G.R. No.

187456

June 2, 2014

ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
ALABANG HILLS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION and RAFAEL
TINIO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 27, 2009, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88864.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as
summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The case traces its roots to the Complaint for Injunction and
Damages filed [with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa
City] on October 19, 2006 by [herein petitioner, Alabang
Development Corporation] ADC against [herein respondents,
Alabang Hills Village Association, Inc.] AHVAI and Rafael Tinio
(Tinio), President of AHVAI. The Complaint alleged that [petitioner]
is the developer of Alabang Hills Village and still owns certain
parcels of land therein that are yet to be sold, as well as those
considered open spaces that have not yet been donated to [the]
local government of Muntinlupa City or the Homeowner's
Association. Sometime in September [2006], ADC learned that
AHVAI started the construction of a multi-purpose hall and a
swimming pool on one of the parcels of land still owned by ADC
without the latter's consent and approval, and that despite
demand, AHVAI failed to desist from constructing the said
improvements. ADC thus prayed that an injunction be issued
enjoining defendants from constructing the multi-purpose hall and
the swimming pool at the Alabang Hills Village.
In its Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim, AHVAI denied
ADC's asseverations and claimed that the latter has no legal
capacity to sue since its existence as a registered corporate entity
was revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
on May 26, 2003; that ADC has no cause of action because by
law it is no longer the absolute owner but is merely holding the
property in question in trust for the benefit of AHVAI as beneficial

owner thereof; and that the subject lot is part of the open space
required by law to be provided in the subdivision. As counterclaim,
it prayed that an order be issued divesting ADC of the title of the
property and declaring AHVAI as owner thereof; and that ADC be
made liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees.
Tinio filed his separate Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,
practically reiterating the defenses of AHVAI.2
On January 4, 2007, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276,
rendered judgment dismissing herein petitioner's complaint on the
grounds (1) that the latter has no personality to file the same; (2)
that the subject property "is a reserved area for the beneficial use
of the homeowners, as mandated by law;" and (3) that the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), not the RTC,
has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between petitioner and
respondents.3
Aggrieved, herein petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC
decision. Herein respondent AHVAI, on the other hand, moved
that it be allowed to prosecute its compulsory counterclaim
praying, for this purpose, that the RTC decision be amended
accordingly.
In its Order dated February 20, 2007, the RTC approved
petitioner's notice of appeal but dismissed respondent AHVAIs
counterclaim on the ground that it is dependent on petitioner's
complaint. Respondent AHVAI then filed an appeal with the CA.
In its assailed Decision dated March 27, 2009, the CA dismissed
both appeals of petitioner and respondent, and affirmed the
decision of the RTC. With respect to petitioner, the CA ruled that
the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint as the same
was filed when petitioner was already defunct and, as such, it no
longer had capacity to file the said complaint. As regards,
respondent AHVAIs counterclaim, the CA held that "where there
is no claim against the [respondent], because [petitioner] is
already in existent and has no capacity to sue, the counterclaim is
improper and it must be dismissed, more so where the complaint
is dismissed at the instance of the [respondent]."
Thus, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

RELYING ON THE CASE OF "COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC. v.
COURT OF APPEALS" IN RESOLVING PETITIONER'S LACK OF
CAPACITY
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING LACK OF CAPACITY OFTHE PETITIONER IN FILING
THE CASE CONTRARY TO THE EARLIER RULINGS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE
THAT PETITIONER IS MANDATED TO CEDE PROPERTIES TO
RESPONDENT AHVAI4
Anent the first assigned error, the Court does not agree that the
CA erred in relying on the case of Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals.5 The CA cited the case for the purpose of restating
and distinguishing the jurisprudential definition of the terms "lack
of capacity to sue" and "lack of personality to sue;" and of
applying these definitions to the present case. Thus, the fact that,
unlike in the instant case, the corporations involved in the
Columbia case were foreign corporations is of no moment. The
definition of the term "lack of capacity to sue" enunciated in the
said case still applies to the case at bar. Indeed, as held by this
Court and as correctly cited by the CA in the case of Columbia:
"[l]ack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the
exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary
qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character
or representation he claims[;] 'lack of capacity to sue' refers to a
plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority,
insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other
general disqualifications of a party. ..."6 In the instant case,
petitioner lacks capacity to sue because it no longer possesses
juridical personality by reason of its dissolution and lapse of the
three-year grace period provided under Section 122 of the
Corporation Code, as will be discussed below.
With respect to the second assigned error, Section 122 of the
Corporation Code provides as follows:
SEC. 122. Corporate liquidation. Every corporation whose
charter expires by its own limitation or is annulled by forfeiture or
otherwise, or whose corporate existence for other purposes is
terminated in any other manner, shall nevertheless be continued
as a body corporate for three (3) years after the time when it

would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and

defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close
its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute
its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for
which it was established.
At any time during said three (3) years, said corporation is
authorized and empowered to convey all of its property to trustees
for the benefit of stockholders, members, creditors, and other
persons in interest. From and after any such conveyance by the
corporation of its property in trust for the benefit of its
stockholders, members, creditors and others in interest, all
interest which the corporation had in the property terminates, the
legal interest vests in the trustees, and the beneficial interest in
the stockholders, members, creditors or other persons in interest.
Upon winding up of the corporate affairs, any asset distributable to
any creditor or stockholder or member who is unknown or cannot
be found shall be escheated to the city or municipality where such
assets are located.
Except by decrease of capital stock and as otherwise allowed by
this Code, no corporation shall distribute any of its assets or
property except upon lawful dissolution and after payment of all its
debts and liabilities.
This Court has held that:
It is to be noted that the time during which the corporation,
through its own officers, may conduct the liquidation of its assets
and sue and be sued as a corporation is limited to three years
from the time the period of dissolution commences; but there is no
time limit within which the trustees must complete a liquidation
placed in their hands. It is provided only (Corp. Law, Sec. 78 now
Sec. 122]) that the conveyance to the trustees must be made
within the three-year period. It may be found impossible to
complete the work of liquidation within the three-year period or to
reduce disputed claims to judgment. The authorities are to the
effect that suits by or against a corporation abate when it ceased
to be an entity capable of suing or being sued (7 R.C.L., Corps.,
par. 750); but trustees to whom the corporate assets have been
conveyed pursuant to the authority of Sec. 78 [now Sec. 122] may
sue and be sued as such in all matters connected with the
liquidation...7

In the absence of trustees, this Court ruled, thus:

Still in the absence of a board of directors or trustees, those
having any pecuniary interest in the assets, including not only the
shareholders but likewise the creditors of the corporation, acting
for and in its behalf, might make proper representations with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which has primary and
sufficiently broad jurisdiction in matters of this nature, for working
out a final settlement of the corporate concerns.8
In the instant case, there is no dispute that petitioner's corporate
registration was revoked on May 26, 2003.1wphi1Based on the
above-quoted provision of law, it had three years, or until May 26,
2006, to prosecute or defend any suit by or against it. The subject
complaint, however, was filed only on October 19, 2006, more
than three years after such revocation. It is likewise not disputed
that the subject complaint was filed by petitioner corporation and
not by its directors or trustees. In fact, it is even averred, albeit
wrongly, in the first paragraph of the Complaint9that "[p]laintiff is a
duly organized and existing corporation under the laws of the
Philippines, with capacity to sue and be sued. x x x"10
Petitioner, nonetheless, insists that a corporation may still sue,
even after it has been dissolved and the three-year liquidation
period provided under Section 122 of the Corporation Code has
passed. Petitioner cites the cases of Gelano v. Court of
Appeals,11 Knecht v. United Cigarette Corporation,12 and PepsiCola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 as authority
to support its position. The Court, however, agrees with the CA
that in the abovecited cases, the corporations involved filed their
respective complaints while they were still in existence. In other
words, they already had pending actions at the time that their
corporate existence was terminated.
The import of this Court's ruling in the cases cited by petitioner is
that the trustee of a corporation may continue to prosecute a case
commenced by the corporation within three years from its
dissolution until rendition of the final judgment, even if such
judgment is rendered beyond the three-year period allowed by
Section 122 of the Corporation Code. However, there is nothing in
the said cases which allows an already defunct corporation to
initiate a suit after the lapse of the said three-year period. On the
contrary, the factual circumstances in the abovecited cases would
show that the corporations involved therein did not initiate any

complaint after the lapse of the three-year period. In fact, as

stated above, the actions were already pending at the time that
they lost their corporate existence.
In the present case, petitioner filed its complaint not only after its
corporate existence was terminated but also beyond the threeyear period allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation Code.
Thus, it is clear that at the time of the filing of the subject
complaint petitioner lacks the capacity to sue as a corporation. To
allow petitioner to initiate the subject complaint and pursue it until
final judgment, on the ground that such complaint was filed for the
sole purpose of liquidating its assets, would be to circumvent the
provisions of Section 122 of the Corporation Code.
As to the last issue raised, the basic and pivotal issue in the
instant case is petitioner's capacity to sue as a corporation and it
has already been settled that petitioner indeed lacks such
capacity. Thus, this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from
the ruling of the CA finding it unnecessary to delve on the other
issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88864,
sustaining the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 276, in Civil Case No. 06-138, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 187495

April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love,
cherish and protect his wife, to give her a home, to provide her
with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means, to
treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to
honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her,
but also to protect her from oppression and wrong."1
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies.
Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly
legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of
1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which
affirmed the Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case
Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October
18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then and raised their four (4)
children6 as they put up several businesses over the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a ComplaintAffidavit,7 alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped
her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase
2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on
December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder
for refusing to have sex with him.

On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de

Oro City issued a Joint Resolution,8 finding probable cause for
grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and
recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed
against the accused-appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the
RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and
Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The Information in Criminal Case No.
99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9,
1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by
means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10,
1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by
means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on
July 21, 1999.11 On August 18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial court in
an Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accusedappellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both
charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Information15 averring that the name of the private
complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape. The
motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated
November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of commission
of the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998 thereby
modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The

motion was granted on January 18, 2000.17 Accordingly, the

criminal informations were amended as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused by means of force upon person did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against
the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
1997.18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused by means of force upon person did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against
the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of
1997.19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He
maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a joint trial
of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of
KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000, which, together with
pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where
his father was one of the laborers. They got married after a year of
courtship.20 When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the
accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store.21 Later on, they
engaged in several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and
hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the rice mill,
which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with
the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely
assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the
trucks to haul goods.22

Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish

was not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Even the daughters
observed the disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He would
drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively
managed the businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on
the other hand, did not acquiesce with that objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a
house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.26 Three of the
children transferred residence therein while KKK, the accusedappellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon.
She shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he
accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De
Oro City most of the days of the week.28 On Wednesdays, she
went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family
store and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same
day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between
KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and
fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with
equal degree of enthusiasm.30However, in 1997, he started to be
brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans
any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method
of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist
his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling
usually upon his complaint that she failed to attend to him. She
was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a
bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman
must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She
disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good
future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12,
1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept together in Cebu City
where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By
October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back in
Cagayan de Oro City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and
their children went about their nightly routine. The family store in
their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was
taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls'
bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while
the accused-appellant watched television in the living
room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the

accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to

their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK
complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accusedappellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her
reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you
lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer
here [to] our bed."36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had
headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got
angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against
the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up
from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long,
expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on
her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and
when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled
them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.39 KKK stayed
defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her
legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle
him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating
her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to
protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because
I'm not feeling well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on
the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom,43KKK's pleas were
audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie,
don't do that to me, have pity on me,"44 MMM woke up 000 who
prodded her to go to their parents' room.45 MMM hurriedly climbed
upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom
and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?"46 The accusedappellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the
door and said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family trouble,"
before closing it again.47 Since she heard her mother continue to
cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the
bedroom door again, and then kicked it.48 A furious accused-

appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once more:
"Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family trouble!"
Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM
boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma,
why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what
happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she
helped her mother get up in order to bring her to the girls'
bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered
herself with a blanket.50 However, their breakout from the room
was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant
blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the knob. He
commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when
the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then
held KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get
away, MMM leaned against door and embraced her mother tightly
as they pushed their way out.51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and
queried her as to what happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is
an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm
not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night.
After closing the family store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the
children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join
them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere.
After resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to
the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend
the night in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing
the beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked
KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep with the
children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me,
anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She
dismissed his comment by turning her head away after retorting:
"So be it." After that, he left the room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go
with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and
attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will
you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him,
he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart.57 At this
point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we
are in front of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the
accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have

sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family." He
then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls
obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently heard
the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking
bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The
accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and panties.
He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body
is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you
wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs,
held her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside her. Once
gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs,
stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly
uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a]
flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM
and OOO scurried upstairs but found the door locked. MMM
pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the
doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room,
MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her
hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why
are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal,
he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel well.
"62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father
owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's father. He came to know
KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers. When
they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school
graduate while she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from
pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard work and
efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and
established their own businesses that included a rice mill
managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks
that hauled coffee, copra, or com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and
17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident
somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon.
He left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's

graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned

to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed
to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take
care of the truck and buy some com.64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until
June 1999 corroborated the above claims. According to him, on
October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of
the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a
pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant
were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com into the
truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant
then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in New Cebu,
Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia,
together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to
tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in October
7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together with the
separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours
to turn the truck around and hoist it to the towing bar of the other
truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in
Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City
where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The
accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three men
brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the
rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control
and management of their businesses as well as the possession of
their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was
provoked to do so when she failed to account for their bank
deposits and business earnings. The entries in their bank account
showed the balance of P3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but
after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount
dwindled to a measly P9,894.88.66 Her failure to immediately
report to the police also belies her rape allegations.67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the
accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd behavior.
While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites,
the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was
surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her
after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-tech," because
they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK had
also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives
home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door and
welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer ask for
his permission whenever she went out.68

Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave

the accused-appellant several love letters purportedly addressed
to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accusedappellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey,
somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police,
another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and
three other priests.71 Several persons told him about the
paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them about it
because he trusted her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by
OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was listening
loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television
program, he asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette
player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around
and hit the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head
bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK
thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the
argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without the
accused-appellant because she had somebody young,
handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who
smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with threefourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to the accusedappellant. However, the separation did not push through because
the accused-appellant's parents intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK
pursued legal separation from the accused-appellant by initiating
Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter
obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999.75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the
version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight and
credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of
the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere
and genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in
our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a
crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found
unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations of extra-marital
affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial court
shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on
inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the
other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual

whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling

disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan
"GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate
charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in
each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of
(P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77

wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal
investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and
physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be
at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the
commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon,
the place where he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours
away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed
Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

Ruling of the CA

The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward

testimony of the victim herself and the corroborative declarations
of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable
doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force
and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical
examination did not negate the commission of the crime because
a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he
and KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of and
right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical
evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation
used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that physical
showing of external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and
convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim was
forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accusedappellant are spouses only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's
accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her
husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently
explained by KKK when she stated that she only found out that a

Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a

woman was the property of her father until she marries to become
the property of her husband.87 If a man abducted an unmarried
woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the
owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her
identity upon marriage and the law denied her political power and
status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she
misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the family.90

SO ORDERED.79
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the
RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original
informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced
by the amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to
the amended informations.

Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods

and such treatment was justified under three ideologies.

Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6,

2009, the Court notified the parties that, if they so desire, they
may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation
and Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt
its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant,
through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was
not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took
place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated
by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal
bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up
resistance or seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the
absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in KKK's
panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient
English practices of 'bride capture' whereby a man conquered a
woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man
abducted a woman and married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of
the woman's chastity but rather to punish the act of obtaining the
heiress' property by forcible marriage84 or to protect a man's
valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her
father's property and if a man raped his wife, he was merely using
his property.86

This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a

similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman becomes one with her
husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own
personal property or write a will.91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in
England, conceived the irrevocable implied consent theory that
would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He
stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself
upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her
husband, which she cannot retract.92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the
United States of America (USA) and England. It gives legal
immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act
which would be rape if committed against a woman not his
wife.93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the
forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife of
the perpetrator."94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule
was Commonwealth v. Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it
would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim.
Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of them
citing Hale's theory as basis.96

The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in
1909. A husband was endowed with absolute immunity from
prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The privilege was personal
and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his
wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in
raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in
the USA demanding for its abolition for being violative of married
women's right to be equally protected under rape laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by
proscribing the application of the rule in cases where the husband
and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by its
terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or a decree,
judgment or written agreement of separation.100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York
when the Court of Appeals of New York declared the same
unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in
distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The
decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent
theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between
marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales which
have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based
upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights
incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the
slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for
rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married
woman to sexual intercourse has been cited most frequently in
support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a
supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a
sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a
degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the
victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and
psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is
irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes,
marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to
coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage
license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly
rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right
to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a
husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in
sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing
domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x x."

The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were

the common-law doctrines that a woman was the property of her
husband and that the legal existence of the woman was
"incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x."
Both these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this
State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any
modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by
denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with
recognition as a whole human being x x x."102 (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of
them, as well as the District of Columbia, outlawing the act without
exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some
exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife
is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally
unable to consent.103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever
reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that the old
provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's
irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form.
According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may
not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case
there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of
rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first
international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major
instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination
against women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting
gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in
addressing global concerns.107 The country also committed,
among others, to condemn discrimination against women in all its
forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and
without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against women
and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and
women in their national constitutions or other appropriate
legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure,
through law and other appropriate means, the practical
realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures,
including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all
discrimination against women;

xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation,
to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs
and practices which constitute discrimination against
women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which
constitute discrimination against women.108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the
Philippines enshrined the principle of gender equality in the 1987
Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof,
thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nationbuilding, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to adopt and
implement the generally accepted principles of international law
such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate
gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype
concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.109 The law reclassified
rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of
crimes against chastity. More particular to the present case, and
perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph
of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and
criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage
between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or
the penalty imposed.

In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent

forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not
be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage
is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses
the term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No.
8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal
relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is
committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the
records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's
progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite
of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to
conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of
our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape
under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:

as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a

husband from being sued by the wife for rape. Even
jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a
wife from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in
this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now being
presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide
here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual rape,
there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The wife
can sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be
prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no
law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put
second paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many of us.
x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape
even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for
something that will unify and keep the cohesion of the family
together that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House
version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a
husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual
assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no
crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the point, under
Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second
paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the
offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is
that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is
no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault,
what do you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point

of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill
No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the
offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape?
x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited,
very limited 17 years of private practice in the legal profession,
Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license

MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor,

we have already stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is all
denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That is
why I am sorry that our House version which provided for sexual
assault was not carried by the Senate version because all sexual
crimes under this bicameral conference committee report are all
now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from reclusion
perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So
there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?

xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of
this. I am in favor of punishing the husband who forces the wife
even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital
rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of
marriage. x x x.110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape
but marital rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific
mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this
marital rape can be implicitly contained in the second paragraph. x
x x So marital rape actually was in the House version x x x. But it
was not another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that
because you are the lawful husband does not mean that you
cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your
wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains she was raped, I
guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am
the husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I
can beat you up? That's all it means. That is why if we stop
referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang
ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No,
what it is saying is you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me
up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It was just a way of
saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged
with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you
propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful
husband does not mean you can have carnal knowledge by
force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a
grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba
yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang,
it is not meant to have another classification of rape. It is all the
same definition x x x.
xxxx

HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x

x, we can say that this rule is implicit already in the first proviso. It
implies na there is an instance when a husband can be charged
[with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete
natin ito. But it is understood that this rule of evidence is now
transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of
pardon. We will remove marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3
but we will retain the one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t
is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of
evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband cannot
beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made
clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape.
All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ,
don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do
you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as
inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to the women
and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we
are not defining or creating a new crime but instead, we are just
defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a
rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is not, does not
negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the
point in discussion. The only disagreement now is where to place
it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on
marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or
intimidation or any of the circumstances that would define rape x x
x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are separated
does not come into the picture. So even if they are living under

one roof x x x for as long as the attendant circumstances of the

traditional rape is present, then that is rape.112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x
[t]his provision on marital rape, it does not actually change the
meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind,
whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband
against the wife. So the bill really says, you having been married
to one another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think
there is any need to change the concept of rape as defined
presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually
add anything to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely
clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has evidence to show that she
was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into
having sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape
has been committed against her by the husband, notwithstanding
the fact that they have been legally married. It does not change
anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change
on this x x x.113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is
further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262,114 which regards rape within
marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a
man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or
physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in
nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as
a sex object, making demeaning and sexually
suggestive remarks, physically attacking the

sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him

to watch obscene publications and indecent
shows or forcing the woman or her child to do
indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing
the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same
room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the
victim to engage in any sexual activity by force,
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat
of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional
and other forms of non-personal violence are the most common
type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among
ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women
experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight
percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the
irrevocable implied consent theory. In his appeal brief before the
CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which
gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically
consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK,
were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that
consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband
and wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be
viewed and treated differently from ordinary rape cases and that
the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack
thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is
a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife.116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable
implied consent theory evolved have already been superseded by
modem global principles on the equality of rights between men
and women and respect for human dignity established in various
international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines,
as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the
traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and
in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them.

Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures

to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices,
customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.117 One of such measures is
R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that
marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute
proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to
every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at
least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is
the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, which was Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly
subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the
forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of
discrimination against women, identified 'marital rape' as a
species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against
women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in,
or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in
private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but
not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the
family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the
household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, nonspousal violence and violence related to exploitation;119 (Emphasis
ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual
violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife
without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence
upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W
and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act
as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her

to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not
merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a
fellow human being with dignity equal120 to that he accords
himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing
her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent.
Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international
commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational
notions on marital activities121 that have lost their relevance in a
progressive society.

of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape
committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage.
Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their
husband and those raped by any other man alike.

It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love

one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy,
as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and
mutual123 and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or
coercion.

Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in

Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those raised by herein
accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a
license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A
married woman has the same right to control her own body, as
does an unmarried woman.128 She can give or withhold her
consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot
unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.

Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy

between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion.
Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a
gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep
sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the
hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in
deepening marital relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized to
despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for
coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to
protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and
State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his
indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in
sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to
declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential
marital obligation.125 But he cannot and should not demand sexual
intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital
rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and
in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.
The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws126 ordains
that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give
undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no
person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of
laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No.
8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual
assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the
perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms

The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily

discriminates against married rape victims over unmarried rape
victims because it withholds from married women raped by their
husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape
victims.

Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have

control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related
to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of
coercion, discrimination and violence.129 Women do not divest
themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple
reason that human rights are inalienable.130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape
and non-marital rape nor provide for different definition or
elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what
the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial
legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth.
Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for
marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims and
unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the
victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to
apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any differently if
the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements
and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape
cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship
between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in
accordance with the established legal principles and evidentiary
policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found
that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted
the accused-appellant.

The evidence for the prosecution was

based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the
credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts
must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party.
While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the
testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless,
duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's
testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is
credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature.
If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect.
This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the
witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially
during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its
evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of
substance and value have been plainly overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on
appeal.132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a
meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the trial proceedings
and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found
no justification to disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both
credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on six
separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her
statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She
remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid
during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal
examination, she was able to convincingly explain and debunk the
allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to
have sex with him despite her refusal on October 16, 1998. He
initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by
violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to
aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for
them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due to
abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy
transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her
panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The
tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She reiterated that she
was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount of

resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart,

gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and
inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he
never desisted.133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October
1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the appalling episode in
the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in
the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the
beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and
berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom.
When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the
accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to
pacify the accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded
them that as the head of the family he could do whatever he
wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he
ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter
proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled
down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to
me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do
what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."134 But her
pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts
and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her
and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself, he
got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what
you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the
essential element that must be proved is the absence of the
victim's consent to the sexual congress.136
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from
the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent machinations
or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving
free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12
years of age or is demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent
was wrestled from her through force and intimidation both of
which were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution
through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO:

Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your
husband, do you remember what happened?
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him
but I warded off his hand.
Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger
by touching or knocking her lap which means that he wanted to
have sex."
Q So, what did you do after that?
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling
well. (at this juncture the witness is sobbing)
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have
sex with you?
A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my
pantie [sic] was tom.
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because
he is so strong.
xx xx
Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else
did he do?
A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
Q So after that what else did he do?
A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two
hands no matter how I wrestled but I failed because he is stronger
than me.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is
giving her testimony.
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your
two legs and rode on you and held your two hands?
A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my
whole body is aching."
Q How did you say that to your husband?
A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
xxxx
A I shouted when I uttered that words.
xxxx
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
xxxx
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137
(Cross-Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA;
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your
husband normally remove your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty
because according to you he normally do that if he have sex with
you?

A Yes, Sir.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my
panty because I don't want to have sex with him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your
panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that
time?
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
xxxx
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty
he also remove your nightgown?
A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your
duster [sic]?
A No, only on the breast level.138
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short
pant and pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and
pantie?
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also
my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot
withstand sex."
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it
down?
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your
husband, what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and
mounted on me and succeeded in having sex with me.139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly
overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing her legs and then
resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the
consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual
intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient
intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to the actual moment
of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted
sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for
her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to
indulge his sexual craving.

The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to

sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to sleep in the
children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over
her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to
their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched
to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that
ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it
was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No
consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that
juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was
about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since
the act for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or at
least unclear to the person from whom the consent was desired.
The significant point when consent must be given is at that time
when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual
congress. In this case, that point is when the accused-appellant
tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be
an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument
that KKK should have hit him to convey that she was resisting his
sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the
law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove
resistance140 much more requires her to raise a specific kind
thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible
resistance for the accused-appellant to recognize that she
seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her
panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend
her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be
irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired result.
What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind141 or is of
such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to
bow into submission.142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of
blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical certificate
do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on
the victim's underwear that determines the fact of
rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence
that is not necessary to prove rape.144 These details do not pertain
to the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is

-sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her

consent.145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v.
Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances of which are, however,
disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony
of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was
controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness
who stated that force was not applied based on the position of her
hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the
absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an
indication of consent.147 Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as
discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's
testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness the
actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is
essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only
the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced
sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and
OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed
the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with
KKK's narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to
and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in
KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie,
dont do that to me, have pity on me"149 on the night of October 16,
1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their
conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her
mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for meddling.
Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked
the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it
and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion
from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her
hair disheveled while her tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief
struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally
able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK
narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he
forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following
night after the accused-appellant barged inside the children's
bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to
interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out

after bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of
the children because he is the head of the family. The girls then
stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their mother
helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently
depicted that the accused-appellant, through the use of force and
intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal knowledge of
his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom
coupled with her verbal and physical resistance were clear
manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her
on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on
October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant on
her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her children
after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the conclusion that
the sexual acts that occurred were against her will.
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited
merely because they failed to report the rape incidents to the
police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges.
Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults
does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is
satisfactorily explained.150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a
husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is
considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue
his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr.
(Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the separate
charges for grave threats and physical injuries against the
accused-appellant.151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption in rape
cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a
layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique.
In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the
common factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to
the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is
in view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's
absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal desires. A
husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar
occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.

Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing

marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that could have
befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police
authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable
explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape
incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.

inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it

reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious
stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal
quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the
accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold no
evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's
credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to
present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere
vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant with
fabricated rape charges.

The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit

for rape is not fatal in view of the credible, candid and positive
testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence
carries more weight than the affidavit since it underwent the
rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations.
Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered
incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to
testimony given in court.152

It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent

theory as defense, the accused-appellant has essentially admitted
the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two criminal
informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the
defense of alibi and any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.

Ill motive imputed to the victim

At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.

The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does

not inspire belief as it is riddled with loopholes generated by
incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to
establish that the P3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account
was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands
(BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October
31, 1996 in the amount of P3,149,840.63 is the same amount the
accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although
the accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he
admitted that approximately P3 Million was spent for the
construction of their house. These pieces of evidence effectively
belie the accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not
account for the money deposited in the bank.153

Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is

inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no
improper motive to testify falsely.154

Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant

failed to explain how Bebs could be his wife KKK when the lettersender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while
KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not
present Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the
existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed,
despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such
love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extramarital affairs by presenting witnesses who could corroborate his
claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an able man
would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled
around with 10 men - some of whom he has even met. The
accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand are

Alibi

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not
only that he was at some other place at the time of the
commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.
Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance
between the place where the accused was and the place where
the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more
importantly, the facility of access between the two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed
attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com
with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the same will
not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce
clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of
the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be
traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City,
and even less by private vehicle which was available to the
accused appellant at any time.156 Thus, it was not physically

impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at the dates and

times when the two rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive
identification and credible testimony of the victim, and her two
daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in
the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the
accused-appellant.

To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a

similar form of domestic violence, an award ofP30,000.00 as
exemplary damages is imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from the date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.161
A Final Note

Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accusedappellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear,
straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two
separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of
overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant
from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the
testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of
KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason
and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accusedappellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16
and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each
count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant for being in
accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further,
he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No.
9346, which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount
of P50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to rape victims without
need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption
that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she
underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the
finding that rape took place.1wphi1 Considering that the crime
committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying circumstances
attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount
is P50,000.00159 and not P75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.

Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an

abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human being. It
respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It
can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as
shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored
fortress, the family home, committed against her by her husband
who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein
pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws
provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive
husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license
to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his wife's
body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest
herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own
body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her
consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's
unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort
to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek
succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her
refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an
annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the
spiritual and biological communion that achieves the marital
purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and
as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never
sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein
pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as a tool to
harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that
safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and
scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any
person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made
answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or
other laws.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated

July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant
Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He
is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of
PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape.
The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 182438

July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by
petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC)
Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
3

The presented evidence showed that Joey Umadac and Claire

Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003
at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed
officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the
marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage
license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their
parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent
Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan
Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to
perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having
been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the
couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the
presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged
on arraignment.
The prosecutions witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere,
testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil
sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding.
Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle.
She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each
other, and sign a document.6 She heard the petitioner instructing
the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter,
they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw
the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation
given to her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the
couple declare during the ceremony that they take each other as
husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the
municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty.
Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no
marriage license was issued to the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony,
denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a
solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him aP200.00 fine
pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioners
act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he
made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the
couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in performing a
marriage ceremony without the couples marriage license, the
petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the
penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The
MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently
states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically
penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the
discretion of the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides

the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these laws, the
MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of P200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the
circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing"
the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the
prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the
petitioners negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that
the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44,
of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs ruling. The CA observed
that although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in
determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted,
viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the
solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two
witnesses of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution
duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a
marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioners criminal liability
under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on
whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article
350 of the same Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the
imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it
covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds:
First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not
define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming
that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated

in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code,

these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple
take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate
containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed by the
contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing
officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution
failed to prove that the contracting parties personally declared that
they take each other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the
principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot
interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of
matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into
a "marriage ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the
"blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to
the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in
violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the
filing of the present case against him.21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for
a penalty. The present case is not covered by Section 44 of the
Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its
provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURTS RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, were proven by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized
solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1)
authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an
illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner
admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence,
the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by
the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal
marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically

define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal"
performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on
these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of
the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 324 of
the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 625 of
the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious
rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they
take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article
3(3)27mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines
a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses
of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form of
religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum
requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should
be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence
of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as
husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties
appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses.
On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the
petitioners allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the
testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioners allegation that the court asked insinuating and
leading questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge may
examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to
extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material
testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the
position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against

him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal

certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the
judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it from
belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even
the petitioners admission regarding the circumstances of the
ceremony, support Floridas testimony that there had indeed been
the declaration by the couple that they take each other as
husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their
declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear
and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to
show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had
any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of
separation of church and State precludes the State from qualifying
the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the
petitioners allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by
Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required.
This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or
latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to
the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution
recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement
of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of
marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and
regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which
penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and
mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner
conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum
requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner
may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony
qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as

contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of

the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the
petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential
requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage
certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he
knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted
the "blessing" of their relationship.

the regulations and practices whereof require banns or

publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in
accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate
solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal;
or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation
of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than
one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than
two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis
ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony

despite knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of
marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioners knowledge of the absence
of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.

Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of any provision

of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be
promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine
of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not
more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
[emphasis ours]

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a

marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present
case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the
requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as
discussed above.

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the

ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the
present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section
39, of the Marriage Law.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the

couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall be
imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law.
The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and
44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law
provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage Any priest or
minister solemnizing marriage without being authorized by the
Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force
when called upon to do so by the parties or parents,
grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any
bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not

include the present case.1wphi1 As correctly found by the MTC,
the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the
Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only
the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision
which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352
falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613
which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations
to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is
one of such regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine
of P200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No.
31028.
SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 159031

June 23, 2014

NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having
a judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit
on its face void and in existent for lack of a marriage license, is
guilty of bigamy as defined and penalized by Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Case
The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on
August 29, 2002,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his
conviction for bigamy under the judgment rendered on October
30, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 49808 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1968,2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal
Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of
accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo3 without the benefit of
a marriage license.4 The records show that Lasanas and Patingo
had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack
of the marriage license.5 On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and
Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony
before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo
City.6 They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of
cohabitation for that purpose.7 Both ceremonies were evidenced
by the corresponding marriage certificates.8 In 1982, Lasanas and
Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences.9
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with
Josefa Eslaban in a religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon
Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage
certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single.10

On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of

marriage and damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo
City,11 which was docketed as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to
Branch 39 of the RTC. The complaint alleged that Socorro had
employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing his
consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches,
psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to
suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation
warranting the award of damages. In support of his complaint, he
further alleged, among others, that:
He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which
marriage was officiated by Hon. Carlos B. Salazar, Municipal
Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo. Machine copy of the Marriage
Contract is herewith attached as Exhibit "A" and made part hereof;
which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San Jose Church,
Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of Iloilo
City Registrar. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith
attached as Annex "B";
Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no properties
except some personal belongings;
Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967 at the
house of Mr. Raul L. Cataloctocan in Burgos Street, Lapaz, Iloilo
City wherein the purpose of their meeting was for the plaintiff to
consult and seek treatment by the defendant because the latter
was a "babaylan": Plaintiff was treated by the defendant and the
subsequent treatments were performed by the defendant at her
residence in Barangay, Banga, Mina, Iloilo, the treatment made
being on a continuing basis;
xxxx
On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to come with
her to Iloilo City. They went to Dainty Restaurant at J.M. Basa
Street. Plaintiff saw several persons therein. After eating plaintiff
was made to sign the marriage contract, which was null and void
for lack of marriage license and based on a false affidavit of
cohabitation. After their marriage, they went home to Barangay
Bangac, Mina, Iloilo, which marked the start of a married life
rocked with marital differences, quarrels and incompatibilities,
without love, but under the uncontrollable fear of harm that should
befall him should he not follow her;

xxxx
During the period the parties are living together defendant would
nag the plaintiff, fabricate stories against him and displayed her fit
of jealousy, neglect her marital obligations even committed
infidelity, which psychological incompatibilities and marital
breaches have forced the petitioner to live separately from
defendant since 1982 up to the present.12
In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City.13After due proceedings,
the accused was formally indicted for bigamy under the
information filed on October 20, 1998 in the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of
Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said
accused, Noel Lasanas being previously united in a lawful
marriage with Socorro Patingo and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with Josefa Eslaban.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was
raffled to Branch 38 of the RTC in Iloilo City. The accused pleaded
not guilty at his arraignment,15 and trial ensued in due course.
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39)
rendered its judgment in Civil Case No. 23133 dismissing the
accuseds complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the
marriage between him and Socorro valid and legal, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered dismissing the complaint filed by the plaintiff Noel
Arenga Lasanas against the defendant, Socorro Patingo,
considering that the marriage between them is valid and legal.
The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give monthly
support to his wife, the defendant in this case, Ma. Socorro
Patingo in the amount of P3,000.00 a month, from the time that
she filed her answer with counterclaim on February 3, 1997,
pursuant to Article 203 of the Family Code and every month
thereafter. Costs against the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.16
The accused appealed to the CA.17
Ruling of the RTC
On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed
decision in Criminal Case No. 49808, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of BIGAMY punishable under Art.
349 of the Revised Penal Code, judgment is hereby entered
ordering him to serve an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum.

Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on

certiorari.21 He argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied
the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of
the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before
one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this
purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family
Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his
subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a
recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in Article 53
in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that, consequently,
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the
subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25 and that his good
faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of
criminal liability.26
Ruling

The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him under

Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

The appeal lacks merit.

SO ORDERED.18

The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal

Code, which provides:

Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his

conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC thereby erred in
finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of
the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the
solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally
married to Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not
established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent
were absolutory in his favor; and that he had been of the honest
belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of the nullity
of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent
marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged
decision, decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court
DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues

Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be

imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the
offender has been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accusedappellant Lasanas and private complainant Patingo was void
because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of
cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could

not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the church
wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the
essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be
present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except
in those instances when this requirement may be excused. There
having been no marriage license nor affidavit of cohabitation
presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the
religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have
first secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void
marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa
Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa
Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Accuseds reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil.
845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because
the ruling in these cases have already been abandoned per
Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA
499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA
229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but
Yaps ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code
and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals,
supra.
Regarding accused-appellants defense of good faith, the same is
unavailing pursuant to Maozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is
correct in all respect.28
Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA,
insisting that the RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally
married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license,
affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally
married to Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not
established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent
were absolutory in his favor; and that he had been of the honest
belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of the nullity

of the first marriage before he could contract a subsequent

marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged
decision, decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court
DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.

been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:

SO ORDERED.

20

Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on
certiorari.21 He argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied
the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of
the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before
one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this
purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family
Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his
subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a
recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in Article 53
in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that, consequently,
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the
subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking;25 and that his good
faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of
criminal liability.26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the
offender has been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not

This Court concedes that the marriage between accusedappellant Lasanas and private complainant Patingo was void
because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of
cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could
not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the church
wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the
essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be
present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except
in those instances when this requirement may be excused. There
having been no marriage license nor affidavit of cohabitation
presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the
religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have
first secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void
marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa
Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but after his marriage to Josefa
Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Accuseds reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil.
845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because
the ruling in these cases have already been abandoned per
Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA
499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA
229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but
Yaps ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code
and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals,
supra.
Regarding accused-appellants defense of good faith, the same is
unavailing pursuant to Maozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is
correct in all respect.28

Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing
elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of
the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between
the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent
marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v.
People:29
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of
a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee which drafted what is now the Family Code of the
Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing
that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person
who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits

bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and
hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him. We note that in petitioners
case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was
declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was
overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
Following petitioners argument, even assuming that a complaint
has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still
escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier
marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such
cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy
dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public
Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file
Informations in court. Plainly, petitioners strained reading of the
law is against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accuseds conviction for bigamy is
affirmed.1wphi1 The crime of bigamy was consummated from
the moment he contracted the second marriage without his
marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared null and void,
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, his
marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and subsisting due to
such marriage not being yet declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction.30 "What makes a person criminally liable
for bigamy," according to People v. Odtuhan:31

But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC
(Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage
after the information for bigamy had already been filed against
him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro.
Considering that the accuseds subsequent marriage to Josefa
was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was
established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa
was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of
marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was
he himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent
marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court has
explained that "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of
this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance
of criminal liability for bigamy.
x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act
of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage."33
The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People:34 x x x
Nollora may not impugn his [subsequent] marriage to Geraldino in
order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we
would be opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of
multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals:

x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage

during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it beheld
as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy.

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such
a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the
State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

The accuseds defense of acting in good faith deserves scant

consideration especially because the records show that he had
filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro
prior to the institution of the criminal complaint against him but
after he had already contracted his second marriage with Josefa.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
bigamy is prision mayor. With neither an aggravating nor a
mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime,
the imposable penalty is the medium period of prision
mayor,35 which ranges from eight years and one day to 10 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the

indeterminate sentence should be within the range of prision
correccional, the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the
offense, which is from six months and one day to six years.
Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of two years and four
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and
one day of prision mayor as maximum, as imposed by the RTC,
was proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on August 29, 2002; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 182839

June 2, 2014

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE GARCIA and CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE
GARCIA, JR., BOBBY GARCIA and JIMMY GARCIA and
HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO GARCIA,
DANILO GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA,
HEHERSON GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA
and JANE GARCIA,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
decision2 dated September 26, 2007 and the resolution3 dated
May 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
71356.
These challenged CA rulings reversed and set aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela,
dismissing Civil Case No. Branch 23-500-96 for lack of cause of
action.
The Factual Background
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly
summarized below.
The subject of the present case is a parcel of residential land with
all its improvements (subject property) located in Barrio Olango,
Mallig, Isabela. The land is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-44422 under the name of Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.)
who acquired the subject property during his marriage with Ligaya
Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987.
The marriage of Jose Sr. and Ligaya produced the following
children: Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, all surnamed Garcia,
who are the respondents in the present case.
Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia
(Spouses Garcia) obtained a loan facility from the petitioner,

Philippine National Bank (petitioner bank), initially

for P150,000.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage over their property covered by TCT No. 177585. The
spouses Garcia increased their loan toP220,000.00 and
eventually to P600,000.00. As security for the increased loan, they
offered their property covered by TCT No. 75324 and the subject
property covered by TCT No. T-44422.
Jose Sr. agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering
the subject property as additional collateral security for the latters
increased loan. For this purpose, Jose Sr. executed Special
Powers of Attorney (SPAs) dated April 14, 1992 and October 6,
1993, respectively, expressly authorizing the Spouses Garcia to
apply for, borrow, or secure any loan from the petitioner bank, and
to convey and transfer the subject property by way of mortgage.
Jose Sr. also executed an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in
favor of the petitioner bank. The SPAs and the Amendment of
Real Estate Mortgage are both inscribed on TCT No. T-44422. All
of these transactions, however, were without the knowledge and
consent of Jose Sr.s children.
On maturity of the loan on April 20,1994, the spouses Garcia
failed to pay their loan to the petitioner bank despite repeated
demands.
On January 12, 1996, the respondents filed before the RTC a
Complaint for Nullity of the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage,
Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the spouses Garcia
and the petitioner bank. They claimed that the Amendment of Real
Estate Mortgage was null and void as to respondents Nora, Jose
Jr., Bobby and Jimmy as they were not parties to the contract.
The respondents alleged that the subject property was a conjugal
property of Jose Sr. and his deceased spouse, Ligaya, as they
acquired the subject property during their marriage; that upon
Ligayas death, Jose Sr., together with his children Nora, Jose Jr.,
Bobby and Jimmy, by law, became owners pro indiviso of the
subject property; that the petitioner bank was at fault for not
including Jose Sr. as payee to the check representing the loan
despite its knowledge that Jose Sr. was a signatory to the real
estate mortgage; that the real estate mortgage executed by Jose
Sr. could not bind his children as they did not give their consent or
approval to the encumbrance; and that the real estate mortgage

was also void as to Jose Sr. since he never benefitted from the
loan.
In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr. was
indebted to them in the amount of P133,800.00. To settle this
indebtedness, Jose Sr. volunteered to give the subject property as
additional security for their (the Garcias) loan to the petitioner
bank.
The petitioner bank, on the other hand, claimed that the mortgage
was made in good faith and for value, and maintained that the
respondents complaint stated no cause of action against it. It
alleged that the real estate mortgage over the properties was duly
registered and inscribed on their titles and was thus binding on the
whole world.
In the course of the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and
Jimmy executed an SPA dated May 31, 1996 authorizing Jose Sr.
to act as their attorney-in-fact during the pretrial of the case.
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The
court held that the subject property was a conjugal property since
it was acquired by Jose Sr. during his marriage with his now
deceased wife. As a conjugal property, it is presumed that upon
the death of his spouse, one-half of the property passed on to
Jose Sr., while the other half went to Jose and his children as coowners and as forced heirs of his deceased spouse. Without the
consent of the children, the trial court ruled that the conjugal
property could only be transferred or encumbered to the extent of
Jose Sr.s share in the conjugal partnership, plus his share as an
heir in the other half pertaining to the estate of his deceased
spouse.
The RTC nevertheless declared that by virtue of the SPA executed
by Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy in this suit, they are already
estopped from questioning the mortgage and from alleging lack of
consent or knowledge in the transaction. It held Jose Sr. liable as
an accommodation party and upheld the petitioner banks right to
collect the debt.
The respondents disagreed with the RTC ruling and elevated the
case to the CA via an ordinary appeal.

The Ruling of the CA

On September 26, 2007, the CA upheld the trial courts finding
that the subject property was conjugal, but reversed and set aside
its ruling in so far as it declared valid and binding the Amendment
of Real Estate Mortgage between the petitioner bank, on one
hand, and the spouses Garcia and Jose Sr., on the other hand,
with respect to respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy.
Relying on the Courts ruling in Nufable v. Nufable,4 the CA ruled
that the encumbrance Jose Sr. made over the entire conjugal
property, without his childrens conformity, was null and void
because a mere part owner could not alienate the shares of the
other co-owners.
The CA also declared that the conjugal property could only be
liable to the extent of Jose Sr.s shares; Jose Sr.s acts could not
affect his childrens pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. It
disagreed with the trial courts estoppel theory and held that their
execution of the SPA should not be construed as acquiescence to
the mortgage transaction. Lastly, it ruled that Jose Sr. could not
escape liability from the mortgage since he voluntarily bound
himself as the Spouses Garcias accommodation mortgagor.
The petition
The petitioner bank disputes the CAs finding that the subject
property was conjugal in nature. It argues that, as can be gleaned
from TCT No. T-44422, the subject property was registered in the
name of Jose Sr. alone, who was described in the title as
"widower" and not "married." The petitioner bank posits that as a
mortgagee in good faith, it had the right to rely on the mortgagors
certificate of title; in the absence of any indication that could
arouse suspicion, it had no obligation to undertake further
investigation and verify whether the property was conjugal or was
acquired during marriage or thereafter.
Since the subject property belonged to Jose Sr., insofar as
petitioner bank as mortgagee was concerned, Jose Sr. had the
right under Article 428 of the Civil Code to mortgage it without the
consent of his children. Accordingly, the mortgage in its entirety
should be declared valid.
The Comment

The respondents state that the issues raised by petitioner bank

are essentially factual; hence, they are beyond the competence of
this Court in a petition for review. They submit that in a certiorari
petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be entertained because the Court is not a trier of facts.

In his testimony, Jose Sr. admitted that at the time he acquired the
land through sale, he was already married. The material portion of
his testimony is as follows:
Q: Upon the death of your wife did you and your wife ever own a
piece of land?

The Courts Ruling

A: Yes, sir.
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Q: Where is that land situated?
The petition before us raises both questions of fact and of law.
Whether petitioner bank is a mortgagee in good faith and for value
and whether the subject property was conjugal, are factual issues
that this Court cannot look into as our examination would entail
going into factual matters and records of the case. In Rule 45
petitions, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions
of fact cannot be entertained.5
Although there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of
law may be raised in a petition for certiorari, the petitioner bank
failed to show that this case falls under any of the established
exceptions. Too, since the CA partially affirmed the findings of the
trial court and absent any indication that these courts committed a
serious error in its findings, this Court is bound by these courts
findings.6

A: In Centro, District 2, Mallig[,] Isabela.

Q: Is that land titled in your names?
A:Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: You and your wife acquired that piece of land?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx

Moreover, even if we were to review the factual issues raised by

the petitioner bank, we still find no reason to depart from the CAs
ruling.

Q: May we know from you[,] Mr. Witness, how did you acquire this
parcel of land presently embraced and covered by TCT No. T44422?

The Subject Property is Conjugal

A: I purchased that piece of land from the Baniqued Family during

my incumbency as Municipal Mayor, sir.

a. All property acquired during marriage is presumed conjugal

Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, their property relations were governed by the
conjugal partnership of gains as provided under Article 119 of the
Civil Code. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife."

Q: What was your civil status at the time you purchased that piece
of land?
A: I was already married, sir.(Emphasis ours, TSN, July 24, 1997,
Jose Garcia Sr.)7
Because of the petitioner banks failure to rebut the allegation that
the subject property was acquired during the formers marriage to
Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property, in line with Article 160 of the Civil Code, applies to this

property. Proof of the subject propertys acquisition during the

subsistence of marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative.8
b. Registration of the subject property in the name of one spouse
does not destroy the presumption that the property is conjugal
The petitioner bank claims that the CA failed to consider that the
subject property was registered in the name of Jose Sr.
alone.1a\^/phi1 Likewise, it raises the argument that Jose Sr.s
change of status in the subject propertys title from "married" to
"widower" prior to the constitution of the real estate mortgage
showed that the property was no longer conjugal.

The conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary

co-ownership upon the death of Ligaya
Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal
partnership was automatically dissolved and terminated pursuant
to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code,13 and the successional rights of
her heirs vest, as provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code,
which states that"[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent."

We do not consider this argument persuasive.

Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an

implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on
the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.14 This
resulting ordinary co-ownership among the heirs is governed by
Article 493 of the Civil Code which reads:

Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does

not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when
the property was acquired.9 The registration of the property is not
conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or
the wife. Although the property appears to be registered in the
name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal
property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during
marriage.10

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership." (Emphasis supplied)

It retains its conjugal nature.

Under this provision, each co-owner has the full ownership of his
part or share in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate,
assign or mortgage it except when personal rights are involved.
Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property
itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the
extent of the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.15 In Carvajal v. Court of
Appeals,16 the Court said:

In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the property,

the petitioner must present strong, clear and convincing evidence
of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.11 The burden of
proving that the property belongs exclusively to the wife or to the
husband rests upon the party asserting it.
In the present case, aside from its allegation that the subject
property is no longer conjugal and its assertion that it is a
mortgagee in good faith, the petitioner bank offered no evidence,
convincing to this Court, that the subject property exclusively
belonged to Jose Sr. As stated earlier, the petitioner bank failed to
overcome the legal presumption that the disputed property was
conjugal.1wphi1 Thus, the conclusion of both lower courts that
the subject property was conjugal property holds. Factual findings
of the CA affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court
unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.12

While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the coowners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate
a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to
the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the

thing is represented by an abstract or Ideal portion without any

physical adjudication.3 An individual co- owner cannot adjudicate
to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing
owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial
decree. Prior to that time all that the co-owner has is an Ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in
common by all the co-owners.4 What a co owner may dispose of
is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited to the
portion that may be allotted to him upon partition. [emphasis
supplied].
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the
entire subject property after the death of Ligaya, but before the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. While under Article 493 of
the Civil Code, even if he had the right to freely mortgage or even
sell his undivided interest in the disputed property, he could not
dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his childrens
consent. As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr.s
right in the subject property is limited only to his share in the
conjugal partnership as well as his share as an heir on the other
half of the estate which is his deceased spouses share.
Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void insofar as it extends to
the undivided shares of his children (Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and
Jimmy) because they did not give their consent to the
transaction.17
Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage constituted
by Jose Sr. over the entire property without his co-owners'
consent is not necessarily void in its entirety. The right of the
petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited though only to the portion
which may be allotted to Jose Sr. in the event of a division and
liquidation of the subject property.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the
Decision dated September 26, 2007of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 71356. Costs against petitioner Philippine National
Bank.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice