this Court, arguing that
the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the
strength of his proclamation, Pacificador took his oath as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, Javier
was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight.
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The Solicitor General moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of supervening
events. Batas Pambansa was abolished causing the disappearance of the office in
dispute between Javier and Pacificador.
Issue: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed because it was already moot
and academic.
Held: No. The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the
office in dispute could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there
are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to
dispel the legal ambiguities here raised.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must
also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we
cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer
possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands
that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but
also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
Terrorism was a special feature in Antique, as demonstrated by the killings previously
mentioned. Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their
supporters were gripped with fear of violence at the hands of the party in power.
What made the situation deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the
Commission on Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter of
record that the petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All
the electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a
more active step as befitted its constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly and
honest elections.
Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its
transparent bias in favor of the administration. This prejudice left many opposition
candidates without recourse except only to this Court.
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ABS-CBN VS. COMELEC 323 SCRA 811 (2000)

Facts: Comelec issued Resolution No. 98-1419 issuing a restraining order to stop
ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit
survey.
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon information that ABS-CBN
has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections
and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials
particularly for President and Vice President. The electoral body believed that such
project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick
count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had
not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
ABS-CBN filed a petition before the SC arguing that Comelec acted with grave abuse
of discretion in issuing such resolution.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the
May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no
longer any actual controversy.
Issue: Whether or not the petition was already moot and academic.
Held: No. The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred
specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental
freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections
is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is
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tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone
a task that could well crop up again in future elections.
The SC has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar
on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. Since the fundamental
freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to
settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit
polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.
ABS-CBN does not have to exhaust available remedies such as filing of motion of
reconsideration before the Comelec. The SC has ruled in the past that this procedural
requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue
involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or
resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely
urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21,
1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold
of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly
enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in
time or the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the
Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court
through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.
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CENTRAL BANK VS. BSP 446 SCRA 229 (2001)

Facts: Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, Central Bank (now
BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from
further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on
the ground that it is unconstitutional:
Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose
positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law).
It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly
not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the
SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the
purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is
to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.
Issue: Whether or not Section 15(c), Art 2 of RA 7653 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the
salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic
class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically
withheld from the lower grades. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-andfile employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees
higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career
advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay.
Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people
whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and
financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution
"to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a
decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress
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that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this
Court before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court.
They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike
employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective
bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the
power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as
a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653
effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. Indeed,
they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to
wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the
equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty
to save them from reasonless discrimination.
Issue: Whether or not the SC acted with propriety in making void the provisions.
Held: Yes. Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in
deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to
Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the
"rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential
treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or
the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. This is true whether the actor
committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or
one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the
character or nature of the actor.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations,
the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been
met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the
problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. What is
more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main
functions of courts of justice and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic
predicates. As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor the discretion to
decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made
particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest
Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it.
DE AGBAYANI VS PNB
1971
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellee Agbayani obtained a loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendantappellant PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate
mortgage. In 1945, Executive Order No. 32 was issued by then President Osmea
suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations
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3
payable by war sufferers. In 1948, the moratorium legislation continuing the
executive order was enacted as Republic Act No. 342. Thereafter, a were declared
unconstitutional in July 26, 1948.
As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount of
P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year, defendant-appellant instituted extrajudicial foreclosure on the mortgaged property for the recovery of the balance of the
loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff-appellee countered with his suit against defendantappellant on August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the mortgage sought to
be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of
maturity, July19, 1944.
HELD:
Prior to the declaration of nullity of a challenged legislative or executive act, it must
be enforced and had to be complied with. It is entitled to obedience and respect until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity. Parties may have
acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting
than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such
legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects.
It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact
must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it
can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It
would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. Therefore, during the
eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force,
prescription did not run.
In the case at bar, there is no need to deal with the effects of declaration of
unconstitutionality of EO and RA because when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years.
Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the
mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of
as a defense.
ALDOVINO VS ALUNAN III

(1994)
Facts:
Herein petitioners and intervenors seek reinstatement and payment of back wages.
Section 29 of Executive Order No. 120, which took effect upon its approval on 30
January 1987,reorganizing the then Ministry of Tourism, provides that incumbents
whose positions are not included in the new position structure and staffing pattern or
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3
who are not reappointed are deemed separated from the service. Pursuant thereto,
the then Ministry of Tourism (MOT, now Department of Tourism, DOT) issued three
various office orders and memoranda declaring all positions thereat vacant, and
effecting the separation of many of its employees.
All office orders and memoranda issued pursuant to E.O. 120 were subsequently
declared null and void by the Supreme Court.
Held:
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as
if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and
considered never to have existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are
bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality which means that no one may
thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases.
It is, in other words, a total nullity.
Plainly, it was as if petitioners and intervenors were never served their termination
orders and, consequently, were never separated from the service, The fact that they
were not able to assume office and exercise their duties is attributable to the
continuing refusal of public respondents to take them in unless they first obtained
court orders, perhaps, for government budgetary and accounting purposes. Under
the circumstances, the more prudent thing that public respondents could have done
upon receipt of the decision in Mandani, if they were earnest in making amends and
restoring petitioners and intervenors to their positions, was to inform the latter of the
nullification of their termination orders and to return to work and resume their
functions. After all, many of them were supposed to be waiting for instructions from
the DOT because in their termination orders it promised to directly contact them
by17telephone, telegram or written notice as soon as funds for their separation
would be available.
The petition is granted. Petitioners are ordered to be reinstated immediately to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries, provided
however, that no supervening event which would otherwise disqualify them from
such reinstatement. Provided, further, that whatever benefits they may have
received from the Government by reason of their termination shall be reimbursed
through reasonable salary deductions.
BROKENSHIRE VS. MINISTER OF LABOR
February 7, 1990
On the matter of the constitutionality of the Wage Orders, only the court can declare
a law or order unconstitutional and until so declared by the court, the Office of the
Regional Director is duly bound to enforce the law or order.
Facts:
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3
Respondents (Employees) filed a complaint against petitioner (Brokenshire Hospital)
with the Regional office of DOLE for non-compliance of Wage Order No.5 and Wage
Order No.6 with respect to living allowance.
In its answer, petitioner raised the affirmative defense of Unconstitutionality of Wage

Orders No. 5 and No. 6. The Regional Director resolved the matter in favor of the
respondents stating that "only the court can declare a law or order unconstitutional
and until so declared by the court, the Office of the Regional Director is duly bound to
enforce the law or order."
Petitioner appealed the case before the Minister of Labor which was subsequently
dismissed for lack of merit. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was likewise denied by the Minister of Labor. Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari.
Ruling:
"x x x Petitioner's contention that the constitutionality of Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6
should be passed upon by the National Labor Relations Commission, lacks merit. The
Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with the power to ultimately declare a
law unconstitutional. Without such declaration, the assailed legislation remains
operative and can be the source of rights and duties.
The Regional Director is plainly, without authority to declare an order or law

unconstitutional and his duty is merely to enforce the law which stands valid, unless
otherwise declared by this Tribunal to be unconstitutional. The Court declared the
assailed Wage Orders constitutional, there being no provision of the 1973
Constitution (or even of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution)
violated by said Wage Orders, which Orders are without doubt for the benefit of
labor."
COCOFED VS REPUBLIC
January 24, 2012
Facts:
Petitioners assert that the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to recognize their vested
rights allegedly created under the coconut levy laws, constitutes taking of private
property without due process of law. They contended that to accord retroactive
application to a declaration of unconstitutionality would be unfair inasmuch as such
approach would penalize the farmers who merely obeyed then valid laws.
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Ruling:
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an

undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
The Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception when to rule
otherwise would be iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an act may be
justified when based on an unconstitutional provision of law.
In the case at bar, the Court rules that the dictates of justice, fairness and equity do
not support the claim of the alleged farmer-owners that their ownership of the UCPB
shares should be respected due to the following:
1. The farmers or claimants do not have any legal right to own the UCPB shares
distributed to them.
2. To grant the said shares to petitioners would be iniquitous and prejudicial to
the remaining farmers who have not received the same.
3. Due to operational problems, the intended beneficiaries of the shares were
not able to receive what was due them.
4. The coconut farmers who sold copra did not get the receipts for the payment
of the coconut levy.
From the foregoing, it is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doctrine to
the UCPB shares. Public funds, which were supposedly given utmost safeguard, were
haphazardly distributed to private individuals based on statutory provisions that are
found to be constitutionally infirm on not only one but on a variety of grounds.
Clearly, applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would
also serve injustice to the Government, to the coconut industry, and to the people,
who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore
expect that their Government would take utmost care of them and that they would
be used no less, than for public purpose.
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FLORES VS. DRILON
June 22, 1993
Facts:
Petitioners, as taxpayers, question the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,"
under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).
The proviso reads (d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the
Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio
chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.
Held:
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure . . .
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the
position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his
appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City. His acts as SBMA
official are not necessarily null and void. He may be considered a de facto officer,
"one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of
policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and
third persons.
Where the duties of the office were exercised, under color of a known election or
appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want
of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or
irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown
to the public, under color of an election, or appointment or pursuant to a public
unconstitutional law, shall valid before the same is adjudged to be such.
The proviso under R.A. 7227, which states that for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed
as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority, is declared
unconstitutional. Consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of
Olongapo City, respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by respondent
Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may be retained by
him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in the exercise of his authority as
officer de facto of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.
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HACIENDA LUISITA INC. (HLI) V. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL
November 22, 2011
The Operative Fact Doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional law but
also to decisions made by the president or the administrative agencies that have the
force and effect of laws, especially if the said decisions produced acts and
consequences that must be respected.
Facts:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to
DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court
cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must,
by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original
6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to
remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the
said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical
implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret
voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their
thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
Court decision.
Ruling:
The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this
case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only
to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President
or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the
nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and
consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact
doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority
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stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5,
2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed
to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want
to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.
ONGSUCO VS. MALONES

October 27, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners are stall holders at the Municipal Public Market, which had just been newly
renovated. Respondent (Municipal Mayor) through a letter gave petitioners five days
notice for a meeting concerning the municipal market. One of the things discussed
was the imposition of a "goodwill fee" to pay for the loan made by the municipality
for the renovation.
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was later approved by the Sangguniang Bayan which
imposed the goodwill fee and which authorized the respondent to enter into lease
contracts over the said public market. Less than a year later, respondent wrote a
letter to petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls in the newly
renovated municipal public market without any lease contract. As a consequence of
which, the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested
applicants. This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall
holders at the municipal Public Market, to file before the RTC a Petition for
Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against respondent.
Petitioners prayed that respondent be enjoined from imposing the goodwill fees
pending the determination of the reasonableness thereof, and from barring
petitioners from occupying the stalls at the municipal public market. One of the main
issues being raised by petitioners is the validity of the Ordinance.
Held:
It is a well established rule that questions on the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures must be raised first in an Administrative case with
the Secretary of Justice before the courts judicial power can be sought following the
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
However, where the issue raised is a purely legal question, then it is well within the
competence and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency.
Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws,
constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to
the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may establish.
The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC is whether Municipal Ordinance No.
98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a
public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and
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Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of
law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.
XXX (c) No tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be enacted or approved in the
absence of a public hearing duly conducted in the manner provided under this
Article.
In the case at bar, notice to the petitioners were made only five days before said
public hearing. This contravenes Article 277(b)(3) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code which requires that the public hearing be
held no less than ten days from the time the notices were sent out, posted, or
published.
YNOT VS IAC
1987
Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef
from one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for
violation of Executive Order No. 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate
to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The
government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of
police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding.
Held:
All Courts can exercise judicial review
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty
in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from
resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide,
"final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such
cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
Other issues:
Police power
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not
reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is
difficult to see how prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to another
can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after the
slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent their slaughter either.
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Due process
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
Separation of powers
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers.
For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
QUA CHEE GAN VS. DEPORTATION BOARD (1963)

FACTS:
Petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board, with having
purchased U.S. dollars without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the
Philippines, and of having clandestinely remitted the same to Hongkong. Petitioners,
Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King, with having
attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States in order to evade
prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S. dollars. A warrant for the arrest of
said aliens was issued by the presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon filing
a bond, they were provisionally set at liberty. When their motion to dismiss was
denied, they filed for a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition. After filing a
bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining the
respondent Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges against petitioners,
pending final termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.
ISSUE: whether deportation board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over
the charges
Held: Under the present and existing laws, deportation of an undesirable alien may
be effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant
to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of
Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section
37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. This case constitute economic sabotage which is a
ground for deportation. The President may order the deportation of these petitioners
if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged. This power
of investigation may be delegated pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
Issue: whether the board had authority to order their arrest as
HELD: No. Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the
President's power to deport is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the
power to arrest. The right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by
the Constitution in the following language:.
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3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).
Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual
demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine
whether under specific circumstances, the curtailment of the liberty of such person is
warranted. This is guaranteed in the Constitution and the statute. EO 398 which
authorizes the board to issue warrant for the arrests of alien and detain him during
investigation unless he files a bond for provisional release is illegal. An implied grant
of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter
under discussion, that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental
right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution,
if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so,
then guarantee a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be
rejected as inimical to the liberty of the people. The guarantees of human rights and
freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.
As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation
Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest,
decreed cancelled.
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TECSON VS. COMELEC ( 2004)
FACTS: In 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter
"FPJ"), filed his COC for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. In
his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date
of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two
assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
ISSUES: Whether FPJ is a natural born citizen; Whether he made a material
misrepresentation in his COC;
HELD: FPJs direct ascendant is his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou whose death
certificate identified him to be Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that
San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired,
would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe (date of birth: May 17, 1915), father of
respondent FPJ.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their
marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was
stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley
to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate
of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino,
twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years
old and married. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. The 1935
Constitution is applicable to determine FPJs citizenship. The applicable provision is:
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution
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(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate
in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation
to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given
to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not
there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos
vs. COMELEC,]must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
GO, SR VS. RAMOS (2009)
FACTS: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated
by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of
Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable
alien. To prove his contention, Luis argued that birth certificate of Jimmy was
tampered, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as "FChinese." Luis argued that
although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario
Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered since all the other entries
were typewritten except the entry on his citizenship which was handwritten as
FChinese.
Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina
mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1(4) of
the 1935 Constitution and CA 625. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952
and 1955 elections. He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an
undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country
as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised
in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog. As to erroneous
entry, he attributed it to the employees of the LCR.
ISSUE: whether Jimmy is a Filipino citizen = NO
HELD: Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a
citizen. Since his citizenship hinges on that of his fathers, it becomes necessary to
pass upon the citizenship of the latter. However, neither the Philippine Bill of
1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare
claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the
passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not
suffice. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the
father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother
and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a
Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen
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himself. However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving that
Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule
could not be applied to him.
As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on
Carlos Filipino citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly found that it did
not. The 1935 Constitution and CA 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides
that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. The proper period for electing
Philippine citizenship was within "reasonable time (within 3 years)" after attaining the
age of majority. It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine
citizenship may be extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a
Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single circumstance
was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that
Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such
belief, considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On
the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate his irregular
election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his
desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not
alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus
sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not
conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a
Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country. It is
incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of
the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the
claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be
resolved in favor of the state.
As to the application of the doctrine of jus soli (citizenship by place of birth): The
doctrine was never extended to the Philippines. It was for a time the prevailing rule in
the acquisition of ones citizenship but it was abandoned in the case of Tan Chong v.
Secretary of Labor. Since then, said doctrine only benefited those who were
individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the
mistaken application of jus soli.
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GONZALES VS. PENNISI (2010)
FACTS:
Michael Alfio Pennisi was born on 13 March 1975 in Queensland,
Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos, allegedly a
Filipino citizen. In March 1999, respondent filed a petition for recognition as Filipino
citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI). BI issued him a Recognition Order
which was affirmed by DOJ Secretary on March 3, 2000. Pursuant to such order, he
was recognition as a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Article III, Sec. 1(2) of the
1973 Constitution and makes him entitled to all the rights and privileges appurtenant
thereto. Thereafter, respondent was drafted and played for the Red Bull, a
professional basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA).
In 2004, DOJ issued a resolution revoking Pennisis certificate of recognition and
directed BI to begin summary deportation proceedings against respondent pursuant
to a recommendation by Senate to review recognition orders of Fil-foreign PBA
players. Trial court subsequently issued a Summary Deportation Order against him.
Respondent filed a petition for review, with an application for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals. CA ruled in favor of
Pennisi.
ISSUE: whether Pennisi is a Filipino citizen
HELD: Yes. The issuance of certificate of recognition to respondent has not attained
finality. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following
concur: (1) A persons citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party; (2)The solicitor general or his authorized representative
took active part in the resolution thereof; and (3)The finding or citizenship is affirmed
by this court.
Pennisi was able to present the birth certificate of his Filipino mother, Anita Tomeda
Quintos and a certification issued by the LCR Of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija stating that
Quintos was born on 14 august 1949 of Filipino parents in Panabingan, San Antonio,
Nueva Ecija; and certified true copy of the Letter Dated 14 July 1999 Of The
Australian Department Of Immigration And Multicultural Affairs, Stating That As Of 14
July 1999, Quintos Has Not Been Granted Australian Citizenship. These documents
have more probative value and must prevail over the statements of Barangay
Officials of Nueva Ecija that no Quintos and Tomedas have resided in the said
barangay and such family names do not exist in census or master list of voters.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The Quintoses
and Tomedas were not included in the census, such as they could have been mere
transients in the place. As for their absence in the masters list of voters, they could
have failed to register themselves as voters. The late registration of Quintos birth
(made 10 years after her birth) does not indicate fraud because it was not issued at
anytime near the filing of respondents petition for recognition as Filipino citizen.
Finally, the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs itself
attested that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship.
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Respondent submitted a certified true copy of Quintos Australian Certificate of
Registration of Alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino. These pieces of evidence
should prevail over the affidavits submitted by Barangay officials.
VILANDO VS. HRET (2011)

FACTS: In 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her COC for the position of
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other
contender, Olivia Paras. Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification
questioning her citizenship against her were filed before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) which reached the Court. Comelec ruled against Limkaichong. On April 1,
2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint
Resolution of the Comelec and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET
by way of a petition for Quo Warranto.
On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as
taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district
concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the
HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the
eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong
was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed.
They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not
attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy
from the time of her marriage to the latter. On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed
both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives.
ISSUE: whether Limkaichong is a Filipino citizen
HELD: Yes. Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The
governing law is the citizenship provision under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution. Limkaichongs father was conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino,
it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father. It matters not whether
the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the
line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent
has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office,
as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent
issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and
having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age under
paragraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. Having failed to prove that
Anesia Sy lost her Philippine citizenship, respondent can be considered a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, having been born to a mother who was a natural-born
Filipina at the time of marriage, and because respondent was able to elect citizenship
informally when she reached majority age. Respondent participated in the barangay
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elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voters affidavit as of 1984, and ran
as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004.
These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re:
Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions
indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had informally
elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution
considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance
with the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution provisions, i.e., Section 1(3),
Article [IV] and Section 2, Article [IV] were enacted to correct the anomalous situation
where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically accorded
the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship yet if so elected, was not
conferred natural-born status. It was the intention of the framers of the 1987
Constitution to treat equally those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority either before or after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
Thus, those who would elect Philippine
citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV] of the 1987 Constitution are now,
under Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also natural-born Filipinos.
Holding an Alian Cert of Reg. by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a
repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same
must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly,
Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her
daughter.
b. Election of Philippine Citizenship
IN RE: CHING 316 SCRA 1 (1999)
Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the
father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to made a
valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children
born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention
"in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The
said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
FACTS: Vicente Ching, born August 11, 1964, was a legitimate son of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother. He took the 1998 Bar Exams and passed but he was not
allowed to take his oath because of the questionable status of his citizenship. It was
only on 15 June 1999, at thirty-five (35) years old or over fourteen (14) years after he
had reached the age of majority, when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
625. In the Manifestation he filed together with his Affidavit of Election and his Oath
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of Allegiance, he stated the fact of his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a
former elected public official.
ISSUE: Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14)
years after he has reached the age of majority?
RULING:
NO.
The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides
that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of
the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of
this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the US Government to the effect that
the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. The phrase reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority
However, the SC held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice that the three (3) year period
is not an inflexible rule. But it cautioned that the extension of the option to elect
Philippine citizenship is not indefinite. Election in this case was only made over 7
years after reaching the age of majority and the court did not consider it to have
been made within a reasonable time.
Based on the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable
period within which to exercise the privilege.
ISSUE: Would the special circumstances invoked by Ching be sufficient to
vest in him Philippine citizenship
RULING: NO as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Ching cannot take cannot find refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare where the
court considered the exercise of the right of suffrage sufficient to show his preference
for Philippine citizenship. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed
under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would
not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect
Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a
Filipino mother.
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Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly
not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his
election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed
when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect
Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he
should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case,
Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this
golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
REPUBLIC VS LIM 419 SCRA 123 (2004)

FACTS: Chule Y. Lim, born October 29, 1954, filed a petition for correction of entries
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court alleging that: 1) her surname YU was
misspelled as Yo, 2) her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have
been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her
deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina and 3) it was erroneously
indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have
been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her
parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters
father were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage
contracted in China. Also, respondent presented a certification attested by officials of
the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is no
record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
The trial court granted the petition and ordered the correction. The Republic
assailed the decision stating that the respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirements of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age
of majority citing Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ordering the correction of citizenship
RULING: No. The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino
citizenship cited apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the
case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her
Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not
required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a
Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since
birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority.
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This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in
Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage
and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship
MA VS FERNANDEZ 625 SCRA 566 (2010)
ISSUE: Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father, who executed an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government
upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the
documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign
nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to
obtain alien certificates of registration?
FACTS: Petitioners are children of a Taiwanese father and a Filipino mother all of
whom were born under the 1935 Philippine Constitution. They were all raised in the
Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent
their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the
country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in
Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled
abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien
Certificates of Registration (ACRs).
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship
in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution. Thus, on 15
August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and
took his oath of allegiance. On 14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the same. In 1978,
Valeriano took his oath of allegiance.
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however,
failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required
under Section 1 of CA 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino
Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected
Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.
RULING:
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of
election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of
the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with
the nearest civil registry.
Where the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of
election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive
acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done .
The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein
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petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal
registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
In general, registration refers to any entry made in the books of the registry,
including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation,
annotation, and even the marginal notes. In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry
made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership
and other real rights. Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose of
notification
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case,
registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the
registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the
petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has
been claimed.
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the
Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to
the state coupled with a pledge "to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance" to
any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the
complete disavowal of any other nationality.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the
petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in
form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry
should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact
that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be
complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative
penalties, if any. The documents they submitted supporting their allegations that
they have already registered with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be
examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau
of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other
issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be
complied with within a reasonable time.
VILANDO VS HRET 656 SCRA 17 (2011)
FACTS: Petitioners filed petition for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the
HRET challenged her eligibility. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese
citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that
she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and
to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her
marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a
determination of Limkaichongs citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into
the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.
For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was
regular and in order and had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she
claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral
attack.
HRET dismissed the petition and petitioners sought reconsideration.
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ISSUE: 1. WON the Quo Warranto petition operate as a collateral attack on
the citizenship of Limkaichongs father
RULING:
Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen.
To prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of
naturalization of Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would
constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an
attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action
for its nullity. The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs
father should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
Under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated
by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of
naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a
matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizens descendant.
ISSUE: 2. WON as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong,
the HRET, having the plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the certificate of
naturalization.
RULING: Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive,
does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the
judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule
otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which,
as already stated, is not permissible.
The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July
9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros
Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent
any evidence to the contrary.
ISSUE: 3. WON Limkaichong can derive Philippine citizenship from her
mother at the time of her birth, where her mother is already not a Filipino
citizen as a result of her marriage to her father as provided under Sec 1(7)
of CA No. 63 in relation to Art 2(1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised
Nationality Law of February 5, 1959
RULING: Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the
alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother
indeed lost her Philippine citizenship.
Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable
proof of forfeiture of Philippine citizenship. . It bears no indication of basis for foreign
citizenship, nor proof of change to foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named
therein has applied for registration and fingerprinting and that such person was
issued a certificate of registration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other
special law. It is only evidence of registration.
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Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a
repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien
citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an
application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act
constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to effectively
result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation
is lacking in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can
transmit her citizenship to her daughter.
Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is
the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof,
reads: Article IV
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
xxx
With Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino,
it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.
Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not
whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore,
following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the
respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for
holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent
issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and
having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age. The
HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen
REPUBLIC VS SAGUN 666 SCRA 321 (2012)
FACTS: Nora Sagun, born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City, is the legitimate child of
a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. She did not elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to
Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was
not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her
application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no
annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to
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annotate the same on her birth certificate. The petition was granted by the trial
court.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of
Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible
RULING: This Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding
established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual.
There is no specific legislation authorizing the
institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our
citizenry. This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic citing the early case of Tan
v. Republic of the Philippines, where we clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable
controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act
or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for
said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the
parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement
relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. x
xx
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of
respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts
competence.
ISSUE: 2. Whether respondent is required under the law to make an
election and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural
requirements in the election of the Philippine citizenship
RULING: Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of
her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she
elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children
follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the
parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of
Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself.
But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must
have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of
election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of
the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with
the nearest civil registry.
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for
registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has
complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950.
In other
words, he should first be required to register as an alien. Pertinently, the person
electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his
alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship
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and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or
invalidity of said election.
Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now
Department) of Justice for final determination and review.
It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which
authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry,
merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of
entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not
the relief prayed for by the respondent.
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts
conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the
records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal
requirements for a valid election.
Specifically, respondent had not
executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The
only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of
alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the
age of majority, which was unregistered.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that
respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a
reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not
registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A.
No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent
for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the
procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since
the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by
election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot
take the place of election of Philippine citizenship.
5. Denaturalization
CO VS CIVIL REGISTER 423 SCRA 420 (2004)
FACTS: Hubert Tan Co born on March 23, 1974 and his sister, Arlene Tan Co, born on
May 19, 1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co
Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese citizens.
Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction
(LOI) No. 270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1055. The Chairman of the Committee issued on
February 15, 1977 Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778 in his favor. Thus, on
February 15, 1977, Co Boon Peng took his oath as a Philippine citizen. In the
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meantime, Hubert and Arlene Co finished college and earned their respective
degrees in architecture and accountancy in Philippine schools.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of entries in their certificates of birth.
They alleged that : Upon granting of Philippine citizenship by naturalization to Co
Boon Peng in 1977, [the] petitioners who were born in the Philippines and still minors
at that time became Filipino citizens through the derivative mode of naturalization.
Our Naturalization Law, specifically Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535 provides that: "Minor children of persons
naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered
citizens thereof;"
The court a quo issued an order dismissing the petition outright on the ground that
the petition was insufficient, solely because the petitioners father Co Boon Peng
applied for naturalization under LOI No. 270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship
by naturalization under PD No. 1055 and not under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473)
ISSUE: Whether or not LOI No. 270 and CA No. 47are statutes in pari
materia which should be read together so that petitioners can claim the
benefit of derivative mode of naturalization under CA 473
RULING: LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of
qualified aliens residing in the Philippines. While they provide for different
procedures, CA No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No. 270
governs naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes have the same purpose
and objective: to enable aliens permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having
demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to the Philippines, as well as affinity
to the culture, tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed to the
economic, social and cultural development of our country, to be integrated into the
national fabric by being granted Filipino citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for
the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more expeditious, less cumbersome
and less expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are
able to integrate themselves into the national fabric, and are thus able to contribute
to the cultural, social and political well- being of the country and its people.
Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes in
pari materia. Absent any express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI
No. 270, the said provision should be read into the latter law as an integral
part thereof, not being inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA
No. 473,9 which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor
children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to the
minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners
in this case.
It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of
naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are
likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their petition: (a)
that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng; (b) that they were
born in the Philippines; and, (c) that they were still minors when Co Boon
Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen;
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REPUBLIC VS ONG 673 SCRA 485 (2012)
Naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization
laws are strictly construed in the governments favor and against the applicant. The
applicant carries the burden of proving his full compliance with the requirements of
law.
FACTS: The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ongs petition for
naturalization despite his failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation as required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the
Revised Naturalization Law.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section
2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
RULING: Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation means not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be
shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide
for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a
public charge. His income should permit him and the members of his family to
live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and
consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative
income, the courts should consider only the applicants income; his or her spouses
income should not be included in the assessment. The spouses additional
income is immaterial for under the law the petitioner should be the one to
possess some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to
qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Lastly, the Court has consistently held
that the applicants qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of
his petition.
The Court finds the appellate courts decision erroneous. First, it should not have
included the spouses income in its assessment of Ongs lucrative income. Second, it
failed to consider the following circumstances which have a bearing on Ongs
expenses vis--vis his income: (a) that Ong does not own real property; (b) that his
proven average gross annual income around the time of his application, which was
only P106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his four minor children; and (c)
that Ongs children were all studying in exclusive private schools in Cebu City. Third,
the CA did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that Ongs income had an
appreciable margin over his known expenses.
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification
of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
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the Revised Naturalization Law
Loss and Reacquisition of Citizenship
AASJS VS DATUMANONG 523 SCRA 108 (2007)
FACTS: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner
avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
ISSUE: By recognizing & allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9225 unconstitutional?
RULING: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it
is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned
with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress
was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
JOSE B. AZNAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate
of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu
Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council, as represented by
petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the
ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States
of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate
issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien
Certificate of Registration and Immigrant Certificate of Residence, issued at Manila on
March 27 and 28, 1958.The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent ExParte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin
the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in
favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main
petition.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,
alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of
the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been
continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the
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country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the
Philippines since 1965.
Issue: W/N private Respondent (Lito Osmea) is a Filipino citizen
Ruling: Yes.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore,
disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of
Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof
that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided
for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath
of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the
evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine
citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of
losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United
States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent
was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to reenter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner
assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an
American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance
required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws.
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are
not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United
States does not concern Us here.By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the
presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the
petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As
earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21,
1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not
applicable to the case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1983 per certification from the United States District Court, Northern
District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States
but claimed that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself
from the persecution of the Marcos government. The Court, however, found this
suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other
Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it
necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of
allegiance of the United States He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine
passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country
since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate .Thus, private
respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be
presumed.
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De Guzman vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were
candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. On
April 3, 2007, private respondent filed against petitioner a petition for disqualification
docketed as SPA No. 07-211, alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines,
but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized
American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.[5] Upon approval of his application, he took his oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued
that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and
political rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
Issue: whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American
citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225.
Ruling: We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of
his failure to renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a
foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. [14]
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant
case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after
taking the oath of allegiance on September 6, 2006. However, it must be
emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish
to seek elective public office, as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
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(2)
Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but
who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath
of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those
seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
apersonal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an
authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY CHEU, Petitioners,

vs.
ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO, Respondent.
Facts:
The father of petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu became a
naturalized7 Filipino citizen sometime in 1959. The said petitioners, being minors at
that time, were also recognized 8 as Filipino citizens.
Respondent Atty. Alvin Agustin T. Ignacio, filed a Complaint 9 dated March 5, 2004 for
blacklisting and deportation against petitioners Geraldine and Grace before the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the basis that the latter two are Canadian citizens who
are illegally working in the Philippines, petitioners having been issued Canadian
passports.
Acting upon the Complaint, respondent Maricel U. Salcedo, Special Prosecutor,
Special Task Force of the BI Commissioner, directed the petitioners, through the
issuance of a subpoenae,10 to appear before her and to bring pertinent documents
relative to their current immigration status, to which the petitioners objected by filing
with the Special Task Force of the BI Commissioner a Comment/Opposition with
Motion Ad Cautelam to Quash Re: Subpoena 11 dated 30 April 2004 (Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum), which was eventually denied by respondent Salcedo in an
Order12 dated May 14, 2004.
Issue: W/N judicial intervention is allowed amidst deportation proceedings.
Ruling:
Yes.Basically, petitioners argue that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, relied upon
by the CA in its decision, does not apply in the present case because it falls under an
exception. Citing Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, petitioners assert that
immediate judicial intervention in deportation proceedings is allowed where the claim
of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
claim is correct. In connection therewith, petitioners assail the applicability
of Dwikarna v. Domingo in the present case, which the CA relied upon in ruling
against the same petitioners.
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In BOC v. Dela Rosa, it is required that before judicial intervention is sought, the claim
of citizenship of a respondent in a deportation proceeding must be so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that such claim is correct. In the said case,
the proof adduced by the respondent therein was so substantial and conclusive as to
his citizenship that it warranted a judicial intervention.
In the present case, there is a substantial or conclusive evidence that petitioners are
Filipino citizens. Without necessarily judging the case on its merits, as to whether
petitioners had lost their Filipino citizenship by having a Canadian passport, the fact
still remains, through the evidence adduced and undisputed by the respondents, that
they are naturalized Filipinos, unless proven otherwise.
However, this Court cannot pass upon the issue of petitioners' citizenship as this was
not raised as an issue. The issue in this petition is on the matter of jurisdiction, and
as discussed above, the trial court has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether
petitioners have abandoned their Filipino citizenship or have acquired dual citizenship
within the confines of the law.
Jacot vs Dal
Facts:
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized
citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. 3
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a
request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The
Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval 4 of petitioners
request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On 27 September 2006, the
Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing
petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. 6
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 7
On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification 8 before
the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter
failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act
No. 9225.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
Issue:
whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007
local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US
citizenship.
Ruling:
This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy
do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be
complied with for different purposes.
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Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired
or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective
public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer
prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing
themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other
than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines).:
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ,

Vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of
candidacy.
Facts:
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman
of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.On October 25, 2007,
respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election
Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the
ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public
office. In his Answer, petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the
same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known
as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. He returned to
thePhilippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the
qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After the votes for Barangay Chairman
were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.
Issue: W/N the petitioner is eligible to run as Barangay Captain.
Ruling:No. Petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American
citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen
by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
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R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired
Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said
law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law
explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement.
Republic vs Dela Rosa
Facts:
Raul Lee(Petitioner) was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992
elections. Private respondent (Frivaldo) was the official candidate of the LakasNational Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of
private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1)
that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not
in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of
Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3)
that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that
the votes case in favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that
he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is
not yet conclusive because the case is still on appeal before us.
Issue: W/N PR is eligible to run for Governor.
Ruling: No.Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru
naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the
procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself
and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to
his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance
value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino
citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure
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3
for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the
repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her
marriage to an alien.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order
setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is
jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication
and posting of the petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to
acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6
of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral
character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years;
(3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4)
that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the
petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a
declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA
400 [1992]).
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons
who vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by
Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a
copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said
law.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its
promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is
counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of
First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in
naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its
promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country;
(2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession;
(3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government
promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.
Sobejana Condon vs Comelec
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on
August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen
owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenshipbefore the Department of Immigration and Indigenous
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3
Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007
elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10,
2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of
office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan 7 and Luis
M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the
RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute
a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225.
The Petitioners Arguments
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on
September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino
citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections.
Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to
her.
Issue
For purposes of determining the petitioners eligibility to run for public office, whether
the "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a
mere pro-forma requirement.
Ruling:
Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to
renounce
her
Australian
citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for naturalborn citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship 18 by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic, thus:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxx---xxxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
xxxx--xxxxx
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC,21 we
declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen
cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she
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personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held
that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed
before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear
and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer
authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained
their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing
themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other
than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of
the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No.
4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act
No. 9225),
Willie Yu vs Santiago
Facts:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the
Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After
manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing
a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed
the return. 2 Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The
parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An internal
resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10
November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court
disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino
citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese
passport in 1971, valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon
presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization
as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for
and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular
Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. While still a citizen of the Philippines
who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to
"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared
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3
his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the
Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
Issue:
W/N Petitioner is a Filipino citizen
Ruling: No. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered
together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship
acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go
Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented
himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized
Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is
grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special
Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of
said TRO have unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his
Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only established by the pleadings
they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be
unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when
petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued
Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed
when required and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the
petitioner his motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the second
paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
Vilando vs HRET August 23, 2011
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Because of
this, her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification
cases against Limkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural born
citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese
and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichongs father. After election, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying
Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the
winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution
No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of
winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.
Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC.
Held: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the
COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the
incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the COMELECs Joint
Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no
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3
impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has
invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9,
1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The
HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and
September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which
granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence
to the contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935
Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by
naturalization.
Respondent had previously participated in the barangay elections, accomplished
voter's affidavit as of 1984, and was elected as Mayor. These are positive acts of
election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how
election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice.
Sobejana-Condon vs Comelec (2012)
Sobejano-Condon was a natural-born Filipino citizen on August 8, 1944 but became a
naturalized Australian citizen due to her marriage to one Kevin Thomas Condon on
December 13, 1984. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant
to Sec. 3 of RA 9225, which was approved and she took her oath of allegiance to the
Republic on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the order dated September 27, 2006
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
The Court held that petitioner Sobejana-Condon was disqualified from running for
elective office for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship under oath contrary to
the exact mandate of Sec. 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be
sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single,
definite, and sensible meaning and must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship
must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized
to administer oath, the Court held.
The Court further held that the petitioners act of running for public office does not
suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While the
Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a
certificate of candidate is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship,
such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of RA 9255 on
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August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Reacquisition or Repatriation
Republic vs dela Rosa (1994)
Frivaldo opted to reacquire Filipino citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed in the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the
hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the
petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3)
petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the
judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the twoyear waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its
promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is
counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of
First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in
naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two years from its
promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country;
(2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession;
(3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government
promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any
decision granting the petition for naturalization before its finality.
Valles vs Comelec (2000)
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian
mother. Australia follows jus soli. She ran for governor. Opponent filed petition to
disqualify her on the ground of dual citizenship.
Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. The fact
that she has dual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for
public office. Filing a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship
because in the certificate, the candidate declares himself to be a Filipino citizen and
that he will support the Philippine Constitution. Such declaration operates as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. The mere fact that respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and
has an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting express renunciation.
Bengzon III vs HRET (2001)
Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent
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Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was
naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then
running for reelection.
WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy
process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as a natural-born Filipino.
Angat vs Republic (1999)
Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He lost his citizenship by
naturalization in the United States of America. In 1991, he returned to the Philippines.
On March 11, 1996, he filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City a
petition to regain his status as a citizen of the Philippines. On September 20, 1996,
upon motion of the petitioner, he was allowed to take the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines which was scheduled on October 3, 1996. On October 4,
1996, the trial judge issued an Order declaring the petitioner as repatriated and a
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.
On March 19, 1997, the OSG filed a Motion asserting that the petition itself should
have been dismissed by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper
forum was the Special Committee on Naturalization consistent with Administrative
Order No. 285.
The Court ruled that when petitioner filed his petition on March 11, 1996, the Special
Committee on Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725
was in place. Administrative Order 285, promulgated on August 22, 1996 relative to
R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was merely then a confirmatory issuance. The Office of the
Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angats petition should have been filed
with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction
thereover. The courts order of October 4, 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did
not acquire finality nor could be a source of right on the part of petitioner.
Note, the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and it was thus
incorrect for petitioner to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 and R.A. No. 2630 since
these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering
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service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied foreign country
or the armed forces of the United States of America, a factual matter not alleged in
the petition. Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all
that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where
he had last resided in the Philippines.
Alterajos vs Comelec (2004)
Ciceron P. Altarejos, a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate
in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections was petitioned by the respondents to
be disqualified or cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a
Filipino citizen and made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that he
was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.
Altejaros took his oath of allegiance as a repatriated Filipino on Dec. 17, 1997 before
the special Committee on Naturalization. However no copy of his oath was registered
in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of immigration until Feb. 18, 2004.
The registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the
Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. In the
case at bar, petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he
filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections.
Petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application and was,
therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10,
2004 elections.
Tabasa vs CA (2006)
When petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a
naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship
derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of
naturalization), petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner theorizes
that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born
Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when
he was still a minor.
The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino
women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born
Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account
of political or economic necessity. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of
repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of
said natural-born Filipinos.
Tabasa lost his citizenship by operation of law and not due to political and economic
exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by political and
economic reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization.
MERCADO vs. MANZANO

307 SCRA 630
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Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were
candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition
for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold the office of vice mayor
of Makati City.
Ruling:
Yes, he is qualified. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws
of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that
he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of
this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in
this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings.
REPUBLIC vs. VILLASOR (54 SCRA 83)
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges
the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, declaring a decision final and executory and
of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the
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Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being
excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the State is immune from suit.
2. Whether or not the writ of execution directed against the funds of the AFP was
validly issued.
Ruling:
1.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit
unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the
classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends."
Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a
recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines,
with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not
to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties,
the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned
and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss
of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a
basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined."
2.
No, it was not validly issued. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound
sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment
proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state
liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be
sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action
'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that
the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation
as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. A rule which has never been
seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be
due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the
process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty,
may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature,
and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as
they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the
latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion
thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it."
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PROFESSIONAL VIDEO vs. TESDA (591 SCRA 83)
Facts:
TESDAs Pre-Qualification Bids Award Committee (PBAC) conducted two (2) public
biddings on June 25, 1999 and July 22, 1999 for the printing and encoding of PVC
cards. A failure of bidding resulted in both instances since only two (2) bidders
PROVI and Sirex Phils. Corp. submitted proposals.
Due to the failed bidding, the PBAC recommended that TESDA enter into a negotiated
contract with PROVI. On December 29, 1999, TESDA and PROVI signed and executed
a Contract Agreement for the provision of goods and services in the printing and
encoding of PVC cards. On August 24, 2000, the two parties executed an Addendum
to the Contract Agreement Project whose terms bound PROVI to deliver one hundred
percent (100%) of the specified supplies to TESDA.
On July 11, 2001, PROVI filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money with
damages against TESDA. PROVI additionally prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment/garnishment against TESDA.
Issues:
1. Whether TESDA, as an agency of the State, can be sued without its consent.
2. Whether or not the writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds, to cover
PROVIs claim against TESDA, is valid.
Ruling:
1. No. TESDA is an instrumentality of the government undertaking governmental
functions.
R.A. No. 7796 created the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority or
TESDA under the declared "policy of the State to provide relevant, accessible, high
quality and efficient technical education and skills development in support of the
development of high quality Filipino middle-level manpower responsive to and in
accordance with Philippine development goals and priorities."
Under constitutional and statutory terms, we do not believe that the role and status
of TESDA can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of the
government, directly attached to the DOLE through the participation of the Secretary
of Labor as its Chairman, for the performance of governmental functions i.e., the
handling of formal and non-formal education and training, and skills development. As
an unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped
with both express and implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it.
2.
The writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds was not valid. TESDAs
funds are public in character, hence exempt from attachment or garnishment.
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and
thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature
and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment. Under
Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the implementation of the Act
shall be included in the annual General Appropriation Act; hence, TESDA funds, being
sourced from the Treasury, are moneys belonging to the government, or any of its
departments, in the hands of public officials.
HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN vs. ATO (629 SCRA 451)
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Facts:
In 1935, spouses Mateo Pidacan and Romana Bigo, predecessors-in-interest of
petitioners-heirs namely, Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri and Adela Pidacan Vda. de
Robles, acquired a parcel of land with an area of about 22 hectares, situated in San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No. 2204 was issued
in favor of said spouses.
However, in 1948, respondent Air Transportation Office (ATO) used a portion of the
property as an airport. In 1974, the ATO constructed a perimeter fence and a new
terminal building on the property. It also lengthened, widened, and cemented the
airport's runway. Petitioners demanded from ATO the payment of the value of the
property as well as the rentals for the use thereof but ATO refused. Eventually in
1988, OCT No. 2204 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7160 was
issued in favor of petitioners. Despite this development, ATO still refused to pay
petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the Principle of State Immunity finds application in this case.
Ruling:
No, it does not apply. Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke
the constitutional doctrine of non-suability of the state, otherwise known as the Royal
Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the state's cloak of
invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled
exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that
the state may not be sued under any circumstance.
To be sure, this Court as the staunch guardian of the citizens' rights and welfare
cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument
in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State's cloak
of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitionerscontractors be duly compensated on the basis of quantum meruit for
construction done on the public works housing project.
It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is the life
of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for
the prevailing party. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and
efficient administration of justice requires that, once a judgment has become final,
the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore,
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they
are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong
them. Petitioners have been deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their
property for a considerable length of time. Now that they prevailed before this Court,
it would be highly unjust and inequitable under the particular circumstances that
payment of just compensation be withheld from them. We, therefore, write finis to
this litigation.
ATO vs. RAMOS (644 SCRA 36)
Facts:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos discovered that a portion of their land registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land records with an
area of 985 square meters, more or less, was being used as part of the runway and
running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air
Transportation Office (ATO). On August 11, 1995, the respondents agreed after
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negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in
consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite
repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO
and some of its officials in the RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants
invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby
President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents
affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the
deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
Issue: Whether the ATO could be sued without the States consent.
Ruling:
Yes, the ATO can be sued. Not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the
character of the objects for which the entity was organized.
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to
act in private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits against certain
corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a
governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The
latter is true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for
by engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so
far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the
corporation.
The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency
of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but
was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an
activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity.
Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit.
We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully
invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted
to of the plaintiffs property.
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the States consent
has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known
as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. With the CAAP having legally succeeded
the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that the ATO had incurred by
virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the
CAAP.
CHINA NATIONAL vs. SANTAMARIA (665 SCRA 189)
Facts:
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp.
(Group) (CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation
(Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a
feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the
Northrail Project).
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On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the
Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyers
Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. The Chinese
government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government
named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend
an amount not exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years,
with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum.
On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and
Injunction against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the
Department of Budget and Management, the National Economic Development
Authority and Northrail. Respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement and
the Loan Agreement were void for being contrary to (a) the Constitution;
(b) Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government
Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code.
Issue: Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before
a local court.
Ruling:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held
and firmly established. Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is
crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved whether the entity claiming
immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. The
restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would show that CNMEG is
engaged in a proprietary activity. The parties executed the Contract Agreement for
the purpose of constructing the Luzon Railways. Despite petitioners claim that the
EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to Northrail because the bank was
mandated by the Chinese government, and not because of any motivation to do
business in the Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing provisions that the Northrail
Project was a purely commercial transaction.
It is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it
contends that it performs governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary
Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term "implementing
agency" has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was
immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it
failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law.
Thus, following this Courts ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-owned and
-controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has the capacity to
sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
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HEIRS OF GAMBOA vs. TEVES (682 SCRA 397)
Facts:
This resolves the motions for reconsideration of the 28 June 2011 Decision filed by (1)
the Philippine Stock Exchange's President, (2) Manuel V. Pangilinan, (3) Napoleon L.
Nazareno ,and (4) the Securities and Exchange Commission (collectively, movants).
Movants contend that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
has long been settled and defined to refer to the total outstanding shares of stock,
whether voting or non-voting. In fact, movants claim that the SEC, which is the
administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of
Filipino citizens in the Constitution and various statutes, has consistently adopted this
particular definition in its numerous opinions. Movants point out that with the 28 June
2011 Decision, the Court in effect introduced a "new" definition or "midstream
redefinition"9 of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
Issue: How should the term capital be construed?
Ruling:
Pursuant to the express mandate of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of 1991
(FIA), as amended, which defined a "Philippine national" as follows:
SEC. 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:
The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic
partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least
sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is
owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized
abroad and registered as doing business in the Philippines under the Corporation
Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for pension or other
employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national
and at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine
nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own
stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least
sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of each of
both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least
sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both
corporations must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporation, shall be
considered a "Philippine national."
Thus, the FIA clearly and unequivocally defines a "Philippine national" as a
Philippine citizen, or a domestic corporation at least "60% of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote" is owned by Philippine citizens.
The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an economy
"effectively controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the
Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to
Philippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose capital
with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The FIAs implementing rules explain that
"for stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine
nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full
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beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights
is essential." In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation
that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to
shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership. This is
precisely because the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full
beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation.
Any other construction of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution contravenes the letter and intent of the Constitution. Any other meaning
of the term "capital" openly invites alien domination of economic activities reserved
exclusively to Philippine nationals. Therefore, respondents interpretation will
ultimately result in handing over effective control of our national economy to
foreigners in patent violation of the Constitution, making Filipinos second-class
citizens in their own country.
Note: The FIA is the basic law governing foreign investments in the Philippines,
irrespective of the nature of business and area of investment. It spells out the
procedures by which non-Philippine nationals can invest in the Philippines.
c. Consent to be sued
How consent is given.
Veterans vs CA (1992)
Facts: VMPSI was operating as a security agency. By virtue of the provisions of RA
5487, the Private Security Agency Law, the then Pt. Chief Lt. Fidel Ramos issued
Rules and Regulations requiring that all private security agencies/company security
forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region
where their main offices are located. On May 12, 1086, a Memorandum Argreement
was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly
contract rate per guard for 8 hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within
Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside. On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency filed a
complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition. PADPAO found
VMPSI guilty and recommended its expulsion from PADPAO and cancellation of its
license to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA (Phil. Constabulary Supervisory
Unit for Security and Investigation Agencies) made similar findings.
When VMPSI requested the issuance of a clearance/certificate of membership,
PADPAO refused to issue one. VMPSI wrote to the PC Chief on March 10 1988 but as
the latter did not reply and VMPSIs license was expiring in March 31, VMPSI filed a
civil case in the RTC against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA. The RTC issued a restraining
order enjoining the defendants from committing acts that would result in the
cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSIs license. The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA moved to
dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the case is against the State which had not
given its consent thereto. On June 10, 1988, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the defendants from cancelling or denying renewal of VMPSIs
license, until further orders from the court. On August 11, 1989, the CA granted the
petition for certiorari filed by the defendants, ordering the RTC to dismiss the
complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this
petition for review.
Issues: W/N VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against
the state without its consent.
How is consent given?
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Ruling: The petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed form is
affirmed. The complaint is a suit against the state without its consent. The PC Chief
and the PC-SUSIA being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a
primary governmental function of regulation the organization and operation of
private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official and agency
may not be sued without the Governments consent. The consent of the State to be
sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a
mere memorandum. In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into
by the PC Chief and the PADPAO did not constitute an implied consent by the State to
be sued; it was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the
salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly a
governmental function. The execution of said agreement is incidental to the purpose
of RA 5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and operation of
private detective watchmen or security guard agencies. The correct test for the
application of state immunity is not the conclusion of the contract by the State by the
legal nature of the act.
DA vs NLRC (1993)
Facts: The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency
entered into a contract on 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the
latter to the said governmental entity. On 13 September 1990, several guards of the
Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of
13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and
overtime pay, as well as for damages, before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of
Cagayan de Oro City against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security
Agency. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein
petitioner and jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the
payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security
guards. On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. Commanding
the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two
respondents.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ
of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was effected without
the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that,
therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant
thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also
pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and
jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.
Petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the
writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a
money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the
NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
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The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly
waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
Agency.
Issue:
1. W/N the DA can be sued.

2. W/N the writ of execution was valid.
Ruling: 1. Yes. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State
may not be sued without its consent," reflects nothing less than a recognition of the
sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule
effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. True, the doctrine, not too
infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it
grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply
invoking its non-suability.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state
may not be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the
doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear
import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States' consent may be
given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general
law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the
state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents
and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between
private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters
into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the
level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign
immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is
not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made
between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another
which is done in its proprietary capacity.
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have
assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into
the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary
in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of
wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract
for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the
consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising
from contract, express or implied.
2. No. Pursuant to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential
Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission
on Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the
State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be
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pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as
amended by P.D. 1445. When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby
necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against it. tersely put, when the State
waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to
prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
In Republic vs. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of
execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy
a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to
the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power
of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law.
The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law.
1. Express Consent
a. Money claims arising from contract
SAYSON vs SINGSON (1973)
Facts: Singson was the sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service. In January 1967, the
Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various spare parts for the repair of a D-8
bulldozer. After a public bidding was conducted on May 5, the Committee on Awards
accepted the bid of Singkier Motors for the sum of P43,530. On May 16, the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications sent a letter-order to Singkier requesting it to
immediately deliver the items listed therein. In due course, Voucher No. 07806
reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for preaudit. Sayson approved it for
the payment of P34,824, with the retention of P8,706. On June 9, 1967, the Voucher
was paid to Singson in the amount of P34,824. However, it would appear that when
the Voucher and supporting papers reached the General Auditing Office (GAO), a
canvass was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila. Quotations were
submitted at P2529.64 only, which was P40,000 less than the price of Singkier. In
view of the overpricing, the GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public
Works. The Secretary then held the district engineer responsible for overpricing and
charges for malversation were filed against the latter and the civil engineer involved.
It was the failure of the Highways Auditor that led to the filing of the mandamus suit
below, with respondent Singson being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of
P8,700, the contract in question having been upheld. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
Issue: What is the proper remedy to enforce collection of money claim against the
Government arising from contract? Will mandamus apply?
Ruling: Mandamus us not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against
the State but an ordinary action for specific performance. Actually, the suit disguised
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as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is
a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except
with the consent of the State. In other words, respondent Singson should have filed
his claims against the State may be filed. It is true that once consent is secured, an
action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory
grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and exhausted. Also,
the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter on appeal
would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor
General. Even had there been such, the Court to which the matter should have been
elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. What
transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious then that it does not have the
imprint of validity.
b. Incorporation of Government Owned and /or Controlled Corporations
NHA vs HEIRS of GUIVELONDO
Facts: On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion
Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. On November
12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, respondents herein, filed a Manifestation
stating that they were waiving their objections to petitioners power to expropriate
their properties. On August 7, 2000, the trial court rendered Partial Judgment
adopting the recommendation of the Commissioners and fixing the just
compensation of the lands of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo at P11,200.00 per
square meter. Petitioner NHA filed two motions for reconsideration. One of which
assailed the amount of just compensation. The lower court denied such motion.
Subsequently, respondent Heirs filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted on
November 22, 2000. Prior to the aforesaid denial of the Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-23386,
complaint for eminent domain, alleging that the implementation of its socialized
housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of the land
sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries cannot afford. The
Motion was denied on September 17, 2001, on the ground that the Partial Judgment
had already become final and executory and there was no just and equitable reason
to warrant the dismissal of the case. On May 27, 2002, respondent sheriff served on
the Landbank of the Philippines a Notice of Third Garnishment against the deposits,
moneys and interests of petitioner therein. Subsequently, respondent sheriff levied
on funds and personal properties of petitioner. Hence, the matter before the SC.
Issues: 1. W/N the State can be compelled and coerced by the courts to exercise or
continue with the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain.
2. W/N writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the State in
an expropriation wherein the exercise of the power of eminent domain will not serve
public use or purpose.
Ruling: 1. Notably, the foregoing cases refer to the dismissal of an action for
eminent domain at the instance of the plaintiff during the pendency of the case. The
rule is different where the case had been decided and the judgment had already
become final and executory. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first,
condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a
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public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to
be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance
of not more than three commissioners. The outcome of the first phase of
expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of expropriation or an order of
dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the second
phase ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being
final, are appealable. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is
taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court dated
December 10, 1999, which declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the
properties of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became final
and may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any court.
Petitioner, in essence, contends that there are just and equitable grounds to allow
dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings. The argument is
tenuous. Socialized housing has been recognized as public use for purposes of
exercising the power of eminent domain. The public purpose of the socialized housing
project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just compensation that the
court has fixed. Respondent landowners had already been prejudiced by the
expropriation case. Petitioner cannot be permitted to institute condemnation
proceedings against respondents only to abandon it later when it finds the amount of
just compensation unacceptable.
2. Generally, funds and properties of the government cannot be the object of
garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted
and the state liability adjudged. However, if the funds belong to a public corporation
or a government-owned or controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality
of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its funds are not
exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any
other corporation. In the case of petitioner NHA, the matter of whether its funds and
properties are exempt from garnishment has already been resolved squarely against
its predecessor, the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC). Hence, it is
clear that the funds of petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or
execution. Petitioners prayer for injunctive relief to restrain respondent Sheriff
Pascual Abordo from enforcing the Notice of Levy and Garnishment against its funds
and properties must, therefore, be denied.
2. Implied Consent
a. Government enters into business contracts
PTA vs PGDEI (2012)
Facts: PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to
bolster and promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors,
Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects. Since
AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the project, it entered into
a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF, a duly organized domestic corporation, to
build the golf course. The sub-contract agreement also provides that PHILGOLF shall
submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in turn, PTA shall directly pay
PHILGOLF.
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PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA plus interest, for the construction of the
golf course. PTA failed to answer the complaint. Hence, the RTC rendered a judgment
of default.
Issue: W/N PTA is immune from the suit.
Ruling: PTA erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government
entity. The application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or economic
affairs. The State, in entering into a business contract, descends to the level of an
individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Since
the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary character
entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial liability by
merely invoking immunity from suit.
b. Inequitable claim to immunity
EPG CONSTRUCTION vs VIGILAR (2001)
Facts: In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement, through the BLISS Development
Corporation, initiated a housing project. The Ministry of Public Works and Highways
forged individual contracts with herein petitioners EPG Construction Co., Ciper
Electrical and Engineering, Septa Construction Co., Phil. Plumbing Co., Home
Construction Inc., World Builders Inc., Glass World Inc., Performance Builders
Development Co. and De Leon Araneta Construction Co., for the construction of the
housing units.
After complying with the terms of said contracts, and by reason of the verbal
request and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional
funds would be available and forthcoming, petitioners agreed to undertake and
perform additional constructions [4] for the completion of the housing units, despite
the absence of appropriations and written contracts to cover subsequent expenses
for the additional constructions. Petitioners then received payment for the
construction work duly covered by the individual written contracts, thereby leaving
an unpaid balance of P5,918,315.63, which amount represents the expenses for the
additional constructions for the completion of the existing housing units. On 14
November 1988, petitioners sent a demand letter to the DPWH Secretary. The money
claims were then referred to COA which returned the same to the DPWH Auditor for
auditorial action. On the basis of the Inspection Report of the Auditors Technical
Staff, the DPWH Auditor interposed no objection to the payment of the money claims
subject to whatever action the COA may adopt.
The COA returned the documents to the DPWH, stating that funds should first
be made available before COA could pass upon and act on the money claims. Then
DPWH Secretary Jose De Jesus requested the Secretary of Budget and Management
to release public funds for the payment of petitioners money claims. P5,819,316.00
was then released for the payment of petitioners money claims.
In a letter dated 26 August 1996, respondent DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar
denied the subject money claims prompting herein petitioners to file before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, , a Petition for Mandamus praying that herein
respondent be ordered to pay.
Issue: 1. W/N petitioners-contractors have the right to be compensated for a public
works housing project.
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2. W/N DPWH is immune from suit.
Ruling: 1. YES. Respondents posits that the existence of appropriations and
availability of funds as certified to and verified by the proper accounting officials are
conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. According to
respondent, sans showing of certificate of availability of funds, the implied contracts
are considered fatally defective and considered inexistent and void ab initio.
Respondent concludes that inasmuch as the additional work done was pursued in
violation of the mandatory provisions of the laws concerning contracts involving
expenditure of public funds and in excess of the public officials contracting authority,
the same is not binding on the government and impose no liability therefor.
We find the instant petition laden with merit and uphold, in the interest of
substantial justice, petitioners-contractors right to be compensated for the
"additional constructions" on the public works housing project, applying
the principle of quantum meruit. The peculiar circumstances present in the
instant case buttress petitioners claim for compensation for the additional
constructions, despite the illegality and void nature of the implied contracts forged
between the DPWH and petitioners-contractors. On this matter, it bears stressing that
the illegality of the subject contracts proceeds from an express declaration or
prohibition by law, and not from any intrinsic illegality.
To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for us to
defeat petitioners-contractors right to be duly compensated for actual work
performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have,
for years, received and accepted benefits from said housing project and reaped the
fruits of petitioners-contractors honest toil and labor.
2. NO. Incidentally, respondent likewise argues that the State may not be sued
in the instant case, invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the
State,[17] otherwise known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty. Respondents
argument is misplaced inasmuch as the Principle of State Immunity finds no
application in the case before us. Under these circumstances, respondent may not
validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under
the States cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to
certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it
does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. the doctrine
of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice on a citizen. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity
to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.
To be sure, this Court as the staunch guardian of the citizens rights and
welfare cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an
instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the
States cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that
petitionerscontractors be duly compensated on the basis of quantum meruit for
construction done on the public works housing project.
REPUBLIC vs UNIMEX (2007)
Facts: Respondent Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH (Unimex) shipped a 40-foot
container and 171 cartons of Atari game computer cartridges, duplicators,
expanders, remote controllers, parts and accessories to Handyware Phils., Inc. After
the shipment arrived in the Port of Manila on July 9, 1985, the Bureau of Customs
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(BOC) agents discovered that it did not tally with the description appearing on the
cargo manifest. As a result, BOC instituted seizure proceedings against Handyware
and later issued a warrant of seizure and detention against the shipment. The
Collector of Customs issued a default order against Handyware for failing to appear.
The Collector then forfeited the goods in favor of the government.
Respondent filed a petition for review against petitioner Commissioner of Customs
(BOC Commissioner) in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA reversed the
forfeiture decree and ordered the release of the subject shipment to respondent
subject to the payment of customs duties. The CTA decision became final and
executor. Unfortunately, however, respondents counsel failed to secure a writ of
execution to enforce the CTA decision. Respondent filed in the CTA a petition for the
revival of its June 15, 1992 decision. It prayed for the immediate release by BOC of
its shipment or, in the alternative, payment of the shipments value plus damages.
BOC informed the court that the subject shipment could no longer be found at its
warehouses. The CTA declared that its June 15, 1992 decision could no longer be
executed due to the loss of respondents shipment so it ordered the BOC
Commissioner to pay respondent the commercial value of the goods based on the
prevailing exchange rate at the time of their importation. The dispositive portion of
the decision read: xxx payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of the goods or
properties seized or forfeited by the Bureau of Customs. BOC appealed. The CA held
that the BOC Commissioner was liable for the value of the subject shipment as the
same was lost while in its custody.
Issue: 1. W/N the state is liable for the loss.
2. W/N government funds can be charged with respondents claim without a
corresponding appropriation.
Ruling: 1. Yes and yes. Petitioner argues that a money judgment or any charge
against the government requires a corresponding appropriation and cannot be
decreed by mere judicial order. Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of
respondents demand will ultimately fall on the government, and that, under the
political doctrine of state immunity, it cannot be held liable for governmental acts
(jus imperii), we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability. The circumstances
of this case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine.
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOCs ineptitude and gross negligence in
the safekeeping of respondents goods.
The situation does not allow us to reject respondents claim on the mere
invocation of the doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly, the doctrine must be fairly
observed and the State should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue
advantage of parties that may have legitimate claims against it. Justice and equity
now demand that the States cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be
shredded.
Accordingly, we agree with the lower courts directive that, upon payment of
the necessary customs duties by respondent, petitioners payment shall be taken
from the sale or sales of goods or properties seized or forfeited by the
Bureau of Customs.(no appropriation needed)
c. Government initiates a complaint. Open to counterclaim.
FROILAN vs PAN (1950)
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Facts: On February 3, 1951, Froilan filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping
Co., alleging that: Foilan purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel FS-197
for P200T, paying P50T down and agreeing to pauy the balance in installments; that,
Foroilan mortgaged said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission to secure the
pauyment of the balance; for failure to pay the installments, the Shipping
Commission took possession of the vessel and cancelled the contract of sale; that
Shipping Commission chartered and delivered the vessel to Part Oriental; that Foilan
appealed to the President and the Cabinet restored him to his rights under the
original contract of sale with the Shipping Commission; that Pan Orental refused to
deliver the vessel to Froilan; Froilan prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the
seizure of said vessel and that he be adjudged to have the rightful possession
thereof. The lower court issued the writ of replevin and Pan Oriental was divested of
its possession of the vessel. On November 10, 1951, the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines filed a complaint-in-intervention alleging that: Froilan failed to pay
to the Shipping Commission; that Pan Oriental refused to deliver the vessel to Froilan;
Froilan prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel and that
he be adjudicated to have the rightful possession thereof. The lower court issued the
writ of replevin and Pan Oriental was divested of its possession of the vessel. On
March 21, 1951, the latter filed its answer denying the right of Froilan to the
possession of said vessel.
On November 10, 1951, the government filed a complaint-in-intervention alleging
that: Froilan failed to pay to the Shipping Commission the balance due on the
purchase price of the vessel; the Intervenor was entitled to the possession of the
vessel either under the terms of the original contract or in order that it may cause the
extrajudicial sale thereof under the Chattel Mortgage Law. Intervenor prayed that
Froilan be ordered to deliver the vessel to the Board of Liquidators.
On Novemeber 29, 1951, Pan Oriental filed an Answer to the complainant-inintervention alleging that: The Republic was obligated to deliver the vessel to it vy
virtue of a contract of bareboat charter with option to purchase executed on June 16,
1949 by the Republic in favor of Pan Oriental; that Pan Oriental had made necessary
and useful expenses on the vessel and claimed the right of retention; that Pan
Oriental prayed that, if the Republic succeeded in obtaining possession of said vessel,
the Republic must comply with its obligation of delivering to the former or causing its
delivery by recovering it from Froilan. The Republic filed a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim of Pan Oriental on the ground that its purpose was to compel the
government to deliver the vessel to Pan Oriental in the event that the government
recovers the vessel from Froilan. It was also alleged that moven was not subject to
the jurisdiction of the court in connection with the counterclaim. The lower court
granted the motion and dismissed the counterclaim. It is from this order that Pan
Oriental filed the present appeal.
Issue: W/N the lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground that
the state is immune from suit.
Ruling: This is untenable because by filing its complaint-in-intervention, the
Government in effect waived its right of non-suability. Hence, the appealed order is
reversed and set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to
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sue private parties in its own courts. The State as plaintiff may avail itself of the
different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in
an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and
comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within
certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have
against the State.
REPUBLIC vs SANDIGANBAYAN (2006)
Facts: Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S.
Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
reconstitution and damages. The case is one of several suits involving ill-gotten or
unexplained wealth that petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the
Sandiganbayan against private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto.
PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises,
entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of
private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have
controlling or majority interest. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken
over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by private
respondent Benedicto and registered in his name or under the names of corporations
he owned or controlled.
Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as members of
the Board of Directors of NOGCCI. As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in
question, PCGG did not pay the corresponding monthly membership due thereon
totalingP2,959,471.00. On account thereof, the 227 sequestered shares were
declared delinquent to be disposed of in an auction sale. PCGG filed a complaint for
injunction with the Regional Trial Court. The complaint, however, was dismissed,
paving the way for the auction sale for the delinquent 227 shares of stock. On August
5, 1989, an auction sale was conducted.
On November
3,
1990, petitioner Republic and
private
respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No.
0034.
The
agreement
contained
a
general
release
clause whereunder petitioner Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the
sequestration
on the 227 NOGCCI
shares,
among
other Benedictos
properties, petitioner Republic acknowledging
that
it
was
within
private
respondent Benedictos capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from
business and the exercise of his profession.
The Sandiganbayan approved the Compromise Agreement and accordingly
rendered judgment in accordance with its terms and subsequently ordered the return
of the sequestered shares or in default thereof, to pay their value which can be
deducted from the Republics cash share in the Compromise Agreement.
Owing to PCGGs failure to comply with the above directive, Benedicto filed
in Civil Case No. 0034 a Motion for Compliance.
PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration which the SB denied. Hence, this
recourse before the SC.
Issue: W/N the PCGG is liable? Can it invoke immunity from suit?
Ruling: PCGG itself does not dispute its being considered as a receiver insofar as the
sequestered 227 NOGCCI shares of stock are concerned. PCGG also acknowledges
that as such receiver, one of its functions is to pay outstanding debts pertaining to
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the sequestered entity or property, in this case the 227 NOGCCI shares in question. It
contends, however, that membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be considered
as an outstanding debt for which PCGG, as receiver, must pay. Petitioner Republic,
through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. But, as private
respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the
exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the
suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034.
Where, as here, the State itself is no
less
the
plaintiff
in
the
main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence
teaches,
when
the
State,
through
its
duly
authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a
private
party,
it
thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to
whatever
counterclaims
or
defenses
the
latter
may
have
against
it. Petitioner Republics act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a
waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that
case, petitioner Republic cannot
set
up
its
immunity
against
private
respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.
In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto,
petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself
in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its
officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to
constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and
rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its
express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign
descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very
act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding
right to the other party to the agreement.
3. Scope of Consent
a. Under Act No. 3083
G.R. No. L-30098 February 18, 1970
THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS vs. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO
FACTS: On 1940, the Government of the Philippines filed a complaint for eminent
domain for the expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to N. T. Hashim, needed to
construct a public road, now known as Epifanio de los Santos Avenue.
The parties thereafter worked out a compromise agreement, respondent estate
having proposed on April 28, 1966, the total amount of P209,076.00, equivalent to
the land's total assessed value, which was confirmed, ratified and approved in
November, 1966 by the Commissioner of Public Highways and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications
On the same date, October 14, 1968, respondent Garcia, as special sheriff, forthwith
served a Notice of Garnishment, on respondent Philippine National Bank, notifying
said bank that levy was thereby made upon funds of petitioners Bureau of Public
Highways and the Auditor General on deposit, with the bank to cover the judgment of
P209,076.00 in favor of respondent estate.
ISSUE: w/n the government funds maybe garnished to satisfy a money claim arising
from an expropriation proceeding?
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HELD: NO. the Court holds that respondent Court's two questioned orders are null
and void on the fundamental ground that government funds are not subject to
execution or garnishment.
As early as 1919, the Court has pointed out that although the Government, as
plaintiff in expropriation proceedings, submits itself to the jurisdiction of the Court
and thereby waives its immunity from suit, the judgment that is thus rendered
requiring its payment of the award determined as just compensation for the
condemned property as a condition precedent to the transfer to the title thereto in its
favor, cannot be realized upon execution. The Court there added that it is incumbent
upon the legislature to appropriate any additional amount, over and above the
provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay the award determined in the
judgment, since the Government cannot keep the land and dishonor the judgment.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
Public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
specific objects, as appropriated by law.
This doctrine was again stressed by. the Court in Republic vs. Palacio, setting aside
as null and void the order of garnishment issued by the sheriff pursuant to the lower
Court's writ of execution on funds of the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of
the Government's Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine National Bank. The Court
emphasized then and re-emphasizes now that judgments against the State or its
agencies and instrumentalities in cases where the State has consented to be sued,
operate merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiff's claim; such judgments may
not be enforced by writs of execution or garnishment and it is for the legislature to
provide for their payment through the corresponding appropriation, as indicated in
Act 3083.
. Under a Charter
G.R. No. L-32667 January 31, 1978
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATION
FACTS: What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a
decision of respondent Court which had become final and executory. 1 A writ of
execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been
issued. 2 He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees
and Laborers Association, in the aforementioned case. The validity of the order
assailed is challenged on the ground that the funds subject of the garnishment "may
be public in character."
ISSUE: w/n the funds of People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (a government
owned entity) may be garnished?
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HELD: YES. The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may
be accepted in the sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a
government-owned entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from
garnishment. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of Industrial Relations
is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later
Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO
are public funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be
garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government owned and
controlled corporation. The NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been
established 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ...'
Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just
like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as amended.
In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, this
Court, through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when
the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity
and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business
thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself pro hac vice
of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law
governing private corporations."
The invocation of Republic v. Palacio, as well as Commissioner of Public Highways v.
San Diego, did not help the cause of petitioner at all The decisions are not
applicable. The funds appertained to a governmental office, not to a governmentowned or controlled corporation with a separate juridical personality. In neither case
therefore was there an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued, the funds of
which could thereafter be held liable to execution and garnishment in the event of an
adverse judgment.
Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they
reiterate the doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of nonsuability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment, refer to Merritt v.
Insular Government, a 1916 decisio. Since then such a principle has been followed
with undeviating rigidity, the latest case in point being Republic v. Villasor,
promulgated in 1973. It is an entirely different matter if, according to Justice Sanchez
in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is "possessed of a
separate and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter,
its funds may be levied upon or garnished. That is what happened in this case.
c. Execution
[ G.R. No. 113191. September 18, 1996
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
FACTS: On 27 January 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-010690-93 for his alleged illegal dismissal by ADB and the latter's violation of the
"labor-only" contracting law. Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified respondent
Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an
immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of
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3
securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the
Asian Development Bank.
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB
had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit. The ADB did not appeal the decision..
Petitioner was later constrained to make an application for a restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction following the issuance, on 16 March 1994, by the Labor
Arbiter of a writ of execution.
ISSUE: w/n the writ of execution is enforceable against ADB?
HELD: No. Article 50(1) of the Charter provides:
"The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases
arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to
guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities.
The above stipulations of both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement should be
able, nay well enough, to establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing
and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of
securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form. The Banks
officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in
their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these
immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily
assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected.
"It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government,
and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government x x x it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government, x x x or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to
the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction x x x as to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is
accepted doctrine that `in such cases the judicial department of government follows
the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic jurisdiction.'
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the
ADB is independent of the municipal law.
"One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. (See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44). The obvious
reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the
local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may
interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of
the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its
member-states
"The Supreme Court has long settled the matter of diplomatic immunities. In WHO vs.
Aquino, SCRA 48, it ruled that courts should respect diplomatic immunities of foreign
officials recognized by the Philippine government. Such decision by the Supreme
Court forms part of the law of the land.
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REPUBLIC v. NLRC
263 SCRA 290 (1996)
FaCTS: The full ownership of PNEI was transferred to its creditor, the National
Investment Development Corporation ("NIDC"), a subsidiary of the Philippine National
Bank ("PNB"), following the latter's foreclosure of PNEI assets. PNEI was one among
several companies placed under sequestration by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government ("PCGG") shortly after the historic 1986 events in EDSA.
The
sequestration order was lifted to give way to the sale of PNEI by the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT) which, in the meanwhile, had taken over the management of
the company. The continuing deterioration of its financial condition prompted PNEI to
lodge a Petition for Suspension of Payments with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), a move calculated to prevent further dissipation of PNEI's assets
and to make PNEI a viable source of income for the government.
The management committee, which was created to handle the business operations of
PNEI, presented a report to the SEC that recommended, in a move to best serve the
interest of all parties concerned (creditors, employees of PNEI and the government),
the sale of the company through privatization in accordance with the rules of the APT.
As a cost saving measure, the management committee also recommended to the
SEC the retrenchment of some 500 employees of PNEI. The retrenchment was carried
out.
The filing of various labor complaints against PNEI was the immediate result where
PNEI lost against the employees. By virtue of the writ of execution, various pieces of
property of PNEI were levied upon and sold at public auction. Meanwhile, APT filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Quash Execution. By then, the proceeds of the sale of
some property had amounted to P1,200,000.00. The amount was deposited with the
NLRC pending resolution of APT's motion. On the other hand, the employees filed a
Motion for Intervention before Labor Arbiter Aquino claiming interest over the same
property of PNEI because of the union's own monetary claim against the latter.
Proceeds from the sale though were not enough to cover these claims, together with
the claims of the creditors.
Issue: Whether or not APT can be sued to be held liable to the obligation of PNEI
HELD Proclamation No. 50, creating APT which has been mandated to "take title to
and possession of, conserve, provisionally manage and dispose of assets" that have
been identified for privatization or disposition, clearly provides that said
instrumentality, among other things, can "sue and be sued." This provision
indubitably shows that APT can be haled to court. Nonetheless, we have likewise
since explained that suability does not necessarily mean liability on the part of the
particular instrumentality or agency of the government. The liability of APT under
this particular arrangement should be co-extensive with the amount of assets taken
over from the privatized firm.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE VICENTE A. HIDALGO

FACTS: On 02 June 1999, Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment
or declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/or recovery of
ownership and possession of a four thousand nine hundred twenty-four-square meter
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3
(4,924.60 sq. m. to be exact) property against the Republic of the Philippines (in
whose name the title to the property was transferred and registered. The property in
question is located at 1440 Arlegui Street, San Miguel, Manila.
On 27 August 2003, Judge Hidalgo rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Mendoza. A
certificate of finality[8] of judgment was issued by the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty.
Michael B. Robles, on 27 November 2003. On 10 December 2003, respondent issued
an order[9] directing the issuance of a writ of execution. On 07 January 2004, Sheriff
Cachero further directed the National Treasurer to cause payment of
P1,942,576,312.45, thus:
ISSUE: w/n the writ of execution can be enforced against the state? NO
-w/n the state can be held liable for attorneys fees? - NO
HELD: In the present case, respondent Judge patently committed two inexcusable
procedural errors the pronouncement of costs against the government and the
subsequent issuance of the writ of execution, in violation of settled rules and
jurisprudence.
In the decision dated 27 August 2003, respondent Judge declared the Republic liable
for payment of attorneys fees and cost of suit, pertinent portion of which reads: 7.
Ordering the defendant Republic of the Philippines to pay the plaintiff attorneys fee,
in an amount equivalent to FIFTEEN (15%) PER CENT of the amount due to the
plaintiff.
In declaring the government answerable to the attorneys fees of the plaintiff
and other costs of the suit, the respondent utterly disregarded the well-established
rule that costs of suit are not recoverable against the government (Section 1, Rule
142, Rules of Court). As early as 15 November 1918, we ruled in the case of Hong
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Rafferty that no costs shall be allowed
against the government of the Philippine Islands where the government is the
unsuccessful party. This was reiterated in the case of Philippines Veterans Affairs
Office v. Anover and The Philippine Veterans Affairs Office v. Tamayo, when we ruled
that court costs are not recoverable from a government agency.
It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not
thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put,
when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an
opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has a liability. In Republic v. Villasor this
Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the
funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory
judgment, has explained, thus . . . The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
4. Suability vs Liability
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E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
FACTS: The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle and collided with the General Hospital
ambulance. As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his
work as a contractor, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of
the Uy Chaco building."
The court find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any
fault on his part, is P18,075.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to
fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of
the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which
Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two
questions submitted to the court for determination.
ISSUE: Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for
that amount?
HELD: No.
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy
to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on
the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it
would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was
intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives
authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with
the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or
courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of
law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act
opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of
liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity
from suit.
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's
liability to any cause not previously recognized.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it
acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words
are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign
to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes
the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is
an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs
the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur.
Civ., 389, 390.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is
only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain,
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for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents
within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of
the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of
damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent
acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient
funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the
Legislature and not with the courts.
MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION v. FIRME
195 SCRA 692 (1991)
FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando is a municipal corporation existing
under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent
Judge Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the Presiding Judge of the CH.
Private respondents are heirs of the deceased Laureano Banina, Sr. and plaintiffs in
the civil case before the aforesaid Court. On Dec. 16, 1965, a collision occurred
involving a passenger jeepney driven by Balagot and owned by the Estate of
Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Nianandog and owned by Velasquez and
a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fen-tando and driven by Bislig. Due to the
impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Banina, Sr. died and 4
others suffered physical injuries. On Dec. 11, 1966, private respondents instituted a
complaint for damages against the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot, owl-ter and
driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants
filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of the dump truck
of petitioner. Private respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and
its regular employee, -Bishg, were impleaded as defendants. Petitioner invoked,
among others, non-suability of the State.
On Oct. 10, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs (private
respondents) ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual damages, attorney's
fees and costs of the suit, dismissing the complaint against the Estate of Nieveras
and Balagot. In an order dated Nov. 7, 1979, the respondent Judge Firme denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner. Hence this petition. (Respondent
Judge failed to resolve the issue of non-suability of the state in the guise of the
municipality.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando is liable for quasi-delict
committed by its regular employee?
HELD: We arrive at the conclusion that the Municipality cannot be held liable for the
torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger imposed on the
Municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation. Accordingly, the petition is
granted.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their
charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in
a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives
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the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions
recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the Municipality insist that "he was
on his way to the Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of
San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. We rule that the driver
of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN VS. HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM,

JR
G.R. No. 168289
FACTS: The case stems from a Complaint filed by herein private respondent Emily
Rose Go Ko Lim Chao against herein petitioners, the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan
and its chief executive, Felix V. Ople (Ople) for collection of a sum of money and
damages. It was alleged that sometime in the middle of the year 2000, respondent,
doing business as KD Surplus and as such engaged in buying and selling surplus
trucks, heavy equipment, machinery, spare parts and related supplies, was contacted
by petitioner Ople. Respondent had entered into an agreement with petitioner
municipality through Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were
needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality.
However, despite having made several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heed
respondents claim for payment.
ISSUE: W/N the municipality maybe held liable? YES.
HELD: The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that
the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent.
Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when they consent to it. Consent is
implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then descends to
the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or special
law[34] such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate
powers one of them is the power to sue and be sued.
Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As held in City of
Caloocan v. Allarde,[35] where the suability of the state is conceded and by which
liability is ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether
to satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not issue upon such judgment,
because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to
satisfy judgments recovered from the action.
These statutes only convey an
implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make
provisions for its full satisfaction. Thus, where consent to be sued is given by general
or special law, the implication thereof is limited only to the resultant verdict on the
action before execution of the judgment.[36]
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
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public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as required by law.
specific objects. x x x
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699
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
ANNOTATION
VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY FROM LOCAL JURISDICTION
By
JORGE R. COQUIA*
________________
1.Introduction, p. 699
2.Historical Background of Diplomatic Immunity, p. 700
3.The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, p. 702
4.Absolute and Relative Immunity, p. 702
5.Theory of Absolute Immunity, p. 703
6.Immunities of Diplomatic Agents, p. 704
7.Immunities of Consuls, p. 704
8.Honorary Consuls, p. 705
9.Immunity of Officials Representing a Sovereign State, p. 706
10.Immunity of Officials of International Organizations, p. 708
11.Immuntiy of Intergovernmental International Organizations, p. 709
12.Immunity of Non-Governmental International Organizations, p. 710
13.The Doctrine of Restrictive Immunity, p. 712
14.Immunity of Ad Hoc Diplomats, p. 714
15.The Proper Procedure in the Jeffrey Liang Case, p. 714
1. Introduction
The concept of diplomatic immunity or exemption of individuals from local jurisdiction
originally started from the immunity of diplomatic envoys such as ambassadors,
minis________________
* Member, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
700
700
ters, our counselors representing their countries abroad. Heads of states or sovereign
rulers traveling abroad enjoy inviolability from local jurisdiction. As international
relations developed with the formation of the family of nations, the concept of
immunity persons from local jurisdiction has very much broadened. Immunity has
extended to consuls, ad hoc diplomats, international organizations and their officers.
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International law now recognizes a system of granting immunity from local
jurisdiction not only intergovernmental organizations but also international nongovernmental organizations and their officials.
The nature of diplomatic immunity granted to officials of intergovernment
organizations was the issue in JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), Petitioner, versus PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent, G.R. No. 125865, promulgated on January 28, 2000
now under annotation.
The petitioner in said case, an employee of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), an
intergovernmental banking organization who allegedly committed a crime of oral
defamation invoked immunity from suit, citing a provision of the Headquarters
Agreement between the Philippine government and the ADB, that: Officers and staff
of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
(a) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
2. Historical Background of Diplomatic Immunity
Diplomatic immunity with the law on diplomatic relations among States was
developed much earlier than all other aspects of international law. Even before the
emergence of Greek civilization, the records of ancient China, India and Egypt
showed practices observing respect for emissaries and recognizing the sacred
character of their office. Although no
701
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701
permanent embassies were established, the Greeks and the Romans sent and
received envoys who were accorded respect and personal inviolability. By then,
traces of the principle of exterritoriality as now understood in modern international
law had already been recognized. (Grotius, Book II, ch. XVII on Right to Legation,
trans. by FCG Kelsley, Carnegie Endorsement for International Peace, Oxford, 1925).
Up to the fall of Roman Empire, ambassadors were regarded only as personal
representatives of the kings or princes. With the development of the Italian states in
the fourteenth century, embassies took on a more formal character, especially in the
case of the representatives of the Holy See to the various secular courts. By the
fifteenth century, resident embassies were established and some form of diplomatic
procedure developed. Eventually, questions of precedence and inviolability of envoys
arose, which resulted in serious disputes among States. (De Vattel, Book IV, ch. V-IX
[1773] Law of Nations).
By custom and tradition antedating all other rules of international law, the diplomatic
agents sent by one state to another have been regarded as possessing a peculiarly
sacred character, in consequence of which they have been accorded special
privileges and immunities. The ancient Greeks regarded an attack upon the person of
an ambassador as an offense of the gravest nature. The writers of ancient Rome were
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3
unanimous in considering an injury to envoys as deliberate infraction of the jus
gentium. Grotius wrote in 1625 that there were two points with regard to
ambassadors which are everywhere recognized as prescribed by the law of nations,
first that they be admitted, and then that they be not violated. The basis upon which
this personal immunity rested was generally found in the principle that the
ambassador personified the state or sovereign he represented. From this principle
developed not only the custom of according special protection to the person of the
ambassador but also a comprehensive exemption from the local jurisdiction. In
explanation of the privileges and immunities thus granted, writers worked out the
fiction of exterritoriality, which held that the ambas702
702
sador and his suite, together with his residence and the surrounding property, were
legally outside the territory of the state. This fiction obtained for a time of foothold in
international law and served the useful purpose, on one hand, of explaining the
actual immunities granted to foreign representatives and, on the other hand, of
emphasizing the sovereignty and equality of the several states. It was, however,
open to the disadvantage not only of being a fiction but of permitting inferences
more comprehensive than the position of the ambassador called for. The conception
is abandoned in the Vienna Convention; which offers no theoretical basis for the
privileges and immunities it grants. (Fenwick, Charles G., International Law, AppletonCentury Co., Inc., New York [1965]).
3. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations
The law on diplomatic intercourse in general as now codified in the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Likewise the law in consular immunities and
privileges are provided with the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
4. Absolute and Relative Immunity
Immunity from the exercise of local jurisdiction may be generally classified as
absolute or relative. According to the classical, or absolute, theory of sovereign
immunity, a foreign sovereign could not, without his consent, be made a defendant in
the courts of another sovereign. But according to a newer and restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, such exemption has been recognized only with respect to
sovereign or public acts of state and not necessarily with respect to its so-called
private acts.
Long ago, the principle of sovereign immunity embraced both the government of a
foreign sovereign (state immunity) and the individual head of the state in question
(personal
703
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
703
immunity). Today the two forms of immunity are quite distinct and have to be
discussed separately.
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3
5. Theory of Absolute Immunity
Regardless of whether an individual is constitutionally the actual head of a state or
only its nominal head, he or she enjoys complete immunity from suit in the territory
of another state. This principle applies equally to crowned heads of state and elected
heads of state. And whatever the sovereign may do in the territory of another state,
he is immune from all prosecution, civil or criminal. This principle was applied in
Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, Queens Bench Division (1894) 1 Q. B. 149. The Sultan of
Johore, a young man visiting England was sued by a woman for breach of promise to
marry. Although the Sultan was not exactly a head of a state, the English Court
dismissed the case on the ground that the Sultan of Johore is immune from suit. The
Court held that (1) certification of the status of a foreign sovereign by means of an
official communication from an adviser of the British sovereign binds English courts
and is to be accepted as conclusive as far as those courts are concerned, and (2) the
relationship existing between Great Britain and the Sultanate of Johore was based on
a treaty of protection by which the Sultan was to enjoy the protection of Great Britain,
engaging, on his part, not to enter into treaties with any foreign states. In the opinion
of the court, the agreement by the sultan not to enter into treaties with other Power
does not seem. . . to be abnegation of his right to enter into such treaties, but only a
condition upon which the protection stipulated for is to be given. If the sultan
disregards it, the consequences may be the loss of that protection, or possibly other
difficulties with this country; but I do not think that there is anything in the treaty
which qualifies or disproves the statement in the letter that the Sultan of Johore is an
independent sovereign.
Similarly, the Gaekwar of Baroda, named as correspondent in the divorce suit of
Statham v. Statham and the Gaekwar of Barosa, (Great Britain, Probate Court, 1912,
p. 12, cited in
704
704
Glahn, Law Among Nations, p. 138) was declared by a British court to be immune
from suit because of his position as sovereign of an independent state in India.
A foreign sovereign or head of state not only enjoys personal immunity from suit but
also cannot be named as a party defendant to a suit brought against him in his
official capacity as the representative of his state. This was brought out clearly in the
case of De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, (Great Britain, Court of Queens Bench, 1851,
17 Q. B., 196) in which a British court dismissed on grounds of immunity of a suit for
money allegedly wrongfully paid to the government of Portugal.
6. Immunities of Diplomatic Agents
The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomats Relations exempts the heads of diplomatic
missions, such as acting ambassadors or nuncios, or internuncios and charges
daffaires from the exercise of local jurisdiction. The diplomatic representatives enjoy
personal inviolability. They are exempted from exercise of jurisdiction of the receiving
state. Even if they commit an offense they may not be arrested. The remedy of the
local state is to consider him a persona non grata and will be asked to leave the
country. Should he refuse to leave the country he will be treated as an ordinary
individual and the local laws can be applied on him.
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7. Immunities of Consuls
Consuls do not belong to the class of diplomatic agents. They look mainly on the
commercial interests of their own states and perform non-political matter such as
issuing passports and visas taking deportees and verification of documents.
Generally, they are not clothed with diplomatic privilege.
However, 1963 Vienna Convention of Consular Relations grants the privileges and
immunities in so far as they are performing their curricular duties. Consuls do not
enjoy im705
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
705
munity from local jurisdiction from private or commercial transactions not connected
with the consular duties. This rule was followed in Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil.
249 (1936). The consul of Uruguay in Manila invoked the immunity from criminal
prosecution for falsification of private documents. The Supreme Court ruled that the
crime committed was not in the performance of his consular duties hence, he cannot
claim immunity from suit.
8. Honorary Consuls
By agreement among states honorary consuls are appointed to perform limited
curricular duties. They may be citizens of the receiving state and are non-career
consuls of a special category distinguished from career consuls. Various national
criteria define honorary consuls as persons who are not regularly salaried. They may
not be nationals of the sending state, and can engage in private gainful occupation,
and permitted to perform only certain limited functions. In view of the wide use of
honorary consuls, the Vienna Convention deals in detail with their status. (See Chap.
III, Arts. 58-68.) The drafters of the Convention refrained from defining honorary
consuls and merely attempted to codify the existing practice of strictly limiting their
immunities to a minimum level necessary for the proper exercise of official consular
functions, for example, freedom of communication, immunity from local jurisdiction
with reference to official acts. Other immunities are limited so as to prohibit the
granting of special benefits to honorary consuls acting in private capacities. For
example, consular archives of a consular post headed by an honorary consul are
inviolable provided that private and official documents are separated; tax exemption
extends only to renumeration received from the sending state for the exercise of
consular functions. Consular employees at a post headed by an honorary consul and
members of the honorary consuls family are granted none of the privileges provided
in the Convention.
706
706
9. Immunity of Officials Representing a Sovereign State
The traditional absolute theory of immunity exempted a state in every way from the
jurisdiction of other countries: its government could not be sued abroad without its
consent; its public property could not be attached; its public vessels could not be
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3
arrested, boarded, or sued; nor could any property or real state owned by the state
be taxed or attached in whatever country it might be located.
Under the doctrine of immunity of the State from suit even officers representing the
sovereign state are exempted from local jurisdiction. This principle was followed in
the Philippines in several cases at the time the US Military Bases were present in the
country.
One of the earliest decisions on this subject was Syquia vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil.
312 (1949). The US military commander was sued to restore the apartment buildings
they owned and leased plus rentals. The Supreme Court in dismissing the case held
that the real party in interest as defendant in the original case is the United States of
America. The lessee in each of the three lease agreements was the United States of
America and the lease agreements themselves were executed in her name by her
officials acting as her agents. The consideration of rentals was always paid by the US
Government not only because, as already stated, the contracts of lease were entered
into by such Government but also because the premises were used by officers of her
armed forces during the war and immediately after the termination of hostilities.
The Supreme Court held that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal
Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The
question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the
action. The US Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is
essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a
citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latters consent but it is
of a citizen filing an action against a
707
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
707
foreign government without said governments consent, which renders more obvious
the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country.
In an earlier case (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]), the Supreme Court
declared that it is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a
friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign,
is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place.
In Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War Damage Commission, 87 Phil. 328
(1950), the respondent, a United States agency established to compensate damages
suffered by the Philippines during World War II, was held as falling within the above
doctrine as the suit against it would eventually be a charge against or financial
liability of the United States Government because x x x, the Commission has no funds
of its own for the purpose of paying money judgments.
In Philippine Alien Property Administration v. Castelo, 89 Phil. 568 (1951), a suit
against the Alien Property Custodian and the Attorney General of the United States
involving vested property under the Trading with the Enemy Act was a suit against
the US. Similar rulings were held in Parreo v. Mc Grannery, 92 Phil. 791 (1953) and
Johnson v. Turner, 94 Phil. 807 (1954), Miquiabas v. Commanding General, 282 C
1948).
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3
In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974) a suit filed against the US Naval Base Commander
in Subic Bay was dismissed under the doctrine of immunity from suit without its
consent.
In US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 482 (1985) the suit filed against the US Naval Base
Commander for breach of contract was likewise dismissed on the doctrine of state
immunity state immunity from suit.
In US v. Ceballos, 182 SCRA 644 (1990), the US Air Force Officer who was sued for
conducting buy bust operations, to prevent the distribution, and possession of
prohibited drugs in the US military base was considered as an official function. As US
government officials they are immune from suit.
708
708
Likewise in US v. Alarcon, 182 SCRA 646 (1990) the suit filed against the US military
officials for damages due to injuries suffered by complainants who were bitten by
their dogs was dismissed as the suit was in effect against US government. The
complainants were committing theft of government property within the military base.
In 1994, the Supreme Court in Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524 (1994)
reiterated the settled jurisprudence that the Vatican as a state represented by the
Holy See may not be sued. The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See
the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its ambassador, the Papal
Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since
1957.
10. Immunity of Officials of International Organiza tions
Historically, the present law on international immunities of international organization
started from the experience of the International Labor Organization and League of
Nations and eventually the United Nations and its agencies.
The immunities enjoyed by the United Nations includes immunity for United Nations
assets, wherever located, from any legal process; immunity of all United Nations
premises from search, requisition, expropriation, confiscation, and any other sort of
interference; immunity of archives; complete freedom from all financial controls,
moratoriums, or other monetary regulations; freedom to hold funds in any desired
currency or metal; freedom to transfer funds; an absolute exemption of all assets and
revenue from all direct taxes; exemption from all customs duties as well as from any
foreign trade prohibitions on goods needed for the official use of the organization; a
guarantee of most favored diplomatic treatment as far as rates, priorities, and so on,
connected with all media of communications, are concerned; exemption from all
forms of censorship; the right to use codes; and the privilege of transporting
correspondence by courier or otherwise under
709
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
709
the full complement of customary diplomatic immunities (Glahn, Law of Nations, p.
154.) Officers in UN agencies also enjoy immunities from local jurisdiction. When
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3
engaged in their official functions, judges of the International Court of Justice enjoy
diplomatic privileges and immunities.
Similarly, the representatives of the European Economic Community and the
European Atomic Energy (EURATOM) possess customary diplomatic privileges and
immunities in the States where they are located.
Special diplomatic missions are usually sent to States the purpose of which are
specified by mutual consent between the sending and receiving States. Members of
these special missions normally enjoy privileges in international law, except in
respect of personal actions, or professional or commercial activities. They enjoy civil
and criminal immunities, and are exempted from customs duties and inspections.
In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Supreme Court
sustained the position of the Department of Foreign Affairs that the WHO official was
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of diplomatic envoys and order the
quashing of the search warrant on him issued by a lower court. The Supreme Court
said in said case that the executive branch of the Philippine Government has
expressly recognized that the petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity,
pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The Department of Foreign Affairs
formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Governments official position
that accordingly, Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a Philippine court summons
without violating an obligation in international law of the Philippine Government.
11. Immunity of Intergovernmental International Organizations
The growth of intergovernmental international organizations dedicated to specific
universal endeavors such as health, agriculture, science, technology and
environment has broadened the concept of international immunities. The reason
710
710
behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international rights organizations, its
officials and functionaries, is to secure them legal and practical independence in the
performance of their duties. (Jenks, International Immunities, London [1961])
The Philippine Supreme Court has ruled on this type of immunity. In Southeast Asian
Fisheries Development CenterAquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AOD) v. National
Labor Organization, 206 SCRA 289 (1992). The Court in said case held that the
SEAFDEC, being an international organization enjoys functional independence and
freedom from control of the state in whose territory it is located.
In Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, 241
SCRA 681 (1995), the Court ruled that the United Nations Revolving Funds for Natural
Resources Exploration, which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United
Nations enjoyed immunity from suit. The United Nations Revolving Funds is involved
in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration
work in Dinagat Island. The Labor Arbiter of the Department of Labor has no
jurisdiction to try the case involving labor disputes.
12. Immunity of Non-Governmental International Organizations
The principle of immunity from said suit has been extended even to nongovernmental international organizations which are performing meritorious services
to assist countries in the promotion of health, protection of environment, and
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3
development of natural resources. By agreement with the government, nongovernmental international organizations which volunteer are exempted from local
jurisdiction in order to give them freedom in the performance of their activities.
In response to the plight of Vietnamese refugees an agreement was forged in 1981
between the Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees whereby an operating center processing Indo-Chinese refu711
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
711
gees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in the
Philippines. The International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), a non-profit
international humanitarian agency incorporated in New York, was accredited by the
Philippine Government to operate the refugee center in the Philippines. Duly
organized under the United Nations Economic and Social Council where it enjoys
consultative status, category II in the U.N., the ICMC was granted status as
specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges accorded by the
Philippine Government.
In view of a certification election of employees union of the ICMC issued by the
Director of Bureau of Labor Relations of the Philippine Government, the ICMC filed a
petition for certiorari with the Philippine Supreme Court invoking its status as
recognized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities. The
Department of Foreign Affairs through its Legal Adviser intervened in the case on the
ground that as the highest executive department with authority and competence to
act on matters involving diplomatic immunity and privileges, it has legal interest in
the outcome of the case. The Supreme Court sustained the intervention of the Legal
Adviser of the Department of Foreign Affairs that the certification election of laborers
and employees union violated the diplomatic immunity of the ICMC as an
international organization. The court reiterated the principle in WHO vs. Aquino, 48
SCRA 242 [1972], that the determination of diplomatic immunity is essentially a
political question which is conclusive on courts. (International Catholic Migration
Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).
The Philippine Supreme Court made a similar ruling in the case of International Rice
Research Institute, Inc., a Ford and Rockefeller Foundation-supported international
organization, with the principal objective of conducting research on rice production.
The Supreme Court sustained a ruling of the Secretary of Labor that an application of
the Philippine Labor Law on the employees and the laborers violated the immunities
and privileges of IRRI as a recognized international or712
712
ganization. (Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI v. International Rice
Institute, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).
13. The Doctrine of Restrictive Immunity
The privileges and immunities of diplomatic officials are not altogether unlimited.
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3
The theory of restrictive immunity was raised for the first time in the Philippines in US
v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985). In the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar, he
averred that the US Naval Commander of Subic Bay should not hide himself behind
the cloak of immunity since when he entered into contracts with private individuals,
he went down to the level of a private. Justice Abad Santos, writing that the majority
opinion of the case, however, ruled that the US Naval Commander was entering into
a contract which involved public and sovereign function of the US government which
is the maintenance of naval facilities for the use of the US Navy.
Since 1952, US Government has followed the policy of recognizing the restrictive
immunity of a State. Through a letter of Jack B. Tate, then acting legal adviser to the
Department of State, to the Acting Attorney General, a policy was laid down that,
thenceforth, private activities of foreign sovereigns would be denied immunity in
American courts. Several United States court decisions followed the new policy
(Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 American Journal
of International La, 93 [1953]).
The United States Congress enacted into law the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 which took effect on January 19, 1977. Said law codifies the re strictive theory
of sovereign immunity by limiting the latter to public acts and excluding all
commercial or private acts. It also laid down the procedure to be followed in filing a
case against a foreign State. The decision of vesting sovereign immunity is
exclusively with the courts, thereby eliminating political questions in the Department
of State.
The principle of restrictive immunity was applied by the Supreme Court in US v.
Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 (1990). In said
713
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
713
case, the private respondent sued the US Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding for contract for barbering services. The Supreme Court
held that barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the State Government
are commercial enterprises. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces
nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen.
These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer
not only the basic haircut and shave (as required in most military organizations) but
such similar indulgences, all for a fee. Interestingly, one of the concessionaires,
private respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to improve his tonsorial business,
presumably for the benefit of his customers. No less significantly, if not more so, all
the barbershop concessionaires are, under the terms of their contracts, required to
remit to the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the
exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint
filed by the private respondents in the court below. The contracts in question being
decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the United States of America v. Ruiz
case cannot be applied here.
In US v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 (1990), the court also ruled that the US Air Force
operating the open mess complex at Camp John Hay is a business enterprise opened
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3
to the public and that the principle of immunity of suit will not apply. The business
was proprietary in character. Such services are not extended to the American
servicemen for free as a prerequisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the
United States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these
servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are available to the general
public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to
visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility pay for
the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the prices
are concededly reasonable and relatively low, such services are
714
714
undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity.
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of
state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove.
For that matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such
immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove
in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit.
14. Immunity of Ad Hoc Diplomats
Members of official missions and delegates traveling abroad to attend international
conference are accorded diplomatic immunity while in the performance of their
official functions. The principle of restrictive immunity applies to them, however, for
acts not directly connected with their official duties.
15. The Proper Procedure in the Jeffrey Liang Case
In the case under annotation, the proper procedure was for the municipal court to
inquire whether the petitioner had committed the crime in connection with the
performance of his official duties as an officer of the Asian Development Bank. Sec.
45 (a) of the Headquarters agreement between the Government of the Philippines
and the Asian Development Bank states that the immunity applies to the
performance of their duties in their official capacities.
The immunity of Jeffrey Liang was not absolute. The principle of restrictive immunity
applies to him. The municipal judge in outrightly dismissing the case on the ground of
immunity of the petitioner from local jurisdiction was not proper. It will be different if
the person enjoyed full diplomatic immunity as what happened in the case of WHO
vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 243 (1972) the official was a U.N. officer with full diplomatic
immunity. Thus, the certifications of
715
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
715
Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the WHO officials enjoyed diplomatic immunity are
conclusive on the courts. It was a political act of the executive which should be
respected by the court.
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3
For that matter, had there been a preliminary investigation as averred by the
petitioner, the case should not have reached the Supreme Court. The preliminary
investigation could have clarified whether the petitioner committed oral defamation
in connection with his official duties as an ADB official.
o0o
Sabili v COMELEC, Librea [G.R. No. 193261. April 24, 2012.]

Doctrine
There is nothing wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run
for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable
certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law
purposes for the period required by law.
Facts
Meynard Sabili ran as Mayor in Lipa City, Batangas for the May 2010 elections. He
stated in his COC that he had been a resident of Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City for 2 years,
8 months. According to him, he was previously a resident of Brgy. Sico, San Juan,
Batangas but he changed his residence to Lipa City thereafter.
Librea contested the truth of the contents of Sabilis COC and prayed for
cancellation. He alleged that Sabili made material misrepresentations of fact in
COC and also failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement since
falsely declared under oath therein that he had already been a resident
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.
its
his
he
of
COMELEC disqualified Sabili and cancelled his COC. Sabili filed an MR. Pending its
resolution, he won the 2010 elections as Lipa City Mayor. However, his MR was
denied. So, he filed this petition before the SC. The SC issued a Status Quo Ante
Order.
Issues/Held
1. Librea presented as proof tax declarations proving that the Lipa City property
of Sabili was owned by Sabilis common-law wife. Librea claims that the same
should have been owned by Sabili as positive proof of intent to change actual
residence. Is Librea correct?
Held: No. Property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates
for local election. Rather, it is a candidate's residence in a locality through actual
residence in whatever capacity. In another case, the SC even sustained a candidates
claim of residency even if he was a mere lessee of an apartment in the same
province where he ran for governor. Also, in Mitra v. COMELEC, the SC ruled that a
candidate's sparsely furnished, leased room on the mezzanine of a feedmill could be
considered as his residence for the purpose of complying with the residency
requirement.
We have long held that it is not required that a candidate should have his
own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. It is
enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of
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a friend or relative. What is of central concern then is that petitioner
identified and established a place in Lipa City where he intended to live in
and return to for an indefinite period of time.
2. Librea presented a Certification from the DepEd, Lipa City Division, indicating
that Sabilis children do not appear on the list of graduates of Lipa City. Is this
material?
Held: No. The issue at hand is Sabilis residence, not the educational record of his
family.
It must be stressed that the children, like the wife, do not dictate the family domicile.
Even in the context of marriage, the family domicile is jointly decided by both
husband and wife. In addition, we note that the transfer to Lipa City occurred in 2007,
when Sabilis children were already well into college and could very well have chosen
to study elsewhere than in Lipa City.
3. Sabili purportedly did not maintain any business in Lipa City, nor did he own
any property there. Is this material?
Held: No. Again, property ownership (and similarly, business interest) in the locality
where one intends to run for local elective post is not a requirement of the
Constitution.
4. Librea had several affidavits of Lipa City residents claiming that he was rarely
seen by them. Is this material?
No. Even assuming the truth of the allegation in the Affidavits that Sabili was "rarely
seen" in the area, this does not preclude the possibility of his residence therein. In a
case, it was held that the averments of certain barangay health workers that they
failed to see a particular candidate whenever they made rounds of the locality of
which he was supposed to be a resident is of no moment. It is possible that the
candidate was out of the house to attend to his own business at the time. The law
does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7)
days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
5. Sabili offered several income tax returns proving that he resided in Lipa City.
This was not considered by COMELEC. Are the ITRs material?
Held: Yes. Under the NIRC, ITRs may be filed either in the place where a person
resides or where his principal place of business is located. The fact that Sabili was
filing his ITRs in Lipa City notwithstanding that he had no business therein showed
that he had actively elected to establish his residence in that city.
A simple perusal of the Income Tax Returns and Revenue Official Receipts for 2007
and 2008 shows that Sabili invariably declares his residence to be Pinagtong-ulan,
Lipa City, rather than San Juan, Batangas.
6. Sabili also presented a Barangay Captain's Certification proving that he had
been residing in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. This was not considered by
the COMELEC. Is this material?
Held: Yes. The Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to
"keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay. It is the business of a
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punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay. Finally, the
Barangay Captain's exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position
requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.
7. Whether Sabili had complied with the one-year residency requirement for local
elective officials?
Held: YES. Thus, Sabili has not misrepresented his residence at Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa
City and the duration thereof.
It is clear that collectively, the pieces of evidence offered by Sabili tend to sufficiently
establish his residence in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.
His actual physical presence in Lipa City is established not only by the presence of a
place (Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of
various persons in Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certification of its barangay captain. His
substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa City is also
sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and
the transfer of his voter registration, but also his participation in the community's
socio-civic and religious life, as well as his declaration in his ITR that he is a resident
thereof.
In view of this Court's finding that petitioner has not misrepresented his residence at
Pinagtong-ulan.
Aldovino v COMELEC, Asilo [G.R. No. 184836. December 23, 2009.]
Doctrine
Preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an
elective official's stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot
simply be an interruption of a term because the suspended official continues to stay
in office. He is merely barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period.
Facts
Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his 2004-2007 term, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal
case he then faced. The SC subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan's suspension
order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position.
Aldovino et al. sought to deny due course to Asilo's COC or to cancel it on the ground
that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth
term therefore violated the three-term limit rule. This was denied by the COMELEC
and eventually by the COMELEC en banc on MR.
Issue
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term
of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local
Government Code)?
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Held
1. NO. Asilo, therefore, is disqualified. The "interruption" of a term exempting an
elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than
the involuntary LOSS OF TITLE to office. The elective official must have
involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an
effective interruption to occur.
Thus, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective
post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of
a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an
effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is
simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the
right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service.
The latter occurs during an office holder's term when he retains title to the office but
cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled
conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the
interests of the individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only
as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the official's
office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the
preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of
power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended.
This was what exactly happened to Asilo.
2. As worded, Section 8, Article X of the Constitution fixes the term of a local
elective office and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more than
three consecutive terms.
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time
which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. The term of office
is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officer's term
his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. The most
and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the
expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed.
A voluntary renunciation of office "shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
3. There are two requisites for the application of the disqualification:
a. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post; and
b. That he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, the disqualification was not applied because Lonzanida
vacated his post not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC. Such involuntary severance
from office is an interruption of continuity of service.
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In Adormeo v. COMELEC, the disqualification was not applied because the official
in this case lost in the elections for his third term but was able to succeed to the
same office by reason of a recall election. Thus, for nearly two years, the official was
a private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat
in the election for the third term.
In Socrates v COMELEC, the disqualification was not applied because the
candidate, who had fully served his three terms, DID NOT run for the same office in a
REGULAR ELECTION. He filed his COC DURING A RECALL ELECTION against the
incumbent.
In Montebon v. COMELEC, the disqualification was not applied where the
candidate, a councilor, succeeded the office of vice-Mayor. Thus, when he ran as
councilor for the fourth term, this was allowed by the SC, ruling that that an
interruption had intervened so that he could again run as councilor. In this case,
the elective official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of
vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an
interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
Ruby Talaga v COMELEC (2012) [G.R. No. 196804. October 9, 2012.]
Doctrine
The existence of a valid COC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution.
Facts
Ramon Talaga filed his COC for the 2010 Mayoralty elections in Lucena City. His
opponent, Castillo filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. contesting the validity of Ramons COC in view of
the fact that he had already served 3 terms as city mayor.
Ramon claimed that when he was preventively suspended by the Sandiganbayan
during his previous terms, his term of office was interrupted. But when Aldovino v
COMELEC (supra) was promulgated, he filed a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve
where he expressly recognized his disqualification to run as Mayor. The
COMELEC disqualified him as a candidate but did not expressly cancel his COC. This
decision became final and executory.
6 days prior to the elections (the OEC requires the filing of COCs 60 days prior the
elections), Barbara Ruby, Ramons wife, filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in
substitution of Ramon. On election day, the name of Ramon remained printed on
the ballots. The votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his
substitute. Barbara won against Castillo.
Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC alleging
that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been
cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be
considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her
substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon
should be considered stray.
Barbara countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or
cancel Ramon's COC, despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there
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was no finding that he had committed misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of
due course to or cancellation of his COC.
Issue/Held
1. Was Ramons COC cancelled?
Yes. The declaration of Ramon's disqualification rendered his COC invalid. The denial
of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding
not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material
representation that is false.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can
be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election
Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not
be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a
candidate.
OEC Section 78 vs OEC Section 68
It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or
confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are
different, for they are based on different grounds, and can result in different
eventualities. A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue
as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under
Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that
of a person who has not filed a CoC. Miranda v. Abaya has clarified that a
candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted
pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified;
but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under
Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate.
2. Was there a valid substitution in this case?
No. The existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution.
Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of
Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and
ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false
declaration of his eligibility to run.
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation
with Motion to Resolve. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all
intents and purposes the COMELEC's declaration of his disqualification had the effect
of announcing that he was no candidate at all. We stress that a non-candidate
like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute.
The concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be
substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or
who never was.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate
of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a
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valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at
all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the
Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and
"original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be
a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our
Constitution.
QUINTO and TOLENTINO, JR. vs. COMELEC. [G.R. No. 189698. December 1,
2009.]1
Doctrine in the 2 Quinto cases
An appointive official who files his COC is deemed automatically resigned,
while an elective official is not deemed automatically resigned.
Facts
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties
in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment
they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold
appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming
elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be
harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that
they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue
Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection
clause.
Held
Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from
their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
1
http://kerstidawn.blogspot.com/
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servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental
act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four
(4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences
between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are
created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than
a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the
second requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the
present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And,
under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective
ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger
that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the
proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office,
could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would
be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision
cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly
absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the
law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive
Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same
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influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post
(in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national
housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign
affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid
justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections.
Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this
time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period
and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the
functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling.
The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater
impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the
elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be
germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso
of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC
violates the equal protection clause.
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR. vs. COMELEC. (MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION.) [G.R. No. 189698. February 22, 2010.]
Facts
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter
moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, Any person holding a public
appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
RA 9369 provides that:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period:
Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the
same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue
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Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection
clause and therefore unconstitutional.
Held
No. To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,
which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions
satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers
the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis
elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one
holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the
measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from
the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of
the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to
public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by
their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were
excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the
mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the
will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for
which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as
appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane
to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the
integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose
wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this
with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
Thus, the Court declares as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Mitra v COMELEC (2010) [G.R. No. 191938. July 2, 2010.]
Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. He was
elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the
legislative district for 3 terms immediately before the 2010 elections.
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On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra
applied for the transfer of his Voter's Registration Record from Brgy. Sta. Monica,
Puerto Princesa City, to Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He
subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of
Aborlan.
His opponents filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra's COC. They
argued that Mitra remains a resident of Puerto Princesa City who has not yet
established residence in Aborlan. They claimed that his residence at the Maligaya
Feedmill as a mere lessee is not indicative of his intention to stay in Aborlan. Thus, he
duly misrepresented in his COC that he resides in Aborlan warranting the
denial/cancellation of his COC.
The COMELEC granted the petition. It found that Mitra has not established his
domicile in Abrolan since he dwelled in a room in Maligaya Feedmill, a small,
sparsely furnished room that is evidently unlived in, located at the second floor of a
structure that appears to be a factory or a warehouse; the residence appears hastily
set-up, cold, and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitra's personality such as old
family photographs and memorabilia collected through the years. What the supposed
residence lacks, in COMELECs perception, are the loving attention and details
inherent in every home to make it one's residence; perhaps, at most, this small room
could have served as Mitra's resting area whenever he visited the locality, but
nothing more than this.
Issue
Are the grounds relied upon by COMELEC to deny due course/cancel Mitras COC
valid?
Held
No. Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a
dwelling as shown by and examined only through photographs, is far from
reasonable; the COMELEC thereby determined the fitness of a dwelling as a person's
residence based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards
when the law is replete with standards that can be used. Where a dwelling
qualifies as a residence i.e., the dwelling where a person permanently intends to
return to and to remain his or her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or
the lack of it, is immaterial.
Examined further, the COMELEC's reasoning is not only intensely subjective but also
flimsy, to the point of grave abuse of discretion when compared with the surrounding
indicators showing that Mitra has indeed been physically present in Aborlan for the
required period with every intent to settle there. Specifically, it was lost on the
COMELEC majority that Mitra made definite, although incremental transfer moves, as
shown by the undisputed business interests he has established in Aborlan in 2008; by
the lease of a dwelling where he established his base; by the purchase of a lot for his
permanent home; by his transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; and by the
construction of a house all viewed against the backdrop of a bachelor Representative
who spent most of his working hours in Manila, who had a whole congressional
district to take care of, and who was establishing at the same time his significant
presence in the whole Province of Palawan.
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From these perspectives, we cannot but conclude that the COMELEC's approach
i.e., the application of subjective non-legal standards and the gross misappreciation
of the evidence is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, as the COMELEC used
wrong considerations and grossly misread the evidence in arriving at its conclusion.
In using subjective standards, the COMELEC committed an act not otherwise within
the contemplation of law on an evidentiary point that served as a major basis for its
conclusion in the case.
Asistio v Hon. Aguirre, Echiverri (2010) [G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010.]
Facts
Echiverri filed against Asistio a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List
of Voters of Caloocan City. He alleged that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City,
specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City. Echiverri
found out that Asistio's address is non-existent. Judge Aguirre ordered the exclusion
of Asistio.
Issue
Whether Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of of Caloocan
City for failure to comply with the residency required by law.
Held
Under Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code and 9 of The Voters Registration Act
of 1996 or R.A. 8189, the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year
residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person
proposes or intends to vote.
"Residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person's acts, activities,
and utterances. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. Three rules must
be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that
a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must
demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts
which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be
for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72
years. His family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan
City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second District
representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such in the
1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor.
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In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these
circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines above
enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as
a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile
elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in
Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters
of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the
2007 and 2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be
physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a voter, should
not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported
misrepresentations in Asistio's COC, if true, might serve as basis for an
election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), 38 or an action to
deny due course to the COC. But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that
Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City.
Sema v COMELEC [G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008.] 2
Facts
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district
of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a
plebiscite held on October 29, 2006.
On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in
view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province
under MMA Act 201.
In an answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407
maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the
First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed
only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10,
2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by
renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsan Province with
Cotabato City.
Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato
City prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the
canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for that office. Sema contended that Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Issues/Held
http://lexislove.wordpress.com/tag/sema-vs-comelec/
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1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
is constitutional.
Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec.
5 of Art.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.
The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an
LGU must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in
the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional/legislative bodies the
power to create LGUs.However, under its plenary powers, Congress can delegate
to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the
delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and
barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria established in the LGC and the
plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is complied.
However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, only x x x an
Act of Congress can create provinces, cities, or municipalities.
According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:
Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least
1 representative in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least 1 Member.
Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of the
Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such province.
No. Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress.
Under the Constitution, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House
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of Representatives, and to apportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in
Congress.
Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers
Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of
existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law the Congress itself
enacts, not through a law enacted by regional/local legislative bodies. The power of
redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make
laws, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415
(1995)].
An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior
legislative body which created it. Congress is a national legislature, and any
changes in its membership through the creation of legislative districts must be
embodied in national law.
The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated
by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM
Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because
the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative
district.
But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is
vested solely in Congress.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office
because Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative
powers of regional assemblies are limited only within its territorial jurisdiction.
(Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to
create/apportion legislative districts for Congress.)
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over
the Constitution. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to
enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose
representative is elected in national elections.
At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces. Thus, MMA
Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan, is void.
Aldaba v COMELEC [G.R. No. 188078. January 25, 2010.]
Doctrine
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district
only in the immediately following election. Thus, a city must first attain the
250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city
shall have a district representative.
Facts
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Before 1 May 2009, Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative
districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos and several
municipalities. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 was passed, amending Malolos' City Charter,
by creating a separate legislative district for the city.
The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no
dispute that the law was based on an undated certification issued by a Regional
Director (Miranda) of the NSO that "the projected population of the Municipality of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit additional representation
in Congress as provided under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Issues/Held
1. Whether RA 9591 is unconstitutional.
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
The Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must
have "a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand." The only issue here is
whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or
projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in
time for the 10 May 2010 elections.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic
projections, is without legal effect because Miranda has no basis and no authority to
issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its
own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in
the year 2010. A city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a
legislative district only in the "immediately following election" after the
attainment of the 250,000 population.
Certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are
declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Certifications
based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying officer. Intercensal population projections must be as of the
middle of every year.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda also does not state that the
demographic projections he certified have been declared official by the National
Statistics Coordination Board as required under the law. . The Certification, which
states that the population of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010," violates
the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be "as of
the middle of every year."
Moreover, the Certification states that "the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of
May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The Certification also states that the population growth rate
of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of
3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only
241,550 in 2010.
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There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will
attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010
elections.
2. Whether Congress' choice of means (e.g. reliance on an NSO certification,
among others) to comply with the population requirement in the creation of a
legislative district is non-justiciable.
The issue is justiciable. The resolution of such questions falls within the checking
function of this Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, "The overwhelming
weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the
courts." Compliance with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative
districts is important because the "aim of legislative apportionment is 'to equalize
population and voting power among districts.'"
Aldaba v COMELEC [G.R. No. 188078.
Reconsideration
March 15, 2010.] Motion for
In this case, COMELEC reasserts its ground that Congress' reliance on the
Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director, National Statistics
Office (NSO), projecting Malolos City's population in 2010, is non-justiciable.
Held
It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the
population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws
creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Court's
judicial review power, 5 then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary
questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a
specific constitutional limitation under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to
representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of necessity, must
inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress
used to comply with the constitutional limitation.
Navarro v Ermita [G.R. No. 180050. February 10, 2010.]
Facts
In a May 12, 2010 Resolution, the Supreme Court struck down R.A. 9355 as
unconstitutional when it created the Dinagat Islands province in violation of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution in relation to Sec. 461 of the LGC. In this MR, the
petitioners contend that the province of the Dinagat Islands is exempted from the
requirement of territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or
more islands. In the same vein, this includes the exemption from the application of
the minimum land area requirement.
The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution states:
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SEC. 10.
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed the
criteria for the creation of a province, thus:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of
the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
square
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute
to the income of the province.
Issue
Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional?
Held
YES. The SC reversed its May 12, 2010 Resolution.
Under the law, the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities that do not contribute to the
income of the province.
It must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of
one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly
provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is
absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under
Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGCIRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply
to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the
physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood
that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newlycreated province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to
infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
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expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to
correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction which could
trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local
autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land
area requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity.
Aquino III, Robredo v COMELEC [G.R. No. 189793. April 7, 2010.]
Doctrine
Section 5 (3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a
city to be entitled to a representative, but the same population requirement does not
apply to a province.
Facts
Petitioners pray that RA 9716 be declared unconstitutional. The law created an
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the
existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by RA 9716, violates the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of 250,000 for
the creation of a legislative district. They claim that the reconfiguration by RA 9716 of
the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
x x x (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative. x x x
Petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the provision is the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district. They theorize that,
save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by
Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to
be valid.
Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to
form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at
least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation
of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the
reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the
minimum population requirement.
Issue
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for
the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
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Held
No. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly
provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to
a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.
For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned
about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to
be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province"
point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is
ONLY REQUIRED FOR A CITY, but NOT FOR A PROVINCE.
Plainly read, Section 5 (3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.
We do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts
of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should
not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is
just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional
district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the
spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the
exact issue presented by this petition.
BANAT VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of
the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is
duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."
Veterans explaining the First Party Rule:
Formula for Determining
Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled
to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of
the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to
receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice
the latters number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the
number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
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Number of votes
of first party
-------------------Total votes for
Proportion of votes of
first party relative to
total votes for party-list
system
party -list system
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the
number of additional seats of the other qualified parties.
Formula for Additional
Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The
formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
-----------------Total no. of votes
for party-list system
Additional seats
No. of
additional
for concerned
party
----------------------No. of votes of
seats allocated to
the first
party
first party
-------------Total no. of votes
for party list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
party
No. of votes of
Additional
seats
concerned
No. of additional
for concerned
=
-----------------x seats allocated to
party
No. of votes of
the first
party
first party
xxx
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the
ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied
by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified
parties as well.
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BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC,
acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated
in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of
the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same
day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
ISSUE:
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these
cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on
22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify
for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?
HELD:
WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of
the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution
dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent
threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.
RATIO:
1 & 2. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution.
However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which
will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
3.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.
This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list
seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates
the
attainment
of
the
permissive ceiling.
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4.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit
our allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference
between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the
parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed
all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply
the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list
candidate is entitled.
5.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate
in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in
the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In
defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or
a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will
participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
ABAYON PALPARAN VS THE HRET
FACTS:
Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat
Tayo and Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET
assailing the jurisdiction of HRET over the Party list.. and its representatives.. HRET
dismissed the proceeding but upheld the jurisdiction over the nominated
representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifivcations of petitioners.
HELD: Affirmative.
The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought
the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo andBa nt a y. Since petitioners Abayon and
Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective
organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into
and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.
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Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are representatives of
districts and party list.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are
treated in like manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees
as members of the House of Representatives, a party-list representative is in every
sense an elected member of the House of Representatives.
Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the
end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit
in the House of Representatives. Both the Constitution and the Party-List System
Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees.
Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution.
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a
nominee the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of
his party-list organization in the context of the facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayoa nd
Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody.
By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization
of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath
and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs
own jurisdiction begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay
party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,

bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
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denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain
biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their
ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition
on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations
of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELECs field personnel.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
HELD:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or
related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance
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on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the partylist system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in
the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST

CORRUPTION (CIBAC)
vs COMELEC and the House of Representatives
(2010)
FACTS:
The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized
groups duly registered under the party-list system of representation that
manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized
national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to
participate, CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva,
submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be
chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The
nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of
nomination dated March 29, 2007, were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2)
herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin
Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.
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Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a

certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees
dated May 7, 2007, whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The
amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) CruzGonzales, and (3) Borje.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the
COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion
seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The right of CIBAC
to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were
purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC
to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas,
the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and
Lokin to a proclamation.
The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
Notwithstanding Villanuevas filing of the certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of more
than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to act on the matter,
prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28,
2007.
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219, whereby it resolved
to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for
proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054.
With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat,
Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed
Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of
the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be
formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume
office. Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not
be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him
of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.
The COMELEC approved the withdrawal of nomination of Atty. Luis Lokin.
Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and
violates the Party-List System Act.
RULING:
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:
o Section 13. Substitution of nominees. A party-list nominee may be
substituted only when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the
party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he
withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the
name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of
nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
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Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four
instances, the fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."
Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to
four the three statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.
We agree with Lokin.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in
the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, has neither the authority nor the license to expand,
extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the
COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be
implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic
that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the
Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying the laws
general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs,
because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added
nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it has merely reworded and
rephrased the statutory provisions phraseology.
The explanation does not persuade.
To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words;
to rephrase is to phrase anew or in a new form. Both terms signify that the
meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section
8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in
the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the party-list
organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted
to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done.
Considering that Section 13 of the Resolution No. 7804 to the extent that it
allows the party-list organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted
to the COMELEC was invalid, CIBACs withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin
ang the others and its substitution of them with new nominees were also
invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the
others could only be for any grounds expressly stated in section 8 of RA 7941.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it
authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee
once it has submitted to the COMELEC.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and TERESITA F. PLANAS vs COMELEC, CIBAC PARTY LIST
represented by VIRGINIA S. JOSE SHERWIN N. TUGNA, and CINCHONA CRUZGONZALES (2012)
FACTS:
On 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution expunging the
Certificate of Nomination which included herein petitioners as representatives
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of the party-list group known as Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC).
The COMELEC en banc affirmed the said Resolution, prompting Luis Lokin, Jr.
and Teresita F. Planas to file the present Petition for Certiorari. Petitioners
allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing both
Resolutions, praying that they be recognized as the legitimate nominees of
CIBAC party-list, and that petitioner Lokin, Jr. be proclaimed as the CIBAC
party-list representative to the House of Representatives.
Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic
Act No. (R.A.) 7941, otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated
in its constitution and bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and
corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the countrys public
service. Under the leadership of the National Council, its highest policymaking
and governing body, the party participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007
elections.
On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent
CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a "Manifestation of Intent to Participate in
the Party-List System of Representation in the May 10, 2010 Elections." The
first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the
partys acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another
Manifestation was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales
and Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president and secretary-general,
respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8744 giving due
course to CIBACs Manifestation, "WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO the determination
which of the two factions of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral
organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is the
official representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations xxx."
On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC
to the COMELEC Law Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva
and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second
Certificate of Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita
Planas as party-list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature
as "acting secretary-general" of CIBAC.
Claiming that the
nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized, respondents
filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Expunge From The Records And/Or For
Disqualification," seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents
contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as "acting secretarygeneral," when she was not even a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of
Nomination and other documents she submitted were unauthorized by the
party and therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly
authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its behalf.
COMELEC granted the Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be
expunged from the records, and declared respondents faction as the true
nominees of CIBAC.
ISSUE:
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Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and
recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC partylist.
RULING:
By virtue of the mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC with
jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing
the qualifications of each nominee, the COMELEC promulgated its "Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/ Organizations
Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections."
Adopting the same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above, Section 6
of these Rules also required that:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in
consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that
the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s,
the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to
represent.
A careful perusal of the records readily shows that Pia B. Derla, who has
signed and submitted, as the purported Acting Secretary General of CIBAC,
the Certificates of Nomination of Respondents, has no authority to do so.
Despite Respondents repeated claim that Ms. Derla is a member and officer
of CIBAC, they have not presented any proof in support of the same. We are at
a loss as to the manner by which Ms. Derla has assumed the post, and We see
nothing but Respondents claims and writings/certifications by Ms. Derla
herself that point to that alleged fact. Surely, We cannot rely on these
submissions, as they are the very definition of self-serving declarations.
Pia Derla, who is not even a member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the
party-list, and clearly not qualified to attest to petitioners as CIBAC nominees,
or certify their nomination to the COMELEC. Petitioners cannot use their
registration with the SEC as a substitute for the evidentiary requirement to
show that the nominees, including Derla, are bona fide members of the party.
Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr. have not even presented evidence proving the
affiliation of the so-called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral Party that is
registered with COMELEC.
WHEREFORE , finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions, the instant Petition is
DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the COMELEC expunging
from its records the Certificate of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010 by Pia B.
Derla. The nominees, as listed in the Certificate of Nomination filed on 19
January 2010 by Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, President and Chairman of
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) Party List, are recognized as the
legitimate nominees of the said party.
MILAGROS E. AMORES vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA
ELECTORAL
FACTS:
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Petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed

office without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC
since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance,
he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section
9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act;
and his change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to
the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector
under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
ISSUE:
WON Mr. Villanuevas assumption of office is legal.
RULING:
the Court shall first discuss the age requirement for youth sector nominees
under Section 9 of RA No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated
as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth
sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate who is more
than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since
this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers
ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There
is thus no reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees
nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of
the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last elections where
Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two months after the law was
enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and could not have been
the objective of RA No. 7941.
Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of
textual support for public respondents ratiocination that the provision did not
apply to private respondents shift of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to
its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there was no resultant
change in party-list affiliation. Section 15 reads:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative
who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office
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shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral
affiliationwithin six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political
party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party
since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the
Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral
affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the
new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months
before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in
the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention.
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to
private respondent.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of
either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector in the May, 2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years
of age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August,
1975. Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months
before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to
CIBACs overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17,
2007.
That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later
upheld, is of no moment. A party-list organizations ranking of its nominees is
a mere indication of preference, their qualifications according to law are a
different matter.
RONALDO LAYUG vs COMELEC, MARIANO VELARDE (alias BROTHER MIKE)

and BUHAY PARTY-LIST
FACTS:
On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a
taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify (SPA No.
10-016 [DCN]) Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010
elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay
Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As
such, it is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution 4, as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System
Act. Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate
businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as one who
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required of
party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807, the
Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List
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Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10, 2010 Automated National
and Local Elections.
In their Answer thereto, Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike claimed that Buhay
Party-List is not a religious sect but a political party possessing all the
qualifications of a party-list. It is composed of groups for the elderly, the
women, the youth, the handicapped, as well as the professionals, and Brother
Mike belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented elderly group. They
likewise argued that nominees from a political party such as Buhay Party-List
need not even come from the marginalized and underrepresented sector.
On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution denying
the petition for lack of substantial evidence.
As a consequence of such entry, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers for Party-List, promulgated on July 30, 2010 NBC
Resolution No. 10-034 proclaiming Buhay Party-List as a winner entitled to two
(2) seats in the House of Representatives. Being the fifth nominee, however,
Brother Mike was not proclaimed as the representative of Buhay Party-List.
ISSUE:
WON the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.
RULING:
The Court not the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its Members.
Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the "members" of the House
are:
o Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law,who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1)
members who shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations. 1 In this case, Buhay Party-List was
entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first two nominees, Mariano
Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother
Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a
member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no
jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay PartyList, as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the
COMELEC. Section 6 of said Act states that the COMELEC may motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
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organization or coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs.
HRET, We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list
and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said partylists.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTION AND OTHER CASES
(G.R. NO. 203766 ETC., 02 APRIL 2013, CARPIO, J.)
(pasensya na...pertinga taasa man uyy)
Facts:
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations
registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
COMELEC Second Divisions resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB)
registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region.
However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector;
PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its
track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA,
ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No.
9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official
ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations
that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC
disqualified the 39 groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections:
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMAPTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD,
GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED,
ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS)
were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to
include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the
13 May 2013 party-list elections.
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Issue:
1.
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations
2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang
Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the
COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Ruling:
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this
Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral
parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions
applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all
the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register
under the partylist system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The objective of the party list system under the 1987 constitution is to
democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the house of
representatives.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system ofrepresentation.
Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats
in the House of Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the House
of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her
party-list group or organization of choice.
Both sectoral and well as non-sectoral parties are included in the party list
system.
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-listsystem to
include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended
the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.
As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can
participate in the party-list system [F]or as long as they field candidates
who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate
in this Constitution.53
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors
was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only
allowed for the first three consecutive terms.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral
parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they
cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in
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nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can
garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to
membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties
that could not compete in legislative district elections.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties
or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from
sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need
not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
What is the proof that the party list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties?
Section 5(2), article VI of the 1987 constitution which mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of congress after the ratification of the 1987 constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the
first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector. This provision clearly shows again
that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious
reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea
that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the reservation of one-half of the
party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution, clearly making the party-list system fully
open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies
under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained
in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be
disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for
non-sectoral parties.
Political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government.
A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties. Clearly, a political party is different from a
sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a political party
refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
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ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government. On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a
sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. R.A. No. 7941 provides
different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate
and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system.
How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded
from the party-list system? To exclude them from the partylist system is to prevent
them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously
senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or
cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political
party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional
political party must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology
or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their
economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.56 The sectors
mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily marginalized and underrepresented.
For sure, professionals are not by definition marginalized and underrepresented,
not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth may lack well-defined political constituencies, and can thus
organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests
andconcerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the
law does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration
of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are
marginalized and underrepresented would lead to absurdities.
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in
section 5 that are, by their nature, economically marginalized and
underrepresented.
These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors.
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For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or
must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector does not mean one must wallow
in poverty, destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is
below the middle class. More specifically, the economically marginalized and
underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the
National Statistical Coordination Board.58
How about sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, do
they need to be marginalized?
No. They belong to ideology-based and cause oriented parties. Allowing them to run
as party list will give give small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack
well-defined political constituencies a chance to win seats in the house of
representatives.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be marginalized and
underrepresented will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack well-defined political constituencies a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the marginalized and
underrepresented the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give
the marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity to likewise win seats in the
House of Representatives. This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those
marginalized and underrepresented, both in economic and ideological status,
will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives.
Political parties can participate in the party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. They cannot directly participate because they neither lack
well defined political constituencies nor represent marginalized and
undderpresented sectors.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district
elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since
they neither lack well-defined political constituencies nor represent marginalized
and underrepresented sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under
the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major
political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under
the party-list system to those who lack well-defined political constituencies, giving
them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
Political parties are allowed to participate in the party list elections through their
sectoral wings in order to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack
well-defined political constituencies.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in
party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack
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well-defined political constituencies. The participation of major political parties in
party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the marginalized and underrepresented and those who lack
well-defined political constituencies, giving them a voice in lawmaking.
Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields
candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can
register under the party-list system.
The qualification of a party-list nominee
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which
he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide
party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or
have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
THE NEW PARAMETERS TO BE FOLLOWED BY COMELEC
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register
under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through
its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the
members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political
constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political
constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national
and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
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6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have
at least one nominee who remains qualified.
ALDOVINO VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of
office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local
Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive
suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public
official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should
not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In
September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then
faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension
order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his
term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The
petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the
petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel
it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his
candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section
8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in
its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did
not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because
of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
Issue:
Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the
three-term limit rule; and . Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary
renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Held:
NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and
limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms.
This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years
during which an official has title to office and can serve
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the
law describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a
qualified interruption
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Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections7 presented the question of whether the
disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the
public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public
official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and
executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the
disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served
three consecutive terms The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the
next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the
legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus,
the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.(EXCEPTION)
"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is
one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective
official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for
an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8,
Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective
officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using
"voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials
stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is
barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is
the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one
since no vacancy exists.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed
Resolution No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the
Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special
election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve
Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. 1
Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004.
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the
provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005
provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01005 also provided that "the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6)
years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3)
years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President."
Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked 12th
and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
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Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction
because:
(1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election
as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No. 6645");
(2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of
candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as
allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; 5 and,
consequently,
(3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election
under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under
Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 ("R.A. No. 6646").
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file
an amended petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents.
Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition in which they reiterated the
contentions raised in their original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of
Resolution No. 01-006.
COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the
petition and on petitioners' standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition,
which seeks the nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto
petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. For his part,
Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this case
because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13th placer
in the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.
Issues:
W/N a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on
14 May 2001.
Held: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the Senate
agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that "the
senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." Senator
Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates needless
expenditures and the voters further inconvenience.
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct
and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it
should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of
a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It
should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free,
orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but
unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court
should not interfere.
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the
electorate of necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an
informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the
present case have led us to conclude that COMELEC's failure to so call and give
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notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001,
COMELEC should not take chances in future elections.
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill
any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives "in the manner
prescribed by law," thus: In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner
prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term
A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001
elections reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance,
either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions 24 or even in its press releases 25 did
COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term
Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did
COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate
receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election.
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its
occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to
give such call, is indispensable to the election's validity. In a general election, where
the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the
body charged to administer the election.
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides
that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the
date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that
election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated
by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to
do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the
statute and not from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus
charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to "call . . . a special election . .
. not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the
vacancy" and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELEC's failure to so call
and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy.
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who
stands most prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise
those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC's omission
prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding
of the special election.
Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim that the manner by which COMELEC
conducted the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because
COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately
the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in our election
laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC "fix the
date of the election," if necessary, and "state, among others, the office or offices to
be voted for." Similarly, petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the
filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing
of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These
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provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation
of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special
elections.
PHILCONSA VS MATHAY
G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966
FACTS: Philippine Constitution Association (Philconsa), non-stock, non-profit
association, whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers has filed a suit
against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the
Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or
passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the
Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the
preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of
Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution which provides xxx No increase
in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such,
increase. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963,
and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December
30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the
approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
ISSUE: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term
of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the
increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
RULING: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision
refers to all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the same
sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This
unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the
expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the
measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident
the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one
single Legislature. The use of the word term in the singular, when combined with
the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House, underscores
that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration
is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure
must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA
4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of
the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
LIGOT VS MATHAY
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G.R. No. L-34676 (April 30, 1974)
56 SCRA 823
FACTS: Petitioner LIGOT served as a member of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelveyear span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the
salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national
government" was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1,
1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were
increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act
expressly provided that said increases "shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution."
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969)
but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term
by virtue of this Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay "that the
increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate
and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the
constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which
provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase."
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his term
having expired on December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement under Act 186,
section 12 (c) as amended by R.A 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any
official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of
service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided "in
case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials
on the rates of pay as provided by law."
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum
of P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum. Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not
sign the warrant.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return
the warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim.
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due course. Hence the present
petition for review by way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners claim for retirement gratuity be computed on the
basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress.
RULING: No. Ligots contention is untenable for the following reasons:
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1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under
Republic Act 4134 could be operative only from December 30, 1969 for incoming
members of Congress when the full term of all members of Congress (House and
Senate) that approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of
the constitutional mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is selfevident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on
December 30, 1969 such as petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the
compensation they received "as provided by law" and the Constitution during their
term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on
December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the
salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during
their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor General in his decision in the similar
case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would
contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by
enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what can not be done directly."
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
was already operative when his retirement took effect on December 30, 1969 cannot
be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose
term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that
a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation.
PEOPLE VS JALOSLOS
324 SCRA 689
FACTS: Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined
at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and
acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed
this motion (Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of
Representatives) asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will. He states that
the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as
their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has
the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his
constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot
be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.
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Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official
or medical reasons.
Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want
their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the
House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to
respect his mandate.
ISSUE: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules
which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general?
RULING: No. True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In
the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of
government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The privilege of immunity from arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of
its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
Section 11, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution provides A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. xxx
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable
by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.
Aguinaldo doctrine does not apply to criminal cases.
Neither can he rely on Aguinaldo doctrine. The Aguinaldo case involves the
administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal
law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless
expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners.
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There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed
to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings
will virtually make him a free man.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters
elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do
so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings
for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accusedappellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of
constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.
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TRILLANES VS PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 179817
556 SCRA 471 (June 27, 2008)
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by
junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood
Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the
President and key national officials.
Later that day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion. A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually
resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident,"
petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup
detat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati.
Close to four years later, Trillanes has remained in detention, threw his hat in the
political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at
noon on June 30, 2007.
Before the commencement of his term, Trillanes filed an "Omnibus Motion for Leave
of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" Among his
requests were: (a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of
the Senate xxx (d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments,
reactions and/or opinions to the press, (e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court
and to the accused and his custodians, to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and
Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who may wish to interview him.
xxx
(NB: letters (b), (c), (f) were withdrawn upon his MR when the court denied this
Omnibus Motion)
Trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. The trial court just the same denied the motion. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Trillanes case is different from that of the Jalosjos case.
(2) Whether or not Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow
him to work and serve his mandate as senator.
(3) Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of
detention prisoners who are held without bail as in the case of Former Pres. Estrada &
Former ARMM Gov. Misuari.
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.
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No distinction between Trillanes case and that of Jalosjos case.
Trillanes in attempting to strike a distinction between his case against Jaloslos argues
that the latter was already convicted albeit his conviction was pending appeal,
whereas he is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil
and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in
Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup dtat cases,
both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of
offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no
distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a
trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the
denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal
action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants
like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. The trial court
thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the
full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Trillanes election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to
serve his mandate.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term"
to speak of. SC categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a
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criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the
voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations
on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only
such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred
by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in
the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of
law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the
duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant
is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has
the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves.
Petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners
who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph
Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social
functions." He harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this
discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court
previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his
certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be
proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a
seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of
taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him
and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG
17 SCRA 876
FACTS: This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and
Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of
an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being
summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the
letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs
interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
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ISSUES: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and,
if not,
(2) whether it is libelous or not.
RULING:
(1) No. The publication is not a privileged communication.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant
was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense, and that Article VI, Section 15 of the 1935 Constitution it states
that The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
other place. The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate
therein.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to
the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a
member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the
finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
(2) Supreme Court are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support
plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the
control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having
been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong
to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that
"it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they
may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which
plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely
unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting
tools of the planners. SC do not think that this statement is derogatory to the
plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are
officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question
seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two
(2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by
the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs'
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reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to
alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions
which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the
same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in
their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant
that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were
knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the
defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of
said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on
their part, of said "planners".
OSMEA VS PENDATUN
G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
109 PHI 863
FACTS: Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., filed a verified petition for "declaratory
relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman
Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members
of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for
annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary
immunity.
HR 59 created a special committee to investigate the truth of the charges against the
President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in his privilege
speech of June 23, 1960. Said charges emanated from his one-hour privileged speech
entitled A Message to Garcia, which constituted a serious assault upon the dignity
of Garcia as the then President.
Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his
words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable
speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the
Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had
uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be
subject to censure by the House.
The respondents challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition,
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Osmea parliamentary immunity was violated.
(2) Whether or not SC has jurisdiction to entertain this petition.
RULING:
(1) There was no violation of Osmeas parliamentary immunity.
(2) SC has no jurisdiction.
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Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be
questioned in any other place. Furthermore, the Rules of the House recognize the
House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense." Such immunity has come to this country from the
practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United
States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the
question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or
any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive
constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmea may be discipline, many arguments
pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the
judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For
one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct
constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate
branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed
by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
LIBAN VS GORDON
G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
593 SCRA 68
CASE: This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having
forfeited his seat in the Senate.
FACTS: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari
(petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having
Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of
the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
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During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he
was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC
Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the
PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as
provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a governmentowned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the
position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically
forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which held that
incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to
another government office.
Among others, Respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this
petition which appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges
that respondent committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for
forfeiture of his public office and further insists that the PNRC is not a governmentowned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI
of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the
PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.
ISSUES:
1. W/n petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a governmentcontrolled corporation;
owned or
3. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of
respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the
Senate
RULING: We find the petition without merit.
(1) Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition.
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto.
Petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board
of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short,
petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public
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officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture
of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under
Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be
able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be
dismissed at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to
the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the
present petition.
Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a
taxpayers suit, the petition would still fail on the merits.
(2) PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95, otherwise
known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary,
humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and
compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without
consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.
The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold
the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as
a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity
with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents
as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC
volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the
Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion,
the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled, and neither can the
PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as instruments of
government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC
volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or
the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral
and independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the
Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency
that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and
cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross Society. It is
imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation
to the State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot
be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does
not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive
any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.
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An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals
elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC
Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private
sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the
President. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the
PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of
the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the
decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the
PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government office.
(3) The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the
Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by
special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as
amended, reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter.
Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under
a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general
law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as
private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code,
except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
Although PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered
a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential
elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a
corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the
constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special
charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations.
Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation
and
grants
it
corporate
powers, is
void
for
being
unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the
PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or
an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC
Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC
should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
LIBAN VS GORDON (MOTION FOR RECON)
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G. R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011
639 SCRA 703
CASE: Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration filed on August 10, 2009 by
respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court
on July 15, 2009 (the Decision), the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed on August
27, 2009 by movant-intervenor Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the
latters Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper filed on December
23, 2009.
FACTS: The Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when
he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as the office of the
PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.[5] The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC Charter
insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and consequently ruled that
the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
Respondent raises the following grounds: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 95 was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the
case in deciding such issue; and (2) as the Court decided that Petitioners did not
have standing to file the instant Petition, the pronouncement of the Court on the
validity of R.A. No. 95 should be considered obiter.
Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue; therefore, it was
unnecessary for the Court to decide on that question. Respondent cites Laurel v.
Garcia, wherein the Court said that it will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some
other ground and goes on to claim that since this Court, in the Decision, disposed of
the petition on some other ground, i.e., lack of standing of petitioners, there was no
need for it to delve into the validity of R.A. No. 95, and the rest of the judgment
should be deemed obiter.
ISSUE: Whether to sustain the constitutionality of the PNRC Chapter.
RULING: As correctly pointed out in respondents Motion, the issue of
constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the
issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the
case.
This Court should not have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended
by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the
Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there
was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its
judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this
declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case,
was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and
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incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence
in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on
June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue
of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The
passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding
the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a
private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just
in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status
accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRCs
contention that its structure is sui generis.
PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
113 SCRA 31
CASE: This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised
against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to
intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
FACTS: An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries
Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held where Puyat and his group won.
The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo
warranto proceedings, questioning the election. They claimed that the stockholders'
votes were not properly counted.
The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC
Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent
Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11,
Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman
could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an
administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7,
1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman
Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that, May 15, Fernandez had purchased
from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director. The deed of sale,
however, was notarized only on May 30 and was sought to be registered on said
date. The next day, May 31, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in
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the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter
in litigation.
The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the
said ten shares. It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may
intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution.
Section 11. No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any
court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, before any court in any civil case
wherein the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the
adverse party, or before any administrative body. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by, the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term
of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for
his pecuniary benefit.
RULING: Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing
on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His
appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10)
shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the
petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected
counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of
stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired
them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, after the contested election of Directors on
May 14, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25 before SEC and one day
before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what
is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as
counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by
petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to
"intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been
an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our
opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention"
was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some
other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to
vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC
Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
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Election of Officers
Santiago vs Guingona 298 SCRA 756 (1998)
Facts:
During the election of officers of the Senate, Senator Santiago nominated Senator
Tatad as Senate President. Senator Ople, on the other hand, nominated Senator
Fernan for the same position. Senator Fernan was voted Senate President with a vote
of 20-2.
Senator Ople was voted president pro tempore while Senator Drilon was voted
majority leader.
Senator Tatad manifested that, as the only ones who voted for him were himself and
Senator Santiago, the two of them comprised the minority and that an agreement
was entered into between them that he will be the minority leader.
The Senate was grouped as follows:
10 members Laban ngMasang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United
Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member AksyonDemokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent
23 total number of senators (The last six members are all classified by petitioners
as "independent".)
According to Senator Flavier, the members of the Lakas NUCD-UMDP is also a
minority since there are only 7 members and that they had chosen Senator Guingona
as the minority leader. Senator Guingona was thereafter formally recognized by the
Senate President as the minority leader.
A petition for quo warranto was filed by Senators Tatad and Santiago alleging that
Senator Guingona had been usurping ,unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to
Senator Tatad.
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for the Senate President to recognize Senator
Guingona as the minority leader.
Held:
History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred
to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the
"minority" normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may
also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority while the lesser
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would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not
as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the
minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as
pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one
of which has to be indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for
purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present
Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No
constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or
the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House
shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
The Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any
rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid
of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts
may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province
of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." Being merely
matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence
of a majority.
Quorum
Avelino vs Cuenco 83 Phil 17 (1949)
Facts:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada
requested that his right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to
formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His
request was approved.
However, on the day of the session, the opening of the session was delayed. He was
not given the chance to speak despite his attempts to claim his right to speak. A
commotion broke outside the Senate gallery which prompted them to adjourn.
Nevertheless, Senator Tanada opposed the motion to adjourn. This led Senate
President Avelino and seven of his followers to leave and abandon the session. The
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remaining senators continued the session which was then chaired by the Senate
President Pro-Tempore.
Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver
his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said
Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was
unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the
respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67,
entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and
designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put
to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting
president of the Philippines Senate.
Note: Except for Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor
who is in the United States, all the Senator were present. 22 Senators were present at
the opening of session.
Issue: Whether or not there was quorum?
Held:
The session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that
a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve
senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The
answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly
constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for
the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon
say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning
of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun
and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator
Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall
constitute a quorum, "the House does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority
of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U.
S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter
requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the
members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the
Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even
if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one,
at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no
doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical
situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate
deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support
Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most
injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office
being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
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amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with
thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said
twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their
acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Rules of Proceedings
Arroyo vs de Venecia 277 SCRA 258 (1997)
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of
the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of
the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo
made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call,
the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded.
After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority
Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee
report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared:
There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by
then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill wassigned into law by
President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure.
But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule
affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
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necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a
case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the
Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum
but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of
a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already
been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Garcillano vs HR Committee 575 SCRA 170 (2008)
Facts:
A few years ago, the Garci tapes (alleged conversation of GMA and Garcillano)
became the subject of Congressional hearings and joint investigation of different HR
Committees. The hearings were indefinitely suspended; however, the they decided
to submit reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource
persons.
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed
with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 4docketed as G.R. No. 170338.
He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these
tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their
committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said
recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the
inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using
the recordings in any of the House proceedings. 5
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired
justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting
its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative
inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
Held:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of
the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or
the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or
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rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What
constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines."
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in
2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14 th Congress, however, of which
the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees
likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry
be in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the
OSGs explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress
to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because
every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections
are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may
thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published
its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted
by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Dela Paz vs Senate Committee 579 SCRA 521 (2009)
Facts:
On October 6, 2008, a Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior Philippine National
Police (PNP) officers arrived in Moscow, Russia to attend the 77th General Assembly
Session of the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL in St.
Petersburg from October 6-10, 2008. With the delegation was Gen. Dela Paz, then
comptroller and special disbursing officer of the PNP. Gen. Dela Paz, however, was to
retire from the PNP on October 9, 2008.
On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the
Moscow airport departure area for failure to declare in written form the 105,000 euros
[approximately P6,930,000.00] found in his luggage. In addition, he was also found to
have in his possession 45,000 euros (roughly equivalent to P2,970,000.00).
Petitioners were detained in Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen. Dela Paz
and the PNP delegation were allowed to return to the Philippines, but the Russian
government confiscated the euros.
On October 21, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few days after Mrs. Dela Paz.
Awaiting them were subpoenae earlier issued by respondent Committee for the
investigation it was to conduct on the Moscow incident on October 23, 2008.
On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead of
attending the hearing, petitioners filed with respondent Committee a pleading
denominated Challenge to Jurisdiction with Motion to Quash Subpoena. 2 Senator
Santiago emphatically defended respondent Committees jurisdiction and
commanded Balajadia to arrest petitioners.
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Issue: whether or not the respondent Committee has jurisdiction to investigate the
Moscow incident.
Held: Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:
"Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary
authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of
its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial
supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.
Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides:
12) Committee on Foreign Relations. Fifteen (15) members. All matters relating to
the relations of the Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and consular
services; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the United Nations Organization
and its agencies; multi-lateral organizations, all international agreements, obligations
and contracts; and overseas Filipinos.
A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the investigation of the
Moscow incident involving petitioners is well within the respondent Committees
jurisdiction.
Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon
Committee may conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance,
misfeasance and nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the government,
its branches, agencies, subdivisions and instrumentalities, and on any matter of
public interest on its own initiative or brought to its attention by any of its members.
It is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate Gen. Dela
Paz, a retired PNP general and member of the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL
Conference in Russia, who had with him millions which may have been sourced from
public funds.
Subsequent to Senator Santiagos verbal command to Balajadia to arrest petitioners,
the Philippine Senate issued a formal written Order of arrest, signed by ten (10)
senators, with the Senate President himself approving it, in accordance with the
Senate Rules.
Discipline of Members
Alejandrino vs Quezon 46 Phil 63 (1924)
Senator Alejandrino, appointed by the Government General to represent the 12 th
Senatorial District, was deprived of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments
of his office for the period of one year from the first of January, 1924. The resolution
was adopted by herein respondents.
Senator Alejandrino prayed before the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction
against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare
the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the
foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents
ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as
Senator and that he enjoy all of his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and
prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of his
office, and from carrying the order of suspension, into effect.
Issue: whether the court has jurisdiction over the matters prayed for by Alejandrino.
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Held:
the general rule of mandamus is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the
government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is
inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members,
or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their
character which therefore pertain to their legislative, functions and over which they
have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a
gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that there where a member has been
expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether
the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.
the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to
"punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds,
expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an
appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive
member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the
power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the
Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General
by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct hypothesis. The
Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the
Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the
Legislature.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for
disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend on appointive member from the
exercise of his office for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed
for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not
possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular
action. If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the
answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power. It would
hardly be becoming for the judiciary to assume the role of either a credulous
inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes down the halls of
legislation and of administration giving heed to those who have grievances against
the Legislature and the Chief Executive.
Osmena vs Pendatun 109 Phil 863 (1960)
Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified
petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction"
against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
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3
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President
with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House
should not punish him.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated
his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his
allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and
Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened
after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to
answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Issue: whether or not the House has the authority to censure petitioner.
Held:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be
questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1
of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has
always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil
actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII,
sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken
in debate. its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense."
Issue: whether the House may still bring action against him when it had taken up
other business after his speech.
Held:
Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, and such approval
amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent. Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure
to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a
particular measure."
Issue: whether a speech attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct.
Held:
the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For
one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct
constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
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3
jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate
branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed
by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
Santiago vs Sandiganbayan356 SCRA 636 (2001)
Facts:
Review of the act of Sandiganbayan in ordering the preventive suspension of
Senator Defensor-Santiago in connection with pending criminal cases filed
against her for her alleged violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).
Issue:
Authority of the Sandiganbayan to issue to decree a 90-day preventive
suspension of Senator Santiago from any government position.
Held:
It is the ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound
to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be
no ifs and buts about it.
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this
Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode
of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he
be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and
to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension,
unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from
the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the
same to the Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held
that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.
Nature of preventive suspension it is not a penalty because it is not imposed
in judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be
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3
entitled to reinstatement and to salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension. (BayotvsSandiganbayan)
The Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of
the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which this Court has, more than once,
upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials
and employees indicted before it.
Order of suspension prescribed by RA 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides
that each
xxx house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of its members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed shall not exceed sixty
days.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have
effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor
from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal
and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one
branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
RA 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and
that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.
ARROYO VS DE VENECIA 277 SCRA 268 (1997)

-
ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this
suit against respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount
to
a
violation
of
the
Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives
and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President
Fidel
V.
Ramos
on
November
22,
1996.
Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the
rules
of
the
House;
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3
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false
and
spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the law violated House
Rules;
and
Whether
a
certiorari/prohibition
will
be
granted.
Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No.
8240.
This
case
is
therefore
dismissed.
Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either
to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political
arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy
in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission
to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be
acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion
were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made
here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of
R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume
that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of
that body.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its
due
enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies
good, if old-fashioned democratic theory: Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to
check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The
sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to
violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent
ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands
on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.
FARINAS VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 417 SCRA 503

-ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
A petition was filed seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of RA

9006 or The Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
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3
Credible Elections Through Fair Election Practices as it repealed Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso jure resignation from public office of one
who filed his certificate of candidacy, except for President and Vice-President.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as
irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof,
should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that
"[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval" is a violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law
before it becomes effective.
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners
allegations that "irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The
signatures of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the
bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of
Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
The
Enrolled
Is Applicable In this Case
Bill
Doctrine
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the
petitioners insist that the entire law should be nullified. They contend that
irregularities attended the passage of the said law particularly in the House of
Representatives catalogued thus:
xxx
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The
Court is not persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the
Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. A review of cases reveals the Courts consistent adherence to the rule.
The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the
irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress,
e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This
Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress,
whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the
formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates
its ruling in Arroyo v. De Venecia, viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there
was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In
Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
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3
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure."
ABAKADA VS PURISIMA 562 SCRA 251 (2008)
ENROLLED BILL THEORY
FACTS: This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of

the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and
allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess
collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department
of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of
the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director
General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners,
two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the
officials nominated by their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from
the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target;
(3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4)
prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including
the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked
to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be
approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.
Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law,
the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
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3
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues
that the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances,
rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative
policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the
executive and the implementing agencies.
ISSUE: WON Section 12 of RA 9335 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate
and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the
Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two senators
representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After
the Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose
of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF,
DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional
principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. 52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) 53 is
vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers
nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a
legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional
committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a
law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it,
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members
of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
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3
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The
President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as
if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or
veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can
become a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the
Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative
act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if
approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be
approved by both Houses of Congress. 54 Second, it must be presented to and
approved by the President.55 As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate
except for some measures that must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and
its referral by the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval,
with or without amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon.
If there are other bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated
into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage
that the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when
desired. The second reading is the most important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof
are distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the
members merely register their votes and explain them if they are allowed by the
rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also
undergo the three readings. If there are differences between the versions approved
by the two chambers, a conference committee 58 representing both Houses will draft a
compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives
will then be submitted to the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter
authenticated with the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the
Secretaries of their respective chambers59
The Presidents role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes
effect as law after the required publication.
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3
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has
enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it
becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights
and obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute.
Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process
clause,61 the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of
Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the
executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that
point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to
approving or vetoing the law.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its
members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to
overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch
charged with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as
unconstitutional. While there may be similar provisions of other laws that may be
invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from invalidating them
wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case assailing those
provisions is brought before us
US V PONS, 34 PHIL. 729 (1916)

-PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE JOURNAL
Pons was charged with the crime of illegal importation of opium, in violation of Act
2381. Pons via his counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the
special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28 th day of February;
that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not
passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that,
therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise
questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the
Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with
having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of
adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely,
(1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous

evidence and
(2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals.
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3
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question
whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled
in the United States that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining
the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron
vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the
adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of
the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not
ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They show,
with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die55 at 12 o'clock
midnight on February 28, 1914.
Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily
depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals
are the acts of the government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object
the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to
inquiry into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are,
as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in
his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on
February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of
all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to
enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the
Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here
suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the
probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of
legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or
absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory.
Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of
the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is
to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of
the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that
afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning
comparatively trifling matters."
ASTORGA VS VILLEGAS 56 SCRA 714 (1974)

-JOURNAL ENTRY RULE VS ENROLLED BILL THEORY
Page 202

3
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the
House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments
on April 21, 1964.
Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the
Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by
Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a
minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it
be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the ViceMayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20,
1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo
Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in totoby the Senate. The amendment
recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate
proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20,
1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the
amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the
Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted
by respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on
July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266
signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill
actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since
it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of
that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the
issue.
Issue: Whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be
adhered to in this jurisdiction.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark
as follows:
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3
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested,
has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government,
and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested,
receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As
the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with
the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to
coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated."
Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the
same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals
and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical
conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether
the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is
present.
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made,
would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity
of the statute This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the
presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the
validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being
no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the
bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be
consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
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subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed
by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to
the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is
a risky
undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the
manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate
and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding
such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by
the law-making body.
FIELD VS. CLARK

- JOURNAL ENTRY VS ENROLLED BILL THEORY
Facts:
Duties were assessed and collected, according to the rates established by the Tariff
Act of October 1, 1890 on goods imported by the appellant.
The appellant alleged that the enrolled act in Custody of the Secretary of the State is
missing a Section 30 as evidenced by the Congressional record of proceedings,
reports of committees of each house, reports of committees of conference, and other
papers printed by authority of Congress therefore it should not become a law even if
the said enrolled act is signed by the required signatories in the Constitution
(American).
The facts which were presented in support of the contention that the bill never
became a law in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution were three.
1) That in engrossing the bill, a clause known as section 30, relating to a rebate
of taxes on tobacco, which was shown by the journals of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate to have been regularly passed by both
Houses of Congress, was omitted, and that the engrossed act, as attested by
the Vice-President and the Speaker of the House, as approved by the
President and as deposited with the Secretary of State, was not the act which
passed the two Houses of Congress, and was therefore not a statute of the
United States in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
2) That the first five paragraphs of Schedule E, section 1, of the act, providing for
bounties to producers of American sugar (paragraphs 231 to 235) were
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unconstitutional and void, no power to enact legislation of this character
having been vested in Congress by the Constitution.
3) That section 3 of said act was unconstitutional and void in that it delegates to
the President the power of laying taxes and duties, which power, by Sections 1
and 8 of Article I of the Constitution, is vested in Congress.
Issues:
Based on the evidence of the Congressional record of proceedings, reports of
committees of each house, reports of committees of conference, and other papers
printed by authority of Congress, should the act be declared null and void, with
reference to the standard set by the Constitution of passage of a bill into law?
Held:
NO. The enrolled act, authenticated by the signature of the presiding officers of both
House of Representatives and the Senate, is sufficient evidence that it passed
Congress.
In regard to certain matters, the Constitution expressly requires that they shall be
entered on the journal. To what extent the validity of legislative action may be
affected by the failure to have those matters entered on the journal we need not
inquire. No such question is presented for determination. But it is clear that in respect
to the particular mode in which, or with what fullness, shall be kept the proceedings
of either house relating to matters not expressly required to be entered on the
journals; whether bills, orders, resolutions, reports, and amendments shall be entered
at large on the journal, or only referred to and designated by their titles or by
numbers -- these and like matters were left to the discretion of the respective houses
of Congress. Nor does any clause of that instrument either expressly or by necessary
implication prescribe the mode in which the fact of the original passage of a bill by
the House of Representatives and the Senate shall be authenticated or preclude
Congress from adopting any mode to that end which its wisdom suggests. Although
the Constitution does not expressly require bills that have passed Congress to be
attested by the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses, usage, the
orderly conduct of legislative proceedings, and the rules under which the two bodies
have acted since the organization of the government require that mode of
authentication.
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government and
that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills
which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested
receives his approval and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As
the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States carries on its face a solemn assurance by the
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legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with
the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept as having passed Congress all
bills authenticated in the manner stated, leaving the courts to determine, when the
question properly arises, whether the act so authenticated is in conformity with the
Constitution.
It is admitted that an enrolled act thus authenticated is sufficient evidence of itself -nothing to the contrary appearing upon its face -- that it passed Congress. But the
contention is that it cannot be regarded as a law of the United States if the journal of
either house fails to show that it passed in the precise form in which it was signed by
the presiding officers of the two houses and approved by the President. It is said that
under any other view, it becomes possible for the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate to impose upon the people as a law
a bill that was never passed by Congress. But this possibility is too remote to be
seriously considered in the present inquiry. It suggests a deliberate conspiracy to
which the presiding officers, the committees on enrolled bills, and the clerks of the
two houses must necessarily be parties, all acting with a common purpose to defeat
an expression of the popular will in the mode prescribed by the Constitution. Judicial
action based upon such a suggestion is forbidden by the respect due to a coordinate
branch of the government. The evils that may result from the recognition of the
principle that an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State, attested by the
signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress and the approval of
the President, is conclusive evidence that it was passed by Congress according to the
forms of the Constitution would be far less than those that would certainly result from
a rule making the validity of congressional enactments depend upon the manner in
which the journals of the respective houses are kept by the subordinate officers
charged with the duty of keeping them.
The conclusion was that, upon grounds of public policy as well as upon the ancient
and well settled rules of law, a copy of a bill bearing the signatures of the presiding
officers of the two houses of the legislature and the approval of the governor, and
found in the custody of the Secretary of State, was conclusive proof of the enactment
and contents of a statute, and could not be contradicted by the legislative journals or
in any other mode.
GUEVERA VS INOCENTES 16 SCRA 379 (1966)

-REGULAR SESSIONS
FACTS: The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as

Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965. Took his
oath of office on November 25th same year. The incumbent Executive issued
Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated January 23, 1966 declaring that all ad interim
appointments made by the former Executive lapsed with the adjournment of the
special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966. The respondent,
Raoul Inocentes was extended an ad interim appointment for the same position by
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the incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966. Guevara filed before the court an
instant petition for Quo Warranto seeking to be declared person legally entitled to the
said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor under Art. VII Sec. 10 (4) of the 1935
Constitution. which states that:
The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the special
session which commenced on January 17, 1966, the respondent contended that the
petitioners ad interim appointment as well as other made under similar conditions
must have lapsed when the Congress adjourned its last special session. But the
petitioner stated that (1) the specific provision in the Constitution which states that:
until the next adjournment of Congress means adjournment of a regular session of
Congress and not by a special session and (2) only the Senate adjourned sine die at
midnight of January 22, 1966 and the House of the Representative merely
suspended its session and to be resumed on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 AM. The
petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has been in continuous session without
interruption since January 17.
ISSUE/S:1. Whether or not, the petitioners contention regarding the next
adjournment of Congress specifically provides for regular session only.
2. Whether or not, the petitioners contention that Congress is still in continuous
session?
HELD: 1. NO. The phrase until the next adjournment of Congress does not make
any reference to specific session of Congress, whether regular or special. But a wellknow Latin maxim is statutory construction stated that when the law does not
distinguish we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus. It is safe to conclude that the authors of the 1935 Constitution used the
word adjournment had in mind either regular or special and not simply the regular
one as the petitioner contended.
2. NO. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22,
1966, the House of the Representative is only a part of the Congress and not the
Congress itself. So logically, the adjournment of one of its Houses is considered
adjournment of the Congress as a whole. And the petitioners ad interim appointment
must have been lapsed on January 22, 1966 upon adjournment of the Senate.
Barbers v. COMELEC, 460 SCRA 569 (2005)

On June 2, 2004, the Commission on Elections sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Biazon as the duly elected 12th Senator in the May 10, 2004
National Elections. While failure of elections were declared in some precincts,
COMELEC reasoned that they would not materially affect the results. Barbers, who
ranked next to Biazon, filed a petition before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation.
When this was denied, he raised the issue before the Supreme Court. Does the
Supreme Court have jurisdiction?
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Held: No. The word sole in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution underscores the
exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunals (SET) jurisdiction over election contests
relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is
categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.
Since Barber contests Biazons
proclamation as the 12 winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers complaint
Hernandez vs. HRET 2009
Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of
the Province of Laguna in the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy
(COC), he indicated his complete/exact address as No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo
Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna (alleged Sta. Rosa
residence).[5]
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification
before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded
to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046
(PES). Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioners COC and the
latters disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material
misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past
elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was
located in the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private
respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao,
Laguna, which was also outside the First District. [

residence).[5]
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3
Laguna, which was also outside the First District. [6] The COMELEC (First Division)
dismissed said petition for lack of merit
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET,
docketed as HRET CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible
to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First
Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void. [9]
Private respondents main ground for the quo warranto petition was that petitioner
lacked the required one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
Held:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the
HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The
authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of
the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals,
[33]
which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the
proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed
and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House
of Representatives. [34]
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate.
Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to
claim that the HRET, when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House
of Representatives is concerned, is co-equal to the COMELEC, such that the HRET
cannot disregard any ruling of COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and
qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other
way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or
contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House
of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if another
body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue
of the Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forumshopping only where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of
action. The two cases here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character.
Mendoza vs. Comelc (2009)
Facts:
Petitioner Mendoza and respondent Pagdanganan vied ofr the position of Governor of
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3
the Province of Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed
winning
candidate
and
assumed
the
office
of
Governor.
- The respondent seasonably filed an election protest with the COMELEC.
- Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-protested precincts soon
followed.
The
revision
was
conducted
at
COMELECs
office
in
Intamuros.
- Thereafter, both parties submitted their other evidences. The formal offer of
evidences was approved and COMELEC ordered the parties to submit their
memoranda.
- Mendoza and Pagdanganan complied with the order and the case was then
submitted
for
resolution.
- March 2, 2009: the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those
involved in the provincial election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).
The
petitioner
filed
to
dismiss
further
proceedings.
- April 29, 2009: The motion filed by petitioner Mendoza was dismissed by COMELEC
2nd Division. According to the latter, COMELEC has plenary powers to find
alternative methods to facilitate the resolution of the election protest; thus, it
concluded that it would continue the proceedings after proper coordination with the
SET.
- The petitioner moved to reconsider the order but still COMELEC 2nd Division denied
the
motion
on
May
26,
2009.
- Allegedly alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election
contest within the SET premises without notice to him and without his participation,
the petitioners counsel wrote the SET Secretary, Atty. Irene Guevarra, a letter dated
June 10, 2009 to confirm the veracity of the reported conduct of proceedings.
- The Secretary responded that the action was authorized by then Acting Chairman of
the Tribunal, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, upon formal request of the Office of
Commissioner
Lucenito
N.
Tagle.
- The petitioner argues that the proceedings before the COMELEC in election protests
are judicial in nature and character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due process
specifically, (a) opportunity to be heard and (b) that judgment be rendered only after
lawful
hearing
apply.
- The petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due process
element of the right to have judgment only after lawful hearing is absent.
- Mendoza asserts that an important element of due process is that the judicial body
should have jurisdiction over the property that is the subject matter of the
proceedings
(2nd
issue).
- Private respondent Pagdanganan argues that the proceeding referred to by
Mendoza
was
COMELECs
decision-making
process.
- Public respondent COMELEC further argues that in the absence of a specific rule on
whether it can conduct appreciation of ballots outside its premises or official custody,
the issue boils down to one of discretion the authority of the COMELEC to control as
it deems fit the processes or incidents of a pending election protest.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC violated due process by conducting proceedings
without giving due notice to the petitioner.
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2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to an excess
of jurisdiction in appreciating ballots which are not in its official custody and are
outside its own premises, authority and control.
Held:
While COMELEC jurisdiction over the Bulacan election contest is not disputed, the
legality of subsequent COMELEC action is assailed for having been undertaken with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, our
standard of review is grave abuse of discretion, a term that defies exact definition,
but generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.
After due consideration, the Supreme Court held that the petition is bereft of merit.
These are the powers of the COMELEC as mentioned by the 1987 Constitution:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and
city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting
elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places,
the appointment of election officials and inspectors, and the registration of voters.
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC are the cardinal
primary rights in administrative proceedings (Ang Tibay Requirements 1-7).
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must
consider
the
evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity,
a
place
when
directly
attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support
a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party
at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process is to
give an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.
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A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential;
in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements
for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence
or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are
reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the
deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during
the hearing.
These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the
case and are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly,
the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be
found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties);
the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate,
must be based on substantial evidence.
In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at
the hearing and deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all
been violated.
In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent
in an adversarial contest where both sides were given their respective rights to
speak, make their presentations, and controvert each others submission, subject
only to established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under these undisputed facts, both
parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can complain of any
denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
The SC said The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party
of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial
election contest. In the context of our standard of review for the petition, we see no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by
the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the appreciation
of ballots this deliberation entailed.
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the
provincial election contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the
transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET. The
Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over election protests involving
provincial officials. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties.
Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to
be intruding into the COMELEC en banc rule-making prerogative when the Second
Division chose to undertake ballot appreciation within the SET premises side by side
with the SET revision of ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down any
new rule; it merely acted pursuant to a rule that the COMELEC en banc itself had
previously enacted.
FACTS: Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of
AAngat Tayoand Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET
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3
assailing the jurisdiction of HRET over the Party list, and its representatives. HRET
representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC
Issue:W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners..
HELD: Affirmative. The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay.
Since petitioners Abayon and Palparanwere not elected into office but were chosen
by
their
respective
organizations
under
their
internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications a
s nominees. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections,
it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5,Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the
members of that House are representatives of districts and party list Once elected,
both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as members
of the House of Representatives, a party-list representative is in every sense an
elected member of the House of Representatives. Although the vote cast in a partylist election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House
of Representatives.Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the
qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A.
7941, echoing the Constitution.It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona fide
member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and
Bantay , respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the
party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The Court holds that respondent HRET
did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over
the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
Layug vs. Comelec (2012)

Facts: On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a
taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify 3 (SPA No. 10016[DCN]) Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and
Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere
extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As such, it is disqualified from
being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution 4, as
well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 5, otherwise known as
the Party-List System Act. Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire
real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as one who
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belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required of partylist nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 6, the Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations
Participating in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. On June
15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution 3 denying the petition for
lack of substantial evidence.
Layug moved for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 before the
COMELEC En Banc claiming denial of due process for failure of the COMELEC to serve
him, his representatives or counsels a copy of said Resolution. He alleged that it was
only on July 26, 2010, after learning about it in the newspapers, that he personally
secured a copy of the Resolution from the COMELEC.4 His motion for reconsideration,
however, was denied by the COMELEC Second Division in its Order 5 dated August 4,
2010 for being filed out of time.
Held:
The Court not the HRET has jurisdisdiction
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its Members. Section 5 (1) of the
same Article identifies who the "members" of the House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. (Underscoring added).
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members
who shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.1 In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House
that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin
C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat
and thus had not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably,
the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay
Party-List, as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the
COMELEC.Section 6 of said Act states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET,1 We ruled that
the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought
the disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution 2and Section
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1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure 3 that has jurisdiction to hear the
instant petition.
Jalosjos vs. Comelec (2012)
Facts: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he
bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In September 2008 he began
occupying the house. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo
to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,
[7]
claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he
indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC, on June 3,
2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos
ineligible to seek election as Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by
continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he
should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place
to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges the
COMELECs finding that he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of
his right to due process.
Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions
affecting elections,[15] such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these
contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives.[16]
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional
candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative
in favor of the HRET.[17]
The fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve
Erasmos appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case
against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos name
from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing
official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELECs Second
Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc
did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his
case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding
his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was
solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had
already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. [18] Thus, the
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COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his
qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Tanada vs. Cuenco
After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was
Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but
was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose
its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3
justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party.
But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to
come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did
Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators
then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election
contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take
cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the
power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the
remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before judicial courts but
rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
Held:
Although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the
Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law
has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised.
Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress
of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass
upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the
authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of
Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of
an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may
not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called
"judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct National
Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral
Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the
fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly
be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House
thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the
duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and
paving the way to its eventual destruction.
Abbas vs. SET (1988)
Facts:
On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in
the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time
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composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later
on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said
election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case.
Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due
process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the
proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunals
Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption
of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4)
members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not
less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority
vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition
for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of
the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court,
whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and
intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and
legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and
intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no SenatorMember of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels
that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET
cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of
valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
Pimentel, Jr. v. HRET, 393 SCRA 231 (2002)
During the May 11, 1998 elections, 14 party-lists representatives from 13
organizations were proclaimed winners. Subsequently, the house of Representatives
constituted the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and also named 12
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members to represent it in the Commission on Appointments. No one from the partylist was named to either constitutional body. Petitioner now seeks the inclusion of
party-list representatives to the two bodies arguing that under the Constitution,
party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET and 2.4 seats
in the CA based on proportional representation.
Held: Under Sec. 17 and Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution, the House and the
Senate exercise the power to choose who among their members would occupy the
allotted 6 slots of their respective electoral tribunal, as well as the 12 seats in the
Commission on Appointments. Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives
comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse rests with the House, not with the Court.
The discretion of the House to choose the members is not absolute, being subject to
the mandatory rule on proportional representation. However, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court will not interfere, absent a clear violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. The present petition does not allege that
the House barred party-list representatives from seeking membership in then HRET
or the CA. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, direct recourse to the Supreme
Court is premature.
Codilla vs. Comelec (2002)

Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma.
Victoria L. Locsin was the incumbent representative of the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte. Both were candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections for the position of
representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
A registered voter of Kananga, Leyte filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification
against petitioner alleging that petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned
by the city government of Ormoc to extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to
the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte for the purpose of inducing,
influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
The case was assigned to the COMELECs Second Division, which issued an order
delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the
Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII. The same division sent notice to the
petitioner through telegram.
At the time of the elections, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the case.
Eventually, petitioner was included in the list of candidates and voted for; initial
results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.
Respondent filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent with
the COMELEC Second Division. A copy was allegedly served on the petitioner by
registered mail but no registry receipt was attached thereto. She also filed a second
motion, a copy of which was sent to petitioner with the corresponding registry
receipt; however, theres no indication when petitioner received the motion.
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The COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the (a) Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of the petitioner and (b)
the Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward
immediately the complete records together with its recommendation to the office of
the Clerk of the Commission. At this time, petitioner has yet to be summoned to
answer the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension alleging that (a) he did not
receive a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation, hence he was denied of his
right to rebut and refute the allegations against him; (b) he did not receive a copy of
the summons on the petition for disqualification; and (c) he received the telegraph
order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation four days after it
was sent to him. Said motion was not resolved; instead, the COMELEC Second
Division promulgated its Resolution that found the petitioner guilty of indirect
solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. The same order declared the
votes cast in favor of the petitioner as stray votes and directed the immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. As a result,
respondent was declared as having the highest number of votes and she was
proclaimed, took her oath of office, and assumed office as the duly elected
representative of the 4th district of Leyte. A copy of the said Resolution was sent by
fax to petitioners counsel.
The petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a
petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation. Said motion was granted and the
COMELEC en banc (a) reversed the resolution of the Second Division and (b) declared
the proclamation of respondent null and void. Respondent did not appeal from this
decision.
Eventually, petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected representative of the 4 th
district of Leyte. Petitioner took his oath of office before the Executive Judge of the
Ormoc Regional Trial Court. Petitioner wrote a letter-appeal to the House of
Representatives through respondent De Venecia, but no action was taken by the
latter. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
2. WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin directed the COMELEC en
banc of jurisdiction to review its validity.
3. WON it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize the
petitioner as the legally elected representative of the 4 th legislative district
of Leyte.
Held:
1. NO. First, the petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings
leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin. The essence of due process is the
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opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision
by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Second, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and
respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner cannot be considered stray. Considering the timely filing of a motion for
reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion in
ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of
the votes cast in his favor.
Also, Respondent Lim, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. It is a settled
doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not
be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election,
the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at
all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate
by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one
can be declared elected in his place.
2. NO. The petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the
Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him; hence, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said
Order of the Second Division. The said order was yet enforceable as it has not
attained finality; thus, it cannot be used as the basis for the assumption in office of
the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4 th Legislative district of
Leyte. For these reasons, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
3. YES. If the Law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case, the administration
of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents because of the following reasons: the petitioner garnered the highest
number of votes; the order of the COMELEC Second Division, which ordered the
proclamation of Respondent Locsin was set aside by the COMELEC en banc which
ordered the proclamation of the petitioner; said decision by the COMELEC en banc
was not challenged by the respondent and has become final and executory.
Barbers v. COMELEC, 460 SCRA 569 (2005)

On June 2, 2004, the Commission on Elections sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Biazon as the duly elected 12th Senator in the May 10, 2004
National Elections. While failure of elections were declared in some precincts,
COMELEC reasoned that they would not materially affect the results. Barbers, who
ranked next to Biazon, filed a petition before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation.
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When this was denied, he raised the issue before the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court have jurisdiction?
Does the
Held: No. The word sole in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution underscores the
exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunals (SET) jurisdiction over election contests
relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is
categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.
Since Barber contests Biazons
proclamation as the 12 winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers complaint
Hernandez vs. HRET 2009
residence).[5]
Laguna, which was also outside the First District. [
residence).[5]
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Laguna, which was also outside the First District. [6] The COMELEC (First Division)
dismissed said petition for lack of merit
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET,
docketed as HRET CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible
to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First
Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void. [9]
Private respondents main ground for the quo warranto petition was that petitioner
lacked the required one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
Held:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the
HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The
authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of
the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals,
[33]
which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the
proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed
and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House
of Representatives. [34]
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate.
Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to
claim that the HRET, when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House
of Representatives is concerned, is co-equal to the COMELEC, such that the HRET
cannot disregard any ruling of COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and
qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other
way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or
contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House
of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if another
body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue
of the Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forumshopping only where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of
action. The two cases here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character.
Mendoza vs. Comelc (2009)
Facts:
Petitioner Mendoza and respondent Pagdanganan vied ofr the position of Governor of
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the Province of Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed
winning
candidate
and
assumed
the
office
of
Governor.
- The respondent seasonably filed an election protest with the COMELEC.
- Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-protested precincts soon
followed.
The
revision
was
conducted
at
COMELECs
office
in
Intamuros.
- Thereafter, both parties submitted their other evidences. The formal offer of
evidences was approved and COMELEC ordered the parties to submit their
memoranda.
- Mendoza and Pagdanganan complied with the order and the case was then
submitted
for
resolution.
- March 2, 2009: the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those
involved in the provincial election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).
The
petitioner
filed
to
dismiss
further
proceedings.
- April 29, 2009: The motion filed by petitioner Mendoza was dismissed by COMELEC
2nd Division. According to the latter, COMELEC has plenary powers to find
alternative methods to facilitate the resolution of the election protest; thus, it
concluded that it would continue the proceedings after proper coordination with the
SET.
- The petitioner moved to reconsider the order but still COMELEC 2nd Division denied
the
motion
on
May
26,
2009.
- Allegedly alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election
contest within the SET premises without notice to him and without his participation,
the petitioners counsel wrote the SET Secretary, Atty. Irene Guevarra, a letter dated
June 10, 2009 to confirm the veracity of the reported conduct of proceedings.
- The Secretary responded that the action was authorized by then Acting Chairman of
the Tribunal, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, upon formal request of the Office of
Commissioner
Lucenito
N.
Tagle.
- The petitioner argues that the proceedings before the COMELEC in election protests
are judicial in nature and character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due process
specifically, (a) opportunity to be heard and (b) that judgment be rendered only after
lawful
hearing
apply.
- The petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due process
element of the right to have judgment only after lawful hearing is absent.
- Mendoza asserts that an important element of due process is that the judicial body
should have jurisdiction over the property that is the subject matter of the
proceedings
(2nd
issue).
- Private respondent Pagdanganan argues that the proceeding referred to by
Mendoza
was
COMELECs
decision-making
process.
- Public respondent COMELEC further argues that in the absence of a specific rule on
whether it can conduct appreciation of ballots outside its premises or official custody,
the issue boils down to one of discretion the authority of the COMELEC to control as
it deems fit the processes or incidents of a pending election protest.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC violated due process by conducting proceedings
without giving due notice to the petitioner.
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2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to an excess
of jurisdiction in appreciating ballots which are not in its official custody and are
outside its own premises, authority and control.
Held:
While COMELEC jurisdiction over the Bulacan election contest is not disputed, the
legality of subsequent COMELEC action is assailed for having been undertaken with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, our
standard of review is grave abuse of discretion, a term that defies exact definition,
but generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.
After due consideration, the Supreme Court held that the petition is bereft of merit.
These are the powers of the COMELEC as mentioned by the 1987 Constitution:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and
city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting
elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places,
the appointment of election officials and inspectors, and the registration of voters.
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC are the cardinal
primary rights in administrative proceedings (Ang Tibay Requirements 1-7).
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must
consider
the
evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity,
a
place
when
directly
attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support
a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party
at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process is to
give an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.
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A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential;
in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements
for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence
or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are
reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the
deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during
the hearing.
These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the
case and are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly,
the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be
found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties);
the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate,
must be based on substantial evidence.
In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at
the hearing and deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all
been violated.
In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent
in an adversarial contest where both sides were given their respective rights to
speak, make their presentations, and controvert each others submission, subject
only to established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under these undisputed facts, both
parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can complain of any
denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
The SC said The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party
of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial
election contest. In the context of our standard of review for the petition, we see no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by
the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the appreciation
of ballots this deliberation entailed.
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the
provincial election contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the
transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to the SET. The
Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over election protests involving
provincial officials. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties.
Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to
be intruding into the COMELEC en banc rule-making prerogative when the Second
Division chose to undertake ballot appreciation within the SET premises side by side
with the SET revision of ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down any
new rule; it merely acted pursuant to a rule that the COMELEC en banc itself had
previously enacted.
FACTS: Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of
AAngat Tayoand Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET
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assailing the jurisdiction of HRET over the Party list, and its representatives. HRET
representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC
Issue:W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners..
HELD: Affirmative. The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay.
Since petitioners Abayon and Palparanwere not elected into office but were chosen
by
their
respective
organizations
under
their
internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications a
s nominees. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections,
it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5,Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the
members of that House are representatives of districts and party list Once elected,
both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as members
of the House of Representatives, a party-list representative is in every sense an
elected member of the House of Representatives. Although the vote cast in a partylist election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House
of Representatives.Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the
qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A.
7941, echoing the Constitution.It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona fide
member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and
Bantay , respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the
party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. The Court holds that respondent HRET
did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over
the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
Layug vs. Comelec (2012)

Facts: On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a
taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify 3 (SPA No. 10016[DCN]) Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and
Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere
extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As such, it is disqualified from
being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution 4, as
well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 5, otherwise known as
the Party-List System Act. Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire
real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as one who
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belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required of partylist nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 6, the Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations
Participating in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. On June
15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution 3 denying the petition for
lack of substantial evidence.
Layug moved for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 before the
COMELEC En Banc claiming denial of due process for failure of the COMELEC to serve
him, his representatives or counsels a copy of said Resolution. He alleged that it was
only on July 26, 2010, after learning about it in the newspapers, that he personally
secured a copy of the Resolution from the COMELEC.4 His motion for reconsideration,
however, was denied by the COMELEC Second Division in its Order 5 dated August 4,
2010 for being filed out of time.
Held:
The Court not the HRET has jurisdisdiction
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its Members. Section 5 (1) of the
same Article identifies who the "members" of the House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations. (Underscoring added).
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members
who shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.1 In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House
that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin
C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat
and thus had not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably,
the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay
Party-List, as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the
COMELEC.Section 6 of said Act states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET,1 We ruled that
the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought
the disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the
COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution 2and Section
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1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure 3 that has jurisdiction to hear the
instant petition.
Jalosjos vs. Comelec (2012)
Facts: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he
bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In September 2008 he began
occupying the house. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo
to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,
[7]
claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he
indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC, on June 3,
2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos
ineligible to seek election as Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by
continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he
should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place
to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges the
COMELECs finding that he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of
his right to due process.
Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions
affecting elections,[15] such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these
contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives.[16]
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional
candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative
in favor of the HRET.[17]
The fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve
Erasmos appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case
against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos name
from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing
official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELECs Second
Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc
did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his
case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding
his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was
solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had
already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. [18] Thus, the
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COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his
qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Tanada vs. Cuenco
After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was
Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but
was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose
its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3
justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party.
But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to
come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did
Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators
then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election
contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take
cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the
power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the
remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before judicial courts but
rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
Held:
Although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the
Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law
has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised.
Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress
of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass
upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the
authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of
Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of
an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may
not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called
"judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct National
Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral
Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the
fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly
be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House
thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the
duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and
paving the way to its eventual destruction.
Abbas vs. SET (1988)
Facts:
On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in
the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time
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composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later
on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said
election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case.
Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due
process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the
proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunals
Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption
of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4)
members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not
less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority
vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition
for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of
the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court,
whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and
intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and
legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and
intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no SenatorMember of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels
that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET
cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of
valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
Pimentel, Jr. v. HRET, 393 SCRA 231 (2002)
During the May 11, 1998 elections, 14 party-lists representatives from 13
organizations were proclaimed winners. Subsequently, the house of Representatives
constituted the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and also named 12
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members to represent it in the Commission on Appointments. No one from the partylist was named to either constitutional body. Petitioner now seeks the inclusion of
party-list representatives to the two bodies arguing that under the Constitution,
party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET and 2.4 seats
in the CA based on proportional representation.
Held: Under Sec. 17 and Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution, the House and the
Senate exercise the power to choose who among their members would occupy the
allotted 6 slots of their respective electoral tribunal, as well as the 12 seats in the
Commission on Appointments. Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives
comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse rests with the House, not with the Court.
The discretion of the House to choose the members is not absolute, being subject to
the mandatory rule on proportional representation. However, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court will not interfere, absent a clear violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. The present petition does not allege that
the House barred party-list representatives from seeking membership in then HRET
or the CA. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, direct recourse to the Supreme
Court is premature.
Codilla vs. Comelec (2002)
Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma.
Victoria L. Locsin was the incumbent representative of the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte. Both were candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections for the position of
representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
A registered voter of Kananga, Leyte filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification
against petitioner alleging that petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned
by the city government of Ormoc to extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to
the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte for the purpose of inducing,
influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
The case was assigned to the COMELECs Second Division, which issued an order
delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the
Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII. The same division sent notice to the
petitioner through telegram.
At the time of the elections, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the case.
Eventually, petitioner was included in the list of candidates and voted for; initial
results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.
Respondent filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent with
the COMELEC Second Division. A copy was allegedly served on the petitioner by
registered mail but no registry receipt was attached thereto. She also filed a second
motion, a copy of which was sent to petitioner with the corresponding registry
receipt; however, theres no indication when petitioner received the motion.
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The COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the (a) Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of the petitioner and (b)
the Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward
immediately the complete records together with its recommendation to the office of
the Clerk of the Commission. At this time, petitioner has yet to be summoned to
answer the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension alleging that (a) he did not
receive a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation, hence he was denied of his
right to rebut and refute the allegations against him; (b) he did not receive a copy of
the summons on the petition for disqualification; and (c) he received the telegraph
order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation four days after it
was sent to him. Said motion was not resolved; instead, the COMELEC Second
Division promulgated its Resolution that found the petitioner guilty of indirect
solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. The same order declared the
votes cast in favor of the petitioner as stray votes and directed the immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. As a result,
respondent was declared as having the highest number of votes and she was
proclaimed, took her oath of office, and assumed office as the duly elected
representative of the 4th district of Leyte. A copy of the said Resolution was sent by
fax to petitioners counsel.
The petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a
petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation. Said motion was granted and the
COMELEC en banc (a) reversed the resolution of the Second Division and (b) declared
the proclamation of respondent null and void. Respondent did not appeal from this
decision.
Eventually, petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected representative of the 4 th
district of Leyte. Petitioner took his oath of office before the Executive Judge of the
Ormoc Regional Trial Court. Petitioner wrote a letter-appeal to the House of
Representatives through respondent De Venecia, but no action was taken by the
latter. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
2. WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin directed the COMELEC en
banc of jurisdiction to review its validity.
3. WON it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize the
petitioner as the legally elected representative of the 4 th legislative district
of Leyte.
Held:
1. NO. First, the petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings
leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin. The essence of due process is the
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opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision
by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Second, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and
respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner cannot be considered stray. Considering the timely filing of a motion for
reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion in
ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of
the votes cast in his favor.
Also, Respondent Lim, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. It is a settled
doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not
be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election,
the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at
all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate
by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one
can be declared elected in his place.
2. NO. The petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the
Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him; hence, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said
Order of the Second Division. The said order was yet enforceable as it has not
attained finality; thus, it cannot be used as the basis for the assumption in office of
the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4 th Legislative district of
Leyte. For these reasons, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
3. YES. If the Law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case, the administration
of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents because of the following reasons: the petitioner garnered the highest
number of votes; the order of the COMELEC Second Division, which ordered the
proclamation of Respondent Locsin was set aside by the COMELEC en banc which
ordered the proclamation of the petitioner; said decision by the COMELEC en banc
was not challenged by the respondent and has become final and executory.
HON. WALDO FLORES, in his capacity as Senior capacity as Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary in the Office of the President, HON. ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, and the PRESIDENTIAL
ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC) vs ATTY. ANTONIO MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:
(I sincerely apologize na taas ni, procedural ang case. Please focus
on the Doctrine of Non-delegation of Powers)
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Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor was appointed by the President as

Regional Director II of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San
Fernando, Pampanga.
On January 30, 2003, the Office of the President received a letter from a
concerned citizen dated January 20, 2003 relating Montemayors ostentatious
lifestyle which is apparently disproportionate to his income as a public official.
The letter was referred to Dario C. Rama, Chairman of the Presidential AntiGraft Commission (PAGC) for appropriate action. The Investigating Office of
the PAGC immediately conducted a fact-finding inquiry into the matter and
issued subpoenas duces tecum to the responsible personnel of the BIR and
the Land Transportation Office (LTO). In compliance with the subpoena, BIR
Personnel Division Chief Estelita Datu submitted to the PAGC a copy of
Montemayors appointment papers along with a certified true copy of the
latters Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) for the year
2002. Meanwhile, the LTO, through its Records Section Chief, Ms. Arabelle O.
Petilla, furnished the PAGC with a record of vehicles registered to Montemayor,
to wit: a 2001 Ford Expedition, a 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, and a 1983
Mitsubishi Galant.
During the pendency of the investigation, the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism, a media organization which had previously published
an article on the unexplained wealth of certain BIR officials, also submitted to
the PAGC copies of Montemayors SSAL for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. In
Montemayors 1999 and 2000 SSAL, the PAGC noted that Montemayor
declared his ownership over several motor vehicles, but failed to do the same
in his 2001 SSAL.
On the basis of the said documents, the PAGC issued a Formal Charge against
Montemayor on May 19, 2003 for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 3019in relation to Section 8 (A) of RA No. 6713 due to his failure to declare
the 2001 Ford Expedition with a value ranging from 1.7 million to 1.9 million
pesos, and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser with an estimated value of 1 million
to 1.2 million pesos in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL. The charge was docketed as
PAGC-ADM-0149-03. On the same date, the PAGC issued an Order directing
Montemayor to file his counter-affidavit or verified answer to the formal
charge against him within ten (10) days from the receipt of the Order.
Montemayor, however, failed to submit his counter-affidavit or verified answer
to the formal charge lodged against him.
On June 4, 2003, during the preliminary conference, Montemayor, through
counsel, moved for the deferment of the administrative proceedings
explaining that he has filed a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning
the PAGCs jurisdiction to conduct the administrative investigation against
him. The PAGC denied Montemayors motion for lack of merit, and instead
gave him until June 9, 2003 to submit his counter-affidavit or verified
answer. Still, no answer was filed.
On June 23, 2003, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in CAG.R. SP No. 77285 enjoining the PAGC from proceeding with the investigation
for sixty (60) days. On September 12, 2003, shortly after the expiration of the
sixty (60)-day TRO, the PAGC issued a Resolution finding Montemayor
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administratively liable as charged and recommending to the Office of the
President Montemayors dismissal from the service.
On March 23, 2004, the Office of the President, through Deputy Executive
Secretary Arthur P. Autea, issued a Decision adopting in toto the findings and
recommendation of the PAGC.
Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said decision. This time, he argued
that he was denied his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded to
investigate his case notwithstanding the pendency of his petition
for certiorari before the CA, and its subsequent elevation to the Supreme
Court. The motion was eventually denied.
Aggrieved, Montemayor brought the matter to the CA via a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE PAGC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND RESPONDENTS
DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE;
WHETHER THE ASSUMPTION BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN OF ITS
JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE
DEPRIVED THE PAGC [WITH ITS JURISDICTION] FROM PROCEEDING WITH ITS
INVESTIGATION.
RULING:
The PAGC was created by virtue of EO No. 12, signed on April 16, 2001 to
speedily address the problem on corruption and abuses committed in the
government, particularly by officials appointed by the President. Under
Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12, the PAGC has the power to investigate and hear
administrative complaints provided (1) that the official to be investigated
must be a presidential appointee in the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, and (2) that the said official must be occupying the position
of assistant regional director, or an equivalent rank, or higher.
Respondent contends that he was deprived of his right to due process when
the PAGC proceeded to investigate him on the basis of an anonymous
complaint in the absence of any documents supporting the complainants
assertions.
Section 4 (c) of EO No. 12 states that the PAGC has the power to give due
course to anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if there
appears on the face of the complaint or based on the supporting documents
attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to engender a belief
that the allegations may be true. Respondent also assails the PAGCs decision
to proceed with the investigation process without giving him the opportunity
to present controverting evidence.
We find nothing irregular with the PAGCs decision to proceed with its
investigation notwithstanding the pendency of Montemayors petition
for certiorari before the CA. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the CA
did not divest the PAGC of its jurisdiction validly acquired over the case before
it.
First, it must be remembered that the PAGCs act of issuing the assailed
resolution enjoys the presumption of regularity particularly since it was done
in the performance of its official duties. Mere surmises and conjectures,
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absent any proof whatsoever, will not tilt the balance against the
presumption, if only to provide constancy in the official acts of authorized
government personnel and officials. Simply put, the timing of the issuance of
the assailed PAGC resolution by itself cannot be used to discredit, much less
nullify, what appears on its face to be a regular performance of the PAGCs
duties.
Second, Montemayors argument, as well as the CAs observation that
respondent was not afforded a second opportunity to present controverting
evidence, does not hold water. The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is
given the opportunity to explain his side, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with.
Significantly, the records show that the PAGC issued an order informing
Montemayor of the formal charge filed against him and gave him ten (10)
days within which to present a counter-affidavit or verified answer. When the
said period lapsed without respondent asking for an extension, the PAGC gave
Montemayor a fresh ten (10)-day period to file his answer, but the latter chose
to await the decision of the CA in his petition for certiorari. During the
preliminary conference, Montemayor was again informed that he is given a
new ten (10)-day period, or until June 19, 2003 within which to file his
memorandum/position paper as well as supporting evidence with a warning
that if he still fails to do so, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for
resolution on the basis of available documentary evidence on record. Again,
the deadline lapsed without any evidence being presented by Montemayor in
his defense.
We stress that the PAGCs findings and recommendations remain as
recommendations until finally acted upon by the Office of the President.
Montemayor, therefore, had two (2) choices upon the issuance of the PAGC
resolution: to move for a reconsideration thereof, or to ask for another
opportunity before the Office of the President to present his side particularly
since the assailed resolution is merely recommendatory in nature. Having
failed to exercise any of these two (2) options, Montemayor cannot now be
allowed to seek recourse before this Court for the consequences of his own
shortcomings.
o The cases filed against respondent before the Ombudsman were
initiated after the Office of the President decided to dismiss
Montemayor. More importantly, the proceedings before the PAGC were
already finished even prior to the initiation and filing of cases against
him by the Ombudsman. In fact, it was the PAGCs findings and
recommendations which served as the basis in the Office of the
Presidents decision to dismiss Montemayor from government service.
Clearly then, the exercise by the Office of the President of its
concurrent investigatory and prosecutorial power over Montemayor
had already been terminated even before the Ombudsman could take
cognizance over the matter. The Ombudsman, therefore, cannot take
over a task that is already a fait accompli.
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As to the substantive aspect, i.e., whether the PAGCs recommendation to

dismiss Montemayor from government service is supported by substantial
evidence, we find in favor of petitioners.
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARYEDUARDO ERMITA
FACTS:
There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board
examination were circulated during the examination period among examinees
reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The examinees
were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations
five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical
Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing
members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from
proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.
President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which

authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review
centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED
Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations).
Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of

independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR
arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher
Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will
effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however
believed that suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with
the mandate of EO 566.
A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was
approved. Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to
exclude independent review center from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the
meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up with HEIs; to revise
the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHEDs coverage to public and
private institutions of higher education.
In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to

exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED
would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No.566; As to the
request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI, tie-up/be
integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI.
Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court
praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and
unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and the prohibition against CHED from
implementing the RIRR. Motion to intervene filed by other organizations/institutions
were granted by the Court.
On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of
2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for
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all existing independent review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in
accordance with the RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC resolved torequire
the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the
RIRR, and CMO 21, s.2008.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative
power as it expands theCHEDs jurisdiction; and
2.
Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.
HELD:
1.
Yes, it expands CHEDs jurisdiction, hence unconstitutional. The scopes of EO
566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The CHEDs
coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher
education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary
educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the
regulation of review centers and similar entities. The definition of a review center
under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers "a program or course of study
that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure
examinations" given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program that
would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
A review course is only intended to "refresh and enhance the knowledge or
competencies and skills of reviewees." Thus, programs given by review centers could
not be considered "programs x x x of higher learning" that would put them under the
jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher education," is defined as "education beyond the
secondary level or "education provided by a college or university." Further, the
"similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or tutorial services" in
areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include,
although not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations,
and tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of
higher learning.
2.
Yes, it is invalid. The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under Section
20, Title I of Book III of EO (invoked by theOSG to justify GMAs action) requires
legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the Presidents other
powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no law granting
the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no
inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA
7722. The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter
and repeal them."
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power,
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.The President has control
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over the executive department, bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has the authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or
interfere with the discretion of itsofficials. Corollary to the power of control, he is
granted administrative power. Administrative power is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.
It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and
check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and regulations.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law
and carrying out the legislative policy. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of
legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi-legislative
power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through
the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rulemaking power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. But The RIRR
covers review centers and similar entities.
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS:
Before us is respondents Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated

April 2, 2009 which granted the consolidated petitions of petitioner Fort Bonifacio
Development Corporation, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Tax
Appeals and the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are
hereby (1) restrained from collecting from petitioner the amount of P28,413,783.00
representing the transitional input tax credit due it for the fourth quarter of 1996; and
(2) directed to refund to petitioner the amount of P347,741,695.74 paid as output
VAT for the third quarter of 1997 in light of the persisting transitional input tax credit
available to petitioner for the said quarter, or to issue a tax credit corresponding to
such amount. No pronouncement as to costs.
The Motion for Reconsideration raises the following arguments:

1.
Section 100 of the Old National Internal Revenue Code (old NIRC), as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7716, could not have supplied the distinction between the
treatment of real properties or real estate dealers on the one hand, and the
treatment of transactions involving other commercial goods on the other hand, as
said distinction is found in Section 105 and, subsequently, Revenue Regulations No.
7-95 which defines the input tax creditable to a real estate dealer who becomes
subject to vat for the first time.
2.
Section 4.105.1 and paragraph (a) (iii) of the transitory provisions of revenue
regulations no. 7-95 validly limit the 8% transitional input tax to the improvements on
real properties.
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3.
Revenue Regulations no. 6-97 did not repeal Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.
ISSUE: Whether or not

allowable transitional input tax credit is limited to
improvements on real properties.
HELD: The instant motion for reconsideration lacks merit.
The first VAT law, found in Executive Order (EO) No. 273 [1987], took effect on
January 1, 1988. It amended several provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 (Old NIRC). EO 273 likewise accommodated the potential burdens of the shift
to the VAT system by allowing newly VAT-registered persons to avail of a transitional
input tax credit as provided for in Section 105 of the Old NIRC.
RA 7716 took effect on January 1, 1996. It amended Section 100 of the Old
NIRC by imposing for the first time value-added-tax on sale of real properties. The
amendment reads:
Sec. 100. Value-added-tax on sale of goods or properties. (a) Rate and base of tax.
There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or exchange of
goods or properties, a value-added tax equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or
gross value in money of the goods, or properties sold, bartered or exchanged, such
tax to be paid by the seller or transferor.(1) The term 'goods or properties' shall mean
all tangible and intangible objects which are capable of pecuniary estimation and
shall include: (A) Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease
in the ordinary course of trade or business; xxx
The provisions of Section 105 of the NIRC, on the transitional input tax credit,
remain intact despite the enactment of RA 7716. Section 105 however was amended
with the passage of the new National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (New NIRC), also
officially known as Republic Act (RA) 8424. The provisions on the transitional input
tax credit are now embodied in Section 111(A) of the New NIRC.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) disallowed Fort Bonifacio

Development Corporations (FBDC) presumptive input tax credit arising from the land
inventory on the basis of Revenue Regulation 7-95 (RR 7-95) and Revenue
Memorandum Circular 3-96 (RMC 3-96).
However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input
tax shall be the improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other
similar structures, constructed on or after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1, 1988).
The transitional input tax shall be 8% of the value of the inventory or actual VAT paid,
whichever is higher, which amount may be allowed as tax credit against the output
tax of the VAT-registered person.
In the April 2, 2009 Decision sought to be reconsidered, the Court struck down
Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95 for being in conflict with the law. It held that the CIR had
no power to limit the meaning and coverage of the term "goods" in Section 105 of
the Old NIRC sans statutory authority or basis and justification to make such
limitation. This it did when it restricted the application of Section 105 in the case of
real estate dealers only to improvements on the real property belonging to their
beginning inventory.
A law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in
relation to the whole law. It is the cardinal rule in statutory construction that a
statutes clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated
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expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with other parts of the statute and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
In construing a statute, courts have to take the thought conveyed by the

statute as a whole; construe the constituent parts together; ascertain the legislative
intent from the whole act; consider each and every provision thereof in the light of
the general purpose of the statute; and endeavor to make every part effective,
harmonious and sensible.
The statutory definition of the term "goods or properties" leaves no room for
doubt. It states: Sec. 100. Value-added tax on sale of goods or properties. (a) Rate
and base of tax. xxx. (1) The term goods or properties shall mean all tangible and
intangible objects which are capable of pecuniary estimation and shall include: (A)
Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary
course of trade or business; xxx.
The term "goods or properties" by the unambiguous terms of Section 100

includes "real properties held primarily for sale to costumers or held for lease in the
ordinary course of business." Having been defined in Section 100 of the NIRC, the
term "goods" as used in Section 105 of the same code could not have a different
meaning. Goods, as commonly understood in the business sense, refers to the
product which the VAT-registered person offers for sale to the public. With respect to
real estate dealers, it is the real properties themselves which constitute their
"goods." Such real properties are the operating assets of the real estate dealer.
However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input
tax shall be the improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other
similar structures, constructed on or after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1, 1988).
As mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code, an administrative rule or regulation

cannot contravene the law on which it is based. RR 7-95 is inconsistent with Section
105 insofar as the definition of the term "goods" is concerned. This is a legislative act
beyond the authority of the CIR and the Secretary of Finance. The rules and
regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have
the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the objects and purposes of the law, and should not be in contradiction
to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict,

the provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify,
expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule that is not
consistent with the statute itself is null and void. While administrative agencies, such
as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue regulations to implement statutes, they
are without authority to limit the scope of the statute to less than what it provides, or
extend or expand the statute beyond its terms, or in any way modify explicit
provisions of the law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative
agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a
discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the
basic law prevails.
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To recapitulate, RR 7-95, insofar as it restricts the definition of "goods" as

basis of transitional input tax credit under Section 105 is a nullity. It is clear,
therefore, that the allowable transitional input tax credit is not limited to
improvements on real properties. The particular provision of RR 7-95 has effectively
been repealed by RR 6-97 which is now in consonance with Section 100 of the NIRC,
insofar as the definition of real properties as goods is concerned. The failure to add a
specific repealing clause would not necessarily indicate that there was no intent to
repeal RR 7-95. The fact that the aforequoted paragraph was deleted created an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy between the provisions of RR 6-97 and
RR 7-95
VICTORIA GUTIERREZ
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM)
FACTS:
These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain allowances and

fringe benefits into the standardized salary rates for offices in the national
government, state universities and colleges, and local government units as required
by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 and implemented
through the challenged National Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59).
Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government
employees. Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional
compensation already being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary
rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations that the employees may be
receiving from such consolidation.
Pursuant thereto, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued

NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989, covering the offices of the national government,
state universities and colleges, and local government units. NCC 59 enumerated the
specific allowances and additional compensations which were deemed integrated in
the basic salaries and these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and
Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM re-issued and published NCC 59 on
May 3, 2004.
The DBM also issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) 10 dated

October 2, 1989, covering all government-owned or controlled corporations and
government financial institutions. The DBM re-issued this circular on February 15,
1999 and published it on March 16, 1999. Accordingly, the Commission on Audit
(COA) disallowed the payments of honoraria and other allowances which were
deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates. Employees of governmentowned or controlled corporations questioned the validity of CCC 10 due to its nonpublication.
Meanwhile, the DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03 dated November 12,
2001, clarifying that only the exempt allowances under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may
continue to be granted the employees; all others were deemed integrated in the
standardized salary rates. Thus, the payment of allowances and compensation such
as COLA, amelioration allowance, and ICA, among others, which were already
deemed integrated in the basic salary were unauthorized.
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On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. 153266, questioning the propriety of
integrating their COLA into their standardized salary rates. Employees of other offices
of the national government followed suit. In addition, petitioners in G.R. 159007
questioned the disallowance of the allowances and fringe benefits that the COA
auditing personnel assigned to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
used to get. Petitioners in G.R. 173119 questioned the disallowance of the ICA that
used to be paid to the officials and employees of the Insurance Commission.
On October 26, 2005 the DBM issued National Budget Circular 2005-502 which
provided that all Supreme Court rulings on the integration of allowances, including
COLA, of government employees under R.A. 6758 applied only to specific
government-owned or controlled corporations since the consolidated cases covering
the national government employees are still pending with this Court. Consequently,
the payment of allowances and other benefits to them, such as COLA and ICA,
remained prohibited until otherwise provided by law or ruled by this Court. The
circular further said that all agency heads and other responsible officials and
employees found to have authorized the grant of COLA and other allowances and
benefits already integrated in the basic salary shall be personally held liable for such
payment.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the non-publication of NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 in the
Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation nullifies the integration of the
COLA into the standardized salary rates; and
HELD:
1.
Petitioners argue that since CCC 10 dated October 2, 1989 covering all
government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions
was ineffective until its re-issuance and publication on March 16, 1999, its
counterpart, NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 covering the offices of the national
government, state universities and colleges, and local government units should also
be regarded as ineffective until its re-issuance and publication on May 3, 2004. Thus,
the COLA should not be deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates from
1989 to 2004. Respondents counter that the fact that NCC 59 was not published
should not be considered as an obstacle to the integration of COLA into the
standardized salary rates. Accordingly, Budget Circular 2001-03, insofar as it
reiterates NCC 59, should not be treated as ineffective since it merely reaffirms the
fact of consolidation of COLA into the employees salary as mandated by Section 12
of R.A. 6758.
It is a settled rule that publication is required as a condition precedent to the
effectivity of a law to inform the public of its contents before their rights and interests
are affected by the same. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation.
Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the integration of COLA into the standardized
salary rates is not dependent on the publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59. This benefit
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is deemed included in the standardized salary rates of government employees since
it falls under the general rule of integrationall allowances.
More importantly, the integration was not by mere legal fiction since it was factually
integrated into the employees salaries.
Records show that the government
employees were informed by their respective offices of their new position titles and
their corresponding salary grades when they were furnished with the Notices of
Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment (NPASA).
The NPASA provided the
breakdown of the employees gross monthly salary as of June 30, 1989 and the
composition of his standardized pay under R.A. 6758. Notably, the COLA was
considered part of the employees monthly income.
In truth, petitioners never really suffered any diminution in pay as a consequence of
the consolidation of COLA into their standardized salary rates. There is thus nothing
in these cases which can be the subject of a back pay since the amount
corresponding to COLA was never withheld from petitioners in the first place.
Consequently, the non-publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59 in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation does not nullify the integration of COLA into the
standardized salary rates upon the effectivity of R.A. 6758. The validity of R.A. 6758
should not be made to depend on the validity of its implementing rules.
COCOFED VS REPUBLIC 663 SCRA 514 (2012)
FACTS:
In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment
Fund (CIF). The source of the CIF was a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of
copra. The Philippine Coconut Administration was tasked to collect and administer
the Fund. Out of the 0.55 levy, P0.02 was placed at the disposition of the COCOFED,
the recognized national association of coconut producers declared by the PCA.
Cocofund receipts were ought to be issued to every copra seller. During the Martial
Law regime, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued several Presidential Decrees
purportedly for the improvement of the coconut industry. The most relevant among
these is P.D. No. 755 which permitted the use of the Fund for theacquisition of a
commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the distribution of the shares
of the stock of the bank it [PCA] acquired free to the coconut farmers (Sec.2).
Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). The PCA bought the 72.2% of PUBs outstanding
capital stock or 137,866 shares at P200 per share (P27, 573,200.00) from Pedro
Cojuangco in behalf of the coconut farmers. The rest of the Fund was deposited to
the UCPB interest free. Farmers who had paid the CIF and registered their receipts
with PCA were given their corresponding UCPB stock certificates. Only 16 million
worth of COCOFUND receipts were registered and a large number of the coconut
farmers opted to sell all/part of their UCPB shares to private individuals. Simply put,
parts of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or
was converted into different assets or investments through the years.
After the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order
1which created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).The PCGG
aimed to assist the President in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the
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Marcoses and their cronies. PCGG was empowered to file cases for sequestration in
the Sandiganbayan. Among the sequestered properties were the shares of stock in
the UCPB registered in the name of over a million coconut farmers held in trust by
the PCA. TheSandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary
Judgment that the Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that Section
1 and 2 of PD No. 755 (and some other PDs) were unconstitutional.
Now, petitioners come to this Court contending that, the Sandiganbayan
gravely erred in concluding that Section 1 of PD No. 755 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it authorizes the PCA to promulgate rules
and regulations governing the distribution of the UCPB shares to the coconut
farmers. Section 1 of PD 755 was complete in itself, prescribed sufficient standards
that circumscribed the discretion of the PCA and merely authorized the PCA to fill
matters of detail an execution through promulgated rules and regulations
ISSUE: WON Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
RULING:
YES. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative
power.
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate.
It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of
the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.
In this case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. This
decree authorizes PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks
of UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy the financial commitments of the coconut
farmers under the Agreement for the acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does
not even state who are to be considered as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who
plants a single coconut tree be already considered a coconut farmer and, therefore,
entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares shall be given to him? The
definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the number of shares a farmer is
entitled to receive for free are important variables to be determined by law and
cannot be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.
Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as to
how the disposition of the UCPB shares or their conversion into private ownership will
redound to the advancement of the national policy declared under it. P.D. No. 755
seeks to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry and
achieve a vertical integration thereof so that coconut farmers will become
participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and development. The said law
gratuitously gave away public funds to private individuals, and converted them
exclusively into private property without any restriction as to its use that would
reflect the avowed national policy or public purpose. Conversely, the private
individuals to whom the UCPB shares were transferred are free to dispose of them by
sale or any other mode from the moment of their acquisition. P.D. No. 755 did not
provide for any guideline, standard, condition or restriction by which the said shares
shall be distributed to the coconut farmers that would ensure that the same will be
undertaken to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry
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pursuant to its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a veritable
carte blanche to distribute to coconut farmers UCPB shares at the level it may
determine, as well as the full disposition of such shares to private individuals in their
private capacity without any conditions or restrictions that would advance the laws
national policy or public purpose, present a case of undue delegation of legislative
power.
Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic vs
Hypermix Feeds Corporation
G.R. No 179579, February 1,
2012
Facts:
The Commissioner of Customs issued CM 27-2003 classifying wheat as
(1)importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge and
depending on these factors, wheat would be classified further as either food grade
with a tariff rate of 3% or feed grade with a tariff rate of 7%.
The regulation also provides for an exclusive list of corporations, ports of
discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. On December 19, 2003,
the respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of
Las Pinas contending the following: (1) the regulation was issued without following
the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code, (2) that the regulation classified
them to be a feed grade supplier without prior assessment and examination, (3)the
equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation treated
the non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all, and(4) the
retroactive application of the regulation is confiscatory. The petitioners thereafter
filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) the RTC does not have jurisdiction of
the subject matter, (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper,(3) CM 27-2003
was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of
the respondent were speculative and premature.
On March10, 2005, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision ruling in
favour of the respondent. It held that, on matters relating to the validity of the
regulation, the court held that the regulation is invalid because the basic
requirements of hearing and publication were not complied with. The petitioners then
appealed to Court of Appeals but it was, however, dismissed. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
WON the issuance of CMO 27-2003 is valid?
Held:
Customs Memorandum Order No. 27-2003 (CMO 23-2007) is invalid. The
Commissioner of Customs (1) violated the right to due process in the issuance of
CMO 27-2003 when he failed to observe the requirements under the Revised
Administrative Code, (2) violated the right to equal protection of laws when he
provided for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation, and
(3) went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the
powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.
CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised
Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center. For tariff purposes, CMO
27-2003 classified wheat according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2)
country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. This is a violation of the equal protection
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clause under the Constitution. The Court does not see how the quality of wheat is
affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have
imported food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat,
a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers
listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be
made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation,
therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the
state. Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended mandates that the
customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the imported
article before tariff may be imposed.
Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the
customs officer had the chance to examine it. Finally, Commissioner of Customs
diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat
importation when it no longer required the customs officers prior examination and
assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of
the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it
with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The
bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations,
Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after
a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to
the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same
time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker?
The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
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observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure.
But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule
affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where
private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute
to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the
House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was
no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had
already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
ABAKADA vs PURISIMA
FACTS: This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and
allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess
collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department
of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of
the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director
General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners,
two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the
officials nominated by their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from
the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target;
(3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4)
prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including
the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.
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The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked
to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be
approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.
Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground
that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law,
the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues
that the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances,
rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative
policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the
executive and the implementing agencies.
ISSUE: WON Section 12 of RA 9335 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate
and seven Members from the House of Representatives. The Members from the
Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two senators
representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After
the Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose
of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF,
DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional
principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. 52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) 53 is
vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers
nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a
legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional
committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a
law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it,
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
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proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members
of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The
President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as
if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or
veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can
become a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the
Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative
act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if
approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved
by both Houses of Congress.54 Second, it must be presented to and approved by the
President.55 As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57,
the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate
except for some measures that must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and
its referral by the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval,
with or without amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon.
If there are other bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated
into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage
that the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when
desired. The second reading is the most important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof
are distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the
members merely register their votes and explain them if they are allowed by the
rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also
undergo the three readings. If there are differences between the versions approved
by the two chambers, a conference committee 58 representing both Houses will draft a
compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives
will then be submitted to the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter
authenticated with the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the
Secretaries of their respective chambers59
The Presidents role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes
effect as law after the required publication.
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has
enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the
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legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it
becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights
and obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute.
Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process
clause,61 the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of
Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the
executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that
point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to
approving or vetoing the law.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its
members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to
overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch
charged with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as
unconstitutional. While there may be similar provisions of other laws that may be
invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from invalidating them
wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case assailing those
provisions is brought before us
SENATE vs ERMITA
FACTS: The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that
the President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464)
last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued
invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on
September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project
of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and
Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by
a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the
alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North
Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued
invitations2 dated September 22, 2005 to the officials of the AFP. Also invited to the
above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff,
General Generoso S. Senga.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the
Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
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Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," 7 which, pursuant to
Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance
with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional
provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the
government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government
shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive
Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him "that officials of
the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail
project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President,
pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent
from the President."
On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged
wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter to Senator Biazon informing him "that per
instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of
the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings
without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that no approval has
been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing
of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28
September 2005."
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen.
Senga, the investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and
Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the
AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were
relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and
169667, for certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital
interest in the resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer
imminent and material injury, as it has already sustained the same with its continued
enforcement since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the
Senates powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and
concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777
and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.
In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture
and Food and the Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of
the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the Department
of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings but most of
them failed to attend having invoked E.O. 464.
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Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 21 and 22 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution
RULING:
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are
significant differences between the two provisions, however, which constrain this
Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3,
require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464.
The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that
they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under
Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads possession of any
information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked
contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege
at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each
House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days
before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or
the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of
Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be
interpreted vis--vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of
Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." An excerpt of the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission shows that the framers were aware that these two
provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a
definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the
Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of
the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period.
There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution which
made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the
parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also
members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate
accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They
shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of government and
shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system
where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their
term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they
enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.
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The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such
appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform
more fully to a system of separation of powers. To that extent, the question hour, as
it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the
parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in a
question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to
elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a
mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress right to executive
information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative.
As Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under
discussion, it is that the Congress has the right to obtain information from any source
even from officials of departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the
United States there is, unlike the situation which prevails in a parliamentary system
such as that in Britain, a clear separation between the legislative and executive
branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right to obtain
information from the executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as the
elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The absence
of close rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country,
comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the
nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period
have perforce made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain information
from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform its legislative tasks.
Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive information, its power of
oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of
most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon
information parceled out ex gratia by the executive. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of
which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains
to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires
their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with
the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
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legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by
the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power
of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence,
each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but
also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This
point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it
during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee vs Majaducon,

407 SCRA 356
July 29, 2003
Where the senate conducts legislative inquiries in

aid of legislation, and persons were subpoenaed
and invited thereto, the latter cannot go to the
court of justice because it has no authority to
prohibit (issue a writ of injunction) the committee
from requiring that person from appearing and
testifying before it; otherwise it will be inconsistent
with the doctrine of separation of powers as the
same is an encroachment to ones prerogatives.
FACTS
Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution No.157 directing the Committee on
National Defense and Security to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the
charges of then Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado that a group of active and
retired military officers were organizing a coup d 'etat to prevent the administration
of then President Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Senator Vicente C. Sotto III also filed Resolution No.160,
"directing the appropriate senate committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment portfolio of
the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, it
appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot in General Santos City, designated as
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Lot X, MR-1160, for P10,500.00 per square meter from private respondent Atty. Nilo J.
Flaviano. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that
the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000.00 per square meter. The Committee
thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to respondent Atty. Flaviano, directing
him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to appear at the hearing.
Instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City
Atty. Flaviano contends that the trial court may properly intervene into investigations
by Congress pursuant to the power of judicial review vested in it by the Constitution.
He avers that he has a valid cause of action to file the petition for prohibition
considering that the Committees investigation will delve into the validity of the
patenting and titling of Lot X, MR-1160-D which, as admitted by petitioner, falls within
the competence of judicial courts.
The trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the Committee "to
CEASE and DESIST from proceeding with the inquiry on matters affecting the
patenting/titling and sale of Lot X,MR-1160-D to AFP-RSBS," and "from issuing
subpoenas to witnesses from Region XI, particularly from General Santos City,
pending the hearing of the petition for prohibition and injunction."
The Committee filed a motion to dismiss thepetition on the grounds of (a) lack of
jurisdiction, and (b) failure to state a valid cause of action.
The trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and granted the writ of
preliminary injunction
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
RULING
YES.
The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to
Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the
Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and
testify before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution, thus:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or
any
of
its
respective
committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing
inor
affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.
There was in this case a clear legislative purpose, as stated in Senate Resolution No.
160, and the appropriate Senate Committee was directed to look into the reported
misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting
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appropriate legislation to protect the rights and interests of the officers and members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, or any court for that matter,
had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent to appear and
testify before it.
Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
G.R. No. 89914
November 20, 1991
Inquiry in Aid of Legislation: When not Allowed

FACTS:
It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the
Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino
people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon law office and Ricardo Lopa
Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business
enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and
Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation. Sen. Enrile subsequently delivered a
privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned
corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was
referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon
Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee
for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise
refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile
categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and
malicious. Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon
which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas
and Bengzons plea. Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to
subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before
the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and
blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable
damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the Bengzon et al filed the
present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
injunctive relief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD:
No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no
suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into
a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory,
particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or
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39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be,
therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the
SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether
or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA
No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more
within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court
may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the
exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a
member.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
A proper claim of executive privilege requires a

specific description of the documents within its
scope as well as the precise reasons for preserving
their confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is
impossible for a court to analyze the claim.
FACTS:
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as
well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public
hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the
NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department
heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff
Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically
prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals
and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine
National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the
executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other
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officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate
committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the
scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying
President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from
their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties
of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: WON EO 464 is constitutional
E.O. 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence
to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For
Other Purposes,
E.O. 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of

Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For
Other Purposes,
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments

Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the
Constitutional provisions on the separation of
powers between co-equal branches of the
government, all heads of departments of the
Executive Branch of the government shall secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest

so requires and the President so states in writing,
the appearance shall only be conducted in
executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature,
Executive Privilege.
Scope
and
Coverage
of
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(a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality
based on executive privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May
1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees provides that Public Officials and
Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or
classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the
public to prejudice the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or

classified information between the President and
the public officers covered by this executive order,
including:
Conversations and correspondence between the

President and the public official covered by this
executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No.
95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
Military, diplomatic and other national security

matters which in the interest of national security
should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R.
No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998).
Information between inter-government agencies

prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December
1998);
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez

v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
Matters affecting national security and public order
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(Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
133250, 9 July 2002).
G.R.
No.
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered

by this executive order:
Senior officials of executive departments who in the

judgment of the department heads are covered by
the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of

the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of

chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP
are covered by the executive privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the

judgment of the National Security Adviser are
covered by the executive privilege; and
Such other officers as may be determined by the

President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials

Before Congress. All public officials enumerated in
Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of
the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress to ensure the observance of the
principle of separation of powers, adherence to the
rule on executive privilege and respect for the
rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid
of legislation.
RULING:
The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.
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3
To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish
Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of
inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although
there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question
Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement
to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of
Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and
balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question
Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation,
under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be
held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid
of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary
in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21
and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not
be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates
to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is
a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be
exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It
is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom.
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under
Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its
face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1
cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid
of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
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When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires
their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory.
The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the
public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high
degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever
it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on
the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and
why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do
so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.
Gudangi vs Senga
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004
election fraud and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464
enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment
from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the
two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to
them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating
the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of Command. Gen.
Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for
willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of
the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:
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Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who
defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber
of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President
may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer.
Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the
duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement
of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a
congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations
on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on
specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers
from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of
members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief
are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to
appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself
recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents
power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly
interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not
come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the
presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today
that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize
the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has
earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to
testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of
the courts.
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340,
October 17, 2006,
504 SCRA 704
Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine

Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), directing an inquiry in aid of
legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
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3
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.
Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Sen Gordon, wrote Chairman Sabio of the PCGG
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted
by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of
prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 (creating
PCGG) No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs
unhampered performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was
repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE:
May Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 be invoked by Chairman Sabio to justify nonappearance on legislative investigations?
RULING:
No.
The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns
the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose
positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the
Constitution stating that: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of
public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of
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courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public
accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and nonaccountability.
Said provision of EO No. 1 violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution which
mandates that Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) vs. Senate Committee on
Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies
FACTS:
Petitioner, Standard Chartered Bank, is an institution incorporated in England with
limited liability licensed to engage in banking, trust, and other related operations in
the country. It violated RA 8799 for selling unregistered foreign securities. Senator
Enrile in his privilege speech introduced a Resolution to attend to the matter. The
respondent-committees chairperson Sen. Angara set an initial hearing to investigate
in aid of legislation thereto. Respondent invited petitioners to attend the hearing and
submit their written position paper. Petitioners, in response, submitted to respondent
a letter stressing their position that there were cases already pending in court which
involved the same issues that the respondent is subjecting to legislative inquiry. The
petitioner thereby poses a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent committee to
continue the inquiry since there are cases of a similar subject filed in court of which
are still pending. Respondent still commenced the investigation. Its vice chairperson
moved for the issuance of a subpoena to those who did not attend the hearing.
Said motion was approved thereby thec ause of a petition. Standard Chartered Bank,
petitioned for a TRO
to direct the Senate Committee on Banks from:
1.Proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to a Senate Resolution
2.Compelling the Banks officers to attend and testify before any further hearing
called by the respondent Committee
3.Enforcing any Hold-departure order (HDO) and/or putting the petitioners on the
Watch list Petitioner-Bank also prays that judgment be rendered annulling the
subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to them and prohibit the
Committee from compelling them to appear and testify in the inquiry being
conducted pursuant to the Resolution.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committee acted without jurisdiction and/or acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, purportedly in aid of
legislation
RULING:
No.
Respondent has jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry although the subject matter
involved is the very same subject matter pending in court. The respondentcommittees action does not encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely on the
courts. The petitioners reliance to the Bengzon case is misplaced to the extent that,
in the case at bar, there are a number of cases already pending in various courts and
administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of
unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance between this case and
Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there.
Central to the Courts ruling in Bengzon was the courts determination that the
intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The petitioners erred in alleging that
the inquiry was simply to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank
in selling unregistered foreign securities. This fallacy is made more glaring at the
conclusion of Sen. Enriles privilege speech urging the Senate to immediately
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar
fraudulent activity in the future.
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or

a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry
by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power
of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a
criminal or an administrative investigation.
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE
AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY
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G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project
in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project
was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18,
2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by
the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused
to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that
he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
HELD:
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YES
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close

advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may

be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public
officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are
presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close
advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
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considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third,
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of

executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. We might have agreed with such
contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself
available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for
eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his
claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7
of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FACTS:
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of review
and arbitrate a hotly, even acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Courts coequal branches of government. On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before
respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters
concerning the National Broadband Project (the NBN Project), a project awarded by
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
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exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and
petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking executive privilege. To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions
on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or
not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioners answers to these three
questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007.
On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent
Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioners testimony on the
ground of executive privilege.
The senate thereafter issued a show cause order, unsatisfied with the reply,
therefore, issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. He also mentioned the
petition for certiorari he previously filed with this Court on December 7, 2007.
Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application
for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1, 2008. In the Courts Resolution dated
February 4, 2008, the parties were required to observe the status quo prevailing prior
to the Order dated January 30, 2008.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari.
Hence, respondent Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications
privilege in our legal system;
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege;
(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; and
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(4) Is the contempt and arrest Order of Neri valid?
HELD:
I
There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege
The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged

information under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who
invoked executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement
between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions
propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees investigation.
Thus, the factual setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in
Senate v. Ermita.
A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would
be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental
to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution.
II
There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the Communications Elicited by the
Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a quintessential and nondelegable presidential power.
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does
not relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power, because the
Constitution does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board
which is required to give its prior concurrence and to report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive.
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3
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make
such power less executive. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in
essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure
the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a
complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does
not diminish the executive nature of the power. In the same way that certain
legislative acts require action from the President for their validity does not render
such acts less legislative in nature.
B. The doctrine of operational proximity was laid down precisely to limit the scope
of the presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive.
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the

doctrine of operational proximity for the reason that it maybe misconstrued to
expand the scope of the presidential communications privilege to communications
between those who are operationally proximate to the President but who may have
no direct communications with her.
It must be stressed that the doctrine of operational proximity was laid down
precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. In the case
at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege to a large swath of the executive
branch (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official
involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term advisor of
the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family.
C. The Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized

interest; and in balancing respondent Committees and the Presidents clashing
interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on
government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.
The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified
presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic
relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Even in Senate v.
Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons
for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which
the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and coequal department.
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
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The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of
decision which are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of
diplomacy is its confidential nature.
With respect to respondent Committees invocation of constitutional prescriptions

regarding the right of the people to information and public accountability and
transparency, the Court finds nothing in these arguments to support respondent
Committees case.
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to

information and the constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency.
These are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic
government. In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with
respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the publics right to
information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in
aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent
Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the
investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again.
III.
Respondent Committees Failed to Show That the Communications Elicited by the
Three Questions Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions
The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive
privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of
compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.
In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees argue that the information
elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in the discharge of their legislative
functions, among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and (b) to
curb graft and corruption.
We remain unpersuaded by respondents assertions.
The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude
into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information which,
according to said respondents, would aid them in crafting legislation. Clearly, the
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need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or
demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial
power to adjudicate actual controversies.
For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before
legislatives bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of
cases by courts of law. Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this Court, the
counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that the Senate could still
come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions.
In other words, the information being elicited is not so critical after all.
Oversight Function of the Congress
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent
Committees need for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling
as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is
because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress.
And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3)
questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose
is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating
graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent
Committees investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.
The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the Constitution and
our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly are
true and who are liable therefor.
IV. No
No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the
contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. The respondent Committees did
not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations
should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the
inquiry, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof. The SC also find merit in the argument of the
OSG that respondent Committees violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure. The respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary
and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass
upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead,
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3
they curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued
the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention.
Motion for Reconsideration Denied.
NOTES:
Restrictions on the right to information: (1) national security matters, (2) trade
secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential
information. National security matters include state secrets regarding military and
diplomatic matters, as well as information on inter-government exchanges prior to
the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements. It was further held that even
where there is no need to protect such state secrets, they must be examined in
strict confidence and given scrupulous protection.
VIRGILLO GARCILLANO VS. HOUSE OFREEPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON

PUBLICINFORMATION ET AL, December 23, 2008
Congress must have a duly published Rules;

otherwise,
the
Senate
or
the
House
of
Representatives could not investigate in aid of
legislation.
Facts:
In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and COMELEC
Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the
elections to favor GMA. The recordings then became subject to legislative hearings
conducted separately by each House. In his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero
motioned a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on
Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
(respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the
wiretapped conversation emerged. Lacsons motion for a senate inquiry was referred
to the Committee on National Defense and Security headed by Biazon. Garci
subsequently filed two petitions: One to prevent the playing of the tapes in the each
house for they are alleged to be inadmissible in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire
tapping law and the other to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on
the wiretapped conversation for the basic reason that there was no proper
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publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the
unlawfully seized documents.
Issue:
Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to
further proceed with their investigation?
Held:
None.
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of
the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or
the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or
rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What
constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated

publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify
the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly
published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these
rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish
the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise

known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
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electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes.In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not make the internet a medium
for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry
subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by
the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed
for the reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly published as
provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without
observance of the required publication will put a persons life, liberty and property at
stake without due process of law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they
already published such rules through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or
the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and
still does not conforme with what the constitution propounded.
In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate
to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.
First petition of Garci denied but the second, granted.
G.R. No. 180308
June 19, 2012
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, vs. SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS
AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, HON.
SEN. RICHARD GORDON AND HON. SEN. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
Facts:
PHILCOMSAT is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas

Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a government-sequestered organization in
which the Republic of the Philippines holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks.
Petitioner PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) is a private corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws and a holding company whose main
operation is collecting the money market interest income of PHILCOMSAT.
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3
For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the PCGG, regularly
received cash dividends from POTC. However, POTC suffered losses in subsequent
years. In view of the losses that the government continued to incur and in order to
protect its interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 4555 directing the
conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed by their respective board
of directors. PSR No. 455 was referred to respondent Committee.
Respondents Senate Committees then submitted the assailed Committee Report No.
312, where it found overwhelming mismanagement by the PCGG and its nominees
over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC. Committee Report No. 312 recommended, inter
alia, the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the
government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO)
under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government
nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
Petitioners filed the instant petition before the Court, questioning, in particular, the
haste with which the respondent Senate approved the challenged Committee Report
No. 312.
Issues:
1) whether the respondent Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or in excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312; and
2) whether it should be nullified, having proposed no piece of legislation and having
been hastily approved by the respondent Senate.
Held:
NO.
The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has
been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio. Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution conferred of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of
Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, which must carry with it
all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. The wide latitude given to
Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise,
Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless.
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G.R. NO. 163193, JUNE 15, 2004
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
ET.AL,
PETITIONER,
VS.
COMMISSION
ON
Facts:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES). It also required the COMELEC
to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and
materials and adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation during the May 11,
1998 presidential elections, particularly in counting the votes collected from the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the failure of the
machines to correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued its
implementation.
The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual voting
and counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with
companies Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the computerized
voting/counting machines) were discontinued. Despite this impediment, the
COMELEC nevertheless continued the electronic transmission of advanced unofficial
results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, also
dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to excess of Jurisdiction in the issuance of Resolution No. 6712.
Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of
the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and VicePresident and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the
citizens accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under
pertinent election laws.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC in
authorizing the use of election funds in consolidating the election results for the May
10, 2004 elections should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. The said Resolution No. 6712 preempts the sole authority of the Congress to
canvass the votes of the election returns for the President and the Vice-President.
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3
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon
Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass the votes for the
elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436,
solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizens arm to conduct the unofficial
counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise
of an unofficial tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of
congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory
basis.
The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the
Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is unofficial, is puerile and
totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official
canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with
more reason, prohibited from making an unofficial canvass of said votes.
MANTE
MANZANO
CIR v. CA, CTA & YMCA, 298 SCRA 83.
Facts:
YMCA is a non- stock, non- profit institution that conducts various
programs and activities which are beneficial to the public, especially the young
people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives.
Thus, YMCA declared itself as charitable and, at the same time, educational
institution.
In conjunction with its operation, YMCA is, on the other hand, earning
revenues from its leased spaces to other private individuals and parking fees from
nonmembers, among others.
In 1980, YMCA generated, inter alia, an income of P676,829.80 from rentals
of the leased premises, and P44,259.00 from parking fees on nonmembers. On July
2, 1984, the CIR issued an assessment to YMCA.
Issue:
Is the income derived from the rentals of real property owned
by YMCA established as a welfare, educational and charitable non- profit
corporation- subject to income tax under the National Internal Revenue Code and the
Constitution?
HELD:
Section 27 of the NIRC, viz:
Exemptions from Tax on Corporation.- The following organizations shall not be

taxed under this Title in respect to income received by them as suchxxx
xxx
xxx
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3
(g) Civic league or organization not organized for profit but operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare;
(h) Club organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and
other non- profitable purposes, not part of the net income of which inures to the
benefit of any private stockholder or member.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Notwithstanding the provisions in the preceding paragraphs, the income of

whatever kind and character of the foregoing organizations from any of their
properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit,
regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to the tax
imposed under this Code (As amended by P. D. No. 1457).
A reading of said paragraph ineludibly shows that the income from any
property of exempt organization, as well as the arising from any activity it conducts
for profit, is taxable. The phrase any of their activities conducted for profit does not
qualify the word properties. This makes income from the property of the
organization taxable, regardless of how that income is used- whether for profit or for
lofty non- profit purposes.
Article VI, Section 28 of par. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides
exemption not the institution itself, but from real estate taxes of all lands, buildings
and improvement actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes.
Neither an exemption be given in light of Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of
the Charter. We reiterate thatYMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax, but
not income tax on the rentals from its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a
non- stock, non- profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption
from the payment of the income tax.
To avail of the exemption, YMCA must prove by substantial evidence that
(1) it falls under the classification non- stock, non- profit educational institution; and,
(2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and
exclusively for educational purposes.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744.

Facts:
Francisco I. Chavez (Chavez later, for brevity), as tax payer, citizen and
former government official who initiated the prosecution Marcoses anf their cronies
who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury, alleges that what
impelled him to bring this action were several news reports bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometimes in September 1997, viz:
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3
1) The alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in
various coded accounts in Swiss bank; and,
2) The reported execution of a compromise between the government (through
PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of
the State to disclose publicly all its transaction involving the national
interest, Chavez demands that PCGG make publicly any and all negotiations and
agreement pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill- gotten wealth.
The PCGG interposes several oppositions for the denial of the reliefs being
sought by Chavez, however, admits forging a compromise with the Marcoses,
stipulating, among others, viz:
2. Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine which
shall be ceded to the FIRST PARTY, and which shall be assigned to/retained by the
PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall be net of, and exempt from,
any form of taxes due to the Republic of the Philippines. xxx.
Issue:
Was the said compromise agreement valid?
Held:
Legal Restraint on a Marcos- PCGG Compromise:

xxx
xxx
xxx
Second, PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to
be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. The
power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain
extent, in the local legislative bodies. Section 28(4), Article VI of the Constitution,
specifically provides, No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The PCGG has
absolutely no power to grant tax exemption, even under the cover of its authority to
compromise ill- gotten wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from
paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal
protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in
favour only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate
constitutional rule that taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the
commissioner of internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be
exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim
against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayers financial position demonstrates a clear
inability to pay. xxx. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of
the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised only
when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the
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administration and collection costs involved do not justify the collection of the tax
due.
LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES v. QUEZON CITY & THE CITY ASSESSOR,
433 SCRA 119
Facts:
Lung Center of the Philippines (LCP later, for brevity) is a non- stock, nonprofit entity, established by virtue of P. D. No. 1823. It stood in Lot No. PR- 3- B- 34- 1B- 1, SWO 04- 000495, registered in its name, measuring 121, 463 sq. mtrs., and
situated in Quezon City. A wide portion of the said hospital at the ground floor is
being leased to private parties and being utilized as canteen, small store spaces,
offices of some professionals, medical clinics, and the like.
LCP contends as a charitable institution being committed to provide free
medical services to indigent patients, and must thus be exempted from real property
taxes. It reinforces its claim by saying that it is being subsidized by the government.
And, such character shall not lose by mere fact of collecting fees from the paying
patients.
Issues: Whether the LCP is a charitable institution; and, (2)Whether the real
properties of the LCP are exempt from real property taxes.
Held:
1) We hold that the LCP is a charitable institution within the context of the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
xxx
xxx
xxx
2) Even as we find that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold,
anent the second issue, that those portions of its real property that are leased to
private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually,
directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
In order to be entitled to the exemption, the real property is ACTUALLY,
DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. Exclusive is defined as
possessed and enjoyed to the exclusive of others; debarred from participation and
enjoyment; and exclusively is defined in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a
privilege exclusively. If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it
is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. The
words dominant use or principal use cannot be substituted for the words used
exclusively without doing violence to the constitution and the law. Solely is
synonymous with exclusively.
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property
charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application of
property itself to the purpose for which the charitable institution is organized. It is
the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of whether
property is used for tax exempt purposes.
for
the
not
the
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities
as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt
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3
from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital
and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non- paying, are
exempt from real property taxes.
EXEC. SECRETARY, et. al. v. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC, et. al., GR
No. 164171; GR No. 164172; GR No. 168741 (482 SCRA 673).
Facts:
On December 12, 2002, Pres. GMA, through Exec. Sec. Alberto G. Romulo,
issued EO 156 entitled Providing for a Comprehensive Industrial Policy and
Directions for the Motor Vehicle Development Program and its Implementing
Guidelines, that provides, among others, viz:
3.1 The importation into the country, inclusive of the Freeport, of all types
of used motor vehicles is prohibited, except for the following:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The above- cited Order is being bombarded with suits for declaratory reliefs
from Subic- based used vehicles importers and traders, among those is herein
Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., before the RTC of Olongapo City, unanimously
seeking, inter alia, for the nullity/invalidity thereof for being transgressing to the
constitution.
Issues: (1) Whether there is statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; (2) If the
answer is in the affirmative, whether Section 3.1 of EO 156 is reasonable and within
the scope provided by law.
Held:
The main thrust of the petition is that EO 156 is constitutional because it
was issued pursuant to EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines and
that its application should be extended to the Freeport because the guarantee of R.A.
7227 on the free flow of goods into the said zone is merely an exemption from
customs duties and taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not an open
floodgate for all kinds of goods and materials without restriction.
Concomitantly, the prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles is
an exercise of police power, which is vested on the legislature. Absent any enabling
law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance, is void.
Such delegation confers upon the President quasi- legislative power which may
defined as the authority delegated by the law- making body to the administrative
body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law
and implement legislative policy. To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an
executive order, must comply with the following requisites:
1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
and,
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4) It must be reasonable.
EO 156 actually satisfied the first requisite of a valid administrative order.
xxx. There are thus explicit constitutional and statutory permission authorizing the
President to ban or regulate importation of articles and commodities into the country.
xxx
xxx
xxx.
With respect to the third and fourth issues, an examination of the nature of
a Freeport under R.A. 7227 and the primordial purpose of the importation ban under
the questioned EO is necessary.
R.A. 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and
balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservation and their extensions
into alternative productive uses in the form of Special Economic and Freeport Zone,
or the Subic Bay Freeport, in order to promote the economic and social development
of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general.
The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods and
capital within a portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract investors to invest
their capital in a business climate with the least governmental intervention.
With minimum interference from the government, investors can, in general,
engaged in any business as well as import and export any article into and out of the
Freeport. These are among the rights accorded to Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises
under Section 39, Rules and Regulation Implementing R.A. 7227.
In given discussions, we hold that the importation ban runs afoul the third
requisite for a valid administrative order. To be valid, an administrative issuance must
not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not supplant
or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws for such is the
sole function of the legislature which the other branches of the government cannot
usurp.
In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President
to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO
156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on
the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which R.A. 7227, considers to some
extent, a foreign territory.
The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be
operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of
the prohibition is an invalid modification of R.A. 7227.
This brings us to the fourth requisite. It is an axiom in administrative law
that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adopted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no
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reasonable relation to the purpose for which they were authorized to be issued, then
they must be held to be invalid.
SEN. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, et. al. v. EXEC. SEC. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA,

JR., et. al., 252 SCRA 695
Facts:
On April 18, 1993, House Representative Antonio Abaya filed HB No. 8817,
entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago. After public hearings on the
said bill were conducted, the same was passed by the House of Representatives on
Second Reading, and was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. Then, it
was transmitted to the Senate.
However, prior to the transmission of the said HB No. 8817 to the Senate
on January 18, 1994, Sen. Vicente Sotto III previously filed before the Senate SB No.
1243, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago. Public hearings were also
conducted by the Senate Committee on Local Government on SB No. 1243. Later, the
Senate Committee on Local Government submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB
No. 8817 approving the same without amendment considering that HB No. 8817 was
all fours with SB No. 1243.
Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading
and was approved on Third Reading, with amendment proposed by the Senate which,
on the other hand, the House of Representatives approved the same.
The enrolled bill was signed by the Chief Executive as R.A. No. 7720.
Issue:
In the enactment of RA No. 7720, was there a compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the
Constitution?
Held:
Although a bill of local application like BH No. 8817 should be constitutional
prescription, originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that R.A. No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the Houseof
Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the
Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the
House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. xxx. HB
No. 8817 was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
xxx. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a
bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long
as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
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JOKER P. ARROYO, et. al., v. JOSE DE VENECIA, et. al., G.R. No. 127255,
August 14, 1997.
Facts:
A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the approved bill, which
originated in the House of Representatives as HB No. 7198.
During the session on November 21, 1996, a number of representatives
delivered sponsorship speech, after interpellation. During Rep. Rogelio Sarmientos
turn, he was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. After
the head count, it turned out that there was really a quorum.
The transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of
Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5
and 6, 1996, showed the factual accounts thereof, viz:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference
committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what
is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for
approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next
week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
The bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the
Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not the House rules were violated that would render the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 null
and void
Held:
The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave
abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240.
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First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have
been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of
a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but
only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a
House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that
there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts have declared
that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts
have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former
Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to
determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. THE SECRETARY OF FINCNE and COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 235 SCRA 630.
Facts:
A HB No. 11197, seeking to amend certain provisions of NIR pertaining to
Value Added- Tax (VAT) was instituted before the House of Representatives, entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System to widen its Tax Base and
Enhance its Administration, amending for these purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103,
104, 105, 106, 107, 108 and 110 of Title IV, 112, 115 and 116 of Title V, and 236, 237
and 238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113 and 114 of Title V, all of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
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3
After the same was considered on the second reading, it was approved by
the House of Representatives after the third reading.
After the HB No. 11197 was transmitted to the Senate, the latter came up
with another version and recommended the approval of SB No. 1630, entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System to widen its Tax Base and
Enhance its Administration, amending for these purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103,
104, 105, 107, 108 and 110 of Title IV, 112 of Title V, and 236, 237 and 238 of Title
IX, and Repealing Sections 113, 114 and 116 of Title V, all of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, and for other purposes.
After considering the HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630, the conference
committee ended up with the endorsement of another/third version of the bill,
entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System, Widening its Tax Base and
Enhancing its Administration and for these Purposes Amending and Repealing the
Relevant Provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended and for Other
Purposes.
The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines, and
became R.A. No. 7716.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 7716 is void for it did not exclusively originate
from the House of
Representatives.
Held:
To begin with, it is not the law- but the revenue bill- which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important
to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. xxx.
At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a
distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute- and not only the bill
which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law- must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not
only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. It would be to
violate the equality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact
make the House superior to the Senate.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. THE SECRETARY OF FINCNE and COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 249 SCRA 630.
Held:
(On Motion for Reconsideration). While Article VI, Section 24 provides that
all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills must originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, it also adds, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments. In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new
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bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a
committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following: (1) to endorse the
bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or
altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in
which case it will be known as a committee bill; or, (4) to make no report at all.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO v. EXEC. SEC. ERMITA, et. al., 469 SCRA 1.
Facts:
Article VII Executive Department

C. Prohibitions
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)
FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the
President allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other
appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government
and government corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it
unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting
the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or
employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or
their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the
said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated
unless otherwise allowed by law which is construed to be an exemption from that
stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is
constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as
ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, Section
13 of the constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both
Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple
positions in the government for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust.
Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective
and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase unless otherwise
provided by the Constitution in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a
broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent
of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies
only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and
the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The
court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.
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National Amnesty Commission vs. COA 437 SCRA 655
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on
March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The
NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of
seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President,
and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government
as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the
three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who
were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997,
NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment ofhonoraria to these
representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27,
1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
Issue: Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio
members
Ruling:
We hold that the position of petitioner NAC is against the law and jurisprudence. The
COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any
allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' official representatives.
In Civil Liberties Union, we elucidated on the two constitutional prohibitions against
holding multiple positions in the government and receiving double compensation: (1)
the blanket prohibition of paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all government
employees against holding multiple government offices, unless otherwise allowed by
law or the primary functions of their positions, and (2) the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII on the President and his official family from holding any other
office, profession, business or financial interest, whether government or private,
unless allowed by the Constitution.
The NAC ex officio members representatives who were all appointive officials with
ranks below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions.
First, the NAC ex officio members representatives are not exempt from the general
prohibition because there is no law or administrative order creating a new office or
position and authorizing additional compensation therefor.
Bitonio vs. COA 425 SCRA 437 G.R. No. 147392
Facts: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of
the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE. In a Letter dated May 11, 1995, Acting
Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes of the DOLE designated the petitioner to be the DOLE
representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA. in pursuance to Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7916, otherwise known as the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995,
As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was receiving
a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the
payment of per diems to the petitioner.
The uniform reason for the disallowance was stated in the Notices, as follows:
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3
Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to
their primary office and to receive compensation therefore was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive
Secretary. Disallowance is in pursuance to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated
September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee Report No. 509
Hence, this petition.
Issue: whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the
petitioner for his
attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the
Secretary of Labor.
Ruling: We rule in the affirmative.
The COA anchors the disallowance of per diems in the case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary where the Court declared Executive Order No. 284 allowing
government officials to hold multiple positions in government, unconstitutional. Thus,
Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited
to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions
and to receive compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution
expressly provides It must be noted that the petitioners presence in the PEZA Board
meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of
Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was no separate or special
appointment for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is
prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such
prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the
Secretary
of Labor.
In Dela Cruz v. Commission on Audit., it was held that
"The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services
are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the
Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining
policy in monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such
additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution."
Similarly in the case at bar, we cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative
of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal.
As the representative of the Secretary of Labor, the petitioner sat in the Board in the
same capacity as his principal. Whatever laws and rules the member in the Board is
covered, so is the representative; and whatever prohibitions or restrictions the
member is subjected, the representative is, likewise, not exempted. Thus, his position
as Director IV of the DOLE which the petitioner claims is not covered by the
constitutional prohibition set by the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. The
petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by the
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Secretary of Labor to sit as his representative. If it were not for such designation, the
petitioner would not have been in the Board at all.
Public Interest v. Elma 494 SCRA 53 (2006) G.R. No. 138965 June 30, 2006
*concurrent
appointments,
incompatible
office
Nature: CPM + TRO to declare null and void the concurrent appointments of ELMA as
PCGG
Chair
and
as
Chief
Presidential
Legal
Counsel
Facts: Elma was appointed as PCGG Chair Oct 1998. Later on he was appointed as
CPLC (Jan 1999 during his term), but waived any remuneration that he may receive
as CPLC.
Supervening events: Theres actually no more controversy involved: In 2001, Elma
was replaced by Sabio as PCGG. Nachura was then appointed as CPLC but pending
resolution
of
the
case,
he
was
appointed
SOLGEN.
Arguments: Public Interest Center
CLU vs. Exec Sec: Art IX-B, Sec 7, par2 and Art VII, Sec13 are violated by concurrent
appointments CPLC and PCGG Chair are incompatible offices.
Arguments: Elma
As interpreted in CLU vs. Exec Sec, the mentioned consti provisions dont cover other
public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary. His
appointment
falls
under
the
exceptions
in
Art
IX-B,
Section
7
The 2 positions are not incompatible.
NOTE: even if issue already moot, SC still took cognizance
case is capable of repetition, and to serve as a guide to
Teaching Function of Judicial Review)
Issue 1: whether such appointments violate the other
regarding multiple offices, Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
of the case because the

the bench. (Symbolic or
constitutional provision
Constitution.
NO if based on position.
YES if based on primary functions test.
The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not
applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary,
undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same
rank as the latter positions.
CLU vs. Exec Sec: The language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and unequivocal
negation of the privilege of holding multiple offices or employment. The Court
cautiously allowed only two exceptions to the rule against multiple offices:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; or
(2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
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required by the primary functions of said officials office. The Court further qualified
that additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the
officials primary functions. Moreover, the additional post must be exercised in an exofficio capacity, which denotes an act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that
conferred by the office.[18] Thus, it will not suffice that no additional compensation
shall be received by virtue of the second appointment, it is mandatory that the
second post is required by the primary functions of the first appointment and is
exercised in an ex-officio capacity.
*Even Section 13, Article VII does not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to
the position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC,
and
vice
versa.
In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
apply to respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet
secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this Court assumes,
arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to respondent Elma, he still could
not be appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because
neither office was occupied by him in an ex-officio capacity, and the primary
functions of one office do not require an appointment to the other post. Moreover,
even if the appointments in question are not covered by Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, said appointments are still prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B,
which covers all appointive and elective officials, due to the incompatibility between
the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
Issue 2: whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under
the prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution.
YES.
The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices
was laid out in People v. Green[13] - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in
the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
[I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two;
x x x Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to
the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility
from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the
other. The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature
and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same
person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by
one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the
incumbent of the other. x x x The offices must subordinate, one [over] the other, and
they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one with the other, before they are
incompatible at common law. x x x
***In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman
and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal
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3
advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies
and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies,
as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency
under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject
to the review of the CPLC.
*note: Memorandum Order No. 152, issued on 9 July 2004 (provides that CPLC review
Decision on investigation involving Cabinet Secretaries, agency heads, or Presidential
appointees with the rank of Secretary conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC)
Public Interest v. Elma 517 SCRA 336 (March 5, 2007) G.R. No. 138965
Facts:
Elma sought - the reconsideration of the Decision in the case of Public Interest
Center, Inc., et al. v. Magdangal B. Elma, et al. (G.R. No. 138965), promulgated on 30
June 2006.
In its Decision, the Court declared that the concurrent appointments of the
respondent as PCGG Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that the
concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. The duties of the CPLC
include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of
various executive departments and agencies and reviewing investigations involving
heads of executive departments. Since the actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of
an executive agency, are subject to the review of the CPLC, such appointments would
be incompatible.
The Court also decreed that the strict prohibition under Section 13 Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG
Chairman nor the CPLC is a secretary, undersecretary, or assistant
secretary. However, had the rule thereunder been applicable to the case, the defect
of these two incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The said section
allows the concurrent holding of positions only when the second post is required by
the primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an exofficio capacity. Although respondent Elma waived receiving renumeration for the
second appointment, the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not require his
appointment as CPLC.
Issue: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration be granted.
Ruling: DENIED
After reviewing the arguments propounded in respondents Omnibus Motions, we
find that the basic issues that were raised have already been passed upon. No
substantial arguments were presented. Thus, the Court denies the respondents
motion for reconsideration.
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3
In response to the respondents request for clarification, the Court ruled that
respondent Elmas concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are
unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices. This ruling does not render both
appointments void. Following the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices,
respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when he
accepted the second office as CPLC.
There also is no merit in the respondents motion to refer the case to the
Court en banc. What is in question in the present case is the constitutionality of
respondent Elmas concurrent appointments, and not the constitutionality of any
treaty, law or agreement. [2] The mere application of constitutional provisions does
not require the case to be heard and decided en banc. Contrary to the allegations of
the respondent, the decision of the Court in this case does not modify the ruling
in Civil LibertiesUnion v. Executive Secretary. It should also be noted that Section 3
of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated 7 February 1989clearly provides that the
Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division
may be appealed.
D. Succession
Estrada vs. Desierto
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected
President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
In the heat of people power , At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered
the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner
and his family hurriedly left Malacanang Palace.29 He issued the following press
statement:
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal
minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that
will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of
this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to
me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may
come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately
discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency On February 6, respondent Arroyo
nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.
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Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while
respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo claims she is the President..
Issue: 1. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether
petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President
Rule: Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its
elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal
requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. In sum,
we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by
his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit
with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due
to any kind inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as
the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity
given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in
the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he
did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his
final act of farewell. His presidency is
now in the part tense. It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only
took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said
letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of
my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the
Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the
petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances
that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the
Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange
that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during
the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence
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when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino
people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was
leaving the reins of government to
respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the
mysterious letter cannot
negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of
the petitioner
clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it
commands scant legal
significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a
changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of
his reputation by the people.
Issue 2: Was Estrada merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of
the presidency, and hence is a President on leave?
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to
adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority
under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing
his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII. Considering the
operative facts:
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the
Senate President and Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on
January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24,
2001 House Resolution No. 175
4. Also, House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176 stating that
expressed its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
5. Further, bills were already sent by the Congress to the Office of GMA as president.
6. Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any
recognition from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to
claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. In fine, even if
the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that
he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
Borja v. COMELEC 295 SCRA 157 September 3, 1998
* In case of temporary disability
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Facts: Jose Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a
term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation
of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and
was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May
8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30,
1998.
Jose Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11,
1998 elections. Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought
Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as
mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible
to serve for another term after that.
COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capco disqualified from running for
reelection as mayor of Pateros. On motion, the COMELEC en banc reversed the
decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. It ruled that Capcos
succession into office is not counted as one term for purposes of the computation of
the three term limitation under the Constitution and Local Government Code.
Capco was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioners
7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Issue:
WON Capco is eligible to run for mayor
Held:
Yes
Ratio: Purpose of the three term rule: First, to prevent the establishment of
political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in
question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people.
To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned
came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law
would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution
reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned
with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by
Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine
years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead,
they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such
officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding
election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned
against prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose as a result of
the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution
provision recognizing peoples power.
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern
about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second
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is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to
choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by
reason of reelection.
Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should
be allowed to choose whom they please to govern them. To bar the election of a local
official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of
succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this
principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the
ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three
consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of
office of elective local officials and bars such official[s] from serving for more than
three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local
official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected. The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned]
was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the
limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is
not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the
service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its
expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly
bars members of the House of Representatives from serving for more than three
terms. Commissioner Bernas states that if one is elected Representative to serve
the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be
considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms
allowed. This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide:
Yes, because we speak of term and if there is a special election, he will serve only
for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator
and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House.
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a
member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns,
becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the
mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill
the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term for which
he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot
be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly
counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of
Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who
succeeds another confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of
the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. This provision
says that No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for
more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
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Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to
have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latters office and serves for
the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without
it, the Vice-President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession
would be qualified to run for President even if he has occupied that office
for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on
elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two
cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of
office to which one may have been elected for purpose of the three-term
limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by
automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the
Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible
for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to
succeed the President in the event of the latters death, permanent
disability, removal or resignation. While he may be appointed to the
cabinet, his becoming so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the
President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek
the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as VicePresident the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event
it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more than four
years may rightly be considered as service for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government Code, he is
the presiding officer of the Sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of
such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship
in the event of vacancy therein being only one of them. It cannot be said of him, as
much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in
running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the
mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence,
his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms
in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
MUNEZ
OMELIO
EFFECTS OF PARDON
CRISTOBAL v. LABRADOR
71 PHIL 34 (1940)
FACTS: On March 15, 1930, the CH found respondent Santos guilty of the crime of
estafa and sentenced him to 6 months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided
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by law, to return to the offended parties the amounts of P375 and P125 respectively,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. On appeal,
the judgment Of conviction was affirmed and the respondent was accordingly
confined in the provincial jail from March 14, 1932 to Aug. 18, 1932. Notwithstanding
his conviction, respondent continued to be a registered elector and was, for the
period comprised between 19-~4 and 1937, seated as the municipal president of
Malabon, Rizal.
On Aug. 22, 1938, CA 357 (Election Code) was approved by the National
Assembly, Sec. 94 of which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been
"declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property." The respondent
forthwith applied to the president for an absolute pardon. On Dec. 24, 1939, the Chief
Executive granted the petition restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political
rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he
will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature and involving no money or property responsibility."
On Nov. 16, 1940, petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of
respondent Santos from the list of voters, citing Sec. 94 of CA 357. The CFI denied
the petition. Hence, this petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the
lower court sustaining the right of respondent to remain in the list of registered
voters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pardon granted by the President restores the
respondent to the full enjoyment of his political rights.
HELD: An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction. While the pardon extended to respondent is
conditioned in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions
which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility,"
it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
1.
Under Section 11(6), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, there are two
limitations upon the exercise of this Constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive,
to wit: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and, (b) that such power does
not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Court,
the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must
remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the
highest authority to whom it is entrusted.
2.
The disability is the result of conviction without which there would be
no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment
which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and
resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities.
When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes
an that is left of the consequences of conviction.
FELOBELLO v. PALATINO
72 PHIL 441 (1941)
FACTS: Petitioner Pelobello instituted quo warranto proceedings in the CFI against
respondent Palatino, the mayor-elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. He alleged that the
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respondent, having been criminally convicted by final judgment in 1912 and
sentenced to imprisonment, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon for
the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by
plenary pardon granted by the President on Dec. 25,1940. From the records, it is
admitted that the respondent committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he
had already been merited conditional pardon from the Gov. General in 1915; that
thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor for the period
1918-1921; was elected municipal president of Torrijos three times in succession
(1922-1931) and finally elected mayor in the 1940 local elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the
disqualification incident to criminal conviction under Sec. 94 of Election Code, the
pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for
assuming office.
HELD: We adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the
limitations imposed by the constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by the legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the
crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that
when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes
all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
Under the existing circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting
him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the
popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned above and
before the date fixed in the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for
defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the
constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive
action and disregard what at bottom is a teclu'lical objection
LACUNA v. ABES
24 SCRA 780 (1968)
FACTS:
Respondent Abes had been convicted of the crime of counterfeiting
treasury warrants and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day to
8 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor. After he had partially served his
sentence, he was released from confinement on 7 April 1959 by virtue of conditional
pardon granted by the president, remitting only the unexpired portion of the prison
term and fine. Without the pardon, his maximum sentence would have been served
on 13 Oct. 1961. In view of the forthcoming 1967 elections, respondent applied for
registration as a voter but the Election Registration Board denied his application. The
denial notwithstanding, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mavor
and won the election. Petitioner Lacuna placed second.
Petitioner filed his petition for quo warranto with application for preliminary
injunction, challenging the eligibility of the respondent to the position of mayor to
which he was duly proclaimed elected. On the same day when hearing was held for
the application for preliminary injunction, the President granted to respondent an
absolute and unconditional pardon and restored him "full civil and political rights."
Thereafter the lower court dismissed the petition and declared the eligibility of
mayor-elect Abes to his position. Petitioner appealed.
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In this present petition, petitioner raised the following arguments: (1) That the
restoration to him of his civil and political rights by the presidential plenary pardon on
Dec. 7,1967 did not retroact to remove the disqualification existing anterior to the
grant of the pardon; and, (2) That by reason of his conviction and non-registration as
avoter, Abes was not a qualified voter at the time of the election, and was therefore
ineligible to the position of mayor under Sec. 2174 of the Revised Administrative
Code. On the other hand, respondent contended that the absolute pardon blotted
out all the consequences of his conviction, including his disqualification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a plenary pardon, granted after election but before the
date fixed by law for assuming office, had the effect of removing the disqualification
prescribed by both the criminal and electoral codes.
HELD: We conclude that the pardon granted to respondent Abes has removed his
disqualification, and his election and assumption of office must be sustained.
1. The new rule consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's
effect should not be necessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the
pardoning power, which was not contemplated in the constitution. "We adopt the
broad view in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the limitations imposed by the
constitution, the pardoning power not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from conviction; and that when granted after the
term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction.xxx We are of the opinion that the better view fi-i the
light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or
impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental
facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving
completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant
disabilities of criminal conviction (Felobello v. Palatino).
2. Petitioner emphasizes the non-registration of Abes as a voter in order to
differentiate the case at bar from Pelobello case. The fact stressed does not,
however, make the case dissimilar because registration as a voter is not a
qualification for a candidate or a voter, within the meaning of "qualified voter" in Sec.
2174 of the Revised Administrative Code; it is merely a step towards voting.
Moreover, the non-registration of Abes as a voter was predicated upon the same
disqualifying effects of his previous conviction that were blotted out by the plenary
pardon.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
170 SCRA 190 (1989)
FACTS:
On March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Mosanto
(then assistant treasurer) and 3 other accused, of the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of 4
years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day
of prision mayor as maximum. On appeal, her conviction was affirmed by this court.
She then filed a motion for reconsideration but pending said motion, she was
extended by the President absolute pardon which she accepted. By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the city treasurer requesting that she be restored to her
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former post since the same was still vacant. In a resolution, the Ministry of Finance
ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her former position without the necessity of
a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.
It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the
Sandiganbavan had required to be indemnified in favor of the government be
satisfied. In her motion for reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner
stressed that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies
that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the
date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; and that she is entitled to back pay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the sum of P4,892.50.
The Office of the President, to which the petitioner's letter was referred for
further review, adopted the resolution of Sandiganbavan and held that petitioner is
not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of her absolute pardon but
must secure an appointment to her former position and that she is liable for the civil
liability concomitant to her previous conviction. In this present petition, petitioner
contended that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case because she
was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal.
Without that final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office
did not attach and the status of her employment remained suspended. According
to her, when pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal
because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the Pres. declared her not guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment.
HELD: The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification
from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former
post as asst. treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required
for a new appointment.
1. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of
guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never
committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a
pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the
fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out
the moral stain- It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal
consequences of a criminal indictment if or-dy to give meaning to the fiat that a
pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative
action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an
individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent.
2. The rationale is plainly evident. Public officers are intended primarily for the
collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be
compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because
of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of
estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude
the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
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character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned
conviction.
3. The 1981 amendments to the 1973 constitution had deleted the earlier rule
that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency
could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was
granted even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning
that under the 1987 constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was
restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not
material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the
result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to
have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan
assumed the character of finality.
4. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for
the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF CONDITIONAL PARDON

TORRES v. GONZALES
152 SCRA 272 (1987)
FACTS:
Sometime before the 1979, petitioner was convicted of the crime of
estafa (two counts), and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term from 11 years,
10 months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1 day. These convictions were
affirmed by the CA. On April 19, 1939, a conditional pardon was granted to the
petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. "Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. On March 22,
1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. On September 8,
1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner who was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence. Claiming that he has been deprived of his rights under the due process
clause of the Constitution since he was not given an opportunity to be heard before
he was arrested and recommitted to prison and that he did not violate his conditional
pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 2 counts of estafa
nor the crime of sedition, petitioner files this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary
before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the
terms of his conditional pardon.
HELD: No, a conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is not necessary
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terms of his conditional pardon. The grant of pardon and the determination of the
terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts and which are
not subject to judicial scrutiny.
DOES PARDONING POWER APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE CASES?

LLAMAS v. EXEC. SEC.
202 SCRA 844 (1991)
FACTS:
Sometime in 1989, petitioner Llamas, the incumbent Vice Governor of
Tarlac, filed with the Department of Local Government verified complaint against the
respondent Governor Campo for alleged violation of some provisions of BP 337 (Local
Government Code). Prior to that, he had instituted with the office of the Ombudsman
a verified complaint against the same respondent for alleged violation of RA 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). After that, the DLG Secretary imposed the
penalty of suspension for a period of 90 days upon the respondent upon his finding
that the latter is guilty of serious neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority for
entering into a loan contract with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation grossly manifestly
disadvantageous to Tarlac province. Respondent's appeal was dismissed by
respondent Ex-Secretary Orbos. Pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of BP 337, petitioner,
on March 1, 1991 took his oath of office as Acting Governor. Respondent Governor
accepted his suspension and turned over his office to petitioner. However, on March
9, 1991, respondent issued an "administrative order" in which he signified his
intention to continue in office in view of the pendency of his motion for
reconsideration of the DLG's decision. Without ruling on the repondent's motion for
reconsideration, respondent Orbos granted Executive Clemency in favor of
respondent governor in the sense that the latter's 90-day suspension was reduced to
the period alreadv served. ' Thereupon, respondent Governor reassumed the
governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification made to the
petitioner. Petitioner questioned that grant of executive clemency on the ground that
executive clemency could be granted by the president only in criminal case as there
is nothing in the statute books or even in the constitution which allows the grant
thereof in administrative cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president has the power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases.
HELD: It is the court's considered view that if the president can grant reprieves,
commutation, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal case, with
much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases which
are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
1. Applying the doctrine Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos,"
we cannot sustain petitioner's view. In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so
we must not distinguish. The constitution does not distinguish between which cases
executive clemency may be exercised by the president, with the sole exception of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only
in criminal cases, it would be indeed unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
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impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are
automatically excluded in as much as the same do not necessarily involve criminal
offenses.
2. A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise
of executive clemency in administrative cases. Under Section 43 of PD 807, "in
meritorious cases, the president may commute or remove administrative penalties or
disabilities issued upon officers and employees, in disciplinary cases, subject to such
terms and conditions as he may impose in the interest of service. "
3. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual
is proof beyond reasonable doubt, but the constitution grants to the President the
power to pardon the act done by the proved criminal and in the process exempts him
from the punishment therefor. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the
quantum of evidence required is a mere substantial evidence to support the decision,
not to mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are not
bound by technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will
be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if the
same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to them, even in
the case of modifying a decision to sub serve the interest of the public.
WHO MAY AVAIL OF AMNESTY?
PEOPLE vs. PATRIARCA
341 SCRA 164 (2000)
FACTS:
Accused, member of the New Peoples Army, was convicted of murder
and sentence to reclusion perpetua He appealed to the Supreme Court. While his
appeal was pending, he applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 347 of March 25,
1992. His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board.
ISSUE: What happens to his appeal?
HELD: The approval of his application for amnesty serves to put an end to his appeal.
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged,
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense. The conviction of accused is therefore reversed, and he is
acquitted of the crime of murder.
POWERS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
LANSANG v. GARCIA
42 SCRA 448 (1971)
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FACTS:
On August 21, 1971, while the Liberal Party was holding a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, 2 hand grenades were thrown. As a consequence,
8 persons died and numerous persons were seriously injured. On August 23, the
President of the Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889
suspending the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners assail the validity of Proclamation
No. 889.
ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation No. 889 is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC has the authority (under the 1973 Constitution) to inquire into the
existence of a factual basis for the issuance of a presidential proclamation
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of determining
the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
Far from being full and plenary, the
authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is circumscribed, confined and
restructed, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its
existence, but also as regards the time when and the place where it may be
exercised. The requisite for a valid suspension is outlined in Sec. 10 of Art. VII of the
1935 Constitution. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that
both conditions are present. Upon the basis of the evidence presented, the court
rules on the validity of Proclamation No. 889.
Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying the system of
Government of the Philippines, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.
However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is NOT ABSOLUTE. It goes
hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is
supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts
within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law (Constitution), and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted -- is vested in the Judiciary Department,
which, in this aspect is in turn constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such
authority, the function of the Judiciary is merely to check, NOT to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act.
GARCIA v. ENRILE
121 SCRA 472 (1983)
FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus and mandamus filed in behalf of 14
detainees. The 14 had been under surveillance for sometime as members of the CPP.
Nine (9) were arrested on July 6, 1982 while holding a meeting in the residence of
one of them, Aurora Porong, in Nueva Ecija. Taken during the said were materials said
to be subversive documents, detailing how the group would infiltrate youth and
student organizations. Also found were a .38 caliber revolver, live bullets and several
rounds of ammunitions and P18,650 cash. Four (4) were arrested the following day,
July 7,1982, while one of them was arrested on July 15.
The petition for habeas corpus alleged that the arrest of the detainees was
illegal on ground that it was affected without a warrant and that their detention was
likewise illegal because no criminal charges had been filed against them within the
period provided by law. In their return, the respondents alleged that shortly after the
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arrest of the detainees, Presidential Commitment Orders (PCO) were issued against
them and it was by virtue of these orders that the detainees were being held in
custody. The SC denied the petition.
HELD: We hold that upon the issuance of PCO against the petitioners, the continued
detention is rendered valid and legal, and their right to be released over after the
filing of charges against them in court, to depend on the President, who may order
the release of a detainee or his being placed under house arrest, as he has done in
meritorious cases.
1. The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the
detention of a person for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which
continues in force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the
arrest has been made initially without any warrant. Its legal effect is to render the
writ unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in
view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ. The grant of power to suspend the
said privilege provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the detention as
long as the invasion/ rebellion has not been repelled or quelled, and the need
therefore in the interest of public safety continues.
The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the
President as Commander-in-chief, is that the exercise thereof is not subject to judicial
inquiry, with a view to determining its legality in the light of bill of rights guarantee to
individual freedom. This must be so because the suspension of the privilege is a
military measure the necessity of which the President alone may determine as an
incident of his grave responsibility as the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, of
protecting not only public safety but the very life of the State, the government and
duly constituted authorities.
2. From the clear language of Lansang vs. Garcia (42 SCRA 488), "the function
of the court is merely to check-not to supplant the executive or to ascertain merely
whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." If, however,
the constitutional right to bail is granted to herein petitioners by the court, thus the
procedure laid down under Rule 114 of the Rules of Court what inevitably results is
the supplanting of the decision of the President to detain pursuant to Proclamation
No. 2045, of person's who come under its coverage.
3. What has been said above shows the need of re-examining the Lansang
case with a view to reverting to the ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker (5 Phil 87) and
Montenegro vs. Castaeda (91Phil 882), that the President's decision to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts, and all
other persons." This well-settled ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which
declared that the "function of the court is merely to check not to supplant - the
Executive, or ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits
of his jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom
of his act." Judicial interference was thus held permissible, and the test laid down
therein is not whether the President acted correctly but whether he acted arbitrarily.
This would seem to be pure semanticism. If we consider that with particular
reference to the nature of the actions the President would take on the occasion of the
grave emergency he has to deal with, which partakes of military measures, the
judiciary can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to assume the authority to check or
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reverse or supplant the presidential actions. On these occasions, the President takes
absolute command, for the very life of the nation and its government, which,
incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President is
answerable only to his conscience, the people and to God. For their part, in giving
him the supreme mandate as their President, the people can only trust and pray that,
giving him their own loyalty with utmost patriotism, the President will not fail them.
CASE DIGESTS
f. Power and Function of the President
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Facts:
Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a
profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of national life.
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order
the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. to issue a travel documents to
former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that
Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue:
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines.
Held:
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and
whatever powers inherent in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g.,
his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily,
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the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated
The Power Involved
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean
that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing
a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from
another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the
President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as
protector of the peace. Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of the President
to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers
in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to
its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no
foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in
fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the
relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow
cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers
short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain
public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from
returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by
the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its
members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a
genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of
our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the
Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The
Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion
to allow a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be
allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
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constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject
to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are
implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard
and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit
to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied.
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist
factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar
the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be
said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her
discretion in deciding to bar their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause
the escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for the President
to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the
Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive action against threats to its
existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and
direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The
preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in
the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and
to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
OPLE vs TORRES
Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that invalidation of Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a
law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue.
Held:
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the
laws. The executive power is vested in the Presidents. It is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance
.
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As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with
the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has
the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general
peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix
a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is
not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head
shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the
all-important freedom of thought.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative
power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought
to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it
confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under
A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering
basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen
will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have
difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
KMU vs DIRECTOR GENERAL
FACTS:
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In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 420
requiring all government agencies and government-owned corporations to streamline
and harmonize their Identification Systems. The purposes of the uniform ID data
collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability and
ensure compatibility and provide convenience to the people served by government
entities.
Petitioners allege that EO420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of
legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they
allege that EO420 infringes on the citizens rights to privacy.
ISSUE: IS EO420 a valid exercise of executive power?
Held:
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two
ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a
memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government
entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular
functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID
format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater
efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and
does not involve the exercise of legislative power.
Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the
government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all
government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a
uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability,
compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of
control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of
government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional
commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC
which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID cards. This only
shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is
needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of
government.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. There are several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs,
increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. The adoption of a
uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs,
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increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420,
the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In
issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely
implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures
efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of
current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is
simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
Difference in AO 308 re: Ople vs Torres:
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and
issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does
not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess
under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres
sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System,[19] a
national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance.
Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new
national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the
existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and
LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public.
Hence, EO
420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional
power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as
under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
REVIEW CENTER vs ERMITA
Facts:
There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board
examination were circulated duringthe examination period among examinees
reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center.The examinees
were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations
five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical
Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakageand traced it to two Board of Nursing
members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from
proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.
Subsequently, President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which
authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review
centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno
(Chairman Puno), approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR).
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In a letter dated 24 November 2006, the Review Center Association of the Philippines
(petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to
amend, if not withdraw the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to
operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs
and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers.
On 26 October 2007, petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before
this Court praying for the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional, and
the prohibition against CHED from implementing the same.
Issue/s:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative
power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.
Held:
The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA
7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private
institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and
private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to
formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.
The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which
offers a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the
knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school
setting in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC. It also
covers the operation or conduct of review classes or courses provided by individuals
whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the
PRC.
A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA
7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the
jurisdiction of the CHED. A review course is only intended to refresh and enhance
the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees. A reviewee is not even
required to enroll in a review center or to take a review course prior to taking an
examination given by the PRC. Even if a reviewee enrolls in a review center,
attendance in a review course is not mandatory. The reviewee is not required to
attend each review class. He is not required to take or pass an examination, and
neither is he given a grade. He is also not required to submit any thesis or
dissertation. Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered
programs x x x of higher learning that would put them under the jurisdiction of the
CHED.
Further, the similar entities in EO 566 cover centers providing review or tutorial
services in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which
include, although not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services
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examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify
as programs of higher learning.
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions
of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to
alter or repeal them,] and this power is vested with the Congress under Section 1,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through
the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rulemaking power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers
review centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education
nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.
Hence, both the EO 566 and RIRR are unconstitutional.
ANGELES vs GAITE
Facts
Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes Vistan, to take care
and provide for as she grew up. Petitioner became attached to such child and took
care of her as her own. Petitioner also gave the same attention to the half-brother of
the grand niece. The latter would seek petitioners financial support ranging from
daily subsistence to hospitalization expenses.
After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grand niece, Michael Vistan, failed
to do an important task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan had a falling out. Since
no more support was given to the latter, he took his half-sister away. He brought her
to different provinces while asked the help of certain individuals to mislead the
petitioner and the police. The police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan through a
dragnet operation.
The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a),
Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of
Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against
Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.
The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the
case. This was however denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a
decision to dismiss the case. Petitioner filed a petition for review with USEC.
Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with SEC Perez
and was also denied
She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was dismissed by such on the
ground of Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review
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of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death
Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the dismissal
Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since it diminishes
the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.
Issue:
W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of
the President?
Held:
No. it does not diminish the power of the President
The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said
Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political
agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive."The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in upholding the
Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely
interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30,
1993 reads:
In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in
Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of
the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of Justice
concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated and clarified.
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary
of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the
Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death x x x.
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Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the
jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding
paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his
power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to
expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum
Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of
rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the
former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the
least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's power and the President's own
judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to
achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation
is upon a cabinet secretary his own alter ego.
BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS:
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental
law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those
exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power,
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this
special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a
showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional
import.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary
of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as
falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the
President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58
allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it
would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all
preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly
hamper the other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and
every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latters expertise in
said matter.
The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the very existence of
cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded
and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government.
BUKLOD vs ZAMORA
Facts:
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During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in
areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President
Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the
employees of EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created thru EO
196 the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana, which EIIB employees claim
to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial review in questioning
the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to
abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the
abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure.
Issue:
WON the president has the power to abolish such public office.
Held:
Yes.
An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders shows that the deactivation of EIIB
and the creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the
purpose of removing the EIIB employees, but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O.
No. 191, which is economy. While Task Force Aduana was created to take the place of
EIIB, its creation does not entail expense to the government.
Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196
provides that the technical, administrative and special staffs of EIIB are to be
composed of people who are already in the public service, they being employees of
other existing agencies. Their tenure with the Task Force would only be temporary,
i.e., only when the agency where they belong is called upon to assist the Task
Force. Since their employment with the Task force is only by way of detail or
assignment, they retain their employment with the existing agencies. And should the
need for them cease, they would be sent back to the agency concerned.
Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men under
the direct control and supervision of the President as base of the governments antismuggling campaign. Such a smaller base has the necessary powers 1) to enlist the
assistance of any department, bureau, or office and to use their respective personnel,
facilities and resources; and 2) to select and recruit personnel from within the PSG
and ISAFP forassignment to the Task Force. Obviously, the idea is to encourage the
utilization of personnel, facilities and resources of the already existing departments,
agencies, bureaus, etc., instead of maintaining an independent office with a whole
set of personnel and facilities. The EIIB had proven itself burdensome for the
government because it maintained separate offices in every region in the Philippines.
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And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly budget appropriation of the government that
the creation of the Task Force Aduana was especially intended to lessen EIIBs
expenses.
While basically, the functions of the EIIB have devolved upon the Task Force Aduana,
we find the latter to have additional new powers. The Task Force Aduana, being
composed of elements from the Presidential Security Group (PSG) and Intelligence
Service Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), [36] has the essential power to effect
searches, seizures and arrests. The EIIB did not have this power. The Task Force
Aduana has the power to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; and to use their personnel, facilities and resources. Again, the EIIB did
not have this power. And, the Task Force Aduana has the additional authority to
conduct investigation of cases involving ill-gotten wealth. This was not expressly
granted to the EIIB.
Consequently, it cannot be said that there is a feigned reorganization. In Blaquera v.
Civil Sevice Commission, we ruled that a reorganization in good faith is one designed
to trim the fat off the bureaucracy and institute economy and greater efficiency in its
operation.
Lastly, we hold that petitioners right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is
better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of
a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of
offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.
Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.
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SECRETARY vs MABALOT
Facts:
The Sec. of DOTC issued to LTFRB Chairman Memorandum Order No. 96-735,
transferring the regional functions of that office to DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending
creation of a Regional LTFRO. Later, the new Sec. of DOTC issued Department Order
No. 97-1025, establishing the DOTCCAR Regional Office as the Regional Office of the
LTFRB to exercise regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct
supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office. Mabalot protested.
Issue:
W/N the MO and DO are violative of the provision of the Constitution against
encroachment on the powers of the
legislative department
Held:
SC upheld the validity of the issuance of the challenged orders.
In the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending
the issuance of the challenged orders, Court upholds. The President, through his duly
constituted political agent and alter ego, may legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of the DOTCCAR as
the LTFRB Regional Office of CAR with the concomitant transfer and performance of
public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
There are three modes of establishing an administrative body: (1) Constitution; (2)
Statute; and (3) by authority of law. This case falls under the third category.
The DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, is authorized by law to create and
establish the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office. This is anchored on the Presidents power
of control under sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution.
By definition, control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. It includes the authority
to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a
power directly vested in him by law.
Under sec. 20, Bk. III, E.O. 292, the Chief Executive is granted residual powers,
stating that unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such
other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws xxx
What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is PD 1772 which amended PD
1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group,
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consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create
and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials.
Granted that the President has the power to reorganize, was the reorganization of
DOTCCAR valid?
In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good
faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in the
instant case was decreed in the interest of service and for purposes of economy
and more effective coOrdination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera
Administrative Region. It thus bear the earmarks of good faith.
DENR
vs
DENR
EMPLOYEES
Facts:
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a
Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum
was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR
Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles.
Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees
association, COURAGE, represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A.
Karim, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders
with prayer for preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid; and
Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
Held:
The DAO and Memorandum are valid. The acts of the DENR Secretary are likewise
valid.
It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency, thus:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
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promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under
Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
However, as head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be expected to
exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. He may
delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by
the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
acts personally.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to
reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet
members exercising control over a particular executive department. Thus, in DOTC
Secretary v. Mabalot, we held that the President through his duly constituted
political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary may legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the
LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant
transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a
regional office of the LTFRB.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by
ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as
an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not
expressly repudiated the same.
In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power of the President to
reorganize the administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the
regional centers. In identifying the regional centers, the President purposely
intended the effective delivery of the field services of government agencies. [23] The
same intention can be gleaned from the preamble of the assailed DAO-99-14 which
the DENR sought to achieve, that is, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
the DENR in delivering its services.
It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1)
there are no buildings yet to house the regional offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer
falls on the month of Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected employees are
already enrolled in schools in Cotabato City, (4) the Regional Development Council
was not consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang Panglungsond, through a resolution,
requested the DENR Secretary to reconsider the orders. However, these concern
issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in
our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or
expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative department, for each
department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of
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authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of
the other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom
of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments.
CONSTANTINO vs CUISA
Facts:
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the
countrys external debt.
The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs
were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback
programs & bond-conversion programs. Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of
his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ Freedom from Debt Coalition
averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not
constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the
Constitution.
And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be
validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly
reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President.
They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino
nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that
the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the
Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not respondents but
the President alone and personally can validly bind the country.
Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
Issue: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the
respondents. (Governor of BSP)
Held:
Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional and legal imprimaturs,
as well as the doctrine of qualified political agency.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of
the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that
the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments
debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed
as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives,
and meet any other sovereign debt management goals.
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every
aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the
country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe
propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many
methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor
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representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board,
explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not,
flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of
constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and
the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly
hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government.
Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency, later
adopted in Villena v. Secretary of the Interior from American jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may
not be delegated to or exercised by an agent oralter ego of the President. Justice
Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear:
Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under
the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their
very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the
President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief
Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of
approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other
person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign
prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).[58]
These distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers
which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the
suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of
executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government.
The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of
the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by
the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive,
but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of
similar gravitas and exceptional import.
We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign
debts falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or
guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual
obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary
incident, but from the established functions of governance.
Another important qualification must be made. The Secretary of Finance or any
designated alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latters prior consent to
or subsequent ratification of his acts. In the matter of contracting or guaranteeing
foreign loans, the repudiation by the President of the very acts performed in this
regard by the alter ego will definitely have binding effect. Had petitioners herein
succeeded in demonstrating that the President actually withheld approval and/or
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repudiated the Financing Program, there could be a cause of action to nullify the acts
of respondents. Notably though, petitioners do not assert that respondents pursued
the Program without prior authorization of the President or that the terms of the
contract were agreed upon without the Presidents authorization. Congruent with the
avowed preference of then President Aquino to honor and restructure existing foreign
debts, the lack of showing that she countermanded the acts of respondents leads us
to conclude that said acts carried presidential approval.
With constitutional parameters already established, we may also note, as a source of

suppletory guidance, the provisions of R.A. No. 245. The afore-quoted Section 1
thereof empowers the Secretary of Finance with the approval of the President and
after consultation of the Monetary Board, to borrow from time to time on the credit
of the Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as in his judgment may be
necessary, and to issue therefor evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine
Government. Ineluctably then, while the President wields the borrowing power it is
the Secretary of Finance who normally carries out its thrusts.
It bears emphasis that apart from the Constitution, there is also a relevant statute,
R.A. No. 245, that establishes the parameters by which the alter ego may act in
behalf of the President with respect to the borrowing power. This law expressly
provides that the Secretary of Finance may enter into foreign borrowing contracts.
This law neither amends nor goes contrary to the Constitution but merely implements
the subject provision in a manner consistent with the structure of the Executive
Department and the alter ego doctine. In this regard, respondents have declared
that they have followed the restrictions provided under R.A. No. 245, which include
the requisite presidential authorization and which, in the absence of proof and even
allegation to the contrary, should be regarded in a fashion congruent with the
presumption of regularity bestowed on acts done by public officials.
Moreover, in praying that the acts of the respondents, especially that of the Secretary
of Finance, be nullified as being in violation of a restrictive constitutional
interpretation, petitioners in effect would have this Court declare R.A. No. 245
unconstitutional. We will not strikedown a law or provisions thereof without so much
as a direct attack thereon when simple and logical statutory construction would
suffice.
RUFINO V. ENDRIGA, July 21, 2006
Article VII, Section 16
Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the
Philippines (CCP) for the primary purpose of propagating arts and culture in
the Philippines. PD 15 increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to
nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, increased further the trustees
to 11.
Eventually, during the term of Ramos, the CCP Board included the Endriga
Group
Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four
years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees.
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The Rufino group took their oaths of office and assumed the performance of
their duties.
the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto questioning Estrada's
appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. They claimed that it is
only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the
Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers
of the CCP.
o The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that
vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the
remaining trustees. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies
shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation
with the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become
entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the President of
the Philippines acting in consultation with the same ranking officers
of the CCP. Thus, the remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect
their fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term. On the other hand,
Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees
for more than two consecutive terms.
o The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada
appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to the
expiration of Maosa's term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent
trustees. They maintained that under the CCP Charter, the trustees'
fixed four-year term could only be terminated "by reason of
resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause." Presidential action was
neither necessary nor justified since the CCP Board then still had 10
incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to fill by election any
vacancy in the Board.
o The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the
supervision and control of the President. The Endriga group cited
Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of
policy and operation x x x."
Rufino Group: that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to
appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. Section 6(b) of
PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be
declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank"
than the appointing power.
CA: Endriga group entitled to the office.

Issue: w/n Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional considering that:
A. [it] is an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the
Constitution;
B. [it] effectively deprives the President of his constitutional power of control and
supervision over the CCP
Held: UNCONSTITIONAL
POWER TO APPOINT
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-
The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's

authority to delegate the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution which provides: the President shall nominate and, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.The
President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those

instances when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this
fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches
violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic
republican government.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints
three groups of officers.
1. heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President by the Constitution. w/ the Commission of
Appointments consent
2. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
consent not required
3. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law. consent not required
appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is
the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a
department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is
declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the
trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the
third group of officers.
o * there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments
Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies,

commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has
the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies,
commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so
grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such
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legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate
officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or board.
This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a selfexecuting power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to
legislative limitations or conditions. 28 The power to appoint conferred directly
by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc29 and on the Constitutional
Commissions30 is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations
or conditions.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by
law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. these inferior or lower in
rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the
power to appoint. The express language of the Constitution and the clear
intent of its framers point to only one conclusion the officers whom the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must
be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint.
Also, the power to appoint can only be vested in the HEADS of the named
offices. The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or
boards and not to their members, for several reasons:
o a plain reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution shows that the word "heads" refers
to all the offices succeeding that term, namely, the departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. This plain reading is consistent with
other related provisions of the Constitution.
o agencies, like departments, have no collegial governing bodies but
have only chief executives or heads of agencies. Thus, the word
"heads" applies to agencies. Any other interpretation is untenable.
o all commissions or boards have chief executives who are their heads.
Since the Constitution speaks of "heads" of offices, and all
commissions or boards have chief executives or heads, the word
"heads" could only refer to the chief executives or heads of the
commissions or boards.
o the counterpart provisions of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions uniformly refer to
"heads" of offices. The 1935 Constitution limited the grant of the
appointment power only to "heads of departments." 32 The 1973
Constitution expanded such grant to other officers, namely, "members
of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and
boards x x x."33 If the 1973 Constitution intended to extend the grant to
members of commissions or boards, it could have followed the same
language used for "members of the Cabinet" so as to state "members
of commissions or boards." Alternatively, the 1973 Constitution could
have placed the words commissions and boards after the word "courts"
so as to state "members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, commissions and
boards." Instead, the 1973 Constitution used "heads of agencies,
commissions, and boards."
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o
the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions make a clear distinction

whenever granting the power to appoint lower-ranked officers to
members of a collegial body or to the head of that collegial body. Thus,
the 1935 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint "in the
courts, or in the heads of departments." Similarly, the 1973
Constitution speaks of "members of the Cabinet, courts, heads of
agencies, commissions, and boards."
As an enumeration of offices, what applies to the first office in the
enumeration also applies to the succeeding offices mentioned in the
enumeration. Since the words "in the heads of" refer to
"departments," the same words "in the heads of" also refer to the
other offices listed in the enumeration, namely, "agencies,
commissions, or boards."
Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be
vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the
power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP.
the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. The CCP,

being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
** Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section

16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP
Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank"
than such "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This
excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in
rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to
elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
o It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining
trustees to "elect" and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect
is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute
cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to
appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the
co-workers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public
office has no constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the
independent appointing power of their fellow trustees. The creation of an
independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President's power
to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the
appointment of CCP trustees every time a new President assumes office.
POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government

extends to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the
lowliest clerk.35 This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and
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does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the
President's power of control over the Executive branch. 36
The CCP falls under the Executive branch. Since the President exercises
control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the
President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the
Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of all
executive x x x offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does
not exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside
of the independent constitutional bodies from the President's power of
control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not
legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the
Executive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating
that office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the
Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President.
Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional
power of control over "all the executive x x x offices." If the Legislature can do
this with the Executive branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar
blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law putting decisions of certain lower
courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the
system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution
among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board
to fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control
under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section
6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and
pressure, specifically from the President. 44 Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes
the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the
President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987
Constitution.
MMDA v Viron Transport G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007

Facts:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the
MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to
decongest traffic by eliminating thebus terminals now located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the
mass transport system. The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron
Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didnt
have the power to direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so
they asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDAs power under
RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a
trial court. In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were
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narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro
Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and
close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct
business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public
Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be
deprived of their real properties without due process of law should they be
required to use the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained
the constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005,
reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable
exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e)
of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Virons and
Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no
justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the
E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any
letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an
immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use
government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the
only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the
implementing officials, but not between third persons.
Issue: Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government
and private investment in the development of the countrys intermodal
transportation and communications systems. It was also tasked to administer
all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and
communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is
the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement
a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President,
although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project,
must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by
law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in
question.
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By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the

President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law,
rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It
was delegated only to set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and
shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects
concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement,
engineering and education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is
devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence,
it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the
Project.
MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the
interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular
class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic

congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held
that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of
Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control
traffic on national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies
at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of
traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such,
measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people
using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper
subject for the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern
that needs to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate
and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they
not duly oppressive?
De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help

impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence
of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been
enlightened
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In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to
provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating
at all.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was
empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment,
maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience
may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. The law
mandates the ltfrb to require any public service to establish, construct,
maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities.
Anak Mindanao vs Executive Secretary (Aug. 29, 2007)

Facts:
AMIN charges the Executive Department with transgression of the principle of
separation of powers.
Under the principle of separation of powers, Congress, the President, and the
Judiciary may not encroach on fields allocated to each of them. The legislature is
generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws,
and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies.
The principle presupposes mutual respect by and between the executive, legislative
and judicial departments of the government and calls for them to be left alone to
discharge their duties as they see fit.19
AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes, 20 they
can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive
orders.
While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the President 21 who, as
Chief Executive, holds the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices,22 it posits that this broad power of control including the power to
reorganize is qualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to
law, citing the constitutional duty23 of the President to ensure that the laws, including
those creating the agencies, be faithfully executed.
AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be clearly an
extension of the President, and the creation of the NCIP as an "independent agency
under the Office of the President."24 It thus argues that since the legislature had seen
fit to create these agencies at separate times and with distinct mandates, the
President should respect that legislative disposition.
In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of these administrative agencies
should be the subject of a statute.
Issue: W/N the President has the power to reorganize administrative agencies
without need of an enacting Statute?
Held: Yes
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The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over executive
departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. And it lays down a limitation
on the legislative power.
The line that delineates the Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter
and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the
Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.
In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative
power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common
interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the
laws. The executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere
with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also
has the duty of supervising and enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general
peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. 25 (Italics
omitted, underscoring supplied)
The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an
executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of
law.26
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full
knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. 27 It is thus
reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency under the
Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on
the Presidents power to reorganize.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily
ordains an executive agencys position in the scheme of administrative structure.
Such determination is primary, 28 but subject to the Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the
executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify the President
to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the
President the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
In carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President is best equipped to
assess whether an executive agency ought to continue operating in accordance with
its charter or the law creating it. This is not to say that the legislature is incapable of
making a similar assessment and appropriate action within its plenary power. The
Administrative Code of 1987 merely underscores the need to provide the President
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with suitable solutions to situations on hand to meet the exigencies of the service
that may call for the exercise of the power of control.
x x x The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of
every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To
remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being
shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of
the President. This is the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. 32
The Office of the President consists of the Office of the President proper and the
agencies under it.33 It is not disputed that PCUP and NCIP were formed as agencies
under the Office of the President. 34 The "Agencies under the Office of the President"
refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the
supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative supervision
of the Office of the President, those attached to the Office for policy and program
coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any
special department.35
As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the Office of
the President to any other department or agency, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Gauged
against these guidelines,36 the challenged executive orders may not be said to have
been issued with grave abuse of discretion or in violation of the rule of law.
ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, et. al vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary
FACTS:
The present controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 dated October 25,
2004, issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf
and on behalf of all their co-employees at the National Printing Office (NPO).
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378,
amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of
government agencies and instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and
instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the private
sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services
offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost
compared to what was offered by the NPO.
Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General
Appropriations Act to its income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as
employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality,
contending that:
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(1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal
Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter
still exercised legislative powers; and
(2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it
paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE: WON the 2 contentions of petitioners have merit
HELD:
Anent the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently
without merit.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power
to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with
the Presidents constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices
and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize
executive offices under existing statutes.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the
Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached
to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine
Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
quoted above authorizes the President (a) torestructure the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate
Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common
Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or
offices from the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in
the Executive Branch, and vice versa.
Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the
Office of the President Proper and to transfer functions/offices not only among
the offices in the Office of President Proper but also the rest of the Office of
the President and the Executive Branch, the President implicitly has the power
to effect less radical or less substantive changes to the functional and internal
structure of the Office of the President, including the modification of functions
of such executive agencies as the exigencies of the service may require.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of
any of its functions to be transferred to another agency.
Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the main
printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms and
publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency
and profitability, it must now compete with the private sector for certain
government printing jobs, with the exception of election paraphernalia which
remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the Commission on Elections may determine
At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by
limiting the exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election forms.
To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the Presidents power to
reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific
provisions in general appropriations laws.
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Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was
reenacted in 2004 (the year of the issuance of Executive Order No. 378),
likewise gave the President the authority to effect a wide variety of
organizational changes in any department or agency in the Executive Branch.
The President has the powerto reorganize even executive offices already
funded by the said appropriations act, including the power to
implement structural, functional, and operational adjustments in the
executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign appropriations of
funds as may be necessary under such reorganization.
Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T.

SANTOS
FACTS:
Consolidation of three cases.
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting
through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local
officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City and a member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod thereof, respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative
complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime
in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression,
grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable
violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
Opinion Court of Appeals: Finding probable grounds and reasons, the
respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last
until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
The respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending
Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and
designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary, that the Department of Local
Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due
process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased,
prejudicial and hostile" towards him arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged
refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party and the running
political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections
and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City.
He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it
had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of
November 14, 1988), notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the
hearing and meted out two more suspension orders of the aforementioned
cases.
He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were
held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary
rejected his request.
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He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable" grounds,

among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which required
confinement; that his "vital" witness was also hospitalized 16 but that the latter
unduly denied his request.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the
President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of
suspension and/or removal over local officials.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter
ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials
HELD:
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in
the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature
of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing
legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials.
It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies
nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress
and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs.
The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to
deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline.
It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the
local government under the general supervision of the Executive.
It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the

local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest
that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was
meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local
autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the
Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation.
he Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation
authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to
proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no
prohibition.
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the
debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers.
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization."
The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the
monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments
and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the
imperialism of Manila."
HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D.
TORRES
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FACTS:
The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from office of petitioner
Eduardo Nonato Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva Ecija.
Private respondent Oscar C. Tinio is the Vice-Governor of said province while
private respondents Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra, Solita C.
Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon G. Interior are members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint
charging petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
Private respondents alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they
were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall.
Petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered
threatening words at them; close behind petitioner were several men with
long and short firearms who encircled the area.
Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance
to a pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of
Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank.
Petitioner's acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan.
Private respondents prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner.
That the presence of his private army posed grave danger to private
respondents' lives and safety.
The letter was endorsed by Congressmen Eleuterio Violago and Pacifico
Fajardo of the Second and Third Districts of Nueva Ecija, former Congressman
Victorio Lorenzo of the Fourth District, and Mayor Placido Calma, President of
the Mayors' League of said province.
Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and
summoned petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle the
controversy.
The parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to
maintain peace and order in the province while private respondents promised
to refrain from filing cases that would adversely affect their peaceful coexistence.
On recommendation of Secretary Barbers (DILG Secretary), Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing
petitioner under preventive suspension for 60 days pending investigation of
the charges against him.
He contends that under the law, it is the Office of the President that has
jurisdiction over the letter-complaint and that the Court of Appeals erred in
applying the alter-ego principle because the power to discipline elective local
officials lies with the President, not with the DILG Secretary.
ISSUE: WON the DILG Secretary is authorized and has jurisdiction over the petitioner
HELD:
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are
governed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, and Administrative Order
Page 344

3
No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the Investigation of

Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials of Provinces,
Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Cities and
Municipalities in Metropolitan Manila."
An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be verified
and filed with the proper government office.
A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the
Office of the President.
A complaint against an elective municipal official must be filed with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan while that of a barangay official must be filed
before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.
The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of
the President.
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the
Investigating Authority.
The Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting
by himself or through the Executive Secretary.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating
Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee.
The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating
Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may
designate a Special Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against
elective local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over
local governments.
The power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must
be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or
conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.
A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a
Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining
Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim.
The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the
power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is
based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.
o "Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
Page 345

3
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of

business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."
The Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23.
The Office should have first required petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter,
the complaint and the answer should have been referred to the Investigating
Authority for further proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is
not fatal.
The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a
preliminary assessment of the case. The President found the complaint
sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further investigation. The
judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion.
In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in
recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during
the investigation.
Pimentel vs. Aguirre

FACTS:
Before us is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to

annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires
local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their
authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin
respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a
portion of their internal revenue allotments.
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO
43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the
amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect
exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the
President, however, only the power of general supervision over LGUs,
consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further argues that
the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of
Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of these units its
share in the national internal revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand
that AO 372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about
by the peso devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's
power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal
autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify measures
that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least
25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not
violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on
their revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature
Page 346

3
pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."
ISSUE:
WON (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures
by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of
their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of
general supervision over local governments
HELD: YES
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. x x x" This provision has been interpreted to exclude
the power of control.
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the
other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in
local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and
the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local
leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent
with his power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only
to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake costreduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country,
which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction
in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of
AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory
imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power
of control. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a
command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.
Bito-onon vs. Fernandez
FACTS:
The petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President
for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio
Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter
President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano
Page 347

3
were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23,
1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of
Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election
prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of
Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25,
1997.
Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review
of the decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City (RTC). On April 26, 1999, Onon filed a motion to dismiss the
Petition for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC
had no jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered by the BES in any post
proclamation electoral protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga
Barangay election of officers and directors. In his motion to dismiss, Onon
claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay
election issued by the DILG on August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular
No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the
regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued without
or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but
rather an exercise of control over the Ligas internal organization.
The RTC denied Onons motion to dismiss. In its order, the RTC ratiocinated
that the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government is
vested with the power to establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other
issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local
government units and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor
compliance thereof by said units. The RTC added that DILG Circular No. 97193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his rule-making power as
provided for under Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
WON the questioned provision in memorandum circular 97-193 was issued by the
DILG Secretary in excess of his authority
HELD: YES
The Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the
filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in
a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree
with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing
of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the
DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated
by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the
decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The
amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of
supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President
does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to
prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code
limits its authority to merely monitoring compliance by local government
units of such issuances.[27] To monitor means to watch, observe or check and
is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local
governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit
Page 348

3
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory
enactments.[28] Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to
interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy
of the local government.[
National Liga vs. Paredes
FACTS:
On 11 June 1997, Rayos, Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5,
District II, Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
and damages before the RTC of Caloocan, alleging that David, Punong
Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City and then president of the
Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the Liga ng mga Barangay National
Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of
the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in 1997.
On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO), effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding of the
general membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City on
14 June 1975. However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein
petitioner David, and so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was
held as scheduled. Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the LigaCaloocan, and thereafter took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan.
On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo
warranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages, against David,
Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
CaloocanCity, and Secretary Barbers. Rayos alleged that he was elected
President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on14 June 1997
by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their Resolution/Petition
No. 001-97.8 On 18 July 1997, the presiding judge granted the TRO,
enjoining therein respondents David, Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from
proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan
Chapters of the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but only for the purpose of
maintaining the status quo and effective for a period not exceeding seventytwo (72) hours.
Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner Davids instance, Special Civil Action
(SCA) No. C-512 pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCANo. C508 pending before Branch 124. Before the consolidation of the cases, on
25 July 1997, the DILG through respondentSecretary Barbers, filed in SCA No.
C-512 an Urgent Motion, invoking the Presidents power of general supervision
over all local government units and seeking that the DILG pursuant to its
delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the Interim
Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time
that the new set of National Liga Officersshall have been duly elected
and assumed office.
ISSUE:
Page 349

3
WON the Liga ng mga Barangay is subject to DILG supervision
HELD:
The controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 4, Article X of the
Constitution, which reads in part:
o Sec. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the Presidents
power of supervision over local governments and his power of control of the
executive departments bureaus and offices. Similar to the counterpart
provisions in the earlier Constitutions, the provision in the 1987
Constitution provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
In the early case of Mondano v. Silvosa, et al., this Court defined supervision
as overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to
compel his subordinates to perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. In Taule v.
Santos, the Court held that the Constitution permits the President to wield no
more authority than that of checking whether a local government or its
officers perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Supervisory
power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an
inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
The case of Drilon v. Lim clearly defined the extent of supervisory power, thus:
The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but
he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done
but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner
for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see that the
rules are followed
In Section 4, Article X of the Constitution applicable to the Liga ng mga
Barangay? Otherwise put, is the Liga legally susceptible to DILG suspension?
This question was resolved in Bito-Onon v. Fernandez, where the Court ruled
that the Presidents power of the general supervision, as exercised therein by
the DILG Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga
barangay, which is not a local government unit?
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department
of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization,
being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by
authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government
officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an
organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the
representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating
Page 350

3
[G.R.
and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and

securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.
The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident,
whether from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an
aggroupment of barangays which are in turn represented therein by their
respective punong barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex
officio capacity at the municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such,
they enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal
councilors, city councilors or provincial board members, as the case may
be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which the barangay participates in
the enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at all the legislative
local levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving
as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development.
No.
107369.
August
11,
1999]
JESULITO A. MANALO, petitioner, vs. PEDRO G. SISTOZA, REGINO ARO III, NICASIO MA.
CUSTODIO, GUILLERMO DOMONDON, RAYMUNDO L. LOGAN, WILFREDO R. REOTUTAR,
FELINO C. PACHECO, JR., RUBEN J. CRUZ, GERONIMO B. VALDERRAMA, MERARDO G.
ABAYA, EVERLINO B. NARTATEZ, ENRIQUE T. BULAN, PEDRO J. NAVARRO, DOMINADOR
M. MANGUBAT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and HONORABLE SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ II In
His Capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Facts: On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior
and Local Government was signed into law by former President Corazon C. Aquino.
Sections 26 and 31 of RA 6975 provided that the appointments of PNP Chief, Senior
Superintendent to Deputy Director General, and Director General shall be subject to
confirmation
by
the
Commission
on
Appointments.
In accordance therewith, on March 10, 1992, the President of the Philippines, through
then Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, promoted fifteen (15) respondent police
officers, by appointing them to positions in the Philippine National Police with the
rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The appointments of respondent police
officers
were
in
a
permanent
capacity.
Without their names submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation,
the said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective
positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then
Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and
other
emoluments.
On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought before this Court this present original
petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject
appointments
and
disbursements
made
therefor.
Issue: WON the appointments extended to police officers require the confirmation of
the
Commission
on
Appointments.
Page 351

3
Ruling:
NO
Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of
the
government
to
be
appointed
by
the
President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided
for
by
law;
Third,
those
whom
the
President
may
be
authorized
by
law
to
appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the
President
alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group
require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of
respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson,
Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials
not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Consequently, unconstitutional are Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which
empower the Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public
officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmed.
But the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid sections notwithstanding, the rest of
Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void
are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional
provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the
statute
remains
valid
without
its
voided
sections.
It is settled that the police force is different from and independent of the armed
forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National
Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein
respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential
appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
[G.R.
No.
149036.
April
2,
2002]
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION

Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN
in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission
on
Elections,
respondents.
Page 352

3
Facts: On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the
Comelecs EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary
capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman
together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad
interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a
Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner
requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government
offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election
period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from
the
coverage
of
the
said
Memo
Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en
banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law
Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261
(h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil
service
laws,
rules
and
regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the
instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC.
Issue: WON the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of
the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Held:
NO.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself
makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill
the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary
or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and
Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad interim
Page 353

3
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments
that
take
effect
immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent", this
provision should be harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad interim
appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad interim
appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning
and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of
the framers of the Constitution.
[G.R.
No.
153881.
March
24,
2003]
ELPIDIO G. SORIANO III, petitioner, vs. REUBEN S. LISTA, DOMINGO T. ESTERA,

ELPIDIO B. PADAMA, MIGUEL C. TABARES, ARTHUR N. GOSINGAN, EFREN L. TADURAN,
CESAR A. SARILE, DANILO M. VILDA and HONORABLE EMILIA T. BONCODIN, in her
capacity
as
Secretary
of
Budget
and
Management,
respondents.
Facts: Public respondents were promoted by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to
different ranks in the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) on different dates as follows:
Reuben
S.
Lista
Vice
Admiral,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Domingo
T.
Estera
Rear
Admiral,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Miguel
C.
Tabares
Commodore,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Arthur
N.
Gosingan
Commodore,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Efren
L.
Taduran
Naval
Captain,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Cesar
A.
Sarile
Naval
Captain,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Danilo
M.
Vilda
Naval
Captain,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Elpidio
B.
Padama
Commodore,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Petitioner bewails the fact that despite the non-submission of their names to the
Commission on Appointments (CA) for confirmation, all of the said respondent officers
of the PCG had assumed their duties and functions. According to petitioner, their
respective appointments are illegal and unconstitutional for failure to undergo the
confirmation process in the CA. Thus, they should be prohibited from discharging
their
duties
and
functions
as
such
officers
of
the
PCG.
Issue: WON the appointments of the respondents need the confirmation of the
Commission
on
Appointments.
Held:
NO.
The PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of
the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do
not
require
confirmation
by
the
CA.
Page 354

3
Section
16,
Article
VII
of
the
1987
Constitution
provides:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments,
agencies,
commissions,
or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment
of
the
Congress.
The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under Section

16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain refers to military officers alone. This
is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the proposed text
of said Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Since the promotions and
appointments of respondent officers are not covered by the above-cited provision of
the Constitution, the same need not be confirmed by the CA.
G.R. No. 164978
October 13, 2005
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LUISA P.

EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM,
JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and SERGIO R. OSMENA III, Petitioners, - versus- EXEC.
SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR.,
MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, JOSEPH H. DURANO, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, RENE C. VILLA, and ARTHUR C. YAP, Respondents.
Facts: This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr.,
Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C.
Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as acting secretaries of their respective
departments.
On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of
their respective departments. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004.
On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously
appointed in an acting capacity.
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Issue: Is President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session,
constitutional?
Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature
may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances
when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive
power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the
legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power
to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a
person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither
may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to
an office.
However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of
Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission
on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold
consent to presidential appointments.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as
acting secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only
an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a
stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of
a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an
alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President
must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in
the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President
who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in
session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by
the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in
an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That
person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make
it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17,
Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent
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person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the
President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is
susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot
exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of
acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting
capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they
can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily
apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents
immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
G.R. No. 83216 September 4, 1989
TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES, GLORIA T. ARAGON (M.D.), LOURDES V. MASTURA,
TRINIDAD A. GOMEZ, ADUL DE LEON, JOSEFINA AZARCON-DELA CRUZ, TRINIDAD M.
DOMINGO, MARIA MAYET T. LEDANO, LOLIT ANTONIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS, AND OFFICES (C.A.), COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS: The petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by
the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII,
Section 7 of the Constitution. Due to the opposition of some congressmen-members
of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must
first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths
and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives, Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra, Jr. suspended the oathtaking of the four sectoral representatives which was
scheduled at the Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business.
In view of this development, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted on
April 25, 1988, a letter dated April 11, 1988 of the President addressed to the
Commission on Appointments submitting for confirmation the appointments of the
four sectoral representatives.
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Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter dated April 22, 1988 addressed to Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra, Jr. (Annex V) appealed to the House of Representatives alleging, among others,
that since no attempt was made to subject the sectoral representatives ** already
sitting to the confirmation process, there is no necessity for such confirmation and
subjection thereto of the present batch would certainly be discriminatory.
On May 10, 1988, petitioner Deles received an invitation from the Commission on
Appointments for the deliberation of her appointment as sectoral representative for
women. Petitioner sent a reply dated May 11, 1988 explaining her position and
questioning the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments over the
appointment of sectoral representatives.
In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions
and Offices of the Commission on Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara,
the Committee ruled against the position of petitioner Deles.
ISSUE: Does the Constitution require the appointment of sectoral representatives to
the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments?
HELD: NO.
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Since
the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may
be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII
of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution, referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII
whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. The records show that
petitioners appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess
(March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of
Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.
Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the
appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the President as appointing authority,
that petitioners appointment requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. As a matter of fact, the President had expressly submitted petitioners
appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Considering that
Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments having
acted on petitioners appointment, said appointment/nomination had become moot
and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission and
unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the Commission.
[G.R. No. 131429. August 4, 1999]
OSCAR BERMUDEZ, ARTURO A. LLOBRERA and CLAUDIO L. DAYAON, petitioners, vs.
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES, BUDGET SECRETARY SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ,
JR., JUSTICE SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., and ATTY. CONRADO QUIAOIT,
respondents.
FACTS: The vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac impelled the
main contestants in this case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and respondent Conrado
Quiaoit, to take contrasting views on the proper interpretation of a provision in the
1987 Revised Administrative Code. Bermudez was a recommendee of then Justice
Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on
the other hand, had the support of then Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997,
President Ramos appointed Quiaoit to the coveted office. Quiaoit received a certified
xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office before
Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac.
On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately informed the President, as
well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission, of that assumption.
On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a petition
for prohibition and/or injunction, and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of injunction/temporary restraining order, against herein respondents,
challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment
lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. After hearing, the trial court considered the petition
submitted for resolution and, in due time, issued its now assailed order dismissing
the petition. The subsequent move by petitioners to have the order reconsidered met
with a denial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit.
HELD: NO.
An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting
by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the
duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once
the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its
acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint. In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral part
thereof.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a
subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with
it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that
the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase upon recommendation of the
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Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised
Administrative Code, should be interpreted to be a mere advise, exhortation or
indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or
obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The President, being the head of the
Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the
departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in
so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.
G.R. No. 139554 July 21, 2006
ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and
FREDDIE GARCIA, petitioners, vs. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO,
PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO, and DOREEN FERNANDEZ,
respondents.
G.R. No. 139565 July 21, 2006
BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCEENRILE POTENCIANO, and DOREEN FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. ARMITA B. RUFINO,
ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and FREDDIE GARCIA,
respondents.
Facts: The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo warranto
proceeding involving two sets of CCP Boards. The controversy revolves on who
between the contending groups, both claiming as the rightful trustees of the CCP
Board, has the legal right to hold office. The resolution of the issue boils down to the
constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the
Board.
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30
(EO 30) creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board
of Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The
original founding trustees, who were all appointed by President Marcos, were Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, Juan Ponce-Enrile, Andres Soriano, Jr., Antonio Madrigal, Father
Horacio Dela Costa, S.J., I.P. Soliongco, and Ernesto Rufino.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos
issued PD 15,9 the CCP's charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a nonmunicipal public corporation free from the "pressure or influence of politics."10 PD 15
increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive
Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.
On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new
trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as
well as two other incumbent trustees. The seven new trustees were:
1. Armita B. Rufino - President, vice Baltazar N. Endriga
2. Zenaida R. Tantoco - Member, vice Doreen Fernandez
3. Federico Pascual - Member, vice Lenora A. Cabili
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4.
5.
6.
7.
Rafael Buenaventura - Member, vice Manuel T. Maosa

Lorenzo Calma - Member, vice Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo
Rafael Simpao, Jr. - Member, vice Patricia C. Sison
Freddie Garcia - Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile Potenciano
Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and
assumed the performance of their duties in early January 1999.
On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this
Court questioning President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP
Board. The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the
CCP Board "shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at
the next regular meeting x x x." In case "only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies
shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers
of the [CCP]." The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is
entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in
consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
The Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the
power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may
not validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow
trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section
6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be
declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the
appointing power.
Issue: WON the appointments extended by then President Estrada to the "Rufino
Group" are valid.
Held: YES.
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances
when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive
power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of
powers that inheres in our democratic republican government.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three
groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose
appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16,
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Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth
group of officers.
The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the
third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law
authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is
declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found
unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because
the trustees fall under the third group of officers.
Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest
"in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers.
The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board. PD 15 and its various
amendments constitute the Chairperson of the Board as the head of CCP. Thus, the
Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be vested by law,
under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint
lower-ranked officers of the CCP.
Under PD 15, the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees.
Section 6 of PD 15, as amended,states:
Board of Trustees. The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be
vested in, and exercised by, a Board of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without
compensation.
The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the
remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them
to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to
appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing officer
appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of
the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to
"elect" and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to
fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional
limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through
election by the co- workers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public
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office has no constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent
appointing power of their fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing
power inherently conflicts with the President's power to appoint. This inherent conflict
has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time a
new President assumes office.
In the present case, the incumbent President appointed the Endriga group as
trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga group to the
same positions. This has been the modus vivendi in filling vacancies in the CCP
Board, allowing the President to appoint and the CCP Board to elect the trustees. In
effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set of officers in the Executive
branch. Each appointing power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two
powers are irreconcilable. The Court must put an end to this recurring anomaly.
There is another constitutional impediment to the implementation of Section 6(b) and
(c) of PD 15. Under our system of government, all Executive departments, bureaus,
and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines.
The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends
to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.35
This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any
implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control
over the Executive branch.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The
CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a
quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the
Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not
placed by law or order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the
Office of the President."
Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an
office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of
all executive x x x offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the
independent constitutional bodies from the President's power of control. There is
no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasijudicial functions.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill
vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section
17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the
President.44 Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity,
virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot
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legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy
and operation x x x."45 This provision does not free the CCP from the President's
control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional. This provision may give the
CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and undertaking
activities, but ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the President's
power of control.
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President's control
over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the President's influence. By
stating that the "President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices," the
1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to control
all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and
subsumes, influence.
G.R.
No.
196231
September
4,
2012
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE

PHILIPPINES, acting through and represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO,
Officer in Charge, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY.
RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITOD.
CATAYONG,
Respondents.
G.R.
No.
196232
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his

capacity as EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F.
ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D.SULAY and ATTY. FROILAN MONTALBAN, .JR., in their capacities
as CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS of the OFFICE OF MALACANANG LEGAL AFFAIRS,
Respondents.
Facts:
G.R.
No.
196231
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of
eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S
Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials
prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC),
chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and vice-chaired by Interior and Local
Government Secretary Jesus Robredo. It was tasked to determine accountability for
the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. However,
petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC
proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent
constitutional
body.
Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually identified
petitioner Gonzales to be among those in whom culpability must lie. In its Report, the
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3
IIRC
made
the
following
findings:
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and

gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in
violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration
in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction
is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated
the
desperate
resort
to
hostage-taking.
Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious
disregard of due process, manifest injustice and oppression in failing to provisionally
suspend the further implementation of the judgment of dismissal against Mendoza
pending
disposition
of
his
unresolved
motion
for
reconsideration.
By enforcing the judgment of dismissal without resolving the motion for
reconsideration for over nine months, the two Ombudsman officials acted with
arbitrariness and without regard to due process and the constitutional right of an
accused to the speedy disposition of his case. As long as his motion for
reconsideration remained pending and unresolved, Mendoza was also effectively
deprived of the right to avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to challenge
the judgment of dismissal before the higher courts and seek a temporary restraining
order
to
prevent
the
further
execution
thereof.
As such, if the Ombudsman cannot resolve with dispatch the motion for
reconsideration, it should have provisionally suspended the further enforcement of
the judgment of dismissal without prejudice to its re- implementation if the
reconsideration is eventually denied. Otherwise, the Ombudsman will benefit from its
own inaction. Besides, the litigant is entitled to a stay of the execution pending
resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Until the motion for reconsideration is
denied, the adjudication process before the Ombudsman cannot be considered as
completely finished and, hence, the judgment is not yet ripe for execution.
But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to
review a pending motion for review of the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and
aggravating the situation. As expected, Mendoza - who previously berated Deputy
Gonzales for allegedly demanding Php150,000 in exchange for favorably resolving
the motion for reconsideration - rejected and branded as trash ("basura") the
Ombudsman [sic] letter promising review, triggering the collapse of the negotiations.
To prevent the situation from getting out of hand, the negotiators sought the
alternative option of securing before the PNP-NCRPO an order for Mendoza's
provisional reinstatement pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration.
Unfortunately, it was already too late. But had the Ombudsman officials performed
their duty under the law and acted decisively, the entire crisis may have ended
differently.
On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge15 against petitioner
Gonzales for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official
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Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O.
No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for
Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Petitioner
filed
his
Answer
thereto
in
due
time.
Meanwhile, the OP notified20 petitioner that a Preliminary Clarificatory Conference
relative to the administrative charge against him was to be conducted at the Office of
the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) on February 8, 2011.
Petitioner Gonzales alleged,21 however, that on February 4, 2011, he heard the news
that the OP had announced his suspension for one year due to his delay in the
disposition of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration. Hence, believing that
the OP had already prejudged his case and that any proceeding before it would
simply be a charade, petitioner no longer attended the scheduled clarificatory
conference. Instead, he filed an Objection to Proceedings22 on February 7, 2011.
Despite petitioner's absence, however, the OP pushed through with the proceedings
and, on March 31, 2011, rendered the assailed Decision,23 the dispositive portion of
which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A.
Gonzales III guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting
betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service.
SO
ORDERED.
G.R.
No.
196232
In December of 2003, 28-year-old Juan Paolo Garcia and 23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia
were caught in the United States smuggling $100,000 from Manila by concealing the
cash in their luggage and making false statements to US Customs Officers. The
Garcia brothers pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling and agreed to forfeit the
amount in favor of the US Government in exchange for the dismissal of the rest of the
charges against them and for being sentenced to time served. Inevitably, however,
an investigation into the source of the smuggled currency conducted by US Federal
Agents and the Philippine Government unraveled a scandal of military corruption and
amassed wealth -- the boys' father, Retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, former
Chief Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had accumulated more than P 300
Million during his active military service. Plunder and Anti-Money Laundering cases
were eventually filed against Major General Garcia, his wife and their two sons before
the
Sandiganbayan.
On January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition
for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail.
On March 16, 2010, however, the government, represented by petitioner, Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit") and her prosecutorial staff sought
the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter referred
to as "PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant
with
jurisprudential
guidelines.
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3
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the
hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's
apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of
Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At
the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and
adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,24 recommending to the President the dismissal
of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges
against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for
having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman
Act.
The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit. In her written explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of
prematurity and the lack of jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the administrative
disciplinary proceeding against her. The OP, however, still proceeded with the case,
setting
it
for
preliminary
investigation
on
April
15,
2011.
Issue: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong
to
the
constitutionally-created
Office
of
the
Ombudsman.
Held:
YES.
The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and

Special
Prose-cutor
is
not
exclusive.
Sec. 21, RA 6770. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office
of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and
covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception
only of those officials removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the
judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman.
For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express
power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. Thus:
Section
8.
Removal;
Filling
of
Vacancy.-
xxxx
Page 367

3
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President
for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due
process.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2)
and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority,
through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative
discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least
diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of
"check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that
the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative
liabilities.
Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own
people and mete out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is equally without question that the
President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions. Considering
the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the President
was the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have
prompted the Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against petitioner
through its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer instead to the President's assumption
of authority, especially when the administrative charge involved "demanding and
soliciting a sum of money" which constitutes either graft and corruption or bribery,
both of which are grounds reserved for the President's exercise of his authority to
remove
a
Deputy
Ombudsman.
In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly
conducted a subsequent and parallel administrative action against petitioner, its
earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and corruption against petitioner could not
have the effect of preventing the Office of the President from proceeding against
petitioner upon the same ground of graft and corruption. After all, the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative
powers.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the
law.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there
is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office
of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting
Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running
afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution
itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other
Page 368

3
public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not
subject
to
impeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor
is
Implied
from
his
Power
to
Appoint.
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also
removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides
otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or
authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly
separates the power to remove from the President's power to appoint.
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already
implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials
in
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman.
The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a
military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general
morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in
relation to the President's own role asCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It
would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent
disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law
enforcement
offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not
Diminish
the
Independence
of
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence
which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from
political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the
people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,
essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of
office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are
"reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians. The cloak of independence is
meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively
function as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog and
protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and
permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the
Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive,
Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy
Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Page 369

3
Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the
grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may
be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed
through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it
cannot be rightly said that giving the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or compromise
the constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a
measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies and
Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had
on
grounds
provided
by
law.
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts,
falling short of constitutional standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust.
At the outset, the Court finds no cause for petitioner Gonzales to complain simply
because the OP proceeded with the administrative case against him despite his nonattendance thereat. Petitioner was admittedly able to file an Answer in which he had
interposed his defenses to the formal charge against him. Due process is satisfied
when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. Due process is
simply having the opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration
of
the
action
or
ruling
complained
of.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.The fact, therefore, that petitioner later refused to participate in the
hearings before the OP is not a hindrance to a finding of his culpability based on
substantial evidence, which only requires that a decision must "have something upon
which
it
is
based."
Factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when supported by
substantial evidence. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability
against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of
removal from office was based on the finding of gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct in office amounting to a betrayal of public trust, which is a constitutional
ground for the removal by impeachment of the Ombudsman (Section 2, Article XI,
1987 Constitution), and a statutory ground for the President to remove from office a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act.
The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted of his
unexplained action in directing the PNP-NCR to elevate P/S Insp. Mendoza's case
records to his office; his failure to verify the basis for requesting the Ombudsman to
take over the case; his pronouncement of administrative liability and imposition of
Page 370

3
the extreme penalty of dismissal on P/S Insp. Mendoza based upon an unverified
complaint-affidavit; his inordinate haste in implementing P/S Insp. Mendoza's
dismissal notwithstanding the latter's non-receipt of his copy of the Decision and the
subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration; and his apparent unconcern that
the pendency of the motion for reconsideration for more than five months had
deprived P/S Insp. Mendoza of available remedies against the immediate
implementation
of
the
Decision
dismissing
him
from
the
service.
The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error
of law. In the instant case, while the evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing
on the part of petitioner, the Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP's
conclusion that the imputed acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner's offenses,
as they factually appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal of public trust
would be to ignore the significance of the legislature's intent in prescribing the
removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for causes that,
theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations that justify the
removal
by
impeachment
of
the
highest
officials
of
the
land.
Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution
added to the existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption and other high crimes. While it was deemed broad
enough to cover any violation of the oath of office, the impreciseness of its definition
also created apprehension that "such an overarching standard may be too broad and
may be subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by the legislature." Indeed, the catchall phrase betrayal of public trust that referred to "all acts not punishable by statutes
as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office" could
be easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct or negligence in office. However,
deliberating on some workable standard by which the ground could be reasonably
interpreted, the Constitutional Commission recognized that human error and good
faith
precluded
an
adverse
conclusion.
The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably acceptable for the
phrase betrayal of public trust to refer to "acts which are just short of being criminal
but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power,
inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary
powers." In other words, acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as to
warrant removal from office may be less than criminal but must be attended by bad
faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment.
A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers.
However, by providing for theirremoval from office on the same grounds as removal
by impeachment, the legislature could not have intended to redefine constitutional
standards of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, as well as betrayal of public trust, and apply them less
stringently. Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was
not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment,
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3
this should remain true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds for impeachment
have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature
nor the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly "overreach"
to cover acts that are not vicious or malevolent on the same level as the other
grounds
for
impeachment.
The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a confluence of several
unfortunate events including system failure of government response. It cannot be
solely attributed then to what petitioner Gonzales may have negligently failed to do
for the quick, fair and complete resolution of the case, or to his error of judgment in
the disposition thereof. Neither should petitioner's official acts in the resolution of P/S
Insp. Mendoza's case be judged based upon the resulting deaths at the Quirino
Grandstand. The failure to immediately act upon a party's requests for an early
resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross neglect of duty amounting to betrayal of
public trust. Records show that petitioner took considerably less time to act upon the
draft resolution after the same was submitted for his appropriate action compared to
the length of time that said draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of
Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration within nine (9) calendar days reckoned from the time the
draft resolution was submitted to him on April 27, 2010 until he forwarded his
recommendation to the Office of Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2010 for the
latter's final action. Clearly, the release of any final order on the case was no longer
in
his
hands.
Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and
an unexplained failure on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt
disposition, the same cannot be considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting
his removal for betrayal of public trust. More so because the neglect imputed upon
petitioner
appears
to
be
an
isolated
case.
Similarly, petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's
case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be
considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount to
wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request
of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional
mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The
factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman
upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S
Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his
statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for
reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be
simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the
lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of
the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was
likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention
or
questionable
motivation.
Page 372

3
Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against
petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal
must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in
office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may
be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind
amounting
to
a
betrayal
of
public
trust.
The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed
administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of
the grounds for her removal from office as provided for under the Constitution and
the
Ombudsman
Act.
Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's
authority to remove her from office upon the averment that without the
Sandiganbayan's final approval and judgment on the basis of the PLEBARA, it would
be premature to charge her with acts and/or omissions "tantamount to culpable
violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust," which are grounds for
removal from office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989;
and which also constitute a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) - causing undue injury to the Government
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. With
reference to the doctrine of prejudicial procedural antecedent, petitioner BarrerasSulit asserts that the propriety of taking and continuing to take administrative
disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on the final disposition by the
Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the Sandiganbayan would uphold
the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against her; if not,
then the situation becomes ripe for the determination of her failings.
The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no
consequence to an administrative finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit.
While the court's determination of the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of
the existing prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's
determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on whether the plea
bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's best
interest and the diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its public
duty to prosecute crimes against the State. Consequently, the disciplining authority's
finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more
particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a
strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the
government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability,
notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered into.
Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence
to establish the guilt of the accused of the crime charged.74 However, if the basis for
the allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence on record, then it is
Page 373

3
significant to state that in its earlier Resolution75 promulgated on January 7, 2010,
the Sandiganbayan had evaluated the testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution
witnesses and declared that "the conglomeration of evidence presented by the
prosecution is viewed by the Court to be of strong character that militates against the
grant
of
bail."
Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably,
chose to plea bargain with the accused Major General Garcia as if its evidence were
suddenly insufficient to secure a conviction. At this juncture, it is not amiss to
emphasize that the "standard of strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny
bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable cause
which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case." Hence, in light of the apparently strong
case against accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining authority would be hardpressed not to look into the whys and wherefores of the prosecution's turnabout in
the
case.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act has,
nonetheless, failed to obtain the necessary votes to invalidate the law, thus, keeping
said provision part of the law of the land. To recall, these cases involve two distinct
issues: (a) the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act; and (b) the
validity of the administrative action of removal taken against petitioner Gonzales.
While the Court voted unanimously to reverse the decision of the OP removing
petitioner Gonzales from office, it was equally divided in its opinion on the
constitutionality of the assailed statutory provision in its two deliberations held on
April 17, 2012 and September 4, 2012. There being no majority vote to invalidate the
law, the Court, therefore, dismisses the challenge to the constitutionality of Section
8(2) of the Ombudsman Act in accordance with Section 2(d), Rule 12 of the Internal
Rules
of
the
Court.
Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the
majority of the Members of the Court actually taking part in the deliberation to
sustain any challenge to the constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of its
provisions.
PALO
DRILON VS CA 202 SCRA 378 (1991)
FACTS:
Ganzon and Paredes (private respondents) were charged with double murder before
Military Commission for the death of Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez during early
martial law. On July 27, 1973, the military promulgated a decision acquitting Raul
Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo Ganzon to life imprisonment with hard labor.
Paredes was thereupon released from custody while Ganzon was made to serve
sentence until he was released on March 25, 1978 and placed under house arrest
under guard.
Page 374

3
In 1988, administration having changed, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez
directed State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe to conduct a preliminary investigation
against Ganzon and Paredes for the above murders.
They moved for the dismissal of the case, in Ganzon's case, on the ground that he,
Ganzon, had been extended an absolute pardon by the President Ferdinand Marcos,
and he, having been previously convicted, can no longer be tried anew, and in
Paredes' case, on the ground that he, Paredes, had been acquitted.
ISSUE: W/N a Ganzon can be tried anew for the murders before the civil court despite
earlier verdict rendered by the military court?
RULING: NO
In the case of Cruz vs Enrile the SC ruled that that all the petitioners in said
proceedings "who have been serving (but not yet completed) their sentence
imprisonment" shall have "the option either to complete the service their sentence,
or be tried anew by the civil courts. Upon conviction they should be credited in the
service of their sentence for the period of their previous imprisonment. Upon
acquittal, they should set free."
The records show that the private respondents had been arraigned by the military
court, pleaded not guilty, and, with respect to Raul Paredes, acquitted, and with
respect to Ganzon, convicted and sentenced. The records also show that Ganzon had
served time until 1978, when he was placed under "house arrest" by then President
Marcos. He also claims that in 1986, he was pardoned by the then President, an
alleged pardon he is invoking to deter the reinvestigation by the Department of
Justice. To the mind of the Court, Ganzon has accepted the judgment against him,
and as Tan asked, "why should [he] who has accepted the justness of the verdict of
the military court who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing to
serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing in a civil
court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty?"
Apparently, the question is whether or not, with respect to Ganzon, he has completed
the service of his sentence, since as we held in Cruz, civilians serving sentences
"may be given the option either to complete the service of their sentence," the
option Ganzon has apparently accepted, "or be tried anew by the civil courts," the
option he is obviously rejecting. The Court believes that the question is material since
if he, Ganzon, has completed the service of his sentence, Tan and Cruz are with more
reason applicable, and second, if he has served his sentence, the question of pardon
is moot and academic.
Ganzon served six years in the stockades of the military no doubt as a result of his
conviction but was released in 1978 and put under so-called house arrest
(although then President Marcos never apparently carried this out seriously as
Ganzon was free apparently, to move in and out of his residence). The Court is of the
considered opinion that these twin developments six-year service of sentence and
subsequent release are significant, since if then President Marcos ordered
Ganzon's release after six years of imprisonment, he then President Marcos,
unavoidably commuted Ganzon's imprisonment to six years (give or take a few days),
Page 375

3
although as a condition, Ganzon shall remain under "house arrest." Court is of the
opinion that if Ganzon's sentence had been commuted, he, Ganzon, has therefore
served his sentence and if he has served his sentence fully, he can no longer be
reinvestigated, or, as the Cruz cases decreed, be made to "complete the service of
[his] sentence."
Under the 1973 Constitution, as is under the present Charter the "pardoning power"
of the President (that is, to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, remit fines
and forfeitures) is final and unappealable so is commutation of sentence, in which
the Chief Executive reduces a sentence. It extinguishes criminal liability
partially, and has the effect changing the penalty to a lesser one.
The Court does not believe, in Ganzon's case, that commutation of sentence need be
in a specific form. It is sufficient, to mind, that Ganzon was voluntarily released in
1978 with terms or conditions, except that he should remain under house arrest.
The Court can not consider Ganzon's house arrest as a continuation of his sentence,
first, because in no way is arrest a penalty, but rather a mere means of "taking ... a
person custody in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for commission of an
offense," or, during early martial law, a means to carry out Proclamation No.
1881, and second, because of the records own scant condition as the exact terms of
his "house arrest" (which, parenthetically, no longer exists. ) Hence, the view of the
Court is that irrespective of the "pardon," Ganzon has served his sentence and to
reiterate, he can no longer be reinvestigated for the same offense, much more
undergo further imprisonment to complete his service.
The fact that Ganzon might have gotten off too lightly, so to speak, is immaterial, and
even as we sympathize with his victims' bereaved families, we cannot ignore the
legal effects of then President Marcos' acts as we did not ignore the legal implications
of trials by military tribunals, although void, as faits accomplis.
The Court therefore need not consider whether or not Rodolfo Ganzon had been
pardoned, and whatever "pardon" the former President may have extended to him
did not erase the fact that as early as 1978, he was a free man. Of course, he was
supposed to have remained under house arrest but as we said, not as a continuation
of his sentence, but pursuant to Marcos' vast arrest and commitment powers during
martial rule. The question of whether or not he should continue to remain under
house arrest is also a moot question as we noted, and arrests except upon lawful
judicial orders are no longer possible.
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3
PEOPLE VS SALLE, JR. 250 SCRA 378 (1991)
FACTS:
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an
indemnity. The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993,
the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January1994, however, appellant Francisco
Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. They were granted a conditional
pardon that with their acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will be
released from confinement, the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and
accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should be dismissed. They were
discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28
December 1993. Atty. Lao further in
formed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his province without consulting
her. She then prays that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and
consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has
not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mengotes conditional pardon
is valid?
RULING:
No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect
until the person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final
and Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntadois hereby

given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the
withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon
granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such
withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said
appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine
National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.
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IN RE TORRES, 251 SCRA 709 (1995)
FACTS:
Torres was convicted for estafa. The sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On
April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the
Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws
of the Philippines. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
The Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been
charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the RTC of
Quezon City.
President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then
Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order
of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner.
Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from this
court. His wife and children filed for an original petition for habeas corpus and pray
for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the
President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to
determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of
pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence,
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N the petition of Torres should be granted?
RULING: NO
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or
the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will
release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of
the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the
sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in
this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the
Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee
complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest
and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply
with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It
is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential
judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the
conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive,
and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon
the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts,
however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
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It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the
three criminal cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that
the third case remains pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his
right to a speedy trial.
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially
adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres
remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which
had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond
judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until
November 2, 2000.
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the
exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary
prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the
pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts
have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a
convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement
as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine
whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is
likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional
pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and
absolutely lodged in his office.
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3
People vs. Casido G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997
Facts:
In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon before the Presidential
Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty
before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC). The PCGBRP was constituted in line
with the confidence-building measures of the government. Thereafter, accusedappellants were granted conditional pardon. But the Court ruled in resolution that the
conditional pardon granted to accused-appellants is void for having been extended
during the pendency of their appeal. Prior to the resolution, the NAC favorably acted
on the
applications for
amnesty
of
accused-appellants.
Issue: W/N
the
release
of
accused-appellants
is
valid
Held: The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the
amnesty
granted
them
and
not
by
the
pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by the Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial
notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and
for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks backward
and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the
pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in
violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of
amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No.
347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress.
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3
PEOPLE VS PATRIARCA 341 SCRA 464 (2000)
FACTS:
Jose Patriarca, Jr., a member of the NPA, was found guilty by the trial court
of the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He then appealed the decision of the RTC.
Subsequently, he applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724. His application
was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities
were
done
in
pursuit
of
his
political
beliefs.
Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accusedappellant?
Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or
other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the
subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty
looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all
its
effects.
The grant of amnesty serves to put an end to the appeal. Jose Patriarca is acquitted
of the crime of murder.
NOTE: SC DISTINGUISHED PARDON FROM AMNESTY
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the CE with the concurrence of Congress is a public act
of w/c the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of
person or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense
of which he has been convicted, it abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does
not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office or right of suffrage unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon and it in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence (Art 36).
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3
MAGDALO VS COMELEC673 SCRA 651 (2012)
FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with
the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political
party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections.
COMELECSecond Division issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration
on the ground that they employed violence and used unlawful means to achieve
their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.
Magdalo filed for Motion for Reconsideration and a Manifestation and Motion for Early
Resolution, while the case is under examination, the May 2010 election was held
without Magdalo on the list of registered political parties.
During the pendency of the case there was a subsequent Grant of Amnesty to the
Military Personnel involved in the Oakwood standoff.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the subsequent grant of amnesty?
RULING:
This Court, in People v. Patriarca, explained the concept of amnesty, to wit:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grant to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is
given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must
be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence
of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. x x
x"51(Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, SECTION 4. Effects. (a) Amnesty pursuant to this proclamation shall
extinguish any criminal liability for acts committed in connection, incident or related
to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the
November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident without prejudice to the
grantees civil liability for injuries or damages caused to private persons.
(b) Except as provided below, the grant of amnesty shall effect the restoration of civil
and political rights or entitlement of grantees that may have been suspended, lost or
adversely affected by virtue of any executive, administrative or criminal action or
proceedings against the grantee in connection with the subject incidents, including
criminal conviction or (sic) any form, if any.
xxx
In light of the foregoing, to still sustain the finding, based on the participation of its
members in the Oakwood incident, that MAGDALO employs violence or other harmful
Page 382

3
means would be inconsistent with the legal effects of amnesty. Likewise, it would not
be in accord with the express intention of both the Executive and the Legislative
branches, in granting the said amnesty, to promote an atmosphere conducive to
attaining peace in line with the governments peace and reconciliation initiatives.
Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the COMELEC as
regards the use of violence. Thus, should MAGDALO decide to file another Petition for
Registration, its officers must individually execute affidavits renouncing the use of
violence or other harmful means to achieve the objectives of their organization.
Further, it must also be underscored that the membership of MAGDALO cannot
include military officers and/or enlisted personnel in active service, as this act would
run counter to the express provisions of the Constitution.
NOTE: (these principles were discussed in this case)
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review. 25 (Emphasis supplied.)
The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The instant
action brings to the fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the very notion of
the use of violence or unlawful means as a ground for disqualification from party
registration. Moreover, considering the expressed intention of MAGDALO to join
subsequent elections, as well as the occurrence of supervening events pertinent to
the case at bar, it remains prudent to examine the issues raised and resolve the
arising legal questions once and for all.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice
has been explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as
to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known x x x as to make it
indisputable among reasonable men."
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3
People of the Philippines & HSBC vs Judge Jose Vera & Mariano Cu Unjieng
65 PHIL 56 (1987)
FACTS:
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration
which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for
a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed
the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However,
Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for
hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which
provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a
system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces
are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because
Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law
provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the
power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides
that only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided
for the salary of a probation officer may the probation system be applied.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited
and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because
there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in
carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute
discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the
constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation
for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality.
This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation
officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. The SC declared
the old probation law as unconstitutional.
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3
G.R. No. L-46437 May 23, 1939 EUFEMIO P. TESORO vs. THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
FACTS:
Tesoro, a convict of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents, accepted the
parole granted by the governor
general. The same included the condition that he shall not commit any crime and will
conduct himself in an orderly
manner. Subsequently, he was charged with adultery. He was arrested and
recommitted to prison.
Rule: 1. Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no
legal authority to investigate
the conduct of the petitioner, and recommend the revocation of his parole. By the
terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report the executive secretary of the board
once a month during the first year of his parole, and, thereafter, once every three
months. By his consent to this condition, petitioner has placed himself under the
supervision of the board. The duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies a
corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire into his conduct, and a
fortiori to make recommendations to the President by whose
authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with
it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such
power of revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental
power of inquiry and investigation, the President of the Philippines is not precluded
by law or by the Constitution from making use of any agency of the government, or
even of any individual, to secure the necessary assistance.
2. Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has
committed a crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having
violated his conditional parole. Under condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed
that he "will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly
manner." (Emphasis ours.) It was, therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction
by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be
deemed to have violated his parole. And under section 64 (i) of the Administrative
Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of
any such
person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of
his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence."
3. Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the
conditional parole. He claims that,
according to the weight of the evidence, the violation took place, not "in the latter
part of September, 1937," as found by the President, but after October 28, 1937, the
date when the parole was supposed to expire. But that as it may, where, as in the
instant case, the determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere,
by way of review, with any of his findings. The petitioner herein having consented to
Page 385

3
place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, he
cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon
which his
recommitment was ordered.
4. When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in
which he was at the time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and
recommitted to prisons (See U.S. vs. Ignacio [1916}, 33 Phil., 202, 204; U.S. vs.
Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the rule is well-settled that, in requiring the convict
to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original sentence as he had
not suffered at the time of his release, the court should not consider the time during
which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original
sentence.
TORRES vs. GONZALES 152 SCRA 272 (1987)
FACTS:
Sometime before the 1979, petitioner was convicted of the crime of
estafa (two counts), and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term from 11 years,
10 months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1 day. These convictions were
affirmed by the CA. On April 19, 1939, a conditional pardon was granted to the
petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. "Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. On March 22,
1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. On September 8,
1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner who was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence. Claiming that he has been deprived of his rights under the due process
clause of the Constitution since he was not given an opportunity to be heard before
he was arrested and recommitted to prison and that he did not violate his
conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 2 counts
of estafa nor the crime of sedition, petitioner files this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary
terms of his conditional pardon.
HELD: No, a conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is not necessary
terms of his conditional pardon. The grant of pardon and the determination of the
terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts and which are
not subject to judicial scrutiny.
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the
proper consequences of such
breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Page 386

3
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of
violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where
the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much
less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had
already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense
for which he was conditionally
pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice.
BARRIOQUINTO vs. FERNANDEZ (January 21, 1949)
FACTS: Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder.
As Barrioquinto had not yet been arrested, the case was proceeded against Jimenez,
upon which the CFI of Zamboanga sentenced him to life imprisonment. Before the
period for perfecting an appeal has expired, defendant Jimemeze became aware of
Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946. The Proclamation granted amnesty in
favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the Revised
Penal Code. Provided, it is in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, which was committed from December
8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Philippines where the offense
was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation. Jimenez
decided to submit his case to the Guerilla Amnesty Commission presided by the
respondents herein, and the other petitioner Barrioquinto, who had then been already
apprehended, did the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commssion, presided by
the respondents, issued an order, returning the cases of the petitioners to the CFI of
Zamboanga. However, the commission did not decide whether or not the petitioners
are entitled to the benefits of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that
inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the
offense as Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolention who shot and killed the
victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to invoke the benefits of amnesty
RULING: YES, the petitioners are entitled to invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The theory of the respondents is predicated on a wrong conception of the
nature or character or an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon:
1.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which
must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty is granted by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with
the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take
judicial notice.
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3
2.
Pardons are granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to
classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction.
3.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an
offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the
punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him the sentence. While amnesty looks backward
and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order to
entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary
that he should, as a condition must admit having committed the criminal
act or offense with which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a
defense. It is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the
accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said
Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation of the
benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. Although
the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the
courts or the Amnesty Commission entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For,
whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense, with which he
is charged, the Commissions, if necessary or requested by the interested party,
should conduct summary hearing of the witnesses for both he complainants and the
accused.
Whether or not the defendant has admitted the commission of the
offense, he can invoke the benefit of amnesty. It is because there is no law,
which makes such admission or confession not admissible as evidence
against him in the courts of justice in case the Amnesty Commission finds
that the offense not come within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
TREATY MAKING
BAYAN vs. EXECUTIVE
342 SCRA 449 (2002)
FACTS:
On Oct. 5, 1998, President Estrada ratified the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the United States of America. The VFA
provides for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed
Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. The President
submitted the Agreement for concurrence by the Senate under Sec. 21, Art. VI,
instead of Sec. 25, Art XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Considering that the agreement is not a basing agreement but covers only
temporary presence of troops and facilities, is the President correct?
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3
HELD: No. Sec. 21, Art VII, applies to treaties in general regardless of the subject
matter or coverage. In contrast, Sec. 25, Art. XVIII is a special provision that applies
to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in
the Philippines. It is not right to argue that the latter section is inapplicable to mere
transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structures
for the establishment of a military bases, troops, or facilities. The conjunction is or.
Stated otherwise, the provision applies to entry of troops without any foreign bases
being established.
PIMENTEL vs. OFFICE
462 SCRA 265 (2005)
FACTS:
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court with
power to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. While the Philippines signed the
Statute on Dec. 28, 2000, the Office of the President did not ratify it in accordance
with its terms and did not transmit it to the Senate for its concurrence.
ISSUE: May a petition for mandamus lie to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the DFA to bring the signed copy to the Senate for its concurrence?
HELD: No. The President, being the head of the state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with
foreign nations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, the Constitution provides a limitation to his
power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the
validity of the treaty entered into by him. The role of the Senate, however, is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it
is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or,
having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal
of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that
should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus.
DEPORTATION OF UNDESIRABLE ALIENS

QUA CHEEGAN v. DEPORT.BD
9 SCRA 27 (1963)
FACTS:
Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the President to deport
aliens and, consequently, the delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary
power to investigate, on the ground that such power is vested in the Legislature. In
other words, it is claimed, for the power to deport to be exercised, there must be a
legislation authorizing the same.
ISSUE: Does the President have the power to deport aliens?
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If so, what is the extent of such power and may the President delegate the
said power to the Deportation Board?
What is the extent of such authority that the President may delegate?
Does the power of the President to conduct investigation for purposes of
finding grounds for deportation carries with it the power to order the arrest of the
alien complained of?
If so, may such power to order arrest be delegated?
HELD: Under the present and existing laws, deportation of an undesirable alien may
be effected in two ways: (1) by order of the President, after due investigation,
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and (2) by the
Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners,
under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
The President may only exercise the power to deport only upon the grounds
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, and on no other, as it would
be unreasonable and undemocratic to hold that an alien may be deported upon an
unstated or undefined ground depending merely on the unlimited discretion of the
Chief Executive.
The President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a
reading of Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." . .
. By virtue of Executive Order No. 33 dated May 29, 1936, President Quezon created
the Deportation Board primarily to receive complaints against aliens charged to be
undesirable, to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code and the rules and regulations therein provided, and make the
corresponding recommendation. Since then, the Deportation Board has been
conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the President.
On whether the authority of the President to conduct investigation herein,
carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the
Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same may be
delegated to the respondent Deportation Board.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is
necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already
stated, --there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of
deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the
deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien
be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino,
that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the
investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas.
And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be
delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may
not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power, considering that no express
authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve as
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a curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security
to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the
guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then a delegation of that implied
power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to the liberties of the people.
Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the
Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against
an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary
release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued
by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed
pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
GO TEK v. DEPORT. BD
79 SCRA 17 (1976)
FACTS: On March 3, 1964, the Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation Board (Board) filed
a complaint against the petitioner Go Tek, a resident Chinaman. It was alleged that:
"In December, 1963, the NBI searched an office believed to be the
headquarters of a guerilla unit of the " Emergency Intetligence Section, Armv of the
US", and that Go Tek was among those arrested, an alleged Sector Commander and
Intelligence and Record Officer of that guerilla unit; Fake dollar checks were found in
Go Tek's possession in violation of Art. 168 of the RPC, rendering himself an
undesirable alien.
The prosecutor prayed that the Board recommend to the President the alien's
immediate deportation as an undesirable alien, his presence in this country having
been and will always be inimical and a menace to the peace, welfare, and security of
the community. In a motion to dismiss, petitioner raised the argument that the
complaint was premature because there was a pending case against him for violation
of Art. 168 and that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the case in view of the obiter
dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case that the President may deport aliens only on the
grounds specified in the law. The Board denied the motion arguing that a criminal
conviction is not a prerequisite before the State may exercise its right to deport an
undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to
make a report and recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive
power to deport an alien or dismiss a deportation proceeding. The trial court, in
granting the writ of prohibition applied for by petitioner, ordered the Board to desist
from taking cognizance of the said complaint and held that the President may deport
only on grounds enumerated by law; that mere possession of forged dollar checks is
not a ground for deportation; that a criminal conviction is necessary; and that the
Board lacks jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a
ground which is not specified in Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law and although the
alien has not yet been convicted of the offense imputed to him.
HELD: We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for illegal
possession of fake dollar checks (as well as his alleged "guerilla" activities) inspite of
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the fact that he has not yet been convicted of illegal possession thereof under Art.
168 of the RPC and notwithstanding that the act is not among the grounds for the
deportation of undesirable aliens as enumerated under the law. The charge against
Go Tek before the Board was not premature.
1. The aforementioned obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case is not
decisive of this case. In the said case, the aliens were charged with
economic sabotage which is a ground for deportation under RA 503.
The ratio decidendi of that case is that the provision of EO 398, series
of 1951, empowering the Board to issue a warrant of arrest upon the
filing of formal charges against an alien, is illegal or unconstitutional
because it is contrary to section 1(3), Art. III of the 1935 Constitution
that warrants shall issue upon probable cause to be determined by the
JUDGE after examining under oath the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce.
2. The President's power to deport aliens and the investigations of aliens
subject to deportation are provided under Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. On the other hand, Section 37 of the Immigration
Law provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of
the Commissioner or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose, and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant "after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien." 13 classes of
aliens who may be deported by the Commissioner are specified in
Section 37.
So, under existing law, the deportation of undesirable aliens may be effected: (1) by
order Of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code; and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the Immigration
Law.
3. The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That
power may be exercised by the Chief Executive when he deems such
action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation.
When the Chief finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in
the country is injurious to the public interest, he may, even in the
absence of express law, deport them.
It has been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of the facts which warrant the deportation of aliens, as disclosed in an
investigation conducted in accordance with section 69. No other tribunal is at liberty
to re-examine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.
DOMINGO vs. SCHEER
421 SCRA 468 (2004)
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FACTS:
Herbert Scheer, a German national, was granted a permanent resident
status by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation in 1986, however, it was
discovered that he had police records an financial liabilities, as well as a pending
arrest warrant in Germany so that he was ordered deported from the Philippines.
ISSUE: Is the power of the President to determine whether an alien may be deported
from the Philippines subject to judicial review?
HELD: The authority to exclude or expel aliens by a power affecting international
relation is vested in the political department of the government, and is to be
regulated by treaty or by an act of Congress, and to be executed by executive
authority, except insofar as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or
by statute, or is required by the Constitution to intervene. Although the courts are
without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch, the court may resolve
questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with the Board of
Commissioners acted with grave abuse of discretion in causing Scheers arrest and
detention. Indeed, it deprived him of due process in issuing the order of deportation
without even conducting a summary hearing. The BOC merely concluded that Scheer
was involved in illegal activities in Palawan without affording him the right to be
heard.
BENGZON v. DRILON
208 SCRA 133 (1992)
FACTS: On June 20, 1953, RA 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This was amended by RA 1797 which
provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates. Identical benefits were
also given to the Members of the Constitutional Commission under RA 1568, as
amended by RA 3595. President Marcos signed PD 578, on Nov. 12, 1974, which
extended similar retirement benefits to the Members of the Armed Forces giving
them also the automatic readjustment features of RA's 1797 and 3595. However, on
Jan. 25, 1975, President Marcos issued PD 644 repealing Sec. 3-A of RA's 1797 and
3595 which authorized the adjustment of the pensions of the retired justices of the
SC, CA, Chairman & Members of the Constitutional Commission and the officers and
members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries. Significantly, while
the adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces was
restored by President Marcos, those of the retired justices of the SC and CA, were not.
This led to the passage by Congress of House Bill 16297 for the reenactment of the
repealed provisions of RA's 1797 and 3595 restoring the said retirement pensions and
privileges of the retired justices and Members of the Constitutional Commission.
President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill 16297, citing the policy on
standardization of compensation as reason for such veto.
Prior to the instant petition, however, some retired justices of the CA filed a
petition dated April 22, 1991 asking this Court for a readjustment of their monthly
pensions in accordance with RA 1797, contending that PD 644 repealing the latter
law did not become a law for lack of publication.
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The Court acted favorably on the request in a resolution dated Nov. 28, 1991.
Pursuant to such resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for
Fiscal Year 1992 (House Bill No. 34925) a certain appropriation for the Judiciary
intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates due the retired justices of the
SC and CA. On Jan. 15, 1992, the President vetoed some portions of Sec. 1 and the
entire Sec. 4 of the Special Provisions for the SC and the lower courts, some portions
of Sec. 1 and the entire Sec. 2 of the Special Provisions for the CA, and some portions
of Sec. 3 of Art. XLV of the Special Provisions of the General Fund Adjustments
(General Appropriations Act, FY 1992). Hence, the instant petition filed by the
petitioners as retired Justices of the SC and CA questioning the constitutionality of the
veto by the President of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for FY
1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the SC
and CA. The petitioners assert that said veto is not an item veto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto by the President of certain provisions in the
General Appropriations Act, FY 1992, relating to the payment of the adjusted
pensions of retired justices of the SC and CA, is unconstitutional.
HELD: The questioned veto is set aside as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed
provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are valid and subsisting.
The veto power is not absolute. In the exercise of the veto power, the
executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He cannot act like an editor
crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes.
However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration
needs the money to run the machinery of the government and it cannot veto the
entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore,
compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for
this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid
inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue
measure. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be
vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriation bill does not
grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of
the item.
The Presidential veto is unconstitutional because:
a) The President did not veto the "general fund adjustment" which is an item
which appropriates P 500-M to enable the government to meet certain unavoidable
obligations which may have been inadequately funded by the specific items for the
different branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of the government.
What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that
permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell
due;
b) An examination of all the sections and the underlined portions which were
vetoed will readily show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed
and unvested parts. Less than all of an item has been vetoed;
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c) The vetoed portions are NOT ITEMS. They are PROVISIONS. Thus, the
AUGMENTATION of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement
payments, by transferring savings from other items of appropriation is a provision
and not an item. It gives power to the Chief Justice to transfer funds from one item to
another. There is no specific appropriation of money involved.
In the same manner, the provision which states that, in compliance with
decisions of the SC and the COA, funds still undetermined in amount may be drawn
from the general fund adjustment is not an item. It is the "general fund adjustment"
itself which is the item. It was not vetoed.
No President may veto the provisions of a law enacted 35 years before his
term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a final and executory
judgment of the SC through the exercise of veto power.
GARCIA v. EXEC. SEC
211 SCRA 219 (1992)
FACTS:
The President issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other
duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines,
an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the
board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other products imported in the
Philippines. EO 443 subsequently increased this additional duty from 5% to 9% ad
valorem.
The Tariff Commission, following the procedures set forth by the Tariff and
Customs Code for the imposition of a special levy on crude oil and other petroleum
products, scheduled a public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity to be
heard and to present evidence in support of their respective positions.
Meantime, the President issued EO 475 reducing the rate of additional duty
from 9% to 5% ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products.
Upon completion of the public hearings, the Commission submitted to the President a
"Report" for consideration and appropriate action. A week later, the President issued
EO 478 which levied (in addition to the aforementioned duty of 9% ad valorem and all
other existing ad valorem duties) a special levy of 95 centavos per liter or 151.05
pesos per barrel of imported crude oil and P 1 per liter of imported oil products.
Petitioner filed a petition assailing the validity of EO No.'s 475 and 478 as
violative of Sec. 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. He contended that since the
Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may
not assume such power by issuing EO No.'s 475 and 478 which are in the nature of
revenue-generating measures. He further argued that EO No.'s 475 and 478
contravene Sec. 401 of the Tariff & Customs Code which authorized the President to
increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose additional duties ONLY when
necessary to protect local industries or products but NOT for the purpose of raising
additional revenue for the government.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not EO No.'s 475 and 478 are violative of the Constitution
and whether or not they contravene the TCC.
HELD: We believe and so hold that EO No.'s 475 and 478 which may be conceded to
be substantially moved by the desire to generate additional revenues, are not, for
that reason alone, either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under Sec. 401 of
the TCC. Petitioner has not successfully overcome the presumptions of
constitutionality and legality to which these EO's are entitled.
1. Under Sec. 24, Art. VI, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and
tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the
legislative rather than the Executive department. There is an explicit
constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President
"subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose"
to fix "within specific limits tariff rates and other duties or imposts"
(Sec. 28, Par. 2, Art. VI).
2. The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's contention that the
President is authorized to act under the TCC ONLY to protect local
industries and products for the sake of the national economy, general
welfare and/or national security for the following reasons:
a. There is nothing in the language of either Sec. 104 or 401 of the
TCC that suggests such a sharp and absolute limitation of
authority. The words "protective" and "protection", being relied
upon by petitioner, are simply not enough to support the very
broad and encompassing limitation which the latter seeks to
rest on those two words;
b. Petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of
which this Court may take judicial notice -- thai the Bureau of
Customs which administers the TCC is one of the principal
traditional generators of producers of governmental revenue,
the other being the BIR;
c. Customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates
are very much like taxes which are frequently imposed for
revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. The levying of
customs duties on imported goods may have in some measure
the effect of protecting local industries. Simultaneously,,
however, the very same customs duties inevitably have the
effect of producing governmental revenues. In the instant case,
since the Philippines in fact produces 10 to 15 % of the crude oil
consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a
special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products
may be seen to have SOME 11protective" impact upon
indigenous oil production for the effective price of imported
crude oil and oil products is increased. At the same time, it
cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the
government are raised by the imposition of such increased tariff
rates or special duty;
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d. Sec. 401 of the TCC establishes general standards with which
the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the
President must be consistent: that authority must be exercised
in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or
national security. Petitioner, however, insists that the
"protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective
that can be secured by the exercise of that delegated authority.
We find it extremely difficult to take seriously such a confined
and closed view of the legislative standards and policies
summed up in Sec. 401.
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v. CEMENT
MANUFACTURERS, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF TRADE, et al.
G.R. No. 158540, 3 August 2005, En Banc (Tinga, J.)
PRINCIPLE: Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may impose
general safeguard measures without a positive final determination by the Tariff
Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may reverse or even review the factual
determination made by the Tariff Commission. Congress has the putative authority to
abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI. It is similarly empowered to alter or expand
its functions through modalities which do not align with established norms in the
bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound to recognize the legislative prerogative to
prescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may be, in affirmation of the
legislative power to restructure the executive branch of government.
ISSUE: Positive Final Determination By the Tariff Commission an Indispensable
Requisite to the Imposition of General Safeguard Measures
HELD: The second core ruling in the Decision was that contrary to the holding of the
Court of Appeals, the DTI Secretary was barred from imposing a general safeguard
measure absent a positive final determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The
fundamental premise rooted in this ruling is based on the acknowledgment that the
required positive final determination of the Tariff Commission exists as a properly
enacted constitutional limitation imposed on the delegation of the legislative power
to impose tariffs and imposts to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI of the
Constitution.
Congressional Limitations Pursuant To Constitutional Authority on the
Delegated Power to Impose Safeguard Measures
The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties on
imported products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the importation
of a product into the country. Concerning as they do the foreign importation of
products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall within the ambit of
Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
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tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.[49]
The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and, hence,
governing in this case. They are:
(1) It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts. Thus, the authority cannot come from the Finance Department, the
National Economic Development Authority, or the World Trade Organization, no
matter how insistent or persistent these bodies may be.
(2) The authorization granted to the President must be embodied in a law.
Hence, the justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive powers. It
cannot arise from administrative or executive orders promulgated by the executive
branch or from the wisdom or whim of the President.
(3) The authorization to the President can be exercised only within the
specified limits set in the law and is further subject to limitations and
restrictions which Congress may impose. Consequently, if Congress specifies
that the tariff rates should not exceed a given amount, the President cannot impose a
tariff rate that exceeds such amount. If Congress stipulates that no duties may be
imposed on the importation of corn, the President cannot impose duties on corn, no
matter how actively the local corn producers lobby the President. Even the most
picayune of limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must be observed by the
President.
There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional
postulates. These impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the
realm of the power of taxation, a power which is within the sole province of
the legislature under the Constitution.
Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to
impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the importation of
foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment
of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute an
undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields
such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an
exceptional grant of legislative power to the President, rather than the affirmation of
an inherent executive power.
This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential
authority attain primordial consideration. First, there must be a law, such as the SMA.
Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which would be filled in by the law.
And further, Congress is further empowered to impose limitations and restrictions on
this presidential authority. On this last power, the provision does not provide for
specified conditions, such as that the limitations and restrictions must conform to
prior statutes, internationally accepted practices, accepted jurisprudence, or the
considered opinion of members of the executive branch.
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The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under Section
28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by
the alter egos of the President, such as department secretaries. Indeed, for purposes
of the Presidents exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it
is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts asalter ego of the President. The SMA
provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is
tasked by Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such
measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even as alter ego of
the President, to levy tariffs and imports.
Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise
construed within the same context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of
its inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the executive branch, subject to
limitations and restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI
Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited respective
spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation of the said law which
significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of
taxation. Indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of
Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress,
not the President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and
imposts. Without legislative authorization through statute, the President
has no power, authority or right to impose such safeguard measures
because taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.
When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose
safeguard measures under the delineated conditions, the President or
the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to perform
an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the legislature. It is
basic agency law that the agent may not act beyond the specifically delegated
powers or disregard the restrictions imposed by the principal. In short, Congress may
establish the procedural framework under which such safeguard measures may be
imposed, and assign the various offices in the government bureaucracy respective
tasks pursuant to the imposition of such measures, the task assignment including the
factual determination of whether the necessary conditions exists to warrant such
impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff
Commission their respective functions[50] in the legislatures scheme of things.
There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and
restrictions imposed by Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI, and that is such
limitations and restrictions are themselves violative of the Constitution. Thus, no
matter how distasteful or noxious these limitations and restrictions may seem, the
Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity
can be demonstrated.
What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case? The
entire SMA provides for a limited framework under which the President, through the
DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in the form of
tariffs and similar imposts. The limitation most relevant to this case is contained in
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Section 5 of the SMA, captioned Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard
Measures, and stating:
The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final
determination of the [Tariff] Commission that a product is being imported into
the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic
production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the
domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary
shall first establish that the application of such safeguard measures will be in the
public interest.[51]
IMMUNITY FROM SUITS
GLORIA v. CA
338 SCRA 5 (2000)
FACTS: Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed by President Aquino as Schools Division
Superintendent, Division of City Schools in Quezon City. He was reassigned as a
superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology as recommended
y DECS Sec. Ricardo Gloria on June 17, 1994. In October 1994 Director Roxas
informed Icasiano of the reassignment but Icasiano requested reconsideration of the
assignment. Request was denied and CA granted a TRO. CA found that the
reassignment as violative of Icasianos security of tenure. However, Sec. Gloria and
Director Roxas contend that the prohibition is improper because it attacks as act of
the President in violation of the Doctrine of Presidential immunity from suit.
HELD: The contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed
against the petitioners and not against the President.
The questioned acts are those of the petitioners and not of the President.
Furthermore, Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there
is grave abuse of discretion or that the President has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO
356 SCRA 108
FACTS:
Following the aborted impeachment trial and the resignation of
majority of the members of the cabinet and the defection of the military and police at
about noon of Jan. 20, 2001, Vice-President Arroyo was sworn into Office as President
of the Philippines, while President Estrada with his family left Malacaang. In the days
that followed, various criminal complaints were filed against Estrada before the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Is Estrada, a non-sitting President, still immune from suit?
HELD: No. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination, can these
crimes, especially plunder, which carries the death penalty, covered by the alleged
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mantle of immunity of a non-sitting President. There is no decision licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not
acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in
the same footing as any other trespasser.
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO
353 SCRA 424
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit Assuming he enjoys
immunity, the
extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before
the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted
in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from
all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. [Estrada vs. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452(2001)]
HELD: We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he
must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of
petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events
that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed
Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus
Officio109 Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he
can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in
a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be
sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when
impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him,
incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the
period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar
circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted
and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a
condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different
factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a nonsitting President.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged
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3
mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of
this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with
post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful
acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a
judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search
for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 scra 160

Facts: These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that
in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) declaring state of national
emergency and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of
the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic
institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected
by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
Ruling: The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a

call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to
enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the
President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017
declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take
over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and
the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made
punishable
by
the
Legislature,
such
portion
of
G.O.
No.
5
is
declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the
absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on
media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of
the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
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Rubrico vs. Arroyo, 613 scra 233

Writ of amparo case..
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their]
Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity from suit
during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such
immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.
Ruling: Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains
preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the
present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986
Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the
President may not be sued during his or her tenure. 9 The Court subsequently made it
abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the
umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during
her incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance
of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. 10 x x x
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what
specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners
protected rights.
Lozada vs. Arroyo, 670 scra 664

Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in dropping as respondent Pres. Gloria Arroyo
despite her failure to submit a verified return and personally claim presidential
immunity in a way not in accord with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his
or her tenure of office or actual incumbency. 68 Conversely, this presidential privilege
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of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed
during his or her tenure.69
In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing
of the original Petition and the issuance of the CA Decision, occurred during the
incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that respect, it was proper for the court a
quo to have dropped her as a respondent on account of her presidential immunity
from suit.
It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of office has already ended,
former President Arroyo can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity
as a defense to evade judicial determination of her responsibility or accountability for
the alleged violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security of
Lozada.
Public interest vs. Elma, 517 scra 336

Facts: Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as
PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He
accepted the second appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may receive
as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void.
Ruling: the Supreme Court declared that the concurrent appointments of the
respondent as PCGG Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that the
concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. The duties of the CPLC
include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of
various executive departments and agencies and reviewing investigations involving
heads of executive departments. Since the actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of
an executive agency, are subject to the review of the CPLC, such appointments would
be incompatible.
The Court also decreed that the strict prohibition under Section 13 Article VII of the
1987 Constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG
Chairman nor the CPLC is a secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
However, had the rule thereunder been applicable to the case, the defect of these
two incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The said section allows the
concurrent holding of positions only when the second post is required by the primary
functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity. Although
respondent Elma waived receiving renumeration for the second appointment, the
primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not require his appointment as CPLC
City of Tagaytay vs. Guerrero, 600 scra 33
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Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of
two (2) parcels of land situated in the Province of Batanggas. TTTDC incurred real
estate tax liabilities on the said properties for the tax years 1976 to 1983. the City
Government of Tagaytay (City of Tagaytay) offered the properties for sale at public
auction. Being the only bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of the City
of Tagaytay and was correspondingly inscribed on the titles of the properties. It then
filed an unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of title in its favor before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City. Subsequently,
theses lands were sold to Melencios.
, TTTDC filed a petition for nullification of the public auction involving the disputed
properties on the ground that the properties were not within the jurisdiction of the
City of Tagaytay and, thus, beyond its taxing authority. 15 The case, docketed as Civil
Case No. TG-1196 before the RTC of Cavite. The auction sale was nullified. Said
decision became final and executor. Petitioners filed an MR. Denied..
Issue: ) whether the RTC of Cavite had jurisdiction to settle the alleged boundary
dispute;
Ruling: the subject properties that are situated in Barrio Birinayan, Municipality of
Talisay, are within the territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Batangas. This factual
finding binds this Court and is no longer subject to review
There is no boundary dispute in the case at bar. The RTC did not amend the existing
territorial limits of the City of Tagaytay and the Province of Batangas. The entire
Barrio Birinayan was transferred to the Municipality of Talisay, Province of Batangas,
by virtue of R.A. No. 1418. At present, Barrio Birinayan forms part of the Municipality
of Laurel, also in the Province of Batangas, pursuant to R.A. No. 5689. The RTC acted
well within its powers when it passed judgment on the nullification of the auction sale
of the contested properties, considering that the City of Tagaytay has no right to
collect real estate taxes on properties that are not within its territorial jurisdiction.
In re Valenzuela, 298 scra 408
De castro vs. JBC, 615 scra 666

Issue: Whether the incumbent President is constitutionally proscribed from appointing
the successor of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010
until the ban ends at 12:00 noon of June 30, 2010
Ruling: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
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provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended
point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter.
(note: The Valenzuela case cited as authority for the position that the election ban
provision applies to the whole Judiciary, only decided the issue with respect to lower
court judges, specifically, those covered by Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any reference to the filling up of vacancies in the Supreme Court pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII constitutes obiter dictum as this issue was not directly in issue and
was not ruled upon).
RE: Seniority Among the Fou (4) Most Recent Apppointments to the Position
of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals
Newly appointed justices. After some initial confusion, the four Justices were finally
listed in the roster of the CA Justices in the following order of seniority: Justice
Fernandez (as most senior), Justice Peralta, Jr., Justice Hernando and Justice AntonioValenzuela (as most junior). The ranking was based in a letter dated March 25, 2010
submitted by the members of the CA Committee on Rules to CA Presiding Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
Ruling: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act, of one who has the
authority, of designating or selecting an individual to discharge and perform the
duties and functions of an office or trust. 3 Where the power of appointment is
absolute and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or
approval is necessary and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission,
may issue at once.4 The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required
of the appointing authority has been complied with.5
In Valencia v. Peralta, 6 the Court ruled that a written memorial that can render title to
public office indubitable is required. This written memorial is known as the
commission. For purposes of completion of the appointment process, the
appointment is complete when the commission is signed by the executive, and
sealed if necessary, and is ready to be delivered or transmitted to the
appointee.7 Thus, transmittal of the commission is an act which is done after the
appointment has already been completed. It is not required to complete the
appointment but only to facilitate the effectivity of the appointment by the
appointees receipt and acceptance thereof.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission
has been signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such
document) is the date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of
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the members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP
129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the earlier the date of the commission
of an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other subsequent appointees. It is
only when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the
order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material.
Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil 522

Facts: Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay
income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After
paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First
Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for
the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the
Constitution.
Ruling: judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries,
because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of
their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited
by the Constitution
Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil 696

Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that
decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the
salaries of judicial officers. section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is
hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or
by law.
A joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring
section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant
Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M.
Endencia representing the income tax collected on his salary and to Justice Fernando
Jugo.
Ruling: When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act
unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of
office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of
the state is imperative and unceasing.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from
payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his
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office, provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but
based on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought
and action. The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but
was grounded on public policy
1. Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, GR L-78780, 23 July

1987
FACTS: Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were
duly appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region. They
seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer
of the Supreme Court) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries. Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminution of the salaries of
Judges/Justices?
HELD: The SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in
PERFECTO VS. MEER (88 Phil 552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93 Phil 696), that
declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the
income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during
their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices
and Judges are property subject to general income tax applicable to all income
earners and that the payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall
within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their
continuance in office.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that
the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make
the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is
but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect.
The ruling that the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a
diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed
in Endencia vs. David, must be deemed discarded.
2. Gualberto J. De La Llana, et. al. vs. Manuel Alba, et. al., GR No. L57883, 12 March 1982
FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing
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BP 129, which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to
MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to
the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit
of this character, it being alleged that the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUES: W/N BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the
justices and judges in this case?
HELD: The SC ruled that the Court is empowered:
to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order
their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the
Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of
course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question
of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its
effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In
the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance
with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent
justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be
accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure
to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory
opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this
Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the
hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore
from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge
that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the
power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in
the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would
invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
3. In Re First Indorsemet From Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez Dated 16
March 1988 Requesting Honorable Justice Marcelo B. Fernan To
Comment On An Anonymous Letter-Complaint, A.M. No. 88-4-5433
April 15, 1988
Facts: Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor, Raul M. Gonzales, endorsed an anonymous
letter complaint with enclosure dated 14 December 1987, against Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan.
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The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter
by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez
referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice
Marcelo B. Fernan. The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel
Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he
apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case
No. 3135 against Justice Fernan.
Issue: W/N disbarment proceeding will prosper against a justice of the Supreme
Court whose position is constitutionally classified as impeachable?
Held: The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in
Administrative Case No. 3135 in the following terms:
There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment must be dismissed.
Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be
members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment
(Article XI [2], Constitution) To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the
Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence
to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be
removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses
listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution...
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution quoted in Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan are
substantially reproduced in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, may
be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal
of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. (underscoring supplied)
It is important to make clear that the Court is not saying that Members of the other
constitutional offices we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for
possible criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other
supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental
procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be
determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed
from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be
thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or
administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may
be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
4. Civil Service Commission, Petitioner, Vs. Department Of Budget And
Management, Respondent, G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Civil Service Commission filed a petition for mandamus which seeks
to compel the respondent Department of Budget and Management to release the
balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. It also seeks a determination by this Court
of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
The petitioner claimed that the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002
appropriated P215,270,000.00 for its Central Office, with a total allocation from all
sources, amounting to P285,660,790.44. [1] It complained, however, that the total
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3
fund released by the respondent to the petitioner during the fiscal year 2002 was
only P279,853,398.14, leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.
The balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its no report,
no release policy, whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their
submission of the documents mentioned in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of
National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds.
Issue: W/N, the application of the no report, no release policy upon independent
constitutional bodies like the petitioner, CSC, a violation of the principle of fiscal
autonomy, and therefore, unconstitutional.
Held: The SC held that the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced
against offices vested with fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5
of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.
By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to
petitioner, a constitutional commission, which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should
thus be construed to mean that no conditions for fund releases may be imposed. This
conclusion is consistent with the June 3, 1993 Resolution of this Court which
effectively prohibited the enforcement of a no report, no release policy against the
Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. [10]
The Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold
that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of
a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities
vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted
the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the
Constitution.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be
given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies
not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
Significantly, pertinent General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA read as follows:
Sec. 63. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or
reduction of appropriations authorized in this Act shall be effected only in cases
where there is unmanageable national government budget deficit.
(underscoring supplied)
Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this Section shall

be construed to mean that the actual national government budget deficit has
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exceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets consistent with the full-year target
deficit of P130.0 billion as indicated in the FY 2002 Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing submitted by the President to Congress pursuant to Section 22,
Article VII of the Constitution or there are clear economic indications of an impending
occurrence of such condition, as determined by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee and approved by the President. (underscoring supplied)
In contrast, the immediately succeeding provision of the Year 2002 GAA, which
specifically applied to offices vested with fiscal autonomy, stated:
Sec. 64. Appropriations of Agencies Vested with Fiscal Autonomy. Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the appropriations authorized
in this Act for the Judiciary, Congress of the Philippines, the Commission on Human
Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections shall be automatically and
regularly released. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, while the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is generally
allowed when there is an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in
conformity with the Constitution, excepted from such rule the appropriations for
entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming that there was a revenue
shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not withhold full release of petitioners funds
without violating not only the Constitution but also Section 64 of the General
Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.
This Court is not unaware that its above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution also states as a
guiding principle on the Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciarys Fiscal Autonomy
that:
After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically
and regularly released subject to availability of funds. (underscoring supplied)
This phrase subject to availability of funds does not, however, contradict the
present ruling that the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be
automatically and regularly released a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding. What is
contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a situation where total revenue collections
are so low that they are not sufficient to cover the total appropriations for all
entities vested with fiscal autonomy. In such event, it would be practically
impossible to fully release the Judiciarys appropriations or any of the entities also
vested with fiscal autonomy for that matter, without violating the right of such other
entities to an automatic release of their own appropriations. It is under that situation
that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release
appropriations is allowed. (underscoring supplied)
Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a small
portion of the total national budget, only in the most extreme circumstances will the
total revenue collections fall short of the requirements of such agencies.
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With respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly provides:
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary
may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the
previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. [16]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional
Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction of appropriations below the
amount for the previous year is clearly absent. Article IX (A), Section 5 merely
states:
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of
appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited
from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount
appropriated for them for the previous year.
In light of all the foregoing discussions, respondents act of withholding the subject
funds
from
petitioner due
to
revenue
shortfall
is
hereby
declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
5. Re: Clarifying And Strengthening The Organizational Structure and
Administrative Set-Up of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA),
A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA, January 31, 2006
Facts: The Court promulgated a Resolution on February 24, 2004, clarifying and
strengthening the organizational structure and administrative set-up of the Philippine
Judicial Academy (PHILJA).1 Pursuant to said resolution, the positions of SC Chief
Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer with Salary Grades (SG) 25
and 23, respectively, were created in the following Divisions of the PHILJA:
Publications Division, and External Linkages Division (Research, Publications and
Linkages Office); Mediation Education and Management Division (Judicial Reforms
Office); Corporate Planning Division, and Administrative Division (Administrative and
Finance Office). However, in its Notice of Organization, Staffing, and Compensation
Action (NOSCA) dated May 5, 2005, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) downgraded said positions and their corresponding salary grades, as follows:
Position
Position
Title/SG
per Title/SG
per Remarks
A.M. No.
DBM NOSCA
01-1-04-SC
SC
Chief Administrative Title
Judicial
Staff Officer V/SG 24 downgraded
Officer/ SG 25
and
SG
reduced
Supervising
Administrative Title
Judicial
Staff Officer IV/SG22 downgraded
Page 413

3
Officer/SG 23
and
SG
reduced2
On July 5, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution, retaining "the originally proposed
titles and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising
Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23) in the [PHILJA]".
Issue: W/N, DBMs issuance of the NOSCA downgrading the Courts proposed
positions and reducing its corresponding salary grades "undermine the independence
of the Judiciary and impinge on the Supreme Courts exercise of its fiscal autonomy
expressly granted by the Constitution."
Held: The SC held that the primary role of the DBM is to breathe life into the policy
behind the Salary Standardization Law of "providing equal pay for substantially equal
work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions." Pursuant to its
mandate, the DBM is authorized to evaluate and determine whether a proposed
reclassification and upgrading scheme is consistent with applicable laws and
regulations.5 The task of the DBM is simply to review the compensation and benefits
plan of the government agency or entity concerned and determine if it complies with
the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard. Thus, the role of the DBM
is "supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the proposed
compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to [government] officials and
employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable
laws."6
As such, the authority of the DBM to review Supreme Court issuances relative to
court personnel on matters of compensation is even more limited, circumscribed as it
is by the provisions of the Constitution, specifically Article VIII, Section 3 7 on fiscal
autonomy and Article VIII, Section 6 8 on administrative supervision over court
personnel. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control 9, as the Court
explained in Bengzon v. Drilon.10
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties.
The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is
anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is
based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant
reminders. XXX
Clearly then, in downgrading the positions and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer and SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer in the PHILJA, the DBM overstepped
its authority and encroached upon the Courts fiscal autonomy and supervision of
court personnel as enshrined in the Constitution; in fine, a violation of the
Constitution itself.
Moreover, the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act reiterates the
constitutional provision on fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary. In matters affecting court
personnel and compensation, the Court is guided by the Special Provision for the
Judiciary under the General Appropriations Act for FY 2003 (Republic Act No. 9206),
which was deemed reenacted for FY 2004, and hence governed during the issuance
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3
of the Resolution of 24 February 2004. The Special Provision vests the Chief Justice
with the authority to "formulate and implement the organizational structure of the
Judiciary, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances and other benefits of their
personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, makes adjustments in the
personal services itemization, including but not limited to the transfer of item or
creation of new positions in the Judiciary." (underscoring supplied)
It is therefore clear that when the Court exercises its administrative authority over
matters affecting its personnel, it does so within parameters prescribed by pertinent
laws. It cannot be presumed that the Court will violate budgetary laws or go beyond
the ambit of its authority or issue administrative resolutions in derogation of the law.
The exercise of such authority should not in any case be absolute or outside the law
as, being the ultimate interpreter of the law, the Court is constitutionally bound to
observe the Constitution and the law it is mandated to interpret. On the other hand,
the DBM is duty-bound not only to accord respect for the issuances of the highest
Court in the Judiciary, the third branch of government, but also to implement them.
For the DBM to even venture to alter a Resolution of the Court is to violate the basic
principle of separation of powers. xxx
xxx
Thus, the authority of the DBM to "review" the plantilla and compensation of court
personnel extends only to "calling the attention of the Court" on what it may perceive
as erroneous application of budgetary laws and rules on position classification. The
DBM may not overstep its authority in such a way as to cause the amendment or
modification of Court resolutions even if these pertain to administration of
compensation and position classification system. Only after its attention to an
allegedly erroneous application of the pertinent law or rule has been called by the
DBM may the Court amend or modify its resolution, as its judgment and discretion
may dictate under the law.
In this instance, the change of two position titles was made apparently to conform to
position titles indicated in the personnel services itemization for all government
positions, clearly oblivious of the fact that positions in the Judiciary are peculiar only
to that branch of government. It appearing that the salary grades of 25 and 23 are
proper positions equivalent to those of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising
Judicial Staff Officer, respectively, under the Salary Standardization Law, and that the
Court prescribed those position titles only after consideration of the nature of work
and functions that the holders of those positions must perform, there is no reason to
amend the Resolutions of 24 February 2004, and of 5 July 2005, so as to reflect the
position titles and salary grades stated in the NOSCA for the same positions. 12
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Department of Budget and Management is
DIRECTED to implement the Resolutions of the Court dated February 24, 2004 and
July 5, 2005, retaining the originally proposed titles and salary grades of the positions
of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23)
in the Philippine Judicial Academy.
6. Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the
Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012
Facts: On June 8, 2010, the Legal Services Sector of the Office of the General
Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), issued an opinion which found the
underpayment amounting to P221,021.50, which resulted when five (5) retired
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3
Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties
assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the
Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the
purchased vehicles by applying the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint
Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the
Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, 3 when it
should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A 4 dated
August 5, 1998.
Issue: W/N, the Commission on Audit (COA) encroached into the Courts judicial
prerogative in light of the Courts fiscal autonomy, when it questions and attempts to
substitute the Courts policy in the disposal of its property.
Held: The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief
Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of
administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court
En Bancs Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal
autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciarys
properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the appellate courts:
XXX by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in Bengzon v. Drilon
(G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the Judiciary has "full flexibility
to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs
require";
XXX the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate
courts of purchasing for sentimental reasons at retirement government properties
they used during their tenure has been recognized as a privilege enjoyed only by
such government officials; and
XXX the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that respect for
sentiments that a retiring Justice attaches to properties he or she officially used
during his or her tenure should be in consonance with the need for restraint in the
utilization and disposition of government resources.
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its independence,
the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where,
when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court
officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Courts granted power;
they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 is part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to
determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed
of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are
exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of
the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the
Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs.
(underscoring supplied)
As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government
Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM), Volume 1, particularly, Section 501 of Title
7, Chapter 3, which states:
Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment. The full
and sole authority and responsibility for the divestment and disposal of property and
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3
other assets owned by the national government agencies or instrumentalities, local
government units and government-owned and/or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries shall be lodged in the heads of the departments, bureaus, and offices of
the national government, XXX. (underscoring supplied)
This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Judiciary,
possesses the full and sole authority and responsibility to divest and dispose of the
properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office, he determines the manner
and the conditions of disposition, which in this case relate to a benefit. As the usual
practice of the Court, this authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation
with the Court En Banc. However, whether exercised by the Chief Justice or by the
Supreme Court En Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion is unequivocal and
leaves no room for interpretations and insertions.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the appraisal value
made by the Property Division, Office of `Administrative Services, of the properties
purchased by the retired Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the
Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be
legal and valid. Let the Commission on Audit be accordingly advised of this
Resolution for its guidance.
7. Annotation Supreme Court re: Jose Suan, Petitioner, Vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, Irma Fishing And Trading Inc., Roberto
Del Rosario And Emiliano Oripaypay, Respondents, G.R. No. 141441,
June 19, 2001
Facts: Jose Suan filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set
aside the decision dated August 17, 1999 of the respondent Court of Appeals 1 which
affirmed the decision of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter dismissing the petitioners
illegal dismissal case against private respondents and the resolution denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration. 2
Issue: W/N, petitioners remedy of filing the petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court was proper.
Held: The SC ruled that the petition was without merit. The Court found the petition
was essentially raising a factual issue, whether petitioner was illegally dismissed from
his employment by the private respondents.
In petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is confined to a review of questions of law, except where the findings
of fact are not supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
a serious abuse of discretion. 8 It is a settled ruling that the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts.9 (underscoring supplied)
The arguments herein raised are mere rehash of petitioners contentions in his
memorandum filed with the NLRC and in his petition for certiorari filed with the
respondent court. We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent
Court of Appeals that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent
NLRC and Labor Arbiter in finding and declaring that petitioner was not dismissed by
the private respondent and hence not entitled to backwages.
8. Evelyn Ongsuco And Antonia Salaya, Petitioners, V. Hon. Mariano M.
Malones, Both In His Private And Official Capacity As Mayor Of The
Municipality Of Maasin, Iloilo, Respondent, G.R. No. 182065, October
27, 2009
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3
Facts: Petitioners, Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya, filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 November 2006, affirming the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 39, of Iloilo City, dated 15 July 2003, in a Civil Case dismissing the
special civil action for Mandamus/Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, filed by the petitioners
against respondent Mayor Mariano Malones of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo.
Petitioners are stall holders of the newly renovated Maasin Public Market, which
imposes an increased goodwill fees of P20,000.00/month in contrast with the
previous P45.00/month rent prior to the renovation, as sanctioned by the Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled "The Municipal Revised Revenue Code" approved on 17
August 1998. The same Code authorized respondent to enter into lease contracts
over the said market stalls,5 and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the
stall holders at the municipal public market. On 18 September 1988, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin passed a Resolution No. 68 declaring the public
hearing dated 11 August 1988 inoperative because majority of the persons affected
by the imposition of the goodwill fee failed to agree to the said measure. However,
the respondent Mayor vetoed the resolution. Thereafter, the respondent Mayor sent a
letter to the petitioners informing them that the stalls were considered vacant and
open for any qualified and interested applicants, due to the fact that they did not
have a new lease contract required by the new ordinance.
Issue: W/N, petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of
the CA before the SC is proper, where petitioners raise the following issues:
I WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE EXHAUSTED ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
BEFORE FILING THE INSTANT CASE IN COURT;
II WHETHER OR NOT EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS APPLICABLE IN
THIS CASE; AND
III WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLEE MARIANO MALONES WHO WAS THEN THE
MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF MAASIN, ILOILO HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.25
Held:
1. On issues 1 and 2, the Court determines that there is no need for petitioners
to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.
The findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the Petition for
Prohibition/Mandamus in the Civil Case was premature is anchored on Section 187 of
the Local Government Code, which reads:
Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue
Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax
ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this
Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the
enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty
(30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a
decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided,
however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of
the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse
of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the
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3
aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction.
It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or
her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the
court is fatal to one's cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. However,
there are several exceptions to this rule.26
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court
from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a
case where the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence;
and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly
constitute an exception.27 Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation
and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is
exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may
establish.28
In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need
to present evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No.
25843 was whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite
the absence, prior to its enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with
Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and
jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of
lower courts over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question. (underscoring supplied)
Although not raised in the Petition at bar, the Court is compelled to discuss another
procedural issue, specifically, the declaration by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, that petitioners availed themselves of the wrong remedy in filing a
Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before the RTC.
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3
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of the Rules of Court lay down under what
circumstances petitions for prohibition and mandamus may be filed, to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent
to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, XXX.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus . - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by
the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent. (Emphases ours.)
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person - whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions - - who has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner
prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition. 32 On the other
hand, the remedy of mandamus lies to compel performance of a ministerial duty. 33
The petitioner for such a writ should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right
to the performance of the act, and it must be the clear and imperative duty of
respondent to do the act required to be done. 34
In this case, petitioners' primary intention is to prevent respondent from
implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting the goodwill fees
from petitioners and barring them from occupying the stalls at the municipal public
market. Obviously, the writ petitioners seek is more in the nature of prohibition
(commanding desistance), rather than mandamus (compelling performance).
For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are:
(1) the impugned act must be that of a "tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions"; and
(2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 35
The exercise of judicial function consists of the power to determine what the law is
and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon the rights of
the parties. The term quasi-judicial function applies to the action and discretion of
public administrative officers or bodies that are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. In
implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, respondent is not called upon to
adjudicate the rights of contending parties or to exercise, in any manner, discretion
of a judicial nature.
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3
A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a
given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his
or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. 36
The Court holds that respondent herein is performing a ministerial function.
The Court further notes that respondent already deemed petitioners' stalls at the
municipal public market vacated. Without such stalls, petitioners would be unable to
conduct their businesses, thus, depriving them of their means of livelihood. It is
imperative on petitioners' part to have the implementation of Municipal Ordinance
No. 98-01 by respondent stopped the soonest. As this Court has established in its
previous discussion, there is no more need for petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies, considering that the fundamental issue between them and respondent is
one of law, over which the courts have competence and jurisdiction. There is no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for petitioners in the ordinary course of law,
except to seek from the courts the issuance of a writ of prohibition commanding
respondent to desist from continuing to implement what is allegedly an invalid
ordinance.rl
2. On the validity of Municipal Ordinance N. 98-01, the SC ruled that:
While the respondent maintains that the imposition of goodwill fees upon stall
holders at the municipal public market is not a revenue measure that requires a prior
public hearing, and that rentals and other consideration for occupancy of the stalls at
the municipal public market are not matters of taxation, the SC rules that
respondent's argument is specious.
Article 219 of the Local Government Code provides that a local government unit
exercising its power to impose taxes, fees and charges should comply with the
requirements set in Rule XXX, entitled "Local Government Taxation":
Article 219. Power to Create Sources of Revenue. Consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy, each LGU shall exercise its power to create its own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, or charges, subject to the provisions of this Rule.
Such taxes, fees, or charges shall accrue exclusively to the LGU.
Article 221(g) of the Local Government Code of 1991 defines "charges" as:
Article 221. Definition of Terms.
xxx
(g) Charges refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property.
Evidently, the revenues of a local government unit do not consist of taxes alone, but
also other fees and charges. And rentals and goodwill fees, imposed by Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01 for the occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market,
fall under the definition of charges. (underscoring supplied)
For the valid enactment of ordinances imposing charges, certain legal requisites must
be met. Section 186 of the Local Government Code identifies such requisites as
follows:
Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. Local government units
may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not
otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided,
That the taxes, fees or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive,
confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the
ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior
public hearing conducted for the purpose. (underscoring supplied.)
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3
Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code establishes in detail the procedure for the enactment of such an ordinance,
relevant provisions of which are reproduced below:
Section 277. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures. x x x.
xxx
(b) The conduct of public hearings shall be governed by the following procedure:
xxx
(2) In addition to the requirement for publication or posting, the sanggunian
concerned shall cause the sending of written notices of the proposed ordinance,
enclosing a copy thereof, to the interested or affected parties operating or doing
business within the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU concerned.
(3) The notice or notices shall specify the date or dates and venue of the public
hearing or hearings. The initial public hearing shall be held not earlier than ten (10)
days from the sending out of the notice or notices, or the last day of publication, or
date of posting thereof, whichever is later;
xxx
(c)
No tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be enacted or approved in the
absence of a public hearing duly conducted in the manner provided under this
Article. (underscoring supplied)
It is categorical, therefore, that a public hearing be held prior to the enactment of an
ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges; and that such public hearing be conducted
as provided under Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Local Government Code.
There is no dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other stall holders
at the municipal public market were sent out on 6 August 1998, informing them of
the supposed "public hearing" to be held on 11 August 1998. Even assuming that
petitioners received their notice also on 6 August 1998, the "public hearing" was
already scheduled, and actually conducted, only five days later, on 11 August 1998.
This contravenes Article 277(b)(3) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Local Government Code which requires that the public hearing be held no less than
ten days from the time the notices were sent out, posted, or published.
When the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin sought to correct this procedural defect
through Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, dated 18 September 1998, respondent
vetoed the said resolution. Although the Sangguniang Bayan may have had the
power to override respondent's veto,37 it no longer did so.
The defect in the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not cured when
another public hearing was held on 22 January 1999, after the questioned ordinance
was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan and approved by respondent on 17 August
1998. Section 186 of the Local Government Code prescribes that the public hearing
be held prior to the enactment by a local government unit of an ordinance levying
taxes, fees, and charges.
Since no public hearing had been duly conducted prior to the enactment of Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01, said ordinance is void and cannot be given any effect.
Consequently, a void and ineffective ordinance could not have conferred upon
respondent the jurisdiction to order petitioners' stalls at the municipal public market
vacant.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182 is
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3
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 is DECLARED void and
ineffective, and a writ of prohibition is ISSUED commanding the Mayor of the
Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, to permanently desist from enforcing the said
ordinance. Petitioners are also DECLARED as lawful occupants of the market stalls
they occupied at the time they filed the Petition for Mandamus/Prohibition XXX. In the
event that they were deprived of possession of the said market stalls, petitioners are
entitled to recover possession of these stalls. (underscoring supplied)
9. Henlin Panay Company And/Or Edwin Francisco/Angel Lazaro III,
Petitioners, vs. National Labor Relations Commission (Nlrc) And Nory
A. Bolanos, Respondents, G.R. No. 180718 , October 23, 2009
Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court
questioning the Decision1 dated October 9, 2007 and the Resolution 2 dated
November 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals affirming the Resolution 3 dated January
31, 2007 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring petitioners
liable for illegally dismissing respondent Nory A. Bolanos.
Issue: W/N, the CA erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC declaring the
petitioners liable for the illegal dismissal of the respondent.
Held: The SC affirmed and modified the decision of the CA confirming the resolution
of the NLRC in declaring the petitioners liable for the illegal dismissal of the
respondent. The Court held that:
To constitute abandonment, there must be a clear and deliberate intent to
discontinue one's employment without any intention of returning. Two elements must
concur:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt
acts.13 It is the employer who has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention
of returning.14
In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove that it was Bolanos who refused to
report for work despite being asked to return to work. Petitioners merely presented
the affidavits of the officers of Henlin Panay narrating their version of the facts. These
affidavits, however, are not only insufficient but also undeserving of credit as they
are self-serving. Petitioners failed to present memoranda or show-cause letters
served on Bolanos at her last known address requiring her to report for work or to
explain her absence, with a warning that her failure to report would be construed as
abandonment of work. Also, if indeed Bolanos abandoned her work, petitioners
should have served her a notice of termination as required by law. Petitioners' failure
to comply with said requirement bolsters Bolanos's claim that she did not abandon
her work but was dismissed.
Clearly, Bolanos's case is one of illegal dismissal. First, there is no just or authorized
cause for petitioners to terminate her employment. Her alleged act of dishonesty of
"passing out" food for free was not proven. Neither was there incompetence on her
part when some food items were not punched in the cash register as she was not the
cashier manning it when the food items were ordered. In fact, the other cashier even
owned up to said mistake. Second, Bolanos was not afforded due process by
petitioners before she was dismissed. A day after the incident, she was verbally
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dismissed from her employment without being given the chance to be heard and
defend herself.
Article VIII, Section 5 (e)
Central Mindanao University v. Executive Secretary

631 SCRA 30 (2010)
FACTS: Central Mindanao University is a chartered educational institution owned and

run by the State. In 1958, President Garcia issued PP 476 reserving 3401 hectares of
lands of the public domain as school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in
its name over 3080 hectares of those lands. On 2003, President Arroyo issued PP 310
that takes 670 hectares from CMUs registered lands for distribution to indigenous
peoples and cultural communities. CMU filed a petition for prohibition against
Executive Secretary et.al. before the RTC of Malaybalay seeking to stop the
implementation of PP 310 and have it declared unconstitutional. Respondents moved
to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC since
the act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive done in
Manila. Initially the RTC denied the motion to dismiss but on reconsideration, but after
the hearing the preliminary injunction incident, it granted the motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. However, the RTC still ruled that PP 310 is not unconstitutional.
CMU filed an appeal before the CA. The latter dismissed CMUs appeal holding among
others that CMUs recourse should have been a petition for review on certiorari filed
directly with the SC since it raised pure questions of law, bearing mainly on the
constitutionality of PP 310.
ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly dismissed CMUs appeal on the ground that it raised
purely questions of law that are proper for a petition for review filed directly with the
SC NO
RULING: Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 vests in the CA
appellate jurisdiction over the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial
bodies. But where an appeal from the RTC raises purely questions of law, recourse
should be by a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court. The
question in this case is whether or not CMUs appeal from the RTCs order of dismissal
raises purely questions of law.
CMUs action was one for injunction against the implementation of PP 310 that
authorized the taking of lands from the university. The fact that the President issued
this proclamation in Manila and that it was being enforced in Malaybalay City where
the lands were located were facts that were not in issue. These were alleged in the
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complaint and presumed to be true by the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the
CMUs remedy for assailing the correctness of the dismissal, involving as it did a pure
question of law, indeed lies with this Court.
The CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it of its right to due process when
it dismissed the case based on the ground that PP 310 was constitutional. CMU points
out that the issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation had not yet been
properly raised and heard. Respondents had not yet filed an answer to join issue with
CMU on that score. What respondents filed was merely a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the injunction case. Whether
the RTC in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation,
resulting in the denial of CMUs right to be heard on the same, is a factual issue that
was proper for the CA to hear and ascertain from the parties. Consequently, the CA
erred in dismissing the action on the ground that it raised pure questions of law.
On the merits, the lands by their character have become inalienable from the
moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMUs use in scientific and
technological research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable
public lands. Section 56 of the IPRA provides that property rights within the ancestral
domains already existing and/or vested upon its effectivity shall be recognized and
respected. Ownership over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as
1958. Transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not
in accord with the IPRA. Petition granted. PP 310 declared null and void for being
contrary to law and public policy.
Abalos and DBP v. Darapa

646 SCRA 200 (2011)
FACTS: In 1962, the spouses Lomantong Darapa and Sinab Dimakuta obtained a loan
from DBP secured by a real and chattel mortgage over a lot situated at Linamon,
Lanao del Norte covered by Tax Declaration No. A-148. In 1970, the spouses applied
for the renewal and increase of their loan using Dimakutas TCT No. T-1997 as
additional collateral. The DBP disapproved the loan application without returning,
however, Dimakutas TCT. When the spouses failed to pay their loan, DBP foreclosed
the mortgages in 1971, which, unknown to the spouses, included TCT No. T-1997. The
spouses failed to redeem the land under TCT No. T-1997, which led to its cancellation
and eventual issuance of another TCT in DBPs name. In 1984, the spouses
discovered all these and they demanded to DBP the reconveyance of the land. DBP
assured them of the return of the land. But in 1994, DBP sold the land to Abalos. On
the same year, the spouses instituted an action for annulment of title and recovery of
possession. The spouses averred that TCT No. T-1997 was not one of the mortgaged
properties and thus its foreclosure by DBP and its eventual sale to Abalos was null
and void. The DBP countered that TCT No. T-1997 had its roots in Tax Declaration No.
A-148. The RTC annulled DBPs foreclosure of the land under TCT No. T-1997 and
declared Dimakuta as the lawful owner. DBP went to the CA but the latter affirmed
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the RTCs decision. DBP now wants to convince the SC that the land covered by the
Tax Declaration mortgaged in 1962, then untitled, is the same land now covered by
TCT No. T-1997.
RULING: It is fundamental procedural law that a petition for review on certiorari filed
with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure shall, as a general rule,
raise only questions of law.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts this is in contradistinction from a question of fact which arises from doubt
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. A question of law does not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any
of them and the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances.
The DBPs insistence that TCT No. T-1,997 is the same land covered by Tax
Declaration No. A-148 is to ask the Court to evaluate the pieces of evidence passed
upon by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. To grant this petition will entail the Court's
review and determination of the weight, credence, and probative value of the
evidence presented at the trial court matters which, without doubt, are factual and,
therefore, outside the ambit of Rule 45.
Petitioners ought to remember that the Court of Appeals factual findings, affirming
that of the trial court, are final and conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed
on appeal, except for the most compelling of reasons, such as when: (1) the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings
are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10)
the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. None of the exceptions is
present in this petition.
In any event, records reveal that the land covered by the TCT was not among the
properties the spouses mortgaged in 1962. The land covered by the TCT is situated in
Barrio Buru-an, Iligan, Lanao del Norte. DBPs former property examiner and
appraiser who examined the lands which the spouses mortgaged to DBP testified that
he never examined any land in Barrio Buru-an, Iligan.
Republic v. De Guzman
652 SCRA 101 (2011)
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FACTS: Respondent De Guzman is the proprietress of Montaguz General Merchandise
(MGM), a contractor accredited by the Philippine National Police for the supply of
office and construction materials and equipment, and for the delivery of various
services such as printing and rental, repair of various equipment, and renovation of
buildings, facilities, vehicles, tires, and spare parts. In 1995, MGM and the PNP
entered into a contract wherein MGM, for the price of P2,288,562.60, undertook to
procure and deliver to the PNP the construction materials for the construction of a
condominium building at Camp Crame. MGM proceeded with the delivery of the
construction materials. MGM was not however paid. Respondent sued the PNP for
sum of money. But according to the PNP, a Landbank check was in fact released in
favor of respondent. Respondent claims however that the check was issued in favor
of Montaguz Builders, a separate entity owned by respondent, and that the warrant
registry of the PNP shows that it was a certain Edgardo Cruz who claimed the check,
not her. At various stages of the proceedings, the former counsel of PNP admitted
that MGM had in fact delivered the construction materials, and that for purposes of
expediting the proceedings, the sole issue that would be resolved was whether or not
respondent had been paid. On the strength of the documentary evidence presented
and offered in court and on petitioners own stipulations and admissions during
various stages of the proceedings, the RTC ruled that there was no payment. It
ordered PNP to pay respondent the contract price. The CA affirmed this ruling.
RULING: It is worthy to note that while this petition was filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the assertions and arguments advanced herein are those that will
necessarily require this Court to re-evaluate the evidence on record.
It is a well-settled rule that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of
law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.
When there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, then it is a
question of law; but when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts, then it is a question of fact. "Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact,
the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a
question of law."
One test to determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case is
whether the Court can resolve the issue that was raised without having to review or
evaluate the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it will be a
question of fact. Thus, the petition must not involve the calibration of the probative
value of the evidence presented. In addition, the facts of the case must be
undisputed, and the only issue that should be left for the Court to decide is whether
or not the conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of facts was appropriate.
In this case, the circumstances surrounding the controversial LBP check are central to
the issue before us, the resolution of which, will require a perusal of the entire
records of the case including the transcribed testimonies of the witnesses. Since this
is an appeal via certiorari, questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will only review
them under certain recognized exceptions.
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Although petitioners sole ground to support this petition was stated in such a
manner as to impress upon this Court that the Court of Appeals committed an error in
law, what the petitioner actually wants us to do is to review and re-examine the
factual findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
Since the petitioner has not shown this Court that this case falls under any of the
enumerated exceptions to the rule, we are constrained to uphold the facts as
established by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and, consequently, the
conclusions reached in the appealed decision.
Cua v. People
660 SCRA 235 (2011)
FACTS: Guillermo Cua is a Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR in Olongapo City. He
was charged with Malversation of Public Funds after an audit disclosed that he
incurred a cash shortage amounting to P291,783. Initially he admitted his cash
shortage purportedly to get even with the BIR which failed to promote him but
promised to pay the amount as soon as possible. A special arrangement was made
between the BIR and him wherein the BIR would withhold his salary and apply the
same to the shortage incurred until full payment of the accountability was made.
Nonetheless, an Information for Malversation of public funds was filed against him.
Cua did not testify and instead adduced documentary evidence showing that he had
paid for the shortage by means of deductions from his salary. The RTC convicted him.
The CA affirmed his conviction. Now before the SC, Cua claims among others that he
is not criminally liable because the PNB confirmed the authenticity of the pertinent
documents and that his payment of the shortage was involuntary and without his
consent.
RULING: At the outset, it should be stressed that in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. Thus, questions of fact
are not reviewable. It is not the Courts function to analyze or weigh all over again
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, its jurisdiction being
limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower
court. As such, a question of law must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants. The resolution of factual issues is
the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are accorded respect.
A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of
facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being
resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. Thus, the
issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set
of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of
fact.
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Petitioner raises the sole issue that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt on the ground that the evidence shows that he did not
incur a shortage of P 291,783.00. He argues that as an exception to the rule that
factual findings and conclusions of the CA are binding on this Court, the CA plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, would alter the
result of the case.
The Court disagrees.
The resolution of the issue raised by petitioner necessarily requires the re-evaluation
of the evidence presented by both parties. This is precisely a question of fact
proscribed under Rule 45. Petitioner has failed to establish that the present case falls
under any of the exceptions to said rule. On the other hand, the factual findings of
the RTC were affirmed by the CA, and as such, are final and conclusive and may not
be reviewed on appeal. On this ground alone, the petition must be denied.
Lorzano v. Tabayag
665 SCRA 38 (2012)
FACTS: The petitioner and the respondent are two of the children of the late Juan
Tabayag. Tabayag owned a parcel of land situated in Iriga City. Right after the burial
of their father, the petitioner allegedly requested from her siblings that she be
allowed to take possession of and receive the income generated by the subject
property until after her eldest son could graduate from college. The petitioners
siblings acceded to the said request. After the petitioners eldest son finished college,
her siblings asked her to return to them the possession of the subject property so
that they could partition it among themselves. However, the petitioner refused to
relinquish her possession of the subject property claiming that she purchased the
subject property from their father as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property. Respondent filed an action for annulment of the sale on the ground that the
signature of their father was forged. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It also
awarded moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of respondent. CA affirmed this
decision.
RULING: Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that
the petition filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
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That the signature of Tabayag in the deed of sale was a forgery is a conclusion
derived by the RTC and the CA on a question of fact. The same is conclusive upon this
Court as it involves the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, which is a matter not for
this Court to resolve. Where a petitioner casts doubt on the findings of the lower
court as affirmed by the CA regarding the existence of forgery is a question of fact.
For the same reason, we would ordinarily disregard the petitioners allegation as to
the propriety of the award of moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of the
respondent as it is a question of fact. Thus, questions on whether or not there was a
preponderance of evidence to justify the award of damages or whether or not there
was a causal connection between the given set of facts and the damage suffered by
the private complainant or whether or not the act from which civil liability might arise
exists are questions of fact.
Essentially, the petitioner is questioning the award of moral damages and attorneys
fees in favor of the respondent as the same is supposedly not fully supported by
evidence. However, in the final analysis, the question of whether the said award is
fully supported by evidence is a factual question as it would necessitate whether the
evidence adduced in support of the same has any probative value. For a question to
be one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them.
Chavez v. JBC
676 SCRA 579 (2012)
FACTS: Frank Chavez filed a petition for prohibition before the SC questioning the
constitutionality of the present composition of the JBC.
RULING: Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court deems it proper to
first ascertain the nature of the petition. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an
action is determined by the allegations therein and the character of the relief sought,
the Court views the petition as essentially an action for declaratory relief under Rule
63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8
(1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that
which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because
the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under the document
sought to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over the petition lies with
the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the fact that only
questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not
among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
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At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes
involved but also to the sanctity of the Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent
to take cognizance of it. After all, the petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65
seeking to enjoin Congress from sending two (2) representatives with one (1) full vote
each to the JBC.
Article VII, Section 4 paragraph 7
Tecson v. Comelec
424 SCRA 277
FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of

and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under
Section 4(7), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original
and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.
ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates? - NO
RULING: An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April
1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a postelection
scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vicepresidency before the elections are held.
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Legarda v. De Castro
542 SCRA 125 (2008)
In the 2004 elections, Congress as National Board of Canvassers proclaimed Noli de

Castro the duly elected Vice President of the Philippines. Legarda who placed second
filed this protest before the PET. De Castro moved for its outright dismissal. But the
PET confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro moved for reconsideration
on the ground that the protest failed to allege a cause of action as the protest did not
specify the contested precincts. The PET ruled that since the protest enumerated all
the provinces, municipalities and cities where she questions all the results in all the
precincts therein, the protest is sufficient in form and substance. The protest was
assigned to Justice Pardo as Hearing Commissioner. In the meantime, Legarda run
and won a seat in the Senate in the 2008 elections. The PET dismissed the protest on
the ground that the contested certificates of canvass would not affect the results, and
because of abandonment as held in Santiago v. Ramos.
Macalintal v. PET
651 SCRA 239 (2011)
FACTS: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and
of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the PET. He chafes at the creation of a
purportedly separate tribunal complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set
personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET. According to him, the
designation of the justices of the SC as members of the PET violates Sec 12, Art VIII
of the Constitution since the PET exercises quasi judicial powers.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on
the basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all
election contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the
Constitution.
ISSUES and RULING:
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Is the PET unconstitutional? No. The explicit reference of the Members of the
Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas
categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the
1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power
granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under
the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vicepresidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
Does the PET exercise quasi judicial powers? No. The traditional grant of judicial
power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes
characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential
election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
FIRST
LEPANTO
CERAMICS,
INC.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC.
vs.
Facts: BOI granted First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI
certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed
floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Eventually, Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration
of the said BOI decision while Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider
the same nor appeal therefrom. Mariwasa filed a petition for review with respondent
Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91.
CA required the BOI and First to comment on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause
why no injunction should issue. On February 17, 1993, respondent court temporarily
restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. This temporary restraining order
lapsed by its own terms on March 9, 1993, twenty (20) days after its issuance,
without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.
On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift
Restraining Order" on the ground that respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction
over BOI Case No. 92-005, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court
pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
On May 25, 1993, respondent court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.
Upon receipt of a copy of the resolution on June 4, 1993, First Lepanto decided not to
file any motion for reconsideration as the question involved is essentially legal in
nature and immediately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC.
Held: Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of
implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing
appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax
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Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and
confusing rules of procedure.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law,
it has, however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. In
Inciong v. de Guia, a circular of this Court was treated as law. In adopting the
recommendation of the Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who
violated Circular No. 7 of this Court dated September 23, 1974, as amended by
Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979,
requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating
Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning cases
instead of raffling is a common practice and holding that respondent could not go
against the circular of this Court until it is repealed or otherwise modified, as "(L)aws
are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall
not be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary."
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91
because the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot
be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making
powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that
Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the
BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such
appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects
which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making
powers.
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI
should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the
substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal
from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be
respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of
this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal,
i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive
right to appeal.
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found
in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular
does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI.
Since in DBP v. CA , we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
the Court of Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies
reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and comprehensive,
there is no reason why BOI should be excluded from Circular 1-91, which is but
implementary of said law.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar
as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI
are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously
allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the
Court of Appeals.
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TERESITA G. FABIAN vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN
Facts: Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business
w/ Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he
allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the
Office in the office of the Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents
developed between the parties and when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship,
Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against him. A case ensued which eventually led an appeal to the
Ombudsman who inhibited himself later the case led to the deputy Ombudsman.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory.
Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that -In all administrative
diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects,
therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to
this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of
the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of
the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give this
Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR. vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE
FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES
Facts: On May 23, 1997, Florentino M. Alumbres, filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the
destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. It
was alleged that he requested Caoibes to return the executive table he borrowed
from respondent; that Caoibes did not answer so respondent reiterated his request
but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted Tarantado ito ah, and boxed
him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses
was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable; and that respondent had
the incident blottered with the Las Pias Police Station. He prayed that criminal
charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.
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On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another administrative case with the
Supreme Court, praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the
ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer.
The Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit. But
instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 and Ex-Parte
Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court, praying that the Office of the
Ombudsman hold its investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in abeyance, and refer
the same to the Supreme Court .Petitioner contended that the Supreme Court, not
the Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination
of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being
members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman must defer action on a criminal complaint
against a judge, or a court employee where the same arises from their administrative
duties, and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court
employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
Held: It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who
were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under
Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding
from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether
a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative
matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court
personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to
whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true
regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the
complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from
the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of
it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of
the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the
Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative
concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case
before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the
Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a
power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as
it does, on judicial independence.
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme
Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO,
GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II, MARIVIC A. TRABAJO-DARAY, ANTONIO E.
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VALENZUELA in his capacity as the Director for Fact Finding and
Intelligence of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, and
MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao
Facts: Pursuant to the governments plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City,
the Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation case against the owners of the
properties affected by the project. The expropriation case was presided by Judge
Renato A. Fuentes. The government won the expropriation case. DPWH still owed the
defendants-lot owners. The lower court granted Tessie Amadeos motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. On May
3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy, addressed to the
Regional Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties subject of the
levy as All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the Department of Public Works
and Highways depot at Panacan, Davao City. The auction sale pushed through and
Alex Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together
with respondent Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties on
May 19, 1994. They were, however, prevented from doing so by the custodian of the
subject DPWH properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo, who claimed that his office
was totally unaware of the auction sale, and informed the sheriff that many of the
properties within the holding area of the depot were still serviceable and were due for
repair and rehabilitation.
On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of
Davao City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court
directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on the
report recommending the filing of an administrative case against the sheriff and
other persons responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution.
The Department of Public Works and Highways, through the Solicitor General, filed an
administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that Judge Renato A. Fuentes
be charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
Section 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme Court with
acts unbecoming of a judge.
Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a
criminal complaint charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, Section 3 (e).
Fuentes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss
complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a
criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And
he conducted an investigation of said complaint against petitioner.
Thus, he
encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel.
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The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation
because the Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which would verify the
propriety of the issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court
Administrator has not filed any administrative case against petitioner judge that
would pose similar issues on the present inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in
the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts
before the Supreme Court.
Held: No.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own
or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative
complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to
investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme
Court, for appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court
personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Petitioners questioned order directing the attachment of government property and
issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official
functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under the given
circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the
Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. No other entity or official of
the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not
any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision-whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis
for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order.
That prerogative belongs to the
Luz Adajar vs Teresita Develos
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Facts: Luz C. Adajar filed a complaint against Teresita Develos, Cyrus Ellorin and
Celsa Ellorin, who are government employees stationed at the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Complainant alleged that she delivered
pieces of jewelries on a consignment basis amounting to 70,000 pesos to Mrs.
Teresita Develuz at her office at RTC Branch 8 Staff Room, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon
with the agreement that she will pay the said amount within Three (3) Months. Mrs.
Develuz made partial payments in the total amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos. However, when demanded from to pay the balance of P20,000.00 Pesos, she
refused. On February 6, 2002 complainant, again, went to RTC Branch 8 to collect the
account from Mrs. Develuz when the latter, in an angry and loud voice said, Dili ba
nga gihatagan ta naman ka sa listahan sa mga nakakuha sa alahas? Ikaw na ang
maningil sa ila, (which in English literally means IS IT NOT THAT I HAVE ALREADY
GIVEN YOU THE LIST OF THOSE WHO GOT THE JEWELRIES? YOU COLLECT IT
YOURSELF). While having a verbal tussle, Mr. Cyrus Ellorin who is a co-employee of
Mrs. Develuz, with the designation of court interpreter of Branch 8, Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, allegedly, went near and shouted. Mr. Cyrus Ellorin violently pushed
complainant of the staff room, practically driving her out as if she was a leper.
Employees of the office of the Clerk of Court brought her to their office and gave her
water and comforted her. The incident was reported to the police and entered into
the blotter.
Respondents contend that the acts of respondents Celsa Ellorin and Teresita Develos
being complained of by complainant were not in relation to their functions as court
employees but were in connection with the pecuniary activity of complainant.
Respondents further assert that complainant is guilty of dishonesty for certifying that
she did not commence any other action before any tribunal or body except before
this Court when in fact she also filed a complaint for misconduct with the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao. Respondents also submitted in evidence a Joint-Affidavit
executed by persons who were indebted to complainant stating therein that
respondent Develos simply facilitated the sale of jewelry made by complainant.
Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, acting on the complaint for misconduct filed by
herein complainant, rendered a Decision dismissing the administrative case against
herein respondents as well as the counter-complaint filed by the latter against herein
complainant.
The Investigating Judge adopted the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao and, accordingly, recommended that the instant administrative complaint
be dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should take cognizance of this case
Held:
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No, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao should not have taken cognizance of the
instant case the same being administrative in nature. As correctly pointed out by the
OCA, it has been settled as early as the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez that:
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By
virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and
court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
power.
Pursuant to the above-settled rule, the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao should
have referred the instant complaint to this Court for appropriate action, instead of
resolving the same. Hence, we agree with the OCA that the Decision rendered by the
Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao in OMB-M-A-02-126-E does not have any force
and effect on the present administrative case before us.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANNY GODOY
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR vs. MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P.
PONCE DE LEON
Facts: A complaint was filed by judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, to cite for indirect contempt
Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman
of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honor's plaint is based
on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and
published in the July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper which is of general circulation
in Puerto Princesa City. The complaint avers that the article tends to impede,
obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice; that the
article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive
and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of
complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and
impartially, but is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed
before him; and that the article is sub judice because it is still pending automatic
review.
Issue: Who has jurisdiction in contempt proceedings where the alleged contumely is
committed against a lower court while the case is pending in the Appellate or Higher
Court
Held: In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an
act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court
and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial
administration, jurisdiction has been felt properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time
with respect to a given controversy. Partly because of administrative considerations,
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and partly to visit the full personal effect of the punishment on a contemnor, the rule
has been that no other court than the one contemned will punish a given contempt.
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the power to punish
for contempt rests with the court contemned is that contempt proceedings are sui
generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt are
charged; the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court
to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its
judgments, orders and processes: and in order that a court may compel obedience to
its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience
thereof, for to submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate
to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.
There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily recognized exceptions to
the general rule, both under Philippine and American jurisprudence, viz.:
1. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court may also be tried by the proper
regional trial court, regardless of the imposable penalty.
2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by
a prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed in and tried by the regional trial
court, or the case may be referred to it for hearing and recommendation where the
charge involves questions of fact.
3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in the interrelation of the
different courts forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or
representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in
vindication of the authority and decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfers
the proceedings to the appellate court , and this last court becomes thereby charged
with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the
appeal." The apparent reason is that both the moral and legal effect of a punishment
for contempt would be missed if it were regarded as the resentment of personal
affronts offered to judges. Contempts are punished as offenses against the
administration of justice, and the offense of violating a judicial order is punishable by
the court which is charged with its enforcement, regardless of the court which may
have made the order. However, the rule presupposes a complete transfer of
jurisdiction to the appellate court, and there is authority that where the contempt
does not relate to the subject matter of the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in
the trial court.
4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one
of its parts or agencies, as in the case of a court composed of several coordinate
branches or divisions.
5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is where the singular jurisdiction
of a given matter has been transferred from the contemned court to another court.
One of the most common reasons for a transfer of jurisdiction among courts is
improper venue. The cases involving venue deal primarily with the question whether
a change of venue is available after a contempt proceeding has been begun. While
generally a change of venue is not available in a contempt proceeding, some
jurisdictions allow such a change in proper circumstances.
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6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations
of orders entered by its predecessor, although where the successor court is created
by a statute which does not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative
transfer of jurisdiction before the contempt occurs is necessary to empower the
successor court to act.
7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced numerous instances
where contempt against the trial court has been punished in the appellate court, and
vice versa. Some appellate courts have taken the view that a contempt committed
after an appeal is taken is particularly contemptuous of the appellate court because
of the tendency of such contempts to upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with
the jurisdiction of such court.
8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the
main case, which circumstance may require a transfer of jurisdiction, but where a
judge is disqualified only in the main case, because of matters which do not
disqualify him in a contempt proceeding, the regular judge should sit in the contempt
proceeding. Likewise, where the regular judge, is absent or otherwise unavailable and
an order is entered by another judge and made returnable to the proper court, the
regular judge may punish for violations of orders so entered.
9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is no bar to
contempt proceedings in one of them that there is also a contempt against the other.
10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to as a
punishment for contempt, the more recent view is that punishment is of secondary
importance to the need to protect the courts and the people from improper
professional practice. To the substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a
punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by another court than the one
contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for contempt of
another court.
11. Some contemptuous acts are also crime, usually misdemeanors, which are often
punishable in other courts than those against which the contemptuous act was done.
12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another court has been allowed to
stand on the basis that the failure of the defendant to make timely objection
operated as a waiver of the right to be tried before the court actually contemned.
The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that
where the entire case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt
rests with the appellate court where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings
thereto or where there is a tendency to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere
with the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Accordingly, this Court having acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt against herein respondents, it
has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has accordingly resolved the same.
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE

ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
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Facts:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 19, sent the Supreme Court a letter which reads:
xxx
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial
Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas, I was designated as a member of
the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential
Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No.
326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the
Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith machine copies of
Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and
duties of the position as member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,
may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of
a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the
powers and duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the

Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the
second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in
any way amount to an abandonment of my present position as Executive Judge of
Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the
Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions
of an Executive Judge.
Issue:
Whether Judge Manzano can serve concurrently as a member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice
Held:
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No. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering
that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the
Constitution, his request must be denied.
While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be

enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its
doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to
assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the
principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the
trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court can pass on his actuation. He is
not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is
indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as
expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be
satisfied with nothing less.
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As
incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity
and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such
structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as nonmembers of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they
exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment
of their judicial duties.
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was
added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one
from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having onehalf (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and
2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero
and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in
this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a
representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and
the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of
Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive
meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice
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by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should
mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and
spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used
in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate
or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a
singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member
composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should
there be a stalemate in voting.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is
explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds
true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court
cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of
the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only.
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member
of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is
constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a constricted
constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception of the Doctrine of Operative
Fact applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of
unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions
are nonetheless valid.
The Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard
the Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its
powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never
be allowed to become judicial exuberance. In cases like this, no amount of practical
logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an
insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of
congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject
matter which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional
mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to
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accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed
solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.
LEAGUE OF CITIES VS COMELEC
Facts: During the 11th Congress] fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before the
House of Representatives. Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became
laws. The twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted upon.
Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No.
2157 to amend Sec. 450 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The proposed amendment sought to increase the
income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million average
annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated income.
In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June
30, 2001 xxx
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted in July
2001 House (H.) Joint Resolution No. 29 which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt
from the income requirement prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
conversions into cities were not acted upon during the previous Congress. The 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29.
Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House of
Representatives re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1
and forwarding it to the Senate for approval.
The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate
session held on November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that
passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a wholesale exemption from
the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For this
reason, he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of individual bills to
pave the way for the municipalities to become cities and then forwarding them to the
Senate for proper action.
Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Common to all 16 measures was a provision
exempting the municipality covered from the PhP 100 million income requirement.
As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual cityhood
bills, all of which eventually lapsed into law on various dates. Each cityhood law
directs the COMELEC, within thirty (30) days from its approval, to hold a plebiscite to
determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.
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Issue: The instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for
violation of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the
equal-protection clause.
[Issue in relation to Article VIII of the Constitution is with respect to the
votes required in a case assailing the constitutionality of a law. Please see
(3)]
Held:
(1) RE: Constitutionality of Exempting Municipalities from the Requirement
of RA 9009:
By constitutional design and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to
create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character.
But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide,
merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or
municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent case, Sema v. CIMELEC. The 1987
Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless provides for the creation of
LGUs xxx
As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of
political subdivisions in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code, subject to the approval of the voters in the unit
concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area,
population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by
RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that these indicators or
criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute.
Doubtless, the code they are referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they
conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs from the income
standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution.
Petitioners posture does not persuade.
The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save
for the use of the term barrio in lieu of barangay, may be instead of shall, the
change of the phrase unit or units to political unit and the addition of the modifier
directly to the word affected, the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction
of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads:
Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears notice, however, that the code similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the
aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create political units.
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Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions,
surely it can exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or
ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation. Thus, the only conceivable
reason why the Constitution employs the clause in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code is to lay stress that it is
Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria. xxx
It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution
speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or
codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991. Be it noted that at the time of the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was
still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to
isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have actually
referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the enactment by
Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via
either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject
enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need
not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository
to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after
making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of
indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this
case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from
PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory
laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically
exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned.
Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified
indicators.
Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC
and not in any other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their
contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and increased
income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality. It is
startling, however, that petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA 9009,
as they in fact use said law as an argument for the alleged unconstitutionality of the
cityhood laws.
As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly decreased the
income criterion vis--vis the respondent LGUs, but without necessarily being
unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed shortly, by reverting to the PhP 20
million threshold what it earlier raised to PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to
subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds
expression in the following uniform provision of the cityhood laws:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
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In any event, petitioners constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we
were to assume purely ex hypothesi the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz:
that the conversion of a municipality to a city shall be in accordance with, among
other things, the income criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other;
otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We shall explain.
Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention,
the Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered
by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion. In
other words, the cityhood laws, which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009,
adhered, in the final analysis, to the criteria established in the Local Government
Code, pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed to
discuss this exemption angle.
Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution are those detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the heading
Requisites for Creation. The section sets the minimum income qualifying bar before
a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be considered for cityhood. Originally,
Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an average regular annual income of at least ten million
pesos for the last three consecutive years as a minimum income standard for a
municipal-to-city conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was superseded by
the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that [a] municipality or cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual
income, x x x of at least twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for at least two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices x x x. RA 9009 in turn amended
said Sec. 450 by further increasing the income requirement to PhP 100 million, thus:
xxx
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which
the resulting law is couched.
Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an
absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the
rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical
inferences derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent.
Xxx
Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of the
pendency of several bills on cityhood, wherein the applying municipalities
were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20 million-income threshold.
These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally noteworthy is the ensuing
excerpts from the floor exchange between then Senate President Franklin Drilon and
Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping short of saying that the income threshold of PhP
100 million under S. Bill No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that have pending
cityhood bills xxx
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Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis for the
inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut
intent of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. Not only
do the congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood
laws from the income requirement of PhP 100 million. Congress has now made its
intention to exempt express in the challenged cityhood laws.
(2) WON there was a violation of the equal protection clause
In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot
plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, precisely because no
deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood
laws. The LCPs claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced
on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to
bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous
on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were
their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the
municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood
laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion
of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its
property as such.
(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply
to the cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words,
Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to be exempted from the income
requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA 9009;
(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the
LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income
requirement;
(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions
are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
It is really
immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body. The hearings and deliberations
during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference inasmuch
as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being
considered during the 13th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as
here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the literal application of the law
results in absurdity or injustice.
(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had
pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially
distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each
of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted under the original Sec.
450 of the 1991 LGC.
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And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see
it, petitioners have not overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in
question.
__________
(3) RE: Votes needed
Xxx But first, we set and underscore some basic premises:
(1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice
Leonardo-De Castro noted, indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive of the
matter of the correctness of the factual premises upon which the said decision was
predicated. The 6-6 vote on the motion for reconsideration per the Resolution of
March 31, 2009, which denied the motion on the sole ground that the basic issues
have already been passed upon reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or
not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic
issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision;
(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 was
precipitated by the tie vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution.
This May 14, 2009 motionwhich mainly argued that a tie vote is inadequate to
declare a law unconstitutional remains unresolved; and
(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the
constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the Court en banc and decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009
Resolution boils down to whether or not the required vote set forth in the
aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the petition
or also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration where
the Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of a law
or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute resolution
dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated
groundthat the basic issues have already been passed suffice to
hurdle the voting requirement required for a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in question?
The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009,
which denied the initial motion on the sole ground that the basic issues had already
been passed upon betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of whether or not
the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues
raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of the
day, the single issue that matters and the vote that really counts really turn
on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the
inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote
on the issue of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution.
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Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote,
should be deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of
the validity or invalidity of the laws in question is, on the merits, secured.
It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the majority of
the Members contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution xxx
Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote in the determination of a
case involving the constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether
such determination is made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion
for reconsideration.
Xxx
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec.
7, Rule 56 and the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing
that:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be
deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original
action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment
or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the
petition or motion shall be denied.
A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution
of the Court En Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the
En Banc or of a Division, as the case may be, who actually took part in the
deliberation of the motion.
If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.
But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the
aforequoted provisions ought to be applied in conjunction with the
prescription of the Constitution that the cases shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon. To repeat, the last vote on the
issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the April 28, 2009
Resolutiona 6-6 deadlock.
xxx Without belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and against the
procedural dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the Court has the
power to suspend its own rules when the ends of justice would be served
thereby. In the performance of their duties, courts should not be shackled by
stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only
tools crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application
must be eschewed, if they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice.
xxx. When a case is impressed with public
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interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order. Time and
again, this Court has suspended its own rules or excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.
The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14, 2009
motion to consider the second motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008
Decision unresolved, and also grants said second motion for reconsideration.
MANGELEN VS. CA
215 SCRA 230 (1992)
Facts: Civil Case No. 84-22306 involved an action for the recovery of the amount of
P600,000.00 which defendant, now private respondent Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc.,
represented by its President, private respondent Pedro Habaluyas, bound itself to pay
plaintiff, now petitioner, by virtue of a Compromise Agreement. Instead of filing an
Answer within the reglementary period private respondents submitted a motion to
dismiss xxx
On 24 July 1984, defendant filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to hold
in abeyance further proceedings on the ground that they had filed with the then
Intermediate Appellate Court on 12 July 1984 a petition for certiorari raising the
issues of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction and litis pendencia. That case was
docketed as A.C.-G.R. No. 03742. xxx
IAC - In said decision, public respondent practically adopted the factual findings of
the trial court, and explicitly declared that the latter simply acted "in accordance with
the provisions of the rules of court" 12 and committed no reversible error "in
declaring the defendents (sic) in default xxx Still unable to accept the verdict,
defendants-appellants filed a motion to reconsider the decision, xxx On 12 July 1989,
public respondent promulgated a resolution reversing its earlier decision of 30
January 1989. Because of its brevity, the resolution is quoted in full:
It appearing (sic) from the motion for reconsideration that defendants-appellants
have good and valid defenses as a amplified in their motion for reconsideration and
their reply to Opposition which in fairness to the lower court, We will not point out,
since this is default case so that any decision of the lower court will not in any way be
preempted in the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court promulgated
on January 30, 1989 is hereby granted and the said decision is hereby reversed. Let
this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
Issue: WON IAC followed the requirement of Article VII Section 14 of the Constitution.
Held: NO.
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The challenged decision leaves much to be desired. What was filed before the public
respondent was an ordinary appeal from a judgment by default. This
necessitated a full-blown decision taking into account the five (5) assigned errors
which touch on both substantive and procedural matters. Accordingly, public
respondent promulgated its 30 January 1989 decision following a meticulous review
of the proceedings had before the trial court and careful re-appraisal of the evidence
adduced before it. Thus, that decision faithfully complied with Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts of the law on which it
is based. Now, if such decision had to be completely overturned or set aside, upon
the filing of a motion for reconsideration, in a subsequent action via a resolution or
modified decision, such resolution or decision should likewise state the factual and
legal foundation relied upon. The reason is obvious: aside from being required by the
Constitution, the court should be able to justify such a sudden change of course; it
must be able to convincingly explain the taking back of its solemn conclusions and
pronouncements in the earlier decision. In the instant case, the public
respondent miserably failed to do so; this is reflected in the quoted resolution of
12 July 1989 which leaves in limbo the trial court's challenged decision because it is
not the latter which is reserved but rather the public respondent's own decision of 30
January 1989. Public respondent simply restore the parties to the status quo
obtaining prior to 30 January 1989. Clearly, therefore, an amended decision on
the appeal proper or on the merits of the decision of the trial court would be in order.
There is more to the confusion. Public respondent ordered the remand of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings, thereby placing the latter in a quandary as to
what it was supposed to do. The trial court would not know what "further
proceedings" means as the public respondent neither nullified the order of default
nor set aside the evidence received ex parte. Thus, the former would be hard pet at
finding a satisfactory solution to the problem presented for its resolution.
GERMAN MACHINERIES VS. ENDAYA

444 SCRA 323 (2004)
Facts: Complainant [Eddie Endaya] alleged that he was employed by respondent
company on January 18, 1993, [as a] car painter xxx he filed a complaint with the
Social Security System against respondent company for failure to remit his SSS
premiums; that when management learned about his complaint, he was reprimanded
and became the object of harassment xxx
Complainant, thus, contends that he was illegally dismissed. Xxx
On January 8, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of herein
respondent (Endaya) xxx Aggrieved by the Labor Arbiters decision, herein petitioner
filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
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In a decision promulgated on February 28, 2002, the NLRC affirmed, with
modification, the Labor Arbiters decision. Accordingly, it disposed of the case as
follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of January 8, 2001 is hereby MODIFIED in that
the award of 10% attorneys fees shall be based on awards representing 13th month
pay and service incentive leave pay.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in
a resolution promulgated on April 19, 2002.
On July 3, 2002, herein petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals
assailing the aforementioned decision and resolution of the NLRC. On November 14,
2002, the Court of Appeals issued the herein assailed resolution dismissing the
petition for certiorari, to wit:
It is axiomatic that for a writ of preliminary injunction to prosper, it must be shown
that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that
the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
In the present petition, the foregoing circumstances are not present. The findings of
fact by the Labor Arbiter were affirmed by public respondent to the effect that private
respondent Eddie Endaya was illegally dismissed by petitioner. It therefore pains us
to conclude that private respondent stands to suffer more due to the said illegal
dismissal. Such that, it is the private respondent who may suffer irreparable injury
should the writ for preliminary injunction be issued. Such being the case, the prayer
for the issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is hereby
DENIED for LACK OF MERIT.
Insofar as the prayer of private respondent for the immediate dismissal of the instant
petition is concerned, we find merit in the same. The factual issues raised in the
instant petition had already been passed upon by public respondent. As such, we
give our imprimatur to the same since it is in agreement with that of the Labor
Arbiter, and hence deems (sic) binding and conclusive on us.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT and that
the questions raised are too UNSUBSTANTIAL to require consideration. SO ORDERED.
Issue: CA has violated the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based.
Held: NO. Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals issued the above-quoted
resolution without any analysis of the evidence of the parties or reference to any
legal basis. As such, it violated Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
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The assailed resolution is not the decision contemplated under Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution. The mandate embodied in this
constitutional provision is applicable only in cases submitted for decision
i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying due course to a
petition and stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the court, after
deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to
the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible
error in the respondent courts decision, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement. In the present case, the Court of Appeals denied due
course and outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner on
the grounds that the factual issues had already been passed upon by the NLRC, and
since its factual findings are in agreement with the findings of the labor arbiter, the
same are binding and conclusive upon the Court of Appeals; and that the questions
raised are too unsubstantial to require consideration. We find these legal bases in
conformity with the requirements of the Constitution.
The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative writ,
never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial
discretion. Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
provides that the court may dismiss a petition for certiorari if it finds the same to be
patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised
therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
Furthermore, a reading of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals shows
that the main issue raised is factual as it questions the finding of the NLRC that
respondent Endaya was illegally dismissed from his employment. Petitioner brought
up issues the resolution of which necessarily involves a review of the evidence
presented by both parties. It is settled that resort to a judicial
review of the
decisions of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court is confined only to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the rendering tribunal, board or office.[18] It does not
include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was the
basis of the labor official or officer in determining his conclusion It is not for the
appellate court to reexamine conflicting evidence, reevaluate the credibility of
witnesses nor substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has
gained expertise in its specialized field. Considering that the findings of fact of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are supported by evidence on record, the same must be
accorded due respect and finality
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

628 SCRA 502 (2010)
Facts: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
Decision dated May 6, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan granting the Demurrer to Evidence
of Mayor Henry E. Barrera (Mayor Barrera) and dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 2503525037, 25039-25041, 25043, 25045-25047, 25049-25050, and 25053-25054, on the
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ground that the elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended,
were not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: WON CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the assailed
decision as it never expressed clearly and distinctly the facts and the evidence on
which it is based, in violation of Article VIII Section 14 of the Constitution
Held: NO.
Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "[n]o decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based." The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution is to inform the person reading the decision, and especially the
parties, of how it was reached by the court after consideration of the
pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should
he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
Thus, a decision is adequate if a party desiring to appeal therefrom can assign errors
against it.
Our review of the Sandiganbayan Decision dated May 6, 2006 reveals that said
judgment actually contained a summary of the antecedent facts and proceedings; as
well as a discussion on the relevant statutory provisions, the elements of the offense
charged, and the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the People.
The factual and legal bases of the assailed Sandiganbayan Decision, granting Mayor
Barrera's Demurrer to Evidence, are readily evident xxx
In the instant cases, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to prove actual
injury and damage suffered by the private complainants, as one of the elements of
the crime herein charged, in that it failed to specify, quantify and prove to the point
of moral certainty the purported "undue injury". Xxx Likewise, the prosecution's
evidence failed to prove manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith on the part of the
accused, as the fourth of the above-stated requisites for the commission of the crime
herein charged.
The evidence presented by the prosecution falls short of that quantum of proof
necessary to establish the fact that the accused acted with manifest partiality or with
evident bad faith. On the contrary, what is clear from the evidence adduced, was
that herein accused simply exercised his legitimate powers under the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC) which provides that a municipal mayor has the
power to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers" and, for this purpose, he shall
have the power to "issue such executive order as are necessary for the proper
enforcement and execution of the laws and ordinances." Ex-Mayor Elamparo's acts of
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entering into lease contracts, when his term was about to expire and herein accusedmovant's term was about to commence, being the mayor-elect, was not only in
violation of the Local Government Code provision that "no contract may be entered
into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior
authorization by the sangguniang concerned," but also of the other requirements of
law such as, a verified application from the complainants, payment of application
fees, drawing of lots and the opening of bids, since not all the displaced vendors can
be accommodated in the thirty-two stalls in the new public market. The intent of
such a maneuvering was obviously to tie the hands of the incoming administration.
The undue haste of awarding stalls in the new public market by Ex-Mayor Elamparo
was flagrant, because from 26 June to 30 June, 1998, former stall holders of the old
market that burned down, held a rally to denounce the allegedly unfair awarding of
contracts of lease over the new stalls, complaints ranging from awards to new
comers, to instances of two stalls, being awarded to one lessee.
It was precisely in this state of affair that prompted herein accused-movant Barrera
to cause the issuance of Memorandum No. 1, Series of 1998, after he had taken his
oath as mayor of Candelaria, Zambales, to wit:
"You are hereby advised that effective 1:00 PM, June 30, 1998, the transferring
to and occupancy of stalls inside the Public Market shall be temporarily suspended.
For your strict implementation and compliance."
Lastly, of significance is the fact that Memorandum No. 1 applied to all stallholders at
the new public market, be they supporters or not of Mayor Barrera during the 1998
mayoralty elections just past. These admissions of the complaining witnesses in open
court, thus, refute their allegations in their affidavits that the purpose of the
memorandum was to award the new stalls to Mayor Barrera's supporters.
In the light of all the foregoing, We find that herein accused-movant Henry E. Barrera
cannot in fairness be held liable under the indictment. In this connection, it has been
held that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on
the weakness of the defense; the burden of proof is never on the accused to disprove
the facts necessary to establish the crime charged. "It is safely entrenched in our
jurisprudence" says the Supreme Court, "that unless the prosecution discharges its
burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not
even offer evidence in his behalf.
In fact, based on the foregoing, the People was able to identify and discuss
with particularity in its present Petition the grave abuse of discretion allegedly
committed by the graft court in granting Mayor Barrera's Demurrer to Evidence.
Thus, contrary to the People's contention, the aforequoted Sandiganbayan
judgment did not violate the mandate of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution.
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LUMANOG VS. PEOPLE
630 SCRA 42 (2010)
Facts: Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief
of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary (now the Philippine National Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard
employed assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the
ambush-slay happened. As a purported eyewitness, he testified on what he saw
during the fateful day, including the faces of the accused.
All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of
ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of
police officers and denial of constitutional rights during custodial investigation.
The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the
accused-appellants based on the credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly
recounted before the trial court their respective positions and participation in the
fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they committed
the crime.
Issue: Did the CA decision comply with the constitutional standard that [n]o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
Held: YES, the CA decision complied with the constitutional standard that [n]o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm,
as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and
while it did not specifically address each and every assigned error raised by
appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to
how the CA reached its ruling affirming the trial courts judgment of
conviction. The principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before
this Court actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged
sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of
torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances
qualifying the offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. What
appellants essentially assail is the verbatim copying by the CA of not only the facts
narrated, but also the arguments and discussion including the legal authorities, in
disposing of the appeal. On such wholesale adoption of the Office of the Solicitor
Generals position, as well as the trial courts insufficient findings of fact, appellants
anchor their claim of failure of intermediate review by the CA
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DUQUE VS. GARRIDO
580 SCRA 321 (2009)
Facts: In a verified letter-complaint dated February 7, 2006 complainant Marietta
Duque charged respondent, Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban City, Leyte, with gross violation of Section 15, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond ninety (90) days in Criminal
Case No. 2000-10-580 entitled People v Reynaldo Caones y Royo Sr., et al.
Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in the
aforementioned Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580. She claimed that the respondent
Judge violated Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a
decision beyond the 90 day reglementary period without requesting an extension of
time from this Court. She alleged that the prosecution filed its Memorandum
submitting the case for resolution on August 10, 2005, but the respondent issued a
Decision on December 12, 2005 which was promulgated on January 27, 2006.
Complainant further alleged that neither the offended party nor the handling
prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.
Issue: WON the respondent judge violated Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution
Held: Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts
nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge
of official duties.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide
a case within the reglementary period of 90 days xxx
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as follows:
Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.
Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of
cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory.
The Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order to
minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our
courts. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the
litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it magnify
the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the
Memorandum for the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005. Thus, the case
was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the decision
should have been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However, respondent
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issued it only on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months after the case
had been submitted for decision.
Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the
Code of Judicial Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 200010-580 within the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed for the lower
courts.
Whenever a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he has to do is to ask
the Court for a reasonable extension of time to resolve it. In this case,
granting that it was for a justifiable reason to render a decision or resolve a matter
beyond the reglementary period, the respondent could have sought additional
time by simply filing a request for extension. Respondent, however, did not
avail of such relief.
Administrative Circular No. 28 issued by this Court on July 3, 1989 regarding the
submission of memoranda for purposes of deciding cases, clearly provides:
x x x The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from
submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or
allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of
the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is
earlier. (Emphasis ours)
A judge cannot even justify his delay in deciding a case on the excuse that he was
still awaiting the parties' memoranda. In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court
held:
x x x judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit memoranda
within the given periods. Non-submission of memoranda is not a justification for
failure to decide cases. The filing of memoranda is not a part of the trial nor is the
memorandum itself an essential, much less indispensable pleading before a case
may be submitted for decision. As it is merely intended to aid the court in the
rendition of the decision in accordance with law and evidence - which even in its
absence the court can do on the basis of the judges personal notes and the records
of the case - non-submission thereof has invariably been considered a waiver of the
privilege. (Emphasis ours)
Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the
prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting a disciplinary sanction.
Under Section 9(1), Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the Revised
Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as a less
serious charge. Under Section 11(B) [21] of the same Rule, the penalty for such
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charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.
COCOFED VS. REPUBLIC
663 SCRA 514 (2012)
Facts: The case revolved around the provisional take-over by the PCGG of COCOFED
and its assets, and the sequestration of shares of stock in United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) purportedly issued to and/or owned by over a million coconut farmers,
Cojuangco, the six (6) Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) corporations[6] and
the fourteen (14) CIIF holding companies[7] (hereafter collectively called "CIIF
companies"). These CIIF companies are so called for having been organized and/or
acquired as UCPB subsidiaries with the use of the CIIF levy.
Concurrently, on June 7, 1990, the PCGG issued a memorandum stating that,
pursuant to the Decision dated October 29, 1989[11] promulgated by the Court in
G.R. No. 75713 entitled Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc., (COCOFED) v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government[12] (COCOFED v. PCGG), it was
appointing the Executive Committee, Directors of the National Board and Regional
Directors of COCOFED. This prompted COCOFED to query the Sandiganbayan as to
the validity of such memorandum and ask for a temporary restraining order to stop
the PCGG from implementing the memorandum. For ease of reference, G.R. No.
75713, a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, sought to nullify the
sequestration and other orders issued by the PCGG against COCOFED and other
enterprises, culminated in the dismissal of said petition. However, in the assailed
Order dated June 15, 1990, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the PCGG-designated board
of directors shall operate COCOFED, stating:
Upon verbal inquiry by Atty. Manuel Laserna, Jr. as to which board should be
recognized in the interim until a resolution of the matter pending before this Court,
the Court is of the view and so hold that those designated by the PCGG as of June 11,
1983 (sic), in the afternoon, will be the operating board of the COCOFED. As earlier
stated, this recognition by this Court is without prejudice to any other act or acts
which the parties might wish to refer to this Court and which this Court will respond
to at the interim.
Aggrieved, COCOFED and others who claimed to have been prejudiced by the
designation of the board of directors issued by the PCGG interposed the instant
petition to challenge said PCGG appointments.
The PCGG discovered later that the sequestered properties involved in the case were
registered in the name of the corporate-owners and not in the name of the individual
defendants; thus, there was a need to further amend the complaint pursuant
to Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution. Under this constitutional
provision, failure to include corporate defendants which own the sequestered
properties would result in the automatic lifting of the writs of sequestration. Thus, 78
corporate defendants were included in the newly amended complaint entitled Third
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Amended Complaint [Expanded per Court-approved Plaintiff's Manifestation/Motion
dated December 8, 1987] dated August 19, 1991. COCOFED was then included as a
party defendant.
In 1995, during the pendency of the instant petition, the Republic moved for
the subdivision of CC 0033 into separate trials on the various sequestered
assets, attaching the corresponding amended complaints. On March 24, 1999,
the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the Republic's motion and
subdividing CC 0033 into eight (8) separate complaints on the various subject
matters
Issue:
GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THIS PETITION
The series of acts and omissions of respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan in Civil
Case No. 0033 culminating in the Order of 15 June 1990 are without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The refusal of Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan Court to receive
petitioners' evidence is a whimsical and capricious evasion of a positive duty under
the law and particularly enjoined in this Honorable Court's Decision in G.R. No. 75713.
The inaction of Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan on the Class Action
Omnibus Motion serves to perpetuate the unlawful acts of respondent PCGG.
The failure of Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan to afford Petitioners speedy
justice is tainted with such unfairness and arbitrariness as to amount to a lack or
excess of jurisdiction.[14]
Held: This petition must be dismissed.
Superseding events have rendered the instant case moot and academic
In Mendoza v. Villas, the Court explained the concept of mootness, citing Gunsi, Sr. v.
Commissioners:
In Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The Commission on Elections, the Court defined a
moot and academic case as follows:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or
dismiss it on ground of mootness.
Sec. 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically provides for the effect of the
amendment of pleadings, to wit:
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Section 8. Effect of amended pleadings. An amended pleading supersedes the
pleading that it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be
received in evidence against the pleader, and claims or defenses alleged therein not
incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived.
Thus, the Court considered the issue of whether an original complaint should have
been dismissed for having become moot with the admission of an amended
complaint in Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr. The Court ruled in this wise:
With the issue of admission of the amended complaint resolved, the question of
whether or not the original complaint should have been dismissed was mooted.
Section 8, Rule 1.0 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that an amended
pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. In this case, the original
complaint was deemed withdrawn from the records upon the admission of
the amended complaint. This conclusion becomes even more pronounced in that
the RTC already rendered a decision on the merits of the said amended complaint,
not to mention the Lu Ym father and sons' concurrence in the mootness of the issue
in the instant petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, with the admission of the subdivided complaints in the instant
case, the original complaint in CC 0033 is deemed withdrawn from the
records, such that CC 0033 no longer exists. Correlatively, the issues
pending in CC 0033 must be likewise considered moot and academic.
OCA VS. MANTUA
665 SCRA 253
Facts: Travel Order No. 103-2008 dated 11 November 2008 ordered the conduct of a
judicial audit in Branch 17 from 24 to 25 November 2008. The judicial audit team
submitted a memorandum dated 14 January 2009, five days after Judge Mantuas
retirement, to Deputy Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches (DCA Vilches). The judicial
audit team quantified Branch 17s caseload as follows:
As of audit date, the Court has a total caseload of 356 cases consisting of 230
criminal cases and 126 civil cases based on the records actually presented to and
examined by the team xxx
The judicial audit team also found that Branch 17s case records were not in order.
The team noted that the case records are stitched together with pagination.
However, the criminal records are not chronologically arranged. Also, the records
attached to criminal cases jointly tried are incomplete (Crim. Cases 1129, 1131,
1189, 1190, 1185, 1186, 1033, 1205, among a few). The courts docket books are not
updated. There are no log book[s] on arrest and search warrants, exhibits,
disposed/decided/archived cases and incoming documents. There is no order on
payment of postponement fee in proper cases.
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It was also noticed that alias warrants of arrest were issued without archiving cases.
xxx
In a letter dated 27 April 2009 addressed to DCA Vilches, Atty. Mape informed the
OCA of the status of the cases enumerated in the report of the judicial audit team
and submitted the Orders, Resolutions and Notices of Hearing issued by Branch 17.
Atty. Mape also stated that Branch 17 already complied with all other items
mentioned by the judicial audit team in their recommendation. However, the wearing
of uniform was considered optional starting 1 April 2009 in view of a memorandum
issued by the OCA. Atty. Mape begged for the OCAs indulgence and explained that
the delay in the submission of his reply was brought about by two substitutions of the
judge assigned to Branch 17. At the time of audit, Judge Mantua presided over
the court. Pursuant to Judge Mantuas retirement on 9 January 2009, Administrative
Order No. 180-2008 designated Judge Maraya, Presiding Judge of Branch 11, Regional
Trial Court, Calubian, Leyte, as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 17 to replace Judge
Mantua. Administrative Order No. 23-2009 dated 3 March 2009 revoked Judge
Marayas designation and Judge Rogelio R. Joboco (Judge Joboco), Presiding Judge of
Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar, took over as acting presiding judge of Branch 17.
Issue: WON Judge Mantua was remiss in his duty to promptly dispose the cases in
his sala
Held: The report of the judicial audit team, and consequently that of the
OCA, suffers from inaccuracies and a slant towards mere fault-finding. Civil
Case No. PN-0354, Mingasca v. Omega-Reyes, was entered twice, but in consecutive
numbers, in the table for civil cases without further setting. Because of this double
entry, the judicial audit team and OCA probably overlooked Judge Mantuas action
dated 27 November 2008. Furthermore, despite Atty. Mapes submissions dated 19
January 2009 and 27 April 2009 of copies of the Orders, Resolutions and Notices of
Hearing issued by Branch 17, the OCA failed to state in their Memorandum that out
of the 126 cases listed, Judge Mantua took action on 114 cases, or 90.48%,
before he retired on 9 January 2009.
It should be noted that the judicial audit team submitted their report to DCA Vilches
five days after Judge Mantuas retirement. The OCA, in turn, submitted their
Memorandum to CJ Puno on 12 May 2009, or a little over four months after Judge
Mantuas retirement. During his incumbency, Judge Mantua was never given a
chance to explain the results of the judicial audit report. With the knowledge
that the judicial audit report will be submitted only after Judge Mantuas retirement,
the judicial audit teams recommendations were directed only to Atty. Mape, the
Acting Clerk of Court and Legal Researcher II of Branch 17, and Judge Maraya, Acting
Presiding Judge of Branch 17 at the time of the reports submission. In its
Memorandum, the OCA recommended that Judge Mantua be fined for gross
incompentency and inefficiency.
The report of the judicial audit team showed that no appropriate action was done in
68 cases, 23 cases remained unresolved after a sufficient amount of time, and 10
cases were not decided within the reglementary period. In contrast, there is no
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showing that Judge Mantua ever requested this Court for a reasonable period of
extension to dispose of these cases.
We issued a Resolution dated 15 August 2011 which redocketed the case as a regular
administrative matter and required Judge Mantua to comment on the OCAs 12 May
2009 Memorandum. The pertinent portions of Judge Mantuas comment read:
When I assumed office as Judge of RTC, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte in August 2005,
my court then had no Clerk of Court. xxx
This comment is not an excuse for the findings of the Judicial Audit team of my
performance, but is made only to show the state of affairs of the court during my
stewardship of the same for a period of a little over three (3) years. However, despite
my earnest efforts, there were things which have been overlooked due to
inadvertence and these were just product [sic] of human weakness and
imperfection.
This Court has always impressed upon judges the necessity of deciding
cases with dispatch. Section 5 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary states that [j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.
Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that [a] judge shall dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Canon 6 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides that [a judge] should be prompt in disposing of
all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice
denied. Section 15(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires that judges of
lower courts decide cases within three months from the date of submission.10
This Court has repeatedly reminded judges that they must resolve matters
pending before them promptly and expeditiously within the constitutionally
mandated three-month period. If they cannot comply with the same, they
should ask for an extension from the Supreme Court upon meritorious
grounds. The rule is that the reglementary period for deciding cases should be
observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time.
Judges must dispose of the courts business promptly. Delay in the disposition of
cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it to disrepute. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with
dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions on them.11
Undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge,12 penalized
either by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one nor more than three months; or by a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00.13 We consider, however, that Judge Mantuas earnest efforts
in attending to the pending cases in his docket during his incumbency serve to
negate his liability.
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This Court concedes that there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial
audit. However, the absence of such rules should not serve as license to recommend
the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were
never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial
audit. Judicial audit reports and the memoranda which follow them should state not
only recommended penalties and plans of action for the violations of audited courts,
but also give commendations when they are due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual
judicial audits may be conducted at least six months before a judges compulsory
retirement. We recognize that effective monitoring of a judges observance
of the time limits required in the disposition of cases is hampered by
limited resources. These limitations, however, should not be used to violate
Judge Mantuas right to due process.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against Judge Celso L. Mantua is DISMISSED

HIPE VS. LITERARTO
671 SCRA 9 (2012)
OCA VS. SANTOS

684 SCRA 1 (2012)
Facts: In a Letter, Judge Santos requested from theOffice of the Court Administrator
(OCA) additional time to try and decide two election cases, namely: (a) Special
Proceedings No. 2007-02 (Election Protest No. 2007-02) filed by a certain Felicisimo
Gavino against Raymundo Jucutan; and (b) Special Proceedings No. 2007-03 (Election
Protest No.2007-03) initiated by Angel Marinas against Edgardo Corre.
The OCA, favorably recommended the extension requested by Judge Santos which
was adopted by the Court in its July 21, 2008 Resolution.Judge Santos was granted an
extension of thirty (30) days or until June 7, 2008 to decide both election cases and
was directed to furnish the Court with copies of his decisions on said cases within ten
(10) days from the promulgation of judgment.
Thereafter, in a Letter Judge Santos provided the Court with a copy of his February
16, 2009 Decision in Election Protest No. 2007-03. The OCA, however, noticed that
the said decision was
rendered eight (8) months beyond the extension granted to Judge Santos. Inits March
11, 2009 Report, the OCA recommended Warning.
In a letter, dated July 10, 2009, Judge Santos sought another extension of thirty (30)
days or until August 10, 2009 to decide Special Proceedings No. 2007-02 as he
apparently needed more time to evaluate the voluminous records of the case. The
OCA, in its Memorandum required Judge Santos to explain xxx
Issue:
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Held: Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires lower courts to
decide or resolve cases or matters for decision or final resolution within three (3)
months from date of submission. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Canon 1,
Rule 1.02, of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs that a judge should administer
justice impartially and without delay.
Specifically, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to
dispose of their business promptly and to decide cases within the required period. All
cases or matters must be decided or resolved by all lower courts within a period of
three (3) months from submission.
To stress the importance of prompt disposition of cases, the Court, in Administrative
Circular No. 3-99, dated January 15, 1999, reminded all judges to strictly follow the
periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding cases because failure to comply
with the said period violates the parties constitutional right to speedy disposition of
their cases. Hence, failure to decide cases within the ninety (90)-day reglementary
period may warrant imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.
In this case, Judge Santos failed to render the decision in 294 cases within the
reglementary period or to even ask for extension. The Court,
in its aim to dispense speedy justice, is not unmindful of circumstances that justify
the delay in the disposition of the cases assigned to judges. It is precisely for this
reason why the Court has been sympathetic to requests for extensions of time within
which to decide cases and resolve matters and incidents related thereto. When a
judge sees such circumstances before the reglementary period ends, all that is
needed is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate justification, for an extension
of time within which to decide the case. Thus, a request for extension within which to
render a decision filed beyond the 90-day reglementary period is obviously a
subterfuge to both the constitutional edict and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Judge Santos could have easily asked the Court or an extension of time to decide on
these cases like what he had done in the two election cases. He, however, opted not
to do so. The Court cannot understand why Judge Santos asked for extension in the
two election cases but not in the 294 cases already waiting for disposition in his sala.
The Court can only surmise that it was deliberate so he could not be directed by the
Court to immediately resolve all of them. The fact that the cases were mentioned in
the monthly report of cases and semestral docket inventories is not extenuating. The
indelible fact is that he was in delay in resolving those cases. Under the
circumstances, it was inexcusable.
A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC
September 28, 2010
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RE: Seniority Among the Four (4) Most Recent Appointments to the Position
of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President transmitted to the SC the
appointments of Court of Appeals Justices:
Appointees
Positions
Hon. Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela
Associate Justice, CA
Hon. Myra G. Fernandez
Hon. Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
Hon. Ramon Paul L. Hernando
The appointment papers of the Justices bore the following dates:

Name of Associate Justice
Date of Appointment
Hon. Myra G. Fernandez
February 16, 2010
Hon. Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
February 16, 2010
Hon. Ramon Paul L. Hernando
February 16, 2010
Hon. Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela
February 24, 2010
The four Justices were finally listed in the roster of the CA Justices in the following
order of seniority: Justice Fernandez (as most senior), Justice Peralta, Jr., Justice
Hernando and Justice Antonio-Valenzuela (as most junior).
The conflict stems from certain provisions of the 2009 Internal Rues of the CA (IRCA).
Rule 1, Sec.1 provides: The date and sequence of the appointment of the
Justices determine their seniority courtwide.. On the other hand, Rule 2, Sec. 1
provides: The Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the
order of their appointments as officially transmitted to the Supreme Court.
According to the CA Committee on Rules, Rule 2, Sec.1 should prevail as the conflict
should be reckoned with BP 129 (Sec 3. Organization) which states that: There is
hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Justice and sixtyeight (68) Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment, and the
Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective
appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of them shall bear the same
date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the
President."
Judge Antonio-Valenzuela (ranked most junior) insisted that she is the most senior
among the four newly appointed CA Associate Justice pursuant to Rule2, Sec.1
IRCA. ." She argued that "the final act in the process of appointing a member of the
Judiciary is the transmittal of the appointment to the Supreme Court."
Issue: whether or not Judge Antonio-Valenzuelas contention is correct.
Ruling: No.
Page 469

3
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, the date the commission has been
signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document)
is the date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the
members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129,
as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the earlier the date of the commission of an
appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other subsequent appointees. It is only
when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the order
of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material. This provision of
statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls over
the provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of appointments as
transmitted to this Court.
Page 470

3
De La Llana v. Alba G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
Facts:
Article VIII, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution states that: The Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior
until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of
inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal."
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa blg. 129 was promulgated. It mandates that Justices
and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts,
except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. Petitioners sought to bolster their claim by imputing
lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and
allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of
the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Congress has the power to reorganize the judiciary
2.
Whether or not the enactment of BP blg 129 violated the security of tenure
provision
Held:
1. Yes. On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization
was organized. 12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order
No. 619-A., dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task
assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization
of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August
7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the
entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of
Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all
Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan."
The mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and
constitutional. Such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the
legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments
and commissions." The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate
court, regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts of the national capital
region, and other metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in cities, as well as
in municipalities, and municipal circuit trial courts. There is even less reason then to
doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang
Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate
Page 471

3
response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there
could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however,
was for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of
power.
2. No. Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides
with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under
Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the
1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal
the power to supervise administratively inferior courts. Moreover, the
Supreme Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a
vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President
who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished
from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant.
In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose
his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless,
for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.
As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the
office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of
the judiciary.
Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of
judicial power. In the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint.
Page 472

3
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT
Facts:
An administrative case was filed against Judge Eustaquio Gacott Jr. for gravely
abusing his discretion in dismissing a criminal case. The Second Division of the Court
reprimanded and fined him in the amount of P10,000 for gross ignorance of the law.
He filed this motion for reconsideration, contending that according to the second
sentence of Art 8, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, The Supreme Court en banc shall
have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote
of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues
in the case and voted in thereon. He argues that it is only the full Court, not a
division thereof, that can administratively punish him.
Issue: whether or not only the Full Court, not a division, can administratively punish
the lower court judge.
Ruling: No.
The very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are
actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that "the
Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts," is
a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the
procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. The second clause, which
refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated
from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can
"order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this
instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full
Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause, a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar
Matter No. 209. It provides that the following are considered en banc cases:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or
employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of
them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
xxxxxxx
Only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be
decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious
evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the
penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of
P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in division.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court
promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies that:
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority
of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and
Page 473

3
voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII,
1987 Constitution).
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3
YNOT vs. IAC
Facts:
In 1980, Marcos issued Executive Order No. 626-A which forbade the transportation
and slaughtering of carabaos. Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pumpboat
from Masbate to Iloilo. The police officers caught him and immediately confiscated
his carabaos. He filed a case for replevin before the RTC. The carabaos were returned
to him upon filing of a superseades bond of P12,000.00. After hearing, the court
sustained the confiscation.
Issue:
whether or not the administrative authorities encroached on the power of the
judiciary.
Held: Yes.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court.
The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once
and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have
had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction
of the accused.
However, Executive Order No. 626-A authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of
the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in
the case of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for
partiality and abuse, and even corruption. To sum up, we find that the challenged
measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.
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3
ADAO vs. Judge LORENZO
Facts:
This complaint (year 1999) was filed against Judge Lorenzo for failing to act upon
complainants objection to the dismissal of a civil case filed in 1997. Judge Lorenzo
reasoned that it was almost physically impossible for him to act on complainants
objection to the notice of dismissal of said case because of his multifarious duties as
Presiding Judge of Branch 1, Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 2, and Judge-Designate
of Branch 4 at Dolores and Branch 5 at Oras, Eastern Samar; and that he did not
resolve the matter because he thought it best that it be resolved by the permanent
judge of the RTC, Branch 2, Borongan, considering that complainant had filed both an
administrative and a criminal complaint against him.
Issue: whether or not Judge Lorenzo acted with grave abuse of discretion in failing to
act upon said objection.
Ruling: Yes. Judge Lorenzos excuse is unjustifiable. The fact that respondent judge
presides over four branches of the RTC is not a valid excuse for his inaction.
A heavy caseload may excuse a judges failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period, but not his/her failure to request an extension of time within
which to decide the case on time.
Nor can respondent use as an excuse the administrative and criminal complaints filed
against him by complainant as the complaints were filed only in May, 1999, more
than a year after complainant filed his memorandum in opposition to the notice of
dismissal on September, 1997. Under Art. VIII,15(1) of the Constitution, judges of
lower courts are required to decide cases or resolve matters within three months
from the date of their submission for resolution.
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3
DE
CASTRO
vs.
JUDICIAL
BAR
COUNCIL
(http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/20306799/1179705776/name/de+castro+vs+JBC.doc.
)
G.R. No. 191002 | March 17, 2010
FACTS
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the
controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election.
Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC,
addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the
office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon
the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position
of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its
announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.
Subsequently, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of
announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their
sworn complaint, written report, or opposition. Although it has already begun the
process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules,
the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for
the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors to call for
either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist or mandamus for the JBC to pass
the shortlist.
ISSUE
W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of
nominees by the JBC?
RULING: No.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which
it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is
not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff
has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant
to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully
neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is
ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Page 477

3
Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least
three nominees to the President for every vacancy in the Judiciary. However, Section
4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90
days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day
period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the
process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court before the occurrence of the vacancy.
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list
of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to
appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs,
because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President
to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part,
considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the
ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the
nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the Presidents
mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates
whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the
discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only
refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in
the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be
an unjustified delay in performing that duty. [88] For mandamus to lie against the JBC,
therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending
nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is similarly devoid of merit. The
challenge mounted against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly
unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to the ex officio members from the Senate
and the House of Representatives, thereby prejudicing the chances of some
candidates for nomination by raising the minimum number of votes required in
accordance with the rules of the JBC, is not based on the petitioners actual interest,
because they have not alleged in their petition that they were nominated to the JBC
to fill some vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners lack locus standi on that
issue.
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3
De Castro vs. Judicial Bar Council (April 20, 2010)
Ruling:
Article VIII, Section 8(1) and (5) of the Constitution provide that "A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it."
Supervision, as a legal concept, more often than not, is defined in relation with the
concept of control. 20 In Social Justice Society v. Atienza, 21 we defined "supervision" as
follows:
[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Under this definition, the Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of its assigned
task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to use to determine who to
recommend. It cannot even direct the JBC on how and when to do its duty, but it can,
under its power of supervision, direct the JBC to "take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties," if the duties are not being
performed because of JBCs fault or inaction, or because of extraneous factors
affecting performance. Note in this regard that, constitutionally, the Court can also
assign the JBC other functions and duties a power that suggests authority beyond
what is purely supervisory.
Where the JBC itself is at a loss on how to proceed in light of disputed constitutional
provisions that require interpretation, 22 the Court is not legally out of line as the
final authority on the interpretation of the Constitution and as the entity
constitutionally-tasked to supervise the JBC in exercising its oversight function by
clarifying the interpretation of the disputed constitutional provision to guide the JBC.
In doing this, the Court is not simply rendering a general legal advisory; it is providing
concrete and specific legal guidance to the JBC in the exercise of its supervisory
authority, after the latter has asked for assistance in this regard. That the Court does
this while concretely resolving actual controversies (the Tolentino and Soriano
petitions) on the same issue immeasurably strengthens the intrinsic correctness of
the Courts action.
Page 479

3
Chavez vs. JBC
Facts:
Chavez seeks judicial intervention with regard to JBC composition. Article VIII, Sec. 8
of the 1987 Constitution provides that, A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. In
compliance, Congress, from the moment of JBC creation, had only 1 representative
(the HR and Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC). Subsequently,
in 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
7 members, an 8th member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC
En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.
Issue: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with
eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the
letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: Yes.
The use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of Congress" is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. Congress may designate
only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one
(1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers of the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to
provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads
the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between
two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for
that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually
muddle the JBCs voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word
"Congress" in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so
worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially
intended a unicameral form of Congress.
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the
composition of the JBC reflects the Commissions desire "to have in the Council a
representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio
members of the Council consist of representatives from the three main branches of
government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the
judiciary. The unmistakable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat
each ex-officio member
as representing
one
co-equal
branch
of
Page 480

3
government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with
the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
To ensure judicial independence, the framers of the Constitution adopted a holistic
approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three branches
of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the
members of the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by
having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote
each, would, as one former congressman and member of the JBC put it, "negate the
principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in
the Constitution."53
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3
Republic
Asuncion)
vs.
Asuncion
(http://www.scribd.com/doc/149333067/Republic-vs-
Facts:
Alexander Manio, a member of PNP, shot T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang. He was charged in
the RTC with the crime of Homicide. The respondent Judge dismissed said Criminal
Case for re-filing with the Sandiganbayan" on the ground that it is the Sandiganbayan
and not the Regional Trial Court, has the jurisdiction over the case. This is in view
with the SC decision in the case of Deloso vs. Domingo, quoted that The
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when
penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional, the
offense charged in the herein case carries penalty of reclusion temporal maximum
to death thus cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction to investigate it. Petitioner opposed the RTC dismissal of the case due to
Courts jurisdiction. He asserted that crimes committed by PNP members are not
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan because they fall within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the regular courts" as provided in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and the
Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court."
ISSUE:
1.
Whether the term regular courts includes the Sandiganbayan
2.
Whether all offenses commited by public officer or employee
with penalty higher than prision correctional would automaticaly be cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
1.
Yes, Sandiganbayan is a regular Court. Regular courts are those within
the judicial department of the government, namely, the Supreme Court and such
lower courts which as established by law, under Section 16, Chapter 4, Book II of the
Administrative Code of 1987, includes the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of
Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Shari'a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and Shari'a Circuit Courts."
Accordingly, the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts.
This is in line with the purpose of the law to remove the jurisdiction of Court- Martial
over criminal cases involving PNP members due to reorganization and turning PNP
into civilian in character which in return mandates the transfer of criminal cases
against members of the PNP to the civilian courts.
2.
No, If the allegation in the information of the offense of any public
officer is not related to his function in his public office then RTC has the exclusive
jurisdiction over the case.
Therefore in the case at bar the dismissal of criminal case purposely to transfer Court
jurisdiction solely on the basis of Deloso vs. Domingo case was erroneous. Any
officer authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation who is investigating an
offense or felony committed by a public officer or employee (including a member of
the PNP) where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, must determine if the crime was
Page 482

3
committed by the respondent in relation to his office. If it was, the investigating
officer shall forthwith inform the Office of the Ombudsman which may either (a) take
over the investigation of the case pursuant to Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770, or (b)
deputize a prosecutor to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of the case pursuant to Section 31 thereof. If the
investigating officer determines that the crime was not committed by the respondent
in relation to his office, he shall then file the information with the proper court.
CAYETANO v. MONSOD
201 SCRA 210 (1991)
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of
the COMELEC in a letter received by the Commission on Appointments. Petitioner
Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10
years.
On June 5, 1991, the CA confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day he assumed
office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Hence, this petition by Cayetano, as citizen and
taxpayer, praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod
as Chairman of COMELEC be declare null and void.
HELD:
Section 1(1), Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that: There shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least 35 years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any election position in the immediately preceding elections. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
While there seems to be no Jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office, Black defines practice of law as The
rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and techniques to serve the interest of another with his comment. It is not limited to
appearing in Court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation but embraces
the preparations of pleadings, and other papers incidents to actions and special
proceedings, conveyance, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of legal advises to clients. xxx
The practice of law means any activity, In or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. To engage in
the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which devise or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Interpreted in the light of various definitions of the term practice of law, particularly
the modem concept of law practice, Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a
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3
lawyer economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirementthat he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. These are added to the fact that Mr.
Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, has been dues-paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-1973 and has also been
paying his professional license fees as a lawyer for more than 10 years.
Practice of law- to include any activity in and out of court which should require the
use of legal skills, knowledge or expertise. But this is qualified by the phrase
member of the Philippine Bar.
Because of the law student practice rule that law students who have finished
at least 3rd year, not 3 years, in law school, to be accepted in the law student
practice. The law student would be technically performing tasks which require the
use of legal skills, but he is not yet a member of the Philippine bar, he cannot be
qualified to the position.
There is a common disqualification on appointments. They must not have
been candidates for any elective position, in the elections immediately preceding
their appointment.
2 things:
(1)
It does not refer to the 1 year usual laying back prohibition
that if you have ran in the last election, you cannot be appointed to any government
office
within a period of 1 year for the Commissioners, it is in the immediately preceding
elections
if youre a candidate, you cannot be appointed within a period of 3 years.
(2)
What election are we talking about-national election, or local election?

-if youre 35, you cannot run for youth (SK)
-for example you ran in 1998 for Congress, then theres the 2001, no problem, you
can be appointed after May 14, 2001 can you be appointed after next year? The
immediately preceding elections would not be the 2001 elections if the barangay
election is considered.
-it should be a national election
Theres a special rule with respect to the COA, all members must not belong
to the same profession. So 2:1 in favor of the CPAs and lawyers.
(2)
Appointment & Term of Commissioners
(a)
Rule against Reappointment
Art. IX-C, Sec. 1(2): The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointment for a
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members
for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
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The President shall make the appointment for 7 years, no reappointment with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments (CA).
No reappointment because it would not be in consonance with the rule on
independence.
NACIONALISTA v. ANGELO
85 PHIL 101 (1949)
FACTS:
On Nov. 9, 1949, while respondent Bautista held the Office of the Solicitor General of
the Philippines, President Quirino designated him as acting member of the COMELEC.
He took his oath of office and forthwith proceeded to assume and perform the duties
of the office while at the same time continued to exercise all the powers and duties
as Solicitor General.
Petitioner Nacionalista Party instituted this proceeding praying that after due hearing,
a writ of prohibition be issued commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist
forever from acting as member of the COMELEC unless is legally appointed as regular
Member of said Commission. Petitioner alleged that membership in the Commission
is a permanent constitutional office with a fixed tenure, and, therefore, no
designation of a person or officer in an acting capacity could and can be made
because a member of the Commission cannot at the same time hold any other office;
and because the respondent as Solicitor General belongs to the Executive
Department and cannot assume the powers and duties of a member in the
Commission.
HELD:
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is an independent body or institution. By the
very nature of their functions, the members of the COMELEC must be independent.
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They must be made to feel that they are secured in the tenure of their office and
entitled to fixed emoluments during their incumbency, so as to make them impartial
in the performance of their functions, their powers, and their duties. That
independence and impartiality mal- IV shaken and by designation of a person or
officer to act temporarily in the COMELEC. It would be more in keeping with the
intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a, permanent
Commission than to designate one to act temporarily.
Moreover, the permanent office of the respondent as Solicitor General is the broad
sense incompatible with the temporary one to which he has been designated,
because his duties and functions as Solicitor General require that all his time be
devoted to their efficient performance. Nothing short of that is required and expected
of him.
The Supreme Court said that the appointment to the Commission is permanent,
they cannot be temporary or in an acting capacity. Only permanent appointees are
secured in their offices.
A person not secured in his office may retain from exercising his duties in such a
manner that he will clash with the appointing authority. There may be hesitation on
his part, that is not conducive to the independence of the Commission. Only a
permanent appointment can make the person secured from the appointing authority.
BRILLANTES v. YORAC
GR 93867 (Dec. 18, 1990)
FACTS:
Petitioner Brillantes is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines
of Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario Davide, who had been named Chairman of the
fact-finding Commission to investigate the 1989 December coup dtat attempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to make the challenged designation.
HELD:
No. The President does not have the power to make the challenged designation. Art.
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that: In no case shall any Member of the
Commission on Elections be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. Art. IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution, likewise expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although essentially executive in nature,
they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of
their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings
under the applicable laws and its own rules and the exercise of its own discretion.
That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of
the Philippines. The choice of the acting Chairman is an internal matter that should
be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President
violates their independence.
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This case talks about the designation of the appointment of the temporary
chairperson. Who shall be the acting chairperson. Because the permanent
chairperson is appointed President, how about the acting? Should the President make
the appointment?
It is within the discretion of the remaining members, who in the meantime will
be the acting chairperson. Because:
1st- the Constitution prohibits appointment in a temporary or acting capacity
2nd- it is still not conducive to the independence of the Commission.
NP v. VERA
85 PHIL 149 (1951)
FACTS:
This is a special civil action for prohibition filed by the Nacionalista Party and its
official candidates for Senators against Vicente de Vera, Chairman of the COMELEC to
enjoin him from sitting or taking part in the deliberations of said Commission in
connection with the elections of the Liberal Party for the position of Senator in the
last elections, and for that reason, he is disqualified from acting on all matters
connected with said elections, the Nacionalista Party also argued that his
appointment as Chairman of the COMELEC is a violation of the constitution and,
therefore, it is void ab initio. It was found out that de Vera was already a member of
the Commission when he is appointed its chairman. Nacionalista Party argued that
such appointment was in fact a reappointment which is expressly prohibited by the
Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court pronounced that the ground invoked by petitioners would be
proper in quo warrant to proceedings but not in a petition for prohibition because it is
inquiring into a persons title he is holding under color of right. Nevertheless, the
Court gave its view on the 1985 Constitutional appointment of COMELEC that There
shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a chairman and two
other members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be
reappointed. xxx it must be noticed from this provision that the prohibition against
reappointment comes as a continuation of the requirement that the Commissioners
shall hold office for a term of 9 years. This imports that the Commissioners may not
be reappointed only after they have held office only for, say, 3 or 6 years, provided
his term will not exceed 9 years at all.
REP v. IMPERIAL
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96 PHIL 770 (1955)
FACTS:
The Solicitor General filed this quo warrant to proceeding against respondents Hon.
Imperial and Hon. Perez, to test the legality of their continuance in office of as
Chairman and Member, respectively, of the COMELEC. According to the Solicitor
General, the first Commissioners of COMELEC were duly appointed and qualified on
July 12, 1945 with the following terms of office:
Hon. Vito, Chairman, for 9 years, expiring on July 12, 1954;
Hon. Enage, Member, for 6 years, expiring on July 12, 1951;
Hon. Vera, Member, for 3 years, expiring on July 12, 1948;
Upon death of chairman Vito in May 1947, Member Vera was promoted Chairman on
May 26, 1947.The Solicitor General argued that based on the case of NP V. Bautista,
the term of office of Vera would have expired on July 12, 1954 or the date when the
term of office if the late Vito would have expired. But Chairman Vera also died in
August, 1951 and the respondent Hon. Imperial was appointed Chairman to serve for
a full term of 9 years or to expire on July 12, 1960 despite the theory that he could
legally server as Chairman only up to July 12. 1954. Respondent Hon. Perez was
appointed member on Dec.8, 1949 again for a full term of 9 years expiring on Nov.
24, 1958. The solicitor General argued that Hon. Perez could serve only up to July 12,
1951 or the date when the term of office of Member Enage who was his predecessor
would have expired.
HELD:
Sec 1. Par. 1 of Art. X of the 1935 Constitution provides that: There shall be an
independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and two other
members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be
reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first appointed, one shall hold office
for a term of nine years, another for six years, and the third for three years. The
Chairman and the other Members of the Commission on Elections may be removed
from office only by impeachment in the manner provided in this Constitution.
The provision that of the first 3 Commissioners appointed one shall hold office for
nine years, another for 6 years and the third for 3 years when taken together with
the prescribed term of office for 9 years, without reappointment, evidences a
deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the
Commission, by having subsequent members appointable only once every 3 years,
so that no President can appoint more than one Commissioner, thereby preserving
and safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the Commission as a body.
The rotation plan and selection of the fixed term of 9 years for all subsequent
appointees were evidently for the purpose of preserving it from hasty and irreflexive
changes.
The operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its
workability: (1) That the terms of the first 3 Commissioners should start on a common
date; and, (2) That any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the
expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
The starting date, however, should be June 21, 1941 since that is the date of the
organization of the Constitutional COMELEC under CA 657 ( which was formerly, a
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purely statutory commission under CA 607), not July 12, 1945 as pointed out by the
Solicitor General. Hence, the terms of office of the first appointees are as follows:
Hon. Vito, Chairman, for 9 years, expiring on June 20, 1950;
Hon. Enage, Member, for 6 years, expiring on June 20 1947.
The first 3-year term expiring on June 20, 1944 was not filled (because Hon. Vera was
appointed on July 12, 1945).
Hence, when Hon. Vera was appointed on July 12, 1945, the first 3-year had already
expired and so his appointment must be deemed for the full 9 years, expiring on June
20, 1953.
When Chairman Vito died on May 7, 1947, Commissioner Vera was appointed
Chairman. Such appointment could only be for the unexpired period of Veras term or
up to June 20, 1953.
Chairman Veras tenure as Chairman expired on June 20, 1950 and his reappointment
was expressly prohibited by the Constitution. The next Chairman was respondent
Hon. Imperial whose terms of 9 years must be deemed to have begun on June 21,
1950, expiring only on June 20, 1959.
As to Perezs case, he succeeded Hon. Enage whose initial 6-year term expired on
June 21, 1947. Perez was to serve for a 9-year term which must be deemed to have
started on June 21, 1947, expiring only on June 20, 1956.
Hence, the legal terms of office of the respondents Hon. Imperial and Hon. Perez have
not yet expired.
They were trying to discuss whether reappointment is possible. The term
before is 9 years. If you are appointed for only 3 years, you can be reappointed for
another 6 years. or if you have been appointed to serve the unexpired term of the
incumbent Commissioner who has died or becomes incapacitated or has been
removed, you can be reappointed provided it does not exceed 9 years.
Supreme Court said in those cases that reappointment is still not possible
because of the so-called rotation plan.
The purpose of the rotation plan is to afford the independence and to protect and
safeguard the independence of the Constitutional Commissions. They are performing
executive functions but not under the executive branch. They are strictly
independent from the executive.
If theres a vacancy before the expiration of the term- the appointees shall serve only
for the unexpired term and that appointee cannot be reappointed.
No Member shall be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. This
is also traceable to the independence of the Commision.
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GAMINDE v. COA
347 SCRA 655 (2000)
FACTS:
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P.
Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. She assumed office
on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the
Commission on Appointment (CA), Congress of the Philippines confirmed the
appointment also informing her that her will expire on February 2, 1999.
On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President
as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, opined that petitioners term of office would expire on
February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion,
petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999,
Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the COA requesting opinion on whether or
not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their
salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, COA, issued an opinion that the term of
Commisioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her
appointment conformably with the constitutional extent. Consequently, on March
24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance,
disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her coterminous staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed
the disallowance to the COA en banc. On June 15, 1999, the COA dismissed petitioner
appeal. The COA affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of
petitioners term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her
appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the
Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with
the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. In time, petitioner moved for
reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the COA denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, CSC, to
which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated
in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
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HELD:
The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, CSC, under an
appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired
on February 02, 1999.
The term of office of the Chairman and members of the CSC is prescribed in the 1987
Constitution, as follows:
Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of 7 years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for 7
years, a Commissioner for 5 years, and another Commissioner for 3 years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
In Republic vs. Imperial, we said that the operation of the rotational plan requires 2
conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three
(3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to
death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled
only for the unexpired balance of the term.
The terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the CC under the 1987
Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates
of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of
the first terms of 7, 5 and 3 years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2-year
interval between the expiration of the terms.
Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate
starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Cc under the 1987
Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of adoption of the 1987
Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between
the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted
against the latter.
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office
of the first appointees to the CC of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the
plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article
IX (D), Section 1(2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a 7-year term
of office for Members of the CC, without re-appointment, and for the first appointees
terms of 7, 5 and 3 years, without re-appointment. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to
expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to coincide
with effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification.
(3) Appointment of Personnel
Art. IX-A, Sec. 4: The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and
employees in accordance with law.
(4) Salary
Art. IX-A, Sec.3: The salary of the Chairman and Commissioners should be fixed by
law and shall not be decreased during their tenure.
Art XVIII, Sec. 17: Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive
an annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representative and the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each: the Senators, the
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Members of the House of the Representatives, the Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four
thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one
hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
Salaries of members of the Commissions are just like the judiciary- not to be decrease
during their tenure, but no prohibition on increase. They can be increase even during
their terms because they have no hand on the passage of the bill.
(5) Disqualifications
Art. IX-A, Sec. 2: No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his
tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice
of any profession or in the activity management or control of any business which in
any way maybe affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in contact with, or in any franchise or privilege
granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
(6) Impeachment
Art. XI, Sec 2: The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, an impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
(7) Appeal
Eugenio S. Capablanca vs. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 179370, November 18, 2009.
FACTS
Capablanca was appointed into the PNP service with the rank of PO1 with a
temporary status and was assigned at the PNP Station in Butuan City. After two
years, he took the PNP Entrance Examination conducted by the NAPOLCOM and
passed the same. On 2000, he took the Career Service Professional ExaminationComputer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the CSC and likewise passed the
same. Thereafter, the Police Regional Office XIII conferred upon him the permanent
status as PO1.
On 2001, The CSC Caraga informed PO1 Capablanca about certain alleged
irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT which he took on 2000. According to the CSC,
the person in the picture pasted in the Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the
person whose picture is attached in the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) and that the
signature appearing in the PS-P was different from the signature affixed to the PDS.
During the preliminary investigation, Capablanca, represented by a counsel,
moved to dismiss the proceedings. He argued that it is the NAPOLCOM which has
sole authority to conduct entrance and promotional examinations for police officers
to the exclusion of the CSC. Thus, the CSP-CAT conducted was void. Moreover, he
alleged that the administrative discipline over police officers falls under the
jurisdiction of the PNP and/or NAPOLCOM.
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In an Order, the CSC Caraga held that there was no dispute as to the sole
authority of NAPOLCOM as argued by him. However, since he submitted a CSC
Career Service Professional eligibility to support his appointment on a permanent
status, then the CSC had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. So, the
motion was denied.
PO1 Capablanca, then, filed a Petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for
the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC. Instead of
filing its Answer, the CSC Caraga moved to dismiss the case. It argued that, other
than not exhausting administrative remedies, the CSC was not stripped of its original
disciplinary jurisdiction over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies.
The court denied CSCs motion, and later, ruled that that the CSC had no jurisdiction
to conduct the preliminary investigation, much less to prosecute PO1 Capablanca.
The CSC filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA granted CSC
Petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT IT HAS ONLY APPELLATE
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND IT IS THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
(NAPOLCOM) WHICH HAS THE JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT INITIATORY INVESTIGATION
OF THE CASE.
RULING
The petition lacks merit.
It is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a
preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity
committed by the petitioner. Petitioner anchors his argument that the heads of
departments, agencies, offices or bureaus should first commence disciplinary
proceedings against their subordinates before their decisions can be reviewed by the
CSC.
It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission that the appellate
power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed
against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their office,
and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil
service examinations.
Moreover, in Civil Service Commission v. Albao, we rejected the contention
that the CSC only has appellate disciplinary jurisdiction on charges of dishonesty and
falsification of documents in connection with an appointment to a permanent position
in the government service.
Finally, petitioners reliance on Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, is
misplaced. In said case, the NAPOLCOM assailed Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 965487, which provides:
3. Appointees to Police Officer and Senior Police Officer positions in the Philippine
National Police must have passed any of the following examinations:
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a)
b)
c)
PNP Entrance Examination;

Police Officer 3rd Class Examination; and
CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination.
The NAPOLCOM took exception to this provision, particularly letter (c),

arguing that the requirement of taking a CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination is
only applicable to entrance in the first-level position in the PNP, i.e., the rank of PO1.
NAPOLCOM stressed that what would entitle a police officer to the appropriate
eligibility for his promotion in the PNP are the promotional examinations conducted
by the NAPOLCOM, and not the CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination.
The Court of Appeals found in favor of the NAPOLCOM and held that the CSC,
by issuing Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 96-5487 encroached on the exclusive power
of NAPOLCOM under RA 6975 to administer promotional examinations for policemen
and to impose qualification standards for promotion of PNP personnel to the ranks of
PO2 up to Senior Police Officers 1-4.
On the contrary, the issue in the instant case is the jurisdiction of
the CSC with regard to anomalies or irregularities in the CSP-CAT, which is a
totally different matter.
TAY
Powers of COA
VELOSO et al. vs. COA
G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011
FACTS:
The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040, authorizing the conferment
of Exemplary Public Service Award (EPSA) to elective local officials of Manila who
have been elected for three consecutive terms in the same position. Pursuant to the
ordinance, the City made partial payments in favor of a number of former councilors.
However, the Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila issued an Audit Observation
Memorandum, with the following observations: that the Ordinance is without legal
basis; the monetary reward is excessive and tantamount to double compensation in
contravention to the IRR of RA 7160; and that the appropriations to implement the
Ordinance was improperly classified.
Thereafter, a Notice of Disallowance (ND) was issued.
The councilors filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of Disallowance, which was granted by
the Legal Adjudication Office-Local of the COA. Upon review however, the COA
rendered the assailed Decision, sustaining the Notice of Disallowance.
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ISSUE: whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local
government funds.
RULING: YES.
It was the contention of the petitioners that the power and authority of the COA to
audit government funds and accounts does not carry with it in all instances the power
to disallow a particular disbursement. Citing Guevara v. Gimenez, they claim that the
COA has no discretion or authority to disapprove payments on the ground that the
same was unwise or that the amount is unreasonable.
The SC however disagreed. As held in National Electrification v. COA, the ruling
in Guevara cited by petitioners has already been overturned in Caltex Philippines,
Inc. v. COA. It was explained that under the 1935 Constitution, the Auditor General
could not correct irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures of
public funds, but could only bring the matter to the attention of the proper
administrative officer. Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the COA is vested with
the authority to determine whether government entities, including LGUs, comply with
laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or
irregular disbursements of these funds.
Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution gives a broad outline of the powers and
functions of the COA, to wit:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining
to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on
a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been
granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and
universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity,
directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or
the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.
However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate,
the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit,
as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general
accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties.
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Under the first paragraph of the above provision, the COA's audit jurisdiction extends
to the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Its jurisdiction
likewise covers, albeit on a post-audit basis, the constitutional bodies, commissions
and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy, autonomous state colleges and
universities, other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, and such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity from or
through the government. The power of the COA to examine and audit government
agencies cannot be taken away from it as Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution
mandates that "no law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of the COA."
Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is vested with broad
powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and
the uses of public funds and property. This includes the exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for
such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. The COA
is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds.
Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit
jurisdiction of the COA.
AGRA et al. vs. COA
G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011
This case involves the grant of rice allowance to employees of the National
Electrification Administration (NEA) by virtue of RA 6758 (the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989). A group of NEA employees, claiming that they did
not receive such allowances, filed a special civil action for mandamus against NEA
before the RTC which later decided in their favor and directed NEA to settle said
claims. This decision was issued a certificate to the effect that is has become final
and executory.
This decision was questioned by NEA before the CA which ordered the
implementation of a writ of execution against the funds of NEA. This was reversed by
the SC on the following grounds:
COA had already passed upon claims similar to the subject of the case in their
earlier resolution. COA opined that the court may have exceeded its
jurisdiction when it entertained the petition for the entitlement of the
employees which had already been passed upon by COA. Thus, employees,
pursuant to the above COA decision, cannot defy that decision by filing a
petition for mandamus in the lower court. PD 1445 and the 1987 Constitution
prescribe that the only mode for appeal from decisions of COA is on certiorari
to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court.
Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when it entertained the subject
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case of mandamus. And void decisions of the lower court can never attain
finality, much less be executed.
NEA is a GOCC. As such GOCC, NEA cannot evade execution; its funds may be
garnished or levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment rendered against it.
However, before execution may proceed against it, a claim for payment of the
judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
Under CA 327, as amended by PD 1445, it is the COA which has primary
jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due
from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries. With respect to money claims arising from the
implementation of R.A. No. 6758, their allowance or disallowance is for COA to
decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to the
SC.
As to the grant of the allowance under said final and executory decision, NEA
requested for a legal opinion before the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) which opined for the approval of the release of the allowance. Hence, NEA
issued a Resolution approving the same and the release of the funds.
However, the resident auditor of COA did not allow the payment of rice allowance for
a particular period. The Notice of Allowance was appealed, but the same was denied
by COA. They went again to the SC questioning the disallowance of their rice subsidy.
RULING:
(Discussion is primarily on the entitlement to the subsidy. The following are the
matters relating to the powers of COA)
The immutability rule applies only when the decision is promulgated by a court
possessed of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Undoubtedly, the petition in
the guise of a case for mandamus is a money claim falling within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of COA. Noting the propensity of the lower courts in taking
cognizance of cases filed by claimants in violation of such primary jurisdiction, the SC
issued Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 23, 2000 enjoining judges of
lower courts to exercise caution in order to prevent "possible circumvention of the
rules and procedures of the Commission on Audit" and reiterating the basic rule that:
"All money claims against the Government must be filed with the Commission on
Audit which shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize
the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect
sue the State thereby."
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is clothed
with original and exclusive jurisdiction, courts are utterly without power and authority
to exercise concurrently such jurisdiction. Accordingly, all the proceedings of the
court in violation of that doctrine and all orders and decisions reached thereby are
null and void. It will be noted in the cited Supreme Court Circular that money claims
are cognizable by the COA and its decision is appealable only to the Supreme Court.
The lower courts have nothing to do with such genus of transactions.
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COCOFED vs. REPUBLIC
663 SCRA 514 (2012)
RULING:
Jurisdiction over coconut levy funds.
The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the responsibility for state
audit. As an independent supreme state auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be
undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution, [n]o law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of [COA]. Following the mandate of the COA and the parameters set forth
by the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it has jurisdiction over coconut levy funds,
being special public funds. Conversely, the COA has the power, authority and duty to
examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and,
consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using said funds. However, declaring
the said funds as partaking the nature of private funds, ergo subject to private
appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the public funds of the government,
and consequently, renders them impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the
pertinent provisions of PD Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its constitutionallymandated function and undermine its constitutional independence. Accordingly,
Article III, Section 5 of both PD Nos. 961 and 1468 must be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
VERZOSA vs. COA

G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012
FACTS:
This resolves the MFR of the SCs Decision affirming COA decision which substantially
held that petitioner (as former Executive Director of the Cooperative Development
Authority or CDA) is personally and liable for the amount of P881,819.00 covered by a
COA Notice of Disallowance and involved overpriced computer units.
Among others, the MFR is anchored on the following ground: whether brand should
be considered by COA as one basis of comparison, in light of compliance with
intellectual property laws on software piracy and hardware imitation.
RULING:
The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of
funds by an agency of the national government on a post-audit basis. For this
purpose, the Constitution has provided that the COA shall have exclusive authority,
subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
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3
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
As such, CDAs decisions regarding procurement of equipment for its own use,
including computers and its accessories, is subject to the COAs auditing rules and
regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive
and extravagant expenditures. Necessarily, CDAs preferences regarding brand of its
equipment have to conform to the criteria set by the COA rules on what is reasonable
price for the items purchased.
In this case, the brand information was found by the COA as irrelevant to the
determination of the reasonableness of the price of the computers purchased by
CDA. Hence, on this ground, the MFR is dismissible.
FUNA vs. COA

G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Villar as Chairman of the
COA.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year
of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from
February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of
the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly
indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his
office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold
on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a
fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of
office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from
February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter to President Aquino III,
signified his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his
replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President Aquino III
named Tan as COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the
main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the
resignation of Villar, the SC consider the instant case as falling within the
requirements for review of a moot and academic case.
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3
ISSUE: Whether or not Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that
body and after having served for 4 years of his 7-year term as COA commissioner, is
valid in light of the term limitations imposed under Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution
RULING:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for
seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner argues that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes
reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a second
appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position of
commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited
reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
This is however incorrect. The flaw lies in regarding the word reappointment as, in
context, embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if a statute or
constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by
the President for a term of 7 years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no
longer be reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a
Commissioner who was appointed for a term of 7 years who likewise served the full
term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner
shall have served the full term of 7 years, then he can no longer be reappointed to
either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is
to prevent the president from dominating the Commission by allowing him to
appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not
served the full term of 7 years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2),
Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to
the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of
terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the
Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the
position of Chairman must not exceed 7 years so as not to disrupt the rotational
system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
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3
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a
promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under
the aforestated circumstances or conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his promotional
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year termfrom
February 2008 to February 2015given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner
devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been
divergence of opinion as to the import of the word reappointment, there has been
unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either as
chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more
than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year
service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to
the spirit of the rotational system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year
appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA
Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be
invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose
of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first
set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA
commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than 7 years cannot
be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the
expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a
full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve
more than 7 years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the SC restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions,
after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of
commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of 7 years; an appointment for
a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot
validly shorten the full term of 7 years in case of the expiration of the term as
this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the
Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation,
disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term
of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired
portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed
for a full term of 7 years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first
appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the
prohibition against reappointment.
Page 501

3
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than 7
years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is
not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period
of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term
of the predecessor will not exceed 7 years and provided further that the
vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation,
disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and
the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman).
On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different
position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new
appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred
under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Appeals
REYES vs. COA
G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Reyes filed this petition with the SC as an appeal by certiorari under Rule
44 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the COA disallowing the
refund of the government share in the fund to them as employee-members of TLRC,
and the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners mode of appeal is correct.
RULING: Incorrect.
Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decision, orders of rulings of
the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party. Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment or
final order of the Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to this
Court on certiorari under Rule 65. However, the petition in this case was filed on June
17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless,
the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit to this Court was
only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the 1987 Constitution.
The judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not reviewable by
ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this Court. Only when the
Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court is not allowed from any order, ruling or decision of the Commission on
Audit.
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[But note that in this case, the SC set aside the procedural error pro hac vice, and
treated the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit not finding that the
COA committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the distribution of the
government share in the aborted TLRC Provident Fund to its members.]
VALLES
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