G.R. No.

167702

March 20, 2009

LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RANDOLPH C. LIMJOCO, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64642 dismissing
Civil Case No. 99-297 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as narrated by the CA, are simple.
[Petitioner Lourdes] Eristingcol is an owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village (or
"village"), Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 208586. On
the other hand, [respondent Randolph] Limjoco, [Lorenzo] Tan and [June] Vilvestre
were the former president and chairman of the board of governors (or "board"),
construction committee chairman and village manager of [Urdaneta Village
Association Inc.] UVAI, respectively. UVAI is an association of homeowners at
Urdaneta Village.
[Eristingcols] action [against UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] is founded on the
allegations that in compliance with the National Building Code and after UVAIs
approval of her building plans and acceptance of the construction bond and
architects fee, Eristingcol started constructing a house on her lot with "concrete
canopy directly above the main door and highway"; that for alleged violation of its
Construction Rules and Regulations (or "CRR") on "Set Back Line" vis-a-vis the
canopy easement, UVAI imposed on her a penalty of P400,000.00 and barred her
workers and contractors from entering the village and working on her property; that
the CRR, particularly on "Set Back Line," is contrary to law; and that the penalty is
unwarranted and excessive.
On February 9, 1999, or a day after the filing of the complaint, the parties reached a
temporary settlement whereby UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre executed an
undertaking which allowed Eristingcols workers, contractors and suppliers to leave
and enter the village, subject only to normal security regulations of UVAI.
On February 26, 1999, UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre filed a motion to dismiss on
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. They argued that
it is the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (or "HIGC")2 which has jurisdiction
over intra-corporate disputes involving homeowners associations, pursuant to Exec.
Order No. 535, Series of 1979, as amended by Exec. Order No. 90, Series of 1986.

Opposing the motion, Eristingcol alleged, among others, that UVAI, Limjoco, Tan
and Vilvestre did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Secs. 4 and 6, Rule
15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and are estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the [RTC] after they voluntarily appeared therein "and embraced its
authority by agreeing to sign an Undertaking."
On May 20, 1999, Eristingcol filed an amended complaint by (i) impleading Manuel
Carmona (or "Carmona") and Rene Cristobal (or "Cristobal"), UVAIs newly-elected
president and chairman of the board and newly-designated construction committee
chairman, respectively, as additional defendants and (ii) increasing her claim for
moral damages against each petitioner from P500,000.00 to P1,000,000.00.
On May 25, 1999, Eristingcol filed a motion for production and inspection of
documents, which UVAI, Limjoco, Tan, Vilvestre, Carmona and Cristobal opposed.
The motion sought to compel [UVAI and its officers] to produce the documents used
by UVAI as basis for the imposition of the P400,000.00 penalty on Eristingcol as well
as letters and documents showing that UVAI had informed the other homeowners of
their violations of the CRR.
On May 26, 1999, the [RTC] issued an order which pertinently reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, for lack of merit, the defendants Motion to Dismiss
is Denied, and plaintiffs motion to declare defendants in default and for contempt
are also Denied."
The [RTC] ratiocinated that [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] may not assail its
jurisdiction "after they voluntarily entered their appearance, sought reliefs therein,
and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an undertaking to desist from
prohibiting (Eristingcols) workers from entering the village." In so ruling, it applied
the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
On June 7, 1999, Eristingcol filed a motion reiterating her earlier motion for
production and inspection of documents.
On June 8, 1999, [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] moved for partial
reconsideration of the order dated May 26, 1999. Eristingcol opposed the motion.
On March 24, 2001, the [RTC] issued an order granting Eristingcols motion for
production and inspection of documents, while on March 26, 2001, it issued an order
denying [UVAIs, Limjocos, Tans and Vilvestres] motion for partial reconsideration.
On May 10, 2001, [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] elevated the dispute before
[the CA] via [a] petition for certiorari alleging that the [RTC] acted without jurisdiction
in issuing the orders of May 26, 1999 and March 24 and 26, 2001. 3

The CA issued the herein assailed Decision reversing the RTC Order4 and
dismissing Eristingcols complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Hence, this appeal positing a sole issue for our resolution:
Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Eristingcols complaint.
Before anything else, we note that the instant petition impleads only Limjoco as
private respondent. The rest of the defendants sued by Eristingcol before the RTC,
who then collectively filed the petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the RTCs
Order, were, curiously, not included as private respondents in this particular petition.
Eristingcol explains that only respondent Limjoco was retained in the instant petition
as her discussions with UVAI and the other defendants revealed their lack of
participation in the work-stoppage order which was supposedly single-handedly
thought of and implemented by Limjoco.
The foregoing clarification notwithstanding, the rest of the defendants should have
been impleaded as respondents in this petition considering that the complaint before
the RTC, where the petition before the CA and the instant petition originated, has yet
to be amended. Furthermore, the present petition maintains that it was serious error
for the CA to have ruled that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over a complaint for
declaration of nullity of UVAIs Construction Rules. Clearly, UVAI and the rest of the
defendants should have been impleaded herein as respondents.
Section 4(a), Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, requires that the petition shall "state the
full name of the appealing party as petitioner and the adverse party as respondent,
without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or
respondents." As the losing party in defendants petition for certiorari before the CA,
Eristingcol should have impleaded all petitioners, the winning and adverse parties
therein.
On this score alone, the present petition could have been dismissed
outright.5 However, to settle the issue of jurisdiction, we have opted to dispose of
this case on the merits.
Despite her having dropped UVAI, Lorenzo Tan (Tan) and June Vilvestre (Vilvestre)
from this suit, Eristingcol insists that her complaint against UVAI and the defendants
was properly filed before the RTC as it prays for the declaration of nullity of UVAIs
Construction Rules and asks that damages be paid by Limjoco and the other UVAI
officers who had inflicted injury upon her. Eristingcol asseverates that since the case
before the RTC is one for declaration of nullity, the nature of the question that is the
subject of controversy, not just the status or relationship of the parties, should
determine which body has jurisdiction. In any event, Eristingcol submits that the

RTCs jurisdiction over the case was foreclosed by the prayer of UVAI and its
officers, including Limjoco, for affirmative relief from that court.
Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in determining which body has
jurisdiction over a case, we should consider not only the status or relationship of the
parties, but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their
controversy.6 To determine the nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction,
courts must look at the averments of the complaint or petition and the essence of the
relief prayed for.7 Thus, we examine the pertinent allegations in Eristingcols
complaint, specifically her amended complaint, to wit:
Allegations Common to All Causes of Action
3. In 1958 and upon its incorporation, [UVAI] adopted a set of By-laws and Rules and
Regulations, x x x. Item 5 of [UVAIs] Construction Rules pertinently provides:
"Set back line: All Buildings, including garage servants quarters, or parts thereof
(covered terraces, portes cocheres) must be constructed at a distance of not less than
three (3) meters from the boundary fronting a street and not less than four (4) meters
fronting the drainage creek or underground culvert and two (2) meters from other
boundaries of a lot. Distance will be measured from the vertical projection of the roof
nearest the property line. Completely open and unroofed terraces are not included in
these restrictions."
Suffice it to state that there is nothing in the same By-laws which deals explicitly with
canopies or marquees which extend outward from the main building.
4. [Eristingcol] has been a resident of Urdaneta Village for eleven (11) years. In
February 1997, she purchased a parcel of land in the Village, located at the corner of
Urdaneta Avenue and Cerrada Street. x x x.
5. In considering the design for the house (the "Cerrada property") which she intended
to construct on Cerrada Street, [Eristingcol] referred to the National Building Code of the
Philippines. After assuring herself that the said law does not expressly provide any
restrictions in respect thereof, and after noting that other houses owned by prominent
families had similar structures without being cited by the Villages Construction
Committee, [Eristingcol] decided that the Cerrada property would have a concrete
canopy directly above the main door and driveway.
6. In compliance with [UVAIs] rules, [Eristingcol] submitted to [UVAI] copies of her
building plans in respect of the Cerrada property and the building plans were duly
approved by [UVAI]. x x x.
7. [Eristingcol] submitted and/or paid the "cash bond/construction bond deposit and
architects inspection fee" of P200,000.00 and the architects inspection fee of P500.00
as required under Construction Rules x x x.

8. In the latter part of 1997, and while the construction of the Cerrada property was
ongoing, [Eristingcol] received a notice from [UVAI], charging her with alleged violations
of the Construction Rules, i.e., those on the height restriction of eleven (11.0) meters,
and the canopy extension into the easement. On 22nd January 1998, [Eristingcol]
(through her representatives) met with, among others, defendant Limjoco. In said
meeting, and after deliberation on the definition of the phrase "original ground elevation"
as a reference point, [Eristingcols] representatives agreed to revise the building plan by
removing what was intended to be a parapet or roof railing, and thereby reduce the
height of the structure by 40 centimeters, which proposal was accepted by the Board
through defendant Limjoco, Gov. Catalino Macaraig Jr. ([UVAIs] Construction
Committee chairman), and the Villages Architect. However, the issue of the alleged
violation in respect of the canopy/extension remained unresolved.
xxxx
9. In compliance with the agreement reached at the 22nd January 1998 meeting,
[Eristingcol] caused the revision of her building plans such that, as it now stands, the
Cerrada property has a vertical height of 10.96 meters and, thus, was within the
Villages allowed maximum height of 11 meters.
10. Sometime in June 1998, [Eristingcol] was surprised to receive another letter from
[UVAI], this time from the Construction Committee chairman (defendant Tan), again
calling her attention to alleged violations of the Construction Rules. On 15th June 1998,
[UVAI] barred [Eristingcols] construction workers from entering the Village. Thus,
[Eristingcols] Construction Manager (Mr. Jaime M. Hidalgo) wrote defendant Tan to
explain her position, and attached photographs of similar "violations" by other property
owners which have not merited the same scrutiny and sanction from [UVAI].
xxxx
11. On 26th October 1998, and for reasons known only to him, defendant Vilvestre sent
a letter to Mr. Geronimo delos Reyes, demanding for an "idea of how [Mr. delos Reyes]
can demonstrate in concrete terms [his] good faith as a quid pro quo for compromise to"
[UVAIs] continued insistence that [Eristingcol] had violated [UVAIs] Construction Rules.
x x x.
xxxx
12. [Eristingcol] through Mr. Hidalgo sent a letter dated 24th November 1998 to
defendant Tan, copies of which were furnished defendants Limjoco, Vilvestre and the
Board, reiterating that, among others: (i) the alleged height restriction violation is untrue,
since the Cerrada property now has a height within the limits imposed by [UVAI]; and (ii)
the demand to reduce the canopy by ninety (90) centimeters is without basis, in light of
the existence of thirty-five (35) similar "violations" of the same nature by other
homeowners. [Eristingcol] through Mr. Hidalgo further mentioned that she had done
nothing to deserve the crude and coercive Village letters and the Boards threats of

work stoppage, and she cited instances when she dealt with [UVAI] and her fellow
homeowners in good faith and goodwill such as in 1997, when she very discreetly spent
substantial amounts to landscape the entire Village Park, concrete the Park track oval
which was being used as a jogging path, and donate to the Association molave benches
used as Park benches.
xxxx
13. On the same date (24th November 1998), defendant Vilvestre sent another letter
addressed to [Eristingcols] construction manager Hidalgo, again threatening to enjoin
all construction activity on the Cerrada property as well as ban entry of all workers and
construction deliveries effective 1st December 1998 unless Mr. delos Reyes met with
defendants. x x x.
xxxx
14. On 2nd December 1998, [Eristingcols] representatives met with defendants
Limjoco, Tan, and Vilvestre. During that meeting, defendants were shown copies of the
architectural plans for the Cerrada property. [Eristingcols] representatives agreed to
allow [UVAIs] Construction Committees architect to validate the measurements given.
However, on the issue of the canopy extension, the defendants informed [Eristingcols]
representatives that the Board would impose a penalty of Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P400,000.00) for violation of [UVAIs] "set back" or easement rule. Defendants
cited the Boards imposition of similar fines to previous homeowners who had violated
the same rule, and they undertook to furnish [Eristingcol] with a list of past penalties
imposed and paid by homeowners found by the Board to have violated the Villages "set
back" provision.
15. On 22nd December 1998, defendant Vilvestre sent [Eristingcol] a letter dated 18th
December 1998 formally imposing a penalty of P400,000.00 for the "canopy easement
violation." x x x.
16. On 29th December 1998, x x x, Vilvestre sent a letter to [Eristingcol], stating that "as
far as [his] administration is concerned, there has been no past penalties executed by
[UVAI], similar to the one we are presently demanding on your on going construction. x
xx
17. On 4th January 1999, [Eristingcols] representative sent a letter to the Board, asking
for a reconsideration of the imposition of the P400,000.00 penalty on the ground that the
same is unwarranted and excessive. On 6th January 1999, [Eristingcol] herself sent a
letter to the Board, expounding on the reasons for opposing the Boards action. On 18th
January 1999, [Eristingcol] sent another letter in compliance with defendants request
for a breakdown of her expenditures in respect of her donations relative to the Village
park.

18. On 3rd February 1999, [Eristingcol] through her lawyers sent defendants a letter,
requesting that her letters of 4th and 6th January 1999 be acted upon.
19. On 4th February 1999, x x x, defendant Limjoco gave a verbal order to [UVAIs]
guards to bar the entry of workers working on the Cerrada property.
20. In the morning of 5th February 1999, defendants physically barred [Eristingcols]
workers and contractors from entering the Village and working at the Cerrada property. 8

Eristingcol then lists the following causes of action:

1. Item 5 of UVAIs Construction Rules constitutes an illegal and unwarranted
intrusion upon Eristingcols proprietary rights as it imposes a set-back or
horizontal easement of 3.0 meters from the property line greater than the
specification in Section 1005(b) of the Building Code that "the horizontal
clearance between the outermost edge of the marquee and the curb line shall be
not less than 300 millimeters." As such, Eristingcol prays for the declaration of
nullity of this provision in UVAIs Construction Rules insofar as she is concerned.
2. UVAIs imposition of a P400,000.00 penalty on Eristingcol has no factual
basis, is arbitrary, whimsical and capricious as rampant violations of the set-back
rule by other homeowners in the Village were not penalized by UVAI. Eristingcol
prays to put a stop to defendants arbitrary exercise of power pursuant to UVAIs
by-laws.
3. Absent any factual or legal bases for the imposition of a P400,000.00 penalty,
defendants and all persons working under their control should be permanently
barred or restrained from imposing and/or enforcing any penalty upon Eristingcol
for an alleged violation of UVAIs Construction Rules, specifically the provision on
set-back.
4. Defendants Limjoco, Tan, and Vilvestre, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil
Code, demonstrated bias against Eristingcol by zeroing in on her alone and her
supposed violation, while other homeowners, who had likewise violated UVAIs
Construction Rules, were not cited or penalized therefor. Defendants actuations
were in clear violation of their duty to give all homeowners, including Eristingcol,
their due.
5. Defendants actuations have seriously affected Eristingcols mental disposition
and have caused her to suffer sleepless nights, mental anguish and serious
anxiety. Eristingcols reputation has likewise been besmirched by UVAIs and
defendants arbitrary charge that she had violated UVAIs Construction Rules. In
this regard, individual defendants should each pay Eristingcol moral damages in
the amount ofP1,000,000.00.

6. Lastly, defendants should pay Eristingcol P1,000.000.00 for litigation expenses

she incurred in instituting this suit and for attorneys fees.

At the outset, we note that the relationship between the parties is not in dispute and
is, in fact, admitted by Eristingcol in her complaint. Nonetheless, Eristingcol is
adamant that the subject matter of her complaint is properly cognizable by the
regular courts and need not be filed before a specialized body or commission.
Eristingcols contention is wrong.
Ostensibly, Eristingcols complaint, designated as one for declaration of nullity, falls
within the regular courts jurisdiction. However, we have, on more than one
occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of
the action.9
A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint reveals that the
nature of the question subject of this controversy only superficially delves into the
validity of UVAIs Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper
interpretation and application of UVAIs by-laws, specifically its construction rules.
Essentially, the conflict between the parties arose as Eristingcol, admittedly a
member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from the application of the canopy
requirement set forth in UVAIs Construction Rules. Significantly, Eristingcol does
not assail the height restriction of UVAIs Construction Rules, as she has readily
complied therewith.
Distinctly in point is China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals,10 which upheld the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over the suit and
recognized its special competence to interpret and apply Valley Golf and Country
Club, Inc.s (VGCCIs) by-laws. We ruled, thus:
Applying the foregoing principles in the case at bar, to ascertain which tribunal has
jurisdiction we have to determine therefore whether or not petitioner is a stockholder
of VGCCI and whether or not the nature of the controversy between petitioner and
private respondent corporation is intra-corporate.
As to the first query, there is no question that the purchase of the subject share or
membership certificate at public auction by petitioner (and the issuance to it of the
corresponding Certificate of Sale) transferred ownership of the same to the latter
and thus entitled petitioner to have the said share registered in its name as a
member of VGCCI. x x x.
By virtue of the aforementioned sale, petitioner became a bona fide stockholder of
VGCCI and, therefore, the conflict that arose between petitioner and VGCCI aptly
exemplifies an intra-corporate controversy between a corporation and its stockholder
under Sec. 5(b) of P.D. 902-A.

An important consideration, moreover, is the nature of the controversy between

petitioner and private respondent corporation. VGCCI claims a prior right over the
subject share anchored mainly on Sec. 3, Art. VIII of its by-laws which provides that
"after a member shall have been posted as delinquent, the Board may order
his/her/its share sold to satisfy the claims of the Club" It is pursuant to this
provision that VGCCI also sold the subject share at public auction, of which it was
the highest bidder. VGCCI caps its argument by asserting that its corporate by-laws
should prevail. The bone of contention, thus, is the proper interpretation and
application of VGCCIs aforequoted by-laws, a subject which irrefutably calls for the
special competence of the SEC.
We reiterate herein the sound policy enunciated by the Court in Abejo v. De la Cruz:
6. In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in
administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes in
the field of labor (as in corporations, public transportation and public utilities) ruled
that Congress in requiring the Industrial Courts intervention in the resolution of
labor-management controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such
jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The
Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary
jurisdiction the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered.
xxxx
In this case, the need for the SECs technical expertise cannot be over-emphasized
involving as it does the meticulous analysis and correct interpretation of a
corporations by-laws as well as the applicable provisions of the Corporation Code in
order to determine the validity of VGCCIs claims. The SEC, therefore, took proper
cognizance of the instant case.11
Likewise in point is our illuminating ruling in Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v.
Sps. Gaston,12 although it ultimately held that the question of subject matter
jurisdiction over the complaint of respondent- spouses Gaston for declaration of
nullity of a board resolution issued by Sta. Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA)
was vested in the regular courts. In Sta. Clara, the main issue raised by SCHA
reads: "Whether [the CA] erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the [RTC], to declare
as null and void the resolution of the Board of SCHA, decreeing that only members
[in] good standing of the said association were to be issued stickers for use in their
vehicles." In holding that the regular courts had jurisdiction over respondent-

spouses Gastons complaint for declaration of nullity, we stressed the absence of

relationship and the consequent lack of privity of contract between the parties, thus:
Are [Respondent-Spouses Gaston] SCHA Members?
In order to determine if the HIGC has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is necessary to
resolve preliminarilyon the basis of the allegations in the Complaintwhether
[respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the SCHA.
[SCHA] contend[s] that because the Complaint arose from intra-corporate relations
between the SCHA and its members, the HIGC therefore has jurisdiction over the
dispute. To support their contention that [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members
of the association, [SCHA] cite[s] the SCHAs Articles of Incorporation and By-laws
which provide that all landowners of the Sta. Clara Subdivision are automatically
members of the SCHA.
We are not persuaded. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association
includes the freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will
associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. It should
be noted that the provision guarantees the right to form an association. It does not
include the right to compel others to form or join one.
More to the point, [respondent-spouses Gaston] cannot be compelled to become
members of the SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws without their express or implied consent. x x x. In the
present case, however, other than the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws,
there is no showing that [respondent-spouses Gaston] have agreed to be SCHA
members.
xxxx
No privity of Contract
Clearly then, no privity of contract exists between [SCHA] and [respondent-spouses
Gaston]. As a general rule, a contract is a meeting of minds between two persons.
The Civil Code upholds the spirit over the form; thus, it deems an agreement to
exist, provided the essential requisites are present. x x x. From the moment there is
a meeting of minds between the parties, it is perfected.
As already adverted to, there are cases in which a party who enters into a contract
of sale is also bound by a lien annotated on the certificate of title. We recognized
this in Bel Air Village Association, Inc. v. Dionisio, in which we ruled:
There is no dispute that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136 covering the subject
parcel of land issued in the name of the petitioner contains an annotation to the

effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of the respondent Bel-Air
Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the
Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the
community. It is likewise not disputed that the provision on automatic membership
was expressly annotated on the petitioners Transfer Certificate of Title and on the
title of his predecessor-in-interest.
The question, therefore, boils down to whether or not the petitioner is bound by such
annotation.
Section 39 of Art. 496 (The Land Registration Act) states:
Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a
certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances
except those noted on said certificate x x x. (Italics supplied)
The above ruling, however, does not apply to the case at bar. When [respondentspouses Gaston] purchased their property in 1974 and obtained Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-126542 and T-127462 for Lots 11 and 12 of Block 37
along San Jose Avenue in Sta. Clara Subdivision, there was no annotation showing
their automatic membership in the SCHA. Thus, no privity of contract arising from
the title certificate exists between [SCHA] and [respondent-spouses Gaston].
Further, the records are bereft of any evidence that would indicate that private
respondents intended to become members of the SCHA. Prior to the implementation
of the aforesaid Resolution, they and the other homeowners who were not members
of the association were issued non-member gate pass stickers for their vehicles.
This fact has not been disputed by [SCHA]. Thus, the SCHA recognized that there
were subdivision landowners who were not members thereof, notwithstanding the
provisions of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.
Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations in the Complaint
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction
would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.
The Complaint does not allege that [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of
the SCHA. In point of fact, they deny such membership. Thus, the HIGC has no
jurisdiction over the dispute.13
In stark contrast, the relationship between the parties in the instant case is wellestablished. Given this admitted relationship, the privity of contract between UVAI

and Eristingcol is palpable, despite the latters deft phraseology of its primary cause
of action as a declaration of nullity of UVAIs Construction Rules. In short, the crux of
Eristingcols complaint is UVAIs supposed arbitrary implementation of its
construction rules against Eristingcol, a member thereof.
Moreover, as in Sta. Clara (had respondent-spouses Gaston been members of
SCHA), the controversy which arose between the parties in this case partook of the
nature of an intra-corporate dispute. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 535,14 which
amended Republic Act No. 580 creating the HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the
regulatory and administrative functions over homeowners associations originally
vested with the SEC. Section 2 of E.O. No. 535 provides in pertinent part:
2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the
Corporation, shall have among others, the following additional powers:
(a) x x x; and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are
vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to home
owners association, the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the
contrary notwithstanding;
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities and operations of all houseowners
association registered in accordance therewith.

By virtue thereof, the HIGC likewise assumed the SECs original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving controversies arising from intracorporate or partnership relations.15 Thereafter, with the advent of Republic Act No.
8763, the foregoing powers and responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to
homeowners associations, were transferred to the HLURB.
As regards the defendants supposed embrace of the RTCs jurisdiction by
appearing thereat and undertaking to desist from prohibiting Eristingcols workers
from entering the village, suffice it to state that the invocation of the doctrine in
Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al.16 is quite a long stretch.
The factual milieu obtaining in Tijam and in the case at bench are worlds apart. As
found by the CA, defendants appearance before the RTC was pursuant to, and in
compliance with, a subpoena issued by that court in connection with Eristingcols
application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). On defendants supposed
agreement to sign the Undertaking allowing Eristingcols workers, contractors, and
suppliers to enter and exit the village, this temporary settlement cannot be equated
with full acceptance of the RTCs authority, as what actually transpired in Tijam.
1avvphi1.zw+

The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception to the general rule that an
objection to the courts jurisdiction over a case may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, as the lack of jurisdiction affects the very authority of the court to take

cognizance of a case.17 In that case, the Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss before the
CA, raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first timefifteen years after
the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu. Indeed, in
several stages of the proceedings in the CFI, as well as in the CA, the Surety
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief, and even submitted
its case for a final adjudication on the merits. Consequently, it was barred by laches
from invoking the CFIs lack of jurisdiction.
To further highlight the distinction in this case, the TRO hearing was held on
February 9, 1999, a day after the filing of the complaint. On even date, the parties
reached a temporary settlement reflected in the Undertaking. Fifteen days
thereafter, defendants, including Limjoco, filed a Motion to Dismiss. Certainly, this
successive and continuous chain of events cannot be characterized as laches as
would bar defendants from questioning the RTCs jurisdiction.
In fine, based on the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint, it is the
HLURB, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64642 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131282

January 4, 2002

GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner,

vs.
HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails the Decisionl dated September 17, 1997, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No.. 2340- UDK, entitled Bernardo Eradel vs.
Non. Ermelino G. Andal, setting aside all proceedings in Civil Case No.1075, Gabriel
L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, before the Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tandag, Surigao del Sur .
The pertinent facts are as follow.
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private respondent Bemardo
Eradel2 entered and occupied petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-1613-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax
declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. When petitioner politely
informed private respondent that the land was his and requested the latter to vacate
the land, private respondent refused, but instead threatened him with bodily harm.
Despite repeated demands, private respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to
leave the land.
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against private
respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner
appended to the complaint the aforementioned tax declaration. The counsel of the
Ruenas asked for extension to file their Answer and was given until July 18, 1995.
Meanwhile, petitioner and the, Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which
became the trial court's basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996.
In this agreement, the Ruenas through their counsel, Atty. Eusebio Avila, entered
into a Compromise Agreement with herein petitioner, Gabriel Duero. Inter alia, the
agreement stated that the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the
ownership and possession of Duero.3 Herein private respondent Eradel was not a
party to the agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer
to the complaint.4
Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996,
judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was ordered to
peacefully vacate and turn over Lot No.1065 Cad. 537-D to petitioner; pay petitioner
P2,000 annual rental from 1988 up the time he vacates the land, and P5,000 as
attorney's fees and the cost of the suit.5 Private respondent received a copy of the
decision on May 25, 1996.

On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he
has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He
explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest
belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to
defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new
trial.
1wphi1.nt

Meanwhile, RED Conflict Case No.1029, an administrative case between petitioner

and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained pending
with the Office of the Regional Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in Davao City. Eventually, it was forwarded to the DENR
Regional Office in Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur .
On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from
Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. He averred
that unless there is a determination on who owned the land, he could not be made to
vacate the land. He also averred that the judgment of the trial court was void
inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable parties, were
not impleaded.
On September 24, 1996, Josephine, Ana Soledad and Virginia, all surnamed
Laurente, grandchildren of Artemio who were claiming ownership of the land, filed a
Motion for Intervention. The RTC denied the motion.
On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief
from Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private respondent
alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land
was only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial
court. On November 22, 1996, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted
on January 28. On February 18, 1997, Entry of Judgment was made of record and a
writ of execution was issued by the RTC on February 27,1997. On March 12,1997,
private respondent filed his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that private
respondent is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction 'of the RTC, Branch 27 in
Tandag, Surigao del Sur, when private respondent filed with said court his Motion for
Reconsideration And/Or Annulment of Judgment. The Court of Appeals decreed as
follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. All
proceedings in "Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, et. al. Civil Case 1075"
filed in the Court a quo, including its Decision, Annex "E" of the petition, and its
Orders and Writ of Execution and the turn over of the property to the Private

Respondent by the Sheriff of the Court a quo, are declared null and void and
hereby SET ASIDE, No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner now comes before this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it held
that:
I.
...THE LOWER COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MA
TTER OF THE CASE.

II
...PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT THEREBY ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT EVEN AFTER
IT SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF THEREFROM.

III
...THE FAlLURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE HIS ANSWER IS
JUSTIFIED. 7

The main issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion when it held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and that private
respondent was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had
filed several motions before it. The secondary issue is whether the Court of appeals
erred in holding that private respondent's failure to file an answer to the complaint
was justified.
At the outset, however, we note that petitioner through counsel submitted to this
Court pleadings that contain inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his
petition,8 we find that to bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in holding
that the RTC had no jurisdiction, petitioner pointed to Annex E9 of his petition which
supposedly is the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel,
Surigao, specifically containing the notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision
Effective 1994." But it appears that Annex E of his petition is not a Certification but a
xerox copy of a Declaration of Real Property. Nowhere does the document contain a
notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." Petitioner also asked
this Court to refer to Annex F,10 where he said the zonal value of the disputed land
was P1.40 per sq.m., thus placing the computed value of the land at the time the
complaint was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction of
the municipal court and within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. However, we

find that these annexes are both merely xerox copies. They are obviously without
evidentiary weight or value.
Coming now to the principal issue, petitioner contends that respondent appellate
court acted with grave abuse of discretion. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an
excess or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.11 But
here we find that in its decision holding that the municipal court has jurisdiction over
the case and that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC, respondent Court of Appeals discussed the facts on which its
decision is grounded as well as the law and jurisprudence on the matter. 12 Its action
was neither whimsical nor capricious.
Was private respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC? In
this case, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals that he was not. While
participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from
challenging the court's jurisdiction,13 we note that estoppel has become an equitable
defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar
a right and not merely its equitable enforcement.14 Hence, estoppel ought to be
applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be
unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of
injustice.15
In the present case, private respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag,
Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. Recall that it was petitioner who filed the
complaint against private respondent and two other parties before the said
court,16 believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then,
Republic Act 769117 amending BP 129 had become effective, such that jurisdiction
already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment. Private
respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a
tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito
Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about
the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was declared
in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and explained that
he defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by his landlord.
In that motion he stated that he had by then the evidence to prove that he had a
better right than petitioner over the land because of his long, continuous and
uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee of the land.18But his motion
was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC a Motion for
Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for
reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first

time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that private
respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on
appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied
his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his
two motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial
of private respondent's motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue the order
for entry of judgment and a writ of execution.
Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the
RTC and in holding that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of
jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even
cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent.19 Further, a
party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the
proceedings and even on appeal.20 The appellate court did not err in saying that the
RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private
respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of
estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action.21 Precedents tell
us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence
as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. 22 Also, neither
waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly
meritorious and exceptional circumstances.23 The Court of Appeals found support for
its ruling in our decision in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, thus:
x x x The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or
proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such
act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been
the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal
provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of
action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall
entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they
pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of
the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the
Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached
or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years
from the finality of the same. [Emphasis ours.] 24

Indeed, "...the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of
its jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its decision a 'lawless' thing."25
Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never
become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would be out of

the question. Resort by private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals was in order .
In holding that estoppel did not prevent private respondent from questioning the
RTC's jurisdiction, the appellate court reiterated the doctrine that estoppel must be
applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage
of justice. Here, we find that petitioner, who claims ownership of a parcel of land,
filed his complaint before a court without appropriate jurisdiction. Defendant, a
farmer whose tenancy status is still pending before the proper administrative agency
concerned, could have moved for dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds.
But the farmer as defendant therein could not be expected to know the nuances of
jurisdiction and related issues. This farmer, who is now the private respondent,
ought not to be penalized when he claims that he made an honest mistake when he
initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before he realized that the
controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but within the jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to
foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case. Furthermore, if the
RTC's order were to be sustained, he would be evicted from the land prematurely,
while RED Conflict Case No.1029 would remain unresolved. Such eviction on a
technicality if allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal
right to till the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.
1wphi1.nt

Having determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the appellate
court in ruling that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC, we need not tarry to consider in detail the second issue.
Suffice it to say that, given the circumstances in this case, no error was committed
on this score by respondent appellate court. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the case, private respondent had justifiable reason in law not to file an answer, aside
from the fact that he believed the suit was properly his landlord's concern.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
No.1075 entitled Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, its Order that private
respondent turn over the disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it
issued, areANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner .
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 144025

December 27, 2002

SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, Manila,
HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Sixth Judicial Region,
Iloilo City,
and LUCKY HOMES, INC., represented by WILSON JESENA, JR., as
Manager, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1999 and its resolution dated
June 1, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54587.
The records disclose that, sometime in 1970, petitioner-spouses purchased a parcel
of land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and containing
an area of 240 square meters. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28254 and was mortgaged to the Social
Security System (SSS) as security for their housing loan. Petitioners then started the
construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as private
respondent mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error,
private respondent, through its general manager, informed petitioners of such
mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises.
Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their house. However, petitioners
defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19
was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners certificate of title was cancelled and a new
one was issued in the name of SSS. After Lot No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners
offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from private respondent that
their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect
to Lot No. 18, considering that their house was built therein. However, private
respondent refused. This prompted petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action
for reformation of contract and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 36, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17115.
On January 15, 1998, the trial court2 rendered its decision dismissing the complaint
for lack of merit and ordering herein petitioners to pay private respondent the
amount of P10,000 as moral damages and anotherP10,000 as attorneys fees. The
pertinent conclusion of the trial court reads as follows:
"Aware of such fact, the plaintiff nonetheless continued to stay in the premises of Lot
18 on the proposal that he would also buy the same. Plaintiff however failed to buy

Lot 18 and likewise defaulted in the payment of his loan with the SSS involving Lot
19. Consequently Lot 19 was foreclosed and sold at public auction. Thereafter TCT
No. T-29950 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-86612 (Exh. 9) was
issued in favor of SSS. This being the situation obtaining, the reformation of
instruments, even if allowed, or the swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19 as earlier
proposed by the plaintiff, is no longer feasible considering that plaintiff is no longer
the owner of Lot 19, otherwise, defendant will be losing Lot 18 without any substitute
therefore (sic). Upon the other hand, plaintiff will be unjustly enriching himself having
in its favor both Lot 19 which was earlier mortgaged by him and subsequently
foreclosed by SSS, as well as Lot 18 where his house is presently standing.
"The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the defendant.
It is evident that what plaintiff had bought from the defendant is Lot 19 covered by
TCT No. 28254 which parcel of land has been properly indicated in the instruments
and not Lot 18 as claimed by the plaintiff. The contracts being clear and
unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the parties, besides the plaintiff failed
to assail the contracts on mutual mistake, hence the same need no longer be
reformed."3
On June 22, 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Thus, on
September 17, 1998, petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution,
alleging that the court a quo had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957 (The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). Conformably, petitioners
filed a new complaint against private respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, on June
30, 1999, petitioner-spouses filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of judgment, premised on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to try and decide Civil Case No. 17115.
In a decision rendered on December 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition for annulment of judgment, relying mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of
estoppel as laid down in the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.4
Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed
this instant petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition by applying the principle of estoppel, even if the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36 of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to decide Civil Case No. 17115.
At the outset, it should be stressed that petitioners are seeking from us the
annulment of a trial court judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. Because it is not an
appeal, the correctness of the judgment is not in issue here. Accordingly, there is no
need to delve into the propriety of the decision rendered by the trial court.
Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the
doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.5 We do not agree. In countless

decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an order or decision rendered
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active
participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered the order or decision will
bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. As we held in the leading case of Tijam
vs. Sibonghanoy:6
"A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.
xxx
"It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the
court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was
not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated
obviously for reasons of public policy."
Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. Thus, in Orosa vs. Court of
Appeals;7 Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals;8 Salva vs. Court of Appeals;9 National Steel
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals;10 Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals;11 PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,12 this Court affirmed the rule
that a partys active participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, which
includes invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops
such party from later challenging that same courts jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the
court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract against private
respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners
vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners
ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which
lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued
a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of
jurisdiction and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them.
Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over
the case they themselves filed.
Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to
profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent.
This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction if not.13

Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by
parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking inconsistent
positions, in utter disregard of the elementary principles of justice and good
faith.14 There is no denying that, in this case, petitioners never raised the issue of
jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court. Instead, they
voluntarily and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said court. It is
now too late in the day for them to repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all
along.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124644

February 5, 2004

ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner,

vs
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan,
Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive Clerk of Court IV of the
Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Arnel Escobal seeking the
nullification of the remand by the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the
records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga
City, Branch 21.
The petition at bench arose from the following milieu:
The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the
Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the
petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at theSa
Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City. He
somehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one
Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was
filed with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No. 903184 charging the petitioner and a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias "Jun
Bombita" with murder. The accusatory portion of the amended Information reads:
That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court by virtue of the Presidential Waiver, dated
June 1, 1990, with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and maul one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel
Escobal armed with a caliber .45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca thereby
inflicting upon him serious, mortal and fatal wounds which caused his death, and
as a consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N. NUECA, mother of the deceased
victim, suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100
(P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and moral and exemplary damages
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P135,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency.1

On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the petitioner
from the service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847.
When apprised of the said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on
October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91, preventively suspending the petitioner from
the service until the case was terminated.2
The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the RTC, while accused
Bombita remained at large. The petitioner posted bail and was granted temporary
liberty.
When arraigned on April 9, 1991,3 the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed
a Motion to Quash4 the Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth
Act No. 408,5 in relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95
of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving PNP members and officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the
Chief of the PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his
suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should
now be reinstated. On September 23, 1993,6 the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote
Judge David C. Naval requesting information on whether he issued an order lifting
the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on February 22, 1994, the
petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of suspension. He
alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for
compassionate justice. The RTC denied the motion on March 9, 1994.7 Trial
thereafter proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner
commenced the presentation of his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to
Dismiss8 the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al.,9 he argued
that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order10 denying the motion to dismiss. It,
however, ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not
the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a
member of the PNP.
In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that it was no longer
presenting any evidence in connection with the petitioners motion. It reasoned that it
had already rested its case, and that its evidence showed that the petitioner did not
commit the offense charged in connection with the performance of his duties as a
member of the Philippine Constabulary. According to the prosecution, they were
able to show the following facts: (a) the petitioner was not wearing his uniform during
the incident; (b) the offense was committed just after midnight; (c) the petitioner was
drunk when the crime was committed; (d) the petitioner was in the company of

civilians; and, (e) the offense was committed in a beerhouse called "Sa Harong Caf
Bar and Restaurant."11
For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on March 15, 1990, he
was at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant at Barlin St., Naga City, to conduct
surveillance on alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No. 03-04 issued
by Police Superintendent Rufo R. Pulido. The petitioner adduced in evidence the
sworn statements of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo who corroborated his
testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the aforestated date.12
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner
committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function.
The trial court added that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,13the issue had
become moot and academic. The amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over
the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not
have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The
trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant
to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion14 and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment consisted
in the inclusion therein of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed
by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his
office.
lawphi1.nt

The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration15 of the said order, reiterating
that based on his testimony and those of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the
offense charged was committed by him in relation to his official functions. He
asserted that the trial court failed to consider the exceptions to the prohibition. He
asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be
applied retroactively.16
The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the mother of the victim,
through counsel, categorically and unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed
with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official mission
when the crime was committed.
On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued an Order reversing
and setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It declared that based on the petitioners
evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that
the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence thereto. It likewise
considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in her complaint before the PLEB that
the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting happened.
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to
allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance
of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975,

to thereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete records with the
stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE and
RECONSIDERED, and it is hereby declared that after preliminary hearing, this
Court has found that the offense charged in the Information herein was
committed by the accused in his relation to his function and duty as member of
the then Philippine Constabulary.
Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Republic
v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. No. 180208, March 11, 1994:
(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended
Information alleging that the offense charged was committed by the
Accused in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his
office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;
(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended Information, the complete records of
this case, together with the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken
during the entire proceedings herein, are hereby ordered transmitted
immediately to the Honorable Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court,
Manila, for appropriate proceedings.17

On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the

Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of
Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It
reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975,18 the RTC
retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner had a salary grade
of "23." Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case and the petitioner
had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity
of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment
therein after trial.
Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial on May 3, 1996, for
the petitioner to continue presenting his evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence,
the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice
of the Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the RTC.
The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.
The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the RTC
on February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the
decree, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against him as

he was charged with homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, and
the crime was committed while in the performance of his duties. He further asserts
that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975
provides that crimes committed by members and officers of the PNP with a salary
grade below "27" committed in relation to office are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the proper RTC, the amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be
applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner asserts, because under Section 7 of
R.A. No. 7975, only those cases where trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan
upon the effectivity of the law should be referred to the proper trial court.
The private complainant agrees with the contention of the petitioner. In contrast, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor contends that the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law when he ordered the remand of the
case to the RTC. It asserts that R.A. No. 7975 should be applied retroactively.
Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime committed by the
petitioner when the amended information was filed with the RTC, by the time it
resolved petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 had already
taken effect. Thus, the law should be given retroactive effect.
The Ruling of the Court
The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of
this Court when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in
the Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the
commencement of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the
Information.19 Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case
continues until the case is terminated.20
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment
for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .21

However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law
over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that
the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the
discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to
merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the
offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law. 22 The
amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any
allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his
duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on
November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include
therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The
trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It
bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect
and under Section 2 of the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or
their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his
office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper
Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior
Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by
reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime
charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively
has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural
law which may be applied retroactively.23
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169914

April 18, 2008

ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY
LEANDRO R. MENDOZA and MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, respondents.
x ----------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 174166

April 18, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and MANILA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SALACNIB BATERINA, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Court is still continuously besieged by Petitions arising from the awarding of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III)
Project to the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), despite the
promulgation by this Court of Decisions and Resolutions in two cases, Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.1 and Republic v. Gingoyon,2 which
already resolved the more basic and immediate issues arising from the said award.
The sheer magnitude of the project, the substantial cost of its building, the expected
high profits from its operations, and its remarkable impact on the Philippine
economy, consequently raised significant interest in the project from various
quarters.
Once more, two new Petitions concerning the NAIA IPT III Project are before this
Court. It is only appropriate, however, that the Court first recounts its factual and
legal findings in Agan and Gingoyon to ascertain that its ruling in the Petitions at bar
shall be consistent and in accordance therewith.
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (G.R. Nos. 155001,
155547, and 155661)
Already established and incontrovertible are the following facts in Agan:
In August 1989, the [Department of Trade and Communications (DOTC)]
engaged the services of Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive

study of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the
present airport can cope with the traffic development up to the year 2010. The
study consisted of two parts: first, traffic forecasts, capacity of existing facilities,
NAIA future requirements, proposed master plans and development plans; and
second, presentation of the preliminary design of the passenger terminal
building. The ADP submitted a Draft Final Report to the DOTC in December
1989.
Some time in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John Gokongwei, Andrew
Gotianun, Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with
then President Fidel V. Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the
construction and operation of a new international airport terminal. To signify their
commitment to pursue the project, they formed the Asia's Emerging Dragon
Corp. (AEDC) which was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on September 15, 1993.
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government
through the DOTC/[Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)] for the
development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a
build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA
7718 (BOT Law).
On December 2, 1994, the DOTC issued Dept. Order No. 94-832 constituting the
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of
the NAIA IPT III project.
On March 27, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jose Garcia endorsed the proposal of
AEDC to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). A revised
proposal, however, was forwarded by the DOTC to NEDA on December 13,
1995. On January 5, 1996, the NEDA Investment Coordinating Council (NEDA
ICC) - Technical Board favorably endorsed the project to the ICC - Cabinet
Committee which approved the same, subject to certain conditions, on January
19, 1996. On February 13, 1996, the NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2
which approved the NAIA IPT III project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily
newspapers of an invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC's
unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended. The
alternative bidders were required to submit three (3) sealed envelopes on or
before 5:00 p.m. of September 20, 1996. The first envelope should contain the
Prequalification Documents, the second envelope the Technical Proposal, and
the third envelope the Financial Proposal of the proponent.
On June 20, 1996, PBAC Bulletin No. 1 was issued, postponing the availment of
the Bid Documents and the submission of the comparative bid proposals.
Interested firms were permitted to obtain the Request for Proposal Documents

beginning June 28, 1996, upon submission of a written application and payment
of a non-refundable fee of P50,000.00 (US$2,000).
The Bid Documents issued by the PBAC provided among others that the
proponent must have adequate capability to sustain the financing requirement for
the detailed engineering, design, construction, operation, and maintenance
phases of the project. The proponent would be evaluated based on its ability to
provide a minimum amount of equity to the project, and its capacity to secure
external financing for the project.
On July 23, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 2 inviting all bidders to a
pre-bid conference on July 29, 1996.
On August 16, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 3 amending the Bid
Documents. The following amendments were made on the Bid Documents:
a. Aside from the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment, the proponent shall
include in its financial proposal an additional percentage of gross revenue
share of the Government, as follows:
i.

First 5 years

5.0%

ii.

Next 10 years

7.5%

iii.

Next 10 years

10.0%

b. The amount of the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment shall be subject

of the price challenge. Proponent may offer an Annual Guaranteed
Payment which need not be of equal amount, but payment of which shall
start upon site possession.
c. The project proponent must have adequate capability to sustain the
financing requirement for the detailed engineering, design, construction,
and/or operation and maintenance phases of the project as the case may
be. For purposes of pre-qualification, this capability shall be measured in
terms of:
i. Proof of the availability of the project proponent and/or the
consortium to provide the minimum amount of equity for the project;
and
ii. a letter testimonial from reputable banks attesting that the project
proponent and/or the members of the consortium are banking with
them, that the project proponent and/or the members are of good
financial standing, and have adequate resources.

d. The basis for the prequalification shall be the proponent's compliance

with the minimum technical and financial requirements provided in the Bid
Documents and the [Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)] of the
BOT Law. The minimum amount of equity shall be 30% of the Project
Cost.
e. Amendments to the draft Concession Agreement shall be issued from
time to time. Said amendments shall only cover items that would not
materially affect the preparation of the proponent's proposal.
On August 29, 1996, the Second Pre-Bid Conference was held where certain
clarifications were made. Upon the request of prospective bidder People's Air
Cargo & Warehousing Co., Inc (Paircargo), the PBAC warranted that based on
Sec. 11.6, Rule 11 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the BOT Law,
only the proposed Annual Guaranteed Payment submitted by the challengers
would be revealed to AEDC, and that the challengers' technical and financial
proposals would remain confidential. The PBAC also clarified that the list of
revenue sources contained in Annex 4.2a of the Bid Documents was merely
indicative and that other revenue sources may be included by the proponent,
subject to approval by DOTC/MIAA. Furthermore, the PBAC clarified that only
those fees and charges denominated as Public Utility Fees would be subject to
regulation, and those charges which would be actually deemed Public Utility
Fees could still be revised, depending on the outcome of PBAC's query on the
matter with the Department of Justice.
In September 1996, the PBAC issued Bid Bulletin No. 5, entitled "Answers to the
Queries of PAIRCARGO as Per Letter Dated September 3 and 10, 1996."
Paircargo's queries and the PBAC's responses were as follows:
1. It is difficult for Paircargo and Associates to meet the required minimum
equity requirement as prescribed in Section 8.3.4 of the Bid Documents
considering that the capitalization of each member company is so
structured to meet the requirements and needs of their current respective
business undertaking/activities. In order to comply with this equity
requirement, Paircargo is requesting PBAC to just allow each member of
(sic) corporation of the Joint Venture to just execute an agreement that
embodies a commitment to infuse the required capital in case the project
is awarded to the Joint Venture instead of increasing each corporation's
current authorized capital stock just for prequalification purposes.
In prequalification, the agency is interested in one's financial capability at
the time of prequalification, not future or potential capability.
A commitment to put up equity once awarded the project is not enough to
establish that "present" financial capability. However, total financial
capability of all member companies of the Consortium, to be established

by submitting the respective companies' audited financial statements, shall

be acceptable.
2. At present, Paircargo is negotiating with banks and other institutions for
the extension of a Performance Security to the joint venture in the event
that the Concessions Agreement (sic) is awarded to them. However,
Paircargo is being required to submit a copy of the draft concession as
one of the documentary requirements. Therefore, Paircargo is requesting
that they'd (sic) be furnished copy of the approved negotiated agreement
between the PBAC and the AEDC at the soonest possible time.
A copy of the draft Concession Agreement is included in the Bid
Documents. Any material changes would be made known to prospective
challengers through bid bulletins. However, a final version will be issued
before the award of contract.
The PBAC also stated that it would require AEDC to sign Supplement C of the
Bid Documents (Acceptance of Criteria and Waiver of Rights to Enjoin Project)
and to submit the same with the required Bid Security.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People's Air Cargo and
Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS)
and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium)
submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. On September 23, 1996, the
PBAC opened the first envelope containing the prequalification documents of the
Paircargo Consortium. On the following day, September 24, 1996, the PBAC
prequalified the Paircargo Consortium.
On September 26, 1996, AEDC informed the PBAC in writing of its reservations
as regards the Paircargo Consortium, which include:
a. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of
PAIRCARGO;
b. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAGS;
c. The prohibition imposed by RA 337, as amended (the General Banking
Act) on the amount that Security Bank could legally invest in the project;
d. The inclusion of Siemens as a contractor of the PAIRCARGO Joint
Venture, for prequalification purposes; and
e. The appointment of Lufthansa as the facility operator, in view of the
Philippine requirement in the operation of a public utility.

The PBAC gave its reply on October 2, 1996, informing AEDC that it had
considered the issues raised by the latter, and that based on the documents
submitted by Paircargo and the established prequalification criteria, the PBAC
had found that the challenger, Paircargo, had prequalified to undertake the
project. The Secretary of the DOTC approved the finding of the PBAC.
The PBAC then proceeded with the opening of the second envelope of the
Paircargo Consortium which contained its Technical Proposal.
On October 3, 1996, AEDC reiterated its objections, particularly with respect to
Paircargo's financial capability, in view of the restrictions imposed by Section 21B of the General Banking Act and Sections 1380 and 1381 of the Manual
Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries. On October 7, 1996,
AEDC again manifested its objections and requested that it be furnished with
excerpts of the PBAC meeting and the accompanying technical evaluation report
where each of the issues they raised were addressed.
On October 16, 1996, the PBAC opened the third envelope submitted by AEDC
and the Paircargo Consortium containing their respective financial proposals.
Both proponents offered to build the NAIA Passenger Terminal III for at least
$350 million at no cost to the government and to pay the government: 5% share
in gross revenues for the first five years of operation, 7.5% share in gross
revenues for the next ten years of operation, and 10% share in gross revenues
for the last ten years of operation, in accordance with the Bid Documents.
However, in addition to the foregoing, AEDC offered to pay the government a
total of P135 million as guaranteed payment for 27 years while Paircargo
Consortium offered to pay the government a total of P17.75 billion for the same
period.
Thus, the PBAC formally informed AEDC that it had accepted the price proposal
submitted by the Paircargo Consortium, and gave AEDC 30 working days or until
November 28, 1996 within which to match the said bid, otherwise, the project
would be awarded to Paircargo.
As AEDC failed to match the proposal within the 30-day period, then DOTC
Secretary Amado Lagdameo, on December 11, 1996, issued a notice to
Paircargo Consortium regarding AEDC's failure to match the proposal.
On February 27, 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine
International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO
and reiterated its objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.
On April 11, 1997, the DOTC submitted the concession agreement for the
second-pass approval of the NEDA-ICC.

On April 16, 1997, AEDC filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction against the
Secretary of the DOTC, the Chairman of the PBAC, the voting members of the
PBAC and Pantaleon D. Alvarez, in his capacity as Chairman of the PBAC
Technical Committee.
xxxx
On July 9, 1997, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the project to PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T.
Enrile, and PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the "Concession
Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III" (1997 Concession Agreement). x x
x.
On November 26, 1998, the Government and PIATCO signed an Amended and
Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA). x x x.
Subsequently, the Government and PIATCO signed three Supplements to the
ARCA. The First Supplement was signed on August 27, 1999; the Second
Supplement on September 4, 2000; and the Third Supplement on June 22, 2001
(collectively, Supplements).
xxxx
Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of
the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various
service providers to offer international airline airport services, such as in-flight
catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance
and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and other services, to several
international airlines at the NAIA. x x x.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers,
claiming that they stand to lose their employment upon the implementation of the
questioned agreements, filed before this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin
the enforcement of said agreements.
On October 15, 2002, the service providers, joining the cause of the petitioning
workers, filed a motion for intervention and a petition-in-intervention.
On October 24, 2002, Congressmen Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez and
Constantino Jaraula filed a similar petition with this Court.
On November 6, 2002, several employees of the MIAA likewise filed a petition
assailing the legality of the various agreements.

On December 11, 2002, another group of Congressmen, Hon. Jacinto V. Paras,

Rafael P. Nantes, Eduardo C. Zialcita, Willie B. Villarama, Prospero C. Nograles,
Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Harlin Cast Abayon and Benasing O. Macaranbon,
moved to intervene in the case as Respondents-Intervenors. They filed their
Comment-In-Intervention defending the validity of the assailed agreements and
praying for the dismissal of the petitions.
During the pendency of the case before this Court, President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, on November 29, 2002, in her speech at the 2002 Golden Shell Export
Awards at Malacaang Palace, stated that she will not "honor (PIATCO)
contracts which the Executive Branch's legal offices have concluded (as) null and
void."3

The Court first dispensed with the procedural issues raised in Agan, ruling that (a)
the MIAA service providers and its employees, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 155001 and
155661, had the requisite standing since they had a direct and substantial interest to
protect by reason of the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts which would affect
their source of livelihood;4 and (b) the members of the House of Representatives,
petitioners in G.R. No. 155547, were granted standing in view of the serious legal
questions involved and their impact on public interest.5
As to the merits of the Petitions in Agan, the Court concluded that:
In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite financial
capacity of the Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the
award by the PBAC of the contract for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void. Further, considering that the
1997 Concession Agreement contains material and substantial amendments,
which amendments had the effect of converting the 1997 Concession Agreement
into an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon, the 1997
Concession Agreement is similarly null and void for being contrary to public
policy. The provisions under Sections 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Section 1.06
of the 1997 Concession Agreement and Section 4.04(c) in relation to Section
1.06 of the ARCA, which constitute a direct government guarantee expressly
prohibited by, among others, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations are also null and void. The Supplements, being accessory contracts
to the ARCA, are likewise null and void.6

Hence, the fallo of the Court's Decision in Agan reads:

WHEREFORE, the 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement and the Supplements thereto are set aside for being null
and void.7

In a Resolution8 dated 21 January 2004, the Court denied with finality the Motions
for Reconsideration of its 5 May 2003 Decision in Agan filed by therein respondents

PIATCO and Congressmen Paras, et al., and respondentsintervenors.9 Significantly, the Court declared in the same Resolution that:
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising
the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by
PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over the said facility, it
has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures.
The compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for
the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its
investors.10 (Emphasis ours.)

It is these afore-quoted pronouncements that gave rise to the Petition in Gingoyon.

Republic v. Gingoyon (G.R. No. 166429)
According to the statement of facts in Gingoyon:
After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained
in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to
put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO
conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. It also
appears that arbitral proceedings were commenced before the International
Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, although the Government has
raised jurisdictional questions before those two bodies.
Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation
with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for
Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special raffle. The Government
sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession
authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities.
The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount
of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines,
representing the NAIA 3 terminal's assessed value for taxation purposes.
The case was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by
respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day
that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Orderdirecting the issuance of a
writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to "take or enter upon the
possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v. Serrano,
the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon
the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and
upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property subject to expropriation. The RTC found these requisites
present, particularly noting that "[t]he case record shows that [the Government
has] deposited the assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land Bank of

the Philippines, an authorized depositary, as shown by the certification attached

to their complaint." Also on the same day, the RTC issued a Writ of
Possession.According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take possession
over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was issued.
However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to
supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the 4
January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that its
earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act
No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as "An Act to Facilitate the
Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government
Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes" and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects.
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures
under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is
required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the
complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the
Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized
government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike
Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial
compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or
the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using
the replacement cost method.
Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8974 and Section
10 of the Implementing Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier
issuances. First, it directed the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch
(LBP-Baclaran), to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to
PIATCO, an amount which the RTC characterized as that which the Government
"specifically made available for the purpose of this expropriation;" and such
amount to be deducted from the amount of just compensation due PIATCO as
eventually determined by the RTC. Second, the Government was directed to
submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized
officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was
directed "to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform
such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation" of the airport
terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just
compensation. However, the Government was prohibited "from performing acts
of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other
parties."

The very next day after the issuance of the assailed 4 January 2005 Order, the
Government filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was set for
hearing on 10 January 2005. On 7 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order,
the second now assailed before this Court, which appointed three (3)
Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3
Complex. That same day, the Government filed a Motion for Inhibition of Hon.
Gingoyon.
The RTC heard the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Inhibition on 10 January 2005. On the same day, it denied these motions in
an Omnibus Order dated 10 January 2005. This is the thirdOrder now assailed
before this Court. Nonetheless, while the Omnibus Order affirmed the earlier
dispositions in the 4 January 2005 Order, it excepted from affirmance "the
superfluous part of the Orderprohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding concessions
or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties."
Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed
on 13 January 2005. The petition prayed for the nullification of the RTC orders
dated 4 January 2005, 7 January 2005, and 10 January 2005, and for the
inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation case.
A concurrent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction was granted by this Court in a Resolution dated 14 January
2005.11

The Court resolved the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines and Manila
International Airport Authority inGingoyon in this wise:
In conclusion, the Court summarizes its rulings as follows:
(1) The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be
observed before the Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be
payment to PIATCO of just compensation in accordance with law and equity. Any
ruling in the present expropriation case must be conformable to the dictates of
the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases.
(2) Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the
immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the
NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or methods
for the determination of just compensation.
(3) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in
favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly
paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under
Section 4(c) of the law.

(4) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is authorized to start the
implementation of the NAIA 3 Airport terminal project by performing the acts that
are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal
upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, subject to the conditions abovestated. As prescribed by the Court, such authority encompasses "the repair,
reconditioning and improvement of the complex, maintenance of the existing
facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and equipment, provision of
services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and transport, and
other services that are integral to a modern-day international airport."
5) The RTC is mandated to complete its determination of the just compensation
within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision. In doing so, the RTC is obliged
to comply with the standards set under Rep. Act No. 8974 and its Implementing
Rules. Considering that the NAIA 3 consists of structures and improvements, the
valuation thereof shall be determined using the replacements cost method, as
prescribed under Section 10 of the Implementing Rules.
(6) There was no grave abuse of discretion attending the RTC Order appointing
the commissioners for the purpose of determining just compensation. The
provisions on commissioners under Rule 67 shall apply insofar as they are not
inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 8974, its Implementing Rules, or the rulings of the
Court in Agan.
(7) The Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision of the
trial court to PIATCO immediately upon the finality of the said decision.
(8) There is no basis for the Court to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.
All told, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to
warrant the nullification of the questioned orders. Nonetheless, portions of these
orders should be modified to conform with law and the pronouncements made by
the Court herein.12

The decretal portion of the Court's Decision in Gingoyon thus reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED in PART with respect to the orders
dated 4 January 2005 and 10 January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders are
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2004 is
HELD IN ABEYANCE, pending payment by petitioners to PIATCO of the amount
of Three Billion Two Million One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P3,002,125,000.00), representing the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities;
2) Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, are authorized [to]
start the implementation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Pasenger

Terminal III project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of
the said International Airport Passenger Terminal project;
3) RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60) days from finality of this
Decision, to determine the just compensation to be paid to PIATCO by the
Government.
The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to the
qualification that the parties are given ten (10) days from finality of
this Decision to file, if they so choose, objections to the appointment of the
commissioners decreed therein.
The Temporary Restraining Order dated 14 January 2005 is hereby LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.13

Motions for Partial Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision were filed by therein
petitioners Republic and MIAA, as well as the three other parties who sought to
intervene, namely, Asakihosan Corporation, Takenaka Corporation, and
Congressman Baterina.
In a Resolution dated 1 February 2006, this Court denied with finality the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of therein petitioners and remained faithful to its assailed
Decision based on the following ratiocination:
Admittedly, the 2004 Resolution in Agan could be construed as mandating the
full payment of the final amount of just compensation before the Government
may be permitted to take over the NAIA 3. However, the Decision ultimately
rejected such a construction, acknowledging the public good that would result
from the immediate operation of the NAIA 3. Instead, the Decision adopted an
interpretation which is in consonance with Rep. Act No. 8974 and with equitable
standards as well, that allowed the Government to take possession of the NAIA 3
after payment of the proffered value of the facilities to PIATCO. Such a reading is
substantially compliant with the pronouncement in the 2004 Agan Resolution,
and is in accord with law and equity. In contrast, the Government's position,
hewing to the strict application of Rule 67, would permit the Government to
acquire possession over the NAIA 3 and implement its operation without having
to pay PIATCO a single centavo, a situation that is obviously unfair. Whatever
animosity the Government may have towards PIATCO does not acquit it from
settling its obligations to the latter, particularly those which had already been
previously affirmed by this Court.14

The Court, in the same Resolution, denied all the three motions for intervention of
Asakihosan Corporation, Takenaka Corporation, and Congressman Baterina, and
ruled as follows:

We now turn to the three (3) motions for intervention all of which were filed after
the promulgation of the Court's Decision. All three (3) motions must be denied.
Under Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the motion to
intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the court.
Since this case originated from an original action filed before this Court, the
appropriate time to file the motions-in-intervention in this case if ever was before
and not after resolution of this case. To allow intervention at this juncture would
be highly irregular. It is extremely improbable that the movants were unaware of
the pendency of the present case before the Court, and indeed none of them
allege such lack of knowledge.
Takenaka and Asahikosan rely on Mago v. Court of Appeals wherein the Court
took the extraordinary step of allowing the motion for intervention even after the
challenged order of the trial court had already become final. Yet it was apparent
in Mago that the movants therein were not impleaded despite being
indispensable parties, and had not even known of the existence of the case
before the trial court, and the effect of the final order was to deprive the movants
of their land. In this case, neither Takenaka nor Asahikosan stand to be
dispossessed by reason of the Court's Decision. There is no palpable due
process violation that would militate the suspension of the procedural rule.
Moreover, the requisite legal interest required of a party-in-intervention has not
been established so as to warrant the extra-ordinary step of allowing intervention
at this late stage. As earlier noted, the claims of Takenaka and Asahikosan have
not been judicially proved or conclusively established as fact by any trier of facts
in this jurisdiction. Certainly, they could not be considered as indispensable
parties to the petition for certiorari. In the case of Representative Baterina, he
invokes his prerogative as legislator to curtail the disbursement without
appropriation of public funds to compensate PIATCO, as well as that as a
taxpayer, as the basis of his legal standing to intervene. However, it should be
noted that the amount which the Court directed to be paid by the Government to
PIATCO was derived from the money deposited by the Manila International
Airport Authority, an agency which enjoys corporate autonomy and possesses a
legal personality separate and distinct from those of the National Government
and agencies thereof whose budgets have to be approved by Congress.
It is also observed that the interests of the movants-in-intervention may be duly
litigated in proceedings which are extant before lower courts. There is no
compelling reason to disregard the established rules and permit the interventions
belatedly filed after the promulgation of the Court's Decision. 15

Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and

Communications and Manila International Airport Authority (G.R. No. 169914)
Banking on this Court's declaration in Agan that the award of the NAIA IPT III Project
to PIATCO is null and void, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC) filed

before this Court the present Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition (with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order), praying of this Court that:
(1) After due hearing, judgment be rendered commanding the Respondents, their
officers, agents, successors, representatives or persons or entities acting on their
behalf, to formally award the NAIA-APT [sic] III PROJECT to Petitioner AEDC
and to execute and formalize with Petitioner AEDC the approved Draft
Concession Agreement embodying the agreed terms and conditions for the
operation of the NAIA-IPT III Project and directing Respondents to cease and
desist from awarding the NAIA-IPT Project to third parties or negotiating into any
concession contract with third parties.
(2) Pending resolution on the merits, a Temporary Restraining Order be issued
enjoining Respondents, their officers, agents, successors or representatives or
persons or entities acting on their behalf from negotiating, re-bidding, awarding or
otherwise entering into any concession contract with PIATCO and other third
parties for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III Project.
Other relief and remedies, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise
prayed for.16

AEDC bases its Petition on the following grounds:

I. PETITIONER AEDC, BEING THE RECOGNIZED AND UNCHALLENGED
ORIGINAL PROPONENT, HAS THE EXCLUSIVE, CLEAR AND VESTED
STATUTORY RIGHT TO THE AWARD OF THE NAIA-IPT III PROJECT;
II. RESPONDENTS HAVE A STATUTORY DUTY TO PROTECT PETITIONER
AEDC AS THE UNCHALLENGED ORIGINAL PROPONENT AS A RESULT OF
THE SUPREME COURT'S NULLIFICATION OF THE AWARD OF THE NAIAIPT III PROJECT TO PIATCO[; and]
III. RESPONDENTS HAVE NO LEGAL BASIS OR AUTHORITY TO TAKE
OVER THE NAIA-IPT III PROJECT, TO THE EXCLUSION OF PETITIONER
AEDC, OR TO AWARD THE PROJECT TO THIRD PARTIES. 17

At the crux of the Petition of AEDC is its claim that, being the recognized and
unchallenged original proponent of the NAIA IPT III Project, it has the exclusive,
clear, and vested statutory right to the award thereof. However, the Petition of AEDC
should be dismissed for lack of merit, being as it is, substantially and procedurally
flawed.
SUBSTANTIVE INFIRMITY
A petition for mandamus is governed by Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the respondent.

It is well-established in our jurisprudence that only specific legal rights are

enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and
clear, and that the writ will not issue in cases where the right is doubtful. Just as
fundamental is the principle governing the issuance of mandamus that the duties to
be performed must be such as are clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by
reason of official station.18
A rule long familiar is that mandamus never issues in doubtful cases. It requires a
showing of a complete and clear legal right in the petitioner to the performance of
ministerial acts. In varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal
rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and
certain. Otherwise, the mandamus petition must be dismissed.19
The right that AEDC is seeking to enforce is supposedly enjoined by Section 4-A of
Republic Act No. 6957,20 as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, on unsolicited
proposals, which provides
SEC. 4-A. Unsolicited proposals. Unsolicited proposals for projects may be
accepted by any government agency or local government unit on a negotiated
basis: Provided, That, all the following conditions are met: (1) such projects
involve a new concept or technology and/or are not part of the list of priority
projects, (2) no direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity is required, and
(3) the government agency or local government unit has invited by publication,
for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation,
comparative or competitive proposals and no other proposal is received for a
period of sixty (60) working days: Provided, further, That in the event another
proponent submits a lower price proposal, the original proponent shall have the
right to match the price within thirty (30) working days.

In furtherance of the afore-quoted provision, the Implementing Rules and

Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718,
devoted the entire Rule 10 to Unsolicited Proposals, pertinent portions of which are
reproduced below

Sec. 10.1. Requisites for Unsolicited Proposals. Any Agency/LGU may accept
unsolicited proposals on a negotiated basis provided that all the following
conditions are met:
a. the project involves a new concept or technology and/or is not part of the list of
priority projects;
b. no direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity is required; and
c. the Agency/LGU concerned has invited by publication, for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation, comparative or
competitive proposals and no other proposal is received for a period of sixty (60)
working days. In the event that another project proponent submits a price
proposal lower than that submitted by the original proponent, the latter shall have
the right to match said price proposal within thirty (30) working days. Should the
original proponent fail to match the lower price proposal submitted within the
specified period, the contract shall be awarded to the tenderer of the lowest
price. On the other hand, if the original project proponent matches the submitted
lowest price within the specified period, he shall be immediately be awarded the
project.
xxxx
Sec. 10.6. Evaluation of Unsolicited Proposals. The Agency/LGU is tasked with
the initial evaluation of the proposal. The Agency/LGU shall: 1) appraise the
merits of the project; 2) evaluate the qualification of the proponent; and 3) assess
the appropriateness of the contractual arrangement and reasonableness of the
risk allocation. The Agency/LGU is given sixty (60) days to evaluate the proposal
from the date of submission of the complete proposal. Within this 60-day period,
the Agency/LGU, shall advise the proponent in writing whether it accepts or
rejects the proposal. Acceptance means commitment of the Agency/LGU to
pursue the project and recognition of the proponent as the "original
proponent." At this point, the Agency/LGU will no longer entertain other
similar proposals until the solicitation of comparative proposals. The
implementation of the project, however, is still contingent primarily on the
approval of the appropriate approving authorities consistent with Section 2.7 of
these IRR, the agreement between the original proponent and the Agency/LGU
of the contract terms, and the approval of the contract by the [Investment
Coordination Committee (ICC)] or Local Sanggunian.
xxxx
Sec. 10.9. Negotiation With the Original Proponent. Immediately after
ICC/Local Sanggunian's clearance of the project, the Agency/LGU shall
proceed with the in-depth negotiation of the project scope, implementation
arrangements and concession agreement, all of which will be used in the

Terms of Reference for the solicitation of comparative proposals. The

Agency/LGU and the proponent are given ninety (90) days upon receipt of ICC's
approval of the project to conclude negotiations. The Agency/LGU and the
original proponent shall negotiate in good faith. However, should there be
unresolvable differences during the negotiations, the Agency/LGU shall
have the option to reject the proposal and bid out the project. On the other
hand, if the negotiation is successfully concluded, the original proponent
shall then be required to reformat and resubmit its proposal in accordance
with the requirements of the Terms of Reference to facilitate comparison
with the comparative proposals. The Agency/LGU shall validate the
reformatted proposal if it meets the requirements of the TOR prior to the
issuance of the invitation for comparative proposals.
xxxx
Sec. 10.11. Invitation for Comparative Proposals. The Agency/LGU shall publish
the invitation for comparative or competitive proposals only after ICC/Local
Sanggunian issues a no objection clearance of the draft contract. The invitation
for comparative or competitive proposals should be published at least once every
week for three (3) weeks in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation. It
shall indicate the time, which should not be earlier than the last date of
publication, and place where tender/bidding documents could be obtained. It
shall likewise explicitly specify a time of sixty (60) working days reckoned from
the date of issuance of the tender/bidding documents upon which proposals shall
be received. Beyond said deadline, no proposals shall be accepted. A pre-bid
conference shall be conducted ten (10) working days after the issuance of the
tender/bidding documents.
Sec. 10.12. Posting of Bid Bond by Original Proponent. The original proponent
shall be required at the date of the first date of the publication of the invitation for
comparative proposals to submit a bid bond equal to the amount and in the
form required of the challengers.
Sec. 10.13. Simultaneous Qualification of the Original Proponent. The
Agency/LGU shall qualify the original proponent based on the provisions of Rule
5 hereof, within thirty (30) days from start of negotiation. For consistency, the
evaluation criteria used for qualifying the original proponent should be the same
criteria used for qualifying the original proponent should be the criteria used in
the Terms of Reference for the challengers.
xxxx
Sec. 10.16. Disclosure of the Price Proposal. The disclosure of the price
proposal of the original proponent in the Tender Documents will be left to the
discretion of the Agency/LGU. However, if it was not disclosed in the Tender
Documents, the original proponent's price proposal should be revealed upon the

opening of the financial proposals of the challengers. The right of the original
proponent to match the best proposal within thirty (30) working days starts
upon official notification by the Agency/LGU of the most advantageous
financial proposal. (Emphasis ours.)

In her sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1586 (the precursor of Republic Act
No. 7718), then Senator (now President of the Republic of the Philippines) Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo explained the reason behind the proposed amendment that
would later become Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7718:
The object of the amendment is to protect proponents which have already
incurred costs in the conceptual design and in the preparation of the proposal,
and which may have adopted an imaginative method of construction or
innovative concept for the proposal. The amendment also aims to harness the
ingenuity of the private sector to come up with solutions to the country's
infrastructure problems.21

It is irrefragable that Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7718, and Section 10 of its IRR, accord certain rights or privileges to the
original proponent of an unsolicited proposal for an infrastructure project. They are
meant to encourage private sector initiative in conceptualizing infrastructure projects
that would benefit the public. Nevertheless, none of these rights or privileges would
justify the automatic award of the NAIA IPT III Project to AEDC after its previous
award to PIATCO was declared null and void by this Court in Agan.
The rights or privileges of an original proponent of an unsolicited proposal for an
infrastructure project are never meant to be absolute. Otherwise, the original
proponent can hold the Government hostage and secure the award of the
infrastructure project based solely on the fact that it was the first to submit a
proposal. The absurdity of such a situation becomes even more apparent when
considering that the proposal is unsolicited by the Government. The rights or
privileges of an original proponent depends on compliance with the procedure and
conditions explicitly provided by the statutes and their IRR.
An unsolicited proposal is subject to evaluation, after which, the government agency
or local government unit (LGU) concerned may accept or reject the proposal
outright.
Under Section 10.6 of the IRR, the "acceptance" of the unsolicited proposal by the
agency/LGU is limited to the "commitment of the [a]gency/LGU to pursue the project
and recognition of the proponent as the 'original proponent.'" Upon acceptance then
of the unsolicited proposal, the original proponent is recognized as such but no
award is yet made to it. The commitment of the agency/LGU upon acceptance of
the unsolicited proposal is to the pursuit of the project, regardless of to whom it

shall subsequently award the same. The acceptance of the unsolicited proposal only
precludes the agency/LGU from entertaining other similar proposalsuntil the
solicitation of comparative proposals.
Consistent in both the statutes and the IRR is the requirement that invitations be
published for comparative or competitive proposals. Therefore, it is mandatory that a
public bidding be held before the awarding of the project. The negotiations between
the agency/LGU and the original proponent, as provided in Section 10.9 of the IRR,
is for the sole purpose of coming up with draft agreements, which shall be used in
the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the solicitation of comparative proposals. Even at
this point, there is no definite commitment made to the original proponent as to the
awarding of the project. In fact, the same IRR provision even gives the concerned
agency/LGU, in case of unresolvable differences during the negotiations, the option
to reject the original proponent's proposal and just bid out the project.
Generally, in the course of processing an unsolicited proposal, the original
proponent is treated in much the same way as all other prospective bidders for the
proposed infrastructure project. It is required to reformat and resubmit its proposal in
accordance with the requirements of the TOR.22 It must submit a bid bond equal to
the amount and in the form required of the challengers.23 Its qualification shall be
evaluated by the concerned agency/LGU, using evaluation criteria in accordance
with Rule 524 of the IRR, and which shall be the same criteria to be used in the TOR
for the challengers.25 These requirements ensure that the public bidding under Rule
10 of IRR on Unsolicited Proposals still remain in accord with the three principles in
public bidding, which are: the offer to the public, an opportunity for competition, and
a basis for exact comparison of bids.26
The special rights or privileges of an original proponent thus come into play only
when there are other proposals submitted during the public bidding of the
infrastructure project. As can be gleaned from the plain language of the statutes and
the IRR, the original proponent has: (1) the right to match the lowest or most
advantageous proposal within 30 working days from notice thereof, and (2) in the
event that the original proponent is able to match the lowest or most advantageous
proposal submitted, then it has the right to be awarded the project. The second right
or privilege is contingent upon the actual exercise by the original proponent of the
first right or privilege. Before the project could be awarded to the original proponent,
he must have been able to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal within
the prescribed period. Hence, when the original proponent is able to timely match
the lowest or most advantageous proposal, with all things being equal, it shall enjoy
preference in the awarding of the infrastructure project.
This is the extent of the protection that Legislature intended to afford the original
proponent, as supported by the exchange between Senators Neptali Gonzales and
Sergio Osmea during the Second Reading of Senate Bill No. 1586:

Senator Gonzales:
xxxx
The concept being that in case of an unsolicited proposal and nonetheless public
bidding has been held, then [the original proponent] shall, in effect, be
granted what is the equivalent of the right of first refusal by offering a bid
which shall equal or better the bid of the winning bidder within a period of,
let us say, 30 days from the date of bidding.
Senator Osmea:
xxxx
To capture the tenor of the proposal of the distinguished Gentleman, a
subsequent paragraph has to be added which says, "IF THERE IS A
COMPETITIVE PROPOSAL, THE ORIGINAL PROPONENT SHALL HAVE THE
RIGHT TO EQUAL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE COMPETITIVE
PROPOSAL."
In other words, if there is nobody who will submit a competitive proposal, then
nothing is lost. Everybody knows it, and it is open and transparent. But if
somebody comes in with another proposal and because it was the idea of the
original proponent that proponent now has the right to equal the terms of the
original proposal.
SENATOR GONZALES:
That is the idea, Mr. President. Because it seems to me that it is utterly unfair for
one who has conceived an idea or a concept, spent and invested in feasibility
studies, in the drawing of plans and specifications, and the project is submitted to
a public bidding, then somebody will win on the basis of plans and specifications
and concepts conceived by the original proponent. He should at least be given
the right to submit an equalizing bid. x x x.27 (Emphasis ours.)

As already found by this Court in the narration of facts in Agan, AEDC failed to
match the more advantageous proposal submitted by PIATCO by the time the 30day working period expired on 28 November 1996;28 and, without exercising its right
to match the most advantageous proposal, it cannot now lay claim to the award of
the project.
The bidding process as to the NAIA IPT III Project was already over after the award
thereof to PIATCO, even if eventually, the said award was nullified and voided. The
nullification of the award to PIATCO did not revive the proposal nor re-open the
bidding. AEDC cannot insist that this Court turn back the hands of time and award
the NAIA IPT III Project to it, as if the bid of PIATCO never existed and the award of

the project to PIATCO did not take place. Such is a simplistic approach to a very
complex problem that is the NAIA IPT III Project.
In his separate opinion in Agan, former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted
that "[T]here was effectively no public bidding to speak of, the entire bidding
process having been flawed and tainted from the very outset, therefore, the award
of the concession to Paircargo's successor Piatco was void, and the Concession
Agreement executed with the latter was likewise void ab initio. x x x.29" (Emphasis
ours.) In consideration of such a declaration that the entire bidding process was
flawed and tainted from the very beginning, then, it would be senseless to re-open
the same to determine to whom the project should have been properly awarded to.
The process and all proposals and bids submitted in participation thereof, and not
just PIATCO's, were placed in doubt, and it would be foolhardy for the Government
to rely on them again. At the very least, it may be declared that there was a failure of
public bidding.30
In addition, PIATCO is already close to finishing the building of the structures
comprising NAIA IPT III,31 a fact that this Court cannot simply ignore. The NAIA IPT
III Project was proposed, subjected to bidding, and awarded as a build-operatetransfer (BOT) project. A BOT project is defined as
A contractual arrangement whereby the project proponent undertakes
the construction, including financing, of a given infrastructure facility,
and the operation and maintenance thereof. The project proponent operates
the facility over a fixed term during which it is allowed to charge facility users
appropriate tolls, fees, rentals, and charges not exceeding those proposed in its
bid or as negotiated and incorporated in the contract to enable the project
proponent to recover its investment, and operating and maintenance expenses in
the project. The project proponent transfers the facility to the government
agency or local government unit concerned at the end of the fixed term that shall
not exceed fifty (50) years. This shall include a supply-and-operate situation
which is a contractual arrangement whereby the supplier of equipment and
machinery for a given infrastructure facility, if the interest of the Government so
requires, operates the facility providing in the process technology transfer and
training to Filipino nationals.32 (Emphasis ours.)

The original proposal of AEDC is for a BOT project, in which it undertook

to build, operate, and transfer to the Government the NAIA IPT III facilities. This is
clearly no longer applicable or practicable under the existing circumstances. It is
undeniable that the physical structures comprising the NAIA IPT III Project are
already substantially built, and there is almost nothing left for AEDC to construct.
Hence, the project could no longer be awarded to AEDC based on the theory of
legal impossibility of performance.

Neither can this Court revert to the original proposal of AEDC and award to it only
the unexecuted components of the NAIA IPT III Project. Whoever shall assume the
obligation to operate and maintain NAIA IPT III and to subsequently transfer the
same to the Government (in case the operation is not assumed by the Government
itself) shall have to do so on terms and conditions that would necessarily be different
from the original proposal of AEDC. It will no longer include any undertaking to build
or construct the structures. An amendment of the proposal of AEDC to address the
present circumstances is out of the question since such an amendment would be
substantive and tantamount to an entirely new proposal, which must again be
subjected to competitive bidding.
AEDC's offer to reimburse the Government the amount it shall pay to PIATCO for
the NAIA IPT III Project facilities, as shall be determined in the ongoing expropriation
proceedings before the RTC of Pasay City, cannot restore AEDC to its status and
rights as the project proponent. It must be stressed that the law requires the project
proponent to undertake the construction of the project, including financing;
financing, thus, is but a component of the construction of the structures and not the
entirety thereof.
Moreover, this "reimbursement arrangement" may even result in the unjust
enrichment of AEDC. In its original proposal, AEDC offered to construct the NAIA
IPT III facilities for $350 million or P9 billion at that time. In exchange, AEDC would
share a certain percentage of the gross revenues with, and pay a guaranteed annual
income to the Government upon operation of the NAIA IPT III. In Gingoyon, the
proferred value of the NAIA IPT III facilities was already determined to be P3 billion.
It seems improbable at this point that the balance of the value of said facilities for
which the Government is still obligated to pay PIATCO shall reach or exceed P6
billion. There is thus the possibility that the Government shall be required to pay
PIATCO an amount less than P9 billion. If AEDC is to reimburse the Government
only for the said amount, then it shall acquire the NAIA IPT III facilities for a price
less than its original proposal of P9 billion. Yet, per the other terms of its original
proposal, it may still recoup a capital investment of P9 billion plus a reasonable rate
of return of investment. A change in the agreed value of the NAIA IPT III facilities
already built cannot be done without a corresponding amendment in the other terms
of the original proposal as regards profit sharing and length of operation; otherwise,
AEDC will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the Government.
Again, as aptly stated by former Chief Justice Panganiban, in his separate opinion
in Agan:
If the PIATCO contracts are junked altogether as I think they should be, should
not AEDC automatically be considered the winning bidder and therefore allowed
to operate the facility? My answer is a stone-cold 'No.' AEDC never won the
bidding, never signed any contract, and never built any facility. Why should it be
allowed to automatically step in and benefit from the greed of another?33

The claim of AEDC to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project, after the award thereof
to PIATCO was set aside for being null and void, grounded solely on its being the
original proponent of the project, is specious and an apparent stretch in the
interpretation of Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7718, and Rule 10 of the IRR.
In all, just as AEDC has no legal right to the NAIA IPT III Project, corollarily, it has no
legal right over the NAIA IPT III facility. AEDC does not own the NAIA IPT III facility,
which this Court already recognized in Gingoyon as owned by PIATCO; nor does
AEDC own the land on which NAIA IPT III stands, which is undisputedly owned by
the Republic through the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA). AEDC
did not fund any portion of the construction of NAIA IPT III, which was entirely
funded by PIATCO. AEDC also does not have any kind of lien over NAIA IPT III or
any kind of legal entitlement to occupy the facility or the land on which it stands.
Therefore, nothing that the Government has done or will do in relation to the project
could possibly prejudice or injure AEDC. AEDC then does not possess any legal
personality to interfere with or restrain the activities of the Government as regards
NAIA IPT III. Neither does it have the legal personality to demand that the
Government deliver or sell to it the NAIA IPT III facility despite the express
willingness of AEDC to reimburse the Government the proferred amount it had paid
PIATCO and complete NAIA IPT III facility at its own cost.
AEDC invokes the Memorandum of Agreement, purportedly executed between the
DOTC and AEDC on 26 February 1996, following the approval of the NAIA IPT III
Project by the National Economic Development Authority Board in a Resolution
dated 13 February 1996, which provided for the following commitments by the
parties:
a. commitment of Respondent DOTC to target mid 1996 as the time frame for the
formal award of the project and commencement of site preparation and
construction activities with the view of a partial opening of the Terminal by the
first quarter of 1998;
b. commitment of Respondent DOTC to pursue the project envisioned in the
unsolicited proposal and commence and conclude as soon as possible
negotiations with Petitioner AEDC on the BOT contract;
c. commitment of Respondent DOTC to make appropriate arrangements through
which the formal award of the project can be affected[;]
d. commitment of Petitioner AEDC to a fast track approach to project
implementation and to commence negotiations with its financial partners,
investors and creditors;

e. commitment of Respondent DOTC and Petitioner AEDC to fast track

evaluation of competitive proposals, screening and eliminating nuisance
comparative bids;34

It is important to note, however, that the document attached as Annex "E" to the
Petition of AEDC is a "certified photocopy of records on file." This Court cannot give
much weight to said document considering that its existence and due execution
have not been established. It is not notarized, so it does not enjoy the presumption
of regularity of a public document. It is not even witnessed by anyone. It is not
certified true by its supposed signatories, Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. for DOTC
and Chairman Henry Sy, Sr. for AEDC, or by any government agency having its
custody. It is certified as a photocopy of records on file by an Atty. Cecilia L.
Pesayco, the Corporate Secretary, of an unidentified corporation.
Even assuming for the sake of argument, that the said Memorandum of Agreement,
is in existence and duly executed, it does little to support the claim of AEDC to the
award of the NAIA IPT III Project. The commitments undertaken by the DOTC and
AEDC in the Memorandum of Agreement may be simply summarized as a
commitment to comply with the procedure and requirements provided in Rules 10
and 11 of the IRR. It bears no commitment on the part of the DOTC to award the
NAIA IPT III Project to AEDC. On the contrary, the document includes express
stipulations that negate any such government obligation. Thus, in the first
clause,35 the DOTC affirmed its commitment to pursue, implement and complete the
NAIA IPT III Project on or before 1998, noticeably without mentioning that such
commitment was to pursue the project specifically with AEDC. Likewise, in the
second clause,36 it was emphasized that the DOTC shall pursue the project under
Rules 10 and 11 of the IRR of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7718. And most significantly, the tenth clause of the same document provided:
10. Nothing in this Memorandum of Understanding shall be understood,
interpreted or construed as permitting, allowing or authorizing the circumvention
of, or non-compliance with, or as waiving, the provisions of, and requirements
and procedures under, existing laws, rules and regulations. 37

AEDC further decries that:

24. In carrying out its commitments under the DOTC-AEDC MOU, Petitioner
AEDC undertook the following activities, incurring in the process tremendous
costs and expenses.
a. pre-qualified 46 design and contractor firms to assist in the NAIA-IPT III
Project;
b. appointed a consortium of six (6) local banks as its financial advisor in June
1996;

c. hired the services of GAIA South, Inc. to prepare the Project Description
Report and to obtain the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) for the
NAIA-IPT III Project;
d. coordinated with the Airline Operators Association, Bases Conversion
Development Authority, Philippine Air Force, Bureau of Customs, Bureau of
Immigration, relative to their particular requirements regarding the NAIA-IPT III
[P]roject; and
e. negotiated and entered into firm commitments with Ital Thai, Marubeni
Corporation and Mitsui Corporation as equity partners. 38

While the Court may concede that AEDC, as the original proponent, already
expended resources in its preparation and negotiation of its unsolicited proposal, the
mere fact thereof does not entitle it to the instant award of the NAIA IPT III Project.
AEDC was aware that the said project would have to undergo public bidding, and
there existed the possibility that another proponent may submit a more
advantageous bid which it cannot match; in which case, the project shall be awarded
to the other proponent and AEDC would then have no means to recover the costs
and expenses it already incurred on its unsolicited proposal. It was a given business
risk that AEDC knowingly undertook.
Additionally, the very defect upon which this Court nullified the award of the NAIA
IPT III Project to PIATCO similarly taints the unsolicited proposal of AEDC. This
Court found Paircargo Consortium financially disqualified after striking down as
incorrect the PBAC's assessment of the consortium's financial capability. According
to the Court's ratio in Agan:
As the minimum project cost was estimated to be US$350,000,000.00 or
roughly P9,183,650,000.00, the Paircargo Consortium had to show to the
satisfaction of the PBAC that it had the ability to provide the minimum equity for
the project in the amount of at least P2,755,095,000.00.
xxxx
Thus, the maximum amount that Security Bank could validly invest in the
Paircargo Consortium is onlyP528,525,656.55, representing 15% of its entire net
worth. The total net worth therefore of the Paircargo Consortium, after
considering the maximum amounts that may be validly invested by each of its
members is P558,384,871.55 or only 6.08% of the project cost, an amount
substantially less than the prescribed minimum equity investment required for the
project in the amount of P2,755,095,000.00 or 30% of the project cost.
The purpose of pre-qualification in any public bidding is to determine, at the
earliest opportunity, the ability of the bidder to undertake the project. Thus, with
respect to the bidder's financial capacity at the pre-qualification stage, the law

requires the government agency to examine and determine the ability of the
bidder to fund the entire cost of the project by considering the maximum
amounts that each bidder may invest in the project at the time of prequalification.
xxxx
Thus, if the maximum amount of equity that a bidder may invest in the
project at the time the bids are submitted falls short of the minimum amounts
required to be put up by the bidder, said bidder should be properly disqualified.
Considering that at the pre-qualification stage, the maximum amounts which the
Paircargo Consortium may invest in the project fell short of the minimum
amounts prescribed by the PBAC, we hold that Paircargo Consortium was not a
qualified bidder. Thus the award of the contract by the PBAC to the Paircargo
Consortium, a disqualified bidder, is null and void. 39

Pursuant to the above-quoted ruling, AEDC, like the Paircargo Consortium, would
not be financially qualified to undertake the NAIA IPT III Project. Based on AEDC's
own submissions to the Government, it had then a paid-in capital of
only P150,000,000.00,40 which was less than the P558,384,871.55 that Paircargo
Consortium was capable of investing in the NAIA IPT III Project, and even far less
that what this Court prescribed as the minimum equity investment required for the
project in the amount of P2,755,095,000.00 or 30% of the project cost. AEDC had
not sufficiently demonstrated that it would have been financially qualified to
undertake the project at the time of submission of the bids.
Instead, AEDC took pains to present to this Court that allowing it to take over and
operate NAIA IPT III at present would be beneficial to the Government. This Court
must point out, however, that AEDC is precisely making a new proposal befitting the
current status of the NAIA IPT III Project, contrary to its own argument that it is
merely invoking its original BOT proposal. And it is not for this Court to evaluate
AEDC's new proposal and assess whether it would truly be most beneficial for the
Government, for the same is an executive function rather than judicial, for which the
statutes and regulations have sufficiently provided standards and procedures for
evaluation.
It can even be said that if the award of the NAIA IPT III Project was merely a matter
of choosing between PIATCO and AEDC (which it is not), there could be no doubt
that PIATCO is more qualified to operate the structure that PIATCO itself built and
PIATCO's offer of P17.75 Billion in annual guaranteed payments to the Government
is far better that AEDC's offer of P135 Million.
Hence, AEDC is not entitled to a writ of mandamus, there being no specific, certain,
and clear legal right to be enforced, nor duty to be performed that is clearly and
peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station.

PROCEDURAL LAPSES
In addition to the substantive weaknesses of the Petition of AEDC, the said Petition
also suffers from procedural defects.
AEDC revived its hope to acquire the NAIA IPT III Project when this Court
promulgated its Decision in Agan on 5 May 2003. The said Decision became final
and executory on 17 February 2004 upon the denial by this Court of the Motion for
Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration submitted by PIATCO. It is this
Decision that declared the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO as null and
void; without the same, then the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO would
still subsist and other persons would remain precluded from acquiring rights thereto,
including AEDC. Irrefutably, the present claim of AEDC is rooted in the Decision of
this Court inAgan. However, AEDC filed the Petition at bar only 20 months after the
promulgation of the Decision in Agan on 5 May 2003.
It must be emphasized that under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, petitions for prohibition and mandamus, such as in the instant case,
can only be resorted to when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
for the party in the ordinary course of law.
In Cruz v. Court of Appeals,41 this Court elucidates that
Although Rule 65 does not specify any period for the filing of a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, it must, nevertheless, be filed within a reasonable time.
In certiorari cases, the definitive rule now is that such reasonable time is within
three months from the commission of the complained act. The same rule should
apply to mandamus cases.
The unreasonable delay in the filing of the petitioner's mandamus suit unerringly
negates any claim that the application for the said extraordinary remedy was the
most expeditious and speedy available to the petitioner. (Emphasis ours.)

As the revised Rules now stand, a petition for certiorari may be filed within 60 days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed.42 Reasonable
time for filing a petition for mandamus should likewise be for the same period. The
filing by the AEDC of its petition for mandamus 20 months after its supposed right to
the project arose is evidently beyond reasonable time and negates any claim that
the said petition for the extraordinary writ was the most expeditious and speedy
remedy available to AEDC.
AEDC contends that the "reasonable time" within which it should have filed its
petition should be reckoned only from 21 September 2005, the date when AEDC
received the letter from the Office of the Solicitor General refusing to recognize the
rights of AEDC to provide the available funds for the completion of the NAIA IPT III

Project and to reimburse the costs of the structures already built by PIATCO. It has
been unmistakable that even long before said letter especially when the
Government instituted with the RTC of Pasay City expropriation proceedings for the
NAIA IPT III on 21 December 2004 that the Government would not recognize any
right that AEDC purportedly had over the NAIA IPT III Project and that the
Government is intent on taking over and operating the NAIA IPT III itself.
Another strong argument against the AEDC's Petition is that it is already barred
by res judicata.
In Agan,43 it was noted that on 16 April 1997, the AEDC instituted before the RTC of
Pasig City Civil Case No. 66213, a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the
Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction, against the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC
Chairman and members.
In Civil Case No. 66213, AEDC prayed for:
i) the nullification of the proceedings before the DOTC-PBAC, including its
decision to qualify Paircargo Consortium and to deny Petitioner AEDC's access
to Paircargo Consortium's technical and financial bid documents;
ii) the protection of Petitioner AEDC's right to match considering the void
challenge bid of the Paircargo Consortium and the denial by DOTC-PBAC of
access to information vital to the effective exercise of its right to match;
iii) the declaration of the absence of any other qualified proponent submitting a
competitive bid in an unsolicited proposal.44

Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 66213, the DOTC issued the notice of award
for the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO on 9 July 1997. The DOTC and PIATCO also
executed on 12 July 1997 the 1997 Concession Agreement. AEDC then alleges
that:
k) On September 3, 1998, then Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada convened a
meeting with the members of the Board of Petitioner AEDC to convey his "desire"
for the dismissal of the mandamus case filed by Petition AEDC and in fact urged
AEDC to immediately withdraw said case.
l) The President's direct intervention in the disposition of this mandamus case
was a clear imposition that Petitioner AEDC had not choice but to accept. To do
otherwise was to take a confrontational stance against the most powerful man in
the country then under the risk of catching his ire, which could have led to untold
consequences upon the business interests of the stakeholders in AEDC. Thus,
Petitioner AEDC was constrained to agree to the signing of a Joint Motion to
Dismiss and to the filing of the same in court.

m) Unbeknownst to AEDC at that time was that simultaneous with the signing of
the July 12, 1997 Concession Agreement, the DOTC and PIATCO executed a
secret side agreement grossly prejudicial and detrimental to the interest of
Government. It stipulated that in the event that the Civil Case filed by AEDC on
April 16, 1997 is not resolved in a manner favorable to the Government, PIATCO
shall be entitled to full reimbursement for all costs and expenses it incurred in
order to obtain the NAIA IPT III BOT project in an amount not less than One
Hundred Eighty Million Pesos (Php 180,000,000.00). This was apparently the
reason why the President was determined to have AEDC's case dismissed
immediately.
n) On February 9, 1999, after the Amended and Restated Concession
Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "ARCA") was signed without Petitioner
AEDC's knowledge, Petitioner AEDC signed a Joint Motion to Dismiss upon the
representation of the DOTC that it would provide AEDC with a copy of the 1997
Concession Agreement. x x x.45

On 30 April 1999, the RTC of Pasig City issued an Order dismissing with
prejudice Civil Case No. 66213 upon the execution by the parties of a Joint Motion
to Dismiss. According to the Joint Motion to Dismiss
The parties, assisted by their respective counsel, respectfully state:
1. Philippine International Air Terminals Company, Inc. ("PIATCO") and the
respondents have submitted to petitioner, through the Office of the Executive
Secretary, Malacaang, a copy of the Concession Agreement which they
executed for the construction and operation of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport International Passenger Terminal III Project ("NAIA IPT III Project), which
petitioner requested.
2. Consequently, the parties have decided to amicably settle the instant case
and jointly move for the dismissal thereof without any of the parties admitting
liability or conceding to the position taken by the other in the instant case.
3. Petitioner, on the other hand, and the respondents, on the other hand,
hereby release and forever discharge each other from any and all liabilities,
direct or indirect, whether criminal or civil, which arose in connection with the
instant case.
4. The parties agree to bear the costs, attorney's fees and other expenses they
respectively incurred in connection with the instant case. (Emphasis ours.)

AEDC, however, invokes the purported pressure exerted upon it by then President
Joseph E. Estrada, the alleged fraud committed by the DOTC, and paragraph 2 in
the afore-quoted Joint Motion to Dismiss to justify the non-application of the doctrine
of res judicata to its present Petition.

The elements of res judicata, in its concept as a bar by former judgment, are as
follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or
order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action.46 All of the elements are present herein so as to bar
the present Petition.
First, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City, dismissing Civil Case No. 66213, was
issued on 30 April 1999. The Joint Motion to Dismiss, deemed a compromise
agreement, once approved by the court is immediately executory and not
appealable.47
Second, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing Civil Case No. 66213
pursuant to the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties constitutes a judgment on
the merits.
The Joint Motion to Dismiss stated that the parties were willing to settle the case
amicably and, consequently, moved for the dismissal thereof. It also contained a
provision in which the parties the AEDC, on one hand, and the DOTC Secretary
and PBAC, on the other released and forever discharged each other from any and
all liabilities, whether criminal or civil, arising in connection with the case. It is
undisputable that the parties entered into a compromise agreement, defined as "a
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or
put an end to one already commenced.48" Essentially, it is a contract perfected by
mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. Once
an agreement is stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more than a mere
contract binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its
determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other
judgment.49 Article 2037 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that a compromise has
upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata.
Because of the compromise agreement among the parties, there was accordingly a
judicial settlement of the controversy, and the Order, dated 30 April 1999, of the
RTC of Pasig City was no less a judgment on the merits which may be annulled only
upon the ground of extrinsic fraud.50 Thus, the RTC of Pasig City, in the same Order,
correctly granted the dismissal of Civil Case No. 66213 with prejudice.
A scrutiny of the Joint Motion to Dismiss submitted to the RTC of Pasig City would
reveal that the parties agreed to discharge one another from any and all liabilities,
whether criminal or civil, arising from the case, after AEDC was furnished with a
copy of the 1997 Concession Agreement between the DOTC and PIATCO. This
complete waiver was the reciprocal concession of the parties that puts to an end the

present litigation, without any residual right in the parties to litigate the same in the
future. Logically also, there was no more need for the parties to admit to any liability
considering that they already agreed to absolutely discharge each other therefrom,
without necessarily conceding to the other's position. For AEDC, it was a declaration
that even if it was not conceding to the Government's position, it was nonetheless
waiving any legal entitlement it might have to sue the Government on account of the
NAIA IPT III Project. Conversely, for the Government, it was an avowal that even if it
was not accepting AEDC's stance, it was all the same relinquishing its right to file
any suit against AEDC in connection with the same project. That none of the parties
admitted liability or conceded its position is without bearing on the validity or binding
effect of the compromise agreement, considering that these were not essential to
the said compromise.
Third, there is no question as to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City over the
subject matter and parties in Civil Case No. 66213. The RTC can exercise original
jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance of writs ofcertiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.51 To recall, the
Petition of AEDC before the RTC of Pasig City was for the declaration of nullity of
proceedings, mandamus and injunction. The RTC of Pasig City likewise had
jurisdiction over the parties, with the voluntary submission by AEDC and proper
service of summons on the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and
members.
Lastly, there is, between Civil Case No. 66213 before the RTC of Pasig City and the
Petition now pending before this Court, an identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of causes of action.
There is an identity of parties. In both petitions, the AEDC is the petitioner. The
respondents in Civil Case No. 66213 are the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC
Chairman and members. The respondents in the instant Petition are the DOTC, the
DOTC Secretary, and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). While it may
be conceded that MIAA was not a respondent and did not participate in Civil Case
No. 66213, it may be considered a successor-in-interest of the PBAC. When Civil
Case No. 66213 was initiated, PBAC was then in charge of the NAIA IPT III Project,
and had the authority to evaluate the bids and award the project to the one offering
the lowest or most advantageous bid. Since the bidding is already over, and the
structures comprising NAIA IPT III are now built, then MIAA has taken charge
thereof. Furthermore, it is clear that it has been the intention of the AEDC to name
as respondents in their two Petitions the government agency/ies and official/s who,
at the moment each Petition was filed, had authority over the NAIA IPT III Project.
There is an identity of subject matter because the two Petitions involve none other
than the award and implementation of the NAIA IPT III Project.

There is an identity of cause of action because, in both Petitions, AEDC is asserting

the violation of its right to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project as the original
proponent in the absence of any other qualified bidders. As early as in Civil Case
No. 66213, AEDC already sought a declaration by the court of the absence of any
other qualified proponent submitting a competitive bid for the NAIA IPT III Project,
which, ultimately, would result in the award of the said project to it.
AEDC attempts to evade the effects of its compromise agreement by alleging that it
was compelled to enter into such an agreement when former President Joseph E.
Estrada asserted his influence and intervened in Civil Case No. 66213. This
allegation deserves scant consideration. Without any proof that such events did take
place, such statements remain mere allegations that cannot be given weight. One
who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid consent to a contract must establish the
same by full, clear and convincing evidence, not merely by preponderance
thereof.52 And, even assuming arguendo, that the consent of AEDC to the
compromise agreement was indeed vitiated, then President Estrada was removed
from office in January 2001. AEDC filed the present Petition only on 20 October
2005. The four-year prescriptive period, within which an action to annul a voidable
contract may be brought, had already expired.53
The AEDC further claims that the DOTC committed fraud when, without AEDC's
knowledge, the DOTC entered into an Amended and Restated Concession
Agreement (ARCA) with PIATCO. The fraud on the part of the DOTC purportedly
also vitiated AEDC's consent to the compromise agreement. It is true that a judicial
compromise may be set aside if fraud vitiated the consent of a party thereof; and
that the extrinsic fraud, which nullifies a compromise, likewise invalidates the
decision approving it.54 However, once again, AEDC's allegations of fraud are
unsubstantiated. There is no proof that the DOTC and PIATCO willfully and
deliberately suppressed and kept the information on the execution of the ARCA from
AEDC. The burden of proving that there indeed was fraud lies with the party making
such allegation. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. The burden
of proof lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either
side. In this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed.55
Moreover, a judicial compromise may be rescinded or set aside on the ground of
fraud in accordance with Rule 38 of the Rules on Civil Procedure on petition for relief
from judgment. Section 3 thereof prescribes the periods within which the petition for
relief must be filed:
SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. A petition provided for
in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty
(60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken, and must be
accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable

negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

According to this Court's ruling in Argana v. Republic,56 as applied to a judgment

based on compromise, both the 60-day and six-month reglementary periods within
which to file a petition for relief should be reckoned from the date when the decision
approving the compromise agreement was rendered because such judgment is
considered immediately executory and entered on the date that it was approved by
the court. In the present case, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City granting the Joint
Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties in Civil Case No. 66213 was issued on 30 April
1999, yet AEDC only spoke of the alleged fraud which vitiated its consent thereto in
its Petition before this Court filed on 20 October 2005, more than six years later.
It is obvious that the assertion by AEDC of its vitiated consent to the Joint Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. 66213 is nothing more than an after-thought and a desperate
attempt to escape the legal implications thereof, including the barring of its present
Petition on the ground of res judicata.
It is also irrelevant to the legal position of AEDC that the Government asserted
in Agan that the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO was void. That the
Government eventually took such a position, which this Court subsequently upheld,
does not affect AEDC's commitments and obligations under its judicially-approved
compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 66213, which AEDC signed willingly,
knowingly, and ably assisted by legal counsel.
In addition, it cannot be said that there has been a fundamental change in the
Government's position since Civil Case No. 66213, contrary to the allegation of
AEDC. The Government then espoused that AEDC is not entitled to the award of the
NAIA IPT III Project. The Government still maintains the exact same position
presently. That the Government eventually reversed its position on the validity of its
award of the project to PIATCO is not inconsistent with its position that neither
should AEDC be awarded the project.
For the foregoing substantive and procedural reasons, the instant Petition of AEDC
should be dismissed.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Baterina (G.R. No. 174166)
As mentioned in Gingoyon, expropriation proceedings for the NAIA IPT III was
instituted by the Government with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Case No. 040876CFM. Congressman Baterina, together with other members of the House of
Representatives, sought intervention in Case No. 04-0876CFM by filing a Petition for
Prohibition in Intervention (with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction). Baterina, et al. believe that the Government need not

file expropriation proceedings to gain possession of NAIA IPT III and that PIATCO is
not entitled to payment of just compensation, arguing thus
A) Respondent PIATCO does not own Terminal III because BOT Contracts do
not vest ownership in PIATCO. As such, neither PIATCO nor FRAPORT are
entitled to compensation.
B) Articles 448, ET SEQ., of the New Civil Code, as regards builders in good
faith/bad faith, do not apply to PIATCO's Construction of Terminal III.
C) Article 1412(2) of the New Civil Code allows the Government to demand the
return of what it has given without any obligation to comply with its promise.
D) The payment of compensation to PIATCO is unconstitutional, violative of the
Build-Operate-Transfer Law, and violates the Civil Code and other laws. 57

On 27 October 2005, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order admitting the Petition
in Intervention of Baterina, et al., as well as the Complaint in Intervention of Manuel
L. Fortes, Jr. and the Answer in Intervention of Gina B. Alnas, et al. The Republic
sought reconsideration of the 27 October 2005 Order of the RTC of Pasay City,
which, in an Omnibus Order dated 13 December 2005, was denied by the RTC of
Pasay City as regards the intervention of Baterina, et al. and Fortes, but granted as
to the intervention of Alnas, et al. On 22 March 2006, Baterina, et al. filed with the
RTC of Pasay City a Motion to Declare in Default and/or Motion for Summary
Judgment considering that the Republic and PIATCO failed to file an answer or any
responsive pleading to their Petition for Prohibition in Intervention.
In the meantime, on 19 December 2005, the Court's Decision in Gingoyon was
promulgated. Baterina also filed a Motion for Intervention in said case and sought
reconsideration of the Decision therein. However, his Motion for Intervention was
denied by this Court in a Resolution dated 1 February 2006.
On 27 March 2006, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order and Writ of Execution,
the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, let a writ of execution be issued in this case directing the Sheriff
of this court to immediately implement the Order dated January 4, 2005 and
January 10, 2005, as affirmed by the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
166429 in the above-entitled case dated December 19, 2005, in the following
manner:
1. Ordering the General Manager, the Senior Assistant General Manager and the
Vice President of Finance of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) to
immediately withdraw the amount ofP3,002,125,000.00 from the abovementioned Certificates of US Dollar Time Deposits with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, Baclaran Branch;

2. Ordering the Branch Manager, Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch
to immediately release the sum of P3,002,125,000.00 to PIATCO;
Return of Service of the Writs shall be made by the Sheriff of this court
immediately thereafter;58

The RTC of Pasay City, in an Order, dated 15 June 2006, denied the Motions for
Reconsideration of its Order and Writ of Execution filed by the Government and
Fortes. Baterina, meanwhile, went before the Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction), docketed as CA-G.R. No.
95539, assailing the issuance, in grave abuse of discretion, by the RTC of Pasay
City of its Orders dated 27 March 2006 and 15 June 2006 and Writ of Execution
dated 27 March 2006.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. No. 95539 with the Court of Appeals, the RTC of
Pasay City issued an Order, dated 7 August 2006, denying the Urgent Manifestation
and Motion filed by the Republic in which it relayed willingness to comply with the
Order and Writ of Execution dated 27 March 2006, provided that the trial court shall
issue an Order expressly authorizing the Republic to award concessions and lease
portions of the NAIA IPT III to potential users. The following day, on 8 August 2006,
the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order denying the intervention of Baterina, et
al. and Fortes in Case No. 04-0876CFM. In a third Order, dated 9 August 2006, the
RTC of Pasay City directed PIATCO to receive the amount of P3,002,125,000.00
from the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch.
By 24 August 2006, the Republic was all set to comply with the 9 August 2006 Order
of the RTC of Pasay City. Hence, the representatives of the Republic and PIATCO
met before the RTC of Pasay City for the supposed payment by the former to the
latter of the proferred amount. However, on the same day, the Court of Appeals, in
CA G.R. No. 95539, issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining, among
other things, the RTC of Pasay City from implementing the questioned Orders, dated
27 March 2006 and 15 June 2006, or "from otherwise causing payment and from
further proceeding with the determination of just compensation in the expropriation
case involved herein, until such time that petitioner's motion to declare in default and
motion for partial summary judgment shall have been resolved by the trial court; or it
is clarified that PIATCO categorically disputes the proferred value for NAIA Terminal
3." The TRO was to be effective for 30 days. Two days later, on 26 August 2006, the
Republic filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order, which the appellate court scheduled for hearing on 5 September
2006.
While the Urgent Motion to lift the TRO was still pending with the Court of Appeals,
the Republic already filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With
Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary

Injunction, attributing to the Court of Appeals grave abuse of discretion in granting

the TRO and seeking a writ of prohibition against the Court of Appeals to enjoin it
from giving due course to Baterina's Petition in CA-G.R. No. 95539. The Republic
thus raises before this Court the following arguments:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO AN EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
GRANTED THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.
A. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S DECISION IN GINGOYON
CONSTITUTES THE "LAW OF THE CASE".
B. THE TRO IS IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THIS COURT'S
DECISION WICH HAD ATTAINED FINALITY.
II
THE REPUBLIC IS SUFFERING IRREPARABLE DAMAGE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS MUST BE PROHIBITED FROM GIVING DUE
COURSE TO A PETITION THAT IS DEFECTIVE IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE.
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO LEGAL STANDING.
1. THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS RULED THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HAS NO LEGAL STANDING.
2. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS LOST HIS STANDING AS AN
INTERVENOR.
B. PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS
ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR.
C. THE BOND POSTED IS INSUFFICIENT.
IV
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S PETITION IS
SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE, THE SAME HAS BECOME MOOT
AND ACADEMIC.

A. THE MOTION TO DECLARE IN DEFAULT AND/OR MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED.
B. PIATCO HAS CATEGORICALLY DISPUTED THE PROFFERED
VALUE FOR NAIA TERMINAL III.59

The Republic prays of this Court that:

(a) Pending the determination of the merits of this petition, a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be ISSUED restraining the
Court of Appeals from implementing the writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R.
SP No. 95539 and proceeding in said case such as hearing it on September 5,
2006. After both parties have been heard, the preliminary injunction be MADE
PERMANENT;
(b) The Resolution date 24 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals be SET ASIDE;
and
(c) CA-G.R. SP No. 95539 be ORDERED DISMISSED.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. 60

On 4 September 2006, the Republic filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw

Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals stating,
among other things, that it had decided to withdraw the said Motion as it had opted
to avail of other options and remedies. Despite the Motion to Withdraw filed by the
Government, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution, dated 8 September 2006,
lifting the TRO it issued, on the basis of the following
In view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Gingoyon case
upholding the right of PIATCO to be paid the proferred value in the amount
of P3,002,125,000.00 prior to the implementation of the writ of possession issued
by the trial court on December 21, 2004 over the NAIA Passenger Terminal III,
and directing the determination of just compensation, there is no practical and
logical reason to maintain the effects of the Temporary Restraining Order
contained in our Resolution dated August 24, 2006. Thus, We cannot continue
restraining what has been mandated in a final and executory decision of the
Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, Our Resolution dated 24 August 2006 be SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the Motion to Withdraw the Motion to Lift the Temporary
Restraining Order is rendered moot and academic.61

There being no more legal impediment, the Republic tendered on 11 September

2006 Land Bank check in the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 representing the

proferred value of NAIA IPT III, which was received by a duly authorized
representative of PIATCO.
On 27 December 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA G.R. No.
95539 dismissing Baterina's Petition.
The latest developments before the Court of Appeals and the RTC of Pasay City
render the present Petition of the Republic moot.
Nonetheless, Baterina, as the private respondent in the instant Petition, presented
his own prayer that a judgment be rendered as follows:
A. For this Honorable Court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion to relax
procedural rules consistent with Metropolitan Traffic Command v. Gonong and
deem that justice would be better served if all legal issues involved in the
expropriation case and in Baterina are resolved in this case once and for all,
toDECLARE that:
i. TERMINAL 3, as a matter of law, is public property and thus not a
proper object of eminent domain proceedings; and
ii. PIATCO, as a matter of law, is merely the builder of TERMINAL 3 and,
as such, it may file a claim for recovery on quantum meruit with the
Commission on Audi[t] for determination of the amount thereof, if any.
B. To DIRECT the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117 to dismiss the
expropriation case;
C. To DISMISS the instant Petition and DENY The Republic's application for
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction for lack of merit;
D. To DECLARE that the P3 Billion (representing the proferred value of
TERMINAL 3) paid to PIATCO on 11 September 2006 as funds held in trust by
PIATCO for the benefit of the Republic and subject to the outcome of the
proceedings for the determination of recovery on quantum meruit due to
PIATCO, if any.
E. To DIRECT the Solicitor General to disclose the evidence it has gathered on
corruption, bribery, fraud, bad faith, etc., to this Honorable Court and the
Commission on Audit, and to DECLARE such evidence to be admissible in any
proceeding for the determination of any compensation due to PIATCO, if any.
[F]. In the alternative, to:
i. SET ASIDE the trial court's Order dated 08 August 2006 denying Private
Respondent's motion for intervention in the expropriation case, and

ii. Should this Honorable Court lend credence to the argument of the
Solicitor General in itsComment dated 20 April 2006 that "there are issues
as to material fact that require presentation of evidence", to REMAND the
resolution of the legal issues raised by Private Respondent to the trial
court consistent with this Honorable Court's holding in the Gingoyon
Resolution that "the interests of the movants-in-intervention [meaning
Takenaka, Asahikosan, and herein Private Respondent] may be duly
litigated in proceedings which are extant before the lower courts."62

In essence, Baterina is opposing the expropriation proceedings on the ground that

NAIA IPT III is already public property. Hence, PIATCO is not entitled to just
compensation for NAIA IPT III. He is asking the Court to make a definitive ruling on
this matter considering that it was not settled in either Agan or Gingoyon.
We disagree. Contrary to Baterina's stance, PIATCO's entitlement to just and
equitable consideration for its construction of NAIA IPT III and the propriety of the
Republic's resort to expropriation proceedings were already recognized and upheld
by this Court in Agan and Gingoyon.
The Court's Decisions in both Agan and Gingoyon had attained finality, the former
on 17 February 2004 and the latter on 17 March 2006.
This Court already made an unequivocal pronouncement in its Resolution dated 21
January 2004 in Agan that for the Government of the Republic to take over the NAIA
IPT III facility, it has to compensate PIATCO as a builder of the structures; and that
"[t]he compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the
government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its
investors."63 As between the Republic and PIATCO, the judgment on the need to
compensate PIATCO before the Government may take over NAIA IPT III is already
conclusive and beyond question.
Hence, in Gingoyon, this Court declared that:
This pronouncement contains the fundamental premises which permeate this
decision of the Court. Indeed, Agan, final and executory as it is, stands as
governing law in this case, and any disposition of the present petition must
conform to the conditions laid down by the Court in its 2004 Resolution.
xxxx
The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant to this
case in two aspects, namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just
compensation determined in accordance with law and equity; and (ii) that
the government is barred from taking over NAIA 3 until such just
compensation is paid. The parties cannot be allowed to evade the directives

laid down by this Court through any mode of judicial action, such as the
complaint for eminent domain.
It cannot be denied though that the Court in the 2004 Resolution prescribed
mandatory guidelines which the Government must observe before it could
acquire the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the actions of respondent judge under review,
as well as the arguments of the parties must, to merit affirmation, pass the
threshold test of whether such propositions are in accord with the 2004
Resolution.64

The Court then, in Gingoyon, directly addressed the issue on the appropriateness of
the Republic's resort to expropriation proceedings:
The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available
under the law, which has the added benefit of an integrated process for the
determination of just compensation and the payment thereof to
PIATCO. We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby
the Government seeks to expropriate a building complex constructed on land
which the State already owns. There is an inherent illogic in the resort to eminent
domain on property already owned by the State. At first blush, since the State
already owns the property on which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be
akin to an action for ejectment.
However, the reason for the resort by the Government to expropriation
proceedings is understandable in this case. The 2004 Resolution, in requiring
the payment of just compensation prior to the takeover by the Government of
NAIA 3, effectively precluded it from acquiring possession or ownership of the
NAIA 3 through the unilateral exercise of its rights as the owner of the ground on
which the facilities stood. Thus, as things stood after the 2004 Resolution, the
right of the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was preconditioned by
lawful order on the payment of just compensation to PIATCO as builder of the
structures.
xxxx
The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA
3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as real property. The
public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also be
noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility
that the property sought to be expropriated may be titled in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, and
in such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The
instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex "stands on a
parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another
agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]."

Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the
Government may have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the
requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be the most
effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be
accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate possession after satisfaction
of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which just
compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to the
propriety of eminent domain proceedings in this case.
Still, in applying the laws and rules on expropriation in the case at bar, we are
impelled to apply or construe these rules in accordance with the Court's
prescriptions in the 2004 Resolution to achieve the end effect that the
Government may validly take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Insofar as this case is
concerned, the 2004 Resolution is effective not only as a legal precedent, but as
the source of rights and prescriptions that must be guaranteed, if not enforced, in
the resolution of this petition. Otherwise, the integrity and efficacy of the rulings of
this Court will be severely diminished.65 (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, also in Gingoyon, categorically recognized PIATCO's ownership over the
structures it had built in NAIA IPT III, to wit:
There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities
which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely
recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just compensation to
PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3. The fact that the
Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a
concession on its part of PIATCO's ownership. Indeed, if no such right is
recognized, then there should be no impediment for the Government to seize
control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings.
xxxx
Thus, the property subject of expropriation, the NAIA 3 facilities, are real
property owned by PIATCO. x x x (Emphasis ours.)66

It was further settled in Gingoyon that the expropriation proceedings shall be held in
accordance with Republic Act No. 8974,67 thus:
Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not
contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just
compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government.
The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such payment must be
effected before the takeover, but it unquestionably requires at least some degree
of payment to the private property owner before a writ of possession may issue.
The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare
minimum requirement, as it assures the private property owner the payment of,

at the very least, the proffered value of the property to be seized. Such payment
of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of
possession in favor of the Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep.
Act No. 8974, one which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the
2004 Resolution.

And finally, as to the determination of the amount due PIATCO, this Court ruled
in Gingoyon that:
Under Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is required to "immediately pay" the
owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred
percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the [BIR]; and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as
determined under Section 7. As stated above, the BIR zonal valuation cannot
apply in this case, thus the amount subject to immediate payment should be
limited to "the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under
Section 7," with Section 7 referring to the "implementing rules and regulations for
the equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land." Under
the present implementing rules in place, the valuation of the
improvements/structures are to be based using"the replacement cost
method." However, the replacement cost is only one of the factors to be
considered in determining the just compensation.
In addition to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also mandated
that the payment of just compensation should be in accordance with equity as
well. Thus, in ascertaining the ultimate amount of just compensation, the duty of
the trial court is to ensure that such amount conforms not only to the law, such as
Rep. Act No. 8974, but to principles of equity as well.
Admittedly, there is no way, at least for the present, to immediately ascertain the
value of the improvements and structures since such valuation is a matter for
factual determination. Yet Rep. Act No. 8974 permits an expedited means by
which the Government can immediately take possession of the property without
having to await precise determination of the valuation. Section 4(c) of Rep. Act
No. 8974 states that "in case the completion of a government infrastructure
project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation
of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the
owner of the property its proferred value, taking into consideration the standards
prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]." The "proffered value" may strike as a highly
subjective standard based solely on the intuition of the government, but Rep. Act
No. 8974 does provide relevant standards by which "proffered value" should be
based, as well as the certainty of judicial determination of the propriety of the
proffered value.
In filing the complaint for expropriation, the Government alleged to have
deposited the amount of P3 Billion earmarked for expropriation, representing the

assessed value of the property. The making of the deposit, including the
determination of the amount of the deposit, was undertaken under the erroneous
notion that Rule 67, and not Rep. Act No. 8974, is the applicable law. Still, as
regards the amount, the Court sees no impediment to recognize this sum of P3
Billion as the proffered value under Section 4(b) of Rep. Act No. 8974. After all, in
the initial determination of the proffered value, the Government is not strictly
required to adhere to any predetermined standards, although its proffered value
may later be subjected to judicial review using the standards enumerated under
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974.68

Gingoyon constitutes as the law of the case for the expropriation proceedings,
docketed as Case No. 04-0876CFM, before the RTC of Pasay City. Law of the case
has been defined in the following manner
By "law of the case" is meant that "whatever is once irrevocably established as
the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case" so long as the "facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court" (21 C.J.S.
330). And once the decision becomes final, it is binding on all inferior courts and
hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify (Kabigting vs. Acting
Director of Prisons, G.R. L-15548, October 30, 1962).69

A ruling rendered on the first appeal, constitutes the law of the case, and, even if
erroneous, it may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final long
ago.70
The extensive excerpts from Gingoyon demonstrate and emphasize that the Court
had already adjudged the issues raised by Baterina, which he either conveniently
overlooked or stubbornly refused to accept.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were
in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters
essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to
questions necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or
necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have
been made in reference thereto, and although such matters were directly referred to
in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the
record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered
without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that
matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily
presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.
Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an adjudication on all the matters which
are essential to support it, and that every proposition assumed or decided by the
court leading up to the final conclusion and upon which such conclusion is based is
as effectually passed upon as the ultimate question which is finally solved. 71

Since the issues Baterina wishes to raise as an intervenor in Case No. 04-0876CFM
were already settled with finality in both Agan and Gingoyon, then there is no point
in still allowing his intervention. His Petition-in-Intervention would only be a
relitigation of matters that had been previously adjudicated by no less than the
Highest Court of the land. And, in no manner can the RTC of Pasay City in Case No.
04-0876CFM grant the reliefs he prayed for without departing from or running afoul
of the final and executory Decisions of this Court inAgan and Gingoyon.
While it is true that when this Court, in a Resolution dated 1 February 2006,
dismissed the Motions for Intervention in Gingoyon, including that of Baterina, it also
observed that the interests of the movants-in-intervention may be duly litigated in
proceedings which are extant before the lower courts. This does not mean, however,
that the said movants-in-interest were assured of being allowed as intervenors or
that the reliefs they sought as such shall be granted by the trial courts. The fate of
their intervention still rests on their interest or legal standing in the case and the
merits of their arguments.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing:
a. The Petition in G.R. No. 169914 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit; and
b. The Petition in G.R. No. 174166 is hereby likewise DISMISSED for being moot
and academic.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

01

January 21, 2004

DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, JR., JOSEPH B. CATAHAN, JOSE MARI B.

REUNILLA, MANUEL ANTONIO B. BOE, MAMERTO S. CLARA, REUEL E.
DIMALANTA, MORY V. DOMALAON, CONRADO G. DIMAANO, LOLITA R.
HIZON, REMEDIOS P. ADOLFO, BIENVENIDO C. HILARIO, MIASCOR
WORKERS UNION-NATIONAL LABOR UNION (MWU-NLU), and PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA),petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and SECRETARY LEANDRO M.
MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and
Communications,respondents,
MIASCOR GROUNDHANDLING CORPORATION, DNATA-WINGS AVIATION
SYSTEMS CORPORATION, MACROASIA-EUREST SERVICES, INC.,
MACROASIA-MENZIES AIRPORT SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR
CATERING SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
CORPORATION, and MIASCOR LOGISTICS CORPORATION, Petitioners-inIntervention,
FLORESTE ALCONIS, GINA ALNAS, REY AMPOLOQUIO, ROSEMARIE ANG,
EUGENE ARADA, NENETTE BARREIRO, NOEL BARTOLOME, ALDRIN
BASTADOR, ROLETTE DIVINE BERNARDO, MINETTE BRAVO, KAREN
BRECILLA, NIDA CAILAO, ERWIN CALAR, MARIFEL CONSTANTINO,
JANETTE CORDERO, ARNOLD FELICITAS, MARISSA GAYAGOY, ALEX
GENERILLO, ELIZABETH GRAY, ZOILO HERICO, JACQUELINE IGNACIO,
THELMA INFANTE, JOEL JUMAO-AS, MARIETTA LINCHOCO, ROLLY LORICO,
FRANCIS AUGUSTO MACATOL, MICHAEL MALIGAT, DENNIS MANALO, RAUL
MANGALIMAN, JOEL MANLANGIT, CHARLIE MENDOZA, HAZNAH MENDOZA,
NICHOLS MORALES, ALLEN OLAO, CESAR ORTAL, MICHAEL ORTEGA,
WAYNE PLAZA, JOSELITO REYES, ROLANDO REYES, AILEEN SAPINA,
RAMIL TAMAYO, PHILLIPS TAN, ANDREW UY, WILLIAM VELASCO, EMILIO
VELEZ, NOEMI YUPANO, MARY JANE ONG, RICHARD RAMIREZ, CHERYLE
MARIE ALFONSO, LYNDON BAUTISTA, MANUEL CABOCAN AND NEDY
LAZO, Respondents-in-Intervention,
NAGKAISANG MARALITA NG TAONG ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents-inIntervention,
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 155547 January 21, 2004

SALACNIB F. BATERINA, CLAVEL A. MARTINEZ and CONSTANTINO G.

JARAULA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his
capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and Communications,
and SECRETARY SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, in his capacity as Head of the
Department of Public Works and Highways, respondents, JACINTO V. PARAS,
RAFAEL P. NANTES, EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, WILLY BUYSON VILLARAMA,
PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., HARLIN CAST
ABAYON, and BENASING O. MACARANBON, Respondents-Intervenors,
FLORESTE ALCONIS, GINA ALNAS, REY AMPOLOQUIO, ROSEMARIE ANG,
EUGENE ARADA, NENETTE BARREIRO, NOEL BARTOLOME, ALDRIN
BASTADOR, ROLETTE DIVINE BERNARDO, MINETTE BRAVO, KAREN
BRECILLA, NIDA CAILAO, ERWIN CALAR, MARIFEL CONSTANTINO,
JANETTE CORDERO, ARNOLD FELICITAS, MARISSA GAYAGOY, ALEX
GENERILLO, ELIZABETH GRAY, ZOILO HERICO, JACQUELINE IGNACIO,
THELMA INFANTE, JOEL JUMAO-AS, MARIETTA LINCHOCO, ROLLY LORICO,
FRANCIS AUGUSTO MACATOL, MICHAEL MALIGAT, DENNIS MANALO, RAUL
MANGALIMAN, JOEL MANLANGIT, CHARLIE MENDOZA, HAZNAH MENDOZA,
NICHOLS MORALES, ALLEN OLAO, CESAR ORTAL, MICHAEL ORTEGA,
WAYNE PLAZA, JOSELITO REYES, ROLANDO REYES, AILEEN SAPINA,
RAMIL TAMAYO, PHILLIPS TAN, ANDREW UY, WILLIAM VELASCO, EMILIO
VELEZ, NOEMI YUPANO, MARY JANE ONG, RICHARD RAMIREZ, CHERYLE
MARIE ALFONSO, LYNDON BAUTISTA, MANUEL CABOCAN AND NEDY
LAZO, Respondents-in-Intervention,
NAGKAISANG MARALITA NG TAONG ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents-inIntervention,
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 155661 January 21, 2004
CEFERINO C. LOPEZ, RAMON M. SALES, ALFREDO B. VALENCIA, MA.
TERESA V. GAERLAN, LEONARDO DE LA ROSA, DINA C. DE LEON, VIRGIE
CATAMIN, RONALD SCHLOBOM, ANGELITO SANTOS, MA. LUISA M. PALCON
and SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PALIPARAN NG PILIPINAS
(SMPP), petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY LEANDRO M.

MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and
Communications,respondents,
FLORESTE ALCONIS, GINA ALNAS, REY AMPOLOQUIO, ROSEMARIE ANG,
EUGENE ARADA, NENETTE BARREIRO, NOEL BARTOLOME, ALDRIN
BASTADOR, ROLETTE DIVINE BERNARDO, MINETTE BRAVO, KAREN
BRECILLA, NIDA CAILAO, ERWIN CALAR, MARIFEL CONSTANTINO,
JANETTE CORDERO, ARNOLD FELICITAS, MARISSA GAYAGOY, ALEX
GENERILLO, ELIZABETH GRAY, ZOILO HERICO, JACQUELINE IGNACIO,
THELMA INFANTE, JOEL JUMAO-AS, MARIETTA LINCHOCO, ROLLY LORICO,
FRANCIS AUGUSTO MACATOL, MICHAEL MALIGAT, DENNIS MANALO, RAUL
MANGALIMAN, JOEL MANLANGIT, CHARLIE MENDOZA, HAZNAH MENDOZA,
NICHOLS MORALES, ALLEN OLAO, CESAR ORTAL, MICHAEL ORTEGA,
WAYNE PLAZA, JOSELITO REYES, ROLANDO REYES, AILEEN SAPINA,
RAMIL TAMAYO, PHILLIPS TAN, ANDREW UY, WILLIAM VELASCO, EMILIO
VELEZ, NOEMI YUPANO, MARY JANE ONG, RICHARD RAMIREZ, CHERYLE
MARIE ALFONSO, LYNDON BAUTISTA, MANUEL CABOCAN AND NEDY
LAZO, Respondents-in-Intervention,
NAGKAISANG MARALITA NG TAONG ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents-inIntervention.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Before this Court are the separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by respondent
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), respondents-intervenors
Jacinto V. Paras, Rafael P. Nantes, Eduardo C. Zialcita, Willie Buyson Villarama,
Prospero C. Nograles, Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Harlin Cast Abayon and Benasing O.
Macaranbon, all members of the House of Representatives (Respondent
Congressmen),1 respondents-intervenors who are employees of PIATCO and other
workers of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal
III (NAIA IPT III) (PIATCO Employees)2 and respondents-intervenors Nagkaisang
Maralita ng Taong Association, Inc., (NMTAI)3 of the Decision of this Court dated
May 5, 2003 declaring the contracts for the NAIA IPT III project null and void.
Briefly, the proceedings. On October 5, 1994, Asias Emerging Dragon Corp.
(AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Philippine Government through the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) for the construction and development of the NAIA IPT III
under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to R.A. No. 6957, as
amended by R.A. No. 7718 (BOT Law).4In accordance with the BOT Law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules), the DOTC/MIAA invited

the public for submission of competitive and comparative proposals to the

unsolicited proposal of AEDC. On September 20, 1996 a consortium composed of
the Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds
Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively,
Paircargo Consortium), submitted their competitive proposal to the Prequalification
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC).
After finding that the Paircargo Consortium submitted a bid superior to the
unsolicited proposal of AEDC and after failure by AEDC to match the said bid, the
DOTC issued the notice of award for the NAIA IPT III project to the Paircargo
Consortium, which later organized into herein respondent PIATCO. Hence, on July
12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile, and
PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the "Concession Agreement for
the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport Passenger Terminal III" (1997 Concession Agreement). On November 26,
1998, the 1997 Concession Agreement was superseded by the Amended and
Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) containing certain revisions and
modifications from the original contract. A series of supplemental agreements was
also entered into by the Government and PIATCO. The First Supplement was
signed on August 27, 1999, the Second Supplement on September 4, 2000, and the
Third Supplement on June 22, 2001 (collectively, Supplements) (the 1997
Concession Agreement, ARCA and the Supplements collectively referred to as the
PIATCO Contracts).
On September 17, 2002, various petitions were filed before this Court to annul the
1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements and to prohibit
the public respondents DOTC and MIAA from implementing them.
In a decision dated May 5, 2003, this Court granted the said petitions and declared
the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements null and void.
Respondent PIATCO, respondent-Congressmen and respondents-intervenors now
seek the reversal of the May 5, 2003 decision and pray that the petitions be
dismissed. In the alternative, PIATCO prays that the Court should not strike down
the entire 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and its supplements in light of
their separability clause. Respondent-Congressmen and NMTAI also pray that in the
alternative, the cases at bar should be referred to arbitration pursuant to the
provisions of the ARCA. PIATCO-Employees pray that the petitions be dismissed
and remanded to the trial courts for trial on the merits or in the alternative that the
1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements be declared valid and
binding.
I
Procedural Matters

a. Lack of Jurisdiction
Private respondents and respondents-intervenors reiterate a number of procedural
issues which they insist deprived this Court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the
instant cases on its merits. They continue to claim that the cases at bar raise factual
questions which this Court is ill-equipped to resolve, hence, they must be remanded
to the trial court for reception of evidence. Further, they allege that although
designated as petitions for certiorari and prohibition, the cases at bar are actually
actions for nullity of contracts over which the trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
Even assuming that the cases at bar are special civil actions for certiorari and
prohibition, they contend that the principle of hierarchy of courts precludes this Court
from taking primary jurisdiction over them.
We are not persuaded.
There is a question of fact when doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of
the facts alleged.5 Even a cursory reading of the cases at bar will show that the
Court decided them by interpreting and applying the Constitution, the BOT Law, its
Implementing Rules and other relevant legal principles on the basis of clearly
undisputed facts. All the operative facts were settled, hence, there is no need for
a trial type determination of their truth or falsity by a trial court.
We reject the unyielding insistence of PIATCO Employees that the following factual
issues are critical and beyond the capability of this Court to resolve, viz: (a) whether
the National Economic Development Authority- Investment Coordinating Committee
(NEDA-ICC) approved the Supplements; (b) whether the First Supplement created
ten (10) new financial obligations on the part of the government; and (c) whether the
1997 Concession Agreement departed from the draft Concession Agreement
contained in the Bid Documents.6
The factual issue of whether the NEDA-ICC approved the Supplements is hardly
relevant. It is clear in our Decision that the PIATCO contracts were invalidated on
other and more substantial grounds. It did not rely on the presence or absence of
NEDA-ICC approval of the Supplements. On the other hand, the last two issues do
not involve disputed facts. Rather, they involve contractual provisions which are
clear and categorical and need only to be interpreted. The interpretation of
contracts and the determination of whether their provisions violate our laws or
contravene any public policy is a legal issue which this Court may properly
pass upon.
Respondents corollary contention that this Court violated the hierarchy of
courts when it entertained the cases at bar must also fail. The rule on hierarchy of
courts in cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the trial courts and
appellate courts generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For
this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to

determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the
evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot
be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts.
It goes without saying that when cases brought before the appellate courts do not
involve factual but legal questions, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of
courts is not necessary. As the cases at bar merely concern the construction of the
Constitution, the interpretation of the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations on undisputed contractual provisions and government actions, and as
the cases concern public interest, this Court resolved to take primary jurisdiction
over them. This choice of action follows the consistent stance of this Court to settle
any controversy with a high public interest component in a single proceeding and to
leave no root or branch that could bear the seeds of future litigation. The suggested
remand of the cases at bar to the trial court will stray away from this policy. 7
b. Legal Standing
Respondent PIATCO stands pat with its argument that petitioners lack legal
personality to file the cases at bar as they are not real parties in interest who are
bound principally or subsidiarily to the PIATCO Contracts. Further, respondent
PIATCO contends that petitioners failed to show any legally demandable or
enforceable right to justify their standing to file the cases at bar.
These arguments are not difficult to deflect. The determination of whether a person
may institute an action or become a party to a suit brings to fore the concepts of real
party in interest, capacity to sue and standing to sue. To the legally discerning, these
three concepts are different although commonly directed towards ensuring that only
certain parties can maintain an action.8 As defined in the Rules of Court, a real party
in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.9 Capacity to sue deals with a
situation where a person who may have a cause of action is disqualified from
bringing a suit under applicable law or is incompetent to bring a suit or is under
some legal disability that would prevent him from maintaining an action unless
represented by a guardian ad litem. Legal standing is relevant in the realm of public
law. In certain instances, courts have allowed private parties to institute actions
challenging the validity of governmental action for violation of private rights or
constitutional principles.10 In these cases, courts apply the doctrine of legal standing
by determining whether the party has a direct and personal interest in the
controversy and whether such party has sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of, a standard which is
distinct from the concept of real party in interest.11 Measured by this yardstick, the
application of the doctrine on legal standing necessarily involves a preliminary
consideration of the merits of the case and is not purely a procedural issue. 12

Considering the nature of the controversy and the issues raised in the cases at bar,
this Court affirms its ruling that the petitioners have the requisite legal standing. The
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 155001 and 155661 are employees of service providers
operating at the existing international airports and employees of MIAA while
petitioners-intervenors are service providers with existing contracts with MIAA and
they will all sustain direct injury upon the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts.
The 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA both provide that upon the
commencement of operations at the NAIA IPT III, NAIA Passenger Terminals I and
II will cease to be used as international passenger terminals.13 Further, the ARCA
provides:
(d) For the purpose of an orderly transition, MIAA shall not renew any expired
concession agreement relative to any service or operation currently being
undertaken at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal I, or
extend any concession agreement which may expire subsequent hereto, except
to the extent that the continuation of the existing services and operations shall
lapse on or before the In-Service Date.14

Beyond iota of doubt, the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts, which the
petitioners and petitioners-intervenors denounce as unconstitutional and illegal,
would deprive them of their sources of livelihood. Under settled jurisprudence, one's
employment, profession, trade, or calling is a property right and is protected from
wrongful interference.15 It is also self evident that the petitioning service providers
stand in imminent danger of losing legitimate business investments in the event the
PIATCO Contracts are upheld.
Over and above all these, constitutional and other legal issues with far-reaching
economic and social implications are embedded in the cases at bar, hence, this
Court liberally granted legal standing to the petitioning members of the House of
Representatives. First, at stake is the build-operate-andtransfer contract of the
countrys premier international airport with a projected capacity of 10 million
passengers a year. Second, the huge amount of investment to complete the project
is estimated to be P13,000,000,000.00. Third, the primary issues posed in the cases
at bar demand a discussion and interpretation of the Constitution, the BOT Law and
its implementing rules which have not been passed upon by this Court in previous
cases. They can chart the future inflow of investment under the BOT Law.
Before writing finis to the issue of legal standing, the Court notes the bid of new
parties to participate in the cases at bar as respondents-intervenors, namely, (1) the
PIATCO Employees and (2) NMTAI (collectively, the New RespondentsIntervenors). After the Courts Decision, the New Respondents-Intervenors filed
separate Motions for Reconsideration-In-Intervention alleging prejudice and direct
injury. PIATCO employees claim that "they have a direct and personal interest [in
the controversy]... since they stand to lose their jobs should the governments
contract with PIATCO be declared null and void."16 NMTAI, on the other hand,

represents itself as a corporation composed of responsible tax-paying Filipino

citizens with the objective of "protecting and sustaining the rights of its members to
civil liberties, decent livelihood, opportunities for social advancement, and to a good,
conscientious and honest government."17
The Rules of Court govern the time of filing a Motion to Intervene. Section 2, Rule 19
provides that a Motion to Intervene should be filed "before rendition of judgment...."
The New Respondents-Intervenors filed their separate motions after a decision has
been promulgated in the present cases. They have not offered any worthy
explanation to justify their late intervention. Consequently, their Motions for
Reconsideration-In-Intervention are denied for the rules cannot be relaxed to await
litigants who sleep on their rights. In any event, a sideglance at these late motions
will show that they hoist no novel arguments.
c. Failure to Implead an Indispensable Party
PIATCO next contends that petitioners should have impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as an indispensable party. It alleges that petitioners sued the DOTC,
MIAA and the DPWH in their own capacities or as implementors of the PIATCO
Contracts and not as a contract party or as representatives of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. It then leapfrogs to the conclusion that the "absence of
an indispensable party renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the
filing of the complaint including the judgment."18
PIATCOs allegations are inaccurate. The petitions clearly bear out that public
respondents DOTC and MIAA were impleaded as parties to the PIATCO
Contracts and not merely as their implementors. The separate petitions filed by the
MIAA employees19 and members of the House of Representatives20 alleged that
"public respondents are impleaded herein because they either executed the
PIATCO Contracts or are undertaking acts which are related to the PIATCO
Contracts. They are interested and indispensable parties to this Petition."21 Thus,
public respondents DOTC and MIAA were impleaded as parties to the case for
havingexecuted the contracts.
More importantly, it is also too late in the day for PIATCO to raise this issue. If
PIATCO seriously views the non-inclusion of the Republic of the Philippines as an
indispensable party as fatal to the petitions at bar, it should have raised the issue at
the onset of the proceedings as a ground to dismiss. PIATCO cannot litigate issues
on a piecemeal basis, otherwise, litigations shall be like a shore that knows no end.
In any event, the Solicitor General, the legal counsel of the Republic, appeared in
the cases at bar in representation of the interest of the government.
II
Pre-qualification of PIATCO

The Implementing Rules provide for the unyielding standards the PBAC should
apply to determine the financial capability of a bidder for pre-qualification purposes:
(i) proof of the ability of the project proponent and/or the consortium to provide a
minimum amount of equity to the project and (ii) a letter testimonial from
reputable banks attesting that the project proponent and/or members of the
consortium are banking with them, that they are in good financial standing,
and that they have adequate resources.22 The evident intent of these standards is
to protect the integrity and insure the viability of the project by seeing to it that the
proponent has the financial capability to carry it out. As a further measure to achieve
this intent, it maintains a certain debt-to-equity ratio for the project.
At the pre-qualification stage, it is most important for a bidder to show that it has the
financial capacity to undertake the project by proving that it can fulfill the
requirement on minimum amount of equity. For this purpose, the Bid Documents
require in no uncertain terms:
The minimum amount of equity to which the proponents financial capability will
be based shall be thirty percent (30%) of the project cost instead of the
twenty percent (20%) specified in Section 3.6.4 of the Bid Documents. This
is to correlate with the required debt-to-equity ratio of 70:30 in Section 2.01a of
the draft concession agreement. The debt portion of the project financing should
not exceed 70% of the actual project cost. 23

In relation thereto, section 2.01 (a) of the ARCA provides:

Section 2.01 Project Scope.

The scope of the project shall include:

(a) Financing the project at an actual Project cost of not less than Three Hundred
Fifty Million United States Dollars (US$350,000,000.00) while maintaining a debtto-equity ratio of 70:30, provided that if the actual Project costs should exceed
the aforesaid amount, Concessionaire shall ensure that the debt-to-equity ratio is
maintained;24

Under the debt-to-equity restriction, a bidder may only seek financing of the NAIA
IPT III Project up to 70% of the project cost. Thirty percent (30%) of the cost must
come in the form of equity or investment by the bidder itself. It cannot be overly
emphasized that the rules require a minimum amount of equity to ensure that a
bidder is not merely an operator or implementor of the project but an investor with
a substantial interest in its success. The minimum equity requirement also
guarantees the Philippine government and the general public, who are the ultimate
beneficiaries of the project, that a bidder will not be indifferent to the completion of
the project. The discontinuance of the project will irreparably damage public interest
more than private interest.

In the cases at bar, after applying the investment ceilings provided under the
General Banking Act and considering the maximum amounts that each member of
the consortium may validly invest in the project, it is daylight clear that the Paircargo
Consortium, at the time of pre-qualification, had a net worth equivalent to only6.08%
of the total estimated project cost.25 By any reckoning, a showing by a bidder that
at the time of pre-qualification its maximum funds available for investment amount to
only 6.08% of the project cost is insufficient to satisfy the requirement prescribed by
the Implementing Rules that the project proponent must have the ability to provide at
least 30% of the total estimated project cost. In peso and centavo terms, at the time
of pre-qualification, the Paircargo Consortium had maximum funds available for
investment to the NAIA IPT III Project only in the amount of P558,384,871.55, when
it had to show that it had the ability to provide at least P2,755,095,000.00. The huge
disparity cannot be dismissed as of de minimis importance considering the high
public interest at stake in the project.
PIATCO nimbly tries to sidestep its failure by alleging that it submitted not only
audited financial statements but also testimonial letters from reputable banks
attesting to the good financial standing of the Paircargo Consortium. It contends that
in adjudging whether the Paircargo Consortium is a pre-qualified bidder, the PBAC
should have considered not only its financial statements but other factors showing
its financial capability.
Anent this argument, the guidelines provided in the Bid Documents are instructive:
3.3.4 FINANCING AND FINANCIAL PREQUALIFICATIONS REQUIREMENTS
Minimum Amount of Equity
Each member of the proponent entity is to provide evidence of networth in cash
and assets representing the proportionate share in the proponent entity. Audited
financial statements for the past five (5) years as a company for each member
are to be provided.
Project Loan Financing
Testimonial letters from reputable banks attesting that each of the members
of the ownership entity are banking with them, in good financial standing and
having adequate resources are to be provided.26

It is beyond refutation that Paircargo Consortium failed to prove its ability to

provide the amount of at least P2,755,095,000.00, or 30% of the estimated
project cost. Its submission of testimonial letters attesting to its good financial
standing will not cure this failure. At best, the said letters merely establish its credit
worthiness or its ability to obtain loans to finance the project. They do not, however,
prove compliance with the aforesaid requirement of minimum amount of equity in

relation to the prescribed debt-to-equity ratio. This equity cannot be satisfied through
possible loans.
In sum, we again hold that given the glaring gap between the net worth of Paircargo
and PAGS combined with the amount of maximum funds that Security Bank may
invest by equity in a non-allied undertaking, Paircargo Consortium, at the time of
pre-qualification, failed to show that it had the ability to provide 30% of the project
cost and necessarily, its financial capability for the project cannot pass muster.
III
Concession Agreement
Again, we brightline the principle that in public bidding, bids are submitted in accord
with the prescribed terms, conditions and parameters laid down by government and
pursuant to the requirements of the project bidded upon. In light of these
parameters, bidders formulate competing proposals which are evaluated to
determine the bid most favorable to the government. Once the contract based on the
bid most favorable to the government is awarded, all that is left to be done by the
parties is to execute the necessary agreements and implement them. There can be
no substantial or material change to the parameters of the project, including the
essential terms and conditions of the contract bidded upon, after the contract award.
If there were changes and the contracts end up unfavorable to government, the
public bidding becomes a mockery and the modified contracts must be struck down.
Respondents insist that there were no substantial or material amendments in the
1997 Concession Agreement as to the technical aspects of the project, i.e.,
engineering design, technical soundness, operational and maintenance methods
and procedures of the project or the technical proposal of PIATCO. Further, they
maintain that there was no modification of the financial features of the project, i.e.,
minimum project cost, debt-to-equity ratio, the operations and maintenance budget,
the schedule and amount of annual guaranteed payments, or the financial
proposal of PIATCO. A discussion of some of these changes to determine whether
they altered the terms and conditions upon which the bids were made is again in
order.
a. Modification on Fees and Charges to be collected by PIATCO
PIATCO clings to the contention that the removal of the groundhandling fees, airline
office rentals and porterage fees from the category of fees subject to MIAA
regulation in the 1997 Concession Agreement does not constitute a substantial
amendment as these fees are not really public utility fees. In other words, PIATCO
justifies the re-classification under the 1997 Concession Agreement on the ground
that these fees are non-public utility revenues.

We disagree. The removal of groundhandling fees, airline office rentals and

porterage fees from the category of "Public Utility Revenues" under the draft
Concession Agreement and its re-classification to "Non-Public Utility Revenues"
under the 1997 Concession Agreement is significant and has far reaching
consequence. The 1997 Concession Agreement provides that with respect to NonPublic Utility Revenues, which include groundhandling fees, airline office rentals and
porterage fees,27 "[PIATCO] may make any adjustments it deems
appropriatewithout need for the consent of GRP or any government
agency."28 In contrast, the draft Concession Agreement specifies these fees as part
of Public Utility Revenues and can be adjusted "only once every two years and in
accordance with the Parametric Formula" and "the adjustments shall be made
effective only after the written express approval of the MIAA."29 The Bid
Documents themselves clearly provide:
4.2.3 Mechanism for Adjustment of Fees and Charges
4.2.3.1 Periodic Adjustment in Fees and Charges
Adjustments in the fees and charges enumerated hereunder, whether or
not falling within the purview of public utility revenues, shall be
allowed only once every two years in accordance with the parametric
formula attached hereto as Annex 4.2f. Provided that the adjustments
shall be made effective only after the written express approval of MIAA.
Provided, further, that MIAAs approval, shall be contingent only on
conformity of the adjustments to the said parametric formula.
The fees and charges to be regulated in the above manner shall consist of the
following:
....
c) groundhandling fees;
d) rentals on airline offices;
....
(f) porterage fees;
. . . .30

The plain purpose in re-classifying groundhandling fees, airline office rentals and
porterage fees as non-public utility fees is to remove them from regulation by the
MIAA. In excluding these fees from government regulation, the danger to public
interest cannot be downplayed.

We are not impressed by the effort of PIATCO to depress this prejudice to public
interest by its contention that in the 1997 Concession Agreement governing NonPublic Utility Revenues, it is provided that "[PIATCO] shall at all times
be judicious in fixing fees and charges constituting Non-Public Utility Revenues in
order to ensure that End Users are not unreasonably deprived of
services."31 PIATCO then peddles the proposition that the said provision confers
upon MIAA "full regulatory powers to ensure that PIATCO is charging non-public
utility revenues at judicious rates."32 To the trained eye, the argument will not fly for it
is obviously non sequitur. Fairly read, it is PIATCO that wields the power to
determine the judiciousness of the said fees and charges. In the draft Concession
Agreement the power was expressly lodged with the MIAA and any adjustment can
only be done once every two years. The changes are not insignificant specks as
interpreted by PIATCO.
PIATCO further argues that there is no substantial change in the 1997 Concession
Agreement with respect to fees and charges PIATCO is allowed to impose which are
not covered by Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 199333 as the "relevant
provision of the 1997 Concession Agreement is practically identical with the draft
Concession Agreement."34
We are not persuaded. Under the draft Concession Agreement, PIATCO
may impose fees and charges other than those fees and charges previously
imposed or collected at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal I,
subject to the written approval of MIAA.35 Further, the draft Concession Agreement
provides that MIAA reserves the right to regulate these new fees and charges if in
its judgment the users of the airport shall be deprived of a free option for the
services they cover.36 In contrast, under the 1997 Concession Agreement, the MIAA
merely retained the right to approve any imposition of new fees and charges
which were not previously collected at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
Passenger Terminal I. The agreement did not contain an equivalent provision
allowing MIAA to reserve the right to regulate the adjustmentsof these new fees
and charges.37 PIATCO justifies the amendment by arguing that MIAA can establish
terms before approval of new fees and charges, inclusive of the mode for their
adjustment.
PIATCOs stance is again a strained one. There would have been no need for an
amendment if there were no change in the power to regulate on the part of MIAA.
The deletion of MIAAs reservation of its right to regulate the price adjustments of
new fees and charges can have no other purpose but to dilute the extent of MIAAs
regulation in the collection of these fees. Again, the amendment diminished the
authority of MIAA to protect the public interest in case of abuse by PIATCO.
b. Assumption by the Government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of
the latters default

PIATCO posits the thesis that the new provisions in the 1997 Concession
Agreement in case of default by PIATCO on its loans were merely meant to
prescribe and limit the rights of PIATCOs creditors with regard to the NAIA Terminal
III. PIATCO alleges that Section 4.04 of the 1997 Concession Agreement simply
provides that PIATCOs creditors have no right to foreclose the NAIA Terminal III.
We cannot concur. The pertinent provisions of the 1997 Concession Agreement
state:
Section 4.04 Assignment.
....
(b) In the event Concessionaire should default in the payment of an Attendant
Liability, and the default has resulted in the acceleration of the payment due date
of the Attendant Liability prior to its stated date of maturity, the Unpaid Creditors
and Concessionaire shall immediately inform GRP in writing of such default.
GRP shall, within one hundred eighty (180) Days from receipt of the joint written
notice of the Unpaid Creditors and Concessionaire, either (i) take over the
Development Facility and assume the Attendant Liabilities, or (ii) allow the
Unpaid Creditors, if qualified, to be substituted as concessionaire and operator of
the Development Facility in accordance with the terms and conditions hereof, or
designate a qualified operator acceptable to GRP to operate the Development
Facility, likewise under the terms and conditions of this Agreement; Provided that
if at the end of the 180-day period GRP shall not have served the Unpaid
Creditors and Concessionaire written notice of its choice, GRP shall be deemed
to have elected to take over the Development Facility with the concomitant
assumption of Attendant Liabilities.
(c) If GRP should, by written notice, allow the Unpaid Creditors to be substituted
as concessionaire, the latter shall form and organize a concession company
qualified to take over the operation of the Development Facility. If the concession
company should elect to designate an operator for the Development Facility, the
concession company shall in good faith identify and designate a qualified
operator acceptable to GRP within one hundred eighty (180) days from receipt of
GRPs written notice. If the concession company, acting in good faith and with
due diligence, is unable to designate a qualified operator within the aforesaid
period, then GRP shall at the end of the 180-day period take over the
Development Facility and assume Attendant Liabilities.

A plain reading of the above provision shows that it spells out in limpid language the
obligation of government in case of default by PIATCO on its loans. There can be no
blinking from the fact that in case of PIATCOs default, the government will assume
PIATCOs Attendant Liabilities as defined in the 1997 Concession Agreement. 38This
obligation is not found in the draft Concession Agreement and the change runs

roughshod to the spirit and policy of the BOT Law which was crafted precisely to
prevent government from incurring financial risk.
In any event, PIATCO pleads that the entire agreement should not be struck down
as the 1997 Concession Agreement contains a separability clause.
The plea is bereft of merit. The contracts at bar which made a mockery of the
bidding process cannot be upheld and must be annulled in their entirety for violating
law and public policy. As demonstrated, the contracts were substantially amended
after their award to the successful bidder on terms more beneficial to PIATCO and
prejudicial to public interest. If this flawed process would be allowed, public bidding
will cease to be competitive and worse, government would not be favored with the
best bid. Bidders will no longer bid on the basis of the prescribed terms and
conditions in the bid documents but will formulate their bid in anticipation of the
execution of a future contract containing new and better terms and conditions that
were not previously available at the time of the bidding. Such a public bidding will
not inure to the public good. The resulting contracts cannot be given half a life but
must be struck down as totally lawless.
IV.
Direct Government Guarantee
The respondents further contend that the PIATCO Contracts do not contain direct
government guarantee provisions. They assert that section 4.04 of the ARCA, which
superseded sections 4.04(b) and (c), Article IV of the 1997 Concession Agreement,
is but a "clarification and explanation"39 of the securities allowed in the bid
documents. They allege that these provisions merely provide for "compensation to
PIATCO"40 in case of a government buy-out or takeover of NAIA IPT III. The
respondents, particularly respondent PIATCO, also maintain that the guarantee
contained in the contracts, if any, is an indirect guarantee allowed under the BOT
Law, as amended.41
We do not agree. Section 4.04(c), Article IV42 of the ARCA should be read in
conjunction with section 1.06, Article I,43 in the same manner that sections 4.04(b)
and (c), Article IV of the 1997 Concession Agreement should be related to Article
1.06 of the same contract. Section 1.06, Article I of the ARCA and its counterpart
provision in the 1997 Concession Agreement define in no uncertain terms the
meaning of "attendant liabilities." They tell us of the amounts that the Government
has to pay in the event respondent PIATCO defaults in its loan payments to its
Senior Lenders and no qualified transferee or nominee is chosen by the Senior
Lenders or is willing to take over from respondent PIATCO.
A reasonable reading of all these relevant provisions would reveal that the ARCA
made the Government liable to pay "all amounts ... from time to time owed or
which may become owing by Concessionaire [PIATCO] to Senior Lenders or

any other persons or entities who have provided, loaned, or advanced funds
or provided financial facilities to Concessionaire [PIATCO] for the Project [NAIA
Terminal 3]."44 These amounts include "without limitation, all principal, interest,
associated fees, charges, reimbursements, and other related expenses...
whether payable at maturity, by acceleration or otherwise."45 They further include
amounts owed by respondent PIATCO to its "professional consultants and advisers,
suppliers, contractors and sub-contractors" as well as "fees, charges and expenses
of any agents or trustees" of the Senior Lenders or any other persons or entities who
have provided loans or financial facilities to respondent PIATCO in relation to NAIA
IPT III.46 The counterpart provision in the 1997 Concession Agreement specifying
the attendant liabilities that the Government would be obligated to pay should
PIATCO default in its loan obligations is equally onerous to the Government as
those contained in the ARCA. According to the 1997 Concession Agreement, in the
event the Government is forced to prematurely take over NAIA IPT III as a result of
respondent PIATCOs default in the payment of its loan obligations to its Senior
Lenders, it would be liable to pay the following amounts as "attendant liabilities":
Section 1.06. Attendant Liabilities
Attendant Liabilities refer to all amounts recorded and from time to time
outstanding in the books of the Concessionaire as owing to Unpaid
Creditors who have provided, loaned or advanced funds actually used for the
Project, including all interests, penalties, associated fees, charges,
surcharges, indemnities, reimbursements and other related expenses, and
further including amounts owed by Concessionaire to its suppliers, contractors
and sub-contractors.47

These provisions reject respondents contention that what the Government is

obligated to pay, in the event that respondent PIATCO defaults in the payment of its
loans, is merely termination payment or just compensation for its takeover of NAIA
IPT III. It is clear from said section 1.06 that what the Government would pay is
the sum total of all the debts, including all interest, fees and charges, that
respondent PIATCO incurred in pursuance of the NAIA IPT III Project. This reading
is consistent with section 4.04 of the ARCA itself which states that the Government
"shall make a termination payment to Concessionaire [PIATCO] equal to the
Appraised Value (as hereinafter defined) of the Development Facility [NAIA Terminal
III] or the sum of the Attendant Liabilities, if greater." For sure, respondent
PIATCO will not receive any amount less than sufficient to cover its debts,
regardless of whether or not the value of NAIA IPT III, at the time of its turn
over to the Government, may actually be less than the amount of PIATCOs
debts. The scheme is a form of direct government guarantee for it is undeniable that
it leaves the government no option but to pay the "attendant liabilities" in the event
that the Senior Lenders are unable or unwilling to appoint a qualified nominee or
transferee as a result of PIATCOs default in the payment of its Senior Loans. As we

stressed in our Decision, this Court cannot depart from the legal maxim that "those
that cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly."
This is not to hold, however, that indirect government guarantee is not allowed under
the BOT Law, as amended. The intention to permit indirect government guarantee is
evident from the Senate deliberations on the amendments to the BOT Law. The idea
is to allow for reasonable government undertakings, such as to authorize the project
proponent to undertake related ventures within the project area, in order to
encourage private sector participation in development projects.48 An example cited
by then Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, one of the sponsors of R.A. No. 7718, is
the Mandaluyong public market which was built under the Build-and-Transfer ("BT")
scheme wherein instead of the government paying for the transfer, the project
proponent was allowed to operate the upper floors of the structure as a commercial
mall in order to recoup their investments.49 It was repeatedly stressed in the
deliberations that in allowing indirect government guarantee, the law seeks to
encourage both the government and the private sector to formulate reasonable and
innovative government undertakings in pursuance of BOT projects. In no way,
however, can the government be made liable for the debts of the project proponent
as this would be tantamount to a direct government guarantee which is prohibited by
the law. Such liability would defeat the very purpose of the BOT Law which is to
encourage the use of private sector resources in the construction, maintenance
and/or operation of development projects with no, or at least minimal, capital outlay
on the part of the government.
The respondents again urge that should this Court affirm its ruling that the PIATCO
Contracts contain direct government guarantee provisions, the whole contract
should not be nullified. They rely on the separability clause in the PIATCO
Contracts.
We are not persuaded.
The BOT Law and its implementing rules provide that there are three (3) essential
requisites for an unsolicited proposal to be accepted: (1) the project involves a new
concept in technology and/or is not part of the list of priority projects, (2) no direct
government guarantee, subsidy or equity is required, and (3) the government
agency or local government unit has invited by publication other interested parties to
a public bidding and conducted the same.50 The failure to fulfill any of the requisites
will result in the denial of the proposal. Indeed, it is further provided that a direct
government guarantee, subsidy or equity provision will "necessarily disqualify a
proposal from being treated and accepted as an unsolicited proposal."51 In fine, the
mere inclusion of a direct government guarantee in an unsolicited proposal is fatal to
the proposal. There is more reason to invalidate a contract if a direct government
guarantee provision is inserted later in the contract via a backdoor amendment.
Such an amendment constitutes a crass circumvention of the BOT Law and renders
the entire contract void.

Respondent PIATCO likewise claims that in view of the fact that other BOT contracts
such as the JANCOM contract, the Manila Water contract and the MRT contract had
been considered valid, the PIATCO contracts should be held valid as well. 52 There is
no parity in the cited cases. For instance, a reading of Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. JANCOM Environmental Corporation53 will show that
its issue is different from the issues in the cases at bar. In the JANCOM case, the
main issue is whether there is a perfected contract between JANCOM and the
Government. The resolution of the issue hinged on the following: (1) whether the
conditions precedent to the perfection of the contract were complied with; (2)
whether there is a valid notice of award; and (3) whether the signature of the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources is sufficient to
bind the Government. These issue and sub-issues are clearly distinguishable and
different. For one, the issue of direct government guarantee was not considered by
this Court when it held the JANCOM contract valid, yet, it is a key reason for
invalidating the PIATCO Contracts. It is a basic principle in law that cases with
dissimilar facts cannot have similar disposition.
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the
NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO
in their construction. For the government to take over the said facility, it has to
compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The
compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the
government can not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its
investors.
II.
Temporary takeover of business affected with public interest in times of
national emergency
Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution grants the State in times of national
emergency the right to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected
with public interest. This right is an exercise of police power which is one of the
inherent powers of the State.
Police power has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare."54 It consists of two essential elements. First, it is an imposition of restraint
upon liberty or property. Second, the power is exercised for the benefit of the
common good. Its definition in elastic terms underscores its all-encompassing and
comprehensive embrace.55 It is and still is the "most essential, insistent, and
illimitable"56 of the States powers. It is familiar knowledge that unlike the power of
eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just
compensation for its paramount consideration is public welfare.57

It is also settled that public interest on the occasion of a national emergency is the
primary consideration when the government decides to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of a public utility or a business affected with public interest. The
nature and extent of the emergency is the measure of the duration of the takeover
as well as the terms thereof. It is the State that prescribes such reasonable terms
which will guide the implementation of the temporary takeover as dictated by the
exigencies of the time. As we ruled in our Decision, this power of the State can not
be negated by any party nor should its exercise be a source of obligation for the
State.
Section 5.10(c), Article V of the ARCA provides that respondent PIATCO "shall be
entitled to reasonable compensation for the duration of the temporary takeover by
GRP, which compensation shall take into account the reasonable cost for the use of
the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex."58 It clearly obligates the government in the
exercise of its police power to compensate respondent PIATCO and this obligation
is offensive to the Constitution. Police power can not be diminished, let alone
defeated by any contract for its paramount consideration is public welfare and
interest.59
Again, respondent PIATCOs reliance on the case of Heirs of Suguitan v. City of
Mandaluyong60 to justify its claim for reasonable compensation for the
Governments temporary takeover of NAIA IPT III in times of national emergency is
erroneous. What was involved in Heirs of Suguitan is the exercise of the states
power of eminent domain and not of police power, hence, just compensation was
awarded. The cases at bar will not involve the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
III.
Monopoly
Section 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the State prohibit or
regulate monopolies when public interest so requires. Monopolies are not per se
prohibited. Given its susceptibility to abuse, however, the State has the bounden
duty to regulate monopolies to protect public interest. Such regulation may be called
for, especially in sensitive areas such as the operation of the countrys premier
international airport, considering the public interest at stake.
By virtue of the PIATCO contracts, NAIA IPT III would be the only international
passenger airport operating in the Island of Luzon, with the exception of those
already operating in Subic Bay Freeport Special Economic Zone ("SBFSEZ"), Clark
Special Economic Zone ("CSEZ") and in Laoag City. Undeniably, the contracts
would create a monopoly in the operation of an international commercial passenger
airport at the NAIA in favor of PIATCO.

The grant to respondent PIATCO of the exclusive right to operate NAIA IPT III
should not exempt it from regulation by the government. The government has the
right, indeed the duty, to protect the interest of the public. Part of this duty is to
assure that respondent PIATCOs exercise of its right does not violate the legal
rights of third parties. We reiterate our ruling that while the service providers
presently operating at NAIA Terminals I and II do not have the right to demand for
the renewal or extension of their contracts to continue their services in NAIA IPT III,
those who have subsisting contracts beyond the In-Service Date of NAIA IPT III can
not be arbitrarily or unreasonably treated.
Finally, the Respondent Congressmen assert that at least two (2) committee reports
by the House of Representatives found the PIATCO contracts valid and contend that
this Court, by taking cognizance of the cases at bar, reviewed an action of a coequal body.61 They insist that the Court must respect the findings of the said
committees of the House of Representatives.62 With due respect, we cannot
subscribe to their submission. There is a fundamental difference between a case in
court and an investigation of a congressional committee. The purpose of a judicial
proceeding is to settle the dispute in controversy by adjudicating the legal rights and
obligations of the parties to the case. On the other hand, a congressional
investigation is conducted in aid of legislation.63 Its aim is to assist and recommend
to the legislature a possible action that the body may take with regard to a particular
issue, specifically as to whether or not to enact a new law or amend an existing one.
Consequently, this Court cannot treat the findings in a congressional committee
report as binding because the facts elicited in congressional hearings are not subject
to the rigors of the Rules of Court on admissibility of evidence. The Court in
assuming jurisdiction over the petitions at bar simply performed its constitutional
duty as the arbiter of legal disputes properly brought before it, especially in this
instance when public interest requires nothing less.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by the respondent PIATCO,
respondent Congressmen and the respondents-in-intervention are DENIED with
finality.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154599

January 21, 2004

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, petitioner,

vs.
THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY
COUNCIL OF MANILA,respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the nullification
of Manila City Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002,1 and respondent City Mayors
Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002,2 dated 15 August 2002 , for being patently
contrary to law.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National (Liga for brevity) is the national
organization of all the barangays in the Philippines, which pursuant to Section
492 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code
of 1991, constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities,
provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political
subdivision chapters.
Section 493 of that law provides that "[t]he liga at the municipal, city, provincial,
metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a
vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of directors." All other matters
not provided for in the law affecting the internal organization of the leagues of
local government units shall be governed by their respective constitution and bylaws, which must always conform to the provisions of the Constitution and
existing laws.3

On 16 March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to
govern its internal organization.4 Section 1, third paragraph, Article XI of said
Constitution and By-Laws states:
All other election matters not covered in this Article shall be governed by the
"Liga Election Code" or such other rules as may be promulgated by the National
Liga Executive Board in conformity with the provisions of existing laws.

By virtue of the above-cited provision, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Election
Code.5 Section 1.2, Article I of the Liga Election Code states:
1.2 Liga ng mga Barangay Provincial, Metropolitan, HUC/ICC Chapters. There
shall be nationwide synchronized elections for the provincial, metropolitan, and

HUC/ICC chapters to be held on the third Monday of the month immediately after
the month when the synchronized elections in paragraph 1.1 above was held.
The incumbent Liga chapter president concerned duly assisted by the proper
government agency, office or department, e.g. Provincial/City/NCR/Regional
Director, shall convene all the duly elected Component City/Municipal Chapter
Presidents and all the current elected Punong Barangays (for HUC/ICC) of the
respective chapters in any public place within its area of jurisdiction for the
purpose of reorganizing and electing the officers and directors of the provincial,
metropolitan or HUC/ICC Liga chapters. Said president duly assisted by the
government officer aforementioned, shall notify, in writing, all the above
concerned at least fifteen (15) days before the scheduled election meeting on the
exact date, time, place and requirements of the said meeting.

The Liga thereafter came out with its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002,6 setting on 21 October 2002 the
synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter
of Manila, together with independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan
chapters.
lawphi1.net

On 28 June 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039,
Series of 2002, providing, among other things, for the election of representatives of
the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both
chapters thirty days after the barangay elections. Section 3 (A) and (B) of the
assailed ordinance read:
SEC. 3. Representation Chapters. Every Barangay shall be represented in the
said Liga Chapters by the Punong Barangayor, in his absence or incapacity,
by the kagawad duly elected for the purpose among its members.
A. District Chapter
All elected Barangay Chairman in each District shall elect from among
themselves the President, Vice-President and five (5) members of the Board.
B. City Chapter
The District Chapter representatives shall automatically become members of the
Board and they shall elect from among themselves a President, Vice-President,
Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor and create other positions as it may deem
necessary for the management of the chapter.
The assailed ordinance was later transmitted to respondent City Mayor Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., for his signature and approval.
On 16 July 2002, upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to
the Office of the City Mayor, still unnumbered and yet to be officially released, the

Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that said ordinance
be vetoed considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions
of the Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of
the powers of the City Council.7

Respondent Mayor, however, signed and approved the assailed city ordinance and
issued on 15 August 2002 Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002, to implement
the ordinance.
Hence, on 27 August 2002, the Liga filed the instant petition raising the following
issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ENACTED CITY ORDINANCE NO. 8039 S. 2002
PURPOSELY TO GOVERN THE ELECTIONS OF THE MANILA CHAPTER OF THE
LIGA NG MGA BARANGAYS AND WHICH PROVIDES A DIFFERENT MANNER OF
ELECTING ITS OFFICERS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID CHAPTERS
ELECTIONS, AND THE ELECTIONS OF ALL OTHER CHAPTERS OF THE LIGA NG
MGA BARANGAYS FOR THAT MATTER, ARE BY LAW MANDATED TO BE
GOVERNED BY THE LIGA CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS AND THE LIGA
ELECTION CODE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY MAYOR OF MANILA COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN HE ISSUED EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 011 TO IMPLEMENT
THE QUESTIONED CITY ORDINANCE NO. 8039 S. 2002.

In support of its petition, the Liga argues that City Ordinance No. 8039, Series of
2002, and Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002, contradict the Liga Election
Code and are therefore invalid. There exists neither rhyme nor reason, not to
mention the absence of legal basis, for the Manila City Council to encroach upon, or
even assume, the functions of the Liga by prescribing, through legislation, the
manner of conducting the Liga elections other than what has been provided for by
the Liga Constitution and By-laws and the Liga Election Code. Accordingly, the
subject ordinance is an ultra vires act of the respondents and, as such, should be
declared null and void.
As for its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the petitioner cites
as reason therefor the fact that under Section 5 of the assailed city ordinance, the
Manila District Chapter elections would be held thirty days after the regular barangay
elections. Hence, it argued that the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or

preliminary injunction would be imperative to prevent the implementation of the

ordinance and executive order.
On 12 September 2002, Barangay Chairman Arnel Pea, in his capacity as a
member of the Liga ng mga Barangay in the City Chapter of Manila, filed a
Complaint in Intervention with Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.8 He supports the position of the
Liga and prays for the declaration of the questioned ordinance and executive order,
as well as the elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay pursuant thereto, to be null
and void. The assailed ordinance prescribing for an "indirect manner of election"
amended, in effect, the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
provides for the election of the Liga officers at large. It also violated and curtailed the
rights of the petitioner and intervenor, as well as the other 896 Barangay Chairmen
in the City of Manila, to vote and be voted upon in a direct election.
On 25 October 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation
in lieu of Comment.9 It supports the petition of the Liga, arguing that the assailed city
ordinance and executive order are clearly inconsistent with the express public policy
enunciated in R.A. No. 7160. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They
are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation.
Thus, the enactments in question, which are local in origin, cannot prevail against
the decree, which has the force and effect of law.
On the issue of non-observance by the petitioners of the hierarchy-of-courts rule, the
OSG posits that technical rules of procedure should be relaxed in the instant
petition. While Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, grants original jurisdiction
over cases of this nature to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the exigency of the
present petition, however, calls for the relaxation of this rule. Section 496 (should be
Section 491) of the Local Government Code of 1991 primarily intended that the Liga
ng mga Barangay determine the representation of the Liga in the sanggunians for
the immediate ventilation, articulation, and crystallization of issues affecting
barangay government administration. Thus, the immediate resolution of this petition
is a must.
On the other hand, the respondents defend the validity of the assailed ordinance
and executive order and pray for the dismissal of the present petition on the
following grounds: (1) certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is unavailing; (2)
the petition should not be entertained by this Court in view of the pendency before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila of two actions or petitions questioning the subject
ordinance and executive order; (3) the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; and (4)
the act sought to be enjoined is fait accompli.
The respondents maintain that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available to one
aggrieved by the decision of a tribunal, officer, or board exercising judicial or quasi-

judicial functions. The City Council and City Mayor of Manila are not the "board" and
"officer" contemplated in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court because both do not exercise
judicial functions. The enactment of the subject ordinance and issuance of the
questioned executive order are legislative and executive functions, respectively, and
thus, do not fall within the ambit of "judicial functions." They are both within the
prerogatives, powers, and authority of the City Council and City Mayor of Manila,
respectively. Furthermore, the petition failed to show with certainty that the
respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
The respondents also asseverate that the petitioner cannot claim that it has no other
recourse in addressing its grievance other than this petition for certiorari. As a matter
of fact, there are two cases pending before Branches 33 and 51 of the RTC of
Manila (one is for mandamus; the other, for declaratory relief) and three in the Court
of Appeals (one is for prohibition; the two other cases, for quo warranto), which are
all akin to the present petition in the sense that the relief being sought therein is the
declaration of the invalidity of the subject ordinance. Clearly, the petitioner may ask
the RTC or the Court of Appeals the relief being prayed for before this Court.
Moreover, the petitioner failed to prove discernible compelling reasons attending the
present petition that would warrant cognizance of the present petition by this Court.
Besides, according to the respondents, the petitioner has transgressed the
proscription against forum-shopping in filing the instant suit. Although the parties in
the other pending cases and in this petition are different individuals or entities, they
represent the same interest.
With regard to petitioner's prayer for temporary restraining order and/ or preliminary
injunction in its petition, the respondents maintain that the same had become moot
and academic in view of the elections of officers of the City Liga ng mga Barangay
on 15 September 2002 and their subsequent assumption to their respective
offices.10 Since the acts to be enjoined are now fait accompli, this petition for
certiorari with an application for provisional remedies must necessarily fail. Thus,
where the records show that during the pendency of the case certain events or
circumstances had taken place that render the case moot and academic, the petition
forcertiorari must be dismissed.
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this petition for
certiorari.
First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor
arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action
that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must
concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties.11

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature."12
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power
and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties.13
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the
enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance
by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of
legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence,
it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the

questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.14 Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. (Italics supplied).
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved.15

Third, even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary
writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special
and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been
adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should
be allowed.
We have held that this Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well
as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive, but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals
in certain cases. As aptly stated in People v. Cuaresma:16
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor0 will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against
the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent

inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Courts docket.

As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,17 the propensity of litigants and lawyers to

disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon
the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant
delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances
had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the
rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is
not a trier of facts.
Thus, we shall reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts,
and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction.18
Petitioners reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre19 is misplaced because the nonobservance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was not an issue therein. Besides, what
was sought to be nullified in the petition for certiorari and prohibition therein was an
act of the President of the Philippines, which would have greatly affected all local
government units. We reiterated therein that when an act of the legislative
department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the
controversy becomes the duty of this Court. The same is true when what is seriously
alleged to be unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is coequal with Congress.
We hesitate to rule that the petitioner and the intervenor are guilty of forumshopping. Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present
or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis
pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties, or
at least such parties as are representing the same interests in both actions; (2)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case.20
In the instant petition, and as admitted by the respondents, the parties in this case
and in the alleged other pending cases are different individuals or entities; thus,
forum-shopping cannot be said to exist. Moreover, even assuming that those five
petitions are indeed pending before the RTC of Manila and the Court of Appeals, we
can only guess the causes of action and issues raised before those courts,

considering that the respondents failed to furnish this Court with copies of the said
petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162059

January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her
brother, of swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang
kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to
quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar.
She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending
on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation
of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her
siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the
OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student
regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General
of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state
university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to
indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor,
hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of
the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking
public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official functions,
committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University
of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and
believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to
said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the
amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was
subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000
and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated
demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said
accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan
does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her
capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,
enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction
over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public
Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X,
Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped.
Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from
Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her
person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely
represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in
an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive
any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or
funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it
was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to
receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official
functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case
of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioners interpretation of the
law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the
source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a fullblown trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public
officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and
exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public
office, petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer,
is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically,
compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition,
petitioner was compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this
case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the
jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b)
of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office.

From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the
student body, she was never a public officer since she never received any
compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view
of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has
original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated
in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial
consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their
responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines
reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively
exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the
university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law
such sums as may be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To
prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the government of the
university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are
consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on
recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors,
lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours
of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant
to them in its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to
remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through
its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations.
The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the
corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the
Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a
non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of
such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public
officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction,
regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified as Salary
Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15
Million was received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of
the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during
the trial on the merits of this case.16

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17 The motion
was denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004. 18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND
DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer
with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not
committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from
President Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural
grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case

is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial,
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to
quash.20Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to
quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and
illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory
and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2
of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an
answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal
from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to
quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal
lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the
motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is
that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal
and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical
and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the
exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss
based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the
petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed
the respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash
based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the
case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss
based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and
enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to
dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss
based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and
directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to

dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition
for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by
respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal
case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based
on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed
by this Court.24

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the
Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and
in her memorandum of authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error.
It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made
by the Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No.
3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief
legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest
norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the
concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.30

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further
altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995
made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on
February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.

" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or
that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these
petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall
apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all
cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or

accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the
same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the
criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil
action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil
action shall be deemed abandoned."

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17,
1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. 31 Pursuant to
Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be
filed with the Sandiganbayan.32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited
by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition
on private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any
person having family or close personal relation with any public official to
capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or
pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction,
application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official
has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by
consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal
relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections,
and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free
access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public
official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft
and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among
those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this
argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606,
without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. 33 Interpretatio talis in
ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat
maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to
each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. 34 The
intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and
every part of the act is to be taken into view.35 In other words, petitioners
interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as
a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute
itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay
marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo
na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by

public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the
twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office.

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks
Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an
Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon
Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later
designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February
7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro
F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O.
No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27,
1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709,
dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular
government agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its
maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A,
Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness
in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional
Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over
the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to
hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the government employees
separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the
offenses charged, asestafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00,
committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons,
including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular
courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint
trial would nonetheless not be possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any
salary or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last
time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public
officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the
varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by
which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public
([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office
under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists
at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest
or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42
Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer."42

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact,
a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the
salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No.
1606. InGeduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27
and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of
the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provision of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out,
the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of
public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.47

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in

an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. 48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the
Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced
instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional
and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it
declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.50
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not
committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of
the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing
her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the
governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private
capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the
information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to
quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the
whims of defendant or respondent.53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner,
being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan
when it did not quash the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds
and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to
stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the
President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the
information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and
the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave
and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000
in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of
the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on
the merits of the instant case.54
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his
reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition forcertiorari and his
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the
Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty
Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal
case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name
different from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty.
Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56
We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A
lawyers conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and
fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act
with complete candor and honesty before the courts.58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 175457

July 6, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 175482
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioner
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.1 and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr.2 assailing the
Decision3 promulgated on September 16, 2005 and Resolution4 dated November 8,
2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892.
The present controversy arose from a letter5 of Atty. David B. Loste, President of the
Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the Office of
the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor
Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the
provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report6dated January 4, 1999, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal charges against petitioner
Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. On September 22,
1999, the new President of the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the
Ombudsman that the IBP is no longer interested in pursuing the case against
petitioners. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
petitioners.8
Nonetheless, in an Information9 dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and
Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a Memorandum10 dated August 4, 2000, recommending the
dismissal of the complaint as regards Balano and the amendment of the Information
to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 15611 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused. The
Amended Information12 reads:

That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, and for sometime prior [or]
subsequent thereto, [in] the Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [the] above-named
accused, Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[,] being then the Provincial Governor of Eastern
Samar, and Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then the Provincial Warden of Eastern
Samar, both having been public officers, duly elected, appointed and qualified as
such, committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping x x x each other, with deliberate intent, manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
order and cause the release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor
Francisco Adalim, accused in Criminal Case No. 10963, for Murder, by virtue of a
warrant of Arrest issued by Honorable Arnulfo P. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, RTCBranch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar, and thereafter placed said detention prisoner
(Mayor Francisco Adalim) under accused RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR.s custody, by
allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused Ambils residence for a period of
Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which act was done without any court order, thus
accused in the performance of official functions had given unwarranted benefits and
advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim to the prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.13
On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason,
however, that Adalims transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon
his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to
petitioners, Adalims sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous
prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.
Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and rested its
case after the admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence with Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of
Denial14 but the same was denied.
At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana
A. Adalim-White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998
to 2001. According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalims lawyers that he
directed the transfer of Adalims detention to his home. He cites poor security in the
provincial jail as the primary reason for taking personal custody of Adalim
considering that the latter would be in the company of inmates who were put away
by his sister and guards identified with his political opponents.15

For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of Eastern
Samar and the sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was
arrested while they were attending a wedding in Sulat, Eastern Samar, on
September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White, she sought the alternative custody of
Gov. Ambil, Jr. after Provincial Warden and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to
guarantee the mayors safety.16
Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern
Samar. He confirmed his arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a murder
case filed against him in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern
Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. Whites account that he spotted inmates who served
as bodyguards for, or who are associated with, his political rivals at the provincial
jail. He also noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him with a raised
clenched fist. Sensing danger, he called on his sister for help. Adalim admitted
staying at Ambil, Jr.s residence for almost three months before he posted bail after
the charge against him was downgraded to homicide.17
Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern
Samar. He recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at
home to assist in the arrest of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting
the legality of Mayor Adalims arrest and arguing with the jail guards against booking
him for detention. At the provincial jail, petitioner was confronted by Atty. White who
informed him that he was under the governor, in the latters capacity as a provincial
jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he submitted to the governors
order to relinquish custody of Adalim.18
Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail to be
dilapidated and undermanned. According to him, only two guards were incharge of
looking after 50 inmates. There were two cells in the jail, each housing 25 inmates,
while an isolation cell of 10 square meters was unserviceable at the time. Also, there
were several nipa huts within the perimeter for use during conjugal visits. 19
On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the
assailed Decision20 finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. The court ruled that in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have
conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable
quarters with access to television and other privileges that other detainees do not
enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by legal process
shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is
admitted to bail.21
The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners defense that Adalims transfer was
made to ensure his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally
verify any actual threat on Adalims life but relied simply on the advice of Adalims
lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and

nipa huts within the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of the jail which could have been
used to separate Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.s
failure to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant Secretary Jesus Ingeniero
of the Department of Interior and Local Government.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr.,
the court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of obedience to a
superior order and sentenced him to imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1)
month to nine (9) years and eight (8) months.
Hence, the present petitions.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our consideration:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e) REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED,
APPLIES TO PETITIONERS CASE BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER SUCH AS PETITIONER IS A
PRIVATE PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 3(e), REPUBLIC ACT NO.
3019, AS AMENDED.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ACTED WITH DELIBERATE INTENT,
MANIFEST PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR GROSS INEXCUSABLE
NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SAID SECTION 3(e).
IV
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR AND JAILER
UNDER SECTIONS 1730 AND 1733, ARTICLE III, CHAPTER 45 OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917 AND SECTION 61, CHAPTER V,
REPUBLIC ACT 6975 HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE CUSTODY OF A
DETENTION PRISONER.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR THE LAWFUL
EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.

VI
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED
BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.22

For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the following errors on the
Sandiganbayan:
I
THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND/OR MISAPPLICATION OF
THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO,
EITHER AS PRINCIPAL OR IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED
AMBIL.
II
IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER,
THE LATTER SHOULD BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER PARAGRAPH 6, ARTICLE 11 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.
III
THE COURT A QUOS BASIS IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AMBIL AND
HEREIN PETITIONER OF HAVING GIVEN MAYOR ADALIM "UNWARRANTED
BENEFITS AND ADVANTAGE TO THE PREJUDICE x x x OF THE
GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE MOST, SPECULATIVE.23

The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into three: (1) Whether
he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; (2)
Whether a provincial governor has authority to take personal custody of a detention
prisoner; and (3) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty under Article 11(5)24 of the RPC.
Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.s assignment of errors can be condensed into
two: (1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A.
No. 3019; and (2) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience
to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose under Article 11(6)25 of the
RPC.
Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does
not apply to his case because the provision contemplates only transactions of a
pecuniary nature. Since the law punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted

benefits to a private person, petitioner avers that he cannot be held liable for
extending a favor to Mayor Adalim, a public officer. Further, he claims good faith in
taking custody of the mayor pursuant to his duty as a "Provincial Jailer" under
the Administrative Code of 1917. Considering this, petitioner believes himself
entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of duty.
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of conspiracy between
him and petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely
following the orders of a superior when he transferred the detention of Adalim. As
well, he invokes immunity from criminal liability.
For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the absence of
jurisprudence that restricts the application of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 to
transactions of a pecuniary nature. The OSP explains that it is enough to show that
in performing their functions, petitioners have accorded undue preference to Adalim
for liability to attach under the provision. Further, the OSP maintains that Adalim is
deemed a private party for purposes of applying Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019
because the unwarranted benefit redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his
person as a detention prisoner accused of murder. It suggests further that
petitioners were motivated by bad faith as evidenced by their refusal to turn over
Adalim despite instruction from Asst. Sec. Ingeniero. The OSP also reiterates
petitioners lack of authority to take custody of a detention prisoner without a court
order. Hence, it concludes that petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of any
justifying circumstance.
After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the present petitions bereft of
merit.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.

In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must
concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial
or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.26
As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers
discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the
Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with
violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 1606,27 as amended by R.A. No. 8249.28 The pertinent portions of Section 4,
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial
department heads[;]
xxxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided inBatas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond
question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a
Certification29 from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO

shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22.
Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in
the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with
Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper court
which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them the Sandiganbayan.
The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In Sison v. People,30 we defined "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" as
follows:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some
motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has
been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as
other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive
and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property." x x x31
In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad
faith in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house.
There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s contention that he is authorized to transfer
the detention of prisoners by virtue of his power as the "Provincial Jailer" of Eastern
Samar.
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the power of local
chief executives over the units of the Philippine National Police within their
jurisdiction:
SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National
Police.The extent of operational supervision and control of local chief executives
over the police force, fire protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in
their respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as
"The Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990," and the rules
and regulations issued pursuant thereto.

In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 697532 on the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology provides:
Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision and
control over all city and municipal jails. The provincial jails shall be supervised
and controlled by the provincial governmentwithin its jurisdiction, whose
expenses shall be subsidized by the National Government for not more than three
(3) years after the effectivity of this Act.
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.33 An officer in control lays down the rules
in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. 34
On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of
an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties."35 If the
subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Essentially,
the power of supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are
faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. 36 The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does not lay
down the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or replace them. 37
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone which has
authority to exercise control and supervision over provincial jails. In any case,
neither of said powers authorizes the doing of acts beyond the parameters set by
law. On the contrary, subordinates must be enjoined to act within the bounds of law.
In the event that the subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may be laid down
on how the act should be done, but always in conformity with the law.
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites
Section 1731, Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 on Provincial jails in
support. Section 1731 provides:
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.The governor of the province
shall be charged with the keeping of the provincial jail, and it shall be his duty
to administer the same in accordance with law and the regulations prescribed
for the government of provincial prisons. The immediate custody and supervision
of the jail may be committed to the care of a jailer to be appointed by the provincial
governor. The position of jailer shall be regarded as within the unclassified civil
service but may be filled in the manner in which classified positions are filled, and if
so filled, the appointee shall be entitled to all the benefits and privileges of classified
employees, except that he shall hold office only during the term of office of the
appointing governor and until a successor in the office of the jailer is appointed and

qualified, unless sooner separated. The provincial governor shall, under the
direction of the provincial board and at the expense of the province, supply
proper food and clothing for the prisoners; though the provincial board may, in
its discretion, let the contract for the feeding of the prisoners to some other person.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987. But again,
nowhere did said provision designate the provincial governor as the "provincial
jailer," or even slightly suggest that he is empowered to take personal custody of
prisoners. What is clear from the cited provision is that the provincial governors duty
as a jail keeper is confined to the administration of the jail and the procurement of
food and clothing for the prisoners. After all, administrative acts pertain only to those
acts which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes
already declared by the legislative body or such as are devolved upon it 38 by the
Constitution. Therefore, in the exercise of his administrative powers, the governor
can only enforce the law but not supplant it.
Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in
Section 173739 under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the
neighboring province in case the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to
accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this provision has been superseded
by Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.
Section 3, Rule 114 provides:
SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person under
detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the
court or when he is admitted to bail.
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by
legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the
governor. This was amply clarified by Asst. Sec. Ingeniero in his
communication40 dated October 6, 1998 addressed to petitioner Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec.
Ingeniero wrote:
06 October 1996
GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
Provincial Capitol
Borongan, Eastern Samar
Dear Sir:
This has reference to the letter of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and the reports earlier
received by this Department, relative to your alleged action in taking into custody Mayor

Francisco "Aising" Adalim of Taft, that province, who has been previously arrested by
virtue by a warrant of arrest issued in Criminal Case No. 10963.
If the report is true, it appears that your actuation is not in accord with the provision of
Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that an arrested person be
delivered to the nearest police station or jail.
Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA 6975 as legal basis in taking custody of the
accused municipal mayor is misplaced. Said section merely speaks of the power of
supervision vested unto the provincial governor over provincial jails. It does not,
definitely, include the power to take in custody any person in detention.
In view of the foregoing, you are hereby enjoined to conduct yourself within the bounds
of law and to immediately deliver Mayor Adalim to the provincial jail in order to avoid
legal complications.
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
JESUS I. INGENIERO
Assistant Secretary

Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a "provincial jailer."
Said petitioners usurpation of the court's authority, not to mention his open and
willful defiance to official advice in order to accommodate a former political party
mate,41 betray his unmistakable bias and the evident bad faith that attended his
actions.
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the
crime. As mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section
3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it is required that the act constituting the offense consist of
either (1) causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or (2) giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge by the accused of his official, administrative or judicial functions.
In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving
unwarranted benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with
murder, by causing his release from prison and detaining him instead at the house
of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e),
R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him
allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides that the "provision shall apply
to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses, permits or other concessions" and he is not such government

officer or employee. Second, the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to
a private party but to a public officer.
However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has
obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v.
Sandiganbayan42 where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of
the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is
"charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions." Following is an
excerpt of what we said in Mejorada,
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any
public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without
distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with
the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph
[Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of
officers (sic) or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of
"public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the
provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of
granting licenses or permits or other concessions.43 (Italics supplied.)
In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,44 we affirmed that a prosecution
for violation of said provision will lie regardless of whether the accused public officer
is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. 45
Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.s second contention, Section 2(b) of R.A.
No. 3019 defines a "public officer" to include elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal from the government.
Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
punishes the giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a private party,
does the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such benefits take petitioners
case beyond the ambit of said law?
We believe not.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than
"private person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference for a reason. The term "party" is a technical word having a precise
meaning in legal parlance46 as distinguished from "person" which, in general usage,
refers to a human being.47 Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a
public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a
private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal
interest.

In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial
jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, they accorded such
privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged
with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019, Adalim was a private party.
Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the
accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his
official, administrative or judicial functions.48 The word "unwarranted" means lacking
adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or
adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or
condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action.
"Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or
estimation above another.49
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place
other than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable
quarters, provided better nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch
television. Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere
representation of his lawyers that the mayors life would be put in danger inside the
provincial jail.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish the
existence of any risk on Adalims safety. To be sure, the latter would not be alone in
having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, even if we treat Akyatans gesture of
raising a closed fist at Adalim as a threat of aggression, the same would still not
constitute a special and compelling reason to warrant Adalims detention outside the
provincial jail. For one, there were nipa huts within the perimeter fence of the jail
which could have been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the prisoners while
the isolation cell was undergoing repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have
exceeded the 85 days that Adalim stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. More
importantly, even if Adalim could have proven the presence of an imminent peril on
his person to petitioners, a court order was still indispensable for his transfer.
The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the justifying circumstances
claimed by petitioners.
Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty or lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 11 of the RPC,
any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office does not incur any criminal liability. In order for this justifying circumstance to
apply, two requisites must be satisfied: (1) the accused acted in the performance of
a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or

the lawful exercise of such right or office.50 Both requisites are lacking in petitioner
Ambil, Jr.s case.
As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he
ordered the transfer and detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to state, the
resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did not proceed from the due performance of
his duty or lawful exercise of his office.
In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of
obedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, Article
11 of the RPC, any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior
for some lawful purpose does not incur any criminal liability. For this justifying
circumstance to apply, the following requisites must be present: (1) an order has
been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for some lawful purpose; and (3)
the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful. 51 Only the first
requisite is present in this case.
While the order for Adalims transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was
then Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado,
Sr. to carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern
Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and,
unarmed with a court order, transported him to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This
makes him liable as a principal by direct participation under Article 17(1)52 of the
RPC.
An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the
same object, one performing one part of and another performing another so as to
complete it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts although
apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness
of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.53
Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.s willful
cooperation in executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.s order to move Adalim from jail,
despite the absence of a court order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot
hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the law. The Rule requiring a court order to
transfer a person under detention by legal process is elementary. Truth be told, even
petitioner governor who is unschooled in the intricacies of the law expressed
reservations on his power to transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of
petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the violation charged, makes them
equally responsible as conspirators.
As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners, Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019
punishes a public officer or a private person who violates Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019
with imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) month to not more than
fifteen (15) years and perpetual disqualification from public office. Under Section 1 of

the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, if
the offense is punished by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same.
1avvphi1

Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, Jr. of
imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and four (4) months is in accord with law. As a co-principal without the benefit
of an incomplete justifying circumstance to his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall
suffer the same penalty.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
We find petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner
Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and four (4) months.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170122

October 12, 2009

CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171381
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed
by petitioner Clarita D. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief. In the first petition
for mandamus and/or certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 170122, petitioner seeks to
nullify and set aside the August 5, 2005 Order,1 as reiterated in another Order dated
August 26, 2005, both issued by the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, which
effectively denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash Civil Case No.
0193, a suit for forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the Philippines against the
petitioner and her immediate family. The second petition for certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 171381, seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005
Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss and/or quashCivil Case No. 0196, another forfeiture
case involving the same parties but for different properties.
The Facts
To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP
143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner
Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias)
had allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 1379,3 filed with the
Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those
properties. This petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually raffled to
the Fourth Division of the anti-graft court.

Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture
case, docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds and properties
amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be raffled
also to the Fourth Division of the SB. For convenience and clarity, Civil Case No.
0193 shall hereinafter be also referred to as Forfeiture I and Civil Case No. 0196 as
Forfeiture II.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB
charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an
Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the value of the property and funds
plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, the
Information was raffled off to the Second Division of the SB. The plunder charge, as
the parties pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties
identified in both forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:
(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia
at his place of detention. Per the Sheriffs Return4 dated November 2, 2005, the
summons were duly served on respondent Garcias. Earlier, or on October 29,
2004, the SB issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic, an issuance
which Gen. Garcia challenged before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165835.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the
SBs lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB
countered with a motion to expunge and to declare the Garcias in default. To the
OMBs motion, the Garcias interposed an opposition in which they manifested
that they have meanwhile repaired to the Court on certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 165835 to nullify the writ of attachment SB issued in which case the SB
should defer action on the forfeiture case as a matter of judicial courtesy.
(2) By Resolution5 of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss;
declared the same motion as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the
period to answer. The same resolution declared the Garcias in default.
Another resolution6 denied the Garcias motion for reconsideration and/or to
admit answer, and set a date for the ex-parte presentation of the Republics
evidence.
A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005,
pursuant to the prohibited pleading rule.
(3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and
consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively
pending in different divisions of the SB, contending that such consolidation is
mandatory under RA 8249.7

On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the
forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the criminal case of plunder.
(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash
Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case
ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the
consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements.

By Order8 of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of movants
having been declared in default which has yet to be lifted.
It is upon the foregoing factual antecedents that petitioner Clarita has interposed her
first special civil action for mandamus and/or certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
170122, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the [SB] 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion x x x in issuing its challenged order of August 5, 2005
and August 26 2005 that merely "Noted without action," hence refused to resolve
petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash by virtue of petitioners prior default in
that:
A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB] 4th Division
could not have acquired jurisdiction over petitioners, [and her childrens] x x x
persons, much less make them become the true "parties-litigants, contestants or
legal adversaries" in forfeiture I. As the [SB] has not validly acquired jurisdiction
over the petitioners [and her childrens] x x x persons, they could not possibly be
declared in default, nor can a valid judgment by default be rendered against
them.
B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner from
challenging the [SB] 4th Divisions lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
forfeiture I as the same can be raised anytime, even after final judgment. In the
absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, any and all proceedings before
the [SB] are null and void.
C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005 rejection of petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the first challenged order that the issue of jurisdiction raised
therein had already been passed upon by [the SB 4th Divisions] resolution of
May 20, 2005, the records clearly show that the grounds relied upon by petitioner
in her motion to dismiss and/or to quash dated July 26, 2005 were entirely
different, separate and distinct from the grounds set forth in petitioners
manifestation and motion [to consolidate] dated April 15, 2005 that was denied
by it per its resolution of May 20, 2005.

D. In any event, the [SB] 4th Division has been ousted of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of forfeiture I upon the filing of the main plunder case against
petitioner that mandates the automatic forfeiture of the subject properties in
forfeiture cases I & II as a function or adjunct of any conviction for plunder.
E. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly
repealed by the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture
mechanism.
F. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the USA,
any penal conviction for forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced outside of the
Philippines x x x.
G. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is
imperative that the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder
case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements, and to avoid possible
conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the [SB] on the matter of forfeiture as a
penal sanction.9 (Emphasis added.)

With respect to Forfeiture II, the following events and proceedings occurred or were
taken after the petition for Forfeiture II was filed:
(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his
return of July 13, 2005, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to
the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to
Gen. Garcia. The general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those
pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the
same, but with the following qualifying note: "Im receiving the copies of Clarita,
Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy but these copies will not guarantee it being
served to the above-named (sic)."
(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of
counsel, filed a motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of
jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject matter thereof which is now
covered by the plunder case.
To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for
alternative service of summons. The motion for alternative service would
be repeated in another motion of August 25, 2005.
(3) By Joint Resolution of November 9, 2005, the SB denied both the petitioners
motion to dismiss and/or to quash and the Republics motion for alternative
service of summons.

On January 24, 2006, the SB denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration. 10

From the last two issuances adverted to, Clarita has come to this Court via the
instant petition for certiorari, docketed as GR No. 171381. As there submitted, the
SB 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its Joint Resolution dated November 9, 2005 and its Resolution
of January 24, 2006 denying petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash in that:
A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on
petitioner, the [SB] ought to have dismissed forfeiture II for lack of jurisdiction
over petitioners person x x x.
B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that mandates
the automatic forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties upon conviction, the
[SB] Fourth Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture.
C. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly
repealed by the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture
mechanism.
D. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is
imperative that the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder
case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements and worse conflicting
decisions by 2 divisions of the Sandiganbayan on the matter of forfeiture as a
penal sanction.11 (Emphasis added.)

Per Resolution of the Court dated March 13, 2006, G.R. No. 170122 and G.R. No.
171381 were consolidated.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly meritorious.
The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down to the
question of jurisdiction and may thusly be couched into whether the Fourth Division
of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitionerand her three sons
for that matterconsidering that, first, vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I)
and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have been ineffectively or improperly
served and, second, that the plunder caseCrim. Case No. 28107has already
been filed and pending with another division of the SB, i.e., Second Division of the
SB.
Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb the Forfeiture Cases in
Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196
Petitioner maintains that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Forfeitures I and II as both cases are now covered or included in the

plunder case against the Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, the filing of
the main plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107), with its automatic forfeiture
mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4th Division of its jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion of the forfeiture cases
with the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to obviate possible double
jeopardy entanglements and colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these
premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the SB 4th Division
for not granting its separate motions to dismiss the two forfeiture petitions and/or to
consolidate them with the plunder case on the foregoing ground.
Petitioners contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in some
of her pleadings, let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over
actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in
nature. We said so in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan12 involving no less than petitioners
husband questioning certain orders issued in Forfeiture I case.
Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder
case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is
flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the
forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005
Resolution,13 the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission
of a criminal offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover
unlawfully acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a "public officer
or employee [acquires] during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion of his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x
x."14 Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired.15 Thus "if the respondent [public official] is unable to show to the
satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then
the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of
such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State.16 x x x
(Citations in the original.)
Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining
only the jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of former President
Marcos, his immediate family and business associates, authorizes under its Sec.
317 the filing of forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which will proceed independently of
any criminal proceedings. The Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,18 interpreted
this provision as empowering the Presidential Commission on Good Government to
file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the
Former Is Civil in Nature while the Latter Is Criminal

It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out
of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the
notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the
forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the
commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it is "sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth]." On the other hand, all that the court needs
to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of
respondents properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how
he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the
forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not
proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent
public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.19
Given the foregoing considerations, petitioners thesis on possible double jeopardy
entanglements should a judgment of conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107
collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense,20 suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes
two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil
in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be
proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is
not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for
plunder.
Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the proceedings
between the plunder case and the subject forfeiture cases, petitioners apprehension
about the likelihood of conflicting decisions of two different divisions of the anti-graft
court on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction is specious at best. What the SB
said in this regard merits approving citation:
On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the division
where the plunder case is pending may issue a decision that would collide or be in
conflict with the decision by this division on the forfeiture case. They refer to a
situation where this Courts Second Division may exonerate the respondents in the
plunder case while the Fourth Division grant the petition for forfeiture for the same
properties in favor of the state or vice versa.
Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not give rise
to a conflict. After all, forfeiture in the plunder case requires the attendance of facts
and circumstances separate and distinct from that in the forfeiture case. Between
the two (2) cases, there is no causal connection in the facts sought to be established
and the issues sought to be addressed. As a result, the decision of this Court in one
does not have a bearing on the other.

There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for the
forfeiture of the subject properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the
plunder case will apply only to those ill-gotten wealth not recovered by the forfeiture
case and vise (sic) versa. This is on the assumption that the information on plunder
and the petition for forfeiture cover the same set of properties.21
RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379
Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not dismissing
Forfeitures I and II with her assertion that RA 7080 impliedly repealed RA 1379. We
are not convinced.
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal,
expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most
basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance
with members of his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not
penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring
during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his
salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to
recover the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.
It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal
and all efforts should be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all laws and
provisions on the same subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very
well be harmonized. The Court perceives no irreconcilable conflict between them.
One can be enforced without nullifying the other.
Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over the Persons of Petitioner
and Her Children
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted
service of summons. There is merit in petitioners contention.
1 a vv p h i 1

Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the
requirements of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service
may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.

It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound
by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized
by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction
over a person.22
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were
served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP
Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is
also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II
were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP
Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for
being irregular and defective.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,23 we broke down the requirements to be:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted
service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or
there is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable
time being "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or
duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of
loss, if any[,] to the other party."24 Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff
must show several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at
least two (2) different dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of
Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion
residing at defendants house or residence; or on a competent person in charge
of defendants office or regular place of business.

From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of

summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through
Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above
for a valid substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also
not strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at petitioners
house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is
detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid
substituted service of summons was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party
voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative

relief.25 In the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from
questioning improper service of summons since the improvident service of summons
in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children)
voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various
pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture hearings.
We cannot subscribe to the Republics views.
Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary
Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to
have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary
appearancethe first sentence of the above-quoted rulemeans is that the
voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case
he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due
to improper service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not
show that she voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following
pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or
to admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate
forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash
Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II;
and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner
solely for special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction
of the SB over her person and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts
therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children
for lack of valid service of summons through improvident substituted service of
summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never
abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to
admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005
setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other
subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and defense of lack of
jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases.

Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB
constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals26 applies to the
instant case. Said case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special
appearance before the courtchallenging its jurisdiction over the person through a
motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other groundsis not tantamount to
estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person;
and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared
before the SB to cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are,
therefore, not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons
nor are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction.
Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of summons made, the SB
did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children. And
perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and
her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the
order declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner
and her three children are concerned. For the forfeiture case to proceed against
them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias summons on
the petitioner and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their
persons.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over
petitioner Clarita D. Garcia and her three children. The proceedings in Civil Case
Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they
pertain to petitioner and her three children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction over their
persons. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO*

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

Additional member as per October 7, 2009 raffle.

Rollo (G.R. No. 170122), pp. 49-50.

Rollo (G.R. No. 171381), pp. 48-69.

An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have
Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for
the Proceedings Therefor.
4

Rollo (G.R. No. 170122), p. 80.

Id. at 106-122.

Id. at 151-166, dated February 3, 2005.

An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for

the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
8

Rollo (G.R. No. 170122), p. 49.

Id. at 15-17.

10

Rollo (G.R. No. 171381), pp. 70-82.

11

Id. at 71.

12

499 Phil. 589 (2005).

13

Rollo (G.R. No. 170122), pp. 219-227.

14

RA 1379, Sec. 2.

15

Id.

16

RA 1379, Sec. 6

17

Sec. 3. Civil suits for restitution x x x or x x x forfeiture proceedings provided for

under [RA] 1379 x x x may be filed separately from and proceed independently of
any proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
18

G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989, 173 SCRA 72.

19

Rollo (G.R. No. 171381), p. 303. Comment on Petition.

20

Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 21 provides that "[n]o person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."
21

Rollo (G.R. No. 171381), p. 81. SB Resolution dated January 24, 2006.

22

Casimina v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 147530, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 171.

23

G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006, 499 SCRA 21.

24

Id. at 34; citing Far Eastern Realty Investment, Inc. v. CA, No. L-36549,
October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 256, 262.
25

Oaminal v. Castillo, 459 Phil. 542 (2003).

26

G.R. No. 103200, August 31, 1994, 236 SCRA 78.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:
These are consolidated petitions under Rule 651 seeking to nullify various
orders2 issued by the Sandiganbayan involving two forfeiture cases against
petitioner Clarita Depakakibo Garcia (Clarita).
I concur with the ponentes views that (1) the Sandiganbayan has and retains
jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases, despite the subsequent filing of the plunder
case; and (2) there is no need to consolidate the plunder case with the forfeiture
cases to avoid double jeopardy.
However, I cannot subscribe to the view that in both forfeiture cases, the
Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction not only over the person of Clarita but also over
Claritas children due to defective service of summons.
I.
G.R. No. 171381
Twenty-two days after the filing of Forfeiture II case, subject of G.R. No. 171381,
Clarita moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over her person as a
defendant, among other grounds. In her Answer filed ad cautelam, Clarita
maintained this defense of lack of jurisdiction over her person as a defendant.
However, instead of dismissing Forfeiture II case for improper service of summons,
the Sandiganbayan cited Philamlife v. Breva3 to justify its non-dismissal of the
complaint.
The Sandiganbayans reliance on Philamlife4 is misplaced because an amended
complaint was subsequently filed therein which prompted the trial court to issue alias
summons which was effectively served. Therefore, as the ponencia correctly
concludes, the Sandiganbayan erred in not dismissing Forfeiture II case for lack of
jurisdiction over Clarita.
However, I disagree with the ponencia in extending the dismissal of Forfeiture II
case, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, to
Claritas non-petitioning children and co-defendants.

Clarita is the lone petitioner in the present cases. Clearly, here is no reason to apply
by extension Claritas arguments in favor of her children and co-defendants Ian Carl,
Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, who are all of legal age. In fact, the ponencia failed
to state any basis for vicariously relating Claritas grounds to her children and codefendants. The ponencia inexplicably extended to Claritas children the benefits
arising from Claritas invocation of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.
Lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense
which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence. 5 By
failing to come to this Court to raise the matter of a purely personal defense, nonpetitioning Claritas children and co-defendants have relinquished their right to avail
of the present remedy.
Since a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or petitioner by the
filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading,6 the Court has no jurisdiction
over Claritas children who did not file any such pleading before this Court, and thus
did not signify their submission to the Courts power and authority. Well-entrenched
is the principle that a party who does not appeal, or file a petition for certiorari, like
the present cases, is not entitled to any affirmative relief. 7
In view of the foregoing, I agree with the conclusion in G.R. No. 171381 insofar as
the Sandiganbayan has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Clarita alone.
II.
G.R. No. 170122
In its 20 January 2005 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied Clarita, et al.s Motion
to Dismiss dated 16 November 2004 (first motion to dismiss) and subsequently
declared defendants in default. In its 3 February 2005 and 23 February 2005
Resolutions, the Sandiganbayan denied two motions for reconsideration.
Despite notice of the default order, Clarita did not file any motion to set it aside.
Instead of forthwith pursuing the proper remedy,8 Clarita allowed a considerable
length of time to lapse.
Clarita thereafter filed a Manifestation with Motion dated 15 April 2005 for the
consolidation of Forfeiture I case with the plunder case, and another Motion to
Dismiss dated 26 July 2005 (second motion to dismiss).
In its Order of 5 August 2005, the Sandiganbayan merely noted the second motion
to dismiss in view of its standing default order. Notably, it was only in this second
motion to dismiss that the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant was first raised. In its Order of 26 August 2005, the Sandiganbayan

denied reconsideration of the 5 August 2005 Order after finding a mere repetition of
the arguments raised.
Since Clarita had already been declared in default, the Sandiganbayan could not be
compelled by mandamus to recognize her right to participate in the proceedings and
resolve her motions, without lifting the default order first. As mentioned earlier,
Clarita did not pursue the proper remedies available to a party declared in default.
She did not file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default or a petition for
certiorari after receipt of the 20 January 2005 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
denying the first motion to dismiss. The 60-day reglementary period provided by law
to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 20 January 2005 and 3 February
2005 via certiorari, aside from having lapsed, may no longer be pursued since these
two Resolutions had already been upheld by this Court in its Decision dated 31
August 2006 in G.R. No. 167103, entitled Garcia v. Sandiganbayan.9
1avvphi1

Regardless, it is my view that Clarita voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction

of the Sandiganbayan in the Forfeiture I case.
Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. -- The defendants voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
The Rule clearly provides that the defendants voluntary appearance shall be
equivalent to service of summons. I disagree with the ponencias conclusion that
Claritas special appearance to question the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is not
voluntary appearance. While the ponencia mentioned some of Claritas pleadings
which were filed by way of special appearance, it ignored certain material facts. The
first motion to dismiss filed by all the defendants, including Clarita, raised the sole
ground of "no jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired properties."10 It was only after more than six months from the denial of the
first motion to dismiss that Clarita raised, via the second motion to dismiss, the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person as defendant.
In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals,11 this Court ruled that an appearance in whatever
form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. A defendant may, e.g.,
appear by presenting a motion and unless by such appearance he specifically
objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person.
Clarita failed to assert the defense of lack of jurisdiction over her person as a
defendant in her Answer, even if filed ex abundante ad cautelam. Here, she

interposed only the defense of "no cause of action" upon a claim of legitimate
acquisition of the properties subject of the case. Likewise, the Manifestation with
Motion dated 15 April 2005 exhibits voluntary appearance on the part of Clarita who
moved not to dismiss but to transfer or consolidate the Forfeiture I case with the
plunder case which was pending in a different division of the Sandiganbayan. Such
filing of the motion to consolidate was not a conditional appearance entered to
question the regularity of the service of summons. Clarita expressly waived her
remedy against the default order when she filed such motion "without any intention
of participating in the default proceedings."12
Since Clarita invoked the transfer or consolidation of the cases as an affirmative
relief, this clearly indicates a recognition of the Sandiganbayans power and
authority. This is inconsistent with a special appearance for the sole purpose of
questioning the courts lack of jurisdiction. In Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp.,
Ltd. v. Catalan,13 this Court held:
It must be noted that HSBANK initially filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Answer or Motion to Dismiss. HSBANK already invoked the RTCs jurisdiction over it
by praying that its motion for extension of time to file answer or a motion to dismiss
be granted. The Court has held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief,
such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Consequently,
HSBANKs expressed reservation in its Answer ad cautelam that it filed the same
"as a mere precaution against being declared in default, and without prejudice to the
Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition...now pending before the Court of Appeals"
to assail the jurisdiction of the RTC over it is of no moment. Having earlier invoked
the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time
to file answer or motion to dismiss, HSBANK effectively submitted voluntarily to the
jurisdiction of the RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise, even
before this Court. (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, I submit that the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Clarita in the Forfeiture I case.
In sum, Clarita failed to substantiate her allegations that the Sandiganbayan: (1) had
not acquired jurisdiction over her person as a defendant in the Forfeiture I case; (2)
gravely abused its discretion when it merely noted her second motion to dismiss in
view of its standing default order; and (3) unlawfully neglected to perform its legal
duty.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition for certiorari filed by Clarita Depakakibo
Garcia alone in G.R. No. 171381 and to DISMISS the petition for certiorari and
mandamus in G.R. No. 170122.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

G.R. No. 139791

December 12, 2003

MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
EDDY NG KOK WEI, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated March
26, 1999 and Resolution2dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 40504, entitled "Eddy Ng Kok Wei vs. Manila Bankers Life Insurance
Corporation".
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
Eddy Ng Kok Wei, respondent, is a Singaporean businessman who ventured into
investing in the Philippines. On November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent
addressed to Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation, petitioner, expressed his
intention to purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces.
Subsequently or on December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee
of P50,000.00 for the purchase of a 46-square meter condominium unit (Unit 703)
valued at P860,922.00. On January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the purchase
price in the sum of P729,830.00.
Consequently, petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio G. Puyat, executed a
Contract to Sell in favor of the respondent. The contract expressly states that the
subject condominium unit "shall substantially be completed and delivered" to the
respondent "within fifteen (15) months" from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990,
and that "(S)hould there be no substantial completion and fail(ure) to deliver the unit
on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by respondent) shall
be charged against (petitioner)".
Considering that the stipulated 15-month period was at hand, respondent returned to
the Philippines sometime in April, 1990.
In a letter dated April 5, 1990, petitioner, through its Senior Assistant Vice-President,
Mr. Mario G. Zavalla, informed respondent of the substantial completion of his
condominium unit, however, due to various uncontrollable forces (such as coup d
etat attempts, typhoon and steel and cement shortage), the final turnover is reset to
May 31, 1990.
1wphi1

Meanwhile, on July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioners notice of delivery dated May
31, 1990, respondent again flew back to Manila. He found the unit still uninhabitable
for lack of water and electric facilities.
Once more, petitioner issued another notice to move-in addressed to its building
administrator advising the latter that respondent is scheduled to move in on August
22, 1990.
On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his
condominium unit was still unlivable. Exasperated, he was constrained to send
petitioner a letter dated November 21, 1990 demanding payment for the damages
he sustained. But petitioner ignored such demand, prompting respondent to file with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150, Makati City, a complaint against the former for
specific performance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-3440.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the
condominium unit and on April 12, 1991, occupied the same. Thus, respondents
cause of action has been limited to his claim for damages.
On December 18, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision3 finding the petitioner
liable for payment of damages due to the delay in the performance of its obligation
to the respondent. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant, ordering Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation to pay plaintiff Eddy
Ng Kok Wei the following:
1. One percent (1%) of the total amount plaintiff paid defendant;
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and

Cost of suit.
"SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 26, 1999, affirmed in
toto the trial courts award of damages in favor of the respondent.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the
Appellate Court in a Resolution dated August 5, 1999.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the instant case; and that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the trial courts finding that petitioner incurred unreasonable delay in the
delivery of the condominium unit to respondent.
On petitioners contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case,
Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, provides:
"SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB)]4 shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
xxx
"C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
x x x."
Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the
instant case. We have consistently held that complaints for specific performance
with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.5
While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case,
petitioners active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such
lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in
the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. 6
Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and
the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial courts
jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question
the trial courts jurisdiction.
On petitioners claim that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a factual
issue. Time and again, we have ruled that "the factual findings of the trial court are
given weight when supported by substantial evidence and carries more weight when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals."7 Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and
thus, liable to pay damages as a result thereof, are indeed factual questions.

The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of
law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by
evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts.8 These exceptions are not present here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 26, 1999
and Resolution dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155206

October 28, 2003

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO M. SANTIAGO, substituted by his widow ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ
VDA. DE SANTIAGO,respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated February 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
62309 and its Resolution dated September 5, 2002 denying its motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the assailed CA decision and that
of the trial court, are as follows:
Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various loans
from defendant GSIS for (the) period September, 1956 to October, 1957 in the total
amount of P3,117,000.00 secured by real estate mortgages over parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 26105, 37177 and 50365. The Zuluetas failed to pay their
loans to defendant GSIS and the latter foreclosed the real estate mortgages dated
September 25, 1956, March 6, 1957, April 4, 1957 and October 15, 1957.
On August 14, 1974, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction by
defendant GSIS submitting a bid price of P5,229,927.84. Not all lots covered by the
mortgaged titles, however, were sold. Ninety-one (91) lots were expressly excluded
from the auction since the lots were sufficient to pay for all the mortgage debts. A
Certificate of Sale (Annex "F," Records, Vol. I, pp. 23-28) was issued by then
Provincial Sheriff Nicanor D. Salaysay.
The Certificate of Sale dated August 14, 1974 had been annotated and inscribed in
TCT Nos. 26105, 37177 and 50356, with the following notations: "(T)he following
lots which form part of this title (TCT No. 26105) are not covered by the mortgage
contract due to sale to third parties and donation to the government: 50-H-5-C-9-J65-H-8, 50-H-5-C-9J-M-7; 50-H-5-C-9-J-65-H-5; 1 lots Nos. 1 to 13, Block No. 1 6,138 sq.m. 2. Lots Nos. 1 to 11, Block No. 2 4,660 sq.m. 3. Lot No. 15, Block No.
3 487 sq.m. 4. Lot No. 17, Block No. 4 263 sq.m. 5. Lot No. 1, Block No. 7 402
sq.m. 6. Road Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, & 4 2,747 sq.m."
In another "NOTE: The following lots in the Antonio Subdivision were already
released by the GSIS and therefore are not included in this sale, namely: LOT

NO. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13 (Old Plan) Block I; 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 (Old Plan)

Block II; 3, 10, 12 and 13 (New Plan) Block I (Old Plan) Block III; 7, 14 and 20 (New
Plan) Block III (Old Plan) Block V; 13 and 20 (New Plan) Block IV (Old Plan) Block
VI; 1, 2, 3 and 10 (New Plan) Block V (Old Plan) Block VII; 1, 5, 8, 15, 26 and 27
(New Plan) Block VI (Old Plan) Block VIII; 7, 12 and 20 (New Plan) Block VII (Old
Plan) Block II; 1, 4 and 6 (New Plan) Block VIII (Old Plan) Block X; 5 (New Plan)
Block X (Old Plan) Block ZXII; 6 (New Plan) Block XI (Old Plan) Block XII; 1, Block
9; 12 Block 1; 11 Block 2; 19 Block 1; 10 Block 6; 23 Block 3."
And the lots on "ADDITIONAL EXCLUSION FROM PUBLIC SALE" are "LOTS
NO. 6 Block 4; 2 Block 2; 5 Block 5; 1, 2 and 3 Block 11, 1, 2, 3 and 4 Block 10; 5
Block 11 (New); 1 Block 3; 5 Block 1; 15 Block 7; 11 Block 9; 13 Block 5; 12 Block 5;
3 Block 10; 6."
On November 25, 1975, an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership (Annex "G,"
Records, Vol. I, pp. 29-31) was executed by defendant GSIS over Zuluetas lots,
including the lots, which as earlier stated, were already excluded from the
foreclosure.
On March 6, 1980, defendant GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown
Development Corporation which sale was disapproved by the Office of the President
of the Philippines. The sold properties were returned to defendant GSIS.
The Register of Deeds of Rizal cancelled the land titles issued to Yorkstown
Development Corporation. On July 2, 1980, TCT No. 23552 was issued cancelling
TCT No. 21926; TCT No. 23553 cancelled TCT No. 21925; and TCT No. 23554
cancelling TCT No. 21924, all in the name of defendant GSIS.
1awphi1.nt

After defendant GSIS had re-acquired the properties sold to Yorkstown

Development Corporation, it began disposing the foreclosed lots including the
excluded ones.
On April 7, 1990, representative Eduardo Santiago and then plaintiff Antonio Vic
Zulueta executed an agreement whereby Zulueta transferred all his rights and
interests over the excluded lots. Plaintiff Eduardo Santiagos lawyer, Atty.
Wenceslao B. Trinidad, wrote a demand letter dated May 11, 1989 (Annex "H,"
Records, Vol. I, pp. 32-33) to defendant GSIS asking for the return of the eighty-one
(81) excluded lots.2
On May 7, 1990, Antonio Vic Zulueta, represented by Eduardo M. Santiago, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, a complaint for
reconveyance of real estate against the GSIS. Spouses Alfeo and Nenita Escasa,
Manuel III and Sylvia G. Urbano, and Marciana P. Gonzales and the heirs of
Mamerto Gonzales moved to be included as intervenors and filed their respective
answers in intervention. Subsequently, the petitioner, as defendant therein, filed its

answer alleging inter alia that the action was barred by the statute of limitations
and/or laches and that the complaint stated no cause of action. Subsequently,
Zulueta was substituted by Santiago as the plaintiff in the complaint a quo. Upon the
death of Santiago on March 6, 1996, he was substituted by his widow, Rosario
Enriquez Vda. de Santiago, as the plaintiff.
After due trial, the RTC rendered judgment against the petitioner ordering it to
reconvey to the respondent, Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago, in substitution of
her deceased husband Eduardo, the seventy-eight lots excluded from the
foreclosure sale. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
1awphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the

defendant:
1. Ordering defendant to reconvey to plaintiff the seventy-eight (78) lots released
and excluded from the foreclosure sale including the additional exclusion from
the public sale, namely:
a. Lot Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, 0, 10, 13, Block I (Old Plan).
b. Lot Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10, Block II (Old Plan).
c. Lot Nos. 3, 10, 12, and 13, Block I (New Plan), Block III (Old Plan),
d. Lot Nos. 7, 14 and 20, Block III (New Plan), Block V (Old Plan).
e. Lot Nos. 13 and 20, Block IV (New Plan), Block VI (Old Plan).
f. Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10, Block V (New Plan), Block VII (Old Plan).
g. Lot Nos. 1, 5, 8, 15, 26 and 27, Block VI (New Plan), Block VIII (Old
Plan).
h. Lot Nos. 7 and 12, Block VII (New Plan), Block II (Old Plan).
i. Lot Nos. 1, 4 and 6, Block VIII (New Plan), Block X (Old Plan).
j. Lot 5, Block X (New Plan), Block XII (Old Plan).
k. Lot 6, Block XI (New Plan), Block XII (Old Plan).
l. Lots 2, 5, 12 and 15, Block I.
m. Lots 6, 9 and 11, Block 2.
n. Lots 1, 5, 6, 7, 16 and 23, Block 3.

o. Lot 6, Block 4.
p. Lots 5, 12, 13 and 24, Block 5.
q. Lots 10 and 16, Block 6.
r. Lots 6 and 15, Block 7.
s. Lots 13, 24, 28 and 29, Block 8.
t. Lots 1, 11, 17 and 22, Block 9.
u. Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, Block 10.
v. Lots 1, 2, 3 and 5 (New), Block 11.
2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, if the seventy-eight (78) excluded lots could
not be reconveyed, the fair market value of each of said lots.
3. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to cancel the land titles covering
the excluded lots in the name of defendant or any of its successors-in-interest
including all derivative titles therefrom and to issue new land titles in plaintiffs
name.
4. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to cancel the Notices of Lis
Pendens inscribed in TCT No. PT-80342 under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554;
TCT No. 81812 under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554; and TCT No. PT-84913
under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554.
5. Costs of suit.3

The petitioner elevated the case to the CA which rendered the assailed decision
affirming that of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Decision of December 17, 1997 of Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED.4
The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid decision but the same
was denied in the assailed CA Resolution of September 5, 2002.
The petitioner now comes to this Court alleging that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING
THAT A) PETITIONER WAS GUILTY OF BAD FAITH WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN

FACT, THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT GROUND TO SUPPORT SUCH

CONCLUSION; AND B) THERE WAS NO PRESCRIPTION IN THIS CASE.5
In its petition, the petitioner maintains that it did not act in bad faith when it
erroneously included in its certificate of sale, and subsequently consolidated the
titles in its name over the seventy-eight lots ("subject lots") that were excluded from
the foreclosure sale. There was no proof of bad faith nor could fraud or malice be
attributed to the petitioner when it erroneously caused the issuance of certificates of
title over the subject lots despite the fact that these were expressly excluded from
the foreclosure sale.
The petitioner asserts that the action for reconveyance instituted by the respondent
had already prescribed after the lapse of ten years from November 25, 1975 when
the petitioner consolidated its ownership over the subject lots. According to the
petitioner, an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent
registration of the property. In this case, when the action was instituted on May 7,
1990, more than fourteen years had already lapsed. Thus, the petitioner contends
that the same was already barred by prescription as well as laches.
The petitioner likewise takes exception to the holding of the trial court and the CA
that it (the petitioner) failed to apprise or return to the Zuluetas, the respondents
predecessors-in-interest, the seventy-eight lots excluded from the foreclosure sale
because the petitioner had no such obligation under the pertinent loan and mortgage
agreement.
The petitioners arguments fail to persuade.

1awphi1.nt

At the outset, it bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is limited to
reviewing only errors of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. Case law has it that the
findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the CA are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. Although there are exceptions to the said rule, we find
no reason to deviate therefrom.6 By assailing the findings of facts of the trial court as
affirmed by the CA, that it acted in bad faith, the petitioner thereby raised questions
of facts in its petition.
Nonetheless, even if we indulged the petition and delved into the factual issues, we
find the petition barren of merit.
That the petitioner acted in bad faith in consolidating ownership and causing the
issuance of titles in its name over the subject lots, notwithstanding that these were
expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale was the uniform ruling of the trial court
and appellate court. As declared by the CA:

The acts of defendant-appellant GSIS in concealing from the Zuluetas [the

respondents predecessors-in-interest] the existence of these lots, in failing to notify
or apprise the spouses Zulueta about the excluded lots from the time it consolidated
its titles on their foreclosed properties in 1975, in failing to inform them when it
entered into a contract of sale of the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown
Development Corporation in 1980 as well as when the said sale was revoked by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos during the same year demonstrated a clear
effort on its part to defraud the spouses Zulueta and appropriate for itself the subject
properties. Even if titles over the lots had been issued in the name of the defendantappellant, still it could not legally claim ownership and absolute dominion over them
because indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system does not attach to titles
secured by fraud or misrepresentation. The fraud committed by defendant-appellant
in the form of concealment of the existence of said lots and failure to return the
same to the real owners after their exclusion from the foreclosure sale made
defendant-appellant holders in bad faith. It is well-settled that a holder in bad faith of
a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be
used as a shield for fraud.7
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the trial court and the CA. The
petitioner is not an ordinary mortgagee. It is a government financial institution and,
like banks, is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings,
including those involving registered lands.8 The Courts ruling in Rural Bank of
Compostela v. CA9 is apropos:
Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in dealing even with
registered lands, than private individuals, for their business is one affected with
public interest, keeping in trust money belonging to their depositors, which they
should guard against loss by not committing any act of negligence which amounts to
lack of good faith by which they would be denied the protective mantle of land
registration statute, Act [No.] 496, extended only to purchasers for value and in good
faith, as well as to mortgagees of the same character and description. 10
Due diligence required of banks extend even to persons, or institutions like the
petitioner, regularly engaged in the business of lending money secured by real
estate mortgages.11
In this case, the petitioner executed an affidavit in consolidating its ownership and
causing the issuance of titles in its name over the subject lots despite the fact that
these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale. By so doing, the petitioner
acted in gross and evident bad faith. It cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the
subject lots were excluded from the sale at public auction. At the least, its act
constituted gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Further, as found by the CA,
the petitioners acts of concealing the existence of these lots, its failure to return
them to the Zuluetas and even its attempt to sell them to a third party is proof of the
petitioners intent to defraud the Zuluetas and appropriate for itself the subject lots.

On the issue of prescription, generally, an action for reconveyance of real property

based on fraud prescribes in four years from the discovery of fraud; such discovery
is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. Registration of real property is a constructive notice to all persons and,
thus, the four-year period shall be counted therefrom.12 On the other hand, Article
1456 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is,
by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes.
An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of
title over the property.13
The petitioners defense of prescription is untenable. As held by the CA, the general
rule that the discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place upon the registration
of real property because it is "considered a constructive notice to all persons" does
not apply in this case. The CA correctly cited the cases of Adille v. Court of
Appeals14 and Samonte v. Court of Appeals,15 where this Court reckoned the
prescriptive period for the filing of the action for reconveyance based on implied trust
from the actual discovery of fraud.
In ruling that the action had not yet prescribed despite the fact that more than ten
years had lapsed between the date of registration and the institution of the action for
reconveyance, the Court in Adille ratiocinated:
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but
it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for
fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to
notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing
rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.
For the same reason, we cannot dismiss private respondents claims commenced in
1974 over the estate registered in 1955. While actions to enforce a constructive trust
prescribes in ten years, reckoned from the date of the registration of the property,
we, as we said, are not prepared to count the period from such a date in this case.
We note the petitioners sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for
himself beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of
extrajudicial settlement that he is "the only heir and child of his mother Feliza with
the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name [alone]." Accordingly,
we hold that the right of the private respondents commenced from the time they
actually discovered the petitioners act of defraudation. According to the respondent
Court of Appeals, they "came to know [of it] apparently only during the progress of
the litigation." Hence, prescription is not a bar.16

The above ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Samonte. In this case, as
established by the CA, the respondent actually discovered the fraudulent act of the
petitioner only in 1989:
... [T]he prescriptive period of the action is to be reckoned from the time plaintiffappellee (then Eduardo M. Santiago) had actually discovered the fraudulent act of
defendant-appellant which was, as borne out by the records, only in 1989. Plaintiffappellee Eduardo M. Santiago categorically testified (TSN of July 11, 1995, pp. 1415) that he came to know that there were 91 excluded lots in Antonio Village which
were foreclosed by the GSIS and included in its consolidation of ownership in 1975
when, in 1989, he and Antonio Vic Zulueta discussed it and he was given by Zulueta
a special power of attorney to represent him to recover the subject properties from
GSIS. The complaint for reconveyance was filed barely a year from the discovery of
the fraud.17
Following the Courts pronouncements in Adille and Samonte, the institution of the
action for reconveyance in the court a quo in 1990 was thus well within the
prescriptive period. Having acted in bad faith in securing titles over the subject lots,
the petitioner is a holder in bad faith of certificates of title over the subject lots. The
petitioner is not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a
shield for frauds.18
Contrary to its claim, the petitioner unarguably had the legal duty to return the
subject lots to the Zuluetas. The petitioners attempts to justify its omission by
insisting that it had no such duty under the mortgage contract is obviously clutching
at straw. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "every person who,
through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
dated February 22, 2002 and Resolution dated September 5, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62309 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the
petitioner.
1a\^/phi1.net

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 151149

September 7, 2004

GEORGE KATON, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL PALANCA JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN
FRESNILLO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action clearly
appear from the complaint filed with the trial court, the action may be dismissed
motu proprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for review
on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless
litigations.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
December 8, 2000 Decision2 and the November 20, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 57496. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"Assuming that petitioner is correct in saying that he has the exclusive right in
applying for the patent over the land in question, it appears that his action is
already barred by laches because he slept on his alleged right for almost 23
years from the time the original certificate of title has been issued to respondent
Manuel Palanca, Jr., or after 35 years from the time the land was certified as
agricultural land. In addition, the proper party in the annulment of patents or titles
acquired through fraud is the State; thus, the petitioners action is deemed
misplaced as he really does not have any right to assert or protect. What he had
during the time he requested for the re-classification of the land was the privilege
of applying for the patent over the same upon the lands conversion from forest to
agricultural.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
cost."4

The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner. It affirmed the RTCs dismissal of his Complaint in Civil Case No.
3231, not on the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but because of prescription
and lack of jurisdiction.
The Antecedent Facts

The CA narrates the antecedent facts as follows:

"On August 2, 1963, herein [P]etitioner [George Katon] filed a request with the
District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the reclassification of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island, located in
Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan, which consists of approximately 18 hectares. Said
property is within Timberland Block of LC Project No. 10-C of Aborlan, Palawan,
per BF Map LC No. 1582.
"Thereafter, the Bureau of Forestry District Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan,
ordered the inspection, investigation and survey of the land subject of the
petitioners request for eventual conversion or re-classification from forest to
agricultural land, and thereafter for George Katon to apply for a homestead
patent.
"Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator) undertook the
investigation, inspection and survey of the area in the presence of the petitioner,
his brother Rodolfo Katon (deceased) and his cousin, [R]espondent Manuel
Palanca, Jr. During said survey, there were no actual occupants on the island but
there were some coconut trees claimed to have been planted by petitioner and
[R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. (alleged overseer of petitioner) who went to
the island from time to time to undertake development work, like planting of
additional coconut trees.
"The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably
endorsed by the Forestry District Office of Puerto Princesa to its main office in
Manila for appropriate action. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente
Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the
endorsement as co-applicants of the petitioner.
"In a letter dated September 23, 1965, then Asst. Director of Forestry R.J.L. Utleg
informed the Director of Lands, Manila, that since the subject land was no longer
needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified and released as
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
"Petitioner contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island had been
classified from forest land to agricultural land and certified available for
disposition upon his request and at his instance. However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then
[l]and investigator of the District Land Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan,
favorably endorsed the request of [R]espondents Manuel Palanca Jr. and
Lorenzo Agustin, for authority to survey on November 15, 1965. On November
22, a second endorsement was issued by Palawan District Officer Diomedes De
Guzman with specific instruction to survey vacant portions of Sombrero Island for
the respondents consisting of five (5) hectares each. On December 10, 1965,
Survey Authority No. R III-342-65 was issued authorizing Deputy Public Land
Surveyor Eduardo Salvador to survey ten (10) hectares of Sombrero Island for

the respondents. On December 23, 1990, [R]espondent Lorenzo Agustin filed a

homestead patent application for a portion of the subject island consisting of an
area of 4.3 hectares.
"Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a
homestead patent application for a portion of the island comprising 8.5 hectares.
Records also reveal that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead
application on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued
Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 19775 with an
area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
"Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates
of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of
respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud. Petitioner
prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.
"On the other hand, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. claims that he himself
requested for the reclassification of the island in dispute and that on or about the
time of such request, [R]espondents Fresnillo, Palanca and Gapilango already
occupied their respective areas and introduced numerous improvements. In
addition, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any homestead application for
the island. Respondents deny that Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the inspection
and survey of the island.
"According to Mandocdoc, the island was uninhabited but the respondents insist
that they already had their respective occupancy and improvements on the
island. Palanca denies that he is a mere overseer of the petitioner because he
said he was acting for himself in developing his own area and not as anybodys
caretaker.
"Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their
respective portions and have declared said portions for taxation purposes and
that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years.
"Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as
the island is concerned because an action for reconveyance can only be brought
by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of
estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an
unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
"In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original
certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents covering certain portions of
the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.
The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for
homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its
conversion from forest land to agricultural land." 6

Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend
his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the
deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC
in its Order dated July 29, 1999.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order was denied by the
trial court in its Resolution dated December 17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited
motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court
with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and
only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the CA ruled
on the merits. It held that while petitioner had caused the reclassification of
Sombrero Island from forest to agricultural land, he never applied for a homestead
patent under the Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land.
The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent and the
reversion of the property to the State were matters between the latter and the
homestead grantee. Unless and until the government takes steps to annul the grant,
the homesteaders right thereto stands.
Finally, granting arguendo that petitioner had the exclusive right to apply for a patent
to the land in question, he was already barred by laches for having slept on his right
for almost 23 years from the time Respondent Palancas title had been issued.
In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on
the merits of the case. It agreed with petitioner that the trial court had acted without
jurisdiction in perfunctorily dismissing his September 10, 1999 Motion for
Reconsideration, on the erroneous ground that it was a third and prohibited motion
when it was actually only his first motion.
Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the challenged
Resolution of the CA Special Division of five members with two justices dissenting
pursuant to its "residual prerogative" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court.
From the allegations of the Complaint, the appellate court opined that petitioner
clearly had no standing to seek reconveyance of the disputed land, because he
neither held title to it nor even applied for a homestead patent. It reiterated that only
the State could sue for cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and
for reversion of the land to the public domain.

Finally, it ruled that prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance.
First, petitioners action was brought 24 years after the issuance of Palancas
homestead patent. Under the Public Land Act, such action should have been taken
within ten years from the issuance of the homestead certificate of title. Second, it
appears from the submission (Annex "F" of the Complaint) of petitioner himself that
Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca had been occupying six hectares of the island
since 1965, or 33 years before he took legal steps to assert his right to the property.
His action was filed beyond the 30-year prescriptive period under Articles 1141 and
1137 of the Civil Code.
Hence, this Petition.7
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
"1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari based on
an issue not raised (the merits of the case) in the Petition?
"2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative
under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the
Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition?"8

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Propriety of Ruling on the Merits
This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CAs
ruling on the merits. He raised it with the appellate court when he moved for
reconsideration of its December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its
November 20, 2001 Resolution, as follows:
"Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may indeed have
lost its way and been waylaid by the variety, complexity and seeming importance
of the interests and issues involved in the case below, the apparent reluctance of
the judges, five in all, to hear the case, and the volume of the conflicting, often
confusing, submissions bearing on incidental matters. We stand corrected." 9

That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The CAs Resolution
on this point has rendered petitioners issue moot. Hence, there is no need to
discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra

jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the only issue that could have
been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed
by the trial court in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is the
doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence, 10 more so when no
determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case.
Second Issue:
Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction
Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its "residual prerogatives"
under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the
Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual
prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It follows
that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its "residual prerogatives" under
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts
over cases appealed to the CA.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except
when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res
judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on
record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim
or action. In Gumabon v. Larin11 we explained thus:
"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances
when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the
plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any
order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would
amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying
and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules
of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical
change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it
appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x."12 (Italics supplied)

On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the

Rules of Court, as follows:

"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A partys appeal by notice of

appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in
due time.
"A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect
to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in
due time.
"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon
the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties.
"In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject
matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and
the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
"In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on
appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of
the appeal." (Italics supplied)

The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter
involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by
the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal
of the original records or the records on appeal.13 In either instance, the trial court
still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal,
and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been
based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of
dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties,
pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual
prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action
motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 114 of the same rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the
Complaint motu proprio "on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower
courts lack of jurisdiction"15 and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the
action.16

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.17 In his Complaint
for "Nullification of Applications for Homestead and Original Certificate of Title No.
G-7089 and for Reconveyance of Title,"18 petitioner averred:
"2. That on November 10, 1965, without the knowledge of [petitioner,
Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr., [petitioners] cousin, in connivance with his co[respondent], Lorenzo Agustin, x x x fraudulently and in bad faith:
2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a pre-requisite to the
filing of an application for homestead patent in his name and that of his
Co-[Respondent] Agustin, [despite being] fully aware that [Petitioner]
KATON had previously applied or requested for re-classification and
certification of the same land from forest land to agricultural land which
request was favorably acted upon and approved as mentioned earlier; a
clear case of intrinsic fraud and misrepresentation;
xxx

xxx

xxx

2.3. In stating in his application for homestead patent that he was applying
for the VACANT PORTION of Sombrero Island where there was none, the
same constituted another clear case of fraud and misrepresentation;
"3. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in
the name of [Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr. and the filing of Homestead Patent
Applications in the names of [respondents], Lorenzo Agustin, Jesus Gapilango
and Juan Fresnillo[,] having been done fraudulently and in bad faith, are ipso
facto null and void and of no effect whatsoever."19
xxx

xxx

xxx

"x x x. By a wrongful act or a willful omission and intending the effects with
natural necessity arise knowing from such act or omission, [Respondent Palanca]
on account of his blood relation, first degree cousins, trust, interdependence and
intimacy is guilty of intrinsic fraud [sic]. x x x."20

Thereupon, petitioner prayed, among others, for a judgment (1) nullifying the
homestead patent applications of Respondents Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as
well as Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of
Respondent Palanca; and (2) ordering the director of the Land Management Bureau
to reconvey the Sombrero Island to petitioner.21
The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of
nullity of the free patent and certificate of title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or
did it plead merely for reversion?

The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such actions, over which
the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction.
In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must
contain the following allegations: 1) that the contested land was privately owned by
the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant;
and 2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a
document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff. 22 In these cases, the
nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the Land
Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or
certificate of title was void ab initio.23
In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also respected as
incontrovertible, but the transfer of the property or title thereto is sought to be
nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the
defendants name.24 As with an annulment of title, a complaint must allege two facts
that, if admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land: (1) that
the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant illegally
dispossessed the plaintiff of the property.25 Therefore, the defendant who acquired
the property through mistake or fraud is bound to hold and reconvey to the plaintiff
the property or the title thereto.26
In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege that he had
previously held title to the land in question. On the contrary, he acknowledged that
the disputed island was public land,27 that it had never been privately titled in his
name, and that he had not applied for a homestead under the provisions of the
Public Land Act.28 This Court has held that a complaint by a private party who
alleges that a homestead patent was obtained by fraudulent means, and who
consequently prays for its annulment, does not state a cause of action; hence, such
complaint must be dismissed.29
Neither can petitioners case be one for reversion. Section 101 of the Public Land
Act categorically declares that only the solicitor general or the officer in his stead
may institute such an action.30 A private person may not bring an action for reversion
or any other action that would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its
derivative title, with the result that the land thereby covered would again form part of
the public domain.31
Thus, when the plaintiff admits in the complaint that the disputed land will revert to
the public domain even if the title is canceled or amended, the action is for
reversion; and the proper party who may bring action is the government, to which
the property will revert.32 A mere homestead applicant, not being the real party in
interest, has no cause of action in a suit for reconveyance. 33 As it is, vested rights
over the land applied for under a homestead may be validly claimed only by the

applicant, after approval by the director of the Land Management Bureau of the
formers final proof of homestead patent.34
Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of lack of
jurisdiction, but also because of the utter absence of a cause of action,35 a defense
raised by respondents in their Answer.36 Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court37 ordains that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit. Indeed, one who has no right or interest to protect has no cause of action by
which to invoke, as a party-plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court.38
Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment
of title or its reconveyance, the case should still be dismissed for being timebarred.39 It is not disputed that a homestead patent and an Original Certificate of
Title was issued to Palanca on February 21, 1977,40 while the Complaint was filed
only on October 6, 1998. Clearly, the suit was brought way past ten years from the
date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive period for reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property.41
It must likewise be stressed that Palancas title -- which attained the status of
indefeasibility one year from the issuance of the patent and the Certificate of Title in
February 1977 -- is no longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Ybanez
v. Intermediate Appellate Court42 ruled that a certificate of title, issued under an
administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, is as indefeasible as one
issued under a judicial registration proceeding one year from its issuance; provided,
however, that the land covered by it is disposable public land, as in this case.
In Aldovino v. Alunan,43 the Court has held that when the plaintiffs own complaint
shows clearly that the action has prescribed, such action may be dismissed even if
the defense of prescription has not been invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v.
Gegato,44 we also explained thus:
"x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the
ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show
it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v.
McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova,
Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v.
Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss
(Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as
an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after
judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84
SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no
statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250;
PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al.,
97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez,

16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating
the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily
apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or
otherwise established by the evidence."45 (Italics supplied)

Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if and when
they are able to do so, courts must endeavor to settle entire controversies before
them to prevent future litigations.46
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolution AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231
is SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of
action and prescription. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182865

December 24, 2008

ROMULO F. PECSON, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT and LYNDON A. CUNANAN, respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This petition for certiorari - filed by Romulo F. Pecson (Pecson) under Rule 64, in
relation with Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court - seeks to set aside and annul
the Resolution dated May 21, 2008 of the Commission on Elections en
banc (COMELEC) in SPR 60-2007.1 The assailed Resolution nullified the grant
(via a Special Order) by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, Angeles City, of
the execution pending appeal of its Decision in the election contest between Pecson
and the private respondent Lyndon A. Cunanan (Cunanan), the proclaimed winner in
the 2007 mayoralty election in Magalang, Pampanga.
THE ANTECEDENTS
Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the Municipality
of Magalang, Province of Pampanga in the May 2007 elections. On May 17, 2007,
Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate, garnering a total of 12,592 votes
as against Pecson's 12,531, or a margin of 61 votes. Cunanan took his oath and
assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang. Soon thereafter, Pecson filed an
election protest, docketed as EPE No. 07-51, with the RTC.
On November 23, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision in Pecson's favor. The RTC
ruled that Pecson received a total of 14,897 votes as against Cunanan's 13,758 - a
vote margin of 1,139.
Cunanan received a copy of the Decision on November 26, 2007 and filed a Notice
of Appeal the day after. The RTC issued on November 27, 2008 an Order noting the
filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of appeal fee and directing the
transmittal of the records of the case to the Electoral Contests Adjudication
Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC. Pecson, on the other hand, filed on
November 28, 2007 an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal,
claiming that Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests
before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials 2 (Rules) allows
this remedy.
The RTC granted Pecson's motion for execution pending appeal via a Special Order
dated December 3, 2007 (Special Order) but suspended, pursuant to the Rules, the

actual issuance of the writ of execution for twenty (20) days. The Special Order
states the following reasons:
1. The result of the judicial revision show[s] that the protestant garnered 14,897
votes as against protestee's 13,758 votes or a plurality of 1,139 votes. The
victory of the protestant is clearly and manifestly established by the rulings and
tabulation of results made by the Court x x x;
2. It is settled jurisprudence that execution pending appeal in election cases
should be granted "to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge's
decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the
board of canvassers." The Court holds that this wisp of judicial wisdom of the
Supreme Court enunciated in the Gahol case and subsequent cases citing it is
borne by the recognition that the decision of the trial court in an election case is
nothing but the court upholding the mandate of the voter, which has as its source
no other than the exercise of the constitutional right to vote. While it is true that
the protestee can avail of the remedy of appeal before the COMELEC, the Court
is more convinced that between upholding the mandate of the electorate of
Magalang, Pampanga which is the fruit of the exercise of the constitutional right
to vote and a procedural remedy, the Court is more inclined to uphold and give
effect to and actualize the mandate of the electorate of Magalang. To the mind of
the Court, in granting execution pending appeal the Court is being true to its
bounden duty to uphold the exercise of constitutional rights and gives flesh to the
mandate of the people. The foregoing is, as far as the Court is concerned,
considered far superior circumstance that convinces the Court to grant
protestant's motion;
3. Public interest and the will of the electorate must be respected and given
meaning;
4. In the case of Navarosa v. Comelec, the Supreme Court held that "In
the Gahol case, the Court gave an additional justification for allowing execution
pending appeal of decisions of trial courts, thus: Public policy underlies it, x x x
[S]omething had to be done to strike the death blow at the pernicious grab-theproclamation-prolong-the-protest technique often, if not invariably, resorted to by
unscrupulous politicians who would render nugatory the people's verdict against
them and persist in continuing in an office they very well know they have no
legitimate right to hold. x x x." A primordial public interest is served by the grant
of the protestant's motion, i.e., to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected
candidate. In the words of Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, "The well known delay
in the adjudication of election protests often gave the successful contestant a
mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to expire
or has expired."

Expectedly, Cunanan moved to reconsider the Order, arguing that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that there were good reasons to issue a writ of

execution pending appeal; and (2) in entertaining and subsequently granting the
motion for execution pending appeal despite the issuance of an order transmitting
the records of the case.
Thereupon, Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of
Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order/Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) with Prayer for Immediate Raffle. He argued in his petition that: (1) the
RTC Decision did not clearly establish Pecson's victory or his (Cunanan's) defeat - a
requirement of Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules; among other reasons, the number
of votes the RTC tallied and tabulated exceeded the number of those who actually
voted and the votes cast for the position of Mayor, and (2) the RTC had
constructively relinquished its jurisdiction by the issuance of the Order dated
November 27, 2007 directing the transmittal of the records of the case.
The Second Division of the COMELEC issued on January 4, 2008 a 60-day TRO
directing: (1) the RTC to cease and desist from issuing or causing the issuance of a
writ of execution or implementing the Special Order; and (2) Cunanan to continue
performing the functions of Mayor of Magalang.
In his Answer and/or Opposition, with Prayer for Immediate Lifting of TRO, Pecson
argued that: (1) preliminary injunction cannot exist except as part or incident of an
independent action, being a mere ancillary remedy that exists only as an incident of
the main proceeding; (2) the "petition for application of preliminary injunction," as an
original action, should be dismissed outright; and (3) Cunanan is guilty of forum
shopping, as he filed a motion for reconsideration of the Special Order
simultaneously with the petition filed with the COMELEC.
The COMELEC's Second Division denied Cunanan's petition in a Resolution dated
March 6, 2008. It ruled that: (1) the resolution of the motion for execution pending
appeal is part of the residual jurisdiction of the RTC to settle pending incidents; the
motion was filed prior to the expiration of the period to appeal and while the RTC
was still in possession of the original record; and (2) there is good reason to justify
the execution of the Decision pending appeal, as Pecson's victory was clearly and
manifestly established. Ruling on the alleged defect in the RTC count, the Second
Division ruled:
[A]fter a careful scrutiny of the Decision, We found that the error lies in the trial
court's computation of the results. In its Decision, the trial court, to the votes
obtained by the party (as per proclamation of the MBOC), deducted the votes per
physical count after revision and deducted further the invalid/nullified ballots per
the trial court's appreciation and thereafter added the valid claimed ballots per
the trial court's appreciation, thus:
Votes obtained per proclamation of the MBOC (-) Votes per physical count (-)
Invalid or nullified ballots (+) Valid claimed ballots = Total Votes Obtained

The formula used by the trial court is erroneous as it used as its reference the
votes obtained by the parties as per the proclamation of the MBOC. It
complicated an otherwise simple and straightforward computation, thus leading
to the error. The correct formula should have been as follows:
Total Number of Uncontested Ballots (+) Valid Contested Ballots (+) Valid
Claimed Ballots = Total Votes Obtained
Using this formula and applying the figures in pages 744 and 745 of the trial
court's Decision, the results will be as follows:
For the Petitioner Cunanan
Total Number of Uncontested Ballots

9,656

Add: Valid Contested Ballots

2,058

Add: Valid Claimed Ballots

36

Total Votes of Petitioner

11,750

For the Private Respondent (Pecson)

Total Number of Uncontested Ballots

9,271

Add: Valid Contested Ballots

2,827

Add: Valid Claimed Ballots

Total Votes of Petitioner

39
12,134

Using the correct formula, private respondent still obtained a plurality of the votes
cast and enjoys a margin of 384 votes over the petitioner. Although not as wide
as the margin found by the trial court, We are nevertheless convinced that the
victory of private respondent has been clearly established in the trial court's
decision for the following reasons:
First, the error lies merely in the computation and does not put in issue the
appreciation and tabulation of votes. The error is purely mathematical
which will not involve the opening of ballot boxes or an examination and
appreciation of ballots. It is a matter of arithmetic which calls for the mere
clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes of the candidates.
Second, the error did not affect the final outcome of the election protest as
to which candidate obtained the plurality of the votes cast.

We are likewise convinced that the assailed order states good or special reasons
justifying the execution pending appeal, to wit:
(1) The victory of the protestant was clearly and manifestly established;
(2) Execution pending appeal in election cases should be granted to give
as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge's decision as that which is
initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of
canvassers;
(3) Public interest and the will of the electorate must be respected and
given meaning; and
(4) Public policy underlies it, as something had to be done to strike the
death blow at the pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest
technique often, if not invariably resorted to by unscrupulous politicians.
Such reasons to Our mind constitute superior circumstances as to warrant the
execution of the trial court's decision pending appeal.

Pecson thus asked for the issuance of a writ of execution via an Ex-Parte Motion.
Despite Cunanan's opposition, the RTC granted Pecson's motion and issued the writ
of execution on March 11, 2008. Pecson thereafter assumed the duties and
functions of Mayor of Magalang.
The Assailed Resolution
On Cunanan's motion, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution dated May 21,
2008 reversing the ruling of the Second Division insofar as it affirmed the RTC's
findings of good reasons to execute the decision pending appeal. It affirmed the
authority of the RTC to order execution pending appeal; it however nullified the
March 11, 2008 writ of execution on the ground that the RTC could no longer issue
the writ because it had lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal of the records
and the perfection of the appeals of both Cunanan and Pecson (to be accurate, the
lapse of Pecson's period to appeal).
On the propriety of executing the RTC Decision pending appeal, the COMELEC en
banc ruled that it was not convinced of the good reasons stated by the RTC in its
Special Order. It ruled that recognition of the worth of a trial judge's decision, on the
one hand, and the right to appeal, including the Commission's authority to review the
decision of the trial court, on the other, requires a balancing act; and not every
invocation of public interest will suffice to justify an execution pending appeal. It
added that at a stage when the decision of the trial court has yet to attain finality,
both the protestee and the protestant are to be considered "presumptive winners." It
noted too that the Second Division already cast a doubt on the correctness of the

number of votes obtained by the parties after the trial court's revision; thus, the
resolution of the pending appeal becomes all the more important. Between two
presumptive winners, considering the pending appeal of the election protest to the
Commission and public service being the prime consideration, the balance should
tilt in favor of non-disruption of government service. The execution of the RTC
Decision pending appeal would necessarily entail the unseating of the protestee,
resulting not only in the disruption of public service, but also in confusion in running
the affairs of the government; a subsequent reversal too of the RTC Decision also
results in the unseating of the protestant. This situation (i.e., the series of turn-over
of the seat of power from one presumptive winner to another) cannot but cause
irreparable damage to the people of Magalang, and overweighs the reasons
asserted by the RTC in its Special Order. In the end, according to the COMELEC,
public interest is best served when he who was really voted for the position is
proclaimed and adjudged as winner with finality.
The Petition and the Prayer for the issuance of a Status Quo Order
In imputing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc, Pecson argues
that: (1) the RTC Decision clearly showed Pecson's victory; (2) the reasons for the
reversal of the RTC Decision practically render impossible a grant of an execution
pending appeal; and (3) the RTC correctly found the presence of the requisites for
execution pending appeal.
Threatened to be unseated, Pecson asked, as interim relief, for the issuance of a
Status Quo Order. He claimed that: (1) the Department of Interior and Local
Government already recognized (based on the issuance of the assailed Resolution)
Cunanan's assumption of office even if the assailed Resolution had not attained
finality; and (2) in order to prevent grave and irreparable injury to Pecson and the
perpetuation of a travesty of justice, a Status Quo Order must immediately issue.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
The remedy of executing court decisions pending appeal in election contests is
provided under the Rules as follows:
SEC. 11. Execution pending appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party, the court, while still in possession of the original
records, may, at its discretion, order the execution of the decision in an election
contest before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject to the following
rules:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day notice to the
adverse party. Execution pending appeal shall not issue without prior notice and

hearing. There must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal. The
court, in a special order, must state the good or special reasons justifying the
execution pending appeal. Such reasons must:
(1) constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will
outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of
the judgment on appeal; and
(2) be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of
the protestee or the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.
(b) If the court grants execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have
twenty working days from notice of the special order within which to secure a
restraining order or status quo order from the Supreme Court of the Commission
on Elections. The corresponding writ of execution shall issue after twenty days, if
no restraining order or status quo order is issued. During such period, the writ of
execution pending appeal shall be stayed. 3

This remedy is not new. Under prevailing jurisprudence,4 the remedy may be
resorted to pursuant to the suppletory application of the Rules of Court, specifically
its Section 2, Rule 39.5 What the Rules (A.M. No. 07-4-15-C) has done is to give the
availability of the remedy the element of certainty. Significantly, the Rules similarly
apply the good reason standard (in fact, the even greater superior circumstances
standard) for execution pending appeal under the Rules of Court, making the
remedy an exception rather than the rule.
At the heart of the present controversy is the question of whether there has been
compliance with the standards required for an execution pending appeal in an
election contest. As heretofore cited, the RTC found all these requisites present. The
Second Division of the COMELEC supported the RTC's ruling, but the
COMELEC en banc held a contrary view and nullified the execution pending appeal.
This en banc ruling is now before us.
Our review of a COMELEC ruling or decision is via a petition for certiorari. This is a
limited review on jurisdictional grounds, specifically of the question on whether the
COMELEC has jurisdiction, or whether the assailed order or resolution is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Correctly
understood, grave abuse of discretion is such "capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at
all in contemplation of law."6

Because this case is essentially about the implementation of an RTC decision

pending appeal, we must first dwell on the writ the RTC issued. The COMELEC
ruled in this regard that the writ of execution the RTC issued on March 11, 2008 was
void; the RTC could no longer issue the writ because of the lapse of the period for
appeal, and because the RTC no longer held the records of the election contest
which had then been transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC.
Cunanan argues in his Comment that this ruling has become final and executory
because Pecson did not question it in the present petition. In Cunanan's view, the
finality of this aspect of the COMELEC ruling renders the issue of the nullification of
the Special Order moot and academic, as any ruling we shall render would serve no
practical purpose; it can no longer be implemented since the means (obviously
referring to the writ the RTC issued on March 11, 2008) of executing the RTC
decision (i.e., seating Pecson as Mayor of Magalang) has, to all intents and
purposes, been nullified and rendered ineffective.
We see no merit in Cunanan's argument. The writ of execution issued by the RTC is
a mere administrative enforcement medium of the Special Order - the main order
supporting Pecson's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ itself
cannot and does not assume a life of its own independent from the Special Order on
which it is based. Certainly, its nullification does not carry with it the nullification of
the Special Order. This consequence does not of course hold true in the reverse
situation - the nullification of the Special Order effectively carries with it the
nullification of its implementing writ and removes the basis for the issuance of
another implementing writ. In the present case, the reality is that if and when we
ultimately affirm the validity of the Special Order, nothing will thereafter prevent the
RTC from issuing another writ.
Another legal reality is that the COMELEC is wrong in its ruling that the RTC could
no longer actually issue the writ on March 11, 2008 because it no longer had
jurisdiction to do so after the appeal period lapsed and after the records were
transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC. That the RTC is still in possession of the
records and that the period to appeal (of both contending parties) must have not
lapsed are important for jurisdictional purposes if the issue is the authority of the
RTC to grant a Special Order allowing execution pending appeal; they are requisite
elements for the exercise by the RTC of its residual jurisdiction to validly order an
execution pending appeal, not for the issuance of the writ itself. This is clearly
evident from the cited provision of the Rules which does not require the issuance of
the implementing writ within the above limited jurisdictional period. The RTC cannot
legally issue the implementing writ within this limited period for two reasons: (1) the
cited twenty-day waiting period under Section 11(b); and (2) the mandatory
immediate transmittal of the records to the ECAD of the COMELEC under Section
10 of the Rules.7

On the substantive issue of whether a writ of execution pending appeal should

issue, we do not agree with the COMELEC's view that there are "two presumptive
winners" prior to its ruling on the protest case. We likewise cannot support its
"balancing act" view that essentially posits that given the pendency of the appeal
and the lack of finality of a decision in the election protest, the unseating of the
protestee, and the need for continuity of public service, the balance should tilt in
favor of continuity or non-disruption of public service; hence, the execution pending
appeal should be denied.
As Pecson correctly argued, this reasoning effectively prevents a winner (at the level
of the courts) of an election protest from ever availing of an execution pending
appeal; it gives too much emphasis to the COMELEC's authority to decide the
election contest and the losing party's right to appeal. What is there to execute
pending appeal if, as the COMELEC suggested, a party should await a COMELEC
final ruling on the protest case? Effectively, the "two presumptive winners" and the
"balancing act" views negate the execution pending appeal that we have
categorically and unequivocally recognized in our rulings and in the Rules we
issued. To be sure, the COMELEC cannot, on its own, render ineffective a rule of
procedure we established by formulating its own ruling requiring a final
determination at its level before an RTC decision in a protest case can be
implemented.
We additionally note that "disruption of public service" necessarily results from any
order allowing execution pending appeal and is a concern that this Court was aware
of when it expressly provided the remedy under the Rules. Such disruption is
therefore an element that has been weighed and factored in and cannot be per se a
basis to deny execution pending appeal.
What comes out clearly from this examination of the COMELEC ruling is that it
looked at the wrong material considerations when it nullified the RTC's Special
Order. They are the wrong considerations because they are not the standards
outlined under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules against which the validity of a
Special Order must be tested. Significantly, the use of wrong considerations in
arriving at a decision constitutes grave abuse of discretion.8
The proper consideration that the COMELEC made relates to the correctness of the
RTC's Decision in light of the Rules' requirement that the victory of the protestant
and the defeat of the protestee be clearly established for execution pending appeal
to issue. According to the COMELEC, no less than the Second Division cast a doubt
on the correctness of the number of votes obtained by the parties after the revision
of ballots when the Second Division proposed a mathematical formula to correct the
RTC count. At the same time, the COMELEC noted that the Second Division could
not have corrected the RTC count, as the petition before it was one
for certiorariwhile the correction of errors in computation properly pertained to the
resolution of Cunanan's pending appeal. To the COMELEC, all these showed that

the correctness of the RTC Decision in favor of Pecson was far from clear and
cannot support an execution pending appeal.
We disagree once more with the COMELEC en banc in this conclusion, as it failed
to accurately and completely appreciate the Second Division's findings. The RTC
Decision, on its face, shows that Pecson garnered more valid votes than Cunanan
after the revision of ballots. The Second Division properly recognized, however, that
the RTC computation suffered from a facial defect that did not affect the final results;
as Cunanan pointed out, the votes for Pecson and Cunanan, if totally summed up,
exceeded the total number of valid votes for mayor.
Duly alerted, the Second Division looked into the purported error, analyzed it, and
found the error to be merely mathematical; the RTC formula would necessarily
exceed the total number of votes cast for mayor because it counted some votes
twice. In making this finding, the Second Division was guided by the rule that one of
the requisites for an execution pending appeal is a clear showing in the decision of
the protestant's victory and the protestee's defeat. Its examination of the RTC
Decision was only for this limited purpose and this was what it did, no more no less.
Specifically, it did not review the RTC's appreciation of the ballots on revision; it did
not review the intrinsic merits of the RTC Decision - issues that properly belong to
the appeal that is currently pending. It merely found that the defect Cunanan noted
was actually inconsequential with respect to the results, thus showing Pecson's clear
victory under the RTC Decision. In other words, the Second Division's corrected
view of the RTC count confirmed, rather than contradicted or placed in doubt, the
conclusion that Pecson won.
Other than the clarity of Pecson's victory under the RTC Decision, the Special Order
cited good and special reasons that justified an execution pending appeal,
specifically: (1) the need to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge's
decision as that which is initially given by the law to the proclamation by the board of
canvassers; (2) public interest and/or respect for and giving meaning to the will of
the electorate; and (3) public policy - something had to be done to deal a death blow
to the pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest technique often, if not
invariably, resorted to by unscrupulous politicians who would render nugatory the
people's verdict against them.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC en banc simply glossed over the RTC's cited reasons
and did not fully discuss why these reasons were not sufficient to justify execution
pending appeal. A combination, however, of the reasons the RTC cited, to our mind,
justifies execution of the RTC Decision pending appeal.
A striking feature of the present case is the time element involved. We have time
and again noted the well known delay in the adjudication of election contests that,
more often than not, gives the protestant an empty or hollow victory in a long drawnout legal battle.9 Some petitions before us involving election contests have been in

fact dismissed for being moot, the term for the contested position having long
expired before the final ruling on the merits came.10 In the present case, the term for
mayor consists of only three (3) years. One year and six months has lapsed since
the May 2007 election; thus, less than two years are left of the elected mayor's term.
The election protest, while already decided at the RTC level, is still at the executionpending-appeal stage and is still far from the finality of any decision on the merits,
given the available appellate remedies and the recourses available through special
civil actions. To be sure, there is nothing definite in the horizon on who will finally be
declared the lawfully elected mayor.
Also, we reiterate here our consistent ruling that decisions of the courts in election
protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots and after
full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given similar worth and
recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers.11 This is especially true when
attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness
of the term of the contested elective office, of the case.
In light of all these considerations, we conclude that the COMELEC erred in
nullifying the RTC's Special Order in a manner sufficiently gross to affect its exercise
of jurisdiction. Specifically, it committed grave abuse of discretion when it looked at
wrong considerations and when it acted outside of the contemplation of the law in
nullifying the Special Order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and
accordingly ANNUL the assailed COMELEC Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 190823

April 4, 2011

DOMINGO CARABEO, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES NORBERTO and SUSAN DINGCO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On July 10, 1990, Domingo Carabeo (petitioner) entered into a contract
denominated as "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa"1 (kasunduan) with
Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco (respondents) whereby petitioner agreed to
sell his rights over a 648 square meter parcel of unregistered land situated in Purok
III, Tugatog, Orani, Bataan to respondents for P38,000.
Respondents tendered their initial payment of P10,000 upon signing of the contract,
the remaining balance to be paid on September 1990.
Respondents were later to claim that when they were about to hand in the balance
of the purchase price, petitioner requested them to keep it first as he was yet to
settle an on-going "squabble" over the land.
Nevertheless, respondents gave petitioner small sums of money from time to time
which totaled P9,100, on petitioners request according to them; due to respondents
inability to pay the amount of the remaining balance in full, according to petitioner.
By respondents claim, despite the alleged problem over the land, they insisted on
petitioners acceptance of the remaining balance of P18,900 but petitioner remained
firm in his refusal, proffering as reason therefor that he would register the land first.
Sometime in 1994, respondents learned that the alleged problem over the land had
been settled and that petitioner had caused its registration in his name on December
21, 1993 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 161806. They thereupon offered to
pay the balance but petitioner declined, drawing them to file a complaint before
the Katarungan Pambarangay. No settlement was reached, however, hence,
respondent filed a complaint for specific performance before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Balanga, Bataan.
Petitioner countered in his Answer to the Complaint that the sale was void for lack of
object certain, the kasunduan not having specified the metes and bounds of the
land. In any event, petitioner alleged that if the validity of the kasunduan is upheld,
respondents failure to comply with their reciprocal obligation to pay the balance of
the purchase price would render the action premature. For, contrary to respondents
claim, petitioner maintained that they failed to pay the balance of P28,000 on

September 1990 to thus constrain him to accept installment payments

totaling P9,100.
After the case was submitted for decision or on January 31, 2001,2 petitioner passed
away. The records do not show that petitioners counsel informed Branch 1 of the
Bataan RTC, where the complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper
substitution was effected in accordance with Section 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court. 3
By Decision of February 25, 2001,4 the trial court ruled in favor of respondents,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:
1. The defendant to sell his right over 648 square meters of land pursuant to the
contract dated July 10, 1990 by executing a Deed of Sale thereof after the
payment of P18,900 by the plaintiffs;
2. The defendant to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.5
Petitioners counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on March 20, 2001.
By the herein challenged Decision dated July 20, 2009,6 the Court of
Appeals affirmed that of the trial court.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of January
8, 2010, the present petition for review was filed by Antonio Carabeo, petitioners
son,7 faulting the appellate court:
(A)
in holding that the element of a contract, i.e., an object certain is present in
this case.
(B)
in considering it unfair to expect respondents who are not lawyers to make
judicial consignation after herein petitioner allegedly refused to accept payment
of the balance of the purchase price.
(C)
in upholding the validity of the contract, "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan
sa Lupa," despite thelack of spousal consent, (underscoring supplied)

and proffering that

(D)
[t]he death of herein petitioner causes the dismissal of the action filed by
respondents; respondents cause of action being an action in personam.
(underscoring supplied)

The petition fails.

The pertinent portion of the kasunduan reads:8
xxxx
Na ako ay may isang partial na lupa na matatagpuan sa Purok 111, Tugatog, Orani
Bataan, na may sukat na 27 x 24 metro kuwadrado, ang nasabing lupa ay
may sakop na dalawang punong santol at isang punong mangga, kayat ako ay
nakipagkasundo sa mag-asawang Norby Dingco at Susan Dingco na ipagbili sa
kanila ang karapatan ng nasabing lupa sa halagang P38,000.00.
x x x x (underscoring supplied)
That the kasunduan did not specify the technical boundaries of the property did not
render the sale a nullity. The requirement that a sale must have for its object a
determinate thing is satisfied as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the
object of the sale is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a
new or further agreement between the parties.9 As the above-quoted portion of the
kasunduan shows, there is no doubt that the object of the sale is determinate.
Clutching at straws, petitioner proffers lack of spousal consent. This was raised only
on appeal, hence, will not be considered, in the present case, in the interest of fair
play, justice and due process.10
Respecting the argument that petitioners death rendered respondents complaint
against him dismissible,Bonilla v. Barcena11 enlightens:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong
complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the
injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do
not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the
kasunduan, whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his

proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is deemed

void, there is a corollary obligation of petitioner to return the money paid by
respondents, and since the action involves property rights,12 it survives.
1avvphi1

It bears noting that trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died.
Since the trial court was not informed of petitioners death, it may not be faulted for
proceeding to render judgment without ordering his substitution. Its judgment is thus
valid and binding upon petitioners legal representatives or successors-in-interest,
insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned. 13
In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of
authority.14 Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioners counsel of record had no
personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration,
had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial courts decision had
thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.