Professional Documents
Culture Documents
bears stressing that on October 10, 1955, appellant Joaquin Valmonte (one
of the herein petitioners) sent a letter-request to the appellee bank for
additional time within which to exercise the right of redemption over the
properties at P35,000.00 (Exh. 33-Bank; 8-Valenton). In view of such request
and of the similar request from Congressman Celestino C. Juan, the Bank,
through its Board of Directors (BOD) Resolution No. 1096, extended the
redemption period until December 31, 1955 for the appellants (the
petitioners here) to purchase in cash their properties in the amount of the
total claim of the bank. Did the aforesaid act of seeking an extension of the
redemption period constitute an act of ratification within legal contemplation,
thus rendering the petitioners in estoppel? The answer to this important and
pertinent question is in the affirmative. If a party in interest enters into a
lawful agreement, stipulation, compromise or arrangement calculated to
benefit him in connection with a mortgage foreclosure sale, he inevitably
affirms thereby the validity, force and effect of the sale. Similarly, a party
cannot later on rely upon the supposed defects of the sale. The act of
plaintiffs in asking for an extension of time to redeem the foreclosed
properties estopped them from questioning the foreclosure sale
thereafter. DTAIaH
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; TITLE VALIDLY TRANSFERRED DESPITE THE
EXISTENCE OF A DULY ANNOTATED UNFORECLOSED MORTGAGE
BETWEEN RESPONDENT BANK AND APPELLANTS; REASONS.
Since the appellants failed to redeem within the redemption period and
during the extension agreed upon, the effect of such failure to redeem was to
vest absolute ownership over subject properties purchased. The annotation
of the unforeclosed mortgage even if appearing on the title of Artemio
Valenton did not in any way affect the sale between the latter and PNB. In
fact, since there was merger on the part of PNB prior to the sale to said
Valenton, any lien which the petitioners were claiming as subsisting was
already extinguished. Granting ex gratia argumenti that there was no merger
and the unforeclosed mortgage subsisted, PNB still had the right to sell
subject properties and the party who purchased the same shall only be
subjected to the said encumbrance. Indubitably, petitioners are not the
proper parties to insist that there be a foreclosure because as earlier stated,
the prerogative to decide whether or not to foreclose is with the mortgagee
and not with the mortgagor.
C.
D.
E.
F.
a holiday, or when the last day of a given period for doing an act
falls on a holiday. It does not apply to a day fixed by an office or
officer of the government for an act to be done, as distinguished
from a period of time within which an act should be done, which
may be on any day within that specified period. For example, if a
party is required by law to file his answer to a complaint within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the summons and the last day
falls on a holiday, the last day is deemed moved to the next
succeeding business day. But, if the court fixes the trial of a case
on a certain day but the said date is subsequently declared a
public holiday, the trial thereof is not automatically transferred to
the next succeeding business day. Since April 10, 1961 was not
the day or the last day set by law for the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale, nor the last day of a given period, but a date fixed by the
deputy sheriff, the aforesaid sale cannot legally be made on the
next succeeding business day without the notices of the sale on
that day being posted as prescribed in Sec. 9, Act No. 3135." 16
Conformably, the extrajudicial foreclosure conducted on August 19, 1954
was valid, notwithstanding the fact that the said date was declared a public
holiday. Act 3135 merely requires that sufficient publication and posting of
the notice of sale be caused, as required by law.
The issue concerning the authority of the sheriff to conduct the sale is
factual. This Court is bound by the findings by the trial court, and affirmed by
the respondent court, that the signing by the Provincial Sheriff of the Minutes
of Auction Sale (Exh. 55-Bank) and the Certificate of Sale evinced that the
auction sale was conducted by the Deputy Sheriff under the direction of the
Provincial Sheriff. 17
Another basis for the Court to uphold the regularity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure under controversy is the equitable principle of estoppel.
Petitioners' admission that as mortgagors, they had asked for an extension
of time to redeem subject properties estopped them from impugning the
regularity of the conduct of the sale. It bears stressing that on October 10,
1955, appellant Joaquin Valmonte (one of the herein petitioners) sent a
letter-request to the appellee bank for additional time within which to exercise
the right of redemption over the properties at P35,000.00 (Exh. 33-Bank; 8Valenton). In view of such request and of the similar request from
mortgage was for a loan of P16,000.00 and the second one was for a loan of
P5,000.00, by and between petitioners and the PNB. What the Bank did was
to foreclose the second mortgage embodied in a separate mortgage
contract.
Under ordinary circumstances, if a person has a mortgage credit over a
property which was sold in an auction sale, the only right left to him was to
collect its mortgage credit from the purchaser thereof during the sale
conducted. This is so because a mortgage directly and immediately subjects
the property on which it is constituted, whoever its possessor may be, to the
fulfillment of the obligation for the security of which it was
created. 21 However, these steps need not be taken in the present case
because PNB was the purchaser of subject properties and it did so with full
knowledge that it had a mortgage thereon. Obligations are extinguished by
the merger of the rights of the creditor and debtor.
In the case under consideration, the merger took place in the person of PNB,
the principal creditor in the case. The merger was brought about when during
the auction sale, PNB purchased the properties on which it had another
subsisting mortgage credit. This court is bound by the finding of respondent
court that the two loans referred to are separate and distinct and the mere
allegation by petitioners that said loans constitute a single indivisible
obligation should be stricken off as the said allegation is not supported by
evidence. In effect, the mortgage for the P16,000.00 loan was deemed
extinguished. While it is true that there was still an annotation on the Transfer
Certificate of Title issued to respondent Artemio Valenton, the said
annotation or encumbrance was already discharged by operation of law.
Consequently, petitioners' contention that the said title issued to Valenton
was not valid by reason of the said annotation, is devoid of any legal basis.
As aptly held by respondent court:
". . . The purchaser in the extrajudicial sale is appellee bank itself.
As such purchaser, it acquired the right to pay off the claim of the
senior mortgage. However, the senior mortgagee is also appellee
bank. In such a case, Art. 1275 of the New Civil Code as invoked
by defendants-appellees in their respective briefs, to wit:
"ARTICLE 1275. The obligation is extinguished from the time the
characters of creditor and debtor are merged in the same person."
Since the appellants failed to redeem within the redemption period and
during the extension agreed upon, the effect of such failure to redeem was to
vest absolute ownership over subject properties purchased. 25 The
annotation of the unforeclosed mortgage even if appearing on the title of
Artemio Valenton did not in any way affect the sale between the latter and
PNB. In fact, since there was merger on the part of PNB prior to the sale to
said Valenton, any lien which the petitioners were claiming as subsisting was
already extinguished.
Granting ex gratia argumenti that there was no merger and the unforeclosed
mortgage subsisted, PNB still had the right to sell subject properties and the
party who purchased the same shall only be subjected to the said
encumbrance. Indubitably, petitioners are not the proper parties to insist that
there be a foreclosure because as earlier stated, the prerogative to decide
whether or not to foreclose is with the mortgagee and not with the mortgagor.
In light of the foregoing, it is decisively obvious that PNB did not acquire the
mortgaged properties by pactum commissorium, but for failure of the
petitioners to redeem the same. As to the lien which, they claim, should have
hindered the transfer of the certificate of title to the name of Artemio
Valenton, the merger of rights on the part of PNB extinguished whatever
encumbrance there was over the properties deeded out and there is no more
lien to speak of. The transfer of the certificate of title to Artemio Valenton
who was a purchaser for value was valid and the petitioners cannot
effectively defeat the title of Artemio Valenton by claiming otherwise.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DENIED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41621, [February 18, 1999],
362 PHIL 616-633)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154745. January 29, 2004.]
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, petitioner, vs.
HERBERT
MARKUS
EMIL
SCHEER, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
71094 granting the respondent's petition for certiorari and prohibition
annulling the order of arrest issued by the petitioner, and permanently
enjoining her from deporting the respondent from the Philippines. Through its
decision, the CA virtually reversed the Summary Deportation Order 2 of the
Board of Commissioners (BOC) and its Omnibus Resolution 3denying the
respondent's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of said Order, and enjoining
the petitioner from deporting the respondent.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt, Germany,
was a frequent visitor of the Philippines. On July 18, 1986, his application for
permanent resident status was granted. 4 The Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) issued in favor of the respondent Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-396907 dated September 16, 1987 5 and Immigration
Certificate of Residence No. 256789 dated February 24, 1988. 6 The
Commissioner stated that the granting of the petition would redound to the
benefit of the Filipino people. 7 During his sojourn in the Philippines, the
respondent married widowed Edith delos Reyes 8 with whom he had two
daughters. They had a son, Herbert Scheer, Jr., but he passed away on
November 13, 1995. 9 They resided in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, where
the respondent established and managed the Bavaria Restaurant. On May
21, 1991, he was appointed Confidential Agent by then NBI Director Alfredo
S. Lim. 10
In a Letter dated June 29, 1995, Vice Consul Jutta Hippelein informed the
Philippine Ambassador to Bonn, Germany, that the respondent had police
records and financial liabilities in Germany. 11
The Department of Foreign Affairs received from the German Embassy in
Manila Note Verbale No. 369/95 dated July 26, 1995, informing it that the
Palawan. 14 The BOC concluded that the respondent was not only an
undocumented but an undesirable alien as well.
When the respondent was apprised of the deportation order, he forthwith
aired his side to then BID Commissioner Leandro T. Verceles. The
Commissioner allowed the respondent to remain in the Philippines, giving
the latter time to secure a clearance and a new passport from the German
Embassy. 15 Then Presidential Assistant Teodorico K. Imperial wrote a
Testimonial dated November 24, 1995, in behalf of the respondent
addressed to Commissioner Verceles. Nonetheless, the respondent, through
counsel, filed on December 5, 1995 an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. 16 In his motion, the
respondent alleged, inter alia, that: AcSHCD
1. The elementary rules of due process require notice and
opportunity to be heard before a person can be lawfully deprived of
his right (Ute Paterok vs. Bureau of Customs, 193 SCRA 132). In
the instant case, although it is acknowledged that the Honorable
Office may conduct summary deportation proceedings, respondent
was not given notice and opportunity to be heard before said
Summary Deportation Order was issued. Respondent's right to
procedural due process was therefore violated. Consequently, the
Summary Deportation Order is invalid.
2. In issuing, the Summary Deportation Order, this Honorable Office
relied on Note Verbal No. 369/95 issued by the Embassy of the
Federal Republic of Germany, Manila, notifying the Department of
Foreign Affairs and this Honorable Office about the warrant of arrest
against respondent for alleged illegal insurance fraud and illegal
activities. However, a close scrutiny of said note verbal shows that
nowhere therein does it state that respondent was involved in
insurance fraud or in any kind of illegal activities in Germany or
anywhere else in the world, such as in Palawan. Therefore, the
main basis of the Summary Deportation Order is incompetent as
evidence against respondent who is, like every Filipino, presumed
to be innocent until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The power to deport alien is a police power measure necessary
against undesirable alien whose presence in the country is injurious
to the public good and domestic tranquility of the country (Board of
In support of his contention, the Solicitor General has submitted the following
arguments:
I. THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION TO
RESOLVE
RESPONDENT'S
URGENT
MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE SUMMARY DEPORTATION
ORDER, CONSIDERING THAT IT IS THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, AND NOT THE COMMISSIONER ALONE,
WHICH HAS AUTHORITY TO MAKE SAID RESOLUTION.
II. THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
CONSIDERING THAT IT IS THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
AND NOT THE COMMISSIONER ALONE, WHICH ISSUED THE
SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AND THE OMNIBUS
RESOLUTION.
III. THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
PROHIBITING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUMMARY
DEPORTATION ORDER AND THE OMNIBUS RESOLUTION,
CONSIDERING THAT THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS WAS
NOT IMPLEADED AS PARTY-RESPONDENT IN THE PETITION
IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 71094.
IV. ASSUMING BUT WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS WAS PROPERLY IMPLEADED AS PARTYRESPONDENT IN THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 71094,
NEVERTHELESS, THE SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AND
THE OMNIBUS RESOLUTION WERE NOT ISSUED WITHOUT
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF (SIC) EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION.
V. FURTHER ASSUMING BUT WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS WAS PROPERLY IMPLEADED AS
PARTY-RESPONDENT IN THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO.
71094, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION DID NOT ACT WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
On the Solicitor General's fourth and fifth arguments, we are convinced that
the BOC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in issuing its Summary Deportation Order and Omnibus
Resolution, and that the petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in causing the arrest and
detention of the private respondent.
The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely
a privilege and a matter of grace; such privilege is not absolute nor
permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or
deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided
for by the Constitution, the Immigration. Act of 1940, as amended, and
administrative issuances pursuant thereto. In Mejoff v. Director of
Prisons, 66 we held, thus:
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law a part of the
law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary
meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all
other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were
proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human beings are born
free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin,
property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2); that "Every one has the right
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or
by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,
detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.
In this case, the BOC ordered the private respondent's deportation on
September 27, 1995 without even conducting summary deportation
proceedings. The BOC merely relied on the June 29, 1995 Letter of the
German Vice Consul and of the German Embassy's Note Verbale No.
369/95 dated July 26, 1995. It issued the Summary Deportation Order on
footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from
legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule
that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should
be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half
their efficacy, and leads to a gradual depreciation of the right, as if it
consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of the courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis. EScAID
In sum, the arrest and detention of the respondent and his deportation under
the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC for insurance fraud and illegal
activities in Palawan violated his constitutional and statutory rights to due
process.
The Respondent's Arrest and
Detention was Premature,
Unwarranted and Arbitrary
We agree that the Immigration Commissioner is mandated to implement a
legal and valid Summary Deportation Order within a reasonable time. But in
this case, the arrest of the respondent in his house, at near midnight, and his
subsequent detention was premature, unwarranted and arbitrary. Like a
thunderbolt in the sky, the BID agents and marines arrested the respondent
on June 6, 2002, on orders of the petitioner based on the September 27,
1995 Summary Deportation Order. Under the basic rudiments of fair play
and due process, the petitioner was required to first resolve the respondent's
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order, which was filed more
than six years before or on December 5, 1995.
It may be argued that respondent's filing of an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration did not ipso facto suspend the efficacy of the BOC's
deportation order. However, such an argument cannot be sustained in this
case because of the extant and peculiar factual milieu. It bears stressing that
more than six years had elapsed, from the time the Summary Deportation
Order was issued, until the respondent was finally arrested. Supervening
facts and circumstances rendered the respondent's arrest and detention
unjust, unreasonable, barren of factual and legal basis. The BOC should
have set the respondent's motion for hearing to afford him a chance to be
heard and adduce evidence in support thereon. It was bad enough that the
BOC issued its Summary Deportation Order without a hearing; the BOC
dealt the respondent a more severe blow when it refused to resolve his
motion for reconsideration before causing his arrest on June 6, 2002.
As aforestated, the BOC ordered the deportation of the respondent after a
summary proceeding without prior notice on the following grounds: (a) the
respondent's German passport had expired; (b) there was a pending criminal
case for physical injuries against him in Germany; (c) the respondent
indulged in illegal activities in Palawan; (d) that in all likelihood, the
respondent's passport will not be renewed by the German Embassy as he
was wanted for insurance fraud in Germany; and, (e) he was an undesirable
alien. But then, in response to the written query of no less than the petitioner
herself, the German Embassy declared that the respondent was not wanted
by the German police for any crime, including insurance fraud. This could
only mean that the warrant of arrest issued by the German Federal police
mentioned in Note Verbale No. 369/95 had been lifted, and that the
respondent was not involved in any illegal activities in Germany. The criminal
case against the respondent for physical injuries, which does not involve
moral turpitude, was dismissed by the German District Court. Furthermore,
there was no evidence of insurance fraud against the respondent.
The BOC issued its Summary Deportation Order without affording the
respondent the right to be heard on his motion and adduce evidence
thereon. It merely concluded that the respondent was involved in "illegal
activities in Palawan." What made matters worse was that the BOC indulged
in sheer speculation, that the German Embassy is unlikely to issue a new
passport to the respondent. The deportation of aliens should not be based
on mere speculation or a mere product of procrastinations as in this case. As
it turned out, the German Embassy re-issued the respondent's passport; he
was issued a temporary passport, and, thereafter, a regular passport, yet to
expire on March 12, 2006. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this
matter because the respondent himself, six years before he was arrested,
informed then Immigration Commissioner Verceles in a Letter dated March 1,
1996. The respondent's letter forms part of the records of the BOC. There is
no evidence on record that the respondent committed any illegal activities in
Palawan. He was even designated as special agent of the NBI, and was, in
fact, issued clearances by the PNP and the NBI no less. Despite all the
foregoing, the petitioner ordered and caused the arrest and detention of the
respondent.
What is most nettlesome is the apparent antedating of the BOC Omnibus
Resolution. The records show that the petitioner sought to assuage the
respondent's concern on the belated resolution of his pending urgent motion
for reconsideration in a Letter to the latter's counsel dated July 18, 2002 in
which the petitioner assured the respondent that the BOC will provide him of
its action on the said motion:
Dear Atty. Sagisag,
We respond to your letter of 17 June 2002 by informing you that the
case of Mr. Herbert Scheer is being evaluated by the Board of
Commissioners (BOC). The BOC will provide you of the results of
its collegial action in due time.
Very truly
yours,
(Sgd.)
ANDREA
D. DOMING
O
Commission
er 75
However, the Omnibus Resolution of the BOC was dated June 14, 2002,
although on its face it was filed with the Records Division of the BID only on
July 18, 2002.
The foregoing gave reason for the CA to suspect that the Omnibus
Resolution of the BOC was antedated. 76 The petition of the respondent in
the CA must have jolted the petitioner and the BOC from its stupor because
it came out with its Omnibus Resolution on July 18, 2002, which was,
however, dated as early as June 14, 2002. The respondent had to wait in
anxiety for the BOC to quench his quest for justice. The BOC's wanton acts
amounted to an abdication of its duty to act and/or resolve cases/incidents
with reasonable dispatch. To recall our ruling in Board of Commissioners
v. De la Rosa, 77 citing Sheor v.Bengson, 78 thus:This inaction or oversight
on the part of the immigration officials has created an anomalous situation
which, for reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein
involved.
The petitioner and the BOC should have taken to heart the following
pronouncement in Commissioner of Immigration v.Fernandez: 79In the face
of the disclosure that Teban Caoili had been all along working in the Avenue
Electrical Supply Co. (Avesco), located at No. 653 Rizal Avenue, Manila,
until his arrest, and the documentary evidence showing that he had been
issued a Philippine Passport; had regularly paid his Residence Tax
Certificates (A & B), and filed Income Tax Returns, a finding of fact is
necessary whether the Commissioner really had intended to notify Teban
Caoili of the exclusion proceedings the Board had conducted in his absence.
While it may be true that the proceedings is purely administrative in nature,
such a circumstance did not excuse the serving of notice. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of
administrative character, the first of which is the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. 80
xxx xxx xxx
Since the proceedings affected Caoili's status and liberty, notice
should have been given. And in the light of the actuations of the
new Board of Commissioners, there is a necessity of determining
whether the findings of the Board of Special Inquiry and the old
Board of Commissioners are correct or not. This calls for
an examination of the evidence, and, the law on the matter. 81
Apparently, the BOC did not bother to review its own records in resolving the
respondent's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It anchored its Omnibus
Resolution only on the following: the membership of the BOC had changed
when it issued its September 27, 1995 Summary Deportation Order and
under Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 27(b); the BOC is precluded
from reversing a previous order issued by it; 82 and, the September 27, 1995
Order of the BOC had become final and could no longer be reviewed and
reversed by it after the lapse of one year. 83 However, the rulings cited by
the petitioner are not applicable in the instant case, as the said cases cited
involve appeals to the BOC from the decisions of the Board of Special
Inquiry (BSI). In Sy v. Vivo 84 and Lou v. Vivo, 85 we ruled that
under Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, the
Decision of the BOC on appeal from the decision of the BSI becomes final
and executory after one year:
Deportation Order and the BOC which resolved the respondent's Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration are one and the same government entity, with the
same powers and duties regardless of its membership. Similarly, an RTC
judge who replaces another judge who presided over a case may review the
judgment or order of his predecessor as long as the said judgment or order
has not as yet become final or executory, The act subject of review is not the
act of the judge but the act of the court.
The petitioner's contention that it failed to resolve the respondent's motion for
reconsideration because of the change of administration in the BOC was
branded by the CA as flimsy, if not bordering on the absurd:
Firstly, it was issued three days (June 14, 2002) after petitioner filed
this instant petition on June 11, 2002 or almost seven years from
the time the motion for reconsideration was filed;
Secondly, respondent's counsel's excuse that it took such time to
resolve it because it was only later that the motion for
reconsideration was discovered because of change of
administration, is flimsy, if not bordering on the absurd; 90
The Issuance of a New and Regular Passport to the Respondent
Rendered the Summary Deportation Order Moot and Academic, and the
Omnibus Resolution of the BOC Lacking in Legal Basis
We agree with the petitioner that a foreign embassy's cancellation of the
passport it had issued to its citizens, or its refusal to issue a new one in lieu
of a passport that has expired, will result in the loss of the alien's privilege to
stay in this country and his subsequent deportation therefrom. But even the
BOC asserted in its Summary Deportation Order that an embassy's
issuance of a new passport to any of its citizens may bar the latter's
deportation, citing the resolution of this Court inSchonemann
v. Commissioner Santiago. 91
Irrefragably, Commissioner Verceles was mandated to cause the arrest of
the respondent preparatory to his deportation from the Philippines. However,
there was no fixed period in the Order within which to comply with the same.
The Commissioner is not mandated to deport an alien immediately upon
receipt of the BOC's deportation order. It is enough that the Commissioner
complies with the Order within a "reasonable time," which, in Mejoff
v. Director of Prisons, 92 we held to connote as follows:
accepting the force and effect of the BOC's Summary Deportation Order with
its attendant infirmities. He will thereby lose his permanent resident status
and admit the efficacy of the cancellation of his permanent resident visa.
Moreover, his entry into the country will be subject to such conditions as the
petitioner may impose.
The deportation of an alien is not intended as a punishment or penalty. But in
a real sense, it is. In Bridges v. Wixon, 96 Mr. Justice Murphy declared that
the impact of deportation upon the life of an alien is often as great if not
greater than the imposition of a criminal sentence. In dealing with
deportation, there is no justifiable reason for disregarding the democratic and
human tenets of our legal system and descending to the practices of
despotism. As Justice Brewer opined in Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 97 deportation is a punishment because it requires first, an arrest, a
deprivation of liberty and second, a removal from home, from family, from
business, from property. To be forcibly taken away from home, family,
business and property and sent across the ocean to a distant land is
punishment; and that oftentimes is most severe and cruel. It would be putting
salt on the respondent's woes occasioned by the BOC's ineptitude.
Considering the peculiar backdrop and the equities in this case, the
respondent's deportation and the cancellation of his permanent resident visa
as a precondition to his re-entry into this country is severe and cruel; it is a
form of punishment. aCSEcA
Our ruling in Vivo v. Cloribel, 98 has no application in this case, precisely
because the factual milieu here is entirely different. In that case, the
Commissioner of Immigration required the respondents to leave the country
on or before September 12, 1962, because their stay in the country as
approved by the Secretary of Justice had been cancelled. Our ruling in Bing
v.Commission on Immigration, 99 even buttresses the case for the
respondent since we ruled therein that an alien entitled to a permanent stay
cannot be deported without being accorded due notice and hearing.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.
||| (Domingo v. Scheer, G.R. No. 154745, [January 29, 2004], 466 PHIL 235284)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-31061. August 17, 1976.]
SULO NG BAYAN,
INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. GREGORIO
ARANETA, INC., PARADISE FARMS, INC., NATIONAL
WATERWORKS & SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, HACIENDA
CARETAS,
INC.
and
REGISTER
OF
DEEDS
OF
BULACAN,defendants-appellees.
Hill & Associates Law Offices for appellant.
Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for appellee Gregorio Araneta, Inc.
Carlos, Madarang, Carballo & Valdez for Paradise Farms, Inc.
Leopoldo M. Abellera, Arsenio J. Magpale & Raul G. Bernardo, Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel for appellee National Waterworks &
Sewerage Authority.
Candido G. del Rosario for appellee Hacienda Caretas, Inc.
ANTONIO, J p:
The issue posed in this appeal is whether or not plaintiff corporation (nonstock) may institute an action in behalf of its individual members for the
recovery of certain parcels of land allegedly owned by said members; for the
nullification of the transfer certificates of title issued in favor of defendantsappellees covering the aforesaid parcels of land; for a declaration of
"plaintiff's members as absolute owners of the property" and the issuance of
the corresponding certificate of title; and for damages.
On April 26, 1966, plaintiff-appellant Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. filed an accion de
reivindicacion with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial
District, Valenzuela, Bulacan, against defendants-appellees to recover the
ownership and possession of a large tract of land in San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, containing an area of 27,982,250 square meters, more or less,
registered under the Torrens System in the name of defendants-appellees'
predecessors-in-interest. 1 The complaint, as amended on June 13, 1966,
specifically alleged that plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines, with its principal office and place of business at
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; that its membership is composed of natural
persons residing at San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; that the members of the
plaintiff corporation, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest,
had pioneered in the clearing of the afore-mentioned tract of land, cultivated
the same since the Spanish regime and continuously possessed the said
property openly and publicly under concept of ownership adverse against the
whole world; that defendant-appellee Gregorio Araneta, Inc., sometime in the
year 1958, through force and intimidation, ejected the members of the
plaintiff corporation from their possession of the aforementioned vast tract of
land; that upon investigation conducted by the members and officers of
plaintiff corporation, they found out for the first time in the year 1961 that the
land in question "had been either fraudulently or erroneously included, by
direct or constructive fraud, in Original Certificate of Title No. 466 of the Land
Records of the province of Bulacan", issued on May 11, 1916, which title is
fictitious, non-existent and devoid of legal efficacy due to the fact that "no
original survey nor plan whatsoever" appears to have been submitted as a
basis thereof and that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan which issued
the decree of registration did not acquire jurisdiction over the land
registration case because no notice of such proceedings was given to the
members of the plaintiff corporation who were then in actual possession of
said properties; that as a consequence of the nullity of the original title, all
subsequent titles derived therefrom, such as Transfer Certificate of Title No.
4903 issued in favor of Gregorio Araneta and Carmen Zaragoza, which was
subsequently cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7573 in the name
of Gregorio Araneta, Inc., Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4988 issued in the
name of, the National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority (NWSA), Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 4986 issued in the name of Hacienda Caretas, Inc.,
and another transfer certificate of title in the name of Paradise Farms, Inc.,
are therefore void. Plaintiff-appellant consequently prayed (1) that Original
Certificate of Title No. 466, as well as all transfer certificates of title issued
and derived therefrom, be nullified; (2) that "plaintiff's members" be declared
as absolute owners in common of said property and that the corresponding
certificate of title be issued to plaintiff; and (3) that defendant-appellee
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. be ordered to pay to plaintiff the damages therein
specified.
On September 2, 1966, defendant-appellee Gregorio Araneta, Inc. filed a
motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that (1) the
complaint states no cause of action; and (2) the cause of action, if any, is
barred by prescription and laches. Paradise Farms, Inc. and Hacienda
Caretas, Inc. filed motions to dismiss based on the same grounds. Appellee
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority did not file any motion to
corporation". 6 The mere fact that one is president of a corporation does not
render the property which he owns or possesses the property of the
corporation, since the president, as individual, and the corporation are
separate entities. 7 Similarly, stockholders in a corporation engaged in
buying and dealing in real estate whose certificates of stock entitled the
holder thereof to an allotment in the distribution of the land of the corporation
upon surrender of their stock certificates were considered not to have such
legal or equitable title or interest in the land, as would support a suit for title,
especially against parties other than the corporation. 8
It must be noted, however, that the juridical personality of the corporation, as
separate and distinct from the persons composing it, is but a legal fiction
introduced for the purpose of convenience and to subserve the ends of
justice. 9 This separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded, or
the veil of corporate fiction pierced, in cases where it is used as a cloak or
cover for fraud or illegality, or to work an injustice, or where necessary to
achieve equity. 10
Thus, when "the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, . . . the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons, or in the case of two corporations,
merge them into one, the one being merely regarded as part or
instrumentality of the other." 11 The same is true where a corporation is a
dummy and serves no business purpose and is intended only as a blind, or
an alter ego or business conduit for the sole benefit of the
stockholders. 12 This doctrine of disregarding the distinct personality of the
corporation has been applied by the courts in those cases when the
corporate entity is used for the evasion of taxes, 13 or when the veil of
corporate fiction is used to confuse legitimate issue of employer-employee
relationship, 14 or when necessary for the protection of creditors, in which
case the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced and the funds of the
corporation may be garnished to satisfy the debts of a principal
stockholder. 15 The aforecited principle is resorted to by the courts as a
measure protection for third parties to prevent fraud, illegality or injustice. 16
It has not been claimed that the members have assigned or transferred
whatever rights they may have on the land in question to the plaintiff
corporation. Absent any showing of interest, therefore, a corporation, like
plaintiff-appellant herein, has no personality to bring an action for and in
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161237. January 14, 2009.]
PERFECTO MACABABBAD, Jr., * DECEASED, SUBSTITUTED
BY
HIS
HEIRS
SOPHIA MACABABBAD,
GLENN
M.MACABABBAD, PERFECTO VENER M. MACABABBAD III AND
MARY GRACE MACABABBAD, AND SPS. CHUA SENG LIN AND
SAY UN AY, petitioners, vs. FERNANDO G. MASIRAG, FAUSTINA
G. MASIRAG, CORAZON G. MASIRAG, LEONOR G. MASIRAG,
and LEONCIO M. GOYAGOY, respondents.
FRANCISCA MASIRAG BACCAY, PURA MASIRAG FERRERMELAD, and SANTIAGO MASIRAG, intervenors- respondents.
BRION, J p:
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
Perfecto Macababbad, Jr. 1 (Macababbad) and the spouses Chua Seng
Lin (Chua) and Say Un Ay (Say) (collectively called the petitioners), praying
that we nullify the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the
Resolution 3 denying the motion for reconsideration that followed. The
assailed decision reversed the dismissal Order 4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, remanding the case for
further trial.cHATSI
BACKGROUND
On April 28, 1999, respondents Fernando Masirag (Fernando), Faustina
Masirag (Faustina),
Corazon
Masirag (Corazon),
Leonor
Masirag (Leonor) and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy (Leoncio) (collectively
called
the respondents),
filed
with
the
RTC
a
complaint 5 against Macababbad, Chua and Say. 6 On May 10, 1999, they
amended their complaint to allege new matters. 7The respondents alleged
that their complaint is an action for:
quieting of title, nullity of titles, reconveyance, damages and
attorney's fees 8 against the defendants [petitioners here] . . . who
cabal themselves in mala fides of badges of fraud dishonesty,
deceit, misrepresentations, bad faith, under the guise of purported
instrument, nomenclature "EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT WITH
SIMULTANEOUS SALE OF PORTION OF REGISTERED LAND
(Lot 4144)", dated December 3, 1967, a falsification defined and
penalized under Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171, Revised Penal
another owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 13408", filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan, was granted on July 27, 1982. 16 CaAIES
Subsequently, Macababbad registered portions of Lot No. 4144 in his name
and sold other portions to third parties. 17
On May 18, 1972, Chua filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T13408 and the issuance of a title evidencing his ownership over a subdivided
portion of Lot No. 4144 covering 803.50 square meters. On May 23, 1972,
TCT No. T-18403 was issued in his name. 18
Based on these allegations, the respondents asked: (1) that the extrajudicial
settlement of estate and sale be declared null and void ab initio and without
force and effect, and that Chua be ordered and directed to execute the
necessary deed of reconveyance of the land; if they refuse, that the Clerk of
Court be required to do so; (2) the issuance of a new TCT in respondents'
name and the cancellation of Macababbad's and Chua's certificates of title;
and (3) that the petitioners be ordered to pay damages and attorney's fees.
Macababbad filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on July 14,
1999, while Chua and Say filed an "Appearance with Motion to Dismiss" on
September 28, 1999.
On December 14, 1999, the RTC granted the motion of Francisca Masirag
Baccay, Pura Masirag Ferrer-Melad, and Santiago Masirag for leave to
intervene and to admit their complaint-in-intervention. The motion alleged
that they have common inheritance rights with the respondents over the
disputed property.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC, after initially denying the motion to dismiss, reconsidered its ruling
and dismissed the complaint in its Order 19dated May 29, 2000 on the
grounds that: 1) the action, which was filed 32 years after the property
was partitioned and after a portion was sold to Macababbad, had
already prescribed; and 2) there was failure to implead indispensable
parties, namely, the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona and the
persons who have already acquired title to portions of the subject
property in good faith. 20
The respondents appealed the RTC's order dated May 29, 2000 to the CA on
the following grounds:
I.
the respondents' cause of action had not prescribed, because "in assailing
the extrajudicial partition as void, the [respondents] have the right to bring
the action unfettered by a prescriptive period." 25
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
The Third Division of this Court initially denied 26 the petition for review
on certiorari for the petitioners' failure to show any reversible error committed
by the CA. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition. In their motion
for reconsideration, the petitioners clarified the grounds for their petition, as
follows:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT
HAVE JURISDICTION TO PASS UPON AND RULE ON
THE APPEAL TAKEN BY THE RESPONDENTS IN CAGR CV NO. 68541. 27 aTcIAS
In the alternative, ex abundanti cautela, the petitioners alleged other
reversible errors summarized as follows: 28
The RTC dismissal on the ground that indispensable
parties were not impleaded has already become final
and executory because the CA did not pass upon this
ground; 29
The respondents' argument that there was no failure to
implead indispensable parties since the other heirs of
Pedro and Pantaleona who were not impleaded were
not indispensable parties in light of the respondents'
admission that the extra-judicial settlement is valid with
respect to the other heirs who sold their shares to
Perfecto Macababbad is erroneous because innocent
purchasers for value of portions of Lot 4144 who are
also indispensable parties were not impleaded; 30
The CA erred in reconciling Civil Code provisions
Article 1456 and Article 1410, in relation to Article
1409; 31
The CA erred in saying that the Extra-judicial Partition
was an inexistent and void contract because it could not
be said that none of the heirs intended to be bound by
the contract. 32
The respondents argued in their Comment that: 33
Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be
imputed on the respondents for invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA
through an ordinary appeal. Rule 41, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
In Murillo v. Consul, 44 this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3)
modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or
appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal
action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction, covered by Rule 41;
(2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, covered by Rule 42; and (3) petition for
review to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first
mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal
is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.
Prescription
A ruling on prescription necessarily requires an analysis of the plaintiff's
cause of action based on the allegations of the complaint and the documents
attached as its integral parts. A motion to dismiss based on prescription
hypothetically admits the allegations relevant and material to the resolution of
this issue, but not the other facts of the case. 45
Unfortunately, both the respondents' complaint and amended complaint are
poorly worded, verbose, and prone to misunderstanding. In addition,
therefore, to the complaint, we deem it appropriate to consider the
clarifications made in their appeal brief by the petitioners relating to the intent
of their complaint. We deem this step appropriate since there were no
matters raised for the first time on appeal and their restatement was aptly
supported by the allegations of the RTC complaint. The respondents argue
in their Appellant's Brief that:
. . . Although reconveyance was mentioned in the title,
reconveyance of which connotes that there was a
Dismissal based on laches cannot also apply in this case, as it has never
reached the presentation of evidence stage and what the RTC had for its
consideration were merely the parties' pleadings. Laches is evidentiary in
nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in the
pleadings. 49 Without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid
ground to dismiss the respondents' complaint.
Non-joinder
of
Indispensable
parties
is
not
a
Ground for a Motion to Dismiss
The RTC dismissed the respondents' amended complaint because
indispensable parties were not impleaded. The respondents argue that since
the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale was valid with respect to the
other heirs who executed it, those heirs are not indispensable parties in this
case. Innocent purchasers for value to whom title has passed
from Macababbad and the spouses Chua and Say are likewise not
indispensable parties since the titles sought to be recovered here are still
under the name of the petitioners.
We also find the RTC dismissal Order on this ground erroneous.
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor
nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground
for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of any party or on
its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such
terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party
may be severed and proceeded with separately.
In Domingo v. Scheer, 50 this Court held that the proper remedy when a
party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the
action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may
order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity
to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the
plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed
refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own
motion. 51 Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to
include or to amend is the action dismissed. 52 STcEIC