Consolidated Cases in Special Proceedings Under Atty. Tiofilo Villanueva

CASE DIGESTS IN SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS
Submitted in Partial Compliance to ATTY. TIOFILO VILLANUEVA
Submitted by:
Estella Agustin
Grace Aquino
Jennilyn Bacay
Jay Michael De Mesa
Carmi Digno
Roel Espera
Katrina Dianne Gimenez
Maria B. Obbania
Maria Donna Pantoja
Lawrence Villamar
Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data

Title: Secretary Leila De Lima vs. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528
Facts
Respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. This case was docketed and raffled to the sala
of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila
M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the
National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, et al) Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. to cease
and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus
charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush
incident. RTC rendered a Decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC
also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and
inspection orders. The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed
by De Lima, et al.
Issues
1. Whether or not the filing of an answer is appropriate.
2. Whether or not the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the
writ and the filing of a RETURN is proper.
3. Whether or not the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo is the same as the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court ruled that the insistence on filing of an Answer was
inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the
issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of
the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are
violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.
On the second issue, the Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the
issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. Without
a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
Memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. It is a
synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before
the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these
submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.
On the third issue, the Court pointed out that the privilege of the Writ of Amparo
should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege
includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC. After examining
the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the
summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that
will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life,
liberty or security. A judgment which simply grants the privilege of the writ cannot be
executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to
the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very
real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or
ritualistic as granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
1 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding
Title: Spouses Nerio vs. Brgy. Capt. Arcayan, G.R. No. 183460
Facts
Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio
Pador was a marijuana planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City. On 17 March 2008,
respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalaya
farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none. After the raid, petitioners Nerio and Rey
Pador received invitation letters for a conference from respondent Barangay Captain
Arcayan. They referred the invitation letters to their counsel, who advised them not to
attend and, instead, send a letter-reply to Barangay Captain Arcayan. When the latter
received the letter-reply, he allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a
receipt of the document. Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of the raid, the sending
of the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent barangay captain to receive their letterreply as well as the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations, and possible
violence from respondents gravely threatened their right to life, liberty and security and
necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo. After examining the contents of the petition
and the affidavits attached to it, the RTC issued the Writ and directed respondents to make a
verified return. Respondent filed a verified return. The RTC then heard the petition. On 3 July
2008, it issued the assailed Resolution finding that petitioners claims were based merely on
hearsay, speculations, surmises and conjectures, and that respondents had sufficiently
explained the reason behind the issuance of the letters of invitation. It thereafter proceeded
to deny petitioners the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Issue
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the privilege of the writ of Amparo.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners
must prove by substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are being
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission. The writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights
to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those
available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is
not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ
that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
Title: Gen. Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3 2009
Facts
Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. More
than a month after his disappearance, the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, directed against Lt.
Gen. Alexander Yano, et. al. The petition stated that Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension
house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to
be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle
then sped away without the knowledge of his student and according to a reliable source;
that he was in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP
Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve
and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups; That the respondent filed a
complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, but instead of
helping her she was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject of the
petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which
is a clear indication of the refusal to help and provide police assistance in locating her
missing husband.
The petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo
petition filed before the CA. Petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d),
and (e) of the Amparo Rule.
Issue
Does the Amparo Rule intended that the petition be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victims rights for it to be given due course by the court?
Ruling
The Court ruled in negative. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section
5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims
rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts
constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to
describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap,
abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may
purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of
situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners
apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial
concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the
Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the
test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available
to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a
violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party
action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated
component parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the
State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or
security are present.
Title: Gen Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010
Facts
This is a motion for reconsideration on the ruling of the Supreme Court on December
3, 2009, finding that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in
particular, the Chiefs of these organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were fully
accountable6 for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, it was held that Col.
Kasim was accountable for his failure to disclose under oath information relating to the
enforced disappearance; for the purpose of this accountability. It was ordered that Col.
Kasim be impleaded as a party to the case. And held the PNP accountable for the
suppression of vital information that Col. Kasim could, but did not, provide with the same
obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries.
However, before this directive was given, Col. Kasim was already dead.
Issue
Whether or not Col. Kasims death renders the directive to implead him moot and academic.
Ruling
The Court held that the directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present case
has been rendered moot and academic by his death. Nevertheless, it is resolve to deny the
petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Undisputably, this directive can no
longer be enforced, and has been rendered moot and academic, given Col. Kasim's demise.
His intervening death, however, does not necessarily signify the loss of the information Col.
Kasim may have left behind, particularly the network of " assets" he utilized while he was in
the service. Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves an
interwoven network of informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with the
police and the military. It is not farfetched that a resourceful investigator, utilizing the
extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires,13 can still access or
reconstruct the information Col. Kasim received from his " asset" or network of assets during
his lifetime.
Title: Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795

Facts
The petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of Amparo alleging that they have been
deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our
Constitution, as the result of the nefarious activities of both the Private and Public
Respondents. Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy.
Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time of filing
of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment which was
affirmed with finality in four other cases.
Issue
Whether or Not the writ of Amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners.
Ruling
No. The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The threatened
demolition of a dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among
thee numeration of rights covered by the writ. Hence, the court finding no legal basis for the
issuance of the writ dismissed petition outright. It rationed that new remedy of writ of
amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest
possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court
will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature.
However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by
the writ.
Title: Arthur Balao vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050
Facts
On the early morning of September 17, 2008, James Balao was abducted by
unidentified armed men. With no idea where he is, the siblings asked the assistance of the
organization Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) and other NGOs to locate James. One of the
teams also went to the office of the AFP-ISU (PA-ISU) in Navy Base and the office of the
Military Intelligence Group in Camp Allen, both in Baguio City, but the personnel in said
offices denied any knowledge on Jamess whereabouts. Contending that there is no plain,
speedy or adequate remedy for them to protect Jamess life, liberty and security, petitioners
prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo ordering the respondents to disclose where
James is detained or confined, to release James, and to cease and desist from further
inflicting harm upon his person.
The RTC granted the petition.
Issue
Whether or not the order of the court granting the petition for writ of amparo was correct.
Ruling
The Supreme Court partially granted the petitions and modified the judgment of the
RTC. Writ of Amparo was formulated amidst rising incidents of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
The trial erred in granting amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of responsibility on
the part of public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency of evidence. However,
the Court agreed with the trial in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials are
very limited, superficial and one-sided.
In view of the foregoing evidentiary gaps, respondents clearly failed to discharge
their burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of Jamess abduction. Such
ineffective investigation extant in the records of this case prevents us from completely
exonerating the respondents from allegations of accountability for James disappearance.
The reports submitted by the PNP Regional Office, Task Force Balao and Baguio City Police
Station do not contain meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the
investigation made.
In order to effectively address thru the amparo remedy the violations of the
constitutional rights to liberty and security of James who remains missing to date, the Court
deems it appropriate to refer this case back to the trial court for further investigation by the
PNP and CIDG and monitoring of their investigative activities that complies with the standard
of diligence required by the Amparo Rule.
Title: Edgardo Navia vs. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467

Facts
This petition for review on certiorari challenges the decision6 of the RTC of Malolos
which granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo 7 filed by herein respondent against the
petitioners. The petition was filed due to the mysterious disappearance of respondents
husband after he was arrested by the security of Asian Land. The petition does not contain
any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the
government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its
agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petition
whether as responsible or accountable persons
Issue
Whether or not allegation and proof that the persons subject of the petition for Writ of
Amparo are missing are enough for such writ to issue.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative. The Court pointed out that in an amparo petition,
proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such
disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
"Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to
give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the
following elements that constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
Title: Lourdes Rubrico vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871
Facts
On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa
Adhikan, was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security
Squadron (AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite.
She was brought to and detained at the air base without charges. She was released a week
after relentless interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that she would be a
military
asset.
Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary
detention and grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but
nothing has happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the
Dasmarinas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted
from their investigation.
Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which
indicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction
of Lourdes. Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with
the Supreme Court on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman
to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and for
respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
Issue
Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an Amparo
petition.
Ruling
No. Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo
proceedings Command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under
international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. There is no Philippine
law that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of Command Responsibility While
there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that
provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended that
command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this
jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a
principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these
proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a
form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if
there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such
proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction
of an administrative rule may have been committed.
Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to
pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question
to its natural end.
Title: Daniel Masangkay vs. Judge Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484
Facts
Spouses Gregorio and Mar Lourdes Samson filed a complaint for forcible entry and
damages with a prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against herein
petitioner Daniel Masangkay Tapuz et al, for entering without permission and against their
objection the disputed land in Aklan registered under the name of the spouses armed with
bolos and carrying suspected firearms and unidentified persons numbering 120 and for
building a nipa and bamboo structure. The Municipal Trial Court decided in favor of the
spouses, herein private respondent. The herein petitioners appealed the ruling to Regional
Trial Court which affirmed the decision and granted the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction and subsequently, ruled positively on the motion of the spouses to demolished
the structure built by Masangkay Tapuz et. al. While their petition for review of the
permanent mandatory injunction and order of demolition at the Court of Appeals is pending,
the sheriff issued notice to vacate and for demolition. Petitioners now seek the succor of the
Supreme Court with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and
issuance of writ of habeas data and writ of amparo.
Issue
Whether or not writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is the proper remedy.
Ruling
No, the Supreme Court found the petition for certiorari and issuance of writ of habeas
data and writ of amparo as fatally defective in this case.
The writ of amparo does not issue to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. It
was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those
available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
On the other hand, the writ on habeas data on the other hand, is intended to address
the unjustified/unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty and
security, which was not concretely alleged in this case to merit an issuance of the writ.
Title: Fr. Robert Reyes vs. Raul Gonzales, G.R. No. 182161
Facts
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on
November 30, 2007. Petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame
to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and
Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was
probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or
Inciting to Rebellion. Upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales
issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of
Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case
in the interest of national security and public safety. After finding probable cause against
petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an
Information before the RTC, Branch 150 of Makati City. RTC issued an Order dismissing the
charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Petitioner
filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against
petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists. Every time petitioner would leave and return to the
country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes
because of the existing HDO.
Issue
Whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling
No, the Right to travel is not covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The rights
that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules
thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. The
restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal
case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right
to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available
legal recourse or remedy. Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo
due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioners
apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to
his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.
The new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by the Supreme Court is
intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her
right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in
order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its
precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
Title: Noriel Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November
15, 2011
Facts
On September 6, 2009, Petitioner was forcibly taken to a military camp and was
forced to confess to his membership in the NPA. During his 11 days of captivity, he was
repeatedly threatened, detained and mauled. He was also forced to confess the
whereabouts of NPA camp and his fellow NPA comrades, sign documents declaring that he
had surrendered to the military and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became
a military asset. On his last day of incarceration, September 17, 2009, he was ordered to
sign a piece of paper stating that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared
and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned not to report anything
to the media.
On December 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition
for Writ of Habeas Data with prayers for the Protection Order, Inspection of Place and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The Supreme Court granted the
respective writs on December 15, 2009, after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged
that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by the members of the 17 th
Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Issue
Whether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by the Petitioner maybe granted after
the writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that the provisional relief, such as the interim reliefs of
temporary protection order, inspection order and production order are intended to assist the
court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. Being interim
reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case,
it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily
entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since the Court grant the petitioner the
privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a ytemporary protection order
independently of the former.
Title: So vs. Tacla, G.R. No. 190108 (2010)

Facts
Petitioner David E. So (So) filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and
amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified
Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Prior to the institution of the criminal
proceedings before the RTC, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and
care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of
Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla, stated that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar
Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge," as certified by her personal
psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan. Acting on the prosecutions Urgent Motion to Refer
Accuseds Illness to a Government Hospital, Judge Tacla ordered Guisandes referral to the
NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisandes mental health to determine if
she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft.
Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande
be physically brought to the NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to have temporary legal
custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of
confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMHs determination that she
was ready for trial. During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events
occurred which ultimately led to the incident before this Court, The Criminal Case for
Qualified Theft was dismissed.
Issue
1. Is issuance of writ of amparo and habeas corpus a proper remedy based on the facts
at hand?
2. Does the dismissal of the criminal case for qualified theft warrants the dismissal of
the petition for writ of habeas corpus and amparo?
Ruling
On the first issue, The Court ruled in the negative.The Rules on the Writs of Habeas
Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission
complained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to
violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful.
In this case , the confinement and custody of Accused Guisande is proper.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual
seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some
form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrainted via some legal process, the
writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of
habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.
On the second issue, The court completely agreed with the OSG, that with the
dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to
be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisandes person,
and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer
be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have
now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."
Title: Castillo vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 182165 (2009)

Facts
Respondent Amanda Cruz, who along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses
Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to
vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the
Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects. Amanda and her co-respondents
refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent
Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the
latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other
forms of light threats. Thus, respondents filed a motion for writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Issue
1. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights.
2. Whether or not Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal
case already filed.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection
of rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats of
unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v Manalo teaches: As the Amparo Rule was intended
to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. Tapuz
vs. Del Rosario also teaches: What is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, reposndents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an
unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arouse out of a property dispute
between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus
between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty, and
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation,
imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners
will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue
confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for
the offenses a day after their arrest.
On the second issue, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and
habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had
commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the
proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during
trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.
Title: Burgos vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155

Facts
On April 30, 2007, the petitioner held a press conference and announced that her son
Jonas was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the
person abducted was her son Jonas. Upon subsequent police investigation and LTO
verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT
vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. The poloce was able to generate cartographic
sketches of two of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses. On August
29, 2007, the PNP-CIDG presented Emerito Lipio @ KA TIBO/KA CRIS, Marlon D. Manuel @ KA
CARLO, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes @ KA LISA/RAMIL to support the theory that elements
of the New Peoples Army ( NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas. As for the PNP-CIDG, the
CA branded its investigation as rather shallow and conducted haphazardly. The CA took
note that P/Supt. Estomos investigation merely delved into the administrative liability of Lt.
Col. Clement, Lt. Col. Feliciano and Lt. Col. Caga of the 56 th IB, and failed to consider them as
suspects in the abduction of Jonas. The CA emphasized that the PNP-CIDGs investigation
should focus on the criminal aspect of the present case pursuant to Section 24 of Republic
Act No. 6975, which mandates the PNP to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest
of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution.
Issue
Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and
meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their
duties is fatal to the grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that, Considering the findings of the CA and our review of
the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to
conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos,
and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule
on the Writ ofAmparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule
on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is
undertaken. It was further noted that no independent investigation appeared to have been
made by the PNP-CIDG to inquire into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas
was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit
RYG.
The case was referred to the CHR as the Courts directly commissioned agency
tasked with the continuation of the investigation of the Burgos abduction and the gathering
of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to the
Court.
Title: Melissa Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155 (2010)
Facts
In the September 7, 2010 Decision of the Supreme Court, [1] after finding that the
failure of the petitioner to present substantial proof as to the respondents' responsibility
anent her abduction and torture was in part attributable to the lack of extraordinary
diligence on the part of existing police and military investigations, this Court ordered the
conduct of further investigations, this time, to be spearheaded by the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) as the designated lead investigating agency for purposes of this
petition. The CHR was then required to submit a report of its investigations as well as a
recommendation to the Court of Appeals which, in the meantime, retained jurisdiction of this
case. Finally, the Court of Appeals was directed to monitor the investigations and submit to
the Court its own report and recommendation, for its consideration and, ideally, final
disposition.
Issue
Can the Court of Appeals conduct a summary hearing to require the personal
appearance of confidential witnesses interviewed by the CHR and affirm their allegations
under oath?
Ruling
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court pointed out that while the CHR
investigations have already been concluded, no additional evidence tending to implicate any
of the public respondents in the abduction and torture of the petitioner have materialized.
CHR Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130 is quite clear that the evidence gathered during the CHR
investigations were still not sufficient to identify any of the respondents, or anyone in
particular for that matter, as the persons responsible for petitioner's abduction. Neither did
the ocular inspections of various military facilities and firing ranges in Pampanga, conducted
by the CHR, definitively point that petitioner was detained in any of them.
The Court agreed that bringing the persons interviewed in the CHR-Region III
confidentialreports or at the least, the CHR field investigators themselves, before a summary
hearing before the Court of Appeals will serve as a huge step towards identifying the
persons behind the abduction and torture of petitioner. Certainly, it may aid an on-going
investigations by pointing them at an alternative, if not the right direction. Before disposing
of this case once and for all, the Court must ensure that each and every possible lead or
theory was pursued and verified, and no stone left unturned.
Title: Gen. Yano vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640 (2010)

Facts
Cleofas Sanchez filed before the Supreme Court a petition for issuance of a Writ of
Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Esperon, the then
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Supreme Court resolved to
issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the writ before
the Court of Appeals. Cleofas amended her petition on January 14, 2008 to include Marciana
Medina ) and to implead other military officers including Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos as
therein additional respondents.
In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana alleged that their respective sons
Nicolas Sanchez
and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin, Barangay
Bueno,
Capas, Tarlac. On September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 a.m., the wives of Nicolas, namely,
Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed men
in soldiers uniforms passing by; and that that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez
and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and He her son but only saw their caps, slippers,
pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains. They likewise alleged that
Josephine Galang Victoria informed them that she saw Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp of
the Bravo Company sometime in 2006. the respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of
Amparo, the production of the victims bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection
of certain military camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, and
the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Issue
1. Whether or not failure of the respondents to present substantial evidence to prove
that the public officials observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of their
duty is ground for the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
2. Whether or not the grant of provisional remedy in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule is
proper in cases where the public respondents were absolved of the disappearance of
the alleged victim.
Ruling
As regards the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Evidence is required in
Amparo petition. Effect of failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary
diligence in the performance of their duty the requirement for a government official or
employee to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the
extraordinary measures expected to be taken in safeguarding every citizens constitutional
rights as well as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary
diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege
of the Amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by
substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official provides,
however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim
reliefs.
On the second issue, the Court also ruled in the negative. The interim or provisional
remedies provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule are intended to assist the court before it
arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition Section 14 of theAmparo Rule
provides for interim or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia,
protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, These
provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious
determination of the amparo petition.
Title: Gamboa vs. Chan, G.R. No. 193636 (2012)

Facts
Marynette Gamboa, the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, filed a petition for the issuance of
writ of habeas data before the Regional Trial Court alleging that her right to privacy was
violated by her supposed inclusion in the enumeration of indiiduals maintaining a private
army group in the report of the Philippine National Police, made pursuant to the
administrative order no. 275 by then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. She also prayed for
destruction of the report which she claimed was unverified and to restrain the PNP from
forwarding it. The RTC denied her petition for failure to establish the source of the
information.
Issue
Whether or not the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper.
Ruling
No, it is not proper. In denying the petition, the Supreme Court cited the ruling of the
European Commission on Human Rights in Leander vs Sweden which it says, illustrates how
the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may yield
to an overriding legitimate state interest. While the Court held that petitioner established
that the PNP was indeed the source of the report, she nevertheless failed to impute that the
leakage came to third parties on the PNP and such made her and her supporters more
susceptible to harassment and increased police surveillance. The Court ruled, taking
cognizance of the Constitutional fiat of dismantling private armed groups, the state interest
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa as the collection of forwarding
of the report was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
In this case, the Court also cautioned investigating entities that information sharing
must observe strict confidentiality and the intelligence gathered must be released
exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information.
It must be emphasized the in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there
must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right to life , liberty
or security on the other.
Title: Meralco vs. Lim, G.R. No. 184769 (2010)

Facts
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at
the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). An anonymous letter was posted at the door of the
Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which
respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim: MATAPOS
MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG
PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO,
LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB. Copies of the letter were also inserted in the
lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter to the
Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander
Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to
MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 in
light of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats directed against
[her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and
security. Respondent, by letter addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President,
appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and
misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a
denial of due process. Citing the gruelling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang
and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA). Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of
her transfer. No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bulacan.
Issue
Whether or not a labor-related issue is within the parameters of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative. Respondents plea that she be spared from
complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector,
under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does
not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. Writ habeas data will NOT issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of
the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under
the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondents
reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a legitimate concern respecting the terms
and conditions of ones employment are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented
that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to
privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. Her posture unwittingly concedes that
the issue is labor-related.
Rules of Special Proceedings (Rule 72, Rules of Court)

Title: Hagans vs. Wislizenus, No. 16680 (1920)
Facts
This is an original petition for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in the petition are
admitted by a demurrer. The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the
provision of Act 190 permit him to appoint assessors in special proceedings. The petitioner
contends that no authority in law exists for the appointment of assessors in such
proceedings.
Issue
Whether or not a judge of the Court of First Instance, in special proceedings, is
authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to
an administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care, management, and
settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
Ruling
The Court held that in the proceedings like the present the judge of the Court of First
Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. The only provisions of law which could
permit this are sections 153 161 of Act appointment of assessors in a special proceeding
are sections 153 161 of Act No. 190. Section 154 provides that either party to an action
may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such
application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided
Upon examination of Section 1 of Act 190, there is a distinction between an action
and a special proceeding. Said section 1 provides that an action means an ordinary suit
in a court of justice, while every other remedy furnished by law is a special proceeding.
Title: Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129242 (2001)
Facts
Troadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his
eleven (11) children, who are all of legal age. The Respondents, who are eight (8) of the
surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, filed a petition with the respondent Regional
Trial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio
Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 with the CA, alleging that there was
absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family.
According to them, the petition is an ordinary civil action involving members of the same
family hence the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules
of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that
a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with.
Issue
1. Whether or not the case on hand is in the nature of an ordinary civil action involving
members of the same family.
2. Is Article 222 of the civil code applicable to Special proceeding cases?
Ruling
With regard to the first issue, the Court declared that the nature of the case partakes
that of a Special proceeding. The court reiterated that it is a fundamental rule that in the
determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of
the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. The
said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of
estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio, as well as his
residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the
decedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. It also contains an
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by
the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the
relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the
petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of
their deceased father, Troadio Manalo. Although, it contains certain averments which may be
typical of an ordinary civil action, the Petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose
of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The rule has
always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature
of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses
contained in the answer.
As to the second issue, the Court declared that Art. 222 of the civil code which
provides that : " No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that
the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035" is applicable only to ordinary
civil actions and NOT WITH SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it
refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in
which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury
or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed
in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
Title: Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133000 (2001)

Facts
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of
land. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate adjudicating and dividing among
themselves the mentioned real property. In 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia
Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his
wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On
1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage,
as heirs. The private respondents filed a civil case against the petitioner before RTC Manila.
They alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of
fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that
Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of
TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.
Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of
such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
Issue
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement
of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
Ruling
The Court answered in the negative. The court ruled that an action for reconveyance
and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement
of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent,
partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application
of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.Matters which involve settlement and
distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate
court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to
any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising
the questions and on the heir.
In the case at hand, RTC is acting in its general jurisdiction is devoid of authority to
render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
herein petitioner. Moreover, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a
probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent
Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
Title: Reyes vs. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405 (2006)

Facts
Respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui,
Tarlac. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate on July
31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda
Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents Ernesto
Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the municipalities
of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and money which were
allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.
Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate, upon payment of a
bond, pending settlement and distribution of Lisings properties to the legal heirs
Petitioner Anna Reyes opposed such petition, claiming that she was an adopted child
of Lising and the latters husband, Serafin Delos Santos. She asserted that the petition
should be dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary, since
she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. She has
attached, as supplement to her opposition, the judicial decree issued under seal by the Civil
Registrar. Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of the adoption decree. They claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of
petitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) had no records of the adoption case. Petitioners natural mother
supposedly connived with the court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adopted
by the Delos Santos spouses and that the CFIs order for initial hearing was published in a
weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders in special proceedings.
Issue
Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding that petitioner had to prove her
adoption due to imputations of irregularities in view of Section 47 of Rule 39.
Ruling
No, petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those
which she had already presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a
certification from the local civil registrars office. Both certifications were issued under the
seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are thus presumed
to have been regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers perform. It
should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document required by law to be
entered into the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial
pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well
as the court which rendered the judgment. Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the
adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to
the contrary is offered.
Title: Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139868 (2006)

Facts
Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American
citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter,
Kyle Guersey Hill. Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire
estate to Richard consisting of Audreys conjugal share in real estate improvements at
Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Two
years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter,
Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except
for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter. Petitioner, as ancillary
administrator in the court where Audreys will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audreys estate. The
motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with
regards to Richards will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richards undivided
interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof
was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law
of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the
entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.
Issue
Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the
circumstances.
Ruling
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land
of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal.
Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in
exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in
a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence. Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate
according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to
extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988
and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
Title: Domingo vs. Landicho, G.R. No. 170015 (2007)

Facts
Petitioner Crisologo Domingo filed for the registration of parcels of lands in Tagaytay
and was opposed by Landicho et. al. During the pendency of the case, Domingo died and his
lawyer failed to inform the court. The Regional Trial Court ruled in his favor, but was later
reversed by the Court of Appeals. The heirs of Domingo interposed the defense that there
was no valid substitution of parties and therefore, they are not bound by the reversal of the
Court of Appeals. Hence, they now come to the succor of the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether or not failure to substitute parties is fatal to the proceedings.
Ruling
Yes, the Supreme Court held that when a party dies in an action that survives and no
order is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of
the deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no substitution has
been effected , the proceedings held by the court without such legal representatives or heirs
and the judgment rendered after such trial are null and void, because the court acquired no
jurisdiction over the person of the legal representative or of the heirs upon whom trial and
judgment would be binding. However, in this case, the Court deemed objection on the
jurisdiction over the person of the parties as waived as the surviving heirs participated in the
present petition, albeit belatedly.
Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons (Rules 73-90, Rules of Court)

Title: Maloles II vs. Phillips, G.R. No. 133359 (2000)
Facts
On July 20, 1995 Dr. Arturo De Santos filed for the probate of his will. He claimed he
had no compulsory heirs and had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de
Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate
value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the
named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. On Feb. 16 1996, Makati
RTC Branch-61 under judge Gorospe issued an order granting the petition and allowing the
will, the court found that the testator was of sound mind and freely executed said will.
Shortly after on Feb. 26, 1996 Dr. De Santos died.
Petitioner (testators nephew) claiming to be the only son of the deceaseds sister
Alicia de santos, filed a motion for intervention as the nearest of kin, and also as a creditor
of the deceased. Defendant filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Makati
Branch 61, but then withdrew the same. Later defendant then filed the motion in Makati RTC
Branch 65. Petitoner then filed a motion for intervention also with Branch 65, stating again
he was a full blooded nephew and that a case already related to the subject matter was
pending in Branch 61.
Judge Abad Santos, referred the case to Branch 61. Meanwhile Judge Gorospe in
Branch 61 denied the petitioners motion to intervene, and denied taking cognizance of the
case forwarded by Branch 65, because the case in Branch 65 involved the Estate of Decent
Arturo De Santos, while the one in Branch 61 was filed by Arturo de Santos Himself when he
was alive and had already been decided back in Feb. 16 1996, when it allowed the will.
Branch 65 did not want to take the case, but reversed its decision and again took
cognizance of the case to expedite proceedings.
Issue
1 Whether or not Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate
proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
2 Whether or not Makati, Branch 65 acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance
of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent.
3 Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a
right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed
by the respondent.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that Branch 65 now has jurisdiction. Petitioners contention
that that the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful
heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court is
without merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is
limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
This was already done in the ante-mortem probate of Dr. De Santos will during his lifetime.
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was
nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will
pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule
73, 1 which states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts.
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over
the subject matter is another.
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with
approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro
Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts. The different branches comprising each court in
one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each
other.
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition
for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the
same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his
death.
Lastly, regarding petitioners claim as heir and creditor the Court said that The
private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de
Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral
relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the
decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties
the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the
decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. His claim to being a creditor of the
estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the
opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by
evidence.
Title: Malig vs. Bush, G.R. No. L-22761 (1969)

Facts
The plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the acknowledged natural
children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush; that the
defendant, by falsely alleging that she was the legal wife of the deceased was able to secure
her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased; that she submitted to the
court for approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the deceased left a will; that
the defendant then knew that the plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural children of the
deceased; and that they discovered the fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated by the
defendant only in July, 1962. They prayed that the project of partition be annulled. The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss stating that since the action was one to annul a project
of partition duly approved by the probate court it was that court alone which could take
cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Whether or not the case should be dismissed on jurisdictional ground based on Rule
75, Section 1 (now Rule 73, Section 1) of the Rules of Court.
Ruling
No. The case should be remanded for further proceedings. Section 1 of Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court fixes the jurisdiction for purposes of the special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person, "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate." The matter really concerns venue, as the caption
of Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume
jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts."
In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition already
made and approved by the probate court, and to reopen the estate proceeding so that a
new partition may be made, but for recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged
inheritance of which, through fraud, they have been deprived.
Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the defendant, the Court
believes that the plaintiffs' cause should not be foreclosed without a hearing on the merits.
Title: Rodriguez, et. al. vs. Borja, et. al, G.R. No. 180906
Facts
Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk
of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the
petitioners filed a petition before the court to examine the purported will but which was later
withdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was
subsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal of
the special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate based on the purported
will, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.
Issue
Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?
Ruling
Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance
was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio,
have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding
notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of
Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts,
intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only
takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
Title: Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-24742

Facts
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two
minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died
intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City. While
petition was still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a
petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named
executrix. Hence, Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this
court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on
the probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon,
on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were
denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI
Quezon.
Issue
Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in
pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of
probate over intestate proceedings.
Ruling
The rules on venue and jurisdiction, under Rule 73, provides that the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. However, upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had
his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that
the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may
be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before
it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for
probate of the decedent's alleged last will. The residence of the decent or the location of his
estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this
were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. Therefore, the CFI of
Quezon City did not act with grave abuse of discretion nor it acted without jurisdiction.
Title: San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. No.

Facts
The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis. During his
lifetime Felicisimo contracted three marriages. From the first marriage contracted in 1942 he
had six children, two of whom are the petitioners in this case. His first wife died in 1963 and
his second marriage to an American citizen ended in the wife getting a divorce in 1971. In
1974 Felicismo married Felicidad, the respondent in this case, in the USA. They had no
children but lived together for 18 years until Felicismo died in 1992.After Felicisimo death,
Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and filed a petition for
letters of administration. The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage opposed this on
the grounds that Felicidad is only a mistress, the second marriage to the American wife
subsisting. The petitioners claimed that Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code cannot be
given retroactive effect to validate the bigamous marriage because it would impair the
vested rights of Felicisimo is legitimate children.
Issue
Does the respondent Felicidad have legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration?
Ruling
Yes, Felicidad haslegal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation. Sec. 2, Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person.
Title: Macias vs. Uy Kim, G.R. No. L-31174 (1972)

Facts
Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed on December 2, 1969 a petition for review
by certiorari against respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, Manuel
Sosantong, Reliable Realty Corporation, and Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance. It
appearing from the complaint that there is presently pending in Branch VIII of this Court
Special Proceeding No. 63866 for the settlement of the inheritance of the deceased Rosina
Marguerite Wolfson. That the plaintiff claims to be a beneficiary by hereditary title of her
estate. It being unquestionable that the authority to distribute the inheritance of a deceased
person and determine the persons entitled thereto belongs exclusively to the court or
branch thereof taking cognizance of the proceedings for its settlement (Branch VIII) in this
case. The orders sought to be annulled and set aside by herein petitioner-appellant in his
complaint against private respondents which was assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court
of First Instance presided over by Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge Barcelona
presiding over Branch VIII of the same court. The Petitoner filed a separate civil case in
Branch X, seeks to recover his distributive share of the estate of the decedent Rosina.
Issue
Whether or not the Judge of Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance can legally
interfere with, or pass upon the validity of said orders of the Judge of Branch VIII, as the
probate court.
Ruling
No, Branch VIII as the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of the
decedent, including the validity of the will, the declaration of heirs, the disposition of the
estate for the payment of its liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of the residue
thereof. Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts." Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions concerning the settlement of
the estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII of
the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by former Judge, now Justice of the
Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlement
of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still
pending. The reason for this provision of the law is obvious. The settlement of the estate of a
deceased person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For the successful administration
of that estate it is necessary that there should be but one responsible entity, one court,
which should have exclusive control of every part of such administration. To intrust it to two
or more courts, each independent of the other, would result in confusion and delay. The
Court cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to file several actions
covering the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief, which is unduly
burdening the courts.
Title: Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18148

Facts
Capili died in 1958, testate in which he disposed his properties in favor of his wife,
cousins all surnamed Capili and Arturo, Deogracias (petitioner) and Eduardo, all surnamed
Bernardo. Reyes died the following year. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernando, executor of
the estate of Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs. The
executor filed a project of partition in the estate proceeding in accordance with the terms of
the will, adjudicating the estate of Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of
Reyes, whose share was allotted to her collateral relatives. These relatives filed an
opposition to the executors project of partition and submitted a counter-projection of their
own, claiming of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Capili on the theory
that they belong not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void for the reason that it
falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code which prohibits donation between spouses during the
marriage. In the same order, the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed
the executor to file another, dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament
of Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation, between the instituted heirs
of Capili and Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of the
deceased spouses.
Issue
Whether or not a probate court in special proceeding had jurisdiction to determine

the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question of title or
ownership of the properties mentioned in the will.
Ruling
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. The Court held that the
determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The
probate court has the jurisdiction since there is a necessity to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties, who are all parties to the proceedings, including the
widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon
petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily.
The petitioners, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed
lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband) put in question
the issue of ownership of the properties is within the competence of probate court.
Title: Ermac vs. Medelo, G.R. No. L-32281 (1975)

Facts
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the respondent court in its
Special Proceeding No. 1517 approving the project of partition filed by private respondent,
pursuant to the order of the same court providing for summary settlement of the intestate
estate of the deceased spouses Potenciano Ermac and Anastacia Mariquit as well as of the
order of denying reconsideration of the first order.
The above-named spouses both died leaving as the only property to be inherited by
their heirs a parcel of land with an assessed value of P590.00. Accordingly, a grandchild filed
a petition for the summary settlement of the said estate which was consequently granted.
However, Petitioner Ermac, one of the children of the deceased spouses, moved for
reconsideration on the ground that it belongs to him and his wife. The motion was denied,
the court ruling that the proper remedy is a separate suit. Accordingly, the petitioner filed a
corresponding action. And when upon submission of the project of partition, the respondent
court approved the same over his objection. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but
the same was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Whether or not respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its
discretion in approving the project of partition notwithstanding that it is being claimed by
petitioners in a separate civil action to be their property and not of the estate.
Ruling
No. The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of deceased persons with the least loss of time. This is especially true with small estates for
which the rules provide precisely a summary procedure dispensing with the appointment of
an administrator together with the other involved and cumbersome steps ordinarily required
in the determination of the assets of the deceased and the persons entitled to inherit
therefrom and the payment of his obligations. Definitely, the probate court is not the best
forum for the resolution of adverse claims of ownership of any property ostensibly belonging
to the decedent's estate. While there are settled exceptions to this rule as applied to regular
administration proceedings, it is not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased
person just because an heir or a third person claims that certain properties do not belong to
the estate but to him. 3 Such claim must be ventilated in an independent action, and the
probate court should proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are no other legal
obstacles to it, for after all, such distribution must always be subject to the results of the
suit. For the protection of the claimant the appropriate step is to have the proper annotation
of lis pendens entered.
Title: PCIB vs. Escolin, G.R. No. L-27860 (1974)

Facts
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well
as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by about five years and a half.
In their respective wills which were executed on different occasions, each one of them
provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
remainder (after funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both
real and personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to hold
unto (him/her) during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the condition that upon the
death of whoever of them survived the other, the remainder of what he or she would inherit
from the other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of the
latter.
Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was
appointed special administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the same date, he
was "allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, (buying and
selling personal and real properties) and to perform acts which he had been doing while the
deceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had
been probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof, upon
his motion in which he asserted that he was "not only part owner of the properties left as
conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges", the trial court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion dated December
11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the
Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further
authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the
properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
contained in the last will and testament of the latter."
Issue
Does the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes
ineffective hereditary substitutions?
Ruling
The Court overruled PCIB's Contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor
of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. The Court ruled
that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as coheirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that the latter would have complete
rights of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the former
would be only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas
they are not to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not
obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentary
substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple case of conditional
simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial
resolutory condition the operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of the
suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of
institution is not prohibited by law.
Title: Ocampo vs. Potenciana, G.R. No. L-2263 (1951)

Facts
The petitioners filed an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeal.
The petitioner executed a document purporting to convey the subject property located in
Binan, Laguna by way of pacto de retro sale to the defendant. The petitioner also executed
another document making it appear that for the period of redemption, an annual rental of
P300 or 12% of the purchase price shall be paid for the lease house and lot. Although the
subject property is registered only in the name of the husband, Edilberto Ocampo, the same
is actually a conjugal property. Also, the original period fixed for repurchase was one year,
extendible to another year. However, several extensions were granted up to its last
extension in 1937, with the vendor paying the principal in addition to interests. After the
lapse of the last extension defendant, and without the right to repurchase being exercised,
Potenciano filed with the register of deeds of Laguna for the consolidation of the title under
the names of Sps. Potenciano.
In 1939, defendant, Potenciano gave the wife of Edilberto, Paz Yatco an option to
repurchase the property within 5 years. Yatco sought to exercise the option by tendering to
Potenciano but being rejected, she then deposited the money (P4,000) in court and brought
an action for in her own name as administratrix of the estate of her husband. Defendants
children, intervened by way of cross-complaint. They alleged that the option given by their
father to the plaintiff was null and void with respect to the share of their deceased mother
which passed unto by right of inheritance. Also, the defendants children wanted to exercise
the right to redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property held in common.
Issue
Whether or not the surviving spouse (Potenciano) has the authority as the de facto
administrator of the conjugal estate to enter into an agreement after the death of his wife
with respect to their conjugal property.
Ruling
NO, the court of appeals erred in the supposing that the surviving spouse had the
authority to as de facto administrator in of the conjugal estate. The supreme court pointed
out that the decision relied upon by the CA is now obsolete. The rule that, upon dissolution
of the marriage by the death of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnership affairs
has been changed by ACT No. 3176, now section 2, Rule 75 which provides that when
marriage is dissolved by death of either the husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. The court also
noted that CA found and it was undisputed that the pacto de retro sale was in reality a loan
with security or an equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for interest. Also, the option
agreement in question was nothing more than mere extension of the time of payment of the
mortgagee, since in the mind of the parties the real transaction between them was that of a
loan with security or equitable mortgage. Consequently, under such view there it is no
longer necessary to consider the claim of the defendants children, Victor and Lourdes
Potenciano, since the consolidation of title to the property in the name of their parents was
null and void.
Title: Reyes and Arcon vs. Ysip, G.R. No. L-7516 (1955)
Facts
This is a petition for a writ to compel the judge of the CFI of Bulcan to permit and
allow petitioner to submit evidence of her claim that she is a natural daughter of the
deceased, Juan Reyes Panlilio. Probate of the last will and testament of decedent was filed in
the CFI. Leonor P. Reyes, herein petitioner filed an opposition. The special administratix, who
had presented the will for probate, object to the personality and right of the petitioner herein
to contest the will and asked that the court resolve her right to contest the will before the
hearing thereon. The Honorable Judge held that only the probate of the will was at issue and
that the question of the presentation of evidence as to the filiation of the oppositor,
petitioner herein was out of place. Counsel for petitioner made attempts to have the court
reconsider its order but the court refused to do so.
Issue
Whether or not the natural child is allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the
probate of the will.
Ruling
In distribution proceedings where a will is sought to be admitted to probate, a person
who can have no interest in the succession cannot be allowed to intervene and oppose such
probate. A person intervening in the proceedings should be required to show interest in the
will or the property affected thereby. For such purpose, it is sufficient that he shows or
produces prima facie evidence of his or her relationship to the testator.
The court did not amount to a prohibition to take part in the hearing for the probate
of the will and was motivated by desire to avoid multiplicity of the issues and the limitation
thereof to the execution of the will. The court did not therefore deprive the petitioner of any
right which she is entitled to under the rules of law.
Title: Cortes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117417 (2000)

Facts
Petitioner Reselva, private respondent. Cortes, and Florante Reselva are brothers and
sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T. Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre
Reselva. During their lifetime, they acquired a property particularly a house and lot
consisting of 100 square meters, more or less. Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died ahead of
Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter executed a holographic will which was probated in this case,
Cortes was appointed Executrix. She filed a motion before respondent probate court praying
that Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of the property, be ordered to vacate the property
at No. 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila and turn over to said Executrix the possession
thereof.
Issue
Can the probate court decide a question of title of ownership?
Ruling
General rule provides that a probate court cannot decide a question of title of
ownership. By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the parties are all heirs
of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title
to property.Here, the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. More
so, when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate action
would be most expensive and inexpedient.
Summary Settlement of Estates (Rule 74, Rules of Court)

Title: Rodriguez, et.al. vs. Tan and Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-6044 (1952)
Facts
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the order of respondent Judge dated
August 11, 1952, wherein after overruling the opposition to the institution of the intestate
estate proceedings of the late Flaviano Rodriguez, he appointed Abelardo Rodriguez
administrator of the estate upon filing a bond in the sum of P2,000.It is averred in the
petition that Flaviano Rodriguez died on February 8, 1944, at Paraaque, Rizal, leaving an
estate with a value of P10,000; that the surviving heirs are the widow, Fortunata Vda. de
Rodriguez, and six children who are the petitioners and respondent Abelardo Rodriguez all
the heirs, who were then already of age, entered into a verbal agreement whereby they
agreed not to make a liquidation of the estate but to place it under the administration of the
widow with the understanding that each of the six children would be entitled to receive a
portion of the income in equal shares from year to year for the needs of their families
provided that they do not exceed the participation to which they are entitled. March 19,
1952, or eight years after the death of Flaviano Rodriguez, respondent Abelardo Rodriguez
filed a petition for administration of their intestate estate of said deceased in spite of his
knowledge that the estate had no debts and all the heirs were of age. Petitioners herein,
objected to the petition invoking the rule that if the estate is free from obligations and the
heirs are all of age, no administration proceedings shall be allowed.
Issue
1. Whether or not respondent Judge acted properly in maintaining the administration

proceedings.
2. Whether or not respondent Judge is correct in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez as
administrator of the estate notwithstanding the fact that the estate has no debts
and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court ruled that the action of the Judge is correct. Section 1,
rule 74 of the Rules of Court, if the decedent left no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. Section 1 does not preclude the
heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or
obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition.
While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit,
or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have
good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or
compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention
were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in
other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may is used not only
once but in the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the
discretion of the heirs.
On the second issue, the judge is also correct in appointing Abelardo as
Administrator. The petitioner in this case appears to be qualified to act as administrator of
the estate of the deceased Flaviano Rodriguez and does not possess any of the
disqualifications. Moreover, he is one of the heirs left by the deceased.
Title: Guico vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-14921

Facts
This is an action for liquidation and partition of the estate. The complaint alleged that
Mariano Bautista died intestate in 1947 and that his properties had already been
extrajudicially partitioned among his heirs; that Gertrudes Garcia likewise died intestate in
1956 leaving as her legitimate heirs plaintiffs and defendants; that said Gertrudes Garcia,
during her lifetime, made several deeds of donation of some of her properties in favor of all
the defendants, but did not provide that the properties donated would not be subject to
collation, so that the donees are legally bound to bring into the mass of the estate by way of
collation the value of the properties received by them in order that the net hereditary estate
may be divided equally among the heirs; and that the deceased Gertrudes Garcia left
outstanding obligations to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and the G.A. Machineries,
Inc.
On a motion to dismiss filed by defendants alleging, among others, that the action
was premature because it is admitted in the complaint that the deceased left certain debts,
the lower court dismissed the complaint on that ground. From the order of dismissal,
plaintiffs appealed.
Issue
Whether or not the action for partition and liquidation may be maintained,
notwithstanding that there are pending obligations of the estate.
Ruling
No. Until all the debts of the estate are paid, the action for partition and liquidation is
premature.
There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of a deceased person by
the heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition, without the filing of a
special proceeding and the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of the
settlement of said estate, but this they may do only "if the decedent left no debts and the
heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians".
The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no
necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and to
deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled
The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending obligations. In
such cases, such obligations must be first paid or compounded with the creditors before the
estate can be divided among the heirs; and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to
how such obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably be submitted to
administration for the payment of such debts. As compared to ordinary partition, the regular
estate proceedings offer the advantage of requiring all creditors of the deceased to disclose
themselves and submit their respective claims within a comparatively short period (12
months under Rule 87, unless claims are contingent), otherwise, they are forever barred.
Title: Rebong vs. Ibanez, G.R. No. L-1578 (1947)

Facts
A petition for certiorari was filed against the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna on the ground that the latter acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in denying the petition for cancellation of the lien or annotation on the
certificate of title issued to the petitioner, of a land extrajudicially inherited by him as the
only heir of her predecessors in interest to the effect that the property described in the title
is subject to the claims of the creditors and other heirs of the deceased Jose Rebong and
Maria Rebong within two years from July 9, 1947, in accordance with sections 1 and 4, Rule
74 of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Whether or not the judge exercise grave abuse of discretion in denying the lien.
Ruling
The court "may order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a
memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions,
requiring security if necessary," upon application of a registered owner on "the ground that
registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate,
have terminated and ceased, or that new interests have arisen or been created which do not
appear upon the certificate." Applying these provisions to the present case, it is evident
that, since the registered or annotated contingent interest of the creditors or other heirs of
the petitioner's predecessors in interest, established by section 4 of Rule 74 has not yet
terminated or ceased, for the period of two from July 9, 1947, have not yet elapsed, the
respondent judge had no jurisdiction or power to order the cancellation of said lien or
annotation as prayed by the petitioner. Neither section 4, Rule 74, of the Rules of Court, nor
section 112 of Act No. 496 authorizes interest of substitution of a bond for a lien or
registered interest of any description, whether vested, expedient, inchoate or contingent,
which have not yet terminated or ceased.
In view of the foregoing it is plan that the respondent judge has not acted in excess of
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion, but in conformity with the law, in denying the
petitioner's petition, and the petition for certiorari is therefore denied.
Title: McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, G.R. No. 6871 (1912)

Facts
Margarita Jose died in 1902 and Engracio Palanca was appointed as the administrator with the will
annexed of the estate, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao became his sureties. After the
execution of the bond by Palanca, as administrator, he took possession of all the property left by Margarita
Jose.
Issue
Whether or not there can be administration of estate even after the partition and division has
already consummated.
Ruling
No, The Supreme Court ruled that after the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and
597 have been fully consummated, no further administration of the estate can be had unless there occur
the following requisites: 1.) There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years
after such settlement and distribution of estate."2.) The creditor holding the claim must be the person who
moves the court for the appointment of an administrator.
In the case at bar, no debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It was nearly four years
after the partition of the estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their respective portions before it
was even discovered that Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of the estate to his own use;
and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five years before the alleged claim against the estate of
Mariano Ocampo was fixed. And, no creditor made his application. The necessary conclusion is that the
appointment of commissioners to hear the claim above referred to was beyond the powers of the court and
was without jurisdiction. The finding of the commissioners had no force or effect. It gave no right against the
estate and none against the so-called administrator. This section creates a statute of limitations which
deprives all debts which are not discovered within the prescribed time of the power of requiring an
administration of the estate. The partition proceedings are proceedings out of court. Consequently there is
no prescribed method of ascertaining and settling claims. The appointment of commissioners, the
publication of notice to creditors, and all the other proceedings necessary in cases of administration in court
are not required in partition out of court. It was not the intention of the law to pronounce the partition void of
no effect simply because not all of the debts were paid before the partition was made. The fact of non
payment cannot, then, because by the creditor as a reason for attacking the partition directly by asserting
that, inasmuch as a payment of all the debts is a condition precedent to the right of partition, such partition
cannot legally and validly take place while a debt is outstanding. The mere fact, therefore, that a creditor was
not paid before the partition took place furnishes no ground for are vocation of the partition. It simply
provides a fact which he may urge as a reason for the appointment of an administrator and the consequent
administration of so much of the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt discovered
Title: Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153

Facts
Petitioners herein, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo
Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate
daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of
his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children.
That Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945 and on May 6, 1948, respondents
executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased, fraudulently
misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased. Although
they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs respondents succeeded
fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in
the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of title to be issued
in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each. Such fraud was
discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case. They
demanded from respondents their share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest
thereon but respondents
The petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicial
settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their participation of 1/18th of the properties in
litigation; ordering the respondents to reconvey to them their aforementioned share.
The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by
first marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife and that
petitioners' action has already prescribed,
Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo
de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute
of limitations of action.
Issue
Is the petitioner correct?
Ruling
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action
for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants
do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations
operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor
of the property.
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial
settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefore may be
filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have
taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the
Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents
exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute
constructive notice to the whole world.
Title: Sampilo and Salicup vs. Court of Appeals and Sinopera, G.R. No. L-10474
(1958)
Facts
Teodoro Tolete died, leaving his wife and nephews and nieces who are children of his
deceased brothers and sisters. His wife executed an affidavit of self-adjudicating saying that
Teodoro had no children or dependents, neither ascendants or acknowledged natural
children, neither brothers, sisters, nephews nor nieces. Then, his wife sold the property to
Sampilo, then Sampilo sold it to Salacup. Sinopera instituted estate proceedings asking for
letters of administration. She alleged that Teodoros wife, Leonicia de Leon has no right to
execute the affidavit of self-adjudication for there are other heirs aside from her. The
petitioners now argue that Sinoperas cause of action has already prescribed because
according to the rules of court, persons deprived of their right due to the partition or selfadjudication must bring their action within two years from the date of partition or selfadjudication.
Issue
Is the rule apllicable to persons who had no knowledge or not participated in extra
judicial settlement?
Ruling
No. The said rule applies only to persons who participated in the said proceedings
and does not prejudice those who did not have the chance to participate.
According Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. in Section 1, it is required that if there are two
or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. There
cannot be any doubt that those who took part or bad knowledge of the extrajudicial
settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in
any manner ,deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial
settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and
both "the distributees and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest.
Evidently, they are the persons who, in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy
the prejudice to their rights within, the two-year Period. But as to those who did not take part
in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the setlement, there is
no direct or express provision, and it is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to
assert their claims within the period extend the effects of the settlement to the two years.
To to them, to those who did no t take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any
express legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due
Process law.
Title: Cua vs Vargas GR No. 156536 (2006)

Facts
Petitioner Jose Cua bought shares of some of the heirs of Paulina Vargas in the parcel
of residential land with an area of 99 square meters in Virac, Cataduanes. The heirs, whose
shares totaling at 55 square meters, executed an extra-judicial settlement which was
subsequently published in a newspaper of general circulation. Later, they also executed an
extra-judicial settlement with sale over the same property and among the same heirs. One
of the heirs of Paulina who did not participate in the settlement, Gloria Vargas sought to
redeem the sold shares and when it was refused by Cua, sought the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement. Her petition was dismissed by the MTC and RTC, but the CA reversed the
ruling of the inferior courts. Hence, Cua comes to the succor of the Supreme Court with a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Whether or not the publication of extra judicial settlement after it was executed is
binding upon the heirs who did not participated therein.
Ruling
No, it is not binding. In the first place, the requirement of Sec. 1 of Rule 74 was the
publication be done before the extra judicial settlement and not after it was already
executed. Secondly, such publication was not meant to deprive heirs of their lawful
participation therein and instead, is designed for the protection of creditors. The partition
made is not valid in so far as the heirs who did not participate therein is concerned.
Title: Cruz vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 140422 (2006)

Facts
This Petition assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals,affirming in toto the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 156. Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal,
Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat)
claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first
marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto, Florencio,
Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal
resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. Buenaventura Cristobal died
intestate.More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had
executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their
names.
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between
them and private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus,a Complaint for
Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private
respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In their
prayer, they sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed by respondents,
cancellation of TCT's issued in the individual names of private respondents,re-partitioning of
the subject property in accordance with the law of succession.
Issue
1. Whether or not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the subject
property executed by the private respondents
2. Whether or not petitioners right to recover their share of the subject property is
barred by laches.
Ruling
As regards the first issue, the Court ruled that the petitioners are not bound, the
applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states.Under the said
provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the
extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons.In the case at bar, since the estate of
the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the subject property, the
partition thereof by the private respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement
of Buenaventura Cristobals estate. The partition of the subject property by the private
respondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded therefrom.
Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition executed by private respondents among
themselves in 1948. The Deed of Partition excluded four of the eight heirs of Buenaventura
Cristobal who were also entitled to their respective shares in the subject property. Since
petitioners were not able to participate in the execution of the Deed of Partition, which
constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late Buenaventura Cristobal by
private respondents, such settlement is not binding on them.
As to the second issue, the doctrine of laches does NOT apply in the instant case.
Upon petitioner Elisas knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject property had been
transferred to the private respondents to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from the
first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners filed in 1995 a petition with their
barangay to settle the case among themselves and private respondents, but since no
settlement was had, they lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995, to annul
private respondents title over the land. There is no evidence showing failure or neglect on
their part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The doctrine of stale
demands would apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable
to allow a party to enforce his legal rights. absence any strong or compelling reason, this
Court is not disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an
owner.Laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable

considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice.
Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a
property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of
another.
Probate of Wills (Rules 75-77, Rules of Court)

Title: In re: Estate of Johnson, G.R. No. 12767 (1918)
Facts
Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States,
died in Manila, leaving a holographic will by which he disposed of his estate. The said
document was not executed in conformity with the provisions the Code of Civil Procedure
generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants the Philippines. Thereafter a petition
was presented in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the probate of the will, on the
ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United
States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State;
and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. After which, the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate.
After the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an
appearance in her behalf and asserted that Ebba is a legitimate heir of the testator. Thus,
she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing
testamentary successions in these Islands. Therefore, she moved to annul the decree of
probate and put the estate into intestate administration in order for her to claim the estate
as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
Issue
Whether or not the order of the probate can be set aside on the ground that the
testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in
conformity with the laws of that State.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic
validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due
execution of the will. The intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined
by the law of Illinois and not of the Philippines.
In paragraph 2 of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and
testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount
of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be
the nature of the property and the country where it may be situate."
In this case the petition submitted to the lower court was insufficient to warrant the
setting aside of the order, probating the will in question, whether said petition be considered
as an attack on the validity of the decree for error apparent, or whether it be considered as
an application for a rehearing based upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavits
which accompany the petition. Further, in the latter aspect the petition is subject to the
further fatal defect that it was not presented within the time allowed by law.
Thus, the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The order
appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
Title: Manahan vs. Manahan, G.R. No. 38050 (1933)

Facts
This is an appeal taken Engracia Manahan, from the order of the CFI of Bulacan in the
matter of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, denying her motion for reconsideration
and new trial.
The deceased left a will. Engracia, her niece and the named executor, filed a petition
for the probate of the will. Proper notice and publication were done. Petition was granted.
One year and seven months later, Tiburcia, sister of Donata, filed a motion for
reconsideration and new trial contending that she is an heir of the deceased but was not
notified of the probate proceedings. Therefore, the proceeding was void. It was denied.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
1. Is Tiburcia an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as such,
should have been notified of the probate of the will?
2. Is authentication synonymous to probate?
Ruling
3. Can the validity of the probated will be questioned on appeal?
As to the first issue, no, she was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will
and neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not
having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had
the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be
notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not
been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any
successional right.
On the second issue, in the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential
difference between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words
authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires is that the
competent court declared that in the execution of the will the essential external formalities
have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and
effective in the eyes of the law.
With regard to the third issue, no, Once a will has been authenticated and admitted
to probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The
decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot
impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or
independent action or proceedings.
It is not timely to discuss the validity and sufficiency of the execution of the will in question.
As we have already said, this question can no more be raised in this case on appeal. After
due hearing, the court found that the will in question was valid and effective and the order
admitting it to probate, thus promulgated, should be accepted and respected by all. The
probate of the will in question now constitutes res judicata.
Title: Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez, G.R. No. L-39274 (1975)

Facts
The case is about the probate of the will of Leodegaria Julian, who made provisions in
her will that after her husband's death all her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands
should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised
and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the
will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets.
The private respondent Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of
lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged
improper partition of the conjugal estate.
Meanwhile, another lawyer who claims to be the counsel for the petitoner seek to
withdraw the probate of the will and convert the proceeding into intestate proceeding. He
assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal assets or allegedly effected a
compromise of future legitimes.
The RTC agreed with the view of the lawyer that the will was void so it dismissed the
petition for probate and converted the testate proceeding into intestate.
Issue
Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before
ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
Ruling
No. The court agreed with the trial court and declared that the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. However, the court also ruled that the probate court erred in declaring that
the will is void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding. The
Court cited the rules, "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does
not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the
testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not
been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and
others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid
without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary
scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in
favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to
dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should
be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language
of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect.
Title: Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, G.R. No. L-23638 (1967)

Facts
Ismaela Dimagiba filed a petition for probate of the will of Benedicta de los Reyes.
Such petition was opposed by Dionisio Fernandez, et al. The court ruled in favor of probate.
Fernandez et. al. appealed, but it was beyond the reglamentary period. They argued that
they were entitled to await the other grounds for opposition before appealing.
Issue
Whether or not the probate of the will became final for lack of appeal.
Ruling
Yes. A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity
of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of the will. As such, probate order is
final and appealable. They do not have to await the resolution of its other oppositions since
the Rules of Court enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in special
proceedings.
Title: Guevara vs. Guevara and Quinto, G.R. No. L-5405 (1956)
Facts
Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests to his
wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural
daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter. Victorino died
but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any settlement proceeding
initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to
himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the
acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.
Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a
portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and
based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not
probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.
Issue
Can a probate of a will be dispensed?
Ruling
No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to
circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the
court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its
efficacy. Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the
right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
Title: In re: Estate of Deceased Jose B. Suntay, G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 (1954)
Facts
This is an appeal from the decree of the CFI of Bulacan disallowing the alleged will
and testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will and
testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China on 4 January 1931 by Jose B. Suntay.
Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, Fookien
Province, China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy
and 9 children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz and a child named
Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him.
Intestate proceedings were instituted in the CFI of Bulacan and after hearing letters of
administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay. The surviving widow filed a petition in the CFI
of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and
signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. The petition was
denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing
thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. After
liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late
father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4
January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court,
Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings
praying for the probate of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China.
Issue
Whether or not the will allegedly probated in Amoy, China may be probated in the
Philippines.
Ruling
No. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must
be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be
proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also
be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.
In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court
and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are a
deposition or a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so, it does not measure same
as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity
of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must
be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The
evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the
Philippines.
In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been
done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles
followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and
accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will
referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this
country.
Title: Abut vs. Abut, G.R. No. L-26743 (1972)

Facts
The case is about the probate of the will of Cipriano Abut. The petitioner is the son of
the deceased and the appointed executor of the said will. During the pendency of the case
but before the court a quo could even start the formal hearing of the petition, Generoso
Abut, the original petitioner, died. This eventuality prompted Gavina Abut, a sister of the
deceased executor and an heir and devisee under the will of the testator Cipriano Abut, to
ask the court a quo to substitute her in lieu of original petitioner and to admit an amended
petition wherein she prayed that the probate of the will be allowed and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued in her favor. The court a quo dismissed the
petition originally brought by the deceased Generoso Abut, "without prejudice to the filing of
another petition pursuant to the requirements of the Rules of Court."
Issue
Whether or not the probate court correctly dismissed the petition on the ground that
the original petitioner who was the executor named in the will sought to be probated
died before the petition could be heard and/or terminated.
Ruling
No. The court finds the dismissal untenable. The court ruled that Jurisdiction of the
court once acquired continues until the termination of the case, and remains unaffected by
subsequent events. The court below erred in holding that it was divested of jurisdiction just
because the original petitioner died before the petition could be formally heard. Parties who
could have come in and opposed the original petition, as herein appellees did, could still
come in and oppose the amended petition, having already been notified of the pendency of
the proceeding by the publication of the notice thereof.
Title: Basa vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 42226 (1935)

Facts
The judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga allowed and probated the last
will and testament of Ines Basa, deceased. In 1932, the same judge approved the account of
the administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir of the deceased under the will
and closed the administration proceedings. In 1934, the herein petitioners-appellants filed a
motion in which they prayed that said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court
lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter because there was a failure to comply with
requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in the following
section of the Code of Civil Procedure. Appellants claim that the provisions of section 630 of
the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in view of the fact that although
the trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of the required notice for "three
weeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the will, the first
publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and the hearing took place on
the 27th of that month, only twenty-one days after the date of the first publication instead of
three full weeks before the day set for the hearing. The appellants also contend that the trial
court erred in ruling that the weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which the notice of
hearing was published, was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.
Issue
1. Whether or not the 21 days requirement of publication be followed pursuant to the
section 630 of the civil procedure.
2. Whether or not Ing Katipunan newspaper is considered a newspaper of general
circulation.
Ruling
As regards the first issue, was held that the language used in section 630 of the Code
of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for
three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the first
publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for
the hearing.
As to the second issue, the record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of
general circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news
and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it
is published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made
in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the Province
of Pampanga." The law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in the
Code of Civil Procedure, should be made in the newspaper with the largest numbers is
necessary to constitute a newspaper of general circulation.
Title: Fernandez vs. Tantoco, G.R. No. 25489 (1926)

Facts
Basilia Tantoco, aged 62, executed an instrument purporting to be her will on
September 9, 1925. She was at that time a patient in the San Juan de Dios Hospital. She
died a few days after the will was executed. Hence, an application for the probate of the will
was filed by father Vicente Fernandez, parish priest of Malolos. However, her three brothers
and a nephew opposed the probate. The proponent introduced the three attesting witnesses
to the instrument. The instrument shows every external requisite of proper execution, but
the trial judge refused to allow the probate, for the reason that the three witnesses are not
in harmony whether all three of said witnesses were present together at the time and place
when they affixed their signatures.
Issue
Did the court err for not allowing the probate of the will?
Ruling
Yes, in case of opposition to the probate of the will the proponent is legally bound to
introduce all of the subscribing witnesses, if available. They are therefore forced witnesses
so far as the proponent is concerned, and he is not bound by their testimony to the same
extent that a litigant is bound by the testimony of witnesses introduced in ordinary course. It
follows that the proponent of a will may avail himself of other proof to establish the
instrument, even contrary to the testimony of some of the subscribing witnesses, or all
of them. With respect to the will now in question a prima facie case for the establishment of
the document was made out when it appeared that the instrument itself was properly drawn
and attested and that all of the signatures thereto are authentic. These facts raise a
presumption of regularity; and upon those facts alone the will should, be admitted to
probate in the absence of proof showing that some fatal irregularity occurred. And such
irregularity must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence before probate can be
denied.
Title: Azaola vs. Singson, G.R. No. L-14003 (1960)

Facts
Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, known to be her last
residence. Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for probate of the holographic will, submitted
the said holographic will whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as against
the nephew of deceased Cesario Singson; He testified that he saw the holographic will one
month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as the same was handed to him and
his wife. He also said that he recognized all the signatures appearing in the holographic will
as the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce said statement, witness presented the
mortgage. The special power of the attorney and the general power of attorney and that
there were further exhibited in court two residence certificates to show the signatures of the
testatrix, for comparison purposes. In the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the
handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures appearing is in the handwriting of the
testatrix as well as the signatures appearing therein are the signatures of the testatrix.
The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will
was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner
and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last
will. The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature
are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness
presented by the proponent "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written
in the handwriting of the testatrix.
Issue
Whether or not the probate of the will should be granted.
Ruling
We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested,
he was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil
Code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since
no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being
required by law.
It becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question
of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the
handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if
the law does not so express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator". There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so
familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.
It cannot be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in the
case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at
the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the
will is holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of
three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
Again, Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the
Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court
should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is
produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent
witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact
it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all
available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true
intention of the testator be carried into effect.
The decision appealed from is set aside, and the records ordered remanded to the
Court of origin, with instructions to hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion. But
evidence already on record shall not be retaken.
Title: Gan vs. Yap, G.R. No. L-12190 (1958)

Facts
Petitioner Gan initiated the probate of the alleged lost holographic will of Felicidad Yap.
To prove the holographic will, he presented the testimony of witnesses who claimed to have
seen the said holographic will.
Issue
May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly
seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative. According to the Supreme Court, the Civil Code
requires [the holographic will] to be protocoled and presented to the judge, (Art. 689) who
shall subscribe it and require its identity to be established by the three witnesses who
depose that they have no reasonable doubt that the will was written by the testator (Art.
691). And if the judge considers that the identity of the will has been proven he shall order
that it be filed (Art. 693). All these, imply presentation of the will itself. Art. 692 bears the
same implication, to a greater degree. It requires that the surviving spouse and the
legitimate ascendants and descendants be summoned so that they may make "any
statement they may desire to submit with respect to the authenticity of the will." As it is
universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the testator and by himself
alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or its contents, the above article
692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they know
of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote it.
The holographic will needs to be presented in court and to the relatives.
Unlike ordinary wills, holographic wills cannot be proven by testimonial wills when
lost or destroyed. In the first, the authenticity is guaranteed by the testimony of the
subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). While in the latter, the only
guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself. The loss of the holographic will entails
the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are
available to authenticate.
Title: Nittscher vs. Nittscher, G.R. No. 160530 (2007)

Facts
Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the
probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein
respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition
for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittschers
surviving spouse, petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said
petition. However, the court Order denied petitioners motion to dismiss, and granted
respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner was denied due process of law because she did not receive
by personal service the notices of the proceedings.
Ruling
No. Under Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally .
If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his
compulsory heirs.
In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and
Dr. Nittschers children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail,
of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondents
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the
said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters
testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was
accorded every opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore, petitioners allegation that she
was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without basis.
Title: Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, supra

Facts
Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American
citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter,
Kyle Guersey Hill. Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire
estate to Richard consisting of Audreys conjugal share in real estate improvements at
Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Two
years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter,
Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except
for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter. Petitioner, as ancillary
administrator in the court where Audreys will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audreys estate. The
motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with
regards to Richards will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richards undivided
interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof
was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law
of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the
entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.
Issue
Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.
Ruling
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land
of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal.
Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in
exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in
a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence. Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate
according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to
extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988
and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
Title: Dais vs. Garduo and Altavas, G.R. No. 25523 (1926)
Facts
This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to admit an
appeal interposed in a probate case by the petitioners.
In a probate proceeding, certain lands belonging to the estate of the deceased were
ordered sold, over the opposition of some of the heirs, for the purpose of obtaining funds for
the payment of attorneys fees alleged to be due. The heirs excepted to this order as well as
to another order denying a motion for reconsideration and the CFI refused to admit the
appeal. The land was sold and the proceeds of the sale paid over to the attorney. The heirs
thereupon petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the lower court
to admit the appeal. The respondent moved that the petition be dismissed on the ground
that the matters at issue had become moot questions by reason of the execution of the
order of sale and the payment of the proceeds to the attorney for the estate.
Issue
1. Whether or not the order appealed from is a moot question.
2. Whether or not the order was premature for being interlocutory.
Ruling
1. No. If the payment was improvidently made, the money might be ordered refunded
and that, therefore, the order appealed from had not become a moot question.
2. An order issued without the consent of the heirs and directing the administrator of
the estate of the deceased person to proceed immediately with the sale of the land
pertaining to the estate is not an interlocutory order and is appealable. The court below
may possibly have been misled by the provision in section 123 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, that no ruling, order or judgment shall "be the subject of appeal to the Supreme
Court until final judgment is rendered for one party or the other." This provision applies to
ordinary civil action, but that it cannot be accepted literally in regard to probate
proceedings, is best shown by the extensive provisions for special appeals contained in
sections 773 to 783 of the same Code."
Letters Testamentary and of Administration (Rules 78-79, Rules of Court)

Title: Lim vs. Diaz-Millarez, et. al., G.R. No. L-17633 (1966)
Facts
Petitioner, claiming to be a nephew of the late Jose Millarez who died intestate, filed
with the CFI of Negros Occidental, a petition for his appointment as judicial administrator of
the estate of the deceased. The petition alleged that the deceased left no relatives such as
descendants, ascendants or surviving spouse, except collaterals. To the said petition,
oppositor herein, claiming to be the widow of the deceased, filed an opposition on two
grounds: the petitioner has an adverse interest in the estate; and that the properties of the
estate are subject matter of a litigation between her as a plaintiff and Lim as defendant in a
civil case.
Issue
Whether or not a person who has an adverse interest in the estate proceeding be
appointed as administrator of such estate.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that Lim, as a relative of the deceased, has some interest
adverse to that of Diaz-Millarez. Shown to have some liabilities to latter and to the estate as
a whole, Lim cannot compatibly perform the duties of an administrator. In this jurisdiction,
one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse
interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
Title: Medina vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34760 (1973)

Facts
This is a review by certiorari of the resolution dismissing the petition challenging the
lower courts orders appointing Gonzales (private respondent) as special administrator of the
intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina. Gonzales had been interfering in the
possession and enjoyment of the harvests of the property known as Bitukang Manok by
petitioner Del Carmen to whom the property had been sold, and full payment therefor
received by the estate through Gonzales predecessor with the approval of the lower court,
which overruled Gonzales opposition thereto as an assignee of some heirs of the estate, and
as one personally interested in the purchase of the property for himself.
Issue
Whether or not Gonzales, the special administrator, should be disqualified.
Ruling
Yes, the special administrator is disqualified and must be excluded. It is an
established doctrine that as administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed
where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by virtue of the equally
established principle that an administrator is a quasi-trustee, disqualified from acquiring
properties of the estate, and who should be indifferent between the estate and claimants of
the property except to preserve it for due administration and who should be removed when
his interest conflict with such right and duty.
Respondent, whose appeal of the lower courts order of approval of the sale to the CA
is pending, cannot be at the same time an appellant in his personal capacity opposing the
sale of the property and an appellee representing the estate and upholding the same sale as
made by the estate through Gonzales predecessor as special administrator. Since the estate
proceedings have been pending for over 13 years now without the lower court once having
appointed a regular administrator, the said court is directed to name a suitable person.
While the provisions of the Rules of Court may be deemed directory in nature, "the
speedy settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law" and "courts of first
instance should exert themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time
they are presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and
administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher
measures."
Title: Maloles II vs. Phillips, G.R. No. 129505 (2000)

Facts
Dr. Arturo de Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He alleged that he had no
compulsory heirs and named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc. He named as his executor the respondent. The Petition was granted and
shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died.
The Petitioner filed a motion for intervention claiming that he was the sole full-blooded
nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the
testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the
issuance of letters of administration in his name. On the other hand, the respondent filed a
motion for the issuance of letters testamentary. Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner's
motion for intervention.
Issue
Whether or not the petitioner, being the nearest next of kin and a creditor of the
deceased has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by the respondent.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative. The Petitioner has no right to intervene and oppose
the petition for issuance of letters of testamentary. The Petitioner is not an heir or legatee
under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter.
As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only
in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and
disposes of all his properties the petitioner can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His
interest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the
first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the
records show, not supported by evidence.
Rule 79, 1 provides:
"Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for
administration. Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds
why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as
executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon
the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters
of administration with the will annexed."
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who would
be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.
Title: Sison, et. al. vs. Teodoro, G.R. No. L-6704 (1956)
Facts
In1951, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in G. R. No. L-3846 ordering the
Testate Estate of Margarita David to pay the claim of the Testate Estate of Crispulo Sideco. To
facilitate the payment of the said claim, Priscilla F. Sison, an heiress of the estate, delivered
to its administrator the amount of P12,128.44 to cover the payment of her one half share in
the Sideco claim. The other heiress, herein Appellant Narcisa F. Teodoro, was unwilling to do
the same, contending that the Estate has real properties which could be sold and with its
proceeds pay the Sideco claim, hence, the administrator filed a petition with the lower court
to compel Narcisa F. Teodoro to deliver to him her share in the payment of the
aforementioned Claim. The lower court entered an order.
Issue
Ruling
Is it right to apply the residuary funds in the payment of the Sideco Claim?
The Court answered in the affirmative. The Court stated that the residuary funds in
the hands of the heiresses of this estate should be applied to the payment of the Sideco
claim for it is more advantageous to use that fund to pay the claim in question than selling
the real properties of the estate for that purpose. Besides, section 3 of Rule 89 of the Rules
of Court provides:
The personal estate of the deceased shall be first chargeable with the payment of
debts and expenses and if the personal estate is not sufficient for that purpose, or its sale
would redound to the detriment of the participants in the estate, the whole of the real
estate, or so much thereof as is necessary, may be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered for that purpose by the executor or administrator, after obtaining the authority
of the court therefor.
And according to section 6 of Rule 89, the Court has authority to fix the contributive
shares of the devisees, legatees or heirs for the payment of a claim if they have entered into
possession of portions of the estate before the debts and expenses thereof have been
settled and paid. Appellant argues, however, that section 3 of Rule 89, Rules of Court, is not
applicable to the instant case on the ground that it refers to the personal and real properties
of the deceased which are in the hands of the administrator, and not to the properties of the
estate which are already in the hands of the heiresses. This contention is likewise untenable.
The residuary funds in the hands of the Appellant are funds of the estate and the Court has
jurisdiction over them and, therefore, it could compel the Appellant to deliver to the
administrator of this estate the necessary portion of such fund for the payment of the Sideco
Claim.
Title: Matute vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-26751, L-26085, and L-16106
(1969)
Facts
On August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood
brother of both the petitioner and the herein respondent Matias S. Matute, filed in Special
Proceeding (settlement of the Matute estate) a petition praying for the removal of Matias as
co-administrator and his appointment in such capacity. Carlos alleged that for a period of
more than two years from the date of his appointment, said Matias S. Matute has neglected
to render a true, just and complete account of his administration and that he is not only
incompetent but also negligent in his management of the estate under his charge consisting
of five haciendas.The respondent Matias opposed the allegation that it is completely without
basis and false. Records show that he made an accounting and the same was submitted to
the court. That his competence to act as administrator has been established to the
satisfaction of the court. It appears that during the reception of evidence conducted on
December 29, 1965 by the probate court, Carlos S. Matute and the other heirs submitted
their respective lists of exhibits in support of their motion to oust Matias. On January 8, 1966
Matias filed a written objection to the admission of the movants exhibits on the ground that
the same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed
originals which never properly identified nor shown in court. The counsel for Matias filed with
leave of court a Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence which avers that there is
no sufficient evidence on record to justify and support the motions for the removal of
the herein co-administrator Matias S. Matute. The probate court issued an order removing
Matias S. Matute as co-administrator. Hence, the certiorari.
Issue
Whether or not Rule 33 regarding judgment on demurrer to evidence is applicable to special
proceedings such that its disregard by the probate court amounts to grave abuse of
discretion.
Ruling
The Court answered in the affirmative. Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court
provides that in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. The application
of the above cited Rule in special proceedings, like the case at bar, is authorized by the
Rules. Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the controverted
order removing the respondent as co-administrator without giving him the opportunity to
adduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance to
introduce evidence in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or
demurrer to evidence. The Court view that the above actuation of the probate judge
constituted grave abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident order as nullity.
Title: Baluyut vs. Pau, G.R. No. L-42088 (1976)

Facts
Alfredo Baluyut, nephew of Sotero Baluyut filed a verified petition for letters of
administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion Lopez,
who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent's estate. He prayed
that he be appointed regular administrator and in the meantime as special administrator.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified opposition alleged that she was unaware that her
deceased husband executed a will.She prayed that she be named administratrix and that
the appointment of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator be set aside.
The lower court cancelled Alfredo's appointment as special administrator and
appointed Mrs. Baluyut as regular administratrix with a bond of P20,000. The order was
based on the fact that as surviving spouse she has a preferential right to be appointed as
administratrix of her deceased husband's estate and that she is entitled to three-fourths of
the conjugal estate: one-half in her own right and one-fourth as heir of the deceased. Letters
of administration were issued to Mrs. Baluyut after she posted her bond and took her oath.
Issue
Whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Mrs.
Baluyut as administratrix.
Ruling
The probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut as surviving spouse enjoys
preference in the granting of letters of administration, it does not follow that she should be
named administratrix without conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to
discharge that trust. Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain
person should act as executor is not binding on the probate court and does not
automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters testamentary.We further held that a
hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointed
administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording
oppositors a chance to contest the petition.Moreover, it is necessary to convert the
proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot
be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy.
After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and
proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will
should be conducted .Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in
the interest of the orderly administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs.
Baluyut's fitness to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity
should be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
Title: Capistrano v. Nadurata, G.R. No. 18754 (1922)

Facts
This is a proceeding commenced by the appellees for the appointment of Justo Buera as
administrator of the estate of Petra de los Santos, deceased. The application was opposed
by appellants Pedro and Juan de los Santos, claiming that they were brothers of the
deceased and praying that the first of them be appointed administrator. Leon Nadurata
intervened, asserting himself to be the surviving spouse of the intestate Petra de los Santos,
and praying that the letters of administration be issued to him. The trial court found
Nadurata not to be the surviving spouse of the deceased and the de los Santos brothers not
to be the nearest relatives of the latter. The lower court, then, confirmed the appointment of
Justo Buera as administrator of the estate.
Issue
Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion when the trial court declared Justo
Buera as the administrator of the estate.
Ruling
The Court answered in the negative. According to the Court The selection of an
administrator of the estate of a deceased lies within the discretion of the court (sec. 642,
subsec. 1, Code of Civil Procedure). And the record does not contain anything tending to
show an abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court.
The act of the lower court in overruling the objection of the opponents and confirming
the appointment as administrator of the person proposed by the applicants is not only
indicative of sound discretion, but is right and just; for the evidence shows that Leon
Nadurata is not surviving spouse of Petra de los Santos, who died widow and not twice
widow, and that the opponents Pedro de los Santos and Juan de los Santos are not, as they
pretend to be, brother of the aforesaid deceased.
Title: Arevalo vs. Bustamante, et. al., G.R. No. 47098 (1940)
Facts
Two years and some months after Bustamante Bernabe died, his widow Rufina
Arevalo promoted the record of his intestacy; and in consideration that she was the widow of
the deceased, was appointed by court administrator of his goods relicts. Jose Bustamante,
Maria Bustamante, Corazon Reyers and Remedios Reyes who claimed to be heirs of Bernabe
filed objection for the appointment of the administration.
Issue
Was the appointment of Rufina Arevalo as administrator valid?
Ruling
Yes. Spouse may have enjoyed preference as to the appointment of administrator of
the estate provided that she is not competent or are unwilling to serve.
Title: Edgar San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 and 134029 (2007)
Facts
This involves consolidated petitions for review assailing the decision of the CA, which
reversed and set aside resolutions of the RTC resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo who, during his
lifetime, contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit in 1942 out of
which were born six children. In 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, in
1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee, an American citizen, with whom he had a son. In 1971,
Merry Lee filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, U.S.A., which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody
in 1973. In 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death in 1992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she
filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC.
Issue
Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The respondents legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family
Code.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also
provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as
far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An interested person has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
In the instant case, Felicidad would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was
not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity
to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil
Code.
Title: Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3378 (1951)

Facts
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan denying the
appellants' petition for relief from the judgment of the said court allowing the will executed
by the deceased Damasa Crisostomo.
The appellants alleged that the judgement was obtained through fraud because the
proponents of the will did not cause personal notice of the hearing to be made upon the
legal heir s of the decedent, contrary to the requirement of Rule 77, sec. 4 of the Rules of
Court. They allege that they are "nephews and nieces and therefore legal heirs of the
deceased Damasa Crisostomo and that as an interested parties, they may appeal in the
present case, because in the event the will is allowed, and the legacies in the will are
declared invalid or the legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies will go to appellants.
Issue
Whether or not the appellants are interested parties, and that in case the legacies in
the will are declared invalid or legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies will go to them.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative. They are not interested parties. The appellants
merely alleged in their petition for relief that they are "nephews and nieces and therefore
legal heirs of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo," without specifying the degree of
relationship they had with the latter. The interest claimed by the appellants is contingent
only.
In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the
interest in order that a person may be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so that
he will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's order, decree or
judgment: and not indirect or contingent. The interest claimed by the appellants is purely
contingent or dependent upon several uncertain and future events to invalidation of certain
legacies left in the will.
Title: Duran vs. Duran, G.R. No. L-23372 (1967)

Facts
Pio Duran died intestate. Among his alleged heirs are Josefina Duran, as surviving
spouse; several brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces. Subsequent to his death, Cipriano
Duran, one of the surviving brothers, executed a public instrument assigning and renouncing
his hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of Josefina Duran, for the consideration
of P2, 500.00. A year later, Cipriano filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition for
intestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate. Against said petition, Josefina Duran filed
an opposition, praying for its dismissal upon the ground that the petitioner is not an
"interested person" in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation the estate,
in view of the afore-stated, attaching a copy of the same; in the alternative, she asked to be
appointed administratrix.
Issue
Whether or not Cipriano loses his right as interested person in the estate after said
assignment is approved by the court.
Ruling
The Court tuled in the negative. The situation in the Santos case involves an
assignment between co-heirs pendente lite, during the course of settlement proceedings,
properly and validly commenced. At the time of said assignment, therefore, the settlement
court had already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of estate. As a result, any
assignment regarding the same had to be approved by said court. Since the approval of the
court is not deemed final until the estate is closed, the assigning heir remains an interested
person in proceedings even after said approval, which can be vacated is given. In the
present case, however, the assignment took place when no settlement proceedings was
pending. The properties subject matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of
a settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition as between
the assignor and assignee, the same does not need court approval to be effective as
between the parties.
An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the participants even if the requisites of
Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are for
purposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only. Should it be contended that
said partition was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy is
to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that purpose.
Title: Avelino vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115181 (2000)

Facts
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio
Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino. Respondents are likewise
compulsory heirs. . The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
Petitioner filed before the RTC of Quezon City Branch 78, a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April
10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate. In return, the
respondents filed their opposition. The trial court converted petitioner's action for letters of
administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. CA
affirmed the lower courts ruling. Petitioner submits that no partition of the estate is possible
in the instant case as no determination has yet been made of the character and extent of
the decedent's estate. She insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of
a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. The
conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down
for lack of legal basis.
Issue
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in upholding the lower court's finding.
Ruling
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or
the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond
required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered
and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78. The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74.
Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the
lower court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into an
action for judicial partition. Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the
trial court converting an action for letters of administration to one for judicial partition has
no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order
is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree
as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary
action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. The trial court appropriately
converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition,
upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the Court
of Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.
Special Adminstrator (Rule 80, Rules of Court)

Title: Matias vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-10907 (1957)
Facts
Aurea Matias, being the universal heiress and named executrix in the purported will
of her Aunt Gabina Raquel who died single, instituted probate proceeding. However, Basilia,
cousin of the deceased and was over 80 y/o, totally blind opposed its probate and pray for
the appointment of her niece Victorina, a pharmacist, as special administrator. Opposition
was sustained by the lower court. So Matias appealed, and while pending appeal, it was
Horacio Rodriguez, a practicing lawyer, former prosecutor and Mayor of Cavite who was
appointed special administrator. Basilia opposed again and insist his removal and pray that
special administration be issued to Ramon Plata. The Lower court under the respondent
judge granted the opposition and appoint Basilia, Victorina, and Ramon Plata as special
administrator and remove Horacio. Matias questioned the order and insist that PNB or BPI be
appointed should the court refused her qualification, but was denied. Later on, due to
inability to perform duties, Basilia withdrew. Hence this petition by Matias against the judge,
Victorina and Plata.
Issue
Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion for not appointing the named
executrix and the propriety of appointing more than one special administratrix?
Ruling
The Supreme Court found the actions of respondent judge cannot be supported
with1. While the probate of the will was denied, the order to this effect is not yet final and
executory. Matias beinguniversal heiress and executrix still has special interest to protect.2.
While generally, there should only be 1 special administrator maybe appointed, probate
court in its discretion,when it deems best, and whenever there are at least two factions
among heirs, may appoint more than 1 specialadministrator or a special co-adminstrator but
to administer the whole single estate exercising jointly powers of administration temporaily
and not independently.3. On technical side, there was late notice of hearing for the removal
of Rodriguez as special administrator, andlack of notice that Basilia and Victorina be
appointed as special administrator while in their motion, it only seekremoval of Rodriguez
and appointment of Plata.
Title: Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-20735 (1965)

Facts
Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D.
Liwanag. Respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her as such special
administratrix of the same court, for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage constituted in
his favor by said Pio D. Petitioner moved to dismiss Agregado's complaint, upon the ground
that as special administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor of the deceased.
Issue
Whether the petitioner herein can be sued as special administratrix.
Ruling
Yes, she can be sued. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special
administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the
adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases where the
appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are not to deny the present
action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator will be
delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated.
Title: Anderson vs. Perkins, G.R. No. L-15388 (1961)

Facts
Dora Perkins Andersons filed a petition for the probate of the supposed last will and
testament of the late Eugene Anthony Perkins. On the same date of filing, petitioner also
filed an urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator
of the estate, and on the same, the court granted such appointment upon posting of a bond
of Enrile. Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to
the probate of the will presented by the petitioner. The special administrator submitted an
inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging the deceased at
the time of his death.
About 2 years later, special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking
authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institutions, certain personal
effects of the deceased which were allegedly deteriorating physically and in value. The
special administrator submitted before the court, as required, copy of the inventory of the
personal effects.
Idonah Perkins opposed the proposed sale reasoning that (1) most of the properties
sought to be sold were conjugal properties; and (2) that unauthorized removal of the pieces
of furniture belonging to the estate have been made. Lower court approved the sale.
Issue
Whether or not the administrator has legal authority to sell personal properties that
are not perishable.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Supreme Court held that Section 2, Rule 81, of
the Rules of Court, provides that the special administrator may sell such perishable and
other property as the court orders sold, which shows that the special administrators power
to sell is not limited to perishable property only. It is true that the function of a special
administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular
administrator is appointed. But it is not alone the specific property of the estate which is to
be preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special
administrator of the perishable property. It is in line with the general power of the special
administrator to preserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that Section
2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell other property as the court ordered
sold.
Title: Silverio, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109979 (1999)
Facts
Beatriz Silverio died intestate and was survived by her husband, three sons and two
daughters. More than three years from her death, Edgardo, son, filed a petition for letters of
administration and an urgent petition for appointment of special administrator. He alleged
that his stepfather, (Silverio, Sr.) failed to show that he is a fit and proper person to
discharge the duties of an administrator. He alleged conflict of interest because according to
him, Silverio, Sr. was a cheating husband; he removed properties from the conjugal property;
he used conjugal property to buy real estate properties and concealed them by giving them
to his illegitimate children; and he is charged with violations of Securities Act.
RTC appointed Edgardo as special administrator. Silverio, Sr. opposed but failed to
attend hearings because he resides in Australia. Thereafter, Edgardo was appointed as
regular administrator. Alleging that the rule provides that the surviving spouse takes
precedence exclusive of and over all other heirs in the appointment of administrator,
Silverio, Sr. sought to annul the appointment of special administrator and later regular
administrator.
Issue
Can the probate court disregard the order of preference in the appointment of the
administrator?
Ruling
Yes. The court may do so. The order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In this case, the
appointment of Edgardo as administrator is proper.
that:
In the case of Intestate Estate of the deceased Geronima Uy Coque, the Court held
A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to
the administration of the estate of a deceased person; but if the person enjoying such
preferential rights is unsuitable the court may appoint another person.
In the same case, the court disregarded the order of preference ratiocinating, thus:
xxx The determination of a persons suitability for the office of administrator rests,
to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment
and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that
the court below was an error.
xxx Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of
some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. Xxx
Title: Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo vs. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934
(2005)
Facts
Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B. Almoradie, died leaving behind a sizable

inheritance consisting mostly of real estate and shares of stock. One Belinda Castillo,
claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for
intervention. Resolution on this motion was, however, held in abeyance pending some
incidents in the CA. Roberto Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta, filed a petition for
probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. He
alleged that he discovered his mothers will in which he was instituted as the sole heir of the
testatrix, and designated as alternate executor for the named executor therein, a brother of
Crisanta, who had predeceased the latter.
Belinda Castillo died. The intestate proceedings was dismissed and the probate court
appointed Roberto Gabriel as special administrator of his mothers estate. The heirs of
Belinda filed a Motion praying that they be substituted as party-litigants in lieu of their late
mother.
Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, the respondent filed a "Manifestation and Motion"
where she informed the probate court of her husbands death and prayed that she be
admitted as substitute in place of her late husband, and be appointed as administratrix of
the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well.
Issue
Whether or not the appointment of the respondent as special administratix is proper.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The appointment of the respondent as special
administratix is proper. The Court racionated that appointment of a special administrator lies
entirely in the discretion of the court. The order of preference in the appointment of a
regular administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the
selection of a special administrator. In the issuance of such appointment, which is but
temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the court determines
who is entitled to the administration of the estate of the decedent. On this point, The Court
held that the preference of private respondent Dolores Gabriel is with sufficient reason.
While it is true, as petitioners submit, that private respondent is neither a compulsory
nor a legal heir of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and is considered a third person to the estate of
Crisanta, nonetheless, private respondent is undeniably entitled to the administration of the
said estate because she is an heir of her husband Roberto, whose estate is the former estate
of his adopting mother Crisanta.
The petitioners strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is
misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of regular administrators of estates; Section 1,
Rule 80, on the other hand, applies to the appointment of a special administrator. It has long
been settled that the appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the appointment of regular administrators.
Executors and Administrators (Rules 81-85, Rules of Court)
Title: Mendoza vs. Pacheco and Cordero, G.R. No. 43351 (1937)
Facts
Former administrator Soriano filed a P5K bond, with respondent-appellants as
sureties. Upon accounting, Soriano was indebted to the estate for P23K and was unable to
return it to the estate. New administrator Cosme demanded the execution of Sorianos bond.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna ordered such, after notice to the sureties. The said
court approved a settlement between the former and current administrators, whereby the
former ceded some real properties, reducing the debt from P 23, 000.00 to P5, 000.00. A
year after, the new administrator requested the sheriff to levy the properties of the sureties
and advertise public sale thereof to collect the remaining unpaid debt of P5, 000.00. Sureties
filed moved to be discharged from the bond but the court denied. They filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to CFI and appeal to the Supreme Court, but were all denied. The Court
ruled that since they did not file an MR and appeal on the Execution order, their MR for the
levy was too late. The case was remanded to the CFI. They challenged, for the first time,
that the CFI had no jurisdiction to issue execution of bond.
Issue
Whether or not probate court can order execution of bond.
Ruling
Yes. Probate court has the power to require the filing of the bond, fix the amount
thereof, and hold it accountable for any breach of administrators duty. The surety is liable
within the bond during accounting in the probate proceedings, not in another separate
proceeding.
Title: Sison, et. al. vs. Teodoro, G.R. No. L-6704 (1956)
Facts
The CFI of Manila which had jurisdiction over the estate of Margarita David, issued an
order appointing appellant Carlos Moran Sison as judicial administrator without
compensation after filing a bond. After entering into his duties as administrator, he filed an
accounting of his administration which included items as an expense of administration the
premiums he paid on his bond.
One of the heirs, herein appellee Narcisa Teodoro, objected to the approval of the
items. The court approved the report but disallowed the items objected to on the ground
that these cannot be considered as expenses of administration. Moran Sison filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied hence this appeal.
Issue
Whether or not an executor or judicial administrator can validly charge the premiums
on his bond as an expense of administration against the estate.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative. The premiums paid by an executor or administrator
serving without a compensation for his bond cannot be charged against the estate. Further
Sec. 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court does not authorize the executor or administrator to
charge to the estate the money spent for the bond. As held in the case of Sulit v. Santos (56
Phil 626), the position of an executor or administrator is one of trust. The law safeguards the
estates of deceased persons by making as a requirement for qualification the ability to give
a suitable bond. The execution of said bond is therefore a condition precedent to acceptance
of the responsibilities of the trust. Further, the giving of the bond is not a necessary expense
in the care, management, and settlement of the estate within the meaning of Sec. 680 of
the Civil Code of Procedure, since such are the requirements after the executor or
administrator has already qualified for the office and has entered the performance of his
duties.
Title: De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-6476 (1955)

Facts
Petitioner Francisco De Borja filed for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of
his deceased wife Josefa Tangco in 1940 with him later named as the executor thereof in
1941. The records of the case were destroyed during the Pacific war but were reconstituted
in 1946 with Francisco De Borja qualified as executor and administrator. Due to his physical
condition, Francisco was unable to fully administer the estate and upon petition of Matilde
de Borja, one of the heirs Crisanto de Borja was appointed and later qualified in 1951 as his
co-administrator.
In 1952, the Regional Trial Court without petition or notice to anyone appointed the
private respondent Jose de Borja as co-administrator. Francisco, Crisanto, and Matilde move
for reconsideration of his appointment, which was indirectly denied by the respondent Judge.
They subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the order appointing Jose as coadministrator and the order denying the motion for reconsideration, later filing a
corresponding record of appeal which Tan refused to give due course holding that such
appointment is interlocutory and is hence, not appealable. Francisco et al filed for a petition
for mandamus.
Issue
Whether or not appointment of co-administrator is appealable.
Ruling
Yes, the appointment of a co-administrator is appealable. An order appointing a
regular administrator is appealable as opposed to an order appointing a special
administrator which is not appealable, being temporary and limited in time and for specific
purpose. A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the
powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. Hence, the
appointment is also appealable and the petition for mandamus in this case, is granted.
Title: Uy Tiotico vs. Imperial and Panis, G.R. No. 29414 (1928)
Facts
Petition for a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent judge from compelling the
petitioner to pay the sum of P11,250 to the respondent, Alejandro Panis, out of the funds of
the estate of the deceased Basilisa Yangco, of which estate said petitioner is the
administrator. Respondent Panis was counsel for the administration of said estate.
Issue
Whether or not Panis can enforce the payment of the attorney's fees out of the funds
of the estate.
Ruling
No, The attorney can not hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are
allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the
payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the
estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate.
Title: Rodriguez vs. Ynza, G.R. No. L-8290 - 8291 (1955)

Facts
Dionisio Ynza died testate in which the will was probated. There are 3 legatees, one
of which is the petitioner, and they were adulterous children of the testator. About 3 months
after the death of the testator and after the will was probated, one of the children and
legatees, Maria Cristina Ynza decided to sell as in fact she sold her share of one-third of all
the estates of Dionisio Ynza, to her co-legatees Julia Ynza and Jose Ynza, thereby leaving
Jose and Julia sole co-owners of said estates. Jose Ynza, thereafter, sold to his co-legatee and
co-owner Julia his one-half share of the estate situated in the City of Iloilo as a result of
which, he remained half co-owner only of the properties situated in Negros Occidental. Julia
Ynza died without issue in Iloilo, leaving a will which was probated in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo. In said will Julia left all her properties, real and personal, in the City of Iloilo
to the Sisters Sofia Staub and Claudia Staub with a proviso that they have under their care
her protegee Carmen Danuya. Jose Ynza filed a civil case against the executor of the will of
Julia Ynza alleging that he was the absolute owner of pro indiviso with the late Julia Ynza
and other properties he shared with the latter.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner is the absolute owner of such properties he shared with his
siblings.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled, by going back to the fifth paragraph of the will of Dionisio
Ynza, it may not be considered as accretion as apparently contemplated by the testator by
his employment of the word "accrecera". Under the old Civil Code, Article 982 thereof, there
is right of accretion in testamentary succession when two or more persons are called to the
same inheritance or to the same portion thereof without special designation of parts, and
one of the persons so called die before the testator or renounces the inheritance or be
incapable of receiving it. In the present case, the three persons called to the inheritance,
namely, Jose, Julia, and Maria Cristina, survived the testator. However, the condition imposed
in paragraph 5 of the will of Dionisio Ynza might possibly be regarded as a charge or trust
limiting the ownership and disposition of the 1/3 portion allotted to each of the legatees. The
intention of the testator might have been as contended by plaintiff-appellant to prevent the
property from going into the hands of strangers and at the same time giving a right to the
surviving legatee or legatees the right to receive intact the one-third portion of the legatee
who dies without issue. This right may naturally be renounced or waived by any of the
legatees who stand to benefit by it; and as to the condition that none of the properties or
estate of Dionisio Ynza should go into the hands of strangers, since it is a condition not
entirely unselfish, and it is not affected with public interest but on the contrary is rather
against public policy in that it limits the rights of ownership and free disposal of private
property, said condition may not be enforced at the instance of the State. It may be enforced
only by the legatees who have an interest in its enforcement; but surely not by the legatee
who from the very beginning not only had violated that condition but had renounced his
right to it. Under the condition imposed by paragraph 5 of the will of Dionisio Ynza, it may be
supposed that in order to carry out the condition that the portion of the legatee dying
without issue should go to his surviving co-legatees, none of the legatees may dispose of his
one-third portion in his lifetime; and yet, both Jose Ynza and Julia Ynza not only allowed
Maria Cristina to dispose of and sell her legacy of one-third portion, contrary to the provision
of the will.
Title: Tumang vs. Laguio, G.R. No. 50277 (1980)

Facts
In a special proceeding involving the estate of the late Dominador Tumang, his wife,
Magdalena, who is also the adminstratrix and executrix of the will, filed a petition to declare
the testate proceedings definitely terminated and closed with respect to her and her two
children, Melba and Nestor. The petition was premised on the claim that the said heirs have
already received the properties adjudicated to them and that to be able to transfer the said
properties in their names, there should be an order from the court declaring that the testate
proceedings closed with regard to the said heirs. The petition was opposed by Guia Laguio,
another child of Magdalena, on the ground that not all the properties adjudicated to them
have been delivered and that there could not be a partial termination of the proceedings.
Magdalena, the administratrix withdrew the petition.
Issue
1. Whether or not the court should have required the administratrix to render an
accounting of the cash and stock dividends received after the approval of her final
accounting.
2. Whether or not the acceptance of the cash dividends by an heir constituted a
waiver to demand such accounting.
Ruling
On the first issue, yes, the Court held that the executor/administrator should account
for his receipts and disbursements subsequent to his last accounting. Section 8 of Rule 85
provides that the "executor or administrator shall render an account of his administration
within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration * **,
and be shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly
settled."
In the instant case, further accounts by the executrix appear to be in order, in view of
the fact that the dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the final accounts
rendered by the executrix. It appears that the interests of all the parties will be better served
and the conflict between petitioners and respondent will be resolved if such additional
accounting is made. Further, "it has been held that an executor or administrator who
receives assets of the estateafter he has filed on account should file a supplementary
account thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that it is only with respect to matters
occurring after the settlement of final account that representatives will be compelled to file
supplementary account."
As to the second issue, as to the alleged waiver, SC held that the said acceptance
does not constitute a waiver. The duty of an executor or administrator to render an account
is not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded.
It is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the
administration is finally ordered closed and terminated, to the end that no part of the
decedent's estate be left unaccounted for. The fact that the final accounts had been
approved does not divest the court of jurisdiction to require supplemental accounting for,
aside from the initial accounting, the Rules provide that "he shall render such further
accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled."
Claims against the Estate (Rule 86, Rules of Court)

Title: Santos vs. Manarang, G.R. No. 8235 (1914)
Facts
Don Lucas de Ocampo died, leaving certain real and personal property to his three
children through a last will and testament. The fourth clause of the will provided that his
debt to the plaintiff be religiously paid his wife and executors in the form and at the time
agreed upon. The will was duly probated and a committee was regularly appointed to hear
and determine such claims against the estate as might be presented. The committee
submitted its report to the court .The plaintiff presented a petition to the court asking that
the committee be required to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate which
were recognized in the will of testator. This petition was denied by the court.
The plaintiff instituted the present proceedings against the administratrix of the
estate to recover the sums mentioned in the will as due him. Relief was denied in the court.
The plaintiff states that his failure to present the said claims to the committee was due to his
belief that it was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his will,
expressly recognized them and directed that they should be paid.
Issue
May the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the settlement of claims
against an estate by a committee appointed by the court be superseded by the contents of a
will?
Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative. The provisions of the code of civil procedure relating
to the settlement of claims against an estate by a committee appointed by the court cannot
be superseded by the contents of a will.
The Court racionated that the Code of Civil Procedure has established a system for
the allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. If it is unnecessary to present
such claim to the committee, the source of nonclaims is not applicable. It is not barred until
from four to ten years, according to its classification in chapter 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, establishing questions upon actions. If a debt is expressly recognized in the will
must be paid without its being verified, there is nothing to prevent a partial or total
alienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest under a guise of a debt, since all of the
latter must be paid before the amount of the legal portion can be determined.
To allow a debt mentioned in the will in the amount expressed therein on the ground
that such was the desire of the testator, when, in fact, the debt had been wholly or partly
paid, would be not only unjust to the residuary heirs, but a reflection upon the good sense of
the testator himself. The direction in the will for the executor to pay all just debts does not
mean that he shall pay them without probate.
Title: Tan Sen Guan vs. Go Siu San, G.R. No. 22451 (1924)
Facts
Record shows that the plaintiff is the administrator of the intestate estate of Tan Peng
Sue, just as the defendant is the administrator in the testamentary proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Antonio Tampoco; that, according to the books kept by the
defendant administrator, Antonio Tampoco owed Tan Peng Sue a certain sum of money; that
upon the death of Antonio Tampoco, which occurred on February 5, 1920, proceeding was
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of his estate. On
December 14 of that year commissioners were appointed to hear and decide whatever claim
might be presented against the estate; that said commissioners qualified as such in due
time, and rendered their final report on June 27, 1921, which was approved by the court
below on July 14 of said year. On March 27, 1924, the lower court presided over by the
Honorable Geo. R. Harvey, judge, after considering the motion for new trial, rendered a new
decision, setting aside that of December 22, 1923, and ordering the administrator of the
estate of Antonio Tampoco to pay the administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue the sum of
P28,802.60, with interest thereon at the rate of 9 6/10 per cent annum from March 28, 1920.
From this decision the administrator of the estate of Antonio Tampoco appealed, assigning as
error the decision of the lower court holding the claim presented as valid and effective at the
time it was presented, and not holding the same as extinguished at that time under the law.
Issue
Whether or not the action has prescribed?
Ruling
Under section 690, a creditor who has failed to present his claim within the period
fixed by the committee on claims may apply to the court, within six months after the period
previously fixed, for the renewal of the commission for the purpose of examining his claim.
Also a creditor may make such application even after six months from the expiration of the
period formerly fixed and before the final settlement of the estate, if the committee shall
have failed to give the notice required by section 687. The record shows that the application
of the plaintiff was presented fourteen months after the expiration of the period fixed for the
filing of claims. And while it was presented before the final settlement of the estate of
Antonio Tampoco, yet, it having been proved that the committee had published in the
newspaper La Nacion the notice required by law, there was no possible ground for granting
said application. Even considering this application under section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, we believe that the lapse of fourteen months is an unsurmountable barrier
opposing the granting of said application. It matters not that the defendant did not appeal
from the order of the lower court appointing new commissioners, if it is taken into
consideration that it was entered beyond the authority given by section 690. And as the
defendant objected to said appointment, we believe that he is now entitled to raise the point
in this court. For the foregoing the judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is hereby
declared that the plaintiff appellee has lost his right to enforce his claim in this proceeding.
Title: De Villanueva vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L-18403 (1963)
Facts
For the administration of the estate of her deceased husband, Pascual
Villanueva, the widow Mauricia G. Villanueva, on December 19, 1949, petitioned the Court of
First Instance of Agusan, for letters of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 67). The petition was set
for hearing and Notice thereof was published on February 25, March 4, and 11, 1950, in the
Manila Daily Bulletin. At the hearing, other heirs while agreeing to the placing of estate
under administration, opposed the appointment the widow. The name of Atty. Teodulo R.
Ricaforte, suggested and all the parties agreed. After the taking the required oath, Atty.
Ricaforte entered upon the performance of his duties. the defendant-appellant Philippine
National Bank filed in the administration proceedings, Creditor of Pascual Villanueva,
deceased, respectfully presents its claim against the estate of the said deceased.
The administrator, on November 5, 1954, opposed the alleging that he had
no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
therein. The appellant PNB, on November 14, 1958, more than four (4) Years after the
opposition of the claim presented by the administrator, filed a pleading captioned "Petition
for an Extension of time within which to File the Claim of Philippine National Bank", alleging,
among others, that Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules, allows the filing of claims even if the period
stated in the notice to creditors elapsed, upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable;
that its failure to present the claiming with the period stated in the notice, was its lack of
knowledge of administration proceedings, for while said maintains a branch office in Agusan,
the employees did not come to know of the proceedings, the notice has been published in
the Morning Times, a newspaper very limited circulation.
Issue
Ruling
Whether or not the question is already barred.
The claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the lower court,
within which to present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed or
about 1 year and 8 months late. This notwithstanding, appellant contends that it did not
know of such administration proceedings, not even its employees in the Branch Office in
Butuan City, Agusan. It is to be noted that the petition for Letters of Administration and the
Notice to Creditors were duly published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning
Times, respectively, which was a full compliance with the requirements of the Rules.
Moreover, the supposed lack of knowledge of the proceedings on the part of appellant and
its employees had been belied by uncontested and eloquent evidence, consisting of a
deposit of an amount of money by the administrator of the estate in said Bank (Agusan
Agency). It is quite true that the Courts can extend the period within which to present claims
against the estate, even after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension should be
granted under special circumstances. The lower did not find any justifiable reason to give
the extension and for one thing, there was no period to extend, the same had elapsed.
WHEREFORE, the order subject of the appeal is hereby affirmed.
Title: Vera vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-31364 (1979)

Facts
The Government of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue filed a
motion for allowance of claim and order for payment of taxes representing the estate's tax
deficiencies in 1963 to 1964 in the intestate proceedings of Luis Tongoy. The administrator
opposed arguing that the claim was already barred by the statute of non-claims under Sec. 5
Rule 86, which was sustained by the Regional Trial Court. The government filed an appeal on
certiorari against the two orders of the court.
Issue
Can the claim for taxes of the government be barred under statute of limitations?
Ruling
No, the provision on statute of non-claims makes no mention of claims for monetary
obligation of the decedent created by law, such as taxes which is entirely of different
character from the claims expressly enumerated under Sec. 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, if a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must
necessarily, and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. The reason for the
more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent's estate in the form of
exception from the application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find. Taxes are the
lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and certain availability are imperious need.
Upon taxation depends the Governments ability to serve the people for whose
benefit taxes are collected. To safeguard such interest, neglect or omission of government
officials entrusted with the collection of taxes should not be allowed to bring harm or
detriment to the people, in the same manner as private persons may be made to suffer
individually on account of his own negligence, the presumption being that they take good
care of their personal affairs. This should not hold true to government officials with respect
to matters not of their own personal concern. This is the philosophy behind the
government's exception, as a general rule, from the operation of the principle of estoppel.
Title: Paredes vs. Moya, G.R. No. L-28051 (1974)

Facts
Petitioner Severino Parades commenced a suit on January 4, 1964 in CFI-Manila, as

Civil Case No. 55880, for the collection of separation and overtime pays against his
employer, August Kuntze. On March 5, 1971, a decision was rendered against the defendant
August Kuntze, from which judgment, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the case
was pending appeal in the said Court, August Kuntze died on June 19, 1972. Accordingly,
plaintiff Parades (now petitioner) was duly notified. Thereafter, Carmencita D. Navarro
Kuntze, administratrix of the estate of the deceased, was substituted in his place as party in
the appealed case. On June 5, 1973 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in said Civil
Case No. 55880 for appellant's failure to file the printed record on appeal, and so the record
of the case was ordered remanded respondent court.
A motion for execution was filed by plaintiff-appellee (petitioner Parades). On August
22, 1973 the provincial Sheriff of Rizal levied on the properties of defendant-appellant (now
substituted by the Administratrix of the estate of the Deceased, consisting of two (2) lots
covered by TCT No. 45089 issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. In the
auction sale conducted by the Sheriff of Rizal on October 2, 1973, plaintiff-appellee
(petitioner Paredes) being the highest bidder, acquired said lot, as per certificate of sale
which was duly annotated in the back of TCT No. 45089. However, in spite of a Motion to
Quash the Writ of Execution filed by respondent-appellant (Administratrix) on September 6,
1973 and still pending resolution, Parades (plaintiff-appellee, below) sold the property he
acquired in execution sale in favor of his co-petitioner, Victorio Ignacio on October 10, 1973.
Issue
Whether or not the petitioner erred in filing his claim to have the money judgment in
his favor executed against the properties of the deceased Kuntze.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that it was error on the part of the petitioner, to have the
money judgment in his favor executed against the properties of the deceased Kuntze.The
proper remedy of plaintiff Paredes should have been to file his claim in the administration
proceedings of the estate of the deceased defendant Kuntze where private respondent is the
administratrix. As provided by law, all claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for
money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice.
Title: Ignacio vs. Pampanga Bus Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-18936 (1967)
Facts
In 1951, Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. (Pambusco) lodged its complaint against two
defendants Valentin Fernando and Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando. The suit was to
upon a contractual obligation. In January, 1955, Elchico died. By this time, Pambusco had
already presented its evidence and submitted its case. In March,1955, intestate proceedings
were filed and notice to the estate's creditors was given for them to file their claims within
six months from the first publication of the notice.
The CFI rendered judgment in the civil case in favor of Pambusco.
In January, 1961, the judgment in the civil case having reached finality, Pambusco
moved in the intestate proceedings that the heirs and/or the present joint administratrices,
be ordered to pay the share of the deceased in the judgment debt. The administratrices
opposed.
Issue
Whether or not Pambuscos claim is time-barred.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative. It matters not that Pambusco's said claim was filed
with the probate court without the six-month period from March, 1955, set forth in the notice
to creditors. For, Section 2, Rule 86, permits acceptance of such belated claims.
The claim was filed in the probate court on February 25, 1959, while the defendants
in the civil case were still perfecting their appeal therein. The record does not show that the
administrator objected thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of time. The pendency
of that case is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the claim. And, the order of final
distribution is still to be given. The order of the lower court of allowing payment of appellee's
claim "impliedly granted said appellee an extension of time within which to file said claim."
The probate court's discretion has not been abused. It should not be disturbed.
Title: Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Icaragal, G.R. No. 29414 (1928)
Facts
The defendant, with one Jacinto Figueroa, for value received, executed in favor of the
plaintiff a promissory note for one thousand six hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614), and in
security for its payment, said the defendant also executed a real estate mortgage on a
parcel of land in Pagil, Laguna. Thereafter, the promissors defaulted in the payment of the
agreed monthly instalments; wherefore, plaintiff instituted an action for the collection of the
amount due on the note. Judgment was there rendered for the plaintiff. A writ of execution
was subsequently issued and, in pursuance thereof, the sheriff levied on the properties of
the defendants, including that which has been mortgaged by the defendant in favor of the
plaintiff. The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party
claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of execution the property which was the subject of the
mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at
the public auction. By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted from the sale of
the property and, in consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff
remained unsatisfied. Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage.
The trial court dismissed the complaint.
Issue
Whether or not plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage
after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment against the defendant-appellee
on the promissory note for the payment of which the mortgage was constituted as a
security.
Ruling
The court ruled in affirmative. The Plaintiff appellant is barred from foreclosing the
real estate mortgage. The Court ruled that for non-payment of a note secured by mortgage,
the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action
consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the
creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure
of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the
debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the
mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both
refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for
a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot
split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and
thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the
first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two
separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to
foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single
breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression
to the debtor.
The court also held that a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage
debtor either a personal action for debt or real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other
words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause
of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.
Title: Soriano vs. Parsons, G.R. No. L-24008 (1970)

Facts
The defendant Parsons Hardware Company, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the
Company) was the holder of two mortgage deeds over four parcels of registered land, all
located in the province of Cavite, executed in 1955 by the spouses Claro Soriano and Irene
Quilao. After Sorianos death, Quirino Soriano was appointed administrator of the formers
estate in special proceeding 6107 of the same court. Four years later, the Company sent a
letter to the provincial sheriff of Cavite, requesting him to foreclose the mortgages
extrajudicially, pursuant to the terms of the mortgage deeds. Acting on this letter, the sheriff
scheduled the public auction sale of the encumbered properties for November 12, 1962. On
December 20, 1963, the plaintiff, in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of
Claro Soriano, lodged the present complaint, claiming that the foreclosure sale was void as
the Company, having priorly elected to pursue its claim in the intestate proceedings, could
not in law be permitted to turn around and instead pursue the remedy of extrajudicial
foreclosure. He therefore asked that the foreclosure sale be annulled and the properties
object thereof be ordered reverted to the estate of Claro Soriano.
Issue
Whether or not the filing of the "Contingent Claim" by the Company in the intestate
proceeding constituted a bar to the extrajudicial foreclosure sale thereafter had.
Ruling
The Court affirmed the decision, dismissing the amended complaint. Section 7 of Rule
87 (now Rule 86) does no more than provide the mortgage-creditor, in the interest of
speedy, orderly and inexpensive settlement of the estate of a decedent, a choice of one of
three courses of action for the satisfaction of its loan portfolio. An entirely distinct and
independent act, to be performed in conformity with procedures laid down by the Legislature
or by this Court, is still necessary to effectuate and achieve the remedy elected.
Thus, in this case, the mere fact that the Company formally informed the intestate
court that it was electing to foreclose judicially its mortgages did not automatically operate
as authority for the court motu propio to put into motion the machinery necessary for the
judicial foreclosure of the said securities. It was indispensable for the Company to file an
independent complaint for that specific purpose. The Company did no more than signify its
election of an option. The Company never intended to abandon its securities because by the
very terms of its "Contingent Claim" it explicitly and unequivocally indicated that it would
rely, basically, upon the mortgages, reserving its right to ask for a deficiency judgment, if,
after a judicial foreclosure of its securities, a portion of the loan remained unsatisfied. No
doubt, the Company elected the second remedy. But election by the creditor of any of the
three options is not jurisdictional, and as long as no positive forward step has been taken by
him in pursuance of the option selected, he is not precluded from dropping the option
already chosen and resorting to any of the two other options available to him.
Title: Sps. Suria vs. Heirs of Brigido Tomolin, G.R. No. 157483 (2007)
Facts
Brigido M. Tomolin has the owner of Lot located at Agusan del Sur. It was registered
in his name. Tomolin sold the lot to Carlos Suria. After the sale, Carlos Suria and his wife
Juanita, also a petitioner, had the lot subdivided into several parcels.
Tomolin filed with the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for Annulment of the Deed of
Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Land and Cancellation of TCT with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against petitioners. The complaint alleges, among others, that
Tomolin, then seriously ill, was inveigled by petitioners into signing the contract of sale and
that they did not pay him the amount of P228,200.00.
Tomolin filed with the trial court an amended complaint, Tomolin died. He was
survived by his nieces.
Issue
Is the subtstitution of the late Tomolin by his heirs valid?
Ruling
There can be no dispute that Tomolins complaint affects primarily and principally
property and property rights. Clearly, the action survives his death. Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not err in affirming the trial courts judgment allowing the substitution of the
late Tomolin.
Title: Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation,

G.R. No. 147561 (2006)
Facts
On May 24, 1989, Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation entered into a contract with Jose
D. Santos, Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a
drainage system in Republic-Asahis compound in Barrio Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. RepublicAsahi was to pay JDS. JDS posted a performance bond which executed, jointly and severally
with Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc (SICI).
Due to alleged slow pace of construction, Republic-Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the
contract without prejudice for recovery of damages from JDS and its sureties. Through the
filing of the complaint, Republic-Asahi sought to recover the amount expended to complete
the project using another contractor. SICI filed its answer and interposed the defense that
the money claims against it and JDS have been extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos,
Jr. The lower court dismissed the complaint of Republic-Asahi, but it was reversed by the
Court of Appeals. Hence, SICI filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether or not the death of the party extinguishes the liability of a solidary obligor.
Ruling
No, as a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not
extinguish the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the
transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the
obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves
are extinguished by death.
Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the
obligations under the performance bond.
Actions by and against Executors and Admnistrators

Title: Lopez vs. Olbes, G.R. No. 5480 (1910)
Facts
On October 13, 1908, Ricardo Lopez et al. brought suit against Adolfo Olbes, the
testamentary executor of the deceased Martina Lopez (the mother of Ricardo and
grandmother of the other plaintiffs), alleging in their complaint that Martina executed a
public instrument whereby she donated to plaintiffs a parcel of hemp land situated at the
place called Ali, in the pueblo of Guinobatan, Albay and that the said Olbes, as executor,
claimed to have rights of ownership and possession to the said land adverse to those then
held by the plaintiffs, inasmuch as the said estate still continued to belong to the deceased
Martina Lopez and was then in charge of a trustee by virtue of an agreement had between
the attorneys of the executor and the plaintiff Ricardo, and of the order issued by the court
in the aforesaid probate proceedings. The complaint concluded by asking that judgment be
rendered in the latters favor and against the defendant for the ownership and possession of
the said land.
The defendant filed a demurrer in writing alleging that the plaintiffs, as the heirs or
donees could not maintain any suit against the testamentary executor to recover the title or
possession of the land so long as the court had not adjudicated the estate to them or until
the time allowed for paying the debts should have expired, unless they be given possession
of the said land by the executor. The trial court sustained the demurrer of the defendant and
dismissed the case.
Issue
Whether or not the plaintiffs have the right of ownership and possession over the
parcel of hemp land.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative The action exercised by Ricardo et al is based
on the rights which as such donees had acquired by virtue of the donation inter vivos made
by Martina Lopez during her lifetime on favor of plaintiffs by an instrument the donor, a
donation expressly accepted on the same date by the donees and of which acceptance the
donor was also informed on the same date; wherefore, these requirements of the law having
been complied with, it is unquestionable that the dominion over the land donated was
properly transmitted to the donees who in fact and by operation of law acquired the
ownership of the property, as customarily occurs in all contracts of transfer of dominion.
Property of the testate estate of the deceased Martina Lopez is not here concerned.
During her lifetime she gave away the land mentioned, in the exercise pertained to her as
owner. By virtue of the said donation the sole and true owners of the land donated are the
plaintiffs, so long as said donation is not proven null, inefficacious, or irregular. All the
questions which by reason of the same are raised by the interested parties must be heard in
a regular trial and decided by a final judgment absolutely independent of the probate
proceedings concerning the estate of the deceased, who was the previous owner of the land
concerned; and therefore the complaint of the donees should not have been dismissed, but
the trial should have been proceeded with to final judgment.
Payment of the Debts of the Estate

Sales, Mortgages and other Encumbrances of the Property of Decedent
Distribution and Partition of the Estate
(Rules 88-90 Rules of Court)
Title: Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz and Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 41354 (1934)
Facts
In the intestate proceeding, the administrator filed a petition to authorize the sale of
two parcels of land and which the lower court granted. Consequently, the administrator
executed a deed of sale in favor of De Guzman and De La Roma. Later, Igmidio and Pedro,
legitimate sons of Gregorio de la Cruz filed a petition questioning the jurisdiction of the lower
court to order the sale without complying with the provisions of the section of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The lower court denied the petition.
Issue
Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to order the sale.
Ruling
No. The orders of the lower court are set aside and the sale of the two parcels of land
made by virtue of such orders is declared null and void.
Section 722 provides, among other things, that when an executor or administrator
considers it necessary or beneficial to sell real or personal estate he may make application
to the court having jurisdiction of the estate, and such court may grant license under the
following regulations:
1. The executor or administrator shall present to the court his petition in writing,
setting forth the amount of debts due from the deceased, with charges of
administration, the value of the personal estate, situation of the estate to be sold, or
such other facts as show that the sale is necessary or beneficial;
The petition of the administrator in this case does not set forth the value of the
personal estate nor does it allege that there is no personal estate nor that if there be such
its sale would redound to the detriment of the interests of the participants therein.
It is held that the averment as to the value of the personal estate of a deceased
person, in a probate proceeding, is an essential and necessary requisite to a petition for the
sale of real estate and that a Court of First Instance acquires no jurisdiction to order such
sale if that averment does not appear in the petition; that such an order is void and that a
sale of real estate by virtue of such an order is null and void.
Title: Godoy vs. Orellano, G.R. No. 16584 (1921)

Facts
In consideration of the amount of P1, 000 received by the appellant, Felisa Pagilinan,
a document was executed by her giving the plaintiff- appellee an option to buy a dredge for
the sum of P10,000. It appears from that document that the dredge is the common property
of the vendor and of the defendants. The condition was that the plaintiff was to pay the
whole price of the dredge within twenty days and that said option was granted in
accordance with the power of attorney executed by her co-owners who reserved the right to
ratify whatever sale might be made, or option granted by Pagilinan, their attorney-in-fact.
The latter's co-owners did not ratify the option contract. Before the expiration of twenty
days, the plaintiff appelle was ready to make complete payment of the price, but the
appellant failed to deliver the dredge. Then the plaintiff- appellee brought suit against Feliza
Pagilinan, and the defendants praying that they be ordered to deliver the dredge, upon
payment by him of the sum of P9,000.
The defendants Orellano alleged that the dredge in question was the property of the
intestate estate of Julio Orellano, pending in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.Furthermore, They alleged that the plaintiff perfectly knows that said dredge is under
judicial control and could not be disposed of without judicial authority, and that the court has
never authorized the sale.
Issue
Whether or not the sale of the dredge is valid.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative. The sale of the aforesaid dredge by the
administratrix, or her promise to sell it is null and void. The Rules of Court provides that in
the sale of the property of an intestate estate for the benefit of the heirs, a proceedings to
be had before an administrator of an intestate or testate estate may sell personal or real
property.
A sale and conveyance by executors without an order of the probate court, under a
will devising property to them in trust, but not authorizing any sale of the realty, otherwise
than by a direction to pay the debts of the testator, is void, and passes no title to the
purchase. Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of
properties like the one under consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirs
of Orellano in favor of the administratrix, without authority of court, has no legal effect, and
this is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify
the option contract, as provided in the aforesaid power of attorney. It is in the opinion of the
Court that the judicial administratrix of the intestate estateappellant was not legally
authorized to sell, or contract to sell, any property belonging to said estate without the
authority of the court, and the contract entered into by her with the plaintiff, without this
authority, is null and void.
Title: Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39044 (1985)
Facts
On November 21, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a probate
court in the special proceedings of the testate estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda,
authorized Vicente Legarda, as special co-administrator, to sell the Legarda Tambunting
Subdivision. On December 10, 1952, Vicente Legarda as co-administrator allegedly sold an
area of about 280 square meters of the subdivision denominated as Lot 6, Block 4 situated
at Dinalupihan, Tondo, Manila at P30.00 per square meter to Abelardo Lucero. The sale was
on an instalment basis and Lucero paid an initial amount of P200.00 by virtue of which a
receipt was issued by Legarda. On the same day, Lucero took possession of the lot. On July
31, 1956, the court issued another order authorizing the Philippine Trust Company as
administrator, to sell the subdivision at the earliest possible time at the best obtainable
price.
Issue
1. Whether or not the sale of the lot to Lucero is valid.
2. Whether or not the approval of the probate court is necessary for the validity of the
sale.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that the alleged sale made by Legarda to Lucero did not
bind the Legarda-Tambunting estate, much less, the petitioner who acquired the property in
dispute with the approval of the probate court and in a sole reliance on the clean title of the
said property. As correctly ruled by the trial court: "The plaintiff (petitioner), as the
registered owner of the property, is entitled to the possession thereof, unless the defendant
(private respondent) could show that he is entitled to its possession or to purchase the
same. The property was advertised for sale, but neither Abelardo Lucero nor the defendant
herein appeared in the testate proceedings of Clara Tambunting de Legarda to claim their
right to the particular lot in question. The records of the testate proceedings of Clara
Tambunting de Legarda did not show that any claim was made by Dr. Abelardo Lucero or by
the defendant herein. The alleged sale made by Vicente Legarda in favor of Dr. Lucero did
not bind the estate, for aside from the fact that no formal deed of sale was executed by
Vicente Legarda specifying the terms thereof, it was never approved by the Court. Sales of
immovable properties by the administrators did not bind the estate and have no validity
unless they are approved by the Court. Moreover, the alleged receipt issued by Vicente
Legarda does not constitute even a memorandum of sale, because it did not specify the
price of the land and the manner of payment
The Court also found that the appellate court committed an error of law when it held
that the sale of the lot in question did not need the approval of the probate court. Although
the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging
to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the
court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity of such court.
Title: Dael vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68873 (1989)
Facts
Victorina Durana died intestate on August 1, 1977 in Manila; she was the wife of the
deceased Cesario Cabutihan who died earlier on June 9, 1972. Cabutihan was first married to
Bienvenida Durana. Less than a year thereafter he married Victorina Durana, sister of his
first wife. The first marriage of Cesario Cabutihan had five children and who are the
intervenors. The second marriage with Victorina Durana did not produce any issue. During
the second marriage, they were engaged in a copra business and a public transportation
business. One of the private respondents herein, who filed a petition for the settlement of
the intestate estate of Victorina Durana, wherein she also prayed for her appointment as
administratrix. Petitioners herein filed an opposition, asking that the letters of administration
be issued instead to herein petitioner Lucilda Dael. The court below appointed Amado Zoleta
as special administrator of the estate of the late Victorina Durana. Said special
administrator, upon order of the probate court, submitted an inventory of the properties of
the estate. a "Supplementary Inventory" was filed by the special administrator covering
other real properties of the estate of Victorina, Private respondents moved for the
disapproval of said inventories claiming that the properties listed therein were either
acquired during the first marriage of Cesario Cabutihan or were merely the products or fruits
of the properties of said first union or otherwise acquired through the funds thereof. The trial
court rendered a decision holding that Victorina Durana had no paraphernal properties
brought or contributed to her marriage with Cesario Cabutihan. The probate court thereby
disapproved both inventories and annulled the extrajudicial settlement and deed of sale
mentioned earlier. The latter two were annulled for being simulated or fictitious and for
involving conjugal properties of the first marriage, including properties of Bienvenida, to
which Victorina is not an heir.
Issue
Whether or not the appellate court committed an error in affirming the order of the
lower court.
Ruling
So much of the judgments of both lower courts as declare that all the properties
listed in the two inventories are conjugal partnership assets of the deceased spouses
Cesario Cabutihan and Bienvenida Durana are hereby SET ASIDE. The properties therein
enumerated shall be divided in the following manner: (a) Seven-twelfths (7/12) of fifteen
twenty-ninths (15/29), and one-half (1/2) of fourteen twenty-ninths (14/29), of the properties
listed in the inventory dated August 30, 1978, as well as all the properties listed in the
supplementary inventory dated January 16, 1979, shall constitute the estate of Cesario
Cabutihan. This estate shall be divided equally among his six (6) heirs, and (b) The
remaining five-twelfths (5/12) of fifteen twenty-ninths (15/29) of the properties in said
inventory shall belong to the said five (5) children, share and share alike, as their respective
participations in their mother's inheritance.
Title: Reyes vs. Baretto-Datu, G.R. No. L-17818 (19267)

Facts
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime, they
acquired vast estate (real property in Manila, Pampanga and Bulacan). When Bibiano died,
h e l e f t h i s s h a r e i n a w i l l t o S a l u d B a r r e t t o ( a n d L u c i a M i l a g r o s Barretto;
and a small portion as legacies to his sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his
nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for Maria (the widow).
As appointed administratrix, Maria prepared a project of partition, signed
by her in her ownb e h a l f a n d a s g u a r d i a n o f t h e m i n o r M i l a g r o s . I t
w a s a p p r o v e d , a n d t h e e s t a t e w a s distributed and the shares delivered.
Salud took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of OCTs
and issuance of new titles in her name.Upon Marias death, it was discovered that she
executed two wills in the first,she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; in the
second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. The
later will was allowed.
Issue
Ruling
Whether or not Maria Geraldo has the authority to sign the partition as a guardian.
The Court ruled in the negative. During the project of partition of the property of the
deceased the guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia Milagros Baretto are pending in
the court, does not mean that the guardian had not been appointed; it meant that the
guardianship proceedings had not yet been terminated, and as a guardianship proceedings
begin with the appointment of a guardian, Maria Gerardo must have been appointed when
she signed the project of partition. There is, therefore, no irregularity or defect or error in the
project of partition, apparent on the record of the testate proceedings, which shows that
Maria Gerardo had no power of authority to sign of partition as guardian of the minor Lucia
Milagros Baretto, and, consequently, no ground for the contention that the order approving
the project of partition is absolutely null and void and may be attacked collaterally in the
proceedings.
Title: Garcia vs. Orozco, G.R. No. L-35213 (1978)

Facts
The original plaintiffs, Serafin Orozco, Carmen Orozco, Merced Orozco and Arsenio
Orozco, are brothers and sisters and the natural children of the deceased Epifanio
Orozco,with another woman. Epifanio Orozco had married Albina Garcia, sister of the original
defendants, namely, Juan Garcia and Baldomera Garcia. The marriage was not blessed with
a child.
During the marriage with Albina Garcia, the land in Mataguisi Guinobatan was
acquired by Epifanio Orozco. It also appears that the land in Malobago, Guinobatan. When
Epifanio Orozo died on August 20,1917, he was survived by Albina Garcia, his widow, and
Serafin Orozco, Carmen Orozco, Merced Orozco and Arsenio Orozco, his acknowledged
natural children.
After the death of Epifanio Orozco, his widow, Albina Garcia, executed the deed of
sale, conveying the land in Mataguisi to Baldomera Garcia for a consideration of P4,400.00.
In the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Epifanio
Orozco, one of his acknowledged natural children, original plaintiff Serafin Orozco, was
appointed as administrator. As judicial administrator, Serafin Orozco brought an action on
July 22, 1929, for the recovery of lots located in Mataguisi, Guinobatan, and lots located in
Malobago, same town.
Pursuant to the Convenio submitted by the parties , the lower court rendered
judgment on August 10, 1932, adjudicating, among other properties lots composing the
lands in Mataguisi, Guinobatan, and lots composing the lands in Malobago, same town, to
the intestate estate of Epifanio Orozco, while the other properties involved therein were
given to Albina Garcia as her share in the conjugal partnership. Subsequently, ownership of
the parcels of land involved in the instant case were adjudicated to the estate of Epifanio
Orozco. Such being the case, and inasmuch as the plaintiffs-appellees are the natural
children of the late Epifanio Orozco, the lower court correctly held that they are entitled to
the parcels of land in question, the ownership of which had been adjudicated in his Epifanios
favor as early as in 1932.
The decision expressly stated that Albina Garcia no longer had the usufructuary right
as a widow of the deceased Epifanio Orozco in view of her waiver. By virtue of the writ of
execution issued to enforce the judgment in Civil Case No. 5127, Serafin Orozco, as
administrator of Epifanio Orozco, was placed in possession of the lands adjudicated to the
estate by the sheriff in November 1932.
Not long thereafter, Juan Garcia re-entered the lands in question and extra judicially ejected
therefrom Serafin Orozco. Since that date until the present, the plaintiffs have not been able
to possess said lands.
In a separate action, Orozco et. al. sought to recover from Garcia the two parcels of
land, one situated at Mataguisi Guinobatan, Albay, alleging that they are the absolute
owners of the parcels of land in question and that the defendants in bad faith dispossessed
the former of their possession thereof. Defendants interposed the defense absolute
ownership of the parcels of land involved by virtue of the deeds of sale executed in their
favor.
After the case had been heard on the merits, the court a quo on April 28, 1944,
rendered a decision, declaring the plaintiffs joint owners of the lands in question, and
ordering the, defendants to deliver the possession of said lands to the former. Consequently,
the orig defendants-appellants interposed an appeal within the reglementary period.

However, before the records of the case could be elevated to the Court of Appeals, the same
was destroyed when the provincial capitol building where the court house was located was
destroyed by bombs and fire during the liberation of Albay. Since it can not be reconstituted
except the record on appeal, the lower court ordered that the case will be tried de novo.
Nevertheless, the trial court ruled in favor of Oroszo et. al with the defendant coming to the
succor of the Court of Appeals.
Issue
Whether or not the Court the deed of sale between Albina Garcia and Baldomera
Garcia is valid.
Ruling
No, the deed of sale is not valid as to prejudice the inheritance of the heirs. The
judgment made pursuant to the convenio awarded the other properties involved therein
were given to Albina Garcia as her share in the conjugal partnership, the decision expressly
stating that Albina Garcia no longer had the usufructuary right as widow of the deceased
Epifanio Orozco in view of her waiver. This judgment had long become final and executory.
Considering that the petitioners Baldomera Garcia and Juan Garcia are the sister and brother
of the widow Albina Garcia, that Juan Garcia lived with his sister Albina Garcia and that Juan
Garcia merely administered the properties for her, the Court held that Baldomera Garcia and
Juan Garcia were not strangers to nor third parties in the proceedings against their sister,
Albina Garcia.
For whatever right or interest Baldomera Garcia had in the Mataguisi properties which
she claims were prejudiced by the act of her sister, the widow Albina Garcia, in renouncing
her rights to the Mataguisi and Malobago properties and further agreeing accordingly to the
convenio which became the basis of the judgment in Civil Case No. 5127, Baldomera
Garcia's right of action was against her own sister, the widow Albina Garcia, as the vendor
thereof.
When the widow agreed to the partition of the properties left by her husband and
accepted other lots instead of those in Mataguisi which she had previously sold to her sister,
Baldomera Garcia, the latter had a right of action against the former. To uphold the validity
of the sale made by the widow in favor of her sister would give more share to the widow
than she was entitled to and had agreed upon with the heirs of her husband, the
respondents herein.
Title: Divinagracia vs. Rovira, G.R. No. L-42615 (1976)

Facts
Feliciano Divinagracia died and survived by his wife and 4 daughters. The notice of
his death was published in 2 local periodicals and in Manila Times. Two days after his death,
a petition was filed in the CFI of Iloilo for the settlement of his estate. The order was
published. Emilia, one of the daughters, qualified as administratix. She administered the
estate for 7 years and paid the estate and inheritance taxes. In April 1971, she submitted to
the court a final accounting and project of partition with a prayer of closure of the
proceeding. The court approved and proceeding was declared closed and terminated. The
partition was duly registered.
On June 1971 or after the order of closing the intestate proceeding had become final,
Camilo Divinagracia filed a motion to reopen it and set aside the order of closure. He alleged
that he was an illegitimate child of the decedent and that he came to know the intestate
proceeding only when he was transferred as a government employee from Masbate to Iloilo.
Issue
The administratix opposed. The probate court set aside its prior order of closure.
Whether or not an intestate proceeding, which had already been closed, can still be
reopened so as to allow a spurious child to present evidence on his filiation and to claim his
share in the decedents estate.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held in negative. A closure order of an intestate
proceeding is already final and executor. The motion to reopen it was not filed within the 30day reglementary period counted from the date the order of closure was served on the
administratix. The closure order could not be disturbed anymore. Moreover, the order of
reopening of the intestate proceeding was predicated on the false assumption that there had
been no liquidation of the conjugal partnership and no declaration of heirs. The truth is that
the project of partition and distribution, with final accounting, which was submitted by the
administratix and approved by the probate court, contained a liquidation of the conjugal
partnership and a statement as to who were the decedents heirs and what were their
respective hereditary shares.
Title: Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947 (1997)

Facts
Private respondent Rosalia Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan Sanchez and Maria
Villafranca while private respondents Arturo Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod
are the legitimate children of Rosalia. Petitioners Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna
are the illegitimate children of Juan Sanchez. Following the death of her mother in 1967,
Rosalia filed on January 22, 1968, thru counsel, a petition for letters of administration over
the estate of her mother and the estate of her father, Juan Sanchez, who was at the time in
state of senility. Before the administration proceedings could formally be terminated and
closed, Juan Sanchez died. Petitioners, as heirs of Juan Sanchez, filed a petition for letters of
administration over the intestate estate of Juan Sanchez, which petition was opposed by
Rosalia. On October 30, 1969, however, Rosalia and the petitioners assisted by their
respective counsels executed a compromise agreement wherein they agreed to divide the
properties of the late Juan Sanchez. The compromise agreement was not approved by the
probate court.
Issue
Whether or not the compromise agreement partitioning the estate without the
approval of the probate court is valid.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a
compromise agreement as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Being a
consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial
approval is not required for its perfection. Petitioners argument that the compromise was
not valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court
of Appeals[ where the Court ruled:
It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A
compromise is a consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the meeting of
the minds of the parties to the contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon; see also De los
Reyes v. de Ugarte.) And from that moment not only does it become binding upon
the parties (De los Reyes v. De Ugarte, supra ), it also has upon them the effect and
authority of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially
approved (Meneses v. De la Rosa; Vda. De Guilas v. David; Cochingyan v. Cloribel
However, although denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this case is
essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that
[e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no
will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs
and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their
judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a
public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. We find that all the
foregoing requisites are present in this case. We therefore affirm the validity of the parties
compromise agreement/partition in this case.
Title: Vda. De Gurrea vs. Suplico, G.R. No. 144320 (2006)

Facts
The lot in question was originally owned by one of herein plaintiffs Attorney-in-Fact,
Rosalina Gurrea. In 1958, Rosalina Gurrea transferred the ownership of said lot to Adelina
Gurrea and continued to be the owner of the lot until her death. A Special Proceedings was
instituted to have the will she executed during her lifetime probated and to settle her estate.
Under the said will, the San Juan lot was bequeathed to Pilar and Luis Gurrea, while of the
lot in Baguio City and a one-hectare piece of land in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental were
given to Ricardo Gurrea. Ricardo Gurrea, represented by the defendant, filed an Opposition.
In consideration of said representation, Ricardo Gurrea agreed to pay the defendant "a
contingent fee of twenty (20%) of whatever is due him either real or personal property.
During the pendency of the proceedings and upon the oral instructions of Ricardo Gurrea,
The defendant negotiated with the other heirs of Adelina Gurrea. The heirs arrived at an
amicable settlement regarding the estate of Adelina Gurrea.
As payment of his attorneys fees, Ricardo Gurrea offered the San Juan lot to the defendant
who was initially hesitant to accept the same as the property is occupied by squatters.
However, in order not to antagonize his client, defendant agreed to Ricardo Gurreas
proposal with the further understanding that he will receive an additional commission of 5%
if he sells the Baguio property. The Defendant obtained a title/TCT to the San Juan property
under his name.
Ricardo Gurrea died and after his death, his heirs instituted petition for the settlement of
Ricardo Gurreas estate. The estates administrator, Carlos Gurrea, filed an Inventory of
Properties left by the decedent, which did not initially include the property subject of this
case. The said lot was included only subsequently in the Amended Inventory.
Petitioners conclude that at the time the Transfer of Rights and Interest was notarized, there
is no dispute that the subject property still formed part of the estate of Adelina Gurrea and
was, therefore, still the subject of litigation. Hence, the transfer of rights and interest over
the subject property in favor of respondent is null and void.
Issue
Whether the subject Transfer of Rights and Interest executed even before the estate
proceedings were closed and terminated.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the affirmative that the subject Transfer of Rights and Interest was
executed even before the estate proceedings were closed and terminated.
The Court agree with the petitioners undisputed contention that when the deed of
Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the title over the subject lot was still in the
name of Adelina Gurrea and that it was only on October 7, 1980 that the title was
transferred in the name of Ricardo. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of
the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed
and terminated.The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same.In the present case, while the subject lot was assigned as Ricardos share
in the project of partition executed by the heirs of Adelina Gurrea, the title over the subject
lot was still in the name of the latter and was not yet conveyed to Ricardo when the Transfer
of Rights and Interest was executed.
It follows that, since at the time of execution of the deed of Transfer of Rights and
Interest, the subject property still formed part of the estate of Adelina, and there being no
evidence to show that material possession of the property was given to Ricardo, the probate
proceedings concerning Adelinas estate cannot be deemed to have been closed and
terminated and the subject property still the object of litigation.
Having been established that the subject property was still the object of litigation at
the time the subject deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the assignment of
rights and interest over the subject property in favor of respondent is null and void for being
violative of the provisions of Article 1491 of the Civil Code which expressly prohibits lawyers
from acquiring property or rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may
take part by virtue of their profession.
Guardianship (Rules 92-97, Rules of Court; AM No. 03-02-05-SC 2003-05-01)

Title: Guy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163707 (2006)
Facts
The case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy
Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were represented by their
mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
before the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his
surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts
hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The other
heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping
should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel. Petitioners further alleged that
the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in
exchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her
minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.
The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental
motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she
could not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the
certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower
court. Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards.
Ruling
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians
must necessarily obtain judicial approval. Repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's
scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the
court, the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not
have waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate
children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right
which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the
claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its
jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with
the determination of heirship included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action
may be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to
claim inheritance.
Title: Paciente vs. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. L-58319 (1982)

Facts
Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres, and two minor
children, Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land.This lot which he had inherited from his
deceased father, Felizardo Homeres. The said lot was sold to Conchita Dumdum which was
also sold to petitioner Patria Paciente.Consequently,she was issued TCT by the Register of
Deeds of Tacloban City. Homeres filed a petition for guardianship over the persons and
estate of the minors. The petition was granted and took her oath as guardian. The acting
City Register filed a manifestation informing respondent court that Lot No. 3085-G which is
the subject of the guardianship proceedings had been registered in the name of the
petitioner and it was mortgaged to the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation. The
respondent court issued an order directing the petitioner and the manager of the bank to
appear before the court and show cause why TCT covering a parcel of land co-owned by the
minors should not be cancelled for having been alienated without authority from the court.
Petitioner contends that respondent court in hearing a petition for guardianship is not the
proper situs for the cancellation of a Torrens Title.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent court acting as a guardianship court has jurisdiction
to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the transfer certificate of title of petitioner.
Ruling
The Court held that the respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to issue his order. In the
guardianship proceedings requiring the petitioners to deliver the rentals collected by them
to the guardian and authorizing the latter to collect rentals in the future, for the reason that
the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons
suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward for
the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in action later to be instituted by
the guardian to protect the right of the ward; and that only in extreme cases, where property
clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been judicially decided,
may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.
Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the delivery or return
of the property conveyed are concerned, the Court found the orders of the respondent court
valid. The petitioner's contentions in this regard are untenable. Even the aforecited cases
relied upon do not support her argument.
It was ruled that where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or
conveyed is in question, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the ward
or in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must
be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings.
In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is clear and
indisputable. They inherited a part of the land in question from their father. The sale of this
land, where they are co-owners, by their mother without the authority of the guardianship
court is illegal.
Title: Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, G.R. No. 10058 (1915)
Facts
The petitioner herein was a young man, 21 years of age, the owner of property
valued at nearly P1,000,000, and temporarily traveling abroad at the time the proceedings
were had which terminated in the declaration that he was a spendthrift and the appointment
of a guardian of his property.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner is spendthrift and appointing a guardian for his property
was valid.
Ruling
No. There is no evidence of any kind was taken in the case so far as appears of
record, and the court, in making the order of prodigality and decreeing the appointment of a
guardian, had no more knowledge of the alleged spendthrift's incompetency to manage his
affairs that he had before the petition was presented.It would be a strange condition of
affairs indeed if a citizen and resident of the Philippine Islands could be declared to be an
incompetent and his property taken from his management and control by the naked
allegation of one stranger admitted by the naked concession of another stranger.
Title: Zafra-Sarte vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-23976 (1970)

Facts
On November 3, 1961, herein petitioner Exaltacion Zafra-Sarte petitioned the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court for the appointment of a legal guardian over the person and
property of Remigia Zafra, whom said respondent herein alleged to be an incompetent
person, afflicted with mental disorder and other ailments which rendered her incapable to
take care of herself and to manage her property. In her verified petition, Exaltacion prayed
for her appointment as the legal guardian of the person and property of Remigia, claiming
that she is a niece of the latter, being a daughter of her (Remigia's) sister. Said petition was,
however, opposed by Julian Lua, who claimed that he and Remigia Zafra have lived together
as common-law husband and wife for more than 30 years, and by Francisco Unabia, who
claimed that he is a half-brother of the alleged incompetent. The oppositors prayed that
either of them be appointed legal guardian of Remigia, should she be found incompetent.
Issue
The court that hears the petition granted the pettion of Zafra-Sarte.
Whether or not the respondent court has power to suspend the effectivity of an order
appointing a guardian in the event of the appeal therefrom.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that the order declaring the incompetency and appointing a
guardian was good, until reversed or set aside, and authorized the guardian, in spite of the
appeal, to do whatever was necessary under the direction of the Court, to protect the
property of the incompetent. The above consideration does not detract from the general
principle announced that such appointment of a guardian should be considered good until
reversed or set aside on appeal.
Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is reversed.
Title: Pardo de Tavera vs. El Hogar Fil. Inc., et. al., G.R. No. L-5893 (1956)
Facts
Carmen Pardo De Tavera, eleven years old, is one of the co-owners of a parcel of land. The
co-owners agreed to organize a corporation under the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. and to
accept shares of stock of the corporation to be organized in exchange for their respective
shares. The duly appointed guardian of Carmen filed a petition in the probate proceeding for
the approval of such agreement.
Later, Carmen, already of legal age, brought an action to annul the transfer of her
right, share and interest in the property made by her guardian to Tavera-Luna, Inc. Plaintiff
contends that the probate court's order is a nullity because the provisions of section
569, Act No. 190, the law then in force, were not complied with and for that
reason the probate court was without jurisdiction to order the transfer of her share in the
property to the corporation to be organized and formed.
Issue
Ruling
Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed order.
The Court ruled in the affirmative. That the probate court in guardianship
proceedings had jurisdiction over the petition filed by the guardian admits of no doubt. Only
upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction may an order entered by a court be assailed
collaterally. If the court had jurisdiction, irregularities in the proceedings which would or
could invalidate the courts order may be assailed directly by means of an appeal but not
collaterally.
In her petition, the guardian alleged that the transfer of her wards share in the property
to the corporation then to be organized would be to or for her benefi t and she
expected that the construction of a new building would enhance the value of her
wards share in the property and increase her income. No other consideration or motive
could have prompted the guardian, mother of the minor, to fi le the petition. It is
not necessary for a grant of authority to the guardian to sell the estate of the ward to
state that the income is insufficient to maintain the ward and his family or to maintain or
educate the ward when a minor. It is enough, as the other alternative of the law provides,
that it appears to the satisfaction of the court that it is for the benefit of the ward that his
real estate or some part thereof should be sold, and the proceeds thereof put out at interest,
or invested in some productive security.
Title: Crisostomo vs. Endencia, G.R. No. 45623 (1938)

Facts
The Petitioner is the appointed guardian of Incompetent Petrona Crisostomo. While
the incompetent was already released from the National Psychopathic Hospital, the
petitioner filed a verified petition asking that the court which took cognizance of the
guardianship case declare that the incompetent had recovered her mental faculties, that she
was able to take care of her person and to administer her property, cancel the bond filed by
the guardian, and order the termination and filing away of the record. The court declared the
said Petrona Crisostomo able to take care of her person and to administer her own property,
wherefore, it orders the termination of the guardianship. After the lapse of about nine
months from the issuance of the order, the respondent Ramon Crisostomo, brother of the
incompetent, filed a motion in the guardianship proceedings and in the same court which
had taken cognizance of said special proceedings. He alleged that the order is null and void
because it was entered without notice to the nearest relatives of the incompetent and
without hearing and that the latter had not yet recovered her mentality. The petitioner
objected on the ground that the order sought to be annulled had already become final and
that the court had already lost jurisdiction to reverse or annul the same. The respondent
judge issued an order annulling the order of termination of guardianship.
Issue
Whether or not the order of restoration to capacity is valid despite of lack of notice.
Ruling
The Court ruled in favor of its validity. Section 562 does not require notice of the
hearing to any other person except the guardian and the incompetent. In order that a court
taking cognizance of the guardianship of an incompetent may issue a valid order restoring
him to capacity it is necessary, under this section, (1) that a verified petition be presented
by the incompetent, his guardian, or any relative of such person within the third degree, or
any friend of his; (2) that said petition should allege that the incompetent has recovered his
mental faculties or his legal capacity, as the case may be; and (3) that upon receiving the
petition the court should set the same for hearing and notify the guardian and the
incompetent thereof. At the hearing, the guardian, the relatives of the incompetent, and, in
the discretion of the court, any other person may oppose the remedy sought.
The section in the case under study it happened that the verified petition was signed
by the guardian himself and was supported and accompanied by the sworn statement of the
incompetent. In the petition it was stated that the incompetent had recovered her mental
faculties and this allegation was corroborated by her in her sworn statement when she
stated that she had already recovered her mental faculties. In these circumstances the only
logical conclusion is that the requisites of section 562 have at least been substantially
complied with and that the notice and the hearing were unnecessary and superfluous.
Title: Vda. De Bengson vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L-17066 (2007)
Facts
As the mother of a veteran who died in World War II, Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson
became entitled to certain accrued insurance benefits and to a monthly death compensation
for the rest of her life, all extended by the United States Veterans Administration. Upon
inquiry which showed that the beneficiary was incompetent, the Veterans Administration
filed Special Proceeding No. 586 in the Court of First Instance of La Union, where in due
course, an order was entered on August 8, 1957, adjudging Carmen to be an incompetent
and appointing the PNB as guardian of her estate comprising the monies due from the said
Veterans Administration. Letters of guardianship were issued in favor of PNB. Alleging that
she had regained her competence, her ward, by counsel, filed a petition asking for an order
terminating the guardianship, and for delivery to her of the residuary estate. The son of the
ward, Francisco Bengson, filed a "Manifestation" to the effect that he was the personal
guardian of the incompetent and prayed to be appointed guardian of the ward's estate in
place of the PNB. The lower Court appointed Francisco as guardian in place of PNB.
Issue
Whether or not there is a valid removal of guardianship on the part of PNB and the
Veterans Administration.
Ruling
No. The grounds for which a guardian may be removed are found in Section 2, Rule
98 of the Rules.
When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or

unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty days
after it is due to render an account or make a return, the court may, upon reasonable
notice to the guardian, remove him, and compel him to surrender the estate of the
ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled thereto.... (emphasis supplied).
No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the record would indicate, that there
was any legal ground upon which the removal of the Philippine National Bank as guardian
was founded. Neither in Francisco Bengzon's manifestation nor in the orders of the lower
court is it made to appear that the Philippine National Bank had become incapable of
discharging its trust or was unsuitable therefor, or that it had committed anything which the
Rules includes as grounds for removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable that all
throughout, the Philippine National Bank has discharged its trust satisfactorily. That it has
received commissions allowed by law for its services is no ground to remove it, especially
since the Bank's commission averages no more than P100.00 a year and is offset by interest
on the ward's deposit and the sum that the son would probably have to disburse in bond
premiums. Neither is it sufficient to base removal on the unsubstantiated opinion that it
would be more beneficial to the interests of the ward and more convenient for the
administration of the estate. A guardian should not be removed except for the most cogent
reasons; otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and illegal.
Trustees (Rule 98, Rules of Court)

Title: Saltiga de Romero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17809 (1962)
Facts
Eugenio Romero bought from spouses Celedonio Jaug and Sofia Macan the latter's
"rights, interest, participation, ownership and possession" of 12 hectares of land. The land in
question was then public land. When Eugenio Romero applied for a homestead patent for
said land, the same was disapproved by the Bureau of Lands because said Romero already
had applied for a homestead patent for 24 hectares and was disqualified from owning the
additional 12 hectares. Petitioners contend that LUTERO merely holds Lot 23 Pls-35 in trust
for the benefit of the heirs of his father EUGENIO since it was actually EUGENIO who first
applied for the homestead but considering that EUGENIO was already granted a homestead,
the application had to be placed in the name of his eldest son EUTIQUIO. The application was
subsequently transferred to the name of LUTERO who later transferred the application in the
name of Ricardo Romero (RICARDO), his younger brother.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that LUTERO did not commit fraud in the
titling of Lot 23 Pls-35. They allege that the petitioners failed to prove this during the trial of
the case. On the contrary, LUTERO complied with all the requirements of the law when he
successfully obtained title to the lot. Respondents also deny that LUTERO held the land in
trust for the benefit of the heirs of his father EUGENIO. According to them, this violates the
provisions of The Public Land Act. Even assuming that a trust in fact was created, such is null
and void for being contrary to law. Finally, respondents maintain that the three affidavits of
sale executed in favor of the petitioners are void since they were simulated and not
supported by any consideration; and they were executed within the five-year prohibitory
period from the issuance of the patent. The appellants further claimed that after the
partition, they had been in occupancy of their respective shares through their tenants. The
CA ruled in favor of Lutero.
Issue
Whether Lutero acquired Lot 23 Pls-35 in trust for the benefit of the heirs of Eugenio.
Ruling
A trust is the legal relationship between a person having an equitable ownership in

property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership
of the former entitling him to performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain
powers by the latter. The petitioners did not present any evidence to prove the existence of
the trust. Petitioners merely alleged that LUTERO, through fraudulent means, had the title of
Lot 23 Pls-35 issued in his name contrary to the alleged agreement between the family that
LUTERO would merely hold the lot in trust for the benefit of EUGENIO's heirs. The alleged
agreement was not proven and even assuming that the petitioners duly proved the
existence of the trust, said trust would be of doubtful validity considering that it would
promote a direct violation of the provisions of the Public Land Act as regards the acquisition
of a homestead patent.
Title: Caezo vs. Rojas, G.R. No. 148788 (2007)

Facts
The subject property is an unregistered land situated at Naval, Biliran. In a
complaint, petitioner Soledad Caezo alleged that she bought such parcel of
land from Crisogono Limpiado, although the sale was not reduced into w r i t i n g .
T h e r e a f t e r , s h e i m m e d i a t e l y t o o k p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y. S h e a n d
h e r husband left for Mindanao and entrusted the said land to her father,
Crispulo Rojas, who took p o s s e s s i o n o f , a n d c u l t i v a t e d t h e p r o p e r t y. I n
1980,she
foundout
that
the
r e s p o n d e n t , Concepcion Rojas, her
stepmother, was in possession of the property and was cultivating the same. She
also discovered that the tax declaration over the property was already in the
name of his father. Respondent asserted that it was her husband who bought the
property from Limpiado, which accounts for the tax declaration being in Crispulos name.
Issue
I s the re an existe nce of trus t ove r t he prope rty exp re ss or
i m p l i e d between the petitioner and her father?
Ruling
None. A trust is the legal relationship between one person
h a v i n g a n e q u i t a b l e ownership of property and another person owning the
legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him
to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the
latter. Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created by
the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or
bywords evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which,
without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of
intent or, independently, of the particular intention of the parties, as being super induced on
the transaction by operation of law basically by reason of equity.
In light of the disquisitions, we hold that there was no express trust or resulting
trust established between the petitioner and her father. Thus, in the absence of a trust
relation, the Court concluded that Crispulos uninterrupted possession of the
subject property for 49 years, coupled with the performance of acts of ownership, such
as payment of real estate taxes, ripened into ownership.
Adoption and Custody of Minors (Republic Act Nos. 8581 and 8043; AM No.
02-6-02)
Title: Reyes vs. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405 (2006)
Facts
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before
the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising who
died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario
L. Zalzos, Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising,
AlfredoLising and
respondents
Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.Petitioner
filed
an
opposition to the petition claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latters
husband to which Chichioco filed a petition to annul the adoption of the petitioner. The
appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the
petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption.
Ruling
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document required by
law to be entered into the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other
judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office
as well as the court which rendered the judgment.
Petitioner whose adoption is presumed to be valid would necessarily exclude
respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere collateral relatives of the
latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue would serve no salutary purpose but to
delay the resolution of the instant case. Hence, the petition should be dismissed.
Title: Republic vs. Miller, G.R. No. 125932 (1999)

Facts
On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both American citizens, filed
with the Regional Trial Court Angeles City a verified petition to adopt a Filipino child named
Michael Magno Madaya, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which
allows alien to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable
consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis
of its evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for
adoption.
On August 3, 1988, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a
Filipino child by aliens.
The Solicitor General appealed originally to the CA from the decision of RTC. The CA
certified the case to the Supreme Court because it involved question of law.
Issue
Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt when the petition for adoption was
filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the
effectivity of the Family Code, is qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition. Such alien acquired a vested right
which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
Title: Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118870 (1996)

Facts
On the issue of custody over the minor Ray Perez II, CA ruled in favor of the boys
father, reversing the trial courts decision to grant custody to the childs mother. The
respondent, the father, is a doctor of medicine and the petitioner, the mother, is a registered
nurse working in the U.S. They are married couple who are separated in fact with only one
child. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the
custody of their son. The RTC issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to
his mother, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. Upon appeal by
the father, CA reversed the trial courts order and awarded custody of the boy to him ruling
that there were enough reasons to deny petitioner custody over the child even under seven
years old. It held that granting custody to the boys father would be for the childs best
interest and welfare.
Issue
Whether or not the custody of the child is to be given to the father.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a
child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the
Family Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory
character. Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term separation.
The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below
seven years old shall not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed
the earlier Article 17, par 3 of the Child and youth Welfare Code which reduced the childs
age to 5 years.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his
mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. Only
the most compelling of reasons shall justify the courts awarding the custody of such a child
to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority.
In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and
being sick with a communicable disease.
Title: Santos, et. al. vs. Aranzanso, G.R. No. L-23828 (1966)
Facts
Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes filed a petition for adoption of the petitioners.
Paulina Santos was then 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old. The petition, which
was under oath, alleged inter alia, that the whereabouts of the minors' nearest of kin,
particularly their parents, were unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minors
have been abandoned by their respective parents; and that for years, since their infancy,
said children have continuously been in petitioners' care and custody. The Court granted the
petition. Subsequently eight years later Juliana Reyes died without testament. Simplicio
Santos filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. In said
petition he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, as
surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age. The
respondents alleging that they are the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to the
petition for appointment of administrator. Their grounds are that Simplicio Santos" marriage
to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void: and that the adoption of Paulina
Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their
parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them.
Issue
Whether respondents-oppositors could assail in the settlement proceedings the

adoption decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos.
Ruling
The Respondents could not assail the settlement proceedings the adoption decree in
favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos.
The respondents-oppositors and those who, like them (Pasion sisters), claim an
interest in the estate of Juliana Reyes as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in
the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession
adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same
holds true as long as the adoption must be as in the instant case considered valid.
Title: Republic vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209 (1996)

Facts
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and
simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee
to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired
consequent to his adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name
in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the
petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should
be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Issue
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given
or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Ruling
No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: For
civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and
both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopter.
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of
the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the
adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the
court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees
registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere
incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein. If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and
strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding
for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the
reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition for
change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements
therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is
an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of
rules.
Habeas Corpus
(Rule 102, Rules of Court; AM No. 03-04-04 Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors; AM No. 08-1-16-SC Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data; AM No. 07-9-12-SC Rule on the Writ of Amparo)
Title: Madrian vs. Madrian, G.R. No. 159374 (2007)
Facts
Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent Francisca R. Madrian were married on
July 7, 1993. Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter. After a bitter quarrel
on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons with
him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent sought the help
of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and petitioner to no avail.
She then brought the matter to theLupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too
proved futile.
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis
Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioners act of leaving the conjugal dwelling
and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and
deprived them of their mothers care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and
produce their sons before the court and to explain why they should not be returned to her
custody.
Respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but was
driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler
and drug addict. Petitioners alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties,
causing him to commit acts of violence against her and their children. The situation was
aggravated by the fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently
meddled in their personal problems.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance of
the petition. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition
for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts
under RA 8369.
Issue
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct.
Ruling
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further
affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004).If a minor is being transferred from one
place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case
will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of
the lawmakers when they passed.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer,
all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and
ancillary matters.
Title: Camara vs. Pagayatan, G.R. No. 176563 (2007)

Facts
Petitioner Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Land Compensation Division of
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) was detained under a warrant of arrest respondent
judge issued from a contempt citation against the former for LBPs failure to deposit the
preliminary compensation in Civil Case No. R-1390 as provided under the trial courts order.
LBP was directed to deposit the preliminary compensation, in cash and bonds, in the total
amount of P71,634,027.30 with the LBP, Manila, within 7 days from receipt of this order, and
to notify the Court of compliance within such period.
LBP then complied with this order by depositing the said amount in its head office in
cash under its account in trust for, and in bond payable to, the trial courts clerk of court.
However the respondent judge found LBPs compliance insufficient and ordered LBP to
place the deposit in the name of Josefina Lubrica as payee, in the form that is readily
withdrawable.
Respondent judge ordered Camara to remain in detention until LBP complies with
such order. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Issue
Whether or not a respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of his jurisdiction when he refused to release Camara from detention
despite LBPs compliance.
Ruling
Yes. Under section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of habeas corpus does not
lie if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process. Petitioner does not question the trial courts jurisdiction to issue the
Order citing petitioner in contempt. What petitioner assails is respondent judges refusal to
release Camara from detention despite LBPs compliance of the full amount of the
preliminary compensation.
This is grave abuse of respondent judges contempt powers, amounting to lack or
excess of his jurisdiction.
Title: Moncupa vs. Enrile, G.R. No. L-63345 (1986)

Facts
Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they were members of
a subversive organization. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily released
from detention on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and
academic since the petitioner is free and no longer under the respondents custody.
Petitioner argues that his temporary release did not render the instant petition moot
and academic because of the restrictions imposed by the respondents which constitute an
involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.
Issue
Whether or not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot and academic in
view of the detained persons release with restrictions.
Ruling
The Supreme Court held in negative. Restraints attached to temporary release of a
detained person warrant the Supreme Courts inquiry into the nature of the involuntary
restraint and relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.
Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the detainees
temporary release constitutes restraints on the liberty of the detainee. It is not physical
restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
Temporary release of detainee from detention with involuntary restraints does not
render the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. It is available where a
person continue to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
necessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.
Title: Harden vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-2349 (1948)

Facts
The petitioner, Fred Harden, is being confined in prison for the contempt of court. The
proceedings for contempt arose in a civil case involving the administration of conjugal
partnership, payment of alimony, and accounting. In that case, a receiver was appointed
and a preliminary injunction was issued restraining the petitioner from transferring or
alienating, except for a valuable consideration and with the consent of the court first had
and obtained, moneys, shares of stock, and other properties and assets, real or personal,
belonging to the aforesaid partnership, and which might be found in the names of said
defendants or either of them. The petitioner, however, transferred cash to various banks in
Hongkong and California, as well as to an unknown person. He was ordered by the court to
redeposit the money and the Balatoc Mining Co. shares belonging to the conjugal
partnership, which he had in Hongkong to the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China
(Manila Branch). On various occasions, the petitioner failed to comply with the orders of the
court until he was committed in prison.
Issue
Whether or not the petitioner, Fred Harden, can warrant a writ of habeas corpus.
Ruling
The petition is denied with costs. The grounds for relief by habeas corpus are only (1)
deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights (2) lack of jurisdiction of the court to
impose the sentence or (3) excessive penalty. It was held that the court has jurisdiction to
impose the sentence simply because the person charged is in the state and he is still within
the jurisdiction of its courts. Moreover, the penalty imposed on the petitioner is not
excessive because under Section 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, when the contempt
consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he
may be imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it. This justifies the
penalty imposed on Fred Harden, thereby not making it excessive. Moreover, the courts
findings are supported by sufficient evidence and it is a matter of fact which cannot be
reviewed by habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error.
Title: Olaguer vs. Military Commission, G.R. No. L-54558 (1987)

Facts
The herein petitioners were arrested by the military authorities. They were all initially
detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. All of the petitioners are civilians and they were
charged for subversion. The respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
created the respondent Military Commission to try tile criminal case filed against the
petitioners. In the course of the proceedings, the petitioners went to this Court and filed the
instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. They sought to enjoin the respondent
from proceeding with the trial of their case. They likewise sought their release from
detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of their arguments is that military
commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses alleged to have been
committed during the period of martial law. Pending the resolution of the Petition, the
respondent passed sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the penalty
of death by electrocution. In sum the second Petition seeks to enjoin the said respondents
from taking any further action on the case against the petitioners, and from implementing
the judgment of conviction rendered by the respondent for the reason that the same is null
and void.
Issue
Whether or not military commissions or tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians
for offenses allegedly committed during martial law when civil courts are open and
functioning.
Ruling
The court held that military commissions or tribunals have no jurisdiction to try
civilians for alleged offenses when the civil courts are open and functioning.
As long as the civil courts in the land are open and functioning, military tribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them. Whether
or not martial law has been proclaimed throughout the country or over a part thereof is of no
moment. A state of martial law, does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
Title: Villavicencio vs. Lukban, G.R. No. 14639 (1919)

Facts
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been
permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. the women were kept confined
to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city
authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women
to Davao, Mindanao, as labourers. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a
considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a
member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the
parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao
and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as
including them.
Issue
Whether or not the petition is meritorious.
Ruling
The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the
writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty. The law, in its zealous regard
for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas
corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned
or restrained of his liberty.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who
handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these
women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in
Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising
the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in
Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until
they freely and truly waived his right.
Title: Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125901 (2001)

Facts
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son from
respondent and presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Respondent claimed on
the other hand that she is the natural mother of the child.
The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas corpus. On
appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate
court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.
Issue
Ruling
Is habeas corpus the proper remedy to regain custody of a minor?
Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal
remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the
custody of a third person of his own free will.
Title: Andal vs. People, G.R. No. 138268-69 (1999)

Facts
Petitioner Jury Andal, Ricardo Andal and Edwin Mendoza were all convicted of rape
with homicide in the Regional Trial Court. They seek a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a
claim of mistrial and/or that the decision of the Regional Trial Court was void. They pray for
a temporary restraining order to stay their execution and/or a preliminary injunction
enjoining their execution. They argued that the trial court was ousted of jurisdiction to try
their case since the pre-trial identification of the accused was made without the assistance
of counsel and without a valid waiver from the accused.
Issue
Whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should be granted.
Ruling
No, the Supreme Court found that there was no violation of the constitutional rights
of the accused and a resultant deprivation of liberty or due process of law. The accused
were sentenced to the supreme penalty of death as a result of a valid accusation, trial, and
judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial.
The factual milieu does not show a mistrial or a violation of the constitutional rights
of the accused.
Change of Name (Rule 103, Rules of Court; Republic Act Nos. 9048 and 9255)
Title: Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906 (1992)
Facts
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and
Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old and then known as Maximo
Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the
consent of their natural parents and by order of the court issued on September 9, 1967,
adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong
Wong, now deceased, was an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school
teacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remained childless after fifteen years of
marriage. The couples showered their adopted children with parental love and reared them
as their own children
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and
a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition to
change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong
embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a
Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is
being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life;
and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
The RTC granted and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
Issue
Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of
name are valid, sufficient and proper.
Ruling
Yes, the Supreme Court held it did not believe that by reverting to his old name,
private respondent would then be using a name which he is prohibited by law from using.
True, the law prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but the law does not go so
far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname, and only subjects such
recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. What the law does not prohibit, it
permits.
Title: Dantes Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174689 (2007)

Facts
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual who filed a petition for the
change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth
certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these changes,
among others, so that he can marry his American fianc. The RTC granted Silverios petition.
The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity; that Silverios misfortune to be
trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against
him. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the
part of Silverio and [her] fianc and the realization of their dreams. Later, a petition for
certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue
Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate
may be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in existing
legislation. Republic Act 9048 provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has
jurisdiction in petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the
petition of Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even
assuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon
which it is based (gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Under
the law, a change of name may only be grounded on the following:
1. The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community;
or
3. The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender reassignment as the basis.
On the issue of change of sex, the entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the
regular courts or a petition for the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no
law to support it. And not with the civil registry because there is no clerical error involved.
Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that the entry written in his birth
certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by
the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
Title: Republic vs. Bolante, G.R. No. 160597 (2006)

Facts
This is a petition for review under Rule 45. The Republic assails and seeks to set aside
the decision of CA affirming that of the RTC) in special proceeding case of change of name
commenced by respondent Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also known as Maria Eloisa
Bringas Bolante.
To prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to
conform to the name she has always carried and used. Finding the petition sufficient in form
and substance, the trial court ordered Bolante to comply with the jurisdictional requirements
of notice and publication. She presented and marked in evidence several documents without
any objection on the part of the Republic, represented by the OSG. Then, she took the
witness stand. Her petition was granted but OSG appealed to CA which affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.
Issue
1. Whether or not there is substantial compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 103 of ROC for the
court take cognizance of the petition.
Ruling
2. Whether or not the respondents bare testimony, unsupported by any other

evidence, is sufficient to prove that the change of her name is not resorted for
illegal purposes.
On the first issue, the Court ruled in the affirmative. It cannot be over-emphasized
that in a petition for change of name, any interested person may appear at the hearing and
oppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or his deputy shall appear on behalf of
the Government. The government, as an agency of the people, represents the public and,
therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the government, effectively
represents the public. As it were, the Republic was fully apprised of the new dates of the
initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for a republication of the initial notice
of the hearing.
On the second issue, the Court also ruled in the affirmative. Jurisprudence has
recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name. Among these are: (a)
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
when the change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest.
The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary
issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the
court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best
evidence available.
Title: Republic vs. Belmonte, G.R. No. L-32600 (1988)

Facts
The herein private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao, a resident of Baguio City,
filed a Petition for the change other name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. For this purpose,
she also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her father's
name appearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her mother's name recorded as
PAKIAT CHAN be changed to HELEN CHAN. At the time the litigation was commenced, the
petitioner was a 16-year old minor. Thus, she was assisted in the case by her mother. The
petitioner alleged that the maiden name of her mother is Helen Chan and that the given
name Pakiat written on her birth certificate is actually the given name of her maternal
grandmother. The petitioner also asserted that the name of her father is Pao Yu and not Po
Yu as erroneously written in her birth certificate and as such her real surname is Pao.
Issue
Can a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain entries in the civil
registry be joined in the same proceeding?
Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative. The court held that the procedure recited in Rule 103
regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for
the other for the sole purpose of expediency.
The propriety of corrections should first be determined in a different proceeding more
adversary in character than the summary case instituted by the petitioner with the trial
court. Aside from the change of her name, the petitioner seeks a correction of entries in the
civil registry for the benefit of her parents. This she may not do through a summary
proceeding. The summary procedure for correction of the civil register under Rule 108 is
confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to a material change in the spelling of a
surname as prayed for by the petitioner. A clerical error must be apparent on the face of the
record and should be capable of being corrected by reference to the record alone. The
petitioner seeks more than just the correction of a clerical error.
Moreover, under Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding. An inspection of
all the pleadings filed by the petitioner with the trial court shows that the local civil registrar
concerned was never made a party to the proceeding. Said civil registrar being an
indispensable party, a final determination of the case cannot be made.
Title: Hawliong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194 (1966)

Facts
Petitioner seeks to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin in a petition
filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
He testified that he is 47 years old, married, and an employee of the Leyte Asia
Trading Company; that he has been a resident of Tacloban City for more than 20 years; that
he wants to change his name to Alfonso Lantin because he is called by his Filipino friends as
Alfonso and the name of his father is Placido Lantin; that he wants to have a Filipino name
because he will soon be a Filipino citizen; that he came to the Philippines in 1925 and since
then his Filipino friends have been calling him Alfonso; that there is no pending case against
him as Haw Liong; and that in the event a case will arise against him as Haw Liong he is
willing to appear and answer the same.
After hearing, the court a quo allowed petitioner to change his name from Haw Liong
to Alfonso Lantin. The government has appealed.
Issue
Whether or not the court a quo erred in allowing the change of name of the
petitioner.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The following may be considered, among others,
as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of
name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status,
such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is
necessary to avoid confusion.
Therefore, petitioner cannot file for a change of name on the ground set forth above.
As was disclosed in his cross examination, that in his business dealings with other people he
always signed as Haw Liong and never used the name Alfonso Lantin; that he came to be
called Alfonso by his friends only when during the Japanese occupation his Filipino friends
asked him how he was called and he told them that his name was Alfonso, and since then
they started calling him by that name; and that he is known in Tacloban City as Haw Liong
and has not contracted with any person under the name of Alfonso Lantin. We find,
therefore, no proper or compelling reason that may justify the change of name desired by
petitioner for his petition does not come under any of the cases above adverted to.
Title: Ang Chay vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-22712 (1970)

Facts
Josefina Ang Chay and Mercedita Ang Chay prayed for the change of their respective
names to Josefina Hernandez and Mercedita Hernandez. Both of legal age, single and
residents of San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, at 3 least years prior to the filing of the
petition; that having elected Philippine citizenship on 7 February 1966, they would like to
use Filipino names by having their surnames "Ang Chay changed to "Hernandez".
The petition was opposed by the government, on the ground that the reason adduced
therefor was not proper and reasonable. After hearing, judgment was entered for the
petitioners, and their surnames were decreed changed from for all legal intent and purposes.
It is from this decision that the oppositor Republic of the Philippines is appealing on the
same issue of the propriety and reasonableness of the ground for petitioners' action for
change of their name.
Issue
Whether or not the change of name is valid.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the affirmative. It is a ruling of long standing in this jurisdiction
that change of name is not a matter of right; that being a privilege, before it can be
authorized, the person petitioning for such change must first show proper cause of
compelling reason therefore.
There is valid reason to justify the continued use by petitioners of the names by
which they have been known, and with which they have always conducted, in good faith,
their various social and business activities.
A mere change of name would not cause a change in one's existing family relations,
nor create new family rights and duties where none exists before. Neither would it affect a
person's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship.
Thus, this Court, in some meritorious cases, granted the applications of naturalized
Filipinos for change of their foreign names to Filipino-sounding ones, in order that the
handicap in their social and business dealings, posed by their alien names, may be removed
and thus enable their full integration into the Philippine society where they now belong.
There is more compelling reason, therefore, for the granting of this petition and allowing the
use of Filipino names by herein petitioners, whose mother is a Filipino, and who have been
reared and schooled, and have actually lived, as Filipinos.
Title: Laperal vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-18008 (1962)

Facts
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the
spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she
naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using
her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the
ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her
married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
Issue
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the
specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally
separated from his husband.
Ruling
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband
surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be
considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the
conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and
liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the
name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the
mandatory provision of Art. 372. Petition was dismissed.
Title: Secan Kok vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-27621 (1976)

Facts
On May 18, 1964, appellee Secan Kok filed a petition to change his name and that of
his daughter Marilyn Se respectively to Antonio Cuakok and Gloria Cuakok, although his
petition mentions his other minor children, namely Perfecto, Romeo, Betty, Tomas, Daniel
and Antonio, Jr. as having been born out of his marriage in the Catholic church on August 2,
1947 at Cotabato City, without, significantly, mentioning the name of his wife.
The Court granted the petition, after the petitioner amended and file for
supplemental pleading to include his wife and children to use his name as approved in his
petition.The government appeal for the reason that the judgment had long become final and
was already executory when the present motion for supplemental pleading was filed.
Issue
Whether or not the approved name of the petitioner be extended to his wife and
children.
Ruling
The Court held that the rules are very explicit. Under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the
Revised Rules of Court, it provides that a petition for a change of name shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name to be changed, or some other person in his behalf.
There is need therefore for a separate petition to be filed by the wife Lucia O. Tee, who is
already of age, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children.
To confer jurisdiction on the court, since petitions for change of name are proceedings
in rem, strict compliance with the requirements is essential, namely, that such verified
petition should be published for three (3) successive weeks in some newspapers of general
circulation in the province; and that both the title or caption of the petition and its body shall
recite (1) the name or names or aliases of the applicant; (2) the cause for which the change
of name is sought; and (3) the name or names or aliases of the applicant; (2) the cause for
which the change of name is sought; and (3) the new name asked for.
To allow the change of name of the wife and other minor children of petitionerappellee, upon a mere motion as an incident in the proceedings for the change of name of
petitioner-appellee, will not only deprive the government of the required filing fees therefor
but will also dispense with the aforesaid essential requirements respecting the recitals in the
title of the petition and the publication to apprise persons, who may be in possession of
adverse information or evidence against the grant of the petition, so that they will come
forward with such information or evidence in order to protect public interest as well as the
interest of private individuals who may be prejudiced by the change of name of the
petitioner.
Title: Pabellar vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-27298 (1976)

Facts
The Republic of the Philippines appealed from the decision of the CFI granting the
petition of Mario Pabellar for change of his surname to Carandang and ordering the civil
registrar of Lucena City to make the corresponding change "in his record of birth or in his
civil registry by way of marginal notes.
Petitioner Pabellar wants to change his surname to Carandang. Presumably, no

record of his birth in the civil register is available for none was presented in evidence. His
record shows that when he was baptized as an illegitimate child of Teofila Pabellar with an
unknown father and paternal grandparents, he was given the name Mario Pabellar. However,
he used that name only when he filed the petition in this case. He testified that his father is
Esteban Carandang who is married to Rufina Marasigan. They were separated. She lived in
Batangas. Esteban Carandang took Teofila Pabellar as his common-law wife and lived with
her in Lucena. The petitioner has lived with his parents in Lucena since birth. He has always
used the name Mario Carandang.
His father urged him to see a lawyer so that he could change his surname from
Pabellar to Carandang. On February 28, 1966 the petitioner filed the instant petition for
change of name. He used in the petition the name, Mario Pabellar.
Issue
Is the petition for the change of name is proper?
Ruling
No. The fact that the petitioner was christened Mario Pabellar does not justify his
petition for the change of his surname to Carandang. "The real name of a person is that
given to him in the civil register, not the name by which he was baptized in his church." In a
petition for change of name "the only name that may be changed is the true or official name
recorded in the civil register."
In reality what the petitioner seeks is not a change of name. What he wants is judicial
authority for his continued use of the surname, Carandang, which he has been using since
childhood. That use is allowed by Commonwealth Act No. 142. According to his testimony,
his use of the surname Carandang has the sanction of his natural father. Judicial authority is
required for a change of name or surname (Art. 376, Civil Code) but not for the use of a
surname which the petitioner has already been using since childhood. Hence, the petition in
this case was uncalled for. In colloquial parlance, it has no leg to stand on.
Title: Republic vs. Hernandez, supra.

Facts
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and
simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee
to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired
consequent to his adoption.
Issue
Is the granting of the petition for change of name proper?
Ruling
No. The Court ruled that the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the
civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a
license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change
thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree
of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such
that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot
properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein. If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and
strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding
for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the
reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all
the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed
by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To
consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to
denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial
law system.
Constitution of Family Home (Rule 106, Rules of Court)
Title: Taneo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108532 (1999)
Facts
Petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 (docketed as Civil Case No. 10407) to
declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the children
and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and
September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject
property. Considering that said property has been acquired through free patent, such
property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of
debt.
Issue
Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
Ruling
The family home is not exempt from execution. A debt was incurred before the house
was deemed a family home. Before the effectivity of the Family Code, a family home must
be constituted judicially (filing of petition) and extra-judicially (registration). It turns out that
the instrument constituting the family home was registered only in January 24, 1966. The
money judgment was rendered on the same date.
Absentees (Rule 107, Rules of Court)
Title: Jones vs. Hortiguela, G.R. No. 43701 (1937)

Facts
Marciana Escao had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed
judicial administrator of her entire estate, and in an order issued on May 9, 1932, Angelita
Jones, her daughter by her first marriage, and Felix Hortiguela, her widower by her second
marriage, were declared her only heirs.
The heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a motion alleging
that she was the only heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escao; that there never
was a valid marriage between her mother and Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriage
been celebrated, it was null and void; and even granting that it were valid, Felix Hortiguela
was not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third of the inheritance; that the petitioner was
a minor and that during the hearing of the intestate proceedings she had not been assisted
by counsel but was represent by the same attorney of Felix Hortiguela
Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have
been made not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from
the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and
14 days elapsed; and in accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No. 68,
the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao is null and void.
Issue
Whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged marriage to Marciana Escao was
celebrated.
Ruling
The Court ruled in the negative. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to
enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the
former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that
such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana Escao's
former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news
concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine
years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful. Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela
was lawfully married to Marciana Escao and was divorced from her at the time of her death
there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in
intestate succession, as in the present case.
Title: Armas vs. Calisterio, G.R. No. 136467 (2000)

Facts
Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in
April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second
husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The
latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance
of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a
court declaration of Bounds presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be
the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother
being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be
appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be
adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
Issue
Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to the absence of the
declaration of presumptive death.
Ruling
The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May
1958 where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which
only took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive
governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that
declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least
7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrietas marriage
with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.
Title: Republic vs. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053 (1993)

Facts
Petitioner Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch
10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. He testified that he was a seaman and that he had
first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's
port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent
Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San
Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January
1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites
officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique.
Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his
mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed
him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked
permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983. He
looked for his spouse and sent letters to her known address, but it proved futile. The RTC
granted his petition and was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General opposed such on the
ground that first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead," and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same
proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.
Issue
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Ruling
No, the Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his
missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt
to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead.
The spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of
them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the
laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled
before the trial court in the same proceeding.
Cancellation and Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry (Rule 108, Rules of
Court)
Title: Rivero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273 (2005)

Facts
On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint against Mary Jane Dy ChiaoDe Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy
Chiao, Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on
July 27, 1995. He was represented by his mother. It was also alleged that the Dy Chiao
siblings recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father.
In an answer to the complaint, Mary Jane, through counsel, for herself, and
purportedly in behalf of her brothers, denied the allegations that Shirley and her father had
an amorous relationship and that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father for want
of knowledge or information; the allegation that they had recognized Benedick as the
illegitimate son of their father was, likewise, specifically denied. Finally, she alleged that the
plaintiff's action was for a claim against the estate of their father, which should be filed in an
action for the settlement of the estate of their deceased parents.
However, on December 13, 1996, Benedick and Maryjane, in behalf of her brothers,
duly assisted by their respective cousnels hereby entered a compromise agreement. But the
Dy Chiao brothers, through their Uncle Henry, alleged that the Dy Chiao brothers had no
legal capacity to be sued because they were unsound mind, and did not authorize Maryjane
to execute any compromise agreement.
Issue
1 1. Whether or not Henry Dy Chiao had the authority to file the amended petition for
Benito Dy Chiao, Jr.
2 2. Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for
recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., as well as the
action for partition and distribution of the latter's estate.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court rejected the
petitioners' contention that Henry was the petitioner who filed the amended petition before
the CA. As gleaned from said petition, the petitioners were "Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and Benson
Dy Chiao, represented by their uncle Henry S. Dy Chiao." Moreover, Henry had the authority
to file the amended petition and sign the requisite certification on non-forum shopping when
the CA admitted the amended petition and appointed him as guardian ad litem of his
nephews. In resolving whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent, the
appellate court needed only to determine whether the individual for whom a guardian was
proposed was so incapable of handling personal and financial affairs as to warrant the need
for the appointment of a temporary guardian. It only needed to make a finding that, based
on clear and convincing evidence, the respondent is incompetent and that it is more likely
than not that his welfare requires the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian. A
finding that the person for whom a guardian ad litem is proposed is incapable of managing
his own personal and financial affairs by reason of his mental illness is enough.
Guardians ad litem are considered officers of the court in a limited sense, and the office
of such guardian is to represent the interest of the incompetent or the minor. Whether or not
to appoint a guardian ad litem for the petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court where the petition was filed, taking into account the best interest of the incompetent
or the minor. The court has discretion in appointing a guardian ad litem that will best
promote the interest of justice. The appointment of a guardian ad litem is designed to assist
the court in its determination of the incompetent's best interest.
On the issue of jurisdiction, case law has it that the jurisdiction of the tribunal over the
nature and subject matter of an action is to be determined by the allegations of the
complaint, the law in effect when the complaint was filed and the character of the relief
prayed for by the plaintiff. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of
the action. If a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only
and undertakes to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case to which the statute has no
application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make a
particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Title: Vda. De Biascan vs. Biascan, G.R. No. 138731 (2000)

Facts
Maria Vda De Biascan (legal wife of Florencio) is opposing the appointment of
Rosalina, Florencios acknowledged child as administratix of his estate. Regional Trial Court
does not set aside the appointment and refuses to let her appeal ruling to Court of Appeals
because Notice and Record on Appeal were filed late.
Issue
Whether or not the order issued in April 1981 is subject to appeal.
Ruling
Yes, the ruling of the trial court falls squarely under Section1 (b) and 1(e) of rule 109.
Oders, decrees or judgement issued by a court in special proceeding constitutes a final
determination of the rights of the parties are the proper subject of an appeal. In contrast,
interlocutory orders are not appealable by these are merely incidental to judicial
proceedings.
Title: Lopez vs. Teodoro, G.R. No. L-3071 (1950)

Facts
Eulalio Lopez, Sr., an incapacitated under the judicial guardianship of Eulalio Lopez,
Jr., was the exclusive and absolute owner of an hacienda in Silay, Negros Occidental. The
court acting upon a motion of Senen L. Gamboa and Adelaida Gamboa filed in the
proceedings for guardianship, ordered the guardian to pay the movants. The order provided
that if the guardian did not have funds to pay those debts, he should take the necessary
steps for the sale of some of the property of the guardianship
In pursuance of this authority, the guardian sold the above tract of land, the only
property of which the incapacitated was possessed to Jesus bound himself to pay the
mortgage debt and other obligations aggregating and to satisfy the balance in two
installments.
Salvacion Lopez filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order authorizing
said sale, and upon the motion being denied, she brought this petition for certiorari and
mandamus, contending that the sale was null and void by reason of the court's failure to
adhere to Rule 96, and praying that the orders of the respondent court be corrected and the
said court directed to revoke the sale.
Issue
Whether or not the said sale should be revoke.
Ruling
The court of first instance in which the guardianship proceedings were pending had
jurisdiction to order the questioned sale. It appears that the outstanding indebtedness of the
guardianship properly and legally incurred and part of which was due the petitioner for the
support and maintenance of the incapacitated.
The petition was denied.

Consolidated Cases in Special Proceedings Under Atty. Tiofilo Villanueva

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Consolidated Cases in Special Proceedings Under Atty. Tiofilo Villanueva

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CASE DIGESTS IN SPECIAL

Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data

1 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

2 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

3 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

4 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795

5 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

6 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Edgardo Navia vs. Pardico, G.R. No. 184467

7 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

8 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

9 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

10 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

11 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: So vs. Tacla, G.R. No. 190108 (2010)

12 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Castillo vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 182165 (2009)

13 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Burgos vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155

14 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

15 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Gen. Yano vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640 (2010)

16 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Gamboa vs. Chan, G.R. No. 193636 (2012)

Whether or not the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper.

17 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Meralco vs. Lim, G.R. No. 184769 (2010)

18 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Rules of Special Proceedings (Rule 72, Rules of Court)

19 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

20 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133000 (2001)

21 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Reyes vs. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405 (2006)

22 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139868 (2006)

23 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Domingo vs. Landicho, G.R. No. 170015 (2007)

24 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons (Rules 73-90, Rules of Court)

25 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

26 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Malig vs. Bush, G.R. No. L-22761 (1969)

27 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

28 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-24742

29 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. No.

30 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Macias vs. Uy Kim, G.R. No. L-31174 (1972)

31 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18148

Whether or not a probate court in special proceeding had jurisdiction to determine

32 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Ermac vs. Medelo, G.R. No. L-32281 (1975)

33 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: PCIB vs. Escolin, G.R. No. L-27860 (1974)

34 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Ocampo vs. Potenciana, G.R. No. L-2263 (1951)

35 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

36 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding

Title: Cortes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117417 (2000)

37 |Case Digests in Special Proceeding