G.R. No.

L-14078 March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
FACTS:
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges that on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro
adopted resolution No. 25
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code,
which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian who shall
refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two
thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said
governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite
nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized
legislature.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which
the person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical
purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the
benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity. It is indicative of
the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious
denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
ISSUE:
Whether Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person"
within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine
courts
RULING:
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute
which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely
arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States
Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall
not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since
reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine.
However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications, of
sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these
crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of
enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of
broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary,
no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219
U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next
must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held
valid.
THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this
moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its
weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the
industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs.
Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to
restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.

"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with selfprotection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill.,
191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on
rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the
great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the
right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise
the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There
can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to
the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental
principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait
vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally
deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting
this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term
is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society
and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the
common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint,
deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the
regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great
malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
G.R. No. L-24693 October 23, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC.
and GO HIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE, CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondentappellant.
V VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
FACTS:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc.
petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
Ermita-Malate Hotel And Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc.
petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of
Manila. Top answers for Ermita-Malate Hotel And Motel Operators Association, and one of its members
Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in
the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the
fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar
because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal
information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for
being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities
in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The
petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated
the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?
RULING:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the
licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other
than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection
and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative
of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental
action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right
to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license
fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the
former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of
People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person,
the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments, and the
full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."

A Motion for the reconsideration of our decision of July 31, 1967 was filed by petitioners, followed by a
Motion for new trial. As the Motion for reconsideration is clearly without merit, there is no occasion for this
sought-for new trial. Consequently, both motions are denied.
The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are
asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable
and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due
process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure
being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting
purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs." It
would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be
deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public
safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
There is nothing in the Motion for reconsideration that in any wise affects adversely or impairs the
force of the above conclusion. The task of proving that the challenged Ordinance is void on its
face is one attended with difficulty. Nonetheless, with the persistence worthy of a better cause,
petitioners would cite as fatal infirmity the alleged invasion of the rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, to liberty, and to property unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing, the invocation
of petitioners as motel operators of their alleged right to being free from unreasonable search and
seizure need not be taken seriously. Nor does their claim of the alleged infringement of their
liberty deserve any further thought, its implausibility being self-evident, except perhaps as to the
liberty to contract, which is part and parcel of their right to the property.
Mere fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a
particular mode of earning a living can not prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a
case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by
the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to the disadvantages which may
result from the legal exercise of that power.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor Herminio Astorga included
as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila, traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes
and thrill-seekers."
The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of
these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for
the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests."
Moreover, the increase in the license fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against
the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.