Define Jurisdiction

[G.R. No. L-40527. June 30, 1976.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HERMOGENES MARIANO and HON. AMBROSIO M.
GERALDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V,
respondents.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor
General Nathanael P. Pano, Jr., Solicitor Oswaldo D. Agcaoili,
Provincial P. C. Cliatchko and Assistant Provincial Fiscal C. G.
Perfecta, for petitioner.
Eustaquio Evangelista, for respondent Hermogenes Mariano.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent, then, Liaison Officer of the Municipal Mayor
received in behalf of the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,
several feet of electric cables and cable power from USAID/NEC.
Instead of delivering said items to the Municipality, respondent
appropriated and converted the same to his own use. Thereafter, the
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an information charging said
private respondent with the offense of estafa. Accused moved to
quash the information on the grounds that the Court lacked
jurisdiction to try the case; that the criminal liability had been
extinguished; that the information contained averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse; and that the items which were
subject matter of the information were the same items for which the
Mayor of San Jose del Monte had been indicted and convicted of
malversation of public property by the Military Tribunal. Movant
claimed that since the case against the Mayor had already been
decided by the Military Tribunal, the Court of First Instance had lost
jurisdiction over the case against him.

Respondent court granted the motion to quash on the ground that

since the Military Commission first took cognizance of the case, it
had already lost jurisdiction to pass a new upon the same subject
matter. The People of the Philippines sought a review of the order
granting the motion to quash the information.
The Supreme Court held that the situation does not involve two
tribunals vested with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular
crime so as to apply the rule that the court or tribunal which first
takes cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction thereof exclusive
of the other. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct
offenses, and in the case at bar the accused in the estafa case
respondent) is different from the accused in the alleged
malversation case (the municipal mayor).
Questioned order was set aside, the Court ordering respondent
Judge to try the criminal charge against private respondent without
delay.
SYLLABUS
1.
WORDS AND PHRASES; "JURISDICTION"; ORIGIN AND
MEANING OF THE WORD EXPLAINED. "Jurisdiction" is the basic
foundation of judicial proceedings. The word "Jurisdiction" is derived
from two Latin words "juris" and "dico" "I speak by the law"
which means fundamentally the power or capacity given by the law
to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and determine certain
controversies. Bouvier's own definition of the term "jurisdiction" has
found judicial acceptance, to wit: "Jurisdiction is the right of a Judge
to pronounce a sentence of the law in a case or issue before him,
acquired through due process of law;" it is "the authority by which
judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases." In Herrera vs.
Barretto, (September 10, 1913), 25 Phil. 254, 251, this Court,
defined "jurisdiction" simply as the authority to hear and determine
a cause the right to act in a case. "Jurisdiction" has also been
aptly described as the right to put the wheels of justice in motion

and to proceed to the final determination of a cause upon the

pleadings and evidence.
2.
ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL JURISDICTION DEFINED. "Criminal
Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular
offense and impose the punishment for it.
3.
REMEDIAL LAW, JURISDICTION OF COURTS IS CONFERRED
BY THE CONSTITUTION OR BY LAW. The conferment of
jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is derived exclusively
from the constitution and statutes of the forum. Thus, the question
of jurisdiction of Courts over a case filed before it is to be resolved on
the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its
jurisdiction.
4.
ID.; ID.; ORIGINAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS
OF FIRST INSTANCE. Section 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948
as amended, provides that the Court of First Instance shall have
original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a
fine of more than two hundred pesos.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; IF IMPOSABLE PENALTY OF ESTAFA EXCEEDS
SIX MONTHS IMPRISONMENT, SAME FALLS WITHIN THE
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE.
Where the offense of estafa charged against respondent is penalized
with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its a minimum period or imprisonment from four (4) months and
one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months, the offense falls
within the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
6.
ID.; ID.; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE NOT VESTED WITH
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION WITH THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL
OVER OFFENSE OF ESTAFA. The claim of respondent judge that
his court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the Military
Commission over the offense of estafa, so that, when the latter
tribunal first took cognizance of the case of malversation against the

Municipal Mayor involving the same items which were the subject
matter of the offense of estafa against private respondent, the
respondent court thereby lost jurisdiction over the latter offense is
incorrect, because such jurisdiction was vested upon respondent
court by the law in force at that time which was the Judiciary Act of
1948, the particular provision of which was not affected by any
Presidential issuances under martial law defining the jurisdiction of
military tribunals. The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of a court
is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.
7.

ID.; ID.; MILITARY COMMISSION LACKS JURISDICTION OVER

ESTAFA CASES. General Order No.
dated October 4, 1974, which repeals General Order No. 12 and the
latter's amendments and related 3 Bouvier's own definition of the
term "jurisdiction" has found judicial acceptance, to wit:
"Jurisdiction is the right of a Judge to pronounce a sentence of the
law in a case or issue before him, acquired through due process of
law;" it is "the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance of
and decide cases." 4
In Herrera vs. Barretto, September 10, 1913, 25 Phil. 245, 251, this
Court, in the words of Justice Moreland, invoking American
jurisprudence, defined "jurisdiction" simply as the authority to hear
and determine a cause the right to act in a case. "Jurisdiction"
has also been aptly described as the right General Orders
inconsistent with the former, redefines the jurisdiction of military
tribunals over certain offenses, and estafa and malversation are not
among those enumerated therein, hence, the Military Commission
is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA DISTINCT FROM MALVERSATION.
Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses.
DECISION
MUOZ PALMA, J p:

This petition for Certiorari postulates a ruling on the question of

whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of estafa of goods valued at
not more than six thousand pesos and allegedly committed by a
civilian. 1
On December 18, 1974, the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
filed an Information (Criminal Case No. SM-649) accusing private
respondent herein Hermogenes Mariano of estafa alleged to have
been committed as follows:
"That on or about and during the period from May 11 and June 8,
1971, in the municipality of San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused Hermogenes Mariano, being then appointed as Liaison
Officer by the then incumbent Municipal Mayor, Constantino
Nolasco, acting for and in behalf of the municipality of San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan and authorized to receive and be receipted for US
excess property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of said
municipality, received from the said USAID/NEC the following items,
to wit:

"150 ft. electric cable valued

at $15 or P100.50
"525 ft. cable power valued at
$577.50 or P3,859.35
"250 ft. electric cable at
$125.00 or P837.50.
with a total value of $717.50 or P4,797.35, involving the duty of
making delivery of said items to the said Municipal Mayor, but the
said accused Hermogenes Mariano once in possession of the said

items and far from complying with his aforesaid obligation and in
spite of repeated demands, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and with deceit,
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and
benefit the said items valued at P717.50 or P4,79 7.35, belonging to
the said USAID/NEC, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner
in the said sum of $717.50 or P4,797.35" (pp. rollo).
On February 19, 1975, Hermogenes Mariano thru his counsel filed a
motion to quash the Information on the following grounds:
"1. That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction of the offense
charged or of the person of the defendant;
"2.

That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

"3. That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal

excuse or justification." (p. 19, rollo)
In his motion to quash, Mariano claimed that the items which were
the subject matter of the Information against him were the same
items for which Mayor Constantino A. Nolasco of San Jose del
Monte, province of Bulacan, was indicted before a Military
Commission under a charge of malversation of public property, and
for which Mayor Nolasco had been found guilty and sentenced to
imprisonment at hard labor for ten (10) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months with perpetual
disqualification plus a fine of P19,646.15 (see pp. 23-24, rollo), and
that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco had already been
decided by the Military Tribunal, the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over the case against him. (pp. 19-20,
ibid)
On March 14, 1975 respondent Judge issued an Order granting
the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction reasoning
as follows:
"Considering that the Military Commission had already taken

cognizance of the malversation case against Mayor Nolasco

involving the same subject matter in its concurrent jurisdiction with
this Court, the case involving the subject properties had already
been heard and decided by a competent tribunal, the Military
Commission, and as such this Court is without jurisdiction to pass
upon anew the same subject matter." (pp 30-31, rollo, emphasis
supplied)
Respondent Judge did not rule on the other grounds invoked in the
motion to quash.
The people now seeks a review of the aforesaid Order and
presents the sole issue of jurisdiction of respondent Court over
the estafa, case filed against respondent Mariano.
"Jurisdiction" is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. 2
The word "jurisdiction" is derived from two Latin words "juris" and
"dico" "I speak by the law" which means fundamentally the
power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to
entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies. to put the
wheels of justice in notion, and to proceed to the final
determination of a cause upon the pleadings and evidence. 5
"Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try
a particular offense and impose the punishment for it. 6
The conferment of jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is
derived exclusively from the constitution and statutes of the forum.
Thus, the question of jurisdiction of respondent Court of First
Instance over the case filed before it is to be resolved on the basis of
the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. That, We
find in the Judiciary Act of 1948 where in its Section 44 (f) it is
provided:
"SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of first Instance shall have
original jurisdiction:
"xx
x

xxx

Xxx

In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is

"(f) imprisonment for more than six
months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos," (emphasis
supplied)
The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is
penalized with arresto mayor, in its maximum period to prision
correccional, in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. 7 By
reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months
imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the
accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original
jurisdiction of courts of first instance. LLpr
The above of course is not disputed by respondent Judge; what he
claims in his Order is that his court exercises concurrent
jurisdiction with the military commission and because the latter
tribunal was the first to take cognizance of the subject matter,
respondent court lost jurisdiction over it. That statement of
respondent court is incorrect.
In People vs. Fontanilla, this Court speaking through then Justice
now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, categorically reiterated the
settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the act on. 8 In
the case at bar, it is rightly contended by the Solicitor General that
at the time Criminal Case No. SM-649 was filed, with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan that was December 18, 1974, the law in
force vesting jurisdiction upon said court was the Judiciary Act of
1948, the particular provision of which was not affected one way or
the other by any Presidential issuances under Martial Law. General
Order No. 49 dated October 4, 1974, which repeals General Order
No. 12 and the latter's amendments and related General Orders
inconsistent with the former, redefines the jurisdiction of military
tribunals over certain offenses, and estafa, and malversation are not
among those enumerated therein. 9 In other words the Military

Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.

Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost
jurisdiction over the estafa, case against respondent Mariano with
the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before
the Military Commission. Estafa and Malversation are two separate
and distinct offenses and in the case now before Us the accused in
one is different from the accused in the other. But more fundamental
is the fact that We do not have here a situation involving two
tribunals vested with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime
so as to apply the rule that the court or tribunal which first takes
cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the
other. 10 The Military Commission as stated earlier is without power
or authority to hear and determine the particular offense charged
against respondent Mariano, hence, there is no concurrent
jurisdiction between it and respondent court to speak of. Estafa as
described in the Information, filed in Criminal Case No. SM-649 falls
within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed Order dated March 14,
1975, is set aside and respondent Judge is directed to proceed with
the trial of Criminal Case No. SM-649 without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino and Martin, JJ.,, concur.
Aquino, J., was designated to sit in the First Division.

G.R. No. L-25181

January 11, 1967

AUYONG HIAN (HONG WHUA HANG), petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COLLECTOR
OF CUSTOMS, and COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, respondents-appellees.
Fortunato
de
Leon
for
petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1.
COURTS; JURISDICTION; HOW DETERMINED. The
"jurisdiction" of a court refers to the power of a court to hear and
determine a case. To ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or
not, the provisions of law should be inquired into.
2.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS; JURISDICTION; IMPORTATION.
Where petitioner has raised not only the question of the legality of
the importation but also whether the tobacco thus imported are
goods which are relatively prohibited or absolutely prohibited; and
whether the sale of said tobacco by the Collector of Customs is legal
and proper or not questions which are purely administrative in
nature which fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals; despite the ruling laid down by the Supreme
Court that the said importation was illegal, the Court of Tax Appeals
is not precluded from entertaining the appeal.

ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is a petition for review of the resolution of the respondent Court
of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 1560 dismissing the appeal
interposed by petitioner Auyong Hian (Hong Whua Hang) from the
decision of the Commissioner of Customs, dated December 7, 1964,
which affirmed the decision of the Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila, dated April 23, 1963, in Seizure Identification No. 6669
declaring forfeited in favor of the government 600 hogsheads of
Virginia leaf tobacco that had been imported by Auyong Hian and
ordering the sale of the said tobacco.
The facts pertinent to this case, as shown in the record, may be
briefly stated as follows: Petitioner Auyong Hian applied with the
Import Control Commission, and was granted, four (4) no-dollar
remittance licenses to import Virginia leaf tobacco with an aggregate
value of two million dollars. He filed his application on June 29, 1953
and was advised of the approval of his application the following day,
June 30, 1953 the day the Import Control Law (Republic Act 650)
expired. While negotiations for the importation of Virginia leaf
tobacco pursuant to said licenses were undertaken by the licensee,
it was not until December 30, 1961 that 600 hogsheads of Virginia
leaf tobacco arrived in the Philippines aboard the "SS Fernstate". The
Collector of Customs of Manila refused to release the said shipment
of Virginia leaf tobacco to petitioner, apparently in view of his doubt
as to the legality of the importation. For this reason, petitioner
instituted an action for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, in Civil Case No. 49639, to compel the respondents Collector
of Customs and Commissioner of Customs to release and deliver to
petitioner the tobacco in question. On March 19, 1962, Judge
Manuel Barcelona of the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an
order directing the Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of
Customs to release the tobacco to the petitioner upon the latter's
filing a bond of P300,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the
Collector of Customs filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme
Court questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Manila to order the release of the tobacco shipment and praying for

the annulment of the order of said court directing the release of the
tobacco. This proceeding was before this Court in G.R. No. L-19597,
entitled "Cesar Climaco, et al. v. Manuel Barcelona, et al." On July 31,
1962, this Court, through Mr. Justice Labrador ruled that the Court
of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the order
directing the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs
to release the 600 hogsheads of Virginia leaf tobacco in question to
the petitioner, and incidentally declared that the importation of the
tobacco was illegal upon the ground that the importation was made
long after the Import Control Law had expired and that the
importation was in contravention of the policy of the government as
declared in Republic Acts Nos. 698 and 1194, not withstanding the
alleged approval of said importation by the President of the
Philippines.
On November 8, 1962, the Collector of Customs in instituted seizure
proceedings, Seizure Identification No. 6669, against the 600
hogsheads of Virginia leaf tobacco consigned to the petitioner. On
April 23, 1963, the Collector of Customs rendered his decision
declaring said 600 heads of tobacco forfeited to the Government and
ordered the sale thereof at public auction. The sale at public auction
was set for June 10, 1963. The petitioner received a copy of said
decision on May 7, 1963, and on May 21, 1963, the petitioner filed
with the Collector of Customs his notice of appeal, in due form, from
the above-mentioned decision of the Collector of Customs.
In the meantime certain incidents which have relevance to the case
now before Us had taken place.
On May 4, 1963, Tomas Cloma filed an action against Auyong Hian
in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 53874) seeking
the collection of a sum of money representing fees for alleged
professional services rendered. Cloma applied for a writ of
attachment, which was granted by Judge Francisco Arca on May 13,
1963, and the 600 hogsheads of Virginia leaf tobacco which were
then in the possession of the Collector of Customs were attached
upon Cloma's filing a bond of P20,000.00. The Collector of Customs
filed a third-party claim upon the ground that the tobacco had been
declared forfeited to the government and the same is custodia

legis and could not be subject to attachment. Cloma moved to

dismiss the third-party claim and asked for a restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction ex parte to prevent the Collector of
Customs from selling the 600 hogsheads of tobacco in question. On
June 5, 1963, Judge Arca issued an order restraining the Collector
of Customs from enforcing his decision in Seizure Identification No.
6669 and ordering him to desist from proceeding with the sale at
public auction of the subject tobacco which was set for June 10,
1963. On June 6, 1963, Judge Arca denied the motion of the
Collector of Customs to reconsider the order of June 5, and on June
7 said Judge actually issued a writ of preliminary injunction
embodying exactly the same provision as the restraining order issued
two days previous. Thereupon the Collector of Customs filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
before this Court against Judge Francisco Arca and Tomas Cloma
questioning the jurisdiction of respondent Judge Arca in ordering the
attachment and in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil
Case No. 53874 in the Court of First instance of Manila, hereinabove
adverted to. That proceeding was before this Court in G.R. No. L21839 entitled "Collector of Customs, et al. v. Hon. Francisco Arca, et
al." This Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
Judge Francisco Arca from enforcing the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by him against the Collector of Customs in Civil
Case No. 53874 in the Court of First Instance of Manila and from
giving effect to the order of attachment and other pertinent orders
issued in said case.
Auyong Hian filed a motion before this Court to intervene in that case
of "Collector of Customs v. Arca," supra, and at the same time asked
that pending decision of the case a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining the Collector of Customs or his agents from seizing
and selling the 600 hogsheads of tobacco in question and from
enforcing his decision of April 23, 1963 which was then pending
review before the Commissioner of Customs. On June 25, 1963, this
Court granted the motion of Auyong Hian to intervene. On June 25,
1963, this Court issued a temporary restraining order against the
Collector of Customs enjoining him from selling the 600 hogsheads
of tobacco. On July 3, 1963, after hearing the oral argument of the
parties concerned and upon Auyong Hian's filing a bond of

P50,000.00, this Court issued a preliminary injunction against the

Collector of Customs restraining bond official "from seizing and
selling the 600 hogsheads of imported Virginia tobacco of intervenor
(Auyong Hian) and from enforcing the decision of Seizure
Identification No. 6669 of the Bureau of Customs, dated April 23,
1963."1
It appears, however, that on June 10, 1963 the Collector of Customs
accepted the deposit of the Consolidated Tobacco Industries of the
Philippines, hereinafter referred to as CTIP, of P1,000,000.00 as a
partial payment of The 600 hogsheads of Virginia tobacco; and on
June 27, 1963 said CTIP paid the sum of P500,000.00 as the balance
of the alleged purchase price of the said tobacco. The CTIP upon its
petition, was allowed by this Court to intervene in the case of
"Collector of Customs v. Arca", supra.
On July 17, 1964, this Court rendered its decision in the case of
"Collector of Customs, et al. v. Judge Francisco Arca, et al.," supra,
holding that respondent Judge Francisco Arca has no jurisdiction
over the 600 hogsheads of Virginia leaf tobacco involved in Seizure
Identification No. 6669 and to pass upon the validity of the
actuations of the Collector of Customs, and this Court set aside the
orders of June 5, and June 6, 1963 and the writ of preliminary
injunction of June 7, 1963 issued by said respondent Judge.
Incidentally this Court, also through Mr. Justice Labrador who
penned the decision in the case of "Climaco v. Barcelona", supra,
reiterated the ruling held in the latter case that the importation of
the 600 hogsheads of Virginia leaf tobacco was illegal. Being
cognizant however, that when the decision in the Arca case was
rendered the decision of the Collector of Customs of April 23, 1963
in Seizure Identification No. 6669 was pending appeal before the
Commissioner of Customs, this Court did not dissolve the writ of
preliminary injunction which was issued on July 3, 1963 against the
Collector of Customs restraining said official from proceeding with
the sale of the tobacco in question to the CTIP.
On December 7, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs rendered his
decision on the appeal taken by Auyong Hian from the decision of the
Collector of Customs of April 23, 1963, affirming said decision of the

Collector of Customs. On December 9, 1964, Auyong Hian filed with

the Commissioner of Customs his notice of appeal to the Court of Tax
Appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of Customs.
On January 8, 1965, herein petitioner filed before the Court of Tax
Appeals a petition for review by way of appeal from the decision of
the Commissioner of Customs, above-stated. Summons were served
upon respondents, requiring them to file their answer. After having
been granted various extensions until February 12, 1965 within
which to file their answer, the Solicitor General, on February 4, 1965,
in behalf of respondents Collector of Customs and Commissioner of
Customs, filed a motion to dismiss principally upon the ground
that the subject matter and issues raised in the petition for review
have already been passed upon by the Supreme Court in its decisions
in G.R. No. L-19597, entitled "Cesar Climaco, et al. v. Honorable
Judge Manuel P. Barcelona and Auyong Hian promulgated on July
31, 1962, and in G.R. No. L-21389, entitled "Collector of Customs v.
Hon. Francisco Arca and Tomas Cloma et al.," promulgated on July
17, 1964, and "the said decisions are res judicataso as to control
definitely the disposition of the instant case",2 and that the petitioner
has no cause of action. On February 24, 1965, petitioner (appellant)
filed a "petition to strike out respondents' motion to dismiss and to
declare them in default," upon the ground that the motion to dismiss
is not in accord with respondents' own request to be granted
extension of time to file an answer and the order of the court granting
said request and, therefore, said motion to dismiss did not stop the
running of the period within which to answer.
The CTIP filed a petition to intervene and at the same time sought
admission of its answer in intervention, but on May 29, 1965 said
CTIP withdrew its motion for leave to intervene as well as its answer
in intervention, both dated January 27, 1965.
On May 18, 1965, respondent Collector of Customs of Manila ordered
the release to the CTIP of the 600 hogsheads of tobacco in question,
without authority from the Commissioner of Customs. Believing that
the release was ordered without authority, on May 28, 1965 the
Solicitor General, in behalf of the Commissioner of Customs and the
Collector of Customs, filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a motion

praying that the CTIP be ordered to return the tobacco to the Bureau
of Customs. A motion praying for the same order prayed for by the
Solicitor General in his motion of May 28, 1965 was filed by petitioner
Auyong Hian on May 27, 1965.
On June 22, 1965, the Court of Tax Appeals promulgated a
resolution dismissing the petition of Auyong Hian for review of the
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of
Customs upon the ground that "it is plain that this Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the instant appeal" because the Supreme
Court in the two cases of "Climaco v. Barcelona" supra and "Collector
of Customs v. Arca", supra, had already held that the importation of
the tobacco in question is illegal and "that this Court cannot review,
revise, much less overrule the decisions of the Supreme Court."3 The
Court of Tax Appeals, in the same resolution, further stated that
having found that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal it
deemed it unnecessary to consider the other issues raised by the
petitioner and it refused to entertain the motion of the Solicitor
General for the issuance of an order for the return of the tobacco to
the Bureau of Customs which was released by the Collector of
Customs to the CTIP. In this connection, the record shows that on
July 12, 1965, this, Court, in G.R. No. L-24704, entitled "Auyong
Hian v. Judge Gaudencio Cloribel, et al." issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Judge Cloribel of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the CTIP, the Consolidated Terminals, Inc., the Collector of
Customs and the Commissioner of Customs from disposing or in any
manner interfering with the tobacco in question; and that injunction
is still in full force and effect.
On June 26, 1965, petitioner Auyong Hian filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of June 22, 1965, and for a new
trial, and on July 7, 1965, he further filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration and new trial. The supplemental motion pointed out
that by filing the motion of May 28, 1965, praying the Court of Tax
Appeals to order the CTIP to return the tobacco in question to the
Bureau of Customs, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the
Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs, had thereby
waived their stand that the Court of Tax Appeals had no jurisdiction
to entertain the appeal from the decisions of the Commissioner of

Customs and the Collector of Customs. Both the original and

supplemental motions for reconsideration and new trial, however,
were denied by the Court of Tax Appeals in a resolution dated August
31, 1965. Petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration and
new trial, but said second motion was again denied by the Court of
Tax Appeals in a resolution dated September 18, 1965. From these
resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals of June 22, 1965
dismissing the petition for review, and of August 31, 1965 and
September 12, 1965 denying the motions for reconsideration and
new trial petitioner Auyong Hian appealed to this Court.
Respondents filed their answer, in the instant case, on November 5,
1965, denying certain allegations in the petition for review and
alleging affirmative defenses, the principal defense being that the
petition for review is barred by res judicata and the Court of Tax
Appeals has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition, and praying that
the petition be dismissed.
The principal question that this Court has to resolve in the instant
case is whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals has correctly held
that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal interposed by
petitioner Auyong Hian from the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs, which affirmed the decision of the Collector of Customs in
Seizure Identification No. 6669.
The "jurisdiction" of a court refers to the power of a court to hear and
determine a case. To ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or
not the provisions of the law should be inquired into. The law
pertinent to the resolution of the question before Us is found in the
provisions of Sections 2313 and 2402 of the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines (Republic Act 1937) and in Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 1125, as follows:
SEC. 2313. Review by Commissioner. The person aggrieved
by the decision or action of the Collector in any matter
presented upon protest or by his action in any case of seizure
may, within fifteen days after notification in writing by the
Collector of his action or decision, give written notice to the
Collector of his desire to have the matter reviewed by the
Commissioner. Thereupon the Collector shall forthwith

transmit all the records of the proceedings to the

Commissioner, who shall approve, modify or reverse the action
or decision of the Collector and take such steps and make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to his decision.
(Republic Act 1937.)
SEC. 2402. Review by Court of Tax Appeals. The party
aggrieved by a ruling of the Commissioner in any matter
brought before him upon protest or by his action or ruling in
any case of seizure may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law and
regulations.
Unless an appeal is made to the Court of Tax Appeals in the
manner and within the period prescribed by laws and
regulations, the action or ruling of the Commissioner shall be
final and conclusive. (Republic Act 1837.)
SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving

liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges;
seizure, detention or release of property affected; fines,
forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto;
or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or
part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs; (Republic
Act 1125; Emphasis supplied.)
The record shows that petitioner Auyong Hian has properly brought
this case on appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals in accordance with
the above-quoted provisions of law. The subject matter of the appeal
is perfectly within the power of the Court of Tax Appeals to hear and
decide.
In the case of "Government of the Philippine Islands, et al. v. Gale, et
al.," 24 Phil. 95, this Court declared that

The Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings,

as provided in Act 355 (now Republic Act 1937 the Tariff and
Customs Code), constitutes a tribunal upon which the law
expressly confers jurisdiction to hear and determine all
questions touching the forfeiture and further disposition of the
subject matter of such proceedings .... (Emphasis supplied.)
And so, in the instant case, the Collector of Customs of the Port
of Manila, in Seizure Identification No. 6669, constituted itself
as a tribunal to hear and determine the questions touching the
forfeiture and disposition of the 600 hogsheads of Virginia leaf
tobacco that was imported by Auyong Hian. The Collector of
Customs rendered a decision declaring the tobacco forfeited in
favor of the government and ordering its sale at public auction,
and Auyong Hian timely appealed from that decision to the
Commissioner of Customs. By this appeal Auyong Hian had
thereby questioned not only the seizure and forfeiture of the
tobacco but also the order to sell the tobacco; and any sale
made or conducted pursuant to said appealed decision was
necessarily covered by the appeal to the Commissioner of
Customs. The Commissioner of Customs affirmed the decision
of the Collector of Customs in ordering the forfeiture of the
tobacco, but the decision of the Commissioner was silent
regarding the portion of the decision of the Collector of Customs
ordering the sale. The Commissioner of Customs, in his
affirmatory decision, simply limited himself to declaring that the
seizure of the 600 hogsheads of tobacco and their forfeiture in
favor of the government was in order because of the decisions
rendered by the Supreme Court in the cases of "Climaco v.
Barcelona" and "Collector of Customs v. Arca", supra which held
that the importation of those 600 hogsheads of tobacco was
illegal. The decision of the Commissioner of Customs did not
touch on the other questions raised by petitioner Auyong Hian
in his appeal.
In the petition for review that he filed with the Court of Tax Appeals,
Auyong Hian challenged the decision of the Commissioner of
Customs on the following grounds:

(1) That the decision is not supported by any evidence appearing

in the record;
(2) That the holding that the importation is illegal is ambiguous
because Section 2307 of the Tariff and Customs Code
recognizes two (2) kinds of illegality which the decision does not
distinguish;
(3) That the decision is contrary to law and established
precedents;
(4) That the decision has failed and ignored the various
questions raised by herein petitioner in his appeal and in his
memoranda without cogent reasons;
(5) That the decision has ignored fairness and equity;
(6) That the reliance placed by the respondents upon the
decisions of the Supreme Court in the two cases, Climaco, et al.
v. Judge Barcelona, et al. G.R. No. L-19597 and Collector of
Customs vs. Judge Arca, et al., G.R. No. L-21389, is misplaced,
the reference to illegality therein being more obiter dictum and
beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the primary,
exclusive and original jurisdiction to determine the illegality of
importation being vested by law upon the Collector of Customs
and the Commissioner of Customs; and
(7) Both respondent Collector of Customs and Commissioner of
Customs have disregarded without cogent reasons the findings
of facts and the recommendation of former Acting Customs
Collector Teotimo Roja and Assistant Commissioner for
Operations Juan Celeste, recommending the release of the
aforesaid tobacco to herein petitioner.
In amplification of the grounds alleged in the petition for review the
petitioner stated, among, others, that an examination of the
decisions of both the Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of
Customs together with the transcript of records and exhibits
disclosed that those two decisions are not supported by evidence;
and that by simply declaring the importation illegal the two decisions

did not actually clarify under that category of illegal importation the
subject tobacco falls, because Section 2307 of the Tariff and Customs
Code recognizes two kinds of illegal importation with different
consequences on the rights of the importer to wit: "relatively
prohibited which permits redemption, and absolutely prohibited (like
opium and gambling devices, etc.) which does not permit of
redemption."4
The petitioner claims, in his petition for review, that the worst
that can happen is that the tobacco importation be declared
relatively prohibited inasmuch as it was imported by the
authority of the President of the Philippines, backed up by the
legal opinions of the Secretary of Justice and the Chief Law
Officer of Malacaang. The petitioner also claims that the issue
presented in the appeal is not alone the legality or the illegality
of the importation, but that the appeal had raised questions
that go into the substance of due process and deprivation of
one's property without a day in court. The petitioner further
claims that "the act of seizure and the scheduled auction sale
of petitioner's tobacco on June 10, 1963, which was frustrated
by the interposition first of the preliminary injunction of Judge
Arca and finally by that of the Supreme Court inCollector of
Customs vs. Judge Arca, et al., G.R. L-21389, were all illegal,
arbitrary and with grave abuse of power", and "the decision
appealed from of respondent Commissioner of Customs
affirmed all these illegalities ...."5
We find that the petition for review filed by Auyong Hian before the
Court of Tax Appeals has really raised a number of issues which call
for a ruling or resolution by the Court of Tax Appeals, and it is within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals to rule on, or resolve,
those issues. Among the matters that were questioned by Auyong
Hian in his appeal was the legality and propriety of the order to sell
at public auction, as embodied in the decision of the Collector of
Customs which was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs; and,
more so, because during the pendency of the appeal before the Court
of Tax Appeals it was brought to the attention of said court, by
Auyong Hian as well as by the Solicitor General, that the Collector of
Customs (Pedro Pacis) had released the 600 hogsheads of tobacco in

question to the CTIP which claimed to have purchased said tobacco

at public auction sale which sale is precisely questioned by Auyong
Hian in his appeal. 6
The Court of Tax Appeals declared itself without jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal of Auyong Hian upon the ground that the
Supreme Court had already ruled that the importation of the 600
hogsheads of tobacco was illegal, and that it cannot review, revise,
much less overrule the decision of the Supreme Court. We believe
that the stand taken by the Court of Tax Appeals is not correct. It
appears to Us that the Court of Tax Appeals had overlooked the fact
that the appeal of Auyong Hian from the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs had raised not only the question of the
legality of the importation but also other matters which called for a
ruling by the Court of Tax Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction especially the question of whether the tobacco thus
imported were goods the importation of which was relatively
prohibited or absolutely prohibited, and also the question regarding
the disposal of the tobacco that was thus seized. The declaration by
this Court, in the Barcelona and Arca cases, supra, that the
importation of the tobacco in question was illegal was not intended
to stop the course of the administrative proceedings in relation to the
importation of said tobacco. Let it be noted that when the Barcelona
case was decided on July 31, 1962 the seizure proceedings against
the 600 hogsheads of tobacco in question had not yet been instituted
by the Collector of Customs. It was not until November 8, 1962 when
Seizure Identification No. 6669 was instituted. In the Barcelona case
the question that was before this Court was one regarding
jurisdiction that is whether Judge Barcelona of the Court of First
Instance of Manila had jurisdiction to order the Collector of Customs
and the Commissioner of Customs to release to Auyong Hian the said
600 hogsheads of tobacco. Because in his order of release Judge
Barcelona mentioned, among others, that Auyong Hian had imported
said tobacco pursuant to valid licenses, this Court, on the basis of
the pleadings and the record of that case, rendered a ruling that the
licenses were invalid and so the importation of the tobacco was
illegal.

In the case of Collector of Customs v. Arca, supra, this Court

reiterated the ruling in the Barcelona case that the importation of
said tobacco was illegal. The issue before this Court in the Arca case
was, as in the Barcelona case, regarding jurisdiction-that is, whether
Judge Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction
to order the attachment of the 600 hogsheads of tobacco which was
then under the custody of the Bureau of Customs and which was the
subject of seizure proceedings and whether said judge can enjoin the
Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of Customs from selling
the said tobacco at public auction. This Court declared Judge Arca
without jurisdiction over the shipment involved in Seizure
Identification No. 6669 and to pass upon the validity of the
actuations of the Collector of Customs.
This Court allowed Auyong Hian to intervene in the Arca case, and
because he alleged that as the importer of the tobacco in question he
had made a timely appeal to the Commissioner of Customs from the
decision of the Collector of Customs in the seizure proceedings, this
Court gave him a chance to prosecute his appeal, first before the
Commissioner of Customs, and later before the Court of Tax Appeals.
In the meantime, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of
Customs from seizing and selling the 600 hogsheads of tobacco in
question.
Thus, in spite of the fact that this Court had declared that the
tobacco in question was illegally imported, it at the same time took
cognizance of the administrative proceedings that were going on in
connection with that importation, and this Court recognized the
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs and the Court of Tax
Appeals in connection with those administrative proceedings. In the
very decision, and resolutions, in the case ofCollector of Customs vs.
Arca, supra, this Court has clearly recognized the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals, as the case
may be, to act on the appeal properly brought before him in relation
to the administrative proceedings in connection with the importation.
Thus, in the decision, we read, as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Auyong filed a petition for leave to intervene (granted June 25,

1963) and later, an urgent motion ex parte praying this Court
that, pending decision of herein petition, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining the Collector of Customs or his
agents from seizing and selling the 600 hogsheads of tobacco in
question and enforcing his decision on April 23, 1963 which
was pending review by the Commissioner of Customs. Basis of
intervenor's motion ex parte is the claim that enforcement of
said decision would cause great injustice and damage to him
and render any favorable decision by the Commissioner of
Customs on his appeal ineffectual and without any further
benefit to him. Finding from the verified answer of the intervenor
to the present petition that the order of the Collector of Customs
in the seizure proceedings covering the tobacco in question had
been timely appealed to the Commissioner of Customs, before
whom the administrative proceedings is still pending. We issued
on June 26, 1963 a restraining order, upon intervenor's filing a
bond in the amount of P20,000, directing the Collector of
Customs to desist temporarily from continuing with the public
auction of the tobacco, until July 3, 1963, and ordering the said
Collector to show cause why a preliminary writ of injunction
should not issue. After due hearing, this Court resolved to grant
intervenor Auyong Hian's petition upon his filing a bond of
P50,000, without prejudice to petitioner's filing within five days
from the court's resolution an opposition on the merits to the
petition of intervenor; and likewise allowing the Consolidated
Tobacco Industries of the Philippines, Inc. to file a petition for
intervention, which it did on July 9, 1963.
xxx

xxx

xxx

This Court, having found that intervenor Auyong Hian, had

made a timely appeal from the decision of the Collector of
Customs of April 23, 1963 to the Commissioner of Customs before
whom the appeal is still pending action (see Resolution of June
26, 1963), will refrain from passing upon the validity of the
administrative proceedings therein questioned and will instead
proceed to determine the respective rights of the parties to the
present action.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Auyong Hian, therefore, had lost all his rights to the shipment,
not only because We declared the licenses void and the
shipment illegal in the case of Climaco vs. Barcelona, G.R. No.
L-19597, but also because the seizure proceedings have been
found to be regular and had deprived Auyong Hian of his rights
to the shipment as importer; at least while the order of seizure
has not been set aside.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and injunction

is granted, and the orders of respondent Judge of first instance
dated June 5 and 6, and the writ of preliminary injunction
dated June 7, 1963 and other pertinent orders issued by him,
are set aside, and respondent judge is hereby declared without
jurisdiction over the shipment involved in Manila Seizure
Identification No. 6669 and to pass upon the validity of the
actuations of petitioner Collector of Customs. Pending action by
the Commissioner of Customs on the appeal taken by Auyong
Hian from the April 23, 1963 decision of the Collector of Customs
in the above-mentioned seizure proceedings, the writ of
preliminary injuncion issued by this Court against said Collector
restraining him from proceedings with the sale of the subject
tobacco to intervenor Consolidated Tobacco Industries of the
Philippines, Inc., shall continue to remain in full force and effect.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On January 7, 1965, this Court, in the Arca case, issued the
following resolution:
Considering the petition filed by intervenor Consolidated
Tobacco Industries of the Philippines, Inc. dated January 2,
1965 in L-21389 (Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila
Hon. Francisco Arca, etc., et al.) praying for the lifting of the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court under date
of June 26, 1963 restraining the Collector of Customs from
proceeding with the sale to said intervenor of the tobacco which
is the subject of this litigation, and the manifestation of the

intervenor Auyong Hian dated January 5, 1965 opposing said

petition for the lifting of the preliminary injunction in
question, it appearing that the intervenor Auyong Hian had filed
an appeal on December 9, 1964 from the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs which affirmed the decision of the
Collector of Customs ordering the seizure of subject tobacco, THE
COURT HEREBY DENIES the said petition of intervenor
Consolidated Tobacco Industries of the Philippines, Inc.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On January 19, 1965, also in the Arca case, this Court issued the
following resolution:
It appearing after the oral argument in (L-21389 Collector of
Customs, etc. v. Hon. Francisco Arca, et al.) that Judge
Gaudencio Cloribel has suspended his order complained of;
that there is no reason to believe he would revive it in view of
the disclosure already made; that apparently the order of the
Commissioner of Customs has not yet become final and the Court
of Tax Appeals has already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over
the subject-matter, pursuant to the appeal made by Auyong
Hian; RESOLVED, that this incident be considered closed. And
the petition of intervenor Consolidated Tobacco Industries, Inc.
to reconsider our order of January 7, 1965 is DENIED.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On April 8, 1965, this Court also issued the following resolution in
the Arca case:
In case L-21389 (The Collector of Customs, etc. vs. Hon.
Francisco Arca, etc., et al.), considering the motion of the
intervenor Consolidated Tobacco Industries of the Philippines,
Inc., dated March 31, 1965 praying that the preliminary
injunction issued by this Honorable Court restraining the
Collector of Customs from proceeding with the sale of the
tobacco, subject-matter of the litigation, to said intervenor and
the opposition filed against said motion by intervenor Auyong
Hian (Hong Whua Hang) it appearing that on January 19, 1965
this Court declared that the Court of Tax Appeals had already
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of this

case pursuant to the appeal made by Auyong Hian from the

decision of the Commissioner of Customs and had resolved that
the incident regarding the controversy over the said tobacco was
considered closed: This Court RESOLVED, that the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by it be considered dissolved and
of no further effect. The petition of the intervenor Consolidated
Tobacco Industries of the Philippines, Inc. of March 31, 1965, is
denied without prejudice to taking up the matter with the Court
of Tax Appeals. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will thus be seen, from the above-quoted resolution issued in
connection with incidents brought up after the decision had been
rendered in the Arca case, that in spite of the fact that this Court had
declared the importation of the 600 hogsheads of tobacco in question
illegal, it categorically declared that the Court of Tax Appeals has the
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter (the tobacco) pursuant
to the appeal made by Auyong Hian from the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs. What are declared in these resolutions
are but reaffirmations of what was stated in the decision that
because of the timely appeal made by Auyong Hian, this Court would
refrain from passing upon the validity of the administrative
proceedings. This Court recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals over appeals in administrative proceedings in
connection with importations. Indeed, the proceedings before the
Collector of Customs, the appeal before the Commissioner of
Customs, and the appeal before the Court of Tax Appeals deal with
administrative aspects of importation. While the Court of Tax
Appeals is considered as a judicial body, its functions are to pass
upon administrative decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the provincial or city Boards
of Assessment Appeals.
This Court declared in its decision, in the Arca case, that Auyong
Hian would lose all rights over the tobacco in question "at least while
the order of seizure has not been set aside." This Court thus made it
understood that the seizure proceedings were not yet closed, and
there was no final decision yet on the matter. When this Court said
that it "will refrain from passing upon the administrative proceedings
therein questioned" (in the appeal before the Commissioner of

Customs); and "that apparently the order of the Commissioner of

Customs has not yet become final and the Court of Tax Appeals has
already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter
pursuant to the appeal made by Auyong Hian", what was meant was
that the Court of Tax Appeals is the body that should decide those
matters which this Court had refrained from deciding.
The case as brought by Auyong Hian to the Court of Tax Appeals
involves questions relating to the seizure, forfeiture and the
disposition of the 600 hogsheads of tobacco in question. As has been
adverted to, the matter regarding the sale of the tobacco was included
in the appeal of Auyong Hian from the decision of the Commissioner
of Customs. The act of selling the seized tobacco as well as the seizure
thereof are matters that are governed by the Tariff and Customs
Code, the enforcement of which law is under the administration of
the Bureau of Customs. Hence the Court of Tax Appeals has
jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the Commissioner of
Customs in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and
Customs Code. We find, therefore, that in spite of the ruling laid
down in the Barcelona and Arca cases that the importation of the
600 hogsheads of the tobacco in question was illegal the Court of Tax
Appeals is not precluded from entertaining the appeal filed by
Auyong Hian from the decision of the Commissioner of Customs, said
appeal having raised issues that require resolution or ruling by the
Court of Tax Appeals, and they are issues which could not have been
decided by this Court in those two cases. We hold that the Court of
Tax of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain the aforestated appeal by
Auyong Hian, and it should proceed to determine and decide said
appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the resolutions of June 22, 1965, August 31,
1965 and September 18, 1965, in CTA Case No. 1560, appealed from,
are set aside; and this case is remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals
for further proceedings and decision. No costs. It is so ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P. and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Mr. Castro, J., reserves his vote.

[G.R. No. 74854. April 2, 1991.]

JESUS DACOYCOY, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO V. BENEDICTO,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI,
Antipolo, Rizal, and RUFINO DE GUZMAN, respondents.
Ramon V . Sison for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; VENUE;
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN JURISDICTION AND VENUE, CITED.
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondent
trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously
attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and
venue. Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically
governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the
laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject
matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the
plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject
matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the
convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.
Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the
merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit
may be had.
2.

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT IF DEFENDANT FAILS TO

CHALLENGE VENUE IN A MOTION TO DISMISS.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is
certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the
courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or

impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a

motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered,
he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge
belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT IMPROPERLY LAID UNLESS AND UNTIL
DEFENDANT OBJECTS TO IT IN A MOTION TO DISMISS; REASON.
Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to
dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid,
as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though
technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose
convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court
cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper
laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
4.
ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION; OVER DEFENDANT, HOW
ACQUIRED. In the instant case, even granting for a moment that
the action of petitioner is a real action, respondent trial court would
still have jurisdiction over the case, it being a regional trial court
vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions
which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein . . ." in accordance with Section 19 (2) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. With respect to the parties, there is no dispute
that it acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff Jesus Dacoycoy, now
petitioner, the moment he filed his complaint for annulment and
damages. Respondent trial court could have acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant, now private respondent, either by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the
coercive power of legal process exercised over his person.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO BE HEARD;
RULES OF PROCEDURE SHOULD BE ADHERED TO BY TRIAL
COURT IN CASE AT BAR TO AFFORD THE PARTIES SUCH RIGHT.
It was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a

procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on

the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure
outlined in the Rules of Court to take its proper course. Although we
are for the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and
fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that
respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to
afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be
heard on his cause.

Decision
May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground
of improper venue? This is the issue confronting the Court in the case
at bar.
On March 22, 1983, petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti,
Cainta, Rizal, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI,
Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint against private respondent Rufino de
Guzman praying for the annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving
a parcel of riceland situated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce thereof and damages for
private respondent's refusal to have said deeds of sale set aside upon
petitioner's demand.
On May 25, 1983, before summons could be served on private
respondent as defendant therein, the RTC Executive Judge issued an
order requiring counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial
judge on the matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It found,
based on the allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's action is
a real action as it sought not only the annulment of the aforestated
deeds of sale but also the recovery of ownership of the subject parcel
of riceland located in Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, which is
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court
of Appeals, which in its decision of April 11, 1986, 1 affirmed the order
of dismissal of his complaint.
In this petition for review, petitioner faults the appellate court in
affirming what he calls an equally erroneous finding of the trial court
that the venue was improperly laid when the defendant, now private
respondent, has not even answered the complaint nor waived the
venue. 2
Petitioner claims that the right to question the venue of an action
belongs solely to the defendant and that the court or its magistrate
does not possess the authority to confront the plaintiff and tell him

that the venue was improperly laid, as venue is waivable. In other

words, petitioner asserts, without the defendant objecting that the
venue was improperly laid, the trial court is powerless to dismiss the
case motu proprio.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the dismissal
of petitioner's complaint is proper because the same can "readily be
assessed as (a) real action." He asserts that "every court of justice
before whom a civil case is lodged is not even obliged to wait for the
defendant to raise that venue was improperly laid. The court can take
judicial notice and motu proprio dismiss a suit clearly denominated
as real action and improperly filed before it. . . . the location of the
subject parcel of land is controlling pursuant to Sec. 2, par. (a), Rule
4 of the New Rules of Court . . . 3
We grant the petition.
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondent
trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously
attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and
venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically
governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the
laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject
matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the
plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject
matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the
convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case. 4
Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the
merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit
may be had. 5
In Luna vs. Carandang, 6 involving an action instituted before the
then Court of First Instance of Batangas for rescission of a lease
contract over a parcel of agricultural land located in Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, which complaint said trial court dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction over the leased land, we emphasized:

(1) A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over suits

involving title to, or possession of, real estate wherever
situated in the Philippines, subject to the rules on venue
of actions (Manila Railroad Company vs. Attorney General,
etc., et al., 20 Phil. 523; Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs.
De Leon, et al., 56 Phil. 169; Navarro vs. Aguila, et al., 66
Phil. 604; Lim Cay, et al. vs. Del Rosario, etc., et al., 55
Phil. 692);
(2) Rule 4, Section 2, of the Rules of Court requiring that
an action involving real property shall be brought in the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land lies
is a rule on venue of actions, which may be waived
expressly or by implication.
In the instant case, even granting for a moment that the action of
petitioner is a real action, respondent trial court would still have
jurisdiction over the case, it being a regional trial court vested with
the exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions which involve
the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein . .
." in accordance with Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
With respect to the parties, there is no dispute that it acquired
jurisdiction over the plaintiff Jesus Dacoycoy, now petitioner, the
moment he filed his complaint for annulment and damages.
Respondent trial court could have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant, now private respondent, either by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the
coercive power of legal process exercised over his person. 7
Although petitioner contends that on April 28, 1963, he requested
the City Sheriff of Olongapo City or his deputy to serve the summons
on defendant Rufino de Guzman at his residence at 117 Irving St.,
Tapinac, Olongapo City, 8 it does not appear that said service had
been properly effected or that private respondent had appeared
voluntarily in court 9 or filed his answer to the complaint. 10 At this
stage, respondent trial court should have required petitioner to
exhaust the various alternative modes of service of summons under
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, i.e., personal service under Section 7,
substituted service under Section 8, or service by publication under

Section 16 when the address of the defendant is unknown and

cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is
certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the
courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or
impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a
motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered,
he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge
belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. 11
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion
to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly
laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though
technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose
convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court
cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper
laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a
procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the
ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure
outlined in the Rules of Court to take its proper course. Although we
are for the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and
fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that
respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to
afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be
heard on his cause.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, dated April 11,
1986, is hereby nullified and set aside. The complaint filed by
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Branch LXXI is
revived and reinstated. Respondent court is enjoined to proceed
therein in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.