Haack on Justification and Experience

Author(s): Laurence Bonjour

Source: Synthese, Vol. 112, No. 1 (Jul., 1997), pp. 13-23
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117645
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LAURENCE BONJOUR

HAACK ON JUSTIFICATIONAND EXPERIENCE

Evidence

and Inquiry1
analyses

compelling

rich and insightful book. It contains

is awonderfully
a
and critiques of wide variety of epistemological
and
to empirical knowledge,
views pertaining
including

anti-epistemological
recent versions of foundationalism

and coherentism,
Popper's "epistemol
a
Gold
without
ogy
subject", Quine's naturalized
knowing
epistemology,
the scientistic views of Stich and the Churchlands,
man's
and
reliabilism,
as Haack quite appropriately
the "vulgar pragmatism",
refers to it, of Rorty
and the more

recent

to me

it seems

Stich. All

entirely

of this material

decisive.

In particular,

is valuable,
the critical

and much
discussion

of
of

reliabilism is by far the best andmost complete in the literature; and the
analysis and refutation of the various recent efforts to evade or dismiss the
traditional epistemological
short of devas
projects and issues is nothing
to
it
is
its
resolute
be
from
the pursuit of
refusal
diverted
tating. Indeed,
the traditional epistemological
issues that seems to me the most valuable
feature

of the book.

In this spirit, while

views
epistemological
will

focus

demolition
of the various anti
applauding Haack's
?
- I
was
someone
it
had to do it
dirty work, but
of the views that attempt to solve rather
here on her discussions

than dissolve

the traditional

issues concerning
epistemological
empirical
Haack's
begin by considering
knowledge.
critique of recent versions
of coherentism
and foundationalism.
I will then turn to a more extended
own
and evaluation of her
third alternative, which
she
exposition
proposed
Iwill

dabsfoundherentism.

1.
I begin with
to my
the view that has, until fairly recently, been closest
own heart, namely coherentism. Here Iwill simply say without
further ado
that Haack's
in general and of my own version of
critique of coherentism
in particular has helped,
in company with many other critical
coherentism
discussions,

to finally

convince

me

of what many

have no doubt

suspected

Synthese 112: 13-23, 1997.

1997Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands.
?

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LAURENCEBONJOUR

14

the beginning:
that there is no way for a genuinely
coherentist
posi
no
matter
how
clever
and
bells
whistles
tion,
many
may be built into it,
to provide
standards for empirical
satisfaction
whose
justification
really
the input from the extra-conceptual
world that seems so clearly
guarantees
to be necessary
for genuinely
I am not sure
empirical knowledge. While

from

as it might
of the point is as perspicuous
that her development
seems
me
to
to
here
be
sound.
instinct
entirely
underlying

be, her

One way to put the central point is to say that while a carefully crafted
view can contain, as it were, a semblance
of empirical
coherentist
input,
to guarantee
there is no way consistent with a thoroughgoing
coherentism
that this will

not be a mere

semblance

that fails to really deliver the genuine

of coherentism,
inThe
presented

my own version

article. Thus, for example,

Structure of Empirical Knowledge?
attempts to provide for observational
a
to
of
the
idea
spontaneous
input by appealing
cognitively
belief one that
from the cognitive
is not derived inferentially
but
instead apparently
system
caused from without.
The suggestion
is that such a belief might
still be
the system, by appeal to the fact of its spontaneous
justified from within
occurrence
and to the apparent track record of spontaneous
beliefs ofthat
as
a
of
kind
truth.
Such
belief
would
thus have at
regards frequency
specific
or perceptual
least some of the key features of an observational
belief. By
I
to
the
the
called
Observational
effect
that any
what
Requirement,
imposing
must
of
beliefs
contain
spontaneous
cognitively
justified system
empirical
to the system
beliefs
that are in this way are likely to be true according
to provide a coherentist
account of observational
input.
the
alternative
coherent
however,
systems
Unfortunately,
objection,
which
this account of input is aimed in part to meet, recurs all over again:
itself,

I attempted

the system that these features are

long as it is only specified within
beliefs occur and that the Observation
spontaneous
present, that cognitively
will
be
there
is
satisfied,
indefinitely many other competing
Requirement
coherent
but characterizing
systems containing
analogous
specifications
as

the world

inmore

I attempt

to meet

or less any arbitrarily chosen way one likes. In my book,

this objection3
be
by saying that in order to genuinely

justified such a system must actually be believed and applied, with the
system would not remain
being that an arbitrarily constructed
suggestion
coherent
that its allegedly
in actual application,
and in particular
cogni
occur
not
to
beliefs
be
found
in that
would
spontaneous
tively
genuinely
way. Unfortunately,
of response seems
awareness
ly available
spontaneous

of one

to a coherentist.
beliefs

as I somehow

not to see, this sort

managed
to
sort
the
of introspective
only by appealing
own
's
beliefs and their occurrence
that is not legitimate
however,
to succeed

And as long as the occurrence

and the satisfaction
of the Observation

of cognitively
Requirement

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AND EXPERIENCE
HAACKON JUSTIFICATION

15

of beliefs to that effect with the

is assessed only in terms of the coherence
has to go
is all that the coherentist
rest of the system, which
legitimately
stands.
the
on,
objection
about other
There ismuch more that could be said about this issue?and
I certainly do not expect all of my erstwhile
problems with coherentism.
this easily. But for present purposes,
allies to be convinced
coherentist

while emphasizing that I still think (as indeed does Haack) that the correct
view will

contain

untenability

a major

I want to concede
the
component,
and see where
coherentism
this leads us.

coherentist

of a thoroughgoing

2.
itmight

Where

to some version

seem to lead us is back

of foundationalism,

according towhich all empirical justification depends on basic beliefs that

are supposed
to represent
the input from the world
that is missing
in
a
to Haack,
coherentist
views. According
such
conclusion
is
however,
at best too hasty and turns out in fact to be mistaken. What
the anti
on her view is instead the correctness
of
argument establishes
view
that
the
empirical
justification
experientialism,
depends
essentially
on experience. While
has usually
taken a foundationalist
experientialism
coherentist

are experientialist),
form.
foundherentist

(even though not all versions of foundationalism

it can also, she claims, take an importantly different,

form

even the
the arguments against all versions of foundationalism,
are
in
her
it
is
foundherentism
that
ones,
fatal,
judgment
experientialist
as
most
the
defensible
view.
finally emerges

And

since

Haack's

discussion

of foundationalist

of foundationalism

views.

On

the basis

to the various alternatives

objections
of foundationalism
that is, by her lights,
even
this last, best foundationalist
argues that
no

space here for a full account

are the following.
however,

involves

an elaborate

of this, she formulates

and isolates on this basis

taxonomy
the leading
the version

the most

adequate.

view

is unacceptable.

of this discussion.

The

essential

She

then
I have

points,

as already suggested,
the most defensible
forms of foundation
are
to her,
the experientialist
alism, according
forms, which hold that the
basic or foundational
beliefs are justified by reference to experience, where
First,

this includes
she rejects

and memory
In particular,
sensory, introspective,
experience.
those views
that appeal to an external causal or lawful rela

tion to justify the basic beliefs, on the ground that "what justifies a belief
should be something

of which
it seems

...

the believer

is aware", (p. 28). (As this

down on the internalist

comes

clear that Haack

quotation suggests,
side of the internalism-externalism
controversy,

although,

for reasons

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that

LAURENCEBONJOUR

16
do not seem

to me

to every be adequately
she officially
explained,
rejects
or
at
the
least
standard
the
way of formulating
dichotomy,
as
to
"not
robust
serious
carry any
dichotomy,
enough
weight"
(p. 2).)
in her view the most defensible
of foundationalism
versions
Second,
have two other features. They are weak rather than strong, in that they hold
the standard

have only a relatively weak and defeasible

degree of
or
than
justification,
being completely
justified. And
conclusively
in that they hold that the derived, non
they are impure rather than pure,
beliefs may derive some support from each other, rather than
foundational
that the basic

beliefs

rather

having all their support come from the basic beliefs. Both of these features
the strength of the claim made on behalf of
thus reduce, in different ways,
reason for thinking that these weaker versions of
Haack's
the foundations.
foundationalism
line of argument

are preferable
to the effect

is a familiar
that the claim

but to my mind
of independent

rather fuzzy
justification

on behalf of the basic beliefs is easier to sustain if the strength of the

claimed
is lessened.
justification
Thus the version of foundationalism
on the basis

of Haack's

discussion

that emerges as the most plausible

is an experientialist
foundationalism

that is both weak and impure. Such a view would hold (i) thatbasic beliefs
are justified by appeal to experience, (ii) that this justification is incomplete
and (iii) that other justified beliefs must receive some,
defeasible,
not
but
beliefs.
all, of their justification from these foundational
necessarily
to even this seemingly
What
then is the objection
version of
quite modest
foundationalism?
and/or

appeals to what she calls "the up and back all the

are aimed at the one-directional
which
way
arguments",
aspect of
to which justification
foundationalism,
always flows from basic
according
to derived beliefs
In effect, the point
and never in the reverse direction.
At

this point Haack

down

is, first, that a weak

foundationalist

cannot

deny

that the justification

of

basic beliefs isweak enough to benefit from strengthening by appeal to

if the latter had any support to give; and, second, that an
beliefs,
cannot apparently deny that non-basic
beliefs do
impure foundationalism
to it they are capable of supporting
have support to give, since according
non-basic

each other.

It seems

is left without
directionality

to follow

any rationale
is, according

that a position
that is both weak and impure
for one-directionality.
And to abandon one

to Haack,

to embrace

foundherentism.

The issues raised by this last argument seem tome both difficult and
at least somewhat
clusive
basic

at best. As
beliefs

the connecting

can

itself incon
obscure, however,
rendering the argument
far as I can see, no weak foundationalist
need deny that
lend support to each other, or that they may do so via

medium

of non-basic

beliefs.

The more

or less standard

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AND EXPERIENCE
HAACKON JUSTIFICATION

17

after all, is one inwhich basic beliefs

of weak foundationalism,
conception
which
have some relatively weak
initial degree of justification,
is then
to a level sufficient for knowledge.
like coherence
enhanced by something
the logic of the "enhancement"
is admittedly more than
process
Though
a little obscure,
it seems clear that any interesting notion of coherence
in addition to the basic ones. Thus the issue
involve other beliefs
would
to suppose that basic beliefs can receive support
it is plausible
that
beliefs
non-basic
is, as itwere, merely
goes beyond that which
transferred from other basic beliefs. To this I can only say that no clear case
is whether

from

for thinking that this is so seems to me to emerge from Haack's

discussion
and examples.
is perhaps also worth asking, though I cannot pur
One further question
sue it very far here. I have been assuming
so far that the idea of impure
is at least initially tenable. But it is in fact unclear that this
is so, assuming
that one version of Haack's main argument against coher
She argues, following
entism, not so far mentioned
here, is compelling.
foundationalism

that beliefs get no support from each other by virtue of coherence

Lewis,
it doubtful that non-basic beliefs have any
alone. But this conclusion makes
to
not
other
that
is
derived from basic beliefs:
each
support
give
ultimately
come
it
after all, would
from? And if impure foundationalism
is
where,
for this reason,

unacceptable

so a fortiori

would

be foundherentism.

3.
I turn now
rather,

to a more

to give

direct

the view
part of

consideration

of foundherentism

its full name, double-aspect

the label reflects Haack's

itself

or

The
foundherentism.
a
to
famil
response

"double-aspect"
iar argument against experientialist
views, advanced,
e.g., by Popper and
Davidson.
This argument claims that states of experience,
in virtue of being
can
in character,
stand only in causal relations, not in
non-propositional
to beliefs, and argues on this basis that such experiential
logical relations,
states cannot be a source of justification
for beliefs. The rationale for this
a matter of logic,
conclusion
is essentially
is the idea that justification
or
like reasoning
and that only proposi
inference,
involving
something
tions can stand

in logical relations. The further conclusion

drawn is that
can
case no
relations
obtain
between
in
which
beliefs,
only
justificatory
version of experientialism
would be tenable (p. 29).
Haack's
experiential
justification
justification

this argument
is correct in its claim that
reply is that while
states as such can play only a causal role, it errs in thinking that
is exclusively
logical in character. On the contrary, she claims,
involves

a causal

aspect

in addition

to the logical

or quasi

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LAURENCEBONJOUR

18

logical aspect, and it is the explicit attention given to these two aspects
that constitutes
the "double aspect" component
and their interrelation
of
and analogously
her view. In brief, it is states of experience,
also states
of belief
those

that play the causal role; while

it is the contents of
role (pp. 29, 74).
the logical or quasi-logical
two different
is elaborated by means of a distinction
between

and memory,
that play

states

This view

that allegedly
of a belief:
pertain to the justification
a
A person's 5-evidence
and C-evidence.
for belief consists of

of evidence

notions
S-evidence

those evidentially

relevant

states of the person

that are causally

operative,

directly or indirectly, in producing, sustaining, or inhibiting the belief in

to Haack,
this will standardly include
question. According
current states of perceptual
and introspective
experience,

states of belief,
and "memory

states of these kinds.

traces" of previous
experiential
for a belief that the C-evidence
It is on the basis of the 5-evidence

that

is to be specified. Whereas
the 5-evidence
finally determines
justification
of states of the believer,
the C-evidence
will con
consists of a collection
or propositions"
that can stand in logical and
sist of a set of "sentences
relations of consistency,
relations,
coherence,
confirmation,
quasi-logical
or explanation,
to each other and to the propositional
content of the belief
or propositions
are sup
sentences
whose
is at issue. These
justification
to reflect the contents of the states that make up the 5-evidence.
But,
shall see, there is a serious problem
lurking here as to how some of
those contents are properly to be characterized.
For the belief states that are included in the 5-evidence,
the correlated

posed
as we

will consist simply of the propositional

content that is believed.
C-evidence
to
This seems straightforward
But
it
is,
say the least, substantially
enough.
to the various experiential
the
less clear just how
C-evidence
corresponding
states and memory
traces of such
to be formulated.
The main motive
the position

included

in the 5-evidence

is

for the double-aspect

of
component
states do not have
the fact that experiential

was, after all,

content or anything

content
like propositional
very much
or
that beliefs do. So how then is a propositional
equivalent
to
the
that will somehow
evidential
force
of
capture
experience

propositional
in the way
correlate

states

be arrived at?
awareness
that there is a problem here, her
as extremely
sketchy. Her solution, for which
or defense
little in the way of explanation
is offered, is that the C-evidence
to experiential
states and memory
traces will consist simply
corresponding
While

Haack

consideration

shows

some

of it strikes me

or propositions
ascribing those states to the subject in question.
a state of perceptual
an ascription will characterize
in
experience
terms of the object or situation
that the experience
would
be
normally

of sentences
Such

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AND EXPERIENCE
HAACKON JUSTIFICATION
taken to be a perception
of, qualified by an indication
this
is
relevant. Thus, for example,
where
perception
that
the
say
subject "is in the sort of perceptual
might

19

of the conditions

of

a typical ascription
state a person would

when
in, in normal circumstances,
looking at a rabbit three feet away
state a normal subject
and in good light" or "is in the sort of perceptual
when getting a brief glimpse of a
would be in, in normal circumstances,
be

rabbit at dusk" (p. 80).

fast-moving
Given this account of C-evidence,
to a particular
belief
then depends,

the degree

of justification
pertaining
on three main
to Haack,

according
on
favorable
the person's direct C-evidence
how
is
first,
on
will
where
the
with respect to the proposition
this
believed,
depend
at least approximately
the same thing
integration,
degree of explanatory
as explanatory
that results when
the believed proposition
in
coherence,
considerations:

is added to the direct C-evidence;

second, on how well the beliefs
question
are themselves
in the direct evidence
contained
supported apart from any

appeal to the belief originally inquestion, with this question being repeated
that support the directly
evidential
for any further beliefs
and
beliefs,
so on; and third, on the comprehensiveness
of the C-evidence.
Haack
cannot consist merely of
that the C-evidence
adds the further requirement
propositions
evidence.

to beliefs,

corresponding

but must

include

some experiential

Haack's
overall account of empirical
which
of course
justification,
includes many
refinements
and details which
there has been no room to
in its general
include here, seems to me on the whole extremely promising
contours. It seems quite plausible
that some view of this general kind, com
and coherentist
foundationalist
elements, will
bining both experientialist
more
more
be both
and
defensible
than most or all
dialectically
plausible
?
of the existing alternatives
though for reasons already briefly suggested
as to whether
above, the question
in character seems
foundherentist

the best view will

tome difficult

or

be foundationalist

to answer

and perhaps

not

even

clearly defined. But despite my sympathy with the general shape of

Haack's
approach, I have serious doubts about her treatment of an issue that
lies at the very heart of her position:
the issue of the relation of experience,
or
to propositionally
formulated
sensory
perceptual
experience,
especially

beliefs about the world. Iwill devote the final section of this paper to a
consideration

of this pivotal

problem.

4.
On Haack's

view,

as we

given by a proposition

have

force of experience
is
seen, the evidential
to the person in question,
that experience
ascribing

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LAURENCEBONJOUR

20
with

the experience
that would

itself being

described

in terms of the sort of physical

the evidential
force of my

it. Thus

situation

typically produce
at the present moment might be described by saying that I am
experience
state a normal
in the sort of perceptual
be in, in normal
subject would
a
room full of people. My concern
when
is to
circumstances,
looking at
such a claim

how

understand

that can play

evidence

comes

a justificatory

to be available

to the believer

as

role.

One aspect of theproblem is that Imight simply fail to have the concepts
or might not know how they apply to experience.
in question
To recur to
if I do not possess
earlier example,
the concept of a rabbit or do not
Haack's
know what rabbits look like, either in general or in the relevant perceptual
then I can hardly be aware that my experience
is the sort
circumstances,
that would result from a rabbit. But even where this specific sort of problem
does not arise, more needs to be said about how I come to be justifiably
can correctly be described
aware that my experience
in this way, or else
offered can serve as evidence
for me even if I
about how the description
aware that it applies.
am not justifiably
I might
of course have a belief'with
the indicated content about my
no
reason
there
is
But
apparent
why such a belief would not
experience.
of some sort. To be sure, some philosophers
have
itself require justification
no
that beliefs about my own experience
simply require
justification,
seems to reject any such
But Haack
that they are as itwere self-justifying.

held

to apply to the sort of

(p. 28), and in any case it was never claimed
that would be at issue here, viz. one about how the
belief about experience
is
caused.
typically
experience
view

To be sure, we are no doubt aware in some way of the nature or content

of our experience
is after
simply by virtue of having it. Sensory experience
or
a
awareness
state. This basic
all
conscious
of experience
does
primordial
or conceptual
to be couched in propositional
not seem, however,
terms, nor
does Haack

seem

to want

of the double-aspect
by virtue of having
propositional
to the believer
The

view.

to say that it is. That is, after all, the whole point
But then the problem
remains: how is it that

a non-propositional
of a particular
sort, a
experience
sort
the
of
indicated
Haack
becomes
available
by
description

for purposes
issue of how what

tualized sensory
those pertaining

of justification?
has often been described

as raw or unconcep

relates to propositional
experience
judgments,
especially
to the physical world, has of course been central to the

epistemology of empirical knowledge from the very beginning. Indeed,

of this problem
that motivated
in differ
it was the seeming
intractability
as
ent ways
views
such seemingly
and, alas,
phenomenalism
desperate
is that Haack deals with this fundamen
coherentism. My basic complaint

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AND EXPERIENCE
HAACKON JUSTIFICATION

21

of the
tal problem essentially
by fiat, simply stipulating a characterization
but giving no real account of where
it comes
evidential force of experience,
from.
are really two problems
here, which
related. The first
though they are closely

There
even

it is useful
is whether

to separate,
and how non

can confer

on any propo
experience
justification
perceptual
propositional
seems to do, that the experience
itself is
sitional claim. To say, as Haack
no
can
a
content
that
stand in anything
like a logi
cause, having
merely
at best how any
itmysterious
cal relation to a propositional
claim, makes
can result.
justification
The second problem
If some

account

arises only if and when the first is somehow solved.

of how it is possible
in general for "raw"

can be given

to be justificatorily
then arises of speci
relevant, the problem
experience
a
the
in
that can thereby
claims
defensible
way
fying
specific propositional
be justified by a particular state of experience. Here a solution might be in
some ways easier if itwere plausible
to view the initial propositional
claims
as being couched
terms that are as close as possible
in phenomenological
to the apparent character of the "raw" experience
itself? something
like the
earlier in
pure sense-datum
language envisaged
by various philosophers
this sort of solution would seriously aggravate the
this century. Notoriously
to the physical-object
further problem of relating the results of experience
beliefs that are our ultimate concern. But in any case this sort of solution is
ruled out by the inconvenient
but stubborn fact, pointed out by
seemingly
Haack (p. 107) along with many others, that we also do not in general have
beliefs

about our experience

that are couched

in such phenomenological

terms.

I, along with many others, have argued in the past that these two prob
so that the very idea that non-propositional
lems are unsolvable,
experience
can be relevant to the justification
of our beliefs would have to be aban
now seems to me to be mistaken,
doned. This conclusion
and in any case
to lead to nothing but skepticism.
I am now somewhat more
But while
that a solution can be found, my present point is that itwill not
optimistic
do to short-circuit
the whole
issue, as Haack does, by simply stipulating
an
account
of the evidential upshot of experience
without
that
explanation
is already

comfortably

couched

in propositional,

indeed

in physical-object

terms.

I have no space here to pursue this issue very far, even if itwere presently
that are
power to do so. But there are two alternative
approaches

in my

perhaps worth distinguishing by way of conclusion.

The first alternative is to hold fast to the idea that the non-propositional
content

of experience

plays merely

a causal

role, which

seems

to me

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to

LAURENCEBONJOUR

22

any attempt to appeal to experience

abandoning
as
to do here, the internalist
I
will
continue
(assuming,
Haack and I apparently
share). Such a view could perhaps

for justification
that
perspective

require

causation

riential

to expe

appeal
or observational

to identify genuinely
perceptual
about the content of experience

including
tification

even beliefs

genuinely

caused

itself. But

beliefs,
the jus

involve no further appeal to experience

of these beliefs would
like coherence
and so could apparently only derive from something
among
and with further, non-perceptual
beliefs. Such a position would
themselves
resemble rather closely my own earlier view, with the important difference
the perceptual
that there would be no question as to whether
beliefs were
by the world.
but whether

systems objection,
input from the world
now

demand

seems

This would
the content

in the full sense

to me

avoid

the alternative

of such beliefs would

that empirical knowledge

more doubtful.

coherent
constitute
seems

to

substantially
that I can see is the one that Haack seems to want to
The only alternative
avoid, even though her view seems at the same time to demand it: the view
contents of experience,
that the non-propositional
that we are non-propositionally
conscious

features

the purely
of merely

experiential
by virtue of
a justificatory,
and

can somehow
themselves
having the experience,
play
a causal, role.
not merely
as I
The initial intuitive appeal of this view seems extremely
obvious:
look out at this room, it is the various patterns of color and shape them
of them or of me as
selves, not some already propositional
description
that
them, that seem to give me my main reason for believing
experiencing
there are people here before me. To be sure, I also in fact believe
that my
is of the sort that I would have if I were
in a reasonably well
experience
lighted
ization

room full of people.

of my experiential

as Haack's

view

But how

it seems

state

is not

seems

by the myriad details

enced content.
correlation

But

to suggest,
of the non-propositional

can this be? It appears

between

or association

that this latter character

obvious

the epistemological
starting point,
but is instead itself justified somehow
and non-conceptual

that there must

experiential
that I am confidently

experi

be some

features

tacitly grasped
and propositional
by in a way that

or judgments,
one
guided
seems
even though I am unable even to
to provide justification,
at least
the correlation
terms. It is such
itself in propositional
begin to formulate
seems
me
a correlation
to
to
in
be relying
which
Haack
fact
in
upon
beliefs

making

to the corresponding
from experiential
5-evidence
of C-evidence.
But bringing
formulations
it into the open

the transition

propositional

both makes clear its highly puzzling character, and also highlights what I

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AND EXPERIENCE
HAACKON JUSTIFICATION
take to be the ultimate

question

in this area: how

23

is such a correlation

(or

our reliance on it) itself to be justified?

Here
about

we

are

the relation

in the dialectical

of old-fashioned
discussions
vicinity
between
sense-data
and physical
objects. But those
are less helpful in relation to our present concerns
than

earlier discussions
one might
of their obsession
have hoped, both because
with
the issue
an issue whose
status of sense-data,
of the ontological
epistemological
and because of their general hospitality
is far from obvious,
significance

like phenomenalism,
it is now very hard to take
views
which
no space here to try to
I
In
have
case,
any
seriously.
perhaps fortunately,
solve this rather daunting problem.
up, I have argued, first, that Haack has not probed deeply
Summing
to reductive

that is pretty clearly the central component

enough into the experientialism
of her position;
when one does so, a serious unsolved
that
and, second,
To
I
agree with her that some view along these
repeat,
problem emerges.
the best hope for a defensible
lines represents
and non-skeptical
general
of empirical
But it seems to me that we
justification.
some distance
to go in order to reach one that is really adequate.

account

have

still

NOTES
Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction inEpistemology (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1993). References in the text are to the pages of this book.
2
Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1985).
3

Op.

cit., pp.

149-150.

Department of Philosophy
University ofWashington
Seattle,WA
U.S.A.

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