NON DELEGATION OF POWERS

Case No. 1
G.R. No. L-32096, Edu v. Hon. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
October 24, 1970
G.R. No. L-32096
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Hector C.
Fule and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for petitioner.Teddy C. Galo in his own behalf.
, J.:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule squarely
on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law1 in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition
against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the
enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and
prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of such
enactment as well as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in his answer, would join
such a plea asking that the constitutional and legal questions raised be decided "once and for
all." Respondent Teddy C. Galo who was quite categorical in his assertion that both the
challenged legislation and the administrative order transgress the constitutional requirements
of due process and non-delegation, is not averse either to such a definitive ruling. Considering
the great public interest involved and the reliance by respondent Galo and the allegation that
the repugnancy to the fundamental law could be discerned on the face of the statute as enacted

and the executive order as promulgated, this Court, sees no obstacle to the determination in
this proceeding of the constitutional questions raised. For reasons to be hereafter stated, we
sustain the validity of the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the
implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional infirmity being at best flimsy and
insubstantial.
As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other
motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise of the police
power, for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a
manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent
Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land
Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as
an undue exercise of legislative power. There was a hearing on the plea for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction held on May 27. 1970 where both parties were duly
represented, but no evidence was presented. The next day, on May 28, 1970, respondent Judge
ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of such
administrative order. There was the day after, a motion for its reconsideration filed by the
Solicitor General representing petitioner. In the meanwhile, the clerk of court of respondent
Judge issued, on June 1, 1970 the writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of the
required bond. The answer before the lower court was filed by petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970.
Thereafter, on June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the
order of injunction. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with this court on
June 18, 1970.
In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required respondents to file an answer to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta,
did file his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining why he restrained the enforcement of
Administrative Order No. 2 and, as noted at the outset, joining the Solicitor General in
seeking that the legal questions raised namely the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and
secondly the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 alleged to be in excess of the authority
conferred on petitioner and therefore violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power be definitely decided. It was on until July 6, 1970 that respondent Galo filed his answer
seeking the dismissal of this petition concentrating on what he considered to be the patent
invalidity of Administrative Order No. 2 as it went beyond the authority granted by the
Reflector Law, even assuming that it is constitutional. In the meanwhile, on July 2, 1970, the
petition was called for hearing with Solicitor Vicente Torres appearing for petitioner and
respondent Galo for himself. It was made clear during the course of such argumentation that
the matter of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law was likewise under consideration by
this Court. The case is thus ripe for decision.

We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the Reflector Law as
well as the validity of Administrative Order No. 2.
1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the petition, the answers, and the oral
argument, it would be proper for this Court to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of the
Reflector Law. Our answer, as indicated, is in the affirmative. It is to be noted that the main
thrust of the petition before us is to demonstrate in a rather convincing fashion that the
challenged legislation does not suffer from the alleged constitutional infirmity imputed to it
by the respondent Galo. Since the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed
before him before respondent Judge would seek a declaration of nullity of such enactment by
the attribution of the violation the face thereof of the due process guarantee in the deprivation
of property rights, it would follow that there is sufficient basis for us to determine which view
should prevail. Moreover, any further hearing by respondent Judge would likewise to limited
to a discussion of the constitutional issues raised, no allegations of facts having made. This is
one case then where the question of validity is ripe for determination. If we do so, further
effort need not be wasted and time is saved moreover, the officials concerned as well as the
public, both vitally concerned with a final resolution of questions of validity, could know the
definitive answer and could act accordingly. There is a great public interest, as was
mentioned, to be served by the final disposition of such crucial issue, petitioner praying that
respondent Galo be declared having no cause of action with respondent Judge being
accordingly directed to dismiss his suit.
There is another reinforcement to this avenue of approach. We have done so before in a suit,
Climaco v. Macadaeg, 2 involving the legality of a presidential directive. That was a petition
for the review and reversal of a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the then Judge
Macadaeg. We there announced that we "have decided to pass upon the question of the
validity of the presidential directive ourselves, believing that by doing so we would be putting
an end to a dispute, a delay in the disposition of which has caused considerable damage and
injury to the Government and to the tobacco planters themselves."
There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from similarly passing
upon the question of the validity of a legislative enactment in a proceeding before it to test the
propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The same felt need for resolving once
and for all the vexing question as to the constitutionality of a challenged enactment and thus
serve public interest exists. What we have done in the case of an order proceeding from one of
the coordinate branches, the executive, we can very well do in the matter before us involving
the alleged nullity of a legislative act. Accordingly, there is nothing to preclude the grant of
the writs prayed for, the burden of showing the constitutionality of the act having proved to be
as will now be shown too much for respondent Galo.
2. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a
corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not

well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every

motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning
devices either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be visible
at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the
requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered."3 It is thus obvious that the
challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety.
Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came to force, Calalang v.
Williams,4 identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." Shortly after independence in 1948,
Primicias v. Fugoso,5 reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as "the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people." The concept was set forth in negative terms by
Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as "that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society."6 In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v.
Mutuc7 with the totality of legislative power.
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to quote
Justice Malcolm anew "the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," 8
extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out "to all the great public needs." 9 Its scope, everexpanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs
that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being
of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the
time." 10 The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It would then be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for their number and unanimity
were this Court to sustain respondent Galo. 11 That we are not disposed to do, especially so as
the attack on the challenged statute ostensibly for disregarding the due process safeguard is
angularly unpersuasive. It would be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening
to condemn a statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for public
safety. How can it plausibly alleged then that there was no observance of due process equated
as it has always been with that is reasonable? The statute assailed is not infected with
arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a

legitimate response to a felt public need. It can stand the test of the most unsymphatetic
appraisal.
Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been unable to resist the teaching of many
American State Court decisions referred to in the secondary source, American Jurisprudence
principally relied upon by him. He ought to have been cautioned against an indiscriminate
acceptance of such doctrines predicated on what was once a fundamental postulate in
American public law, laissez faire.
It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a concept did influence American court
decisions on constitutional law. As was explicitly stated by Justice Cardozo speaking of that
era: "Laissez-faire was not only a counsel of caution which would do well to heed. It was a
categorical imperative which statesmen as well as judges must obey." 12 For a long time
legislation tending to reduce economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due
process clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract, based on such a basic assumption.
The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt more responsive to the social and
economic forces at work changed matters greatly. By 1937, there was a greater receptivity by
the American Supreme Court to an approach not too reverential of property rights. Even
earlier, in 1935, Professor Coker of Yale, speaking as a historian, could already discern a
contrary drift. He did note the expending range of governmental activity in the United States.
13 What is undeniable is that by 1943, laissez-faire was no longer the dominant theory. In the
language of Justice Jackson in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette: 14 "We must, transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or
non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are
increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through expanded and
strengthened governmental controls."
While authoritative precedents from the United States federal and state jurisdictions were
deferred to when the Philippines was still under American rule, it cannot be said that the
laissez-faire principle was invariably adhered to by us even then As early as 1919, in the
leading case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 15 Justice Malcolm already had
occasion to affirm: "The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the
individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has
shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity. The
Courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail after the other two branches of the
Government in this progressive march." People v. Pomar, 16 a 1924 decision which held
invalid under the due process clause a provision providing for maternity leave with pay thirty
days before and thirty days after confinement could be cited to show that such a principle did
have its day. It is to be remembered though that our Supreme Court had no other choice as the
Philippines was then under the United States, and only recently the year before, the American
Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 17 in line with the laissez-faire theory, did
hold that a statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally infirm.

What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of
laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with
social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic
affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through
state action. No constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property
rights, especially so when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded, unless of course on
the clearest and most satisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
On such a showing, there may be a declaration of nullity, but not because the laissez-faire
principle was disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or non-impairment
guarantees would call for vindication.
To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be
on that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of
the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first President of the Republic,
made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who
noted the "vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited
power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to compete with existing
business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current tendencies" in other
jurisdictions. 18 He spoke thus: "My answer is that this constitution has definite and well
defined philosophy not only political but social and economic. ... If in this Constitution the
gentlemen will find declarations of economic policy they are there because they are necessary
to safeguard the interests and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days
have come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the
patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and national
interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional provision
automatically imposes. 19
It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion, Justice Laurel, who likewise sat in the
Constitutional Convention and was one of its leading lights, explicitly affirmed in a
concurring opinion, later quoted with approval in the leading case of Antamok Goldfields
Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 20 that the Constitution did away with the
laissez-faire doctrine. In the course of such concurring opinion and after noting the changes
that have taken place calling for a more affirmative role by the government and its undeniable
power to curtail property rights, he categorically declared the doctrine in People v. Pomar no
longer retains "its virtuality as a living principle." 21
It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire principle that during the Commonwealth
era, no constitutional infirmity was found to have attached to legislation covering such
subjects as collective bargaining, 22 security of tenure, 23 minimum wages, 24 compulsory
arbitration, 25 the regulation of tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of
securities, 27 and control of public services. 28 So it is likewise under the Republic this Court
having given the seal of approval to more favorable tenancy laws, 29 nationalization of the

retail trade, 30 limitation of the hours of labor, 31 imposition of price control, 32 requirement
of separation pay for one month, 33 and social security scheme. 34

a violation of any of its provisions or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto a fine of not
less than P10 nor not less than P50 could be imposed. 42

Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the scrutiny of
Philippine decisions rendered with not unexpected regularity, during all the while our
Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of such a shibboleth as laissez-faire. It
was one of those fighting faiths that time and circumstances had upset, to paraphrase Holmes.
Yet respondent Galo would seek to vivify and resurrect it. That, it would appear, is a vain
quest, a futile undertaking. The Reflector Law is thus immune from the attack so recklessly
hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the constitutional test.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress
may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to
the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What
cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation
of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may
indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has
rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done , and
delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of
the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded
as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of nondelegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17,
1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus:
"No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if
not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector
commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an
intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light
shall be visible 100 meters away at night." 35 Then came a section on dimensions, placement
and color. As to dimensions the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors - Not less than 3
inches in diameter or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape - At least 3 inches wide
and 12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle
owner." 36 Provision is then made as to how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed,
pasted or painted." 37 There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there
shall be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to
those installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end of the body thereof. 38 The
color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or
reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and
those placed on the sides and in the rear shall all be red. 39
Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: "Non-compliance with
the requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the
motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration maybe suspended in
pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided], However, that in the case
of the violation of Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less
than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed. 40 It is not to be lost sight of that
under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the
Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not
conflict with its provisions. 41 It is likewise an express provision of the above statute that for

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to
be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety. That is sought to be attained as in Calalang v.
Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." 43
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision
announced not long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of nondelegation "has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern governments, giving rise
to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in
the United States and England but in practically all modern governments." 44 He continued:
"Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects
of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 45 Consistency with the conceptual

approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character,
the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.
Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from, Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs.
Exconde: 46 "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a nondelegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is that the
regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes ... " 47
An even more explicit formulation of the controlling principle comes from the pen of the then
Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion: "Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed
upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue the same constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power. It is true that, under our system of government, said power may not be
delegated except to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to
determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details
in the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is
that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the, delegation
furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the
Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance
with the legislative will." (Yakus vs. United States, 88 L. ed.
848) ... It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be construed and exercised in
relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which are, among others, "to
maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to promote a rising level of production,
employment and real income in the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265). These
standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority, the character
of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant said authority
beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers ... " 48
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation
Code.Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress
and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character.
There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation
Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality
such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative
Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by
respondent Galo.

WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted, the orders of
May 28, 1970 of respondent Judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the
writ of preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his order of June 9, 1970 denying
reconsideration are annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge is likewise directed to dismiss
the petition for certiorariand prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo, there being no
cause of action as the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner have not
been shown to be tainted by invalidity. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Villamor, J., took no part.

the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for
burial expenses.
Case No. 2
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and
KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.
Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.
CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for
dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to
correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions,
however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover,
the private respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court,
observing that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No.
797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of
Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier
under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order,
the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money
claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the
1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims
for death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such employment. 2
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow
is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic
employee and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social Security
System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission.

The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is
challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over
the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.

We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an
overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in
1985.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an
accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive
Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the
vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security
System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless
assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of

Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is
defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board
vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is
described as "any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment
contract and shall include seamen" 4 or "any person working overseas or who has been
employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner
under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen." 5 These definitions clearly

apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under a contract of
employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris,
while berthed in a foreign country. 6
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied
or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The
first is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and
approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive
Order NO. 797. 7 The second is its payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and
regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694
"for the purpose of providing social and welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."
Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private
respondent's signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas contract
worker Vitaliano Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the
light of the petitioner's own previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had
made contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the
Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not
considered overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it necessary to
submit its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to
contribute to the Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the
analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the definitions given
be considered seamen nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by
the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February
1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and
domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment . A
similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board and had been
sustained in a number of cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner claims that it had never entered
into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first
place, it should have done so as required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all
parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are
advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist
from using any other format of employment contract effective that date." In the second place,
even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written
into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11

But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of
the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been
given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not
subject to delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797, reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder
provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier
observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the
format adopted by the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion
to determine how the law may be enforced, notwhat the law shall be. The ascertainment of
the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate
Court 12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition
of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order.
It is there authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.'
(Italics supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities
for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the
usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations
that the officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is
none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen?
Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping

authority that is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing,'
in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative
powers.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first
test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under
the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the
many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or
judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the
case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent,
if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has
become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability
of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The
growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems
that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor
on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract
prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by
the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring
the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the
exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which,
in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the
rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public
interest" in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v.
CIR 16 "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy
and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United
States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension
of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the
Social Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial
gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude
allowance of the private respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically
reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum
Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that
Section C. Compensation and Benefits.
1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of:
a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers
b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio
operators and master electrician

c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.

2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be
separate and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits
which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ...
3. ...
c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the
Philippines, the owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the
seaman an amount not exceeding P18,000.00 for burial
expenses.
The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by
the National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows:
Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.
All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of
the Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall
be granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the
seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment
contract approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social
Security Law and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the
seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance with such laws.

Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitumon their

respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life
of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the
cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations 21 are observed.
Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved
in favor of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the
principle that those with less in life should have more in law.
When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice,
the heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion
the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the
opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of
management, with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of
capital but its active and equal partner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary
restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
Case No. 3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class,
consistently with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for
the protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest.

EN BANC

One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has
been denied due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has
also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself.
Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasijudicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the
second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of
Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own
circulars, the Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the
Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics

ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST

CONSUMERS
NETWORK,
INC.
(ECN), Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
(ERC), NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS
AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER
UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC.
(PECO),Respondents.

G.R. No. 159796

July 17, 2007

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist Consumers
Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in this original action praying that
Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge, 1and Rule 18 of the Rules and
Regulations (IRR)2 which seeks to implement the said imposition, be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers
be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be
issued directing the respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the
said charge.3 The assailed provision of law reads:
SECTION 34. Universal Charge. Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, a
universal charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all
electricity end-users for the following purposes:
(a) Payment for the stranded debts 4 in excess of the amount assumed by the National
Government and stranded contract costs of NPC 5 and as well as qualified stranded
contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the restructuring of the industry;
(b) Missionary electrification;6
(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or renewable
sources of energy vis--vis imported energy fuels;
(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatthour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an environmental fund to be used solely
for watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall be managed by NPC
under existing arrangements; and
(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding
three (3) years.
The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which shall be passed on and collected
from all end-users on a monthly basis by the distribution utilities. Collections by the
distribution utilities and the TRANSCO in any given month shall be remitted to the PSALM
Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th) of the succeeding month, net of any amount due to the

distribution utility. Any end-user or self-generating entity not connected to a distribution

utility shall remit its corresponding universal charge directly to the TRANSCO. The PSALM
Corp., as administrator of the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall be disbursed
only for the purposes specified herein in an open and transparent manner. All amount
collected for the universal charge shall be distributed to the respective beneficiaries within a
reasonable period to be provided by the ERC.
The Facts
Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect.7
On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities
Group8 (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition
for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification,
docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-165.9
On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-194,
praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge
of P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total of P119,488,847.59, be approved for
withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power Sector Assets
and
Liabilities Management Group (PSALM)10 for the rehabilitation and management of
watershed areas.11
On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order 12 in ERC Case No. 2002-165 provisionally
approving the computed amount of P0.0168/kWh as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the
Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission
Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a
monthly basis.
On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision 13 (for ERC Case No. 2002-165) modifying
its Order of December 20, 2002, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the provisional authority granted to
petitioner National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) in the
Order dated December 20, 2002 is hereby modified to the effect that an additional amount
of P0.0205 per kilowatt-hour should be added to the P0.0168 per kilowatt-hour provisionally
authorized by the Commission in the said Order. Accordingly, a total amount of P0.0373 per

kilowatt-hour is hereby APPROVED for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund managed by
PSALM as its share from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification (UC-ME)
effective on the following billing cycles:

5. Start of Operation; and

6. Explanation of the reallocation of UC-ME funds, if any.

(a) June 26-July 25, 2003 for National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO); and

SO ORDERED.15

(b) July 2003 for Distribution Utilities (Dus).

Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194, authorizing the NPC to
draw up toP70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject
to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.16

Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to collect the UC-ME in the amount
of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour and remit the same to PSALM on or before the 15th day of the
succeeding month.
In the meantime, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit, not later than April 30, 2004, a detailed
report to include Audited Financial Statements and physical status (percentage of completion)
of the projects using the prescribed format.1avvphi1
Let copies of this Order be furnished petitioner NPC-SPUG and all distribution utilities (Dus).

On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO)
charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as
reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.17
Hence, this original action.
Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to implement
the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds:

SO ORDERED.
On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the ERC, among
others,14 to set aside the above-mentioned Decision, which the ERC granted in its Order dated
October 7, 2003, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the "Motion for Reconsideration" filed by
petitioner National Power Corporation-Small Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 26, 2003 is hereby modified accordingly.
Relative thereto, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit a quarterly report on the following:
1. Projects for CY 2002 undertaken;
2. Location
3. Actual amount utilized to complete the project;
4. Period of completion;

1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be
implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be
collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is
strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any
executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same
unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal
Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the
latter complete discretionary legislative authority.
2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected
should be used.
3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and
confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation as the consumers were
not given a chance to be heard and represented.18
Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is collected
to fund the operations of the NPC. They argue that the cases 19 invoked by the respondents
clearly show the regulatory purpose of the charges imposed therein, which is not so in the
case at bench. In said cases, the respective funds 20 were created in order to balance and

stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act as buffer to counteract the changes and
adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other variables which cannot be adequately and
timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to delegate powers to
administrative bodies.21 Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge is imposed not for a
similar purpose.
On the other hand, respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public
purposes, such as support of the government, administration of the law, or payment of public
expenses, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to
ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry. Thus, it is exacted by the State in
the exercise of its inherent police power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no
undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the latter merely exercises a limited
authority or discretion as to the execution and implementation of the provisions of the
EPIRA.22
Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), share the same view that the Universal Charge is not a tax because it
is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's
electric power industry, and is, therefore, an exaction in the exercise of the State's police
power. Respondents further contend that said Universal Charge does not possess the essential
characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound to the benefit of the electric power
industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly levied on electricity end-users,
unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability to pay. Moreover,
respondents deny that there is undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the
EPIRA sets forth sufficient determinable standards which would guide the ERC in the
exercise of the powers granted to it. Lastly, respondents argue that the imposition of the
Universal Charge is not oppressive and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power
of the State and it complies with the requirements of due process.23
On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount
pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund components of the
Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC Case Nos.
2002-194 and 2002-165. Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under Sec. 46 24 of the EPIRA,
which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or its IRR.25
The Issues
The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:

1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a
tax; and
2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of
the ERC.26
Before we discuss the issues, the Court shall first deal with an obvious procedural lapse.
Petitioners filed before us an original action particularly denominated as a Complaint
assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the Universal Charge and
Rule 18 of the EPIRA's IRR. No doubt, petitioners have locus standi. They impugn the
constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA because they sustained a direct injury as a result of
the imposition of the Universal Charge as reflected in their electric bills.
However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they filed this
"Complaint" directly with us. Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any of the public respondents, in order for the
Court to consider it as a petition for certiorari or prohibition.
Article VIII, Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution27 categorically provides that:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the rules of court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.
But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the regional trial courts and the Court of
Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek
such relief.28 It has long been established that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional

and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and call for the exercise
of our primary jurisdiction.29 This circumstance alone warrants the outright dismissal of the
present action.
This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the constitutional issue raised
herein. We are aware that if the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is not resolved now,
the issue will certainly resurface in the near future, resulting in a repeat of this litigation, and
probably involving the same parties. In the public interest and to avoid unnecessary delay, this
Court renders its ruling now.

merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.36
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police
power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34
which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed 37 and which can be
amply discerned as regulatory in character. The EPIRA resonates such regulatory purposes,
thus:
SECTION 2.Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State:

The instant complaint is bereft of merit.

(a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the country;
The First Issue
To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the States power of taxation from the
police power.
The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging
in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the
responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency that is to pay it. 30 It
is based on the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and
certain availability is an imperious need. 31 Thus, the theory behind the exercise of the power
to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of
promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.32
On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. 33 It is the most pervasive, the least
limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The
justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as
not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually
extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which
the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. 34 We have held that
the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control,
with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its
patrons.35
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose for
which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is

(b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of
electric power;
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in a regime of free and
fair competition and full public accountability to achieve greater operational and
economic efficiency and enhance the competitiveness of Philippine products in the
global market;
(d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the ownership base of the
power generation, transmission and distribution sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public and private sector
entities in the process of restructuring the electric power industry;
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and services of electric
utilities and other providers of electric power;
(g) To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy sources and
infrastructure;
(h) To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and renewable energy resources
in power generation in order to reduce dependence on imported energy;
(i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the assets and liabilities
of the National Power Corporation (NPC);

(j) To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory body and system to
ensure consumer protection and enhance the competitive operation of the electricity
market; and
(k) To encourage the efficient use of energy and other modalities of demand side
management.
From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not
a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is surely
promoted.
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an
implement of police power.38 InValmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al.39 and in Gaston
v. Republic Planters Bank,40 this Court held that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and
the Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made in the exercise of the police power.
The doctrine was reiterated in Osmea v. Orbos41 with respect to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree
with petitioners that the instant case is different from the aforementioned cases. With the
Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created under the administration of
PSALM.42 The STF has some notable characteristics similar to the OPSF and the SSF, viz.:
1) In the implementation of stranded cost recovery, the ERC shall conduct a review
to determine whether there is under-recovery or over recovery and adjust (true-up)
the level of the stranded cost recovery charge. In case of an over-recovery, the ERC
shall ensure that any excess amount shall be remitted to the STF. A separate account
shall be created for these amounts which shall be held in trust for any future claims
of distribution utilities for stranded cost recovery. At the end of the stranded cost
recovery period, any remaining amount in this account shall be used to reduce the
electricity rates to the end-users.43
2) With respect to the assailed Universal Charge, if the total amount collected for the
same is greater than the actual availments against it, the PSALM shall retain the
balance within the STF to pay for periods where a shortfall occurs.44
3) Upon expiration of the term of PSALM, the administration of the STF shall be
transferred to the DOF or any of the DOF attached agencies as designated by the
DOF Secretary.45
The OSG is in point when it asseverates:

Evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special Trust Fund, under the last
paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No. 9136, is well within the pervasive and non-waivable power
and responsibility of the government to secure the physical and economic survival and wellbeing of the community, that comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police
power of the State.46
This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an exaction
imposed primarily in pursuit of the State's police objectives. The STF reasonably serves and
assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is
imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry.
The Second Issue
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of government
has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of
non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari
potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle
that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening
mind of another. 47
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to
various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this
principle.48 Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the
legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the
minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies - the principal
agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules
and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for
the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.49

The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34
thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
standards.
Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that "within one (1) year from the effectivity
thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be
imposed on all electricity end-users," and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be
paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative
parameters provided in the law itself. For one, Sec. 43(b)(ii) of the EPIRA provides:
SECTION 43.Functions of the ERC. The ERC shall promote competition, encourage
market development, ensure customer choice and penalize abuse of market power in the
restructured electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC is authorized to issue cease and
desist order after due notice and hearing. Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the
following key functions in the restructured industry:
xxxx
(b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate and enforce, in
accordance with law, a National Grid Code and a Distribution Code which shall include, but
not limited to the following:
xxxx
(ii) Financial capability standards for the generating companies, the TRANSCO, distribution
utilities and suppliers: Provided, That in the formulation of the financial capability standards,
the nature and function of the entity shall be considered: Provided, further, That such
standards are set to ensure that the electric power industry participants meet the minimum
financial standards to protect the public interest. Determine, fix, and approve, after due notice
and public hearings the universal charge, to be imposed on all electricity end-users pursuant to
Section 34 hereof;
Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of
discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Sec. 51(d) and (e) of the
EPIRA50 clearly provides:
SECTION 51.Powers. The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its functions and for
the attainment of its objective, have the following powers:

xxxx
(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract costs of NPC
which shall form the basis for ERC in the determination of the universal charge;
(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the proceeds from sales
and other property contributed to it, including the proceeds from the universal
charge.
Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power.
As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: "interest of law and order;" 51 "adequate and efficient instruction;"52 "public
interest;"53 "justice and equity;"54 "public convenience and welfare;"55 "simplicity, economy
and efficiency;"56 "standardization and regulation of medical education;"57and "fair and
equitable employment practices."58 Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, "to ensure
the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of
the supply of electric power"59 and "watershed rehabilitation and management"60 meet the
requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to
formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC's conferred powers were challenged.
In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission,61 the Court had occasion
to say:
In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the provisions of the EPIRA must
not be read in separate parts. Rather, the law must be read in its entirety, because a statute is
passed as a whole, and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Its meaning cannot to
be extracted from any single part thereof but from a general consideration of the statute as a
whole. Considering the intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading the statute in its
entirety, it is plain to see that the law has expanded the jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the
ERC in this case, to enable the latter to implement the reforms sought to be accomplished by
the EPIRA. When the legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of the ERC, they did not
intend to abolish or reduce the powers already conferred upon ERC's predecessors. To sustain
the view that the ERC possesses only the powers and functions listed under Section 43 of the
EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law.
In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 62 in the same case, then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power in relation to the

delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power as a vital
public utility, to wit:
Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer limited to the preservation
of public health, safety and morals, which used to be the primary social interests in earlier
times. Police power now requires the State to "assume an affirmative duty to eliminate the
excesses and injustices that are the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy."
Police power is now exerted "to further the public welfare a concept as vast as the good
of society itself." Hence, "police power is but another name for the governmental authority
to further the welfare of society that is the basic end of all government." When police power
is delegated to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise should be given a
wide latitude. Police power takes on an even broader dimension in developing countries such
as ours, where the State must take a more active role in balancing the many conflicting
interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued by the ERC, acting as an agent of the
State in the exercise of police power. We should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its
exercise. This approach is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of electric power
rates. Electric power generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of economic
growth that affects not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important factor in
encouraging investment and promoting business. The engines of progress may come to a
screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as
a result of power outages or unreliable electric power services. The State thru the ERC
should be able to exercise its police power with great flexibility, when the need arises.
This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy
Regulatory Commission63 where the Court held that the ERC, as regulator, should have
sufficient power to respond in real time to changes wrought by multifarious factors affecting
public utilities.
From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of
legislative power to the ERC.
Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the
imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory, and
amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or
abandoned per Resolution64 of August 3, 2004.65 Moreover, the determination of whether or
not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves
questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same. 66
As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall what this Court said of EPIRA:

One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent years is the EPIRA. It
established a new policy, legal structure and regulatory framework for the electric power
industry. The new thrust is to tap private capital for the expansion and improvement of the
industry as the large government debt and the highly capital-intensive character of the
industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical constraints to the program. To
attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded structure of the industry had to be
addressed. While the generation and transmission sectors were centralized and monopolistic,
the distribution side was fragmented with over 130 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic.
The pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization of existing generation capacity; extremely
high and uncompetitive power rates; poor quality of service to consumers; dismal to
forgettable performance of the government power sector; high system losses; and an inability
to develop a clear strategy for overcoming these shortcomings.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry, including the
privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a
competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of various government agencies and the
private entities. The law ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors,
namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply.
Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its transmission business spun
off and privatized thereafter.67
Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one
that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.68Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome
this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which
would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are
unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 4
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997
FRANCISCO
S.
TATAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997
EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA, WIGBERTO
TANADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT
COALITION
(FDC),
SANLAKAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO
VIRAY, in his capacity as the Secretary of Energy, CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON
Corporation and PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes". 1 R.A. No. 8180 ends
twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. Few cases
carry a surpassing importance on the life of every Filipino as these petitions for the upswing
and downswing of our economy materially depend on the oscillation of oil.
First, the facts without the fat. Prior to 1971, there was no government agency regulating the
oil industry other than those dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free to
enter and exit the market without any government interference. There were four (4) refining

companies (Shell, Caltex, Bataan Refining Company and Filoil Refining) and six (6)
petroleum marketing companies (Esso, Filoil, Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then operating
in the country. 2
In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by a crippling oil crisis. The government,
realizing that petroleum and its products are vital to national security and that their continued
supply at reasonable prices is essential to the general welfare, enacted the Oil Industry
Commission Act. 3 It created the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the business of
importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing,
distributing, marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas and other refined
petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fix the market prices of petroleum
products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and to regulate the
operations and trade practices of the industry. 4
In addition to the creation of the OIC, the government saw the imperious need for a more
active role of Filipinos in the oil industry. Until the early seventies, the downstream oil
industry was controlled by multinational companies. All the oil refineries and marketing
companies were owned by foreigners whose economic interests did not always coincide with
the interest of the Filipino. Crude oil was transported to the country by foreign-controlled
tankers. Crude processing was done locally by foreign-owned refineries and petroleum
products were marketed through foreign-owned retail outlets. On November 9, 1973,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos boldly created the Philippine National Oil Corporation
(PNOC) to break the control by foreigners of our oil industry. 5 PNOC engaged in the business
of refining, marketing, shipping, transporting, and storing petroleum. It acquired ownership of
ESSO Philippines and Filoil to serve as its marketing arm. It bought the controlling shares of
Bataan Refining Corporation, the largest refinery in the country. 6 PNOC later put up its own
marketing subsidiary Petrophil. PNOC operated under the business name PETRON
Corporation. For the first time, there was a Filipino presence in the Philippine oil market.
In 1984, President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956, created the Oil
Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil
caused by exchange rate adjustments or increase in the world market prices of crude oil and
imported petroleum products. The fund is used (1) to reimburse the oil companies for cost
increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate
adjustment and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil, and (2) to reimburse oil
companies for cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of
petroleum products. Under the law, the OPSF may be sourced from:
1. any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty
imposed on petroleum products subject to tax under P.D. No. 1956 arising
from exchange rate adjustment,

2. any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax

exemptions of government corporations, as may be determined by the
Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy,
3. any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment
the resources of the fund through an appropriate order that may be issued by
the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in
the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum
products, or
4. any resulting peso costs differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by
oil companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less
than the peso costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as
fixed by the Board of Energy. 7
By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country Caltex, Shell and the
government-owned PNOC.
In May, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172 creating
the Energy Regulatory Boardto regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting,
shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources
"when warranted and only when public necessity requires." The Board had the following
powers and functions:
1. Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum
products;
2. Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of
piped gas to be charged by duly franchised gas
companies which distribute gas by means of
underground pipe system;
3. Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline
concessionaries under the provisions of R.A. No.
387, as amended . . . ;
4. Regulate the capacities of new refineries or
additional capacities of existing refineries and
license refineries that may be organized after the
issuance of (E.O. No. 172) under such terms and

conditions as are consistent with the national

interest; and
5. Whenever the Board has determined that there
is a shortage of any petroleum product, or when
public interest so requires, it may take such steps
as it may consider necessary, including the
temporary adjustment of the levels of prices of
petroleum products and the payment to the Oil
Price Stabilization Fund . . . by persons or
entities engaged in the petroleum industry of
such amounts as may be determined by the
Board, which may enable the importer to recover
its cost of importation. 8
On December 9, 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of
Energy to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects,
and activities of the government in relation to energy exploration, development, utilization,
distribution and conservation. 9 The thrust of the Philippine energy program under the law was
toward privatization of government agencies related to energy, deregulation of the power and
energy industry and reduction of dependency on oil-fired plants. 10 The law also aimed to
encourage free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy
activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the effectivity
of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs
andtimetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy
industry."
Pursuant to the policies enunciated in R.A. No. 7638, the government approved
the privatization of Petron Corporation in 1993. On December 16, 1993, PNOC sold 40% of
its equity in Petron Corporation to the Aramco Overseas Company.
In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil
industry. It enacted R.A. No.8180, entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase any
quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own
and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the
same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of
Energy. 11
The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation
phase. During the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing aspects of the oil industry were
to be lifted. The following were to be accomplished: (1) liberalization of oil importation,

exportation, manufacturing, marketing and distribution, (2) implementation of an automatic

pricing mechanism, (3) implementation of an automatic formula to set margins of dealers and
rates of haulers, water transport operators and pipeline concessionaires, and (4) restructuring
of oil taxes. Upon full deregulation, controls on the price of oil and the foreign exchange
cover were to be lifted and the OPSF was to be abolished.

Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates
Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject
which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in
section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of
the downstream oil industry.

The first phase of deregulation commenced on August 12, 1996.

In G.R. No. 127867, petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Joker P. Arroyo, Enrique Garcia, Wigberto
Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and
Sanlakas contest the constitutionality of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392.
Section 15 provides:

On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil
Industry through E.O. No. 372.
The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A No. 8180 and
E.O. No. 372.
In G.R. No. 124360, petitioner Francisco S. Tatad seeks the annulment of section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 8180. Section 5(b) provides:
b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this
Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of
three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven
percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for
imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on
imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided,
further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.
The petition is anchored on three arguments:
First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7%
tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against
prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and
will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.
Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil
industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law.
Petitioner avers that the tariff differential between imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products bars the entry of other players in the oil industry because it effectively
protects the interest of oil companies with existing refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the
objective of the law "to foster a truly competitive market."

Sec. 15.Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section 5(e) of

Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far
as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil
and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the implementation of the
full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and
the following laws are deemed repealed:
xxx xxx xxx
E.O. No. 372 states in full, viz.:
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7638, otherwise known as the "Department of Energy
Act of 1992," provides that, at the end of four years from its effectivity last
December 1992, "the Department (of Energy) shall, upon approval of the President,
institute the programs and time table of deregulation of appropriate energy projects
and activities of the energy sector;"
WHEREAS, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the
"Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996," provides that "the DOE shall,
upon approval of the President, implement full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full
deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market
are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable;"
WHEREAS, pursuant to the recommendation of the Department of Energy, there is
an imperative need to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry
because of the following recent developments: (i) depletion of the buffer fund on or

about 7 February 1997 pursuant to the Energy Regulatory Board's Order dated 16
January 1997; (ii) the prices of crude oil had been stable at $21-$23 per barrel since
October 1996 while prices of petroleum products in the world market had been stable
since mid-December of last year. Moreover, crude oil prices are beginning to soften
for the last few days while prices of some petroleum products had already declined;
and (iii) the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar has been stable for
the past twelve (12) months, averaging at around P26.20 to one US dollar;
WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 377 dated 31 October 1996 provides for an
institutional framework for the administration of the deregulated industry by defining
the functions and responsibilities of various government agencies;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8180, the deregulation of the industry will
foster a truly competitive market which can better achieve the social policy
objectives of fair prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean
and high quality petroleum products;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by the powers vested in me by law, do hereby declare the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following
submissions:
First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the
full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not
define when it is practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President the
full deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when the President may consider it
practicable to declare full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific standard
to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining
nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the
alleged depletion of the OPSF fund a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180.
Third, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel
among the three existing oil companies Petron, Caltex and Shell in violation of the

constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair

competition.
Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and
E.O. No. 392. In addition, respondents contend that the issues raised by the petitions are not
justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the law. Respondents further aver that petitioners
have no locus standi as they did not sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the
implementation of R.A. No. 8180.
The petitions were heard by the Court on September 30, 1997. On October 7, 1997, the Court
ordered the private respondents oil companies "to maintain the status quo and to cease and
desist from increasing the prices of gasoline and other petroleum fuel products for a period of
thirty (30) days . . . subject to further orders as conditions may warrant."
We shall now resolve the petitions on the merit. The petitions raise procedural and substantive
issues bearing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. The procedural
issues are: (1) whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy, and (2) whether or
not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and executive
order. The substantive issues are: (1) whether or not section 5 (b) violates the one title one
subject requirement of the Constitution; (2) whether or not the same section violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution; (3) whether or not section 15 violates the constitutional
prohibition on undue delegation of power; (4) whether or not E.O. No. 392 is arbitrary and
unreasonable; and (5) whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
We shall first tackle the procedural issues. Respondents claim that the avalanche of arguments
of the petitioners assail the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180. They aver that deregulation of the
downstream oil industry is a policy decision made by Congress and it cannot be reviewed,
much less be reversed by this Court. In constitutional parlance, respondents contend that the
petitions failed to raise a justiciable controversy.
Respondents' joint stance is unnoteworthy. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the
courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. 12 The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the
inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the
limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only
the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. 13 We
held in the recent case of Tanada v. Angara: 14
xxx xxx xxx

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.
Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional
provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
Even a sideglance at the petitions will reveal that petitioners have raised constitutional issues
which deserve the resolution of this Court in view of their seriousness and their value as
precedents. Our statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that petitioners are
assailing R.A. No. 8180 because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not because the
law lacks wisdom. The principle of separation of power mandates that challenges on the
constitutionality of a law should be resolved in our courts of justice while doubts on the
wisdom of a law should be debated in the halls of Congress. Every now and then, a law may
be denounced in court both as bereft of wisdom and constitutionally infirmed. Such
denunciation will not deny this Court of its jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of the
said law while prudentially refusing to pass on its wisdom.
The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren
ground. In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance
on a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people. 15 In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas,
Inc. v. Tan, 16 we stressed:
xxx xxx xxx
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest
are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the
public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have
not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.
There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far
reaching importance of the validity of RA No. 8180 deregulating our downstream oil industry.
Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical on the standing of petitioners for they
pose issues which are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution.

We shall now track down the substantive issues. In G.R. No. 124360 where petitioner is
Senator Tatad, it is contended that section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates
the provision 17 of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should
be expressed in its title. We do not concur with this contention. As a policy, this Court has
adopted a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule. We have consistently
ruled 18 that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of
a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. 19 We hold that
section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which
is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported
petroleum. 20 We shall, however, return to the validity of this provision when we examine its
blocking effect on new entrants to the oil market.
We shall now slide to the substantive issues in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners assail section 15
of R.A. No. 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry. We restate its pertinent portion for emphasis, viz.:
Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation Pursuant to section 5(e) of Republic
Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as
practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable . . .
Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the
world market" and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent,
unclear and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that they do not provide the "determinate or
determinable standards" which can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the
downstream oil industry. In addition, they contend that E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date
of full deregulation is void for it illegally considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a
factor.
The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this Court.
As early as 1916 inCompania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. The Board of Public Utility
Commissioners, 21 this Court thru, Mr. Justice Moreland, held that "the true distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made." Over the years, as the legal engineering of men's relationship became more

difficult, Congress has to rely more on the practice of delegating the execution of laws to the
executive and other administrative agencies. Two tests have been developed to determine
whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the
power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, 22 thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation
of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do
is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into
the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional
landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in
light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts bend as far back as
possible to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating
legislative powers. Citing Hirabayashi v. United States 23 as authority, Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz states "that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend
over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from
constitutional infirmity." 24
Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on
the ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle
both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress
expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997,
regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is
mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus,
the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given
to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997.
Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President he is to time it as
far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market
are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar isstable.
Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have
been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The
stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words
are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines
"practicable" as meaning possible to practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a

downward direction, and "stable" as meaning firmly established. 25 The fear of petitioners that
these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus
groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general
standards in other cases. 26
It ought to follow that the argument that E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on
indeterminate standards set by R.A. 8180 must likewise fail. If that were all to the attack
against the validity of E.O. No. 392, the issue need not further detain our discourse. But
petitioners further posit the thesis that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it
considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil
industry in February 1997. A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it
only enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of
the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to
the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor
to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the
debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators wanted to impose as a precondition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. 27 We therefore
hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No.
8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The
misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive
department considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and
the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to
hasten full deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A.
8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the
standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the
power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of
powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is
a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the
Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of
the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the
basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the
Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal
consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or
its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation
under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
We now come to grips with the contention that some provisions of R.A. No. 8180 violate
section 19 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are:
(1) Section 5 (b) which states "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and
starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on

imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum
products at the rate of seven percent (7%) except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which
shall be the same as that for imported crude oil. Provided, that beginning on January
1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be
the same. Provided, further, that this provision may be amended only by an Act of
Congress."
(2) Section 6 which states "To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum
crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to
maintain a minimum inventory equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective
annual sales volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower," and
(3) Section 9 (b) which states "To ensure fair competition and prevent cartels and
monopolies in the downstream oil industry, the following acts shall be prohibited:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any
product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so
as to attract customers to the detriment of competitors.
On the other hand, section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the
aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: "The State shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or
unfair competition shall be allowed."
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies,
consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade,
manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a particular
commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the
total sales of a product or service. 28 On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is
an agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the form of a contract, trust,
pool, holding company, or other form of association, for the purpose of unduly restricting
competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its,
production, distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without
statutory authority. 29 Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means while monopoly
refers to the end. 30
Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 28 of the New Civil Code breathe life to
this constitutional policy. Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes monopolization
and
creation
of
combinations
in
restraint
of

trade, 31 while Article 28 of the New Civil Code makes any person who shall engage in unfair
competition liable for damages. 32
Respondents aver that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) implement the policies and objectives of R.A.
No. 8180. They explain that the 4% tariff differential is designed to encourage new entrants to
invest in refineries. They stress that the inventory requirement is meant to guaranty
continuous domestic supply of petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. They also
submit that the prohibition against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective
entrants. Respondents manifested to the Court that new players have entered the Philippines
after deregulation and have now captured 3% 5% of the oil market.
The validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 8180 has to be decided in light of the letter
and spirit of our Constitution, especially section 19, Article XII. Beyond doubt, the
Constitution committed us to the free enterprise system but it is a system impressed with its
own distinctness. Thus, while the Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed,
it did not prohibit per se the operation of monopolies which can, however, be regulated in the
public interest. 33 Thus too, our free enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and
unadulterated competition where the State pursues a strict hands-off policy and follows the
let-the-devil devour the hindmost rule. Combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competitions are absolutely proscribed and the proscription is directed both against the State
as well as the private sector. 34 This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to
achieve the goals of our national economy as defined by section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution which are: more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a
sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit
of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all,
especially the underprivileged. It also calls for the State to protect Filipino enterprises against
unfair competition and trade practices.
Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses
competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint
of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of
unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article
XII of our Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the
observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of anti-trust law is "to assure a competitive
economy, based upon the belief that through competition producers will strive to satisfy
consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition
among producers allows consumers to bid for goods and services, and thus matches their
desires with society's opportunity costs." 35 He adds with appropriateness that there is a
reliance upon "the operation of the 'market' system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be
produced, how resources shall be allocated in the production process, and to whom the
various products will be distributed. The market system relies on the consumer to decide what

and how much shall be produced, and on competition, among producers to determine who
will manufacture it."

new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the market by the three (3)
existing oil companies.

Again, we underline in scarlet that the fundamental principle espoused by section 19, Article
XII of the Constitution is competition for it alone can release the creative forces of the market.
But the competition that can unleash these creative forces is competition that is fighting yet is
fair. Ideally, this kind of competition requires the presence of not one, not just a few but
several players. A market controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of
players (oligopoly) is hardly the market where honest-to-goodness competition will prevail.
Monopolistic or oligopolistic markets deserve our careful scrutiny and laws which barricade
the entry points of new players in the market should be viewed with suspicion.

Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as ". . . selling or
offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to
attract customers to the detriment of competitors." Respondents contend that this provision
works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on predatory
pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by
R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether
predatory pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is encouraged by the provisions
in
the
law
blocking
the
entry
of
new
players.
Text-writer
Hovenkamp, 36 gives the authoritative answer and we quote:

Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we shall proceed to examine whether the
provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential, inventory reserves, and predatory prices
imposed substantial barriers to the entry and exit of new players in our downstream oil
industry. If they do, they have to be struck down for they will necessarily inhibit the formation
of a truly competitive market. Contrariwise, if they are insignificant impediments, they need
not be stricken down.
In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and
controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the
only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league.
As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various
capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is
only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their
competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to
equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will
have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them
will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be
competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable
because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse.
The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with
heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex,
competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex
against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the
inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities.
Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will
entail a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory
can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points of

xxx xxx xxx

The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a
firm monopoly profits in the future. The monopoly profits will never materialize,
however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the successful
predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the
market contains significant barriers to new entry.
As aforediscsussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant
barriers which discourage new players to enter the market. Considering these significant
barriers established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of
PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory
pricing and succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners' charge that this provision on predatory
pricing is anti-competitive is not without reason.
Respondents belittle these barriers with the allegation that new players have entered the
market since deregulation. A scrutiny of the list of the alleged new players will, however,
reveal that not one belongs to the class and category of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX.
Indeed, there is no showing that any of these new players intends to install any refinery and
effectively compete with these dominant oil companies. In any event, it cannot be gainsaid
that the new players could have been more in number and more impressive in might if the
illegal entry barriers in R.A. No. 8180 were not erected.
We come to the final point. We now resolve the total effect of the untimely deregulation, the
imposition of 4% tariff differential on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products, the
requirement of inventory and the prohibition on predatory pricing on the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 8180. The question is whether these offending provisions can be individually struck
down without invalidating the entire R.A. No. 8180. The ruling case law is well stated by
author Agpalo, 37 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute
creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than
complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would
have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the
other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which
carries out the legislative intent. . . .
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually
dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them
as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the
statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature
intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one
part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions
thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.
R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any reason, any
section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not affected
thereby shall remain in full force and effect." This separability clause notwithstanding, we
hold that the offending provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law
has to be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing
are among the principal props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the
downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent,
these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition,
encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces. R.A.
No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for these
vouchsafing provisions cannot be overstated. Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and
CALTEX had no real competitors but did not have a free run of the market because
government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After
deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real competition yet
are no longer subject to control by government with respect to their pricing and non-pricing
decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated market where competition can be
corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies.
The fall out effects of the defects of R.A. No. 8180 on our people have not escaped Congress.
A lot of our leading legislators have come out openly with bills seeking the repeal of these
odious and offensive provisions in R.A. No. 8180. In the Senate, Senator Freddie Webb has

filed S.B. No. 2133 which is the result of the hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on
Energy. The hearings revealed that (1) there was a need to level the playing field for the new
entrants in the downstream oil industry, and (2) there was no law punishing a person for
selling petroleum products at unreasonable prices. Senator Alberto G. Romulo also filed S.B.
No. 2209 abolishing the tariff differential beginning January 1, 1998. He declared that the
amendment ". . . would mean that instead of just three (3) big oil companies there will be
other major oil companies to provide more competitive prices for the market and the
consuming public." Senator Heherson T . Alvarez, one of the principal proponents of R.A.
No. 8180, also filed S.B. No. 2290 increasing the penalty for violation of its section 9. It is his
opinion as expressed in the explanatory note of the bill that the present oil companies are
engaged in cartelization despite R.A. No. 8180, viz,:
xxx xxx xxx
Since the downstream oil industry was fully deregulated in February 1997, there
have been eight (8) fuel price adjustments made by the three oil majors, namely:
Caltex Philippines, Inc.; Petron Corporation; and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation. Very noticeable in the price adjustments made, however, is the
uniformity in the pump prices of practically all petroleum products of the three oil
companies. This, despite the fact, that their selling rates should be determined by a
combination of any of the following factors: the prevailing peso-dollar exchange rate
at the time payment is made for crude purchases, sources of crude, and inventory
levels of both crude and refined petroleum products. The abovestated factors should
have resulted in different, rather than identical prices.
The fact that the three (3) oil companies' petroleum products are uniformly priced
suggests collusion, amounting to cartelization, among Caltex Philippines, Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation to fix the prices of
petroleum products in violation of paragraph (a), Section 9 of R.A. No. 8180.
To deter this pernicious practice and to assure that present and prospective players in
the downstream oil industry conduct their business with conscience and propriety,
cartel-like activities ought to be severely penalized.
Senator Francisco S. Tatad also filed S.B. No. 2307 providing for a uniform tariff rate on
imported crude oil and refined petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, he
declared in no uncertain terms that ". . . the present set-up has raised serious public concern
over the way the three oil companies have uniformly adjusted the prices of oil in the
country, an indication of a possible existence of a cartel or a cartel-like situation within the
downstream oil industry. This situation is mostly attributed to the foregoing provision on
tariff differential, which has effectively discouraged the entry of new players in the
downstream oil industry."

In the House of Representatives, the moves to rehabilitate R.A. No. 8180 are equally
feverish. Representative Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura has filed H.B. No. 9826 removing the
tariff differential for imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products. In the
explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Buenaventura explained:
xxx xxx xxx
As we now experience, this difference in tariff rates between imported crude oil and
imported refined petroleum products, unwittingly provided a built-in-advantage for
the three existing oil refineries in the country and eliminating competition which is a
must in a free enterprise economy. Moreover, it created a disincentive for other
players to engage even initially in the importation and distribution of refined
petroleum products and ultimately in the putting up of refineries. This tariff
differential virtually created a monopoly of the downstream oil industry by the
existing three oil companies as shown by their uniform and capricious pricing of
their products since this law took effect, to the great disadvantage of the consuming
public.
Thus, instead of achieving the desired effects of deregulation, that of free enterprise
and a level playing field in the downstream oil industry, R.A. 8180 has created an
environment conducive to cartelization, unfavorable, increased, unrealistic prices of
petroleum products in the country by the three existing refineries.
Representative Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr., filed H.B. No. 9981 to prevent collusion among the
present oil companies by strengthening the oversight function of the government, particularly
its ability to subject to a review any adjustment in the prices of gasoline and other petroleum
products. In the explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Punzalan, Jr., said:
xxx xxx xxx
To avoid this, the proposed bill seeks to strengthen the oversight function of
government, particularly its ability to review the prices set for gasoline and other
petroleum products. It grants the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) the authority to
review prices of oil and other petroleum products, as may be petitioned by a person,
group or any entity, and to subsequently compel any entity in the industry to submit
any and all documents relevant to the imposition of new prices. In cases where the
Board determines that there exist collusion, economic conspiracy, unfair trade
practice, profiteering and/or overpricing, it may take any step necessary to protect
the public, including the readjustment of the prices of petroleum products. Further,
the Board may also impose the fine and penalty of imprisonment, as prescribed in
Section 9 of R.A. 8180, on any person or entity from the oil industry who is found
guilty of such prohibited acts.

By doing all of the above, the measure will effectively provide Filipino consumers
with a venue where their grievances can be heard and immediately acted upon by
government.
Thus, this bill stands to benefit the Filipino consumer by making the price-setting
process more transparent and making it easier to prosecute those who perpetrate such
prohibited acts as collusion, overpricing, economic conspiracy and unfair trade.
Representative Sergio A.F . Apostol filed H.B. No. 10039 to remedy an omission in R.A. No.
8180 where there is no agency in government that determines what is "reasonable" increase in
the prices of oil products. Representative Dente O. Tinga, one of the principal sponsors of
R.A. No. 8180, filed H.B. No. 10057 to strengthen its anti-trust provisions. He elucidated in
its explanatory note:
xxx xxx xxx
The definition of predatory pricing, however, needs to be tightened up particularly
with respect to the definitive benchmark price and the specific anti-competitive
intent. The definition in the bill at hand which was taken from the Areeda-Turner test
in the United States on predatory pricing resolves the questions. The definition reads,
"Predatory pricing means selling or offering to sell any oil product at a price below
the average variable cost for the purpose of destroying competition, eliminating a
competitor or discouraging a competitor from entering the market."
The appropriate actions which may be resorted to under the Rules of Court in
conjunction with the oil deregulation law are adequate. But to stress their availability
and dynamism, it is a good move to incorporate all the remedies in the law itself.
Thus, the present bill formalizes the concept of government intervention and private
suits to address the problem of antitrust violations. Specifically, the government may
file an action to prevent or restrain any act of cartelization or predatory pricing, and
if it has suffered any loss or damage by reason of the antitrust violation it may
recover damages. Likewise, a private person or entity may sue to prevent or restrain
any such violation which will result in damage to his business or property, and if he
has already suffered damage he shall recover treble damages. A class suit may also
be allowed.
To make the DOE Secretary more effective in the enforcement of the law, he shall be
given additional powers to gather information and to require reports.
Representative Erasmo B. Damasing filed H.B. No. 7885 and has a more unforgiving view of
R.A. No. 8180. He wants it completely repealed. He explained:

xxx xxx xxx

Contrary to the projections at the time the bill on the Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation was discussed and debated upon in the plenary session prior to its
approval into law, there aren't any new players or investors in the oil industry. Thus,
resulting in practically a cartel or monopoly in the oil industry by the three (3) big oil
companies, Caltex, Shell and Petron. So much so, that with the deregulation now
being partially implemented, the said oil companies have succeeded in increasing the
prices of most of their petroleum products with little or no interference at all from the
government. In the month of August, there was an increase of Fifty centavos (50)
per liter by subsidizing the same with the OPSF, this is only temporary as in March
1997, or a few months from now, there will be full deregulation (Phase II) whereby
the increase in the prices of petroleum products will be fully absorbed by the
consumers since OPSF will already be abolished by then. Certainly, this would make
the lives of our people, especially the unemployed ones, doubly difficult and
unbearable.
The much ballyhooed coming in of new players in the oil industry is quite remote
considering that these prospective investors cannot fight the existing and well
established oil companies in the country today, namely, Caltex, Shell and Petron.
Even if these new players will come in, they will still have no chance to compete
with the said three (3) existing big oil companies considering that there is an
imposition of oil tariff differential of 4% between importation of crude oil by the said
oil refineries paying only 3% tariff rate for the said importation and 7% tariff rate to
be paid by businessmen who have no oil refineries in the Philippines but will import
finished petroleum/oil products which is being taxed with 7% tariff rates.
So, if only to help the many who are poor from further suffering as a result of
unmitigated increase in oil products due to deregulation, it is a must that the
Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996, or R.A.8180 be repealed
completely.
Various resolutions have also been filed in the Senate calling for an immediate and
comprehensive review of R.A. No. 8180 to prevent the downpour of its ill effects on the
people. Thus, S. Res. No. 574 was filed by Senator Gloria M. Macapagal entitled Resolution
"Directing the Committee on Energy to Inquire Into The Proper Implementation of the
Deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry and Oil Tax Restructuring As Mandated Under
R.A. Nos. 8180 and 8184, In Order to Make The Necessary Corrections In the Apparent
Misinterpretation Of The Intent And Provision Of The Laws And Curb The Rising Tide Of
Disenchantment Among The Filipino Consumers And Bring About The Real Intentions And
Benefits Of The Said Law." Senator Blas P. Ople filed S. Res. No. 664 entitled resolution
"Directing the Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry In Aid Of Legislation To Review

The Government's Oil Deregulation Policy In Light Of The Successive Increases In

Transportation, Electricity And Power Rates, As well As Of Food And Other Prime
Commodities And Recommend Appropriate Amendments To Protect The Consuming Public."
Senator Ople observed:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, since the passage of R.A. No. 8180, the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) has imposed successive increases in oil prices which has triggered increases
in electricity and power rates, transportation fares, as well as in prices of food and
other prime commodities to the detriment of our people, particularly the poor;
WHEREAS, the new players that were expected to compete with the oil cartel-Shell,
Caltex and Petron-have not come in;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that a review of the oil deregulation policy be made to
consider appropriate amendments to the existing law such as an extension of the
transition phase before full deregulation in order to give the competitive market
enough time to develop;
WHEREAS, the review can include the advisability of providing some incentives in
order to attract the entry of new oil companies to effect a dynamic competitive
market;
WHEREAS, it may also be necessary to defer the setting up of the institutional
framework for full deregulation of the oil industry as mandated under Executive
Order No. 377 issued by President Ramos last October 31, 1996 . . .
Senator Alberto G. Romulo filed S. Res. No. 769 entitled resolution "Directing the
Committees on Energy and Public Services In Aid Of Legislation To Assess The Immediate
Medium And Long Term Impact of Oil Deregulation On Oil Prices And The Economy."
Among the reasons for the resolution is the finding that "the requirement of a 40-day stock
inventory effectively limits the entry of other oil firms in the market with the consequence that
instead of going down oil prices will rise."
Parallel resolutions have been filed in the House of Representatives. Representative Dante
O. Tinga filed H. Res. No. 1311 "Directing The Committee on Energy To Conduct An Inquiry,
In Aid of Legislation, Into The Pricing Policies And Decisions Of The Oil Companies Since
The Implementation of Full Deregulation Under the Oil Deregulation Act (R.A. No. 8180)
For the Purpose of Determining In the Context Of The Oversight Functions Of Congress
Whether The Conduct Of The Oil Companies, Whether Singly Or Collectively, Constitutes

Cartelization Which Is A Prohibited Act Under R.A. No. 8180, And What Measures Should
Be Taken To Help Ensure The Successful Implementation Of The Law In Accordance With Its
Letter And Spirit, Including Recommending Criminal Prosecution Of the Officers Concerned
Of the Oil Companies If Warranted By The Evidence, And For Other
Purposes." Representatives Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr. Dante O. Tinga and Antonio E. Bengzon
III filed H.R. No. 894 directing the House Committee on Energy to inquire into the proper
implementation of the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. House Resolution No.
1013 was also filed by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Enrique T . Garcia, Jr. and Joker
P. Arroyo urging the President to immediately suspend the implementation of E.O. No. 392.
In recent memory there is no law enacted by the legislature afflicted with so much
constitutional deformities as R.A. No. 8180. Yet, R.A. No. 8180 deals with oil, a commodity
whose supply and price affect the ebb and flow of the lifeblood of the nation. Its shortage of
supply or a slight, upward spiral in its price shakes our economic foundation. Studies show
that the areas most impacted by the movement of oil are food manufacture, land transport,
trade, electricity and water. 38 At a time when our economy is in a dangerous downspin, the
perpetuation of R.A. No. 8180 threatens to multiply the number of our people with bent backs
and begging bowls. R.A. No. 8180 with its anti-competition provisions cannot be allowed by
this Court to stand even while Congress is working to remedy its defects.
The Court, however, takes note of the plea of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX to lift our
restraining order to enable them to adjust upward the price of petroleum and petroleum
products in view of the plummeting value of the peso. Their plea, however, will now have to
be addressed to the Energy Regulatory Board as the effect of the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 is to revive the former laws it repealed. 39 The length of
our return to the regime of regulation depends on Congress which can fasttrack the writing of
a new law on oil deregulation in accord with the Constitution.
With this Decision, some circles will chide the Court for interfering with an economic
decision of Congress. Such criticism is charmless for the Court is annulling R.A. No. 8180
not because it disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by
Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution. The right call therefor should
be for Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms with the Constitution and
not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the Constitution.
Striking down R.A. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to the oil oligopolists. But
the loss in tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not quantifiable in pesos and
centavos. More worthy of protection than the supra-normal profits of private corporations is
the sanctity of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. Indeed when confronted by a
law violating the Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down dead. Lest it is
missed, the Constitution is a covenant that grants and guarantees both the political
and economic rights of the people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian
not only of the people's political rights but their economic rights as well. The protection of the

economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater importance to them for they are
concerned more with the exoterics of living and less with the esoterics of liberty. Hence, for
as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court be vigilant in upholding the
economic rights of our people especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of
the people's economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional
and E.O. No. 372 void.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., concurs in the result.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

LEGISLTAIVE DEPARTMENT
Case No. 1
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 177597

July 16, 2008

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178628
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These consolidated petitions1 seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative
district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.2
The Facts

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the
Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight
municipalities.3 Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by
Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054). 4 Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part
of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII,
having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.

Later, three new municipalities6 were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what
was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district.
Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the
Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29
October 2006.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its
power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, 5 enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA
Act 201 provides:

On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No.
3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201.

Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog,
Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of
Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby
created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6
March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in
the First Legislative District of Maguindanao." Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the
recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27
February 2007,7 provides in pertinent parts:

xxxx
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the
Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to
serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where they are residents:
Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence
of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial
officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the
time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors
shall have been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they
shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act
until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that
there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of the mother province.
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes
Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law
by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in
the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29
March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is
composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.8
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions,
amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as "Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City)."91avvphi1
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for
Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in
Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution 10 and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. 11 Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC

acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained
the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier
directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of
Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.12 Sema further claimed that in issuing
Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion
legislative districts.

statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation

of the Constitution, without a reapportionment"; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No.
7160 (RA 7160) "affirms" the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the
creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate the apportionment
of a legislative district in newly created provinces.

In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose not
to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ
of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the
same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for
the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent
Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the
legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.

(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier
stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined
causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is
"self-executing." Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
even in the absence of a national law; and

In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March
2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan
including Cotabato City." Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or
reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first
legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not
reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component
unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to
mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section
5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city.13
Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents Comments
and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902.
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to
comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new
province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the
Court in Felwa v. Salas14stated that "when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that

(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following
grounds: (a) the "province" contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the
provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA
9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures
relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative
districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative
district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the
disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the
Regional Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in
Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than
250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments on
the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the
affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to
one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such new province.15
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No. 177597
filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments. 16 On the question
of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597
adopted the following positions:

(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a
valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under
Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions,
through their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may be
authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region" and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160. 17 However, Sema
concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the
ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to "prescribe standards lower than those
mandated" in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution.18 Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 "should be construed as
prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not
comply with the minimum criteria" under RA 7160.19
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not
among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in
Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen
(thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance
with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI
of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section
6,20 Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was withheld
from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen
reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance with the
Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its
position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional.
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral arguments on
27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No.
178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's
contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the

voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its Comment to

the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress
of the "appropriate law."
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to
test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R.
No. 177597.
(B) On the merits
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such
province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of
Maguindanao (as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]"), despite the creation of the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.

Main
Regional

Issues
Assembly

The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:

On the Preliminary Matters

The
Writ
of
to
Test
the
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations

Prohibition

is
Constitutionality

Appropriate
of

The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by "any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions." 21 On the other hand, the writ
of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform
an act "which the law specifically enjoins as a duty." 22True, the COMELEC did not issue
Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 23Nor is there a
law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast in
Cotabato City for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." These,
however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because
Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this
writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations. 24
Respondent
Does Not Moot the Petition

On
the
Whether
the
ARMM
Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan

Dilangalens

Proclamation

There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the
14 May 2007 elections for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City"
mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it
involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the
constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the
outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato
City for representative of the district of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" will
be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason
for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in
these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other
succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not
conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction, 25 subject to compliance with the criteria established
in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress"
can create provinces, cities or municipalities.261avvphi1
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the
ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the
power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by
the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. 27 In the present case, the question arises
whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10,

Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is
another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall
be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x."

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,

compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also
be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a
population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even
the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a
legislative district because once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically
becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province
or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a
law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers
Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts
necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress
exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that
regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created,
only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,29 we held that the
"power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to
make laws," and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly
delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is,
can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion

legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be
anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts
for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior
legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.

Legislative
Districts
Only by an Act of Congress

are

Created

or

Reapportioned

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past 28 Constitutions, the power to increase the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative
districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxxx

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section. (Emphasis supplied)

The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly
under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative
districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus,
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions,
expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act,
provides, "The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the
following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x." Since the ARMM Regional
Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create
a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress
enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the "next
national elections" from the effectivity of the law.30
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and
its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.31 It would be
incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a
national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a
district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out
of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every
local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively,
and it can never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative
powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys
legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x."

The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the
exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining
from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides
that:
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes
Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that "each province shall have at least one representative." Thus, the
creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be
entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards
set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where
the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be
made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29
October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives in the
14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement
in Felwa that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district
comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise
nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment."
The contention has no merit.

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695),
creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and
providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional
for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the
Constitution." The Court answered in the negative, thus:
The Constitution ordains:
"The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty
Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least
one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the
return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been
made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by
law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present
Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as practicable,
contiguous and compact territory."
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly,
through the creation of a province for "each province shall have at least one
member" in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several
representative districts within a province. The requirements concerning the apportionment
of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation
of representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces,
under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision
above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that
which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute
which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the
Constitution, without a reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under
which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed
the maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the
effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created
or subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative
districts, without complying with the aforementioned requirements.32 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created
legislative districts "indirectly" through a special law enacted by Congress creating a
province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the
maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does
not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by anational
law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional
law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate
alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress
power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a
province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because
the Constitution provides that "each province shall have at least one representative" in the
House of Representatives. This does not detract from the constitutional principle that the
power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any
other legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative
body to create a province such legislative body must have the power to create legislative
districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by
operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the
creation of, a legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff
Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first
legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative
district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849.
To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao
will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that "[E]ach city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one
representative."
Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of
Representatives. Under Section 19,33 Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly
can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed
in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum
contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. 34 The
following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or
more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the

House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the

Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise);
(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one
representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the
ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)
(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least
250,000; and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the
House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous
creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.

Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there
may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000) [population], x x x, and they will each
have one representative x x x to Congress without any national law, is that what you are
saying?
Atty. Vistan II:
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.
xxxx
Justice Carpio:

The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597
highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
provinces:

So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand (1000)
representatives to the House of Representatives without a national law[,] that is legally
possible, correct?

Justice Carpio:

Atty. Vistan II:

So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and pack Congress
with their own representatives [?]

Yes, Your Honor.36 (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Vistan II:35

Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.
Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x provinces x x x and,
therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House of Representatives
without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you are saying? That can be done, under your
theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.
Justice Carpio:

Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on
regional autonomy,37 nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these
disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government
under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot
be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM
Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the
regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny
province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member," refers to a province created by Congress itself through a
national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of
the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the
present 14th Congress, there are 219 38 district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats
in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total
membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every
election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for
district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there

is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even
before Congress can create new provinces.

merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution,
as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution.
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of
regional assemblies are limited "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x." The Preamble of the ARMM
Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established "within the
framework of the Constitution." This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which
mandates that the ARMM "shall be created x x x within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic
of the Philippines."

WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054

UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we
declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves
also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established
in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because
the creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative
districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to
Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities
because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of
Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only
within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus,
we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and
legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it

Case No. 2

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D.
GABRIEL,
and
ROBERTO
R.
TOBIAS,
JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM
MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.

Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own
legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next
national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former
legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new
legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at
the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes
the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution,
to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No.
7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The
people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675.
The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621
voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed
ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article
VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of
the Constitution.

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the
latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of
R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a
subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not
been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the
Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party
list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standard provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional
districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of
the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to
any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the
right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than
two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section
5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a
separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII,
Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably
adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v.
Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed
in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It

should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated
in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title
of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation"
(emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there
is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had
each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into
two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No.
7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not
required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered
by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article
VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the
latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself
so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate
legislative
districts,
the
assailed
Section
49
of
R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress
to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners

overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and
enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt
itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further
arguments against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The
contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly
excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of
neighboring Mandaluyong.

Case No. 3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in
"gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular
candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General,
it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent
representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both
localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been
diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO
MARIANO,
JR.
et
al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON.
JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN
OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN
R.
OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON.
JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional.R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act

Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie
Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba,
and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are
residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in
relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8,
Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

We find no merit in the petitions.

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati,
thus:
Sec. 2.The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be
converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory
of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it
has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the
City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay
and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the
appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases
involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati
and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied)

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by
special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional
provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within three (3) years following the
return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in
the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and
concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the
same grounds as aforestated.

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the
Local Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be
made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions. 2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is
the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a
local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about
by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that
the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or

multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2
stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of
the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between
the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of
a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by
making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if
they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using
the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable
difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the
existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them
subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we
are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the
submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is
beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial
jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by
meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" was made in order to
provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably
ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was
meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is
not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may
be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with
neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that
the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must
contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in
Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in
the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the
very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The

manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to

give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more
responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving
as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the
mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would
serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of
the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not
be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the
true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil.,
141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA
1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for
purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must
indubitably apply to the case at bar.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A.
No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51.Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of
the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of
Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a
new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already
qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a
new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City
shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall
be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of
the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary

renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.

or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an
actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not
also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a
term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of
the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving
for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall
acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the
present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by
them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor,
respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further
argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming
elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year
consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would
not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted
to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements
before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to
the determination of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek reelection for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may

Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52,
Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52.Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highlyurbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative
districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts
created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by
the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to
be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes,
Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay
Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis
supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for:
(1) reapportionment 6cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is
not expressed in the title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census,
stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we
ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as
in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law.
As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership
by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was
done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a
general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a
particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population
of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional
legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the
same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal
construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with
Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general
subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:
Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and the movantsintervenors motions for reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Courts December 1, 2009
Decision (Decision).1
The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,2 Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code3 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, 4mainly on the ground that they
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The
assailed Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging
the powers, prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the
political arena.
In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and
movants-intervenors submit the following arguments:
(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional
proscription against the participation of public appointive officials and members of
the military in partisan political activity;

SO ORDERED.

(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they
accord differential treatment to elective and appointive officials, because such
differential treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions and is germane to
the purposes of the law;

Case No. 4
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and

EN BANC
G.R. No. 189698

(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and
interest demand such reversal.

February 22, 2010

We find the foregoing arguments meritorious.

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

A.

TOLENTINO,

JR., Petitioners,
I.

Procedural Issues
First, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELECs motion for
reconsideration which was filed on December 15, 2009, as well as the propriety of the
motions for reconsideration-in-intervention which were filed after the Court had rendered its
December 1, 2009 Decision.
i. Timeliness of COMELECs Motion for Reconsideration
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court, 5 in relation to Section 1, Rule 52
of the same rules,6COMELEC had a period of fifteen days from receipt of notice of the
assailed Decision within which to move for its reconsideration. COMELEC received notice of
the assailed Decision on December 2, 2009, hence, had until December 17, 2009 to file a
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on December
14, 2009. The corresponding Affidavit of Service (in substitution of the one originally
submitted on December 14, 2009) was subsequently filed on December 17, 2009 still within
the reglementary period.
ii. Propriety of the Motions for Reconsideration-in-Intervention
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.
Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for intervention shall be
entertained when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor shows that
he has a substantial right or interest in the case; and (2) such right or interest cannot be
adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding.7
Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within which
a motion for intervention may be filed, viz.:

SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion for intervention may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be
attached to the motion and served on the original parties. (italics supplied)
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period
prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have
also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to
be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, 8 when the petition for
review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme
Court,9 and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. 10 In Lim v.
Pacquing,11 the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed
by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive
issues raised by the parties.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court12 after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.13 We stress again
that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers
of the court fully and completely available for justice. 14 Its purpose is not to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.15
We rule that, with the exception of the IBP Cebu City Chapter, all the movants-intervenors
may properly intervene in the case at bar.
First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a substantial right or interest
in the case.
As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge the December
1, 2009 Decision, which nullifies a long established law; as a voter, he has a right to intervene
in a matter that involves the electoral process; and as a public officer, he has a personal
interest in maintaining the trust and confidence of the public in its system of government.
On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are candidates in
the May 2010 elections running against appointive officials who, in view of the December 1,
2009 Decision, have not yet resigned from their posts and are not likely to resign from their
posts. They stand to be directly injured by the assailed Decision, unless it is reversed.
Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be adequately pursued
and protected in another proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be foreclosed if this Courts
Decision attains finality and forms part of the laws of the land.

With regard to the IBP Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the assertion that "this
case involves the constitutionality of elections laws for this coming 2010 National Elections,"
and that "there is a need for it to be allowed to intervene xxx so that the voice of its members
in the legal profession would also be heard before this Highest Tribunal as it resolves issues of
transcendental importance."16
Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City Chapter has
failed to present a specific and substantial interest sufficient to clothe it with standing to
intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked interest is, in character, too indistinguishable to justify
its intervention.
We now turn to the substantive issues.
II.

III.
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the
law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The assailed Decision struck down Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, on the following grounds:

Incumbent Elected Official. Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the
Fair Election Act,17which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code 18 and rendered
ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned
only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are
running,19 an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an
elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.

(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding
elective positions;

These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign.

(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants
holding appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to whether or not they occupy
high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they limit these civil servants
activity regardless of whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or whether
they be in the national, municipal or barangay level; and

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political campaigns is unmistakable. The exchange between
Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Foz during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission is instructive:

Substantive Issues

MS. QUESADA.
(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental
right of these public appointive officials.
We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678,
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional, and accordingly reverse our December 1,
2009 Decision.

xxxx
Secondly, I would like to address the issue here as provided in Section 1 (4), line 12, and I
quote: "No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
partisan political activity." This is almost the same provision as in the 1973 Constitution.
However, we in the government service have actually experienced how this provision has

been violated by the direct or indirect partisan political activities of many government
officials.
So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would make this provision more
strict, and which would deter its violation?
MR. FOZ. Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and the implementing rules on
the matter are more than exhaustive enough to really prevent officers and employees in the
public service from engaging in any form of partisan political activity. But the problem really
lies in implementation because, if the head of a ministry, and even the superior officers of
offices and agencies of government will themselves violate the constitutional injunction
against partisan political activity, then no string of words that we may add to what is now here
in this draft will really implement the constitutional intent against partisan political activity. x
x x20 (italics supplied)
To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers and employees is
presently reflected and implemented by a number of statutes. Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7
and Section 55, Chapter 8 both of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 respectively provide in relevant part:
Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:

whom he supports: Provided, That public officers and employees holding political offices
may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit
contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving subordinates
prohibited in the Election Code.
Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further makes
intervention by civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities an election
offense, viz.:
SECTION 261.Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxxx
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in the civil
service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay
self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be
organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any
partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of
civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be mistaken.

xxxx
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxxx
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding a nonpolitical office.
xxxx
Section 55.Political Activity. No officer or employee in the Civil Service including
members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political
activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or
influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein provided
shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views on current
political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of his candidates for public office

But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply
only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does
not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that "[t]he civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." 21 This is because
elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities
almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period. 22 Political partisanship is the
inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included.23
The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to vote, as
well as express their views on political issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for
public office whom they support. This is crystal clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, viz.:
MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is on page 2, Section 1,
subparagraph 4, lines 13 and 14. On line 13, between the words "any" and "partisan," add the

phrase ELECTIONEERING AND OTHER; and on line 14, delete the word "activity" and in
lieu thereof substitute the word CAMPAIGN.

In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned provisions
challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution in Farias,
et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.25

May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Aquino may proceed.
MS. AQUINO: The draft as presented by the Committee deleted the phrase "except to vote"
which was adopted in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The phrase "except to vote" was
not intended as a guarantee to the right to vote but as a qualification of the general prohibition
against taking part in elections.
Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided for as an exception to this
prohibition, it will amount to disenfranchisement. We know that suffrage, although plenary, is
not an unconditional right. In other words, the Legislature can always pass a statute which can
withhold from any class the right to vote in an election, if public interest so required. I would
only like to reinstate the qualification by specifying the prohibited acts so that those who may
want to vote but who are likewise prohibited from participating in partisan political
campaigns or electioneering may vote.
MR. FOZ: There is really no quarrel over this point, but please understand that there was no
intention on the part of the Committee to disenfranchise any government official or employee.
The elimination of the last clause of this provision was precisely intended to protect the
members of the civil service in the sense that they are not being deprived of the freedom of
expression in a political contest. The last phrase or clause might have given the impression
that a government employee or worker has no right whatsoever in an election campaign
except to vote, which is not the case. They are still free to express their views although the
intention is not really to allow them to take part actively in a political campaign. 24
IV.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause
We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
i. Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling

In Farias, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections
66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among others, that it
unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the
deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of the Omnibus Election Code,
elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned from their respective offices
upon their filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed,
the limitation on appointive officials continues to be operative they are deemed resigned
when they file their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners in Farias thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section 14, with
the end in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions "apply equally" to both elected and
appointive officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is
a reasonable classification, as there are material and significant distinctions between the two
classes of officials. Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in
relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, failed muster. We ruled:
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive
ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The
Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On
the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by
an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in
the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take
(sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or
officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in
political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to
the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any
position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to
pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the
persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection
clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.26
The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our assailed
Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case
has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should
be decided in the same manner.27 This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for
securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin
Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the
opposite way between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect
the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite
principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for

the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of
resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my
rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are
to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.28
Our Farias ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned provisions
cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an adjudication on any
point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum.29 This rule
applies to all pertinent questions that are presented and resolved in the regular course of the
consideration of the case and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to the
matter on which the decision is predicated. 30 For that reason, a point expressly decided does
not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been,
made on some other ground; or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result
reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than
it did.31 As we held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al.:32
A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely
because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another
question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been
disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or
more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court
actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point
decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one
point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and
more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make statements of
the court regarding other propositions dicta.33 (italics supplied)
ii. Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law
The Farias ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if
reexamined.
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws
to all persons or things without distinction.34 What it simply requires is equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification. 35 The test developed by jurisprudence here
and yonder is that of reasonableness,36 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.37
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the
first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious
conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is
not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an
elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain," viz.:
For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could
wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet
post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national
housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With
the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them
differently when both file their [Certificates of Candidacy] for the elections. Under the present
state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President,
retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his
office to support his campaign.38
Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to remedy an
injustice, the Legislature need not address every manifestation of the evil at once; it may
proceed "one step at a time."39 In addressing a societal concern, it must invariably draw lines
and make choices, thereby creating some inequity as to those included or
excluded.40 Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds of reasonable choice" are not exceeded, the
courts must defer to the legislative judgment. 41 We may not strike down a law merely because
the legislative aim would have been more fully achieved by expanding the class. 42 Stated
differently, the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is underinclusive will not render
it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious.43 There is no constitutional requirement that
regulation must reach each and every class to which it might be applied; 44 that the Legislature
must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the
law creates a classification that is "palpably arbitrary or capricious." 45 He must refute all
possible rational bases for the differing treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those
bases as reasons for the enactment,46 such that the constitutionality of the law must be
sustained even if the reasonableness of the classification is "fairly debatable." 47 In the case at

bar, the petitioners failed and in fact did not even attempt to discharge this heavy burden.
Our assailed Decision was likewise silent as a sphinx on this point even while we submitted
the following thesis:
... [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that the statutes distinction is
unfair, underinclusive, unwise, or not the best solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather,
we must find that there is no reasonably rational reason for the differing treatment.48
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the
operation of the deemed resigned provisions? I submit that there is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the
sovereign power of the people. 49 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote.50 Considering that elected officials are put in office by their
constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the
ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign
will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be
served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast,
there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the
purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and
discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will.51 (emphasis in the original)
In fine, the assailed Decision would have us "equalize the playing field" by invalidating
provisions of law that seek to restrain the evils from running riot. Under the pretext of equal
protection, it would favor a situation in which the evils are unconfined and vagrant, existing at
the behest of both appointive and elected officials, over another in which a significant portion
thereof is contained. The absurdity of that position is self-evident, to say the least.
The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that
elected officials (vis--vis appointive officials) have greater political clout over the electorate,
is indeed a matter worth exploring but not by this Court. Suffice it to say that the remedy
lies with the Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the authority, under our
constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make policy choices
responsive to the exigencies of the times. It is certainly within the Legislatures power to
make the deemed-resigned provisions applicable to elected officials, should it later decide that

the evils sought to be prevented are of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt the balance in
favor of expanding the class. This Court cannot and should not arrogate unto itself the power
to ascertain and impose on the people the best state of affairs from a public policy standpoint.
iii. Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled
Finding no Philippine jurisprudence to prop up its equal protection ruling, our assailed
Decision adverted to, and extensively cited, Mancuso v. Taft.52 This was a decision of the First
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals promulgated in March 1973, which struck down
as unconstitutional a similar statutory provision. Pathetically, our assailed Decision, relying
on Mancuso, claimed:
(1) The right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental
freedoms freedom of expression and association;
(2) Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental right
must be subjected to strict equal protection review; and
(3) While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and
impartiality of its public work force, the deemed-resigned provisions pursue their
objective in a far too heavy-handed manner as to render them unconstitutional.
It then concluded with the exhortation that since "the Americans, from whom we copied the
provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being
unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit."
Our assailed Decisions reliance on Mancuso is completely misplaced. We cannot blink away
the fact that the United States Supreme Court effectively overruled Mancuso three months
after its promulgation by the United States Court of Appeals. In United States Civil Service
Commission, et al. v. National Association of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, et al. 53 and Broadrick,
et al. v. State of Oklahoma, et al., 54 the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue
of whether statutory provisions prohibiting federal 55 and state56 employees from taking an
active part in political management or in political campaigns were unconstitutional as to
warrant facial invalidation. Violation of these provisions results in dismissal from
employment and possible criminal sanctions.
The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection clause. It held that (i)
in regulating the speech of its employees, the state as employer has interests that differ
significantly from those it possesses in regulating the speech of the citizenry in general; (ii)

the courts must therefore balance the legitimate interest of employee free expression against
the interests of the employer in promoting efficiency of public services; (iii) if the employees
expression interferes with the maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning services, the
limitation on speech is not unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some
flexibility or latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be covered by any statutory
restrictions.57 Therefore, insofar as government employees are concerned, the correct standard
of review is an interest-balancing approach, a means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness
of fit between the governmental interests and the prohibitions in question.58
Letter Carriers elucidated on these principles, as follows:
Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to have been
that partisan political activities by federal employees must be limited if the Government is to
operate effectively and fairly, elections are to play their proper part in representative
government, and employees themselves are to be sufficiently free from improper influences.
The restrictions so far imposed on federal employees are not aimed at particular parties,
groups, or points of view, but apply equally to all partisan activities of the type described.
They discriminate against no racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. Nor do they seek to control
political opinions or beliefs, or to interfere with or influence anyone's vote at the polls.
But, as the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education, 59 the government has an interest in
regulating the conduct and the speech of its employees that differ(s) significantly from those
it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The
problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the (employee), as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the (government),
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees. Although Congress is free to strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses,
we think the balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the obviously important interests
sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities now contained in the
Hatch Act.
It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of the
Government, or those working for any of its agencies, should administer the law in
accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accordance with their own or the will of a
political party. They are expected to enforce the law and execute the programs of the
Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political party or group or the
members thereof. A major thesis of the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of
Government-the impartial execution of the laws-it is essential that federal employees, for
example, not take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play substantial roles

in partisan political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets. Forbidding
activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective government.

As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with
the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations. (italics supplied)

There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only important that the Government
and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they
appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.

Broadrick likewise definitively stated that the assailed statutory provision is constitutionally
permissible, viz.:

Another major concern of the restriction against partisan activities by federal employees was
perhaps the immediate occasion for enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939. That was the
conviction that the rapidly expanding Government work force should not be employed to
build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt political machine. The experience of the
1936 and 1938 campaigns convinced Congress that these dangers were sufficiently real that
substantial barriers should be raised against the party in power-or the party out of power, for
that matter-using the thousands or hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for at
public expense, to man its political structure and political campaigns.

Appellants do not question Oklahoma's right to place even-handed restrictions on the partisan
political conduct of state employees. Appellants freely concede that such restrictions serve
valid and important state interests, particularly with respect to attracting greater numbers of
qualified people by insuring their job security, free from the vicissitudes of the elective
process, and by protecting them from political extortion. Rather, appellants maintain that
however permissible, even commendable, the goals of s 818 may be, its language is
unconstitutionally vague and its prohibitions too broad in their sweep, failing to distinguish
between conduct that may be proscribed and conduct that must be permitted. For these and
other reasons, appellants assert that the sixth and seventh paragraphs of s 818 are void in toto
and cannot be enforced against them or anyone else.

A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to further serve the goal
that employment and advancement in the Government service not depend on political
performance, and at the same time to make sure that Government employees would be free
from pressure and from express or tacit invitation to vote in a certain way or perform political
chores in order to curry favor with their superiors rather than to act out their own beliefs. It
may be urged that prohibitions against coercion are sufficient protection; but for many years
the joint judgment of the Executive and Congress has been that to protect the rights of federal
employees with respect to their jobs and their political acts and beliefs it is not enough merely
to forbid one employee to attempt to influence or coerce another. For example, at the hearings
in 1972 on proposed legislation for liberalizing the prohibition against political activity, the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission stated that the prohibitions against active
participation in partisan political management and partisan political campaigns constitute the
most significant safeguards against coercion . . .. Perhaps Congress at some time will come to
a different view of the realities of political life and Government service; but that is its current
view of the matter, and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our view, does the
Constitution forbid it.

We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague. 61 We have little doubt that
s 818 is similarly not so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning.62 Whatever other problems there are with s 818, it is all but frivolous to suggest that
the section fails to give adequate warning of what activities it proscribes or fails to set out
explicit standards' for those who must apply it. In the plainest language, it prohibits any state
classified employee from being an officer or member of a partisan political club or a
candidate for any paid public office. It forbids solicitation of contributions for any political
organization, candidacy or other political purpose and taking part in the management or
affairs of any political party or in any political campaign. Words inevitably contain germs of
uncertainty and, as with the Hatch Act, there may be disputes over the meaning of such terms
in s 818 as partisan, or take part in, or affairs of political parties. But what was said in
Letter Carriers, is applicable here: there are limitations in the English language with respect
to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the prohibitions
may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the
ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply
with, without sacrifice to the public interest.' x x x

Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute in
any event.60 x x x

xxxx

xxxx

[Appellants] nevertheless maintain that the statute is overbroad and purports to reach
protected, as well as unprotected conduct, and must therefore be struck down on its face and

held to be incapable of any constitutional application. We do not believe that the overbreadth
doctrine may appropriately be invoked in this manner here.
xxxx
The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First Amendment
area is that any enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and
unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming
threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression. Application of the overbreadth
doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the Court
sparingly and only as a last resort. x x x
x x x But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial over-breadth
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited
one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to
sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct-even if expressive-falls
within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown
extent, there comes a point where that effect-at best a prediction-cannot, with confidence,
justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute
against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the matter another
way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep. It is our view that s 818 is not substantially overbroad and
that whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact
situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.
Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts, s 818 is directed,
by its terms, at political expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But at the same time, s 818 is not a
censorial statute, directed at particular groups or viewpoints. The statute, rather, seeks to
regulate political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner. As indicted, such statutes
have in the past been subject to a less exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact
remains that s 818 regulates a substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly subject to
state regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass. This much was established in United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, and has been unhesitatingly reaffirmed today in Letter Carriers.
Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is no question that s 818 is valid at least insofar as
it forbids classified employees from: soliciting contributions for partisan candidates, political
parties, or other partisan political purposes; becoming members of national, state, or local

committees of political parties, or officers or committee members in partisan political clubs,

or candidates for any paid public office; taking part in the management or affairs of any
political party's partisan political campaign; serving as delegates or alternates to caucuses or
conventions of political parties; addressing or taking an active part in partisan political rallies
or meetings; soliciting votes or assisting voters at the polls or helping in a partisan effort to
get voters to the polls; participating in the distribution of partisan campaign literature;
initiating or circulating partisan nominating petitions; or riding in caravans for any political
party or partisan political candidate.
x x x It may be that such restrictions are impermissible and that s 818 may be susceptible of
some other improper applications. But, as presently construed, we do not believe that s 818
must be discarded in toto because some persons arguably protected conduct may or may not
be caught or chilled by the statute. Section 818 is not substantially overbroad and it not,
therefore, unconstitutional on its face. (italics supplied)
It bears stressing that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachura does not deny the
principles enunciated in Letter Carriers and Broadrick. He would hold, nonetheless, that these
cases cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso, since they "pertain to different
types of laws and were decided based on a different set of facts," viz.:
In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or
threatening to enforce, the Hatch Acts prohibition against "active participation in political
management or political campaigns." The plaintiffs desired to campaign for candidates for
public office, to encourage and get federal employees to run for state and local offices, to
participate as delegates in party conventions, and to hold office in a political club.
In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague and overbroad a provision
in the (sic) Oklahomas Merit System of Personnel Administration Act restricting the political
activities of the States classified civil servants, in much the same manner as the Hatch Act
proscribed partisan political activities of federal employees. Prior to the commencement of the
action, the appellants actively participated in the 1970 reelection campaign of their superior,
and were administratively charged for asking other Corporation Commission employees to do
campaign work or to give referrals to persons who might help in the campaign, for soliciting
money for the campaign, and for receiving and distributing campaign posters in bulk.
Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic resignation provision.
Kenneth Mancuso, a full time police officer and classified civil service employee of the City
of Cranston, filed as a candidate for nomination as representative to the Rhode Island General

Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston then began the process of enforcing the resign-to-run
provision of the City Home Rule Charter.
Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different types of laws and were decided based
on a different set of facts, Letter Carriers and Broadrick cannot be interpreted to mean a
reversal of Mancuso. x x x (italics in the original)
We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these cases. Contrary to his
claim, Letter Carriers, Broadrick and Mancuso all concerned the constitutionality of resign-torun laws, viz.:
(1) Mancuso involved a civil service employee who filed as a candidate for
nomination as representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. He assailed the
constitutionality of 14.09(c) of the City Home Rule Charter, which prohibits
"continuing in the classified service of the city after becoming a candidate for
nomination or election to any public office."
(2) Letter Carriers involved plaintiffs who alleged that the Civil Service Commission
was enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch Acts prohibition against "active
participation in political management or political campaigns"63 with respect to certain
defined activities in which they desired to engage. The plaintiffs relevant to this
discussion are:
(a) The National Association of Letter Carriers, which alleged that its
members were desirous of, among others, running in local elections for
offices such as school board member, city council member or mayor;
(b) Plaintiff Gee, who alleged that he desired to, but did not, file as a
candidate for the office of Borough Councilman in his local community for
fear that his participation in a partisan election would endanger his job; and
(c) Plaintiff Myers, who alleged that he desired to run as a Republican
candidate in the 1971 partisan election for the mayor of West Lafayette,
Indiana, and that he would do so except for fear of losing his job by reason
of violation of the Hatch Act.
The Hatch Act defines "active participation in political management or political campaigns"
by cross-referring to the rules made by the Civil Service Commission. The rule pertinent to
our inquiry states:

30. Candidacy for local office: Candidacy for a nomination or for election to any National,
State, county, or municipal office is not permissible. The prohibition against political activity
extends not merely to formal announcement of candidacy but also to the preliminaries leading
to such announcement and to canvassing or soliciting support or doing or permitting to be
done any act in furtherance of candidacy. The fact that candidacy, is merely passive is
immaterial; if an employee acquiesces in the efforts of friends in furtherance of such
candidacy such acquiescence constitutes an infraction of the prohibitions against political
activity. (italics supplied)
Section 9(b) requires the immediate removal of violators and forbids the use of appropriated
funds thereafter to pay compensation to these persons.64
(3) Broadrick was a class action brought by certain Oklahoma state employees seeking a
declaration of unconstitutionality of two sub-paragraphs of Section 818 of Oklahomas Merit
System of Personnel Administration Act. Section 818 (7), the paragraph relevant to this
discussion, states that "[n]o employee in the classified service shall be a candidate for
nomination or election to any paid public office" Violation of Section 818 results in
dismissal from employment, possible criminal sanctions and limited state employment
ineligibility.
Consequently, it cannot be denied that Letter Carriers and Broadrick effectively overruled
Mancuso. By no stretch of the imagination could Mancuso still be held operative, as Letter
Carriers and Broadrick (i) concerned virtually identical resign-to-run laws, and (ii) were
decided by a superior court, the United States Supreme Court. It was thus not surprising for
the First Circuit Court of Appeals the same court that decided Mancuso to hold
categorically and emphatically in Magill v. Lynch 65 that Mancuso is no longer good law. As
we priorly explained:
Magill involved Pawtucket, Rhode Island firemen who ran for city office in 1975.
Pawtuckets "Little Hatch Act" prohibits city employees from engaging in a broad range of
political activities. Becoming a candidate for any city office is specifically proscribed, 66 the
violation being punished by removal from office or immediate dismissal. The firemen brought
an action against the city officials on the ground that that the provision of the city charter was
unconstitutional. However, the court, fully cognizant of Letter Carriers and Broadrick, took
the position that Mancuso had since lost considerable vitality. It observed that the view that
political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be infringed upon only if less
restrictive alternatives were not available, was a position which was no longer viable, since
the Supreme Court (finding that the governments interest in regulating both the conduct and
speech of its employees differed significantly from its interest in regulating those of the
citizenry in general) had given little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the

coercion of government employees were a less drastic means to the same end, deferring to the
judgment of Congress, and applying a "balancing" test to determine whether limits on
political activity by public employees substantially served government interests which were
"important" enough to outweigh the employees First Amendment rights.67
It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this manner even though the election in
Magill was characterized as nonpartisan, as it was reasonable for the city to fear, under the
circumstances of that case, that politically active bureaucrats might use their official power to
help political friends and hurt political foes. Ruled the court:
The question before us is whether Pawtucket's charter provision, which bars a city employee's
candidacy in even a nonpartisan city election, is constitutional. The issue compels us to
extrapolate two recent Supreme Court decisions, Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers and Broadrick v. Oklahoma. Both dealt with laws barring civil servants from partisan
political activity. Letter Carriers reaffirmed United Public Workers v. Mitchell, upholding the
constitutionality of the Hatch Act as to federal employees. Broadrick sustained Oklahoma's
"Little Hatch Act" against constitutional attack, limiting its holding to Oklahoma's
construction that the Act barred only activity in partisan politics. In Mancuso v. Taft, we
assumed that proscriptions of candidacy in nonpartisan elections would not be constitutional.
Letter Carriers and Broadrick compel new analysis.
xxxx
What we are obligated to do in this case, as the district court recognized, is to apply the
Courts interest balancing approach to the kind of nonpartisan election revealed in this record.
We believe that the district court found more residual vigor in our opinion in Mancuso v. Taft
than remains after Letter Carriers. We have particular reference to our view that political
candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be trenched upon only if less restrictive
alternatives were not available. While this approach may still be viable for citizens who are
not government employees, the Court in Letter Carriers recognized that the government's
interest in regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees differs significantly from
its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in general. Not only was United Public Workers
v. Mitchell "unhesitatingly" reaffirmed, but the Court gave little weight to the argument that
prohibitions against the coercion of government employees were a less drastic means to the
same end, deferring to the judgment of the Congress. We cannot be more precise than the
Third Circuit in characterizing the Court's approach as "some sort of 'balancing' process". 68 It
appears that the government may place limits on campaigning by public employees if the
limits substantially serve government interests that are "important" enough to outweigh the
employees' First Amendment rights. x x x (italics supplied)

Upholding thus the constitutionality of the law in question, the Magill court detailed the major
governmental interests discussed in Letter Carriers and applied them to the Pawtucket
provision as follows:
In Letter Carriers[,] the first interest identified by the Court was that of an efficient
government, faithful to the Congress rather than to party. The district court discounted this
interest, reasoning that candidates in a local election would not likely be committed to a state
or national platform. This observation undoubtedly has substance insofar as allegiance to
broad policy positions is concerned. But a different kind of possible political intrusion into
efficient administration could be thought to threaten municipal government: not into broad
policy decisions, but into the particulars of administration favoritism in minute decisions
affecting welfare, tax assessments, municipal contracts and purchasing, hiring, zoning,
licensing, and inspections. Just as the Court in Letter Carriers identified a second
governmental interest in the avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy, so
there is an equivalent interest in avoiding the appearance of political preferment in privileges,
concessions, and benefits. The appearance (or reality) of favoritism that the charter's authors
evidently feared is not exorcised by the nonpartisan character of the formal election process.
Where, as here, party support is a key to successful campaigning, and party rivalry is the
norm, the city might reasonably fear that politically active bureaucrats would use their official
power to help political friends and hurt political foes. This is not to say that the city's interest
in visibly fair and effective administration necessarily justifies a blanket prohibition of all
employee campaigning; if parties are not heavily involved in a campaign, the danger of
favoritism is less, for neither friend nor foe is as easily identified.
A second major governmental interest identified in Letter Carriers was avoiding the danger of
a powerful political machine. The Court had in mind the large and growing federal
bureaucracy and its partisan potential. The district court felt this was only a minor threat since
parties had no control over nominations. But in fact candidates sought party endorsements,
and party endorsements proved to be highly effective both in determining who would emerge
from the primary election and who would be elected in the final election. Under the prevailing
customs, known party affiliation and support were highly significant factors in Pawtucket
elections. The charter's authors might reasonably have feared that a politically active public
work force would give the incumbent party, and the incumbent workers, an unbreakable grasp
on the reins of power. In municipal elections especially, the small size of the electorate and
the limited powers of local government may inhibit the growth of interest groups powerful
enough to outbalance the weight of a partisan work force. Even when nonpartisan issues and
candidacies are at stake, isolated government employees may seek to influence voters or their
co-workers improperly; but a more real danger is that a central party structure will mass the
scattered powers of government workers behind a single party platform or slate. Occasional
misuse of the public trust to pursue private political ends is tolerable, especially because the

political views of individual employees may balance each other out. But party discipline
eliminates this diversity and tends to make abuse systematic. Instead of a handful of
employees pressured into advancing their immediate superior's political ambitions, the entire
government work force may be expected to turn out for many candidates in every election. In
Pawtucket, where parties are a continuing presence in political campaigns, a carefully
orchestrated use of city employees in support of the incumbent party's candidates is possible.
The danger is scarcely lessened by the openness of Pawtucket's nominating procedure or the
lack of party labels on its ballots.
The third area of proper governmental interest in Letter Carriers was ensuring that employees
achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect
of favor from political activity. The district court did not address this factor, but looked only
to the possibility of a civil servant using his position to influence voters, and held this to be no
more of a threat than in the most nonpartisan of elections. But we think that the possibility of
coercion of employees by superiors remains as strong a factor in municipal elections as it was
in Letter Carriers. Once again, it is the systematic and coordinated exploitation of public
servants for political ends that a legislature is most likely to see as the primary threat of
employees' rights. Political oppression of public employees will be rare in an entirely
nonpartisan system. Some superiors may be inclined to ride herd on the politics of their
employees even in a nonpartisan context, but without party officials looking over their
shoulders most supervisors will prefer to let employees go their own ways.
In short, the government may constitutionally restrict its employees' participation in
nominally nonpartisan elections if political parties play a large role in the campaigns. In the
absence of substantial party involvement, on the other hand, the interests identified by the
Letter Carriers Court lose much of their force. While the employees' First Amendment rights
would normally outbalance these diminished interests, we do not suggest that they would
always do so. Even when parties are absent, many employee campaigns might be thought to
endanger at least one strong public interest, an interest that looms larger in the context of
municipal elections than it does in the national elections considered in Letter Carriers. The
city could reasonably fear the prospect of a subordinate running directly against his superior
or running for a position that confers great power over his superior. An employee of a federal
agency who seeks a Congressional seat poses less of a direct challenge to the command and
discipline of his agency than a fireman or policeman who runs for mayor or city council. The
possibilities of internal discussion, cliques, and political bargaining, should an employee
gather substantial political support, are considerable. (citations omitted)
The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings in respect
of the petitioners overbreadth charge. Noting that invalidating a statute for being overbroad is
"not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark," the court held:

The governing case is Broadrick, which introduced the doctrine of "substantial" overbreadth
in a closely analogous case. Under Broadrick, when one who challenges a law has engaged in
constitutionally unprotected conduct (rather than unprotected speech) and when the
challenged law is aimed at unprotected conduct, "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Two
major uncertainties attend the doctrine: how to distinguish speech from conduct, and how to
define "substantial" overbreadth. We are spared the first inquiry by Broadrick itself. The
plaintiffs in that case had solicited support for a candidate, and they were subject to discipline
under a law proscribing a wide range of activities, including soliciting contributions for
political candidates and becoming a candidate. The Court found that this combination
required a substantial overbreadth approach. The facts of this case are so similar that we may
reach the same result without worrying unduly about the sometimes opaque distinction
between speech and conduct.
The second difficulty is not so easily disposed of. Broadrick found no substantial overbreadth
in a statute restricting partisan campaigning. Pawtucket has gone further, banning
participation in nonpartisan campaigns as well. Measuring the substantiality of a statute's
overbreadth apparently requires, inter alia, a rough balancing of the number of valid
applications compared to the number of potentially invalid applications. Some sensitivity to
reality is needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as
one that is probable. The question is a matter of degree; it will never be possible to say that a
ratio of one invalid to nine valid applications makes a law substantially overbroad. Still, an
overbreadth challenger has a duty to provide the court with some idea of the number of
potentially invalid applications the statute permits. Often, simply reading the statute in the
light of common experience or litigated cases will suggest a number of probable invalid
applications. But this case is different. Whether the statute is overbroad depends in large part
on the number of elections that are insulated from party rivalry yet closed to Pawtucket
employees. For all the record shows, every one of the city, state, or federal elections in
Pawtucket is actively contested by political parties. Certainly the record suggests that parties
play a major role even in campaigns that often are entirely nonpartisan in other cities. School
committee candidates, for example, are endorsed by the local Democratic committee.
The state of the record does not permit us to find overbreadth; indeed such a step is not to be
taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark. On the other hand, the entire focus below, in
the short period before the election was held, was on the constitutionality of the statute as
applied. Plaintiffs may very well feel that further efforts are not justified, but they should be
afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the charter forecloses access to a significant
number of offices, the candidacy for which by municipal employees would not pose the
possible threats to government efficiency and integrity which Letter Carriers, as we have

interpreted it, deems significant. Accordingly, we remand for consideration of plaintiffs'

overbreadth claim. (italics supplied, citations omitted)
Clearly, Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate beyond doubt that Mancuso v.
Taft, heavily relied upon by the ponencia, has effectively been overruled. 69 As it is no longer
good law, the ponencias exhortation that "[since] the Americans, from whom we copied the
provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being
unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit" is misplaced and
unwarranted.70
Accordingly, our assailed Decisions submission that the right to run for public office is
"inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms those of expression and association
lies on barren ground. American case law has in fact never recognized a fundamental right to
express ones political views through candidacy,71 as to invoke a rigorous standard of
review.72 Bart v. Telford73 pointedly stated that "[t]he First Amendment does not in terms
confer a right to run for public office, and this court has held that it does not do so by
implication either." Thus, ones interest in seeking office, by itself, is not entitled to
constitutional protection.74 Moreover, one cannot bring ones action under the rubric of
freedom of association, absent any allegation that, by running for an elective position, one is
advancing the political ideas of a particular set of voters.75
Prescinding from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the case at
bar, are not violative of the equal protection clause. The deemed-resigned provisions
substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service faithful to the
government and the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of the appearance of "political
justice" as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv)
ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both
coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity). These are interests that are
important enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and
employees to seek elective office.1avvphi1
En passant, we find it quite ironic that Mr. Justice Nachura cites Clements v. Fashing 76 and
Morial, et al. v. Judiciary Commission of the State of Louisiana, et al. 77 to buttress his dissent.
Maintaining that resign-to-run provisions are valid only when made applicable to specified
officials, he explains:
U.S. courts, in subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality of resign-to-run provisions
when applied to specified or particular officials, as distinguished from all others, 78 under a
classification that is germane to the purposes of the law. These resign-to-run legislations were

not expressed in a general and sweeping provision, and thus did not violate the test of being
germane to the purpose of the law, the second requisite for a valid classification. Directed, as
they were, to particular officials, they were not overly encompassing as to be overbroad.
(emphasis in the original)
This reading is a regrettable misrepresentation of Clements and Morial. The resign-to-run
provisions in these cases were upheld not because they referred to specified or particular
officials (vis--vis a general class); the questioned provisions were found valid precisely
because the Court deferred to legislative judgment and found that a regulation is not devoid of
a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. In fact, the equal protection
challenge in Clements revolved around the claim that the State of Texas failed to explain why
some public officials are subject to the resign-to-run provisions, while others are not. Ruled
the United States Supreme Court:
Article XVI, 65, of the Texas Constitution provides that the holders of certain offices
automatically resign their positions if they become candidates for any other elected office,
unless the unexpired portion of the current term is one year or less. The burdens that 65
imposes on candidacy are even less substantial than those imposed by 19. The two
provisions, of course, serve essentially the same state interests. The District Court found 65
deficient, however, not because of the nature or extent of the provision's restriction on
candidacy, but because of the manner in which the offices are classified. According to the
District Court, the classification system cannot survive equal protection scrutiny, because
Texas has failed to explain sufficiently why some elected public officials are subject to 65
and why others are not. As with the case of 19, we conclude that 65 survives a challenge
under the Equal Protection Clause unless appellees can show that there is no rational predicate
to the classification scheme.
The history behind 65 shows that it may be upheld consistent with the "one step at a time"
approach that this Court has undertaken with regard to state regulation not subject to more
vigorous scrutiny than that sanctioned by the traditional principles. Section 65 was enacted in
1954 as a transitional provision applying only to the 1954 election. Section 65 extended the
terms of those offices enumerated in the provision from two to four years. The provision also
staggered the terms of other offices so that at least some county and local offices would be
contested at each election. The automatic resignation proviso to 65 was not added until
1958. In that year, a similar automatic resignation provision was added in Art. XI, 11, which
applies to officeholders in home rule cities who serve terms longer than two years. Section 11
allows home rule cities the option of extending the terms of municipal offices from two to up
to four years.

Thus, the automatic resignation provision in Texas is a creature of the State's electoral reforms
of 1958. That the State did not go further in applying the automatic resignation provision to
those officeholders whose terms were not extended by 11 or 65, absent an invidious
purpose, is not the sort of malfunctioning of the State's lawmaking process forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause. A regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it
happens to be incomplete. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid Texas to restrict one
elected officeholder's candidacy for another elected office unless and until it places similar
restrictions on other officeholders. The provision's language and its history belie any notion
that 65 serves the invidious purpose of denying access to the political process to identifiable
classes of potential candidates. (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the dissenters took the Morial line that "there is no blanket
approval of restrictions on the right of public employees to become candidates for public
office" out of context. A correct reading of that line readily shows that the Court only meant to
confine its ruling to the facts of that case, as each equal protection challenge would
necessarily have to involve weighing governmental interests vis--vis the specific prohibition
assailed. The Court held:
The interests of public employees in free expression and political association are
unquestionably entitled to the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. Nothing in
today's decision should be taken to imply that public employees may be prohibited from
expressing their private views on controversial topics in a manner that does not interfere with
the proper performance of their public duties. In today's decision, there is no blanket approval
of restrictions on the right of public employees to become candidates for public office. Nor do
we approve any general restrictions on the political and civil rights of judges in particular. Our
holding is necessarily narrowed by the methodology employed to reach it. A requirement that
a state judge resign his office prior to becoming a candidate for non-judicial office bears a
reasonably necessary relation to the achievement of the state's interest in preventing the
actuality or appearance of judicial impropriety. Such a requirement offends neither the first
amendment's guarantees of free expression and association nor the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. (italics supplied)
Indeed, the Morial court even quoted Broadrick and stated that:
In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining which of its employment
positions require restrictions on partisan political activities and which may be left unregulated.
And a State can hardly be faulted for attempting to limit the positions upon which such
restrictions are placed. (citations omitted)

V.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth
Apart from nullifying Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code on equal protection ground, our assailed Decision struck
them down for being overbroad in two respects, viz.:
(1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants holding
appointive posts without due regard for the type of position being held by the
employee seeking an elective post and the degree of influence that may be attendant
thereto;79 and
(2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil servants holding
appointive positions without due regard for the type of office being sought, whether
it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or barangay
level.
Again, on second look, we have to revise our assailed Decision.
i. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Incumbent Appointive Officials Position, Valid
According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because
they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without due regard
for the type of position being held by the employee running for elective office and the degree
of influence that may be attendant thereto.
Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are extant only
when the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an influential post.
Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the
government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of
systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has amassed "the
scattered powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an
"unbreakable grasp on the reins of power."80 As elucidated in our prior exposition:81
Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to make use of their
respective positions (apparently) to promote their own candidacy may seem tolerable even

innocuous particularly when viewed in isolation from other similar attempts by other
government employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount the equally (if not
more) realistic and dangerous possibility that such seemingly disjointed attempts, when taken
together, constitute a veiled effort on the part of an emerging central party structure to
advance its own agenda through a "carefully orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective]
officials" coming from various levels of the bureaucracy.

officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.
On this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable.

[T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an
emerging political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power" is reason enough to
impose a restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public officials without further
distinction as to the type of positions being held by such employees or the degree of influence
that may be attendant thereto. (citations omitted)

The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the elections for barangay
offices, since these are the only elections in this country which involve nonpartisan public
offices.84

ii. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid

The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overly broad
because they are made to apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive
offices, without due regard for the type of elective office being sought, whether it be partisan
or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or barangay level.
This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that "the concerns of a truly partisan
office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an office
removed from regular party politics [so as] to warrant distinctive treatment," 82 so that
restrictions on candidacy akin to those imposed by the challenged provisions can validly
apply only to situations in which the elective office sought is partisan in character. To the
extent, therefore, that such restrictions are said to preclude even candidacies for nonpartisan
elective offices, the challenged restrictions are to be considered as overbroad.
Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the matter will show
that the alleged overbreadth is more apparent than real. Our exposition on this issue has not
been repudiated, viz.:
A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules and guidelines set forth
therein refer to the filing of certificates of candidacy and nomination of official candidates of
registered political parties, in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections.83 Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of
Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear
that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive

Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the Omnibus

Election Code, in conjunction with other related laws on the matter, will confirm that these
provisions are likewise not intended to apply to elections for nonpartisan public offices.

In this regard, it is well to note that from as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election
Code in 1985, Congress has intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be governed
by special rules, including a separate rule on deemed resignations which is found in Section
39 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said provision states:
Section 39.Certificate of Candidacy. No person shall be elected punong barangay or
kagawad ng sangguniang barangay unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy in triplicate
on any day from the commencement of the election period but not later than the day before
the beginning of the campaign period in a form to be prescribed by the Commission. The
candidate shall state the barangay office for which he is a candidate.
xxxx
Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or
those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled
corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of
candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the
present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of
RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge
raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section
13 of RA 9369 must also fail. 85
In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and the corresponding provision in Section 13 of RA 9369 are

general rules that apply also to elections for nonpartisan public offices, the overbreadth
challenge would still be futile. Again, we explained:
In the first place, the view that Congress is limited to controlling only partisan behavior has
not received judicial imprimatur, because the general proposition of the relevant US cases on
the matter is simply that the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and speech
of its employees that differs significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.86
Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its face for being
overly broad, particularly where, as in this case, "conduct" and not "pure speech" is involved,
the overbreadth must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statutes plainly legitimate sweep.87
In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of a statutes overbreadth would entail,
among other things, a rough balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the
number of potentially invalid applications.88In this regard, some sensitivity to reality is
needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that
is probable.89 The question is a matter of degree. 90 Thus, assuming for the sake of argument
that the partisan-nonpartisan distinction is valid and necessary such that a statute which fails
to make this distinction is susceptible to an overbreadth attack, the overbreadth challenge
presently mounted must demonstrate or provide this Court with some idea of the number of
potentially invalid elections (i.e. the number of elections that were insulated from party rivalry
but were nevertheless closed to appointive employees) that may in all probability result from
the enforcement of the statute.91
The state of the record, however, does not permit us to find overbreadth. Borrowing from the
words of Magill v. Lynch, indeed, such a step is not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken
in the dark,92 especially since an overbreadth finding in this case would effectively prohibit
the State from enforcing an otherwise valid measure against conduct that is admittedly within
its power to proscribe.93
This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when it comes to the
application of the overbreadth doctrine in the analysis of statutes that purportedly attempt to
restrict or burden the exercise of the right to freedom of speech, for such approach is
manifestly strong medicine that must be used sparingly, and only as a last resort. 94
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in the
judgment of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and

perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or
conduct to go unpunished.95 Facial overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a
limiting construction could be placed on the challenged statute, and where there are readily
apparent constructions that would cure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged
overbreadth of the statute.96
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to
remain in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil
of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a
potentially overly broad statute.a1f
In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes which
are, at best, bold predictions cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting
the State from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been,
unquestionably within its power and interest to proscribe. 97 Instead, the more prudent
approach would be to deal with these conceivably impermissible applications through caseby-case adjudication rather than through a total invalidation of the statute itself. 98
Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our assailed Decision have taken place. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, intervenor Drilon stated that a number of high-ranking Cabinet members had
already filed their Certificates of Candidacy without relinquishing their posts. 99 Several
COMELEC election officers had likewise filed their Certificates of Candidacy in their
respective provinces.100 Even the Secretary of Justice had filed her certificate of substitution
for representative of the first district of Quezon province last December 14, 2009 101 even as
her position as Justice Secretary includes supervision over the City and Provincial
Prosecutors,102 who, in turn, act as Vice-Chairmen of the respective Boards of
Canvassers.103 The Judiciary has not been spared, for a Regional Trial Court Judge in the
South has thrown his hat into the political arena. We cannot allow the tilting of our electoral
playing field in their favor.
For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of
RA 9369, which merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not
unconstitutionally overbroad.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the
intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts December
1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not
UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second

proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
SO ORDERED.

nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on
Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative to the
implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or
fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the
Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts
of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821,2distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:

Case No. 5
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

District

Municipalities/Cities

1st District

Del
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

EN BANC
G.R. No. 189793

April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE

ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and
its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N.
TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO
LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the

2nd District

3rd District

4th District

Population

Gallego Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando

Gainza
Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo

Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay
San
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

417,304

474,899

Jose 372,548

429,070

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the
province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao,
and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and
Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following table 3 illustrates the
reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
District

Municipalities/Cities

1st District

Del
Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

2nd District

3rd District (formerly 2nd District)

4th District (formerly 3rd District)

5th District (formerly 4th District)

Population
176,383

Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao

San Fernando
Gainza
276,777
Milaor

Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman

Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

439,043

Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay
San
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

372,548

Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by
the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the
former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for
inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the
representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul
of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population standard.6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x

Jose

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,

compact, and adjacent territory.Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).

429,070

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the
origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until
its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process
progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local
officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as
argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors
of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new
district.4

The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district. 7 The petitioners
theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by
Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be
valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form
new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000.
On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat
representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be
stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of
additional legislative seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission

fixed the original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred
(200), they took into account the projected national population of fifty five million
(55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented
by 200 district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1)
representative.11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by the
Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from
the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in
the same manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the
dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal
technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.

Verbatim, the submission is that:

1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district
of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the
legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and
(3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as
provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities
and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents
concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple
reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to
the creation of legislative districts in provinces. 13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is
only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only
creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be
sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and
Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the
following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1

(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal,

board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions. Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they
were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the
performance of a ministerial act.

3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of
the instant petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716,
the same could have been ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over
which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained,
or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of
Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the
required legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues
that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their
content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural
rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an
important issue of overreaching significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) 16 and
Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the
hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public
importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we
set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v.
Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the
part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an
issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in
cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so,

the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more
recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must
apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a
population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.24Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be
a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or
transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor
any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will
prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of
the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides:
"Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province
is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must
first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to
no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but
not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for
a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn,
the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC. 27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which
was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it
happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which
at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an
additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the
resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that
Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the
operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population
of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.28(Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for
cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to
an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district
within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional
legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a
province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of
its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely
an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the
deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty
thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon
framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would
be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE
SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND
CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the
250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative
districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure
was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should
have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the
determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute
minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the
determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the
population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor
was not the sole,though it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire
country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of
district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in
this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten
(10) cities with a population of at least 250,000; 30 second, the remaining seats were then
redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the
number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 31 Commissioner
Davide, who later became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his
sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:

Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are,
in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the
Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the
1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our
population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at
least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first
allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of
at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo,
Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to
increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance
with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.
(Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this,
the determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and
complaints formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than
population as already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:

Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on
the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined
population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron
are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of
Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more
potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo
and Coron are lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose
inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in
the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He
requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal. 33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the
interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto
Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however,
that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity
requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns
comprising the Second District.

INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:

Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when
it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra,
Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second
District. He then queried whether population was the only factor considered by the Committee
in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards
set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats
should be apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the
legislative district must be compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included
with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from
San Vicente.
xxxx

In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of
Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total
population of 190,000 while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no
substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the
Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the
apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the
importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:

At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with
the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet
and Baguio City.

There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I. 35

REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO

It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based
on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to
be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area,"
because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of
compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were
"political stability and common interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of
"chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral
leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the highland should not be
grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that
they should "balance the area and population."38

Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are
placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special
consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be
divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba
could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however,
pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain
times of the year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially and,
therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that
population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business
matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are
united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by
passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the
Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that
the Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on
the demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and
situs of many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of
the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr.
Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the
amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio
City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan,
Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan,
Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.

Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.

Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we
stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a
standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through
commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that
the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner
that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000
population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the
petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the
provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000
is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a
province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in
2007 is based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the

Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among

provinces and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it
was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this
point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not
prohibit an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that
provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and
complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more
importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other
than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second
legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a
new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383
and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 6
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped
municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion
from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the
redistricting of Districts One and Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased
population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, 42 that would warrant the invalidation of
Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and
second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting
additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor
but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such
settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very
clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this
petition.1avvphi1

EN BANC
G.R No. 188078

March 15, 2010

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA,

and
MINERVA
ALDABA
MORADA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) of the Decision dated 25 January 2010.1
The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already considered and rejected in
the Decision, that Congress reliance on the Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda),
Region III Director, National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos Citys population in
2010, is non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the other sources of Malolos
Citys population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population PMS 3 Progress
Enumeration Report2) and as of 2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos Water District,

dated 31 July 2008,3 and Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008 4) which
Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC
extends its non-justiciability argument to these materials.
We find no reason to grant the motion.
First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the
population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating
legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Courts judicial review
power,5 then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their
constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000
constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of
necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators
Congress used to comply with the constitutional limitation. Thus, nearly five decades ago, we
already rejected claims of non-justiciability of an apportionment law alleged to violate the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation:
It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves existing
conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of judicial statesmanship, consider the
question involved as purely political and therefore non-justiciable. The overwhelming weight
of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts[:]
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not one
which the court cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question.
It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the
political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their
constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it.
It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political situation
does not render it political instead of judicial.
The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no excuse
for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the
means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing inequality of
representation, and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial
legislation in accord with the precepts of the Constitution. 6 (Emphasis supplied; internal
citations omitted)

To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to contend that
this Court has no power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government," a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. Indeed, if we subscribe to the COMELECs theory, this Court would be reduced
to rubberstamping laws creating legislative districts no matter how unreliable and nonauthoritative the population indicators Congress used to justify their creation. There can be no
surer way to render meaningless the limitation in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.7
Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress used to
measure Malolos Citys compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and nonauthoritative. On Mirandas Certification, (that the "projected population of the [City] of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78[%]
between 1995 and 2000"), this fell short of EO 135s requirements that (a) for intercensal
years, the certification should be based on a set of demographic projections and
estimates declared official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b)
certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of the middle of every year; and
(c) certifications based on projections or estimates must be issued by the NSO Administrator
or his designated certifying officer. Further, using Mirandas own growth rate assumption of
3.78%, Malolos Citys population as of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the
constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as base Malolos Citys population as of 1 August
2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda issued his Certification "by authority of the NSO
administrator" does not make the document reliable as it neither makes Miranda the NSO
Administrators designated certifying officer nor cures the Certification of its fatal defects for
failing to use demographic projections and estimates declared official by the NSCB or make
the projection as of the middle of 2010.1avvphi1
Nor are the 2007 Census of Population PMS 3 Progress Enumeration Report, the
Certification of the City of Malolos Water District, dated 31 July 2008 and the Certification
of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008, reliable because none of them qualifies as
authoritative population indicator under EO 135. The 2007 Census of Population PMS 3
Progress Enumeration Report merely contains preliminary data on the population census of
Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to reflect actual population as indicated in the
2007 Census results (showing Malolos Citys population at 223,069). The COMELEC,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), adopts Malolos Citys claim that the 2007
census for Malolos City was "sloped to make it appear that come Year 2010, the population
count for Malolos would still fall short of the constitutional requirement." 8 This unbecoming
attack by the governments chief counsel on the integrity of the processes of the governments
census authority has no place in our judicial system. The OSG ought to know that absent

convincing proof of so-called data "sloping," the NSO enjoys the presumption of the
regularity in the performance of its functions.

creation of local government units in enhancing our democratic institutions, thus both
processes should be subject to the same stringent standards.

The Certification of the City of Malolos Water District fares no better. EO 135 excludes from
its ambit certifications from a public utility gathered incidentally in the course of pursuing its
business. To elevate the water districts so-called population census to the level of credibility
NSO certifications enjoy is to render useless the existence of NSO. This will allow population
data incidentally gathered by electric, telephone, sewage, and other utilities to enter into
legislative processes even though these private entities are not in the business of generating
statistical data and thus lack the scientific training, experience and competence to handle,
collate and process them.

Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May 2010
elections, it breaches the 250,000 population mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member." COMELEC neither alleged nor proved that
Malolos City is in compliance with Section 3 of the Ordinance.

Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative because much like the
Malolos City Water District, the Liga ng Barangay is not authorized to conduct population
census, much less during off-census years. The non-NSO entities EO 135 authorizes to
conduct population census are local government units (that is, province, city, municipality or
barangay) subject to the prior approval of the NSCB and
under the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data processing.9
By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely divergent population
figures,10 the COMELEC unwittingly highlighted the danger of relying on non-NSO
authorized certifications. EO 135s stringent standards ensuring reliability of population
census cannot be diluted as these data lie at the core of crucial government decisions and, in
this case, the legislative function of enforcing the constitutional mandate of creating
congressional districts in cities with at least 250,000 constituents.
There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the constitutionality of RA 9591.
The COMELEC invoked EO 135 to convince the Court of the credibility and
authoritativeness of Mirandas certificate. 11 It is hardly alien for the Court to adopt standards
contained in a parallel statute to fill gaps in the law in the absence of an express
prohibition.12 Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find any distinction, statistically speaking, on the
reliability of an NSO certification of a citys population for purposes of creating its legislative
district and for purposes of converting it to a highly-urbanized or an independent component
city.13 Congress itself confirms the wisdom and relevance of EO 135s paradigm of privileging
NSO certifications by mandating that compliance with the population requirement in the
creation and conversion of local government units shall be proved exclusively by an NSO
certification.14 Unquestionably, representation in Congress is no less important than the

Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the
population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City,
carving the city from the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated
from the rest of the geographic mass of that district. 15 This contravenes the requirement in
Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory." It is no argument to say, as the OSG does, that it
was impracticable for Congress to create a district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory because Malolos city lies at the center of the First Legislative District. The
geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making
compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus
maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the practicable alternative
for Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos Citys legislative district.
Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional
requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient representation of the
minimum mass of constituents.
WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Commission on
Elections dated 22 February 2010 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be
allowed.
SO ORDERED.

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may
make different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may
disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to
be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate
about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights.
Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and
difference in opinion.

Case No. 7
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 190582

April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON

REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and
demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among
those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox
philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time
powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are
preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more
worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not
harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad)
against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11,
20092 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 3 (the Second Assailed
Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its
roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership

base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration with the
COMELEC.

Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my
Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation
and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that
because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation;
and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. 6 Ang Ladlad laid out its
national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters,
and outlined its platform of governance.7

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because
of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to,
and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender,
or more than one gender."
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality
which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the
natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural
use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which
is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petitions par.
6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It
is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men
Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is
the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or
accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are
deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any
act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3)
shocks, defies; or disregardsdecency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the
Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent
shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows.
The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or
both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals;

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people
transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone):

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form;
the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment
selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that
the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows,
whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include
those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other
purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3)
offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited
drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good
customs,established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or
literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines
but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating
to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an
environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous
bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing homosexuals
are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty
under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual
degradation.8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First
Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and
Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R.
Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his
Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to
represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found
themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The
party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons
or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of
marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations only that their interests have
not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the
time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and
transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the
party-list system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence,
courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special
class" of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a
constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution
discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual
relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there
can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain
either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

xxxx
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming
that it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that
Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious
practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules on

Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally
accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines
cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some
moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not
publicly accepted moral norms.

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to
Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-inIntervention.17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladladspetition on moral grounds
violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On
January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.

V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article
201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall
publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes
"immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad"
apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F:
"Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age It is
further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having
Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694
of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all unlawful.10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory
injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin
printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment
on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. 11 Instead of filing a
Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until
January 16, 2010 to Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in
support of petitioners application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to
fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment. 14 The COMELEC, through
its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.15
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order
on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this
Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed
Resolutions.16

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene 18 which motion
was granted on February 2, 2010.19
The Parties Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional
rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based
on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in
denying petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs
allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and
concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification.
However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech, expression,
and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on
these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the
LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with
or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Abra Gay Association

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors
(labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the
party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.

Albay Gay Association

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The
COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a
few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the
country."21

Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan

Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija

Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte

This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its
national existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not
being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not
violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded to
in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of
petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the
issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a
belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners
right to procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang
Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the
Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was
estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members
around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. 22 Ang Ladlad also
represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the
Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"

Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)

Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro
Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila

 Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila

Naga City Gay Association Naga City

respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong
Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.

ONE BACARDI

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration

Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." 24 Clearly,
"governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City23
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT,
it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact,
if COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City,
which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance
with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral
objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its
rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act
for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v.
Escritor:26
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the
dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds
articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require
conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers
would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious
belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government
based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not
support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its
citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class
citizens.1avvphi1
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in
criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government
proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments
based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations

over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all,
they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes
with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and
spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven.
Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest
roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass
scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the
elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion
clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus,
although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.27
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and
homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally
accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs
but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by
the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations
with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of
morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in
danger of losing its own existence.28
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to
imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation
of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and
their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public
morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed
by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the

COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts." 30 The
OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender,
or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a
great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could
be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the
"straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is
wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual
relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior
considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who,
undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or
another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this,
the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will
not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as
"any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings.32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be
emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and
a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the
COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the
provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in
the same treatment of similar persons." 33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed
by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets
a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to
some legitimate government end.35 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas,36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal
protection challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential
attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a
showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution."37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual
conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the
petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such
belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about
homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the
COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an
unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis
review under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that
would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or
dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have
the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political
parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in
the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would
similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves

for the purposes of the equal protection clause. 38 We are not prepared to single out
homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not
received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling
today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all
other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and
impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. 39 It is in the
public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and
deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public
square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every
moral discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their
life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing
religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this
representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and
moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally
designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in
this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally
crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority,
i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting
a constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only
for a minority, however small not only for a majority, however large but for each of us"
the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it
otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society,
and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that
offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or
this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly
not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in
this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity
of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public
perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing
same-sex conduct.41 European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of
gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal
protection provisions in foreign and international texts. 42 To the extent that there is much to
learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such
jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding
on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that
existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to
justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that
their actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."43

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants.
It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid
constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We
do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus
favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual
perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The
OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied.
[COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of
petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful
exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution.
xxxx

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe,
with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the
constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it
proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political
ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means
must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of
association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the
majority of the population.44 A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks
to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying
everyone concerned.45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that
are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of
association guarantee.46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the
other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that
relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual
relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this
Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of
the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community.

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to
freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said
denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial
of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly
nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through
engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. x x x47
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate
in the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by
the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the
petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its
views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other
equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of
petitioners fundamental rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

Article 25

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise,
international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring
about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with
inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are
particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that
such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free
expression of the will of the electors;

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote
human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it
relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application
relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for
discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined
that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual
orientation."48Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements. 49
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral
participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25
(Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in
the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to
public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant
requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure
that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the
core of democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the
principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office
ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the
right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and
reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be
excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or
descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or
disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate
and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from
elective office.50

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of
giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket invocation of
international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners
invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law
In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), 51 which petitioner declares to reflect
binding principles of international law.

hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners

application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms
that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find
basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice.52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and
rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society
wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention
that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for
human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as
rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these
innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that
if "wants" are couched in "rights" language, then they are no longer controversial.1avvphi1
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do
not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary
international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full
of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights,
most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either
State practice or opinio juris.53
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are
emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious
communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of
acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can,
uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is
resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are

Case No. 8
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 136781

October 6, 2000

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA

MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT
KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN,
and
LUZON
FARMERS
PARTY, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136786

October 6, 2000

AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG

ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP,
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU,
PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA,
MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT,
AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136795
October 6, 2000ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANGLUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS'
ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE
KA PILIPINAS, respondents.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck
down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to
enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them.
Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of
Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election
laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of
parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by unique
Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand
innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn,
anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.

DECISION

The Case

PANGANIBAN, J.:*

Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution 1 of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065; 2 and (2) the January 7,
1999 Resolution3 of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed
Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives
"to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided
under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."

Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list.

The Facts and the Antecedents

Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government
-- the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral

party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the
election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the
House of Representatives as regular members. 4 In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the
House -- one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative.5
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of partylist representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy
declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by
enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible." (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law
(RA 7941) in this wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,
prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives
through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with
the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and
coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13)
party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at
least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the
proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the
votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:6
Party/Organization/
Coalition

Number
of Percentage
Votes Obtained
Total Votes

1. APEC

503,487

5.5%

Rene
M.
Melvyn D. Eballe

2. ABA

321,646

3.51%

Leonardo Q. Montemayor

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.41%

Diogenes S. Osabel

Nominees
Silos

4.
VETERANS
FEDERATION
304,802

3.33%

Eduardo P. Pilapil

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.79%

Joy A.G. Young

6. AKO

239,042

2.61%

Ariel A. Zartiga

7. NCSCFO

238,303

2.60%

Gorgonio P. Unde

8. ABANSE! PINAY

235,548

2.57%

Patricia M. Sarenas

9. AKBAYAN

232,376

2.54%

Loreta Ann P. Rosales

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.36%

Benjamin A. Cruz

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.13%

Renato B. Magtubo

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.07%

Cresente C. Paez

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the
Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters
Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which
were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first
nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list
representative.7
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government
Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition
to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It
alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the
House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further
claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit
under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be
declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the
House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations 8 filed their respective Motions for Intervention,
seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds.
Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation
they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP,
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL,
KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP,
Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed
Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38
respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional 9 seats must be
filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list
representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement
prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the partylist system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First,
"the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be
represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the
broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party
system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent
threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51
x x x should have at least one representative." It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission
(Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for
intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list
of names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are
PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP

19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its
Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously
promulgated a set of "Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List
Representatives Through the Party-List System." Under these Rules and Regulations, one
additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec
illustrated in its Annex "A." It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14
incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties).
However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed,
based on its three "elements," the "Group of 38" private respondents. 10
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the
basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system,
objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.
They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or
coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to
seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each,
should be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the
number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up," the Comelec en
banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining
seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to partylist solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two
percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they
had not passed the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two
percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two
political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry
x x x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the
Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system
in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from
complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to
compose 20% of the House of Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority
-- with three commissioners concurring11 and two members12 dissenting -- affirmed the
Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st
party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of
manifest errors."
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement
imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application,
holding that there were more important considerations than this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the
issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before
this Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total
votes cast for the party-list system. 13 In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec
were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as
likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners
sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and
organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec "to CEASE
and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or
on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and
coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7
January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this Court."
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor
appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR
No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo
Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for
Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation
of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae.
Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the
Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective
Memoranda in amplification of their verbal arguments.14

The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on the composition of the House of

Representatives reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector."
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers

The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of
the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other
words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a
qualified party be determined?

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in
arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty
per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We
thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
This formulation16 means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list
seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during
the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:

The Courts Ruling

208

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed
Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.

.80

First
Issue:
Whether
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory

x .20 = 52

the

Twenty

Percent

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up
all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is "No."

Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling

The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled
up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA
7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the partylist election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to
qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this
legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations
or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty
percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up
completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters
themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how
many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers
that the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two
percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would
make it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.

"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list
seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
"mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to
adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.17 Our task now, as should have
been the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely
scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far
as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial
agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared
unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute
remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This
is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation

We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the
equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly
sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives
reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,
Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of
party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed
it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to
obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be
entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party,
organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus
the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:

The Two Percent Threshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate
discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that
was raised by, I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must have obtained
at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under
the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast,
5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually
proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people

sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to
the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President." 18
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of
Representatives, as the following shows:
"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at,
arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among
the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of
the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of
Germany."19
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the
specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of
votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat.
There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent
would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide
deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about
400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000
families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly
because many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational
implication of our proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the
reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the system and that we should not
have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize, should work
hard, and should earn their seats within that system."20
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them.21 But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that
features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are
incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio"22 to ensure meaningful local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not
interpretation or circumvention.23
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a
multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party
list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through
a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in
the implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of
double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the
sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to
earn their seats among the fifty. x x x."24
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit
to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having
hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various
interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously
challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having
upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed
under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the
qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no
dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter
collectively referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage
of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is
then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an
assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more
than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total

number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing
in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.

Party

Number
Votes

One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment

1. APEC

503,487

2. ABA
3. ALAGAD

One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the
votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat. 25 Translated in
figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three
seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two
percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and
ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and
Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats;
Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all
the parties will each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a
party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the
same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional
representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution.
Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was
developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing
party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which
a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of
seats to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the
product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion
of the resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is
entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining
to be allocated

seats
x

Total no. of
qualified parties

votes

of

No. of votes
party concerned

of

No.
of
additional
seats
of
party
concerned
(Integer.decimal)

The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending
order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the
distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:

of Guaranteed
Seats

Additional

Extra
Seats

Total

5.73

321,646

3.66

312,500

3.55

4.
VETERANS 304,802
FEDERATION

3.47

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.90

6. AKO

239,042

2.72

7. NCSCFO

238,303

2.71

8. ABANSE! PINAY

235,548

2.68

9. AKBAYAN

232,376

2.64

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.45

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.21

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.16

13. COCOFED

186,388

2.12

Total

3,429,338

13

32

However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those
obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of
facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall
total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the
principle of "proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.

52

The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the
Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the
twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold
requirements -- two percent for us and five for them. There are marked differences between
the two models, however. As ably pointed out by private respondents, 26 one half of the
German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More important, there are no seat
limitations, because German law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast,
RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the
multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely
inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the
Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula
be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which
demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to
determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to
review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying"
and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional representation" into
a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned
parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as
well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total
votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of
the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot
possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two
additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to
the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first
party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number
of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to
which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for
two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1,
and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such
thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the
twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient
violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified
parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional
contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 27 that a fractional membership
cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another
party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is
entitled to x x x."

In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature.
Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme
Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.

party received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the
same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of
representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant
the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in
proportion to those of the first party.

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis
given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled
to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the
second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula,
therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number
of first party

of

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by
the following complex fraction:

votes
=

Total
votes
party-list system

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

for

Proportion
of
votes
first
party
relative
total votes for party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least
six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be
entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes
without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then
the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less
than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than
the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie
for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of
seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats
reserved in the House of Representatives.1wphi1
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to
one additional seat or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional
seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats
of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would
contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six
percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party
would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first

No.
of
concerned party

of
to
Additional seats
for
concerned =
party

votes

Total
No.
for party-list system

of

of
votes
x

No.
first party

of

votes

Total
No.
for party list system

of

No. of additional
seats allocated to
the first party

of

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

Additional seats
for
concerned =
party

No.
of
concerned party

votes

of
x

No.
first party

of

votes

of

No. of additional
seats allocated to
the first party

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is
computed as follows:
Additional
seats =
for
concerned
party (ABA)

No.
of ABA

of

votes x

No.
of
additional
seats
allocated
to
the first party

No.
of
vites
first party (APEC)

of

Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

Additional
seats
for
concerned =
party (ABA)

321,646
x1=
503,487

.64 or 0 additional seat,

rounding off is not to be applied

Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to
be as follows:
Organization

Votes
Garnered

%age
Total
Votes

of Initial
No.
of Seats

1. APEC

503,487

5.50%

2. ABA

321,646

3.51%

321,646
1 = 0.64

3. ALAGAD

312,500

3.41%

312,500
1 = 0.62

4.
VETERANS 304,802
FEDERATION

3.33%

304,802
1 = 0.61

5. PROMDI

255,184

2.79%

6. AKO

239,042

2.61%

7. NCSFO

238,303

2.60%

8. ABANSE!

235,548

2.57%

PINAY
9. AKBAYAN!

Additional
Seats

10. BUTIL

215,643

2.36%

215,643 / 503,487 *
1 = 0.43 1

11. SANLAKAS

194,617

2.13%

194,617 / 503,487 * 1
1 = 0.39

12. COOP-NATCCO

189,802

2.07%

189,802 / 503,487 * 1
1 = 0.38

13. COCOFED

186,388

2.04%

186,388 / 503,487 * 1
1 = 0.37

since

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number
of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would
be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of
additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact
whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole
numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may
/ 503,487 * result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore,
obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to
a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional
/ 503,487 *
representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional
representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need
/ 503,487 * to work within such extant parameter.

The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides
255,184 / 503,487 * with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each
1 = 0.51
for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of
239,042 / 503,487 * their nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology.
1 = 0.47
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say,
238,303 / 503,487 * however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a
1 = 0.47
mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA
321,646 / 503,487 * 7941 to make it "less strict," then the formula will also be modified to reflect the changes
willed by the lawmakers.
1 = 0.47
Epilogue

232,376

2.54%

232,376 / 503,487 *
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight
1 = 0.46
(38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list

seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold
and proportional representation.

active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It
should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system
of popular democracy.

In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec

effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the
legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the
system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of
the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are
beyond judicial review.28

With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we
are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with
patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the
Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system,
Philippine style.

Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing
such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.29

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting
party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified
parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws, 30 cannot
simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere
implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its
recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the
legislature.

SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions
by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its
provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the
Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.31
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of
three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the "proportional
representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a
total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should
not be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly
defeated the implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system,
though already popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential
system. We should allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in
the heart of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated
litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should
serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more

Case No. 9
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 147589

June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented
herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE
MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL
AUTONOMY;
CITIZENS
MOVEMENT
FOR
JUSTICE,
ECONOMY,
ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS
ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG
LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP;
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY;
NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under
"Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN
MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC);
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG
AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE
PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great
masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed
to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely
passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of
representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which
now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list
elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism
into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785 1issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001.
This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those
herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of
private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized
or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration
filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec,
"[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and
hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of
these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these
petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a
result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual
resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the
disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the
Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No.
3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral
and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list
elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.

"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of
proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the
inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this
electoral window.

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed
as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its
Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions
before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments
on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17,
2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast
for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further
orders of the Court.

"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional
representation' in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with
the Commission on Elections.

Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17,
2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the
parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a nonextendible period of five days. 15

"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that
there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a
manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations
and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3

Issues:

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154
parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying
that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political
Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the
May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as
an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and
that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan
Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against
some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to
file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26,
2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner
Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
filed a Petition 9before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No.
147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17,
2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible
period of five days from notice. 11

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following
issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More
specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which
will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:

Recourse Under Rule 65

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because
there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The
Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a
petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19,
20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19

Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice,

when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set
aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to
participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the
Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en
banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under
Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The
Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections,
Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate
recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this
date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may
just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made
its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the
absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is
available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is one
purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant
case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially
involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which
this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political
parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned
Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major
political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded
political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to
participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all
"registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot
be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may
be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be
valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list
system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod
pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral
party, a national party, UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was
also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33

"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO,
PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open
up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in
congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of
this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or
parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But
they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if
they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics,
the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly
states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties
in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis
of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of
the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the partylist elections.
Third Issue:

Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that
any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the
Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give
"genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he
exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new
chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature."35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it
was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA
7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2.Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,

organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally

identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list
system, Filipino-style.

The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by
means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack ofwell-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular
district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical
strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the
"marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the
law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list
organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons
nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving
more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable
lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we
repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House
of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its
express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system
are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5.Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization
or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than
ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its
desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,
by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the partylist system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a
statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the
words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term
in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits
that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group that is
not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it
admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of
Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens
specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the
party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the
clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate
desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot
be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are
manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and
common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna PatajoKapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and
sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective
sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they
are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout
engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally,
political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is
likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority
who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system
was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the
opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its
noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for
genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the
farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to
come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last
elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating
this social justice vehicle.

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional
district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent
of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing
that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could
participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec
disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the
party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order
to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House
of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has
been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot
otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to
do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been
within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district
elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a
student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities.
Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves
who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open
party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections
otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of
Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats
under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The
party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given
the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those
who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be
snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of
political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V.
Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as
culled from their deliberations.

Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not

an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:

The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source
from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself.
The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the
meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids
of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission
or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the
provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of
the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless
to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating
the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from
what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear
terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress
enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should
therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of
extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words.
Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x
x x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to
constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the
framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only
persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.

Grave Abuse of Discretion

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate
fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have
ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted
before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field
candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or
ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion. 49Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial
instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and
PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as
the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It
argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election
Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this
accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district
representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers
under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of
whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have
the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the
Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga
(MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources and privileges." This
Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine
the truth of such factual allegations.

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity
to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can
be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations
allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In
this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the
law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.

"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of
members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own
political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their
inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall
within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then
certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."54
The following discussion is also pertinent:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and
track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the
interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not
disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however,
that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of
Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as much during
the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the
political party must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52
Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional
provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent
of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS

GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by,
say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo,
the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a member 57 of the Constitutional Commission
in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political
party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not
prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party." 58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or
failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA
7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become
members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not
comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or
organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It
must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in
the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair to other parties, but also
deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9.Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941,
the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully
represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to
the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the
bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not
going to represent a particular district x x x."61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who
have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to
benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and
genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the
underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo
and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other
respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position
does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also
prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating
hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken
them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution
and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions,

and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been
the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 177271

WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to

immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme
urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to
begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number
of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further
DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice
hereof.1wphi1.nt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from
proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the
Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

May 4, 2007

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E.

CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR),
represented by MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE, Secretary-General, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, KAPATIRAN NG MGA
NAKAKULONG NA WALANG SALA (KAKUSA), BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR
NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), AHON PINOY,
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (AGAP),
PUWERSA NG BAYANING ATLETA (PBA), ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG
HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC.
(AGHAM), BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN (BABAE KA), AKSYON
SAMBAYANAN (AKSA), ALAY SA BAYAN NG MALAYANG PROPESYUNAL AT
REPORMANG KALAKAL (ABAY-PARAK), AGBIAG TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC.
(AGBIAG!), ABANTE ILONGGO, INC. (ABA ILONGGO), AANGAT TAYO (AT),
AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN (ANAK), BAGO NATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY
OF THE PHILIPPINES (BAGO), ANGAT ANTAS-KABUHAYAN PILIPINO
MOVEMENT (AANGAT KA PILIPINO), ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE
PROFESSIONAL (ABS), ASSOSASYON NG MGA MALILIIT NA NEGOSYANTENG
GUMAGANAP INC. (AMANG), SULONG BARANGAY MOVEMENT, KASOSYO
PRODUCERS CONSUMER EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (KASOSYO),
UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS (UNI-MAD), PARENTS ENABLING
PARENTS (PEP), ALLIANCE OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES (ANC), FILIPINOS FOR
PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROGRESS MOVEMENT (FPJPM), BIGKIS PINOY
MOVEMENT (BIGKIS), 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UNTAK),
ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS (ABC), BIYAYANG BUKID, INC.,
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), AKBAY PINOY
OFW-NATIONAL INC., (APOI), ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SECTOR (ATS), KALAHI
SECTORAL PARTY (ADVOCATES FOR OVERSEAS FILIPINO) AND
ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS, PROFESSIONALS AND SENIORS
(AAPS), Respondents.

Case No. 10
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

x--------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 177314

May 4, 2007

REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION, BANTAY

KATARUNGAN
FOUNDATION,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

submitted their separate comments. In the main, the separate comments of the private
respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of the plea of petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list groups and thus disqualify them
and their respective nominees from participating in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections.

DECISION

The facts:

GARCIA, J.:

On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and
regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of
names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May
14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary
manifestations. Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to
participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG
KASANGGA; (3)AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW
PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN;
(11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.

Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify
and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting partylist groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on
May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA
7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various
Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in
the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining
whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No.
177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan
Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying
their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14)
accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous letterrequest.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names
of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions,1 the petitioners in G.R.
No. 177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private respondents named
therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as sectoral
organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply with the guidelines prescribed by the
[Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec 2]" and, 2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be
enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the May 2007 elections.
In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public and
private respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a non-extendible
period of five (5) days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7) private
respondents3 in G.R. No. 177271 and one party-list group 4mentioned in G.R. No. 177314

Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition
to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be
disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec
as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the
aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and
marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter 5 dated March
29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of
that groups nominees. Another letter6 of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this
time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject
request.
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner
Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the frontpage banner headline "COMELEC WONT BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", 7 with the
following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented."
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own
behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter 8 to the Comelec formally

requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the
names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to
information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner
headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the Comelec, "collectively or individually, to
issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying the banner headline and the
alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms.
Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en bancResolution 07-07249 under date April 3,
2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner
Rosales basic disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:
RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of party-list
nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on election day.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all letters addressed to the
Commission inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.)
According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007 Resolution
only on April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last part of the " Order
empowering the Law Department to implement this resolution and reply to all letters
inquiring on the party-list nominees is apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort
and mangle the truth and give the impression that the antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007
is the final answer to the two formal requests of Petitioners".10
The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their petition on
April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724.
To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the
accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their
petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec xxx committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations even
withoutsimultaneously determining whether the nominees of herein private respondents are
qualified or not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector they claim to represent in Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of
the eight-point guidelines prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong
Bayani11 case which states that, "not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees." In the case of private

respondents, public respondent Comelec granted accreditations without the

required simultaneous determination of the qualification of the nominees as part of the
accreditation process of the party-list organization itself. (Words in bracket added; italization
in the original)12
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for
cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course
of action would entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties
in question, particularly whether or not they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented
groups. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which
is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari
proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided
on the undisputed facts on record. 13 The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address
issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the
tribunals evaluation of the evidence.14
Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026
in which petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the nominees of
the respondent party-list groups named in their petition.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the
qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a
requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with
the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae
Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration
of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec "not later than ninety (90) days before
the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8 requires the submission "not later than fortyfive (45) days before the election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives shall
be chosen.
Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and
captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these consolidated cases and they may
be summarized as follows:
1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of
the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to
documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and

2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the

public the names of said nominees.
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of the
nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while
commanding the publication and the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list
system participating groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the names
of the party-list nominees in said certified list. Thus:
SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60)
days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to
participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting
in the polling places on election day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list. (Emphasis added.)
And doubtless part of Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees
away from the public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news report appearing in
the adverted April 13, 2007 issue of theManila Bulletin:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its decision not to release
the names of nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions accredited to participate
in the party-list election which will be held simultaneously with the May 14 mid-term polls.
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. said he and [the other five COMELEC]
Commissioners --- believe that the party list elections must not be personality oriented.
Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 , the people are to vote for sectoral parties, organizations,
or coalitions, not for their nominees.
He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of
nominees. xxx (Words in brackets and emphasis added)
Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is
the right to information enshrined in the self-executory 15 Section 7, Article III of the
Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional
provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer
to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the
citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is
the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. 16 Without a governments
acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual
liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights
pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of
his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. 17 And since every citizen
by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground
of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.18
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right
of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the peoples
right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation
as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions
involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too,
there is also the need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as
military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security.19
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both
terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to

determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the
public.

at the first instance, the presumptive validity and regularity of official acts of government
officials and offices.

If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons
employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the
identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public
concern and interest.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be
informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a
system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The
Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo, 21 has consistently made it clear that it
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election.22 So it must be here for still other reasons
articulated earlier.

As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the
nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore,
lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees
shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to
deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said
Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list
which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To
stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is
not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the
Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List"
the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited nondisclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007
elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional
dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.

In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein
petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to
nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to
compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups,
sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same
petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is
hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 partylist elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its compliance
herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof.
This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec.

The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to
a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes,
as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental
right to information.20 While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such
vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually
sit in the House of Representatives.
The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons behind
the Comelecs disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to be stressed,
however, that the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of hard facts and
applicable statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the Court always assumes,

No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179295

April 21, 2009

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH

ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL
REFORMS,
INC.,
and
ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

Case No. 11
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179271

April 21, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION
FOR
NATIONAL
ADVANCEMENT
AND
TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS
BUSINESS
AND
SCIENCE
PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT
TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus, 1 assails the
Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers
(NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the
COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals
(ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A
Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition, 3 assails NBC
Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial
proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the
total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of
seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom
Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The
COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6

Maximum Total Party-List Votes

16,723,121

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the
[COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty
bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before
the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60.
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list
elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle
Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN),
Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOPNATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four
thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers,

thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open
and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six
hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in
connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus
COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a
formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the
required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all partylist ballots have been completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at
least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as
follows:

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board
of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher
than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one
(16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:

RANK

PARTY/ORGANIZATION/
COALITION

VOTES
RECEIVED

BUHAY

1,163,218

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

BAYAN MUNA

972,730

CIBAC

760,260

GABRIELA

610,451

APEC

538,971

A TEACHER

476,036

AKBAYAN

470,872

i.

Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated

15,283,659

ii.

Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ untabulated 1,337,032

(i.e. canvass deferred)

iii
.

Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from 102,430

areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City;
Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao)

ALAGAD

423,076

BUTIL

405,052

Akbayan! Citizens Action Party

AKBAYAN

10

COOP-NATCO

390,029

Alagad

ALAGAD

11

BATAS

386,361

Luzon Farmers Party

BUTIL

12

ANAK PAWIS

376,036

Cooperative-Natco Network Party

COOP-NATCCO

13

ARC

338,194

1
0

14

ABONO

337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan

(BATAS), against which anURGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF
REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for
the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC
No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list
are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the
meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other
election laws, the Commission on Elections, sittingen banc as the National Board of
Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions
set forth below, the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the
Party-List System:
1

Buhay Hayaan Yumabong

BUHAY

Bayan Muna

BAYAN MUNA

Citizens Battle Against Corruption

CIBAC

Gabriela Womens Party

GABRIELA

Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

APEC

Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, A TEACHER

Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational

Reforms, Inc.

11 Anak Pawis

ANAKPAWIS

1
2

Alliance of Rural Concerns

ARC

1
3

Abono

ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions

which may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total
actual votes cast under the Party-List System.
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant toVeterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the
canvass of the party-list results.
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan
(BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render
the proceedings therein moot and academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions
with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their
respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties.
We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC
Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National
Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions
based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected
maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1)
guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National
Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based
on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes
received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is
16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
Party-List

Projected total number of votes

BUHAY

1,178,747

BAYAN MUNA

977,476

CIBAC

755,964

GABRIELA

621,718

APEC

622,489

A TEACHER

492,369

AKBAYAN

462,674

ALAGAD

423,190

BUTIL

409,298

10

COOP-NATCO

412,920

11

ANAKPAWIS

370,165

12

ARC

375,846

13

ABONO

340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the
highest number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance withVeterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list
system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an
additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as
expressed in Veterans, is:
Number of votes of first party
=
Total votes for party-list system

Proportion
of
votes
party relative to total
party-list system

of
first
votes for

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle
it to additional seats:
Proportion
by the first party

of

votes

received Additional seats

Equal to or at least 6%

Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6%

One (1) additional seat

Less than 4%

No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
1,178,747
=
16,261,369

0.07248 or 7.2%

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations
and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as
follows:

Additional seats
a concerned party

for

No.
of
concerned party

votes

No.
of
first party

votes

of

x
of

No. of additional
seats
allocated
to first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus

Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other
elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties,
organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:
Party List

Additional Seats

BUHAY

BAYAN MUNA

CIBAC

GABRIELA

APEC

Party List

Percentage

Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA

1.65

CIBAC

1.28

GABRIELA

1.05

APEC

1.05

A TEACHER

0.83

AKBAYAN

0.78

ALAGAD

0.71

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a
copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

BUTIL

0.69

SO ORDERED.9

COOP-NATCO

0.69

ANAKPAWIS

0.62

ARC

0.63

ABONO

0.57

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions

which may later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total
votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the
appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions
with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their
respective cases.

Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August
2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of
Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon
[NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in
its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as
mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes,
should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section
12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list
representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the
Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and
Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and
Local Elections" resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results."1awphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig,
Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and
academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution
No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to
every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in
accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast
in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were
allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed
in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC
RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of
determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled
to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed
by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941
(R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the
proceedings of the NBC.11
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC
proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed
seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc.
(AGAP),12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the certification15 by COMELEC,
the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
Party-List

No. of Seat(s)

1.1

Buhay

1.2

Bayan Muna

1.3

CIBAC

1.4

Gabriela

1.5

APEC

1.6

A Teacher

1.7

Akbayan

1.8

Alagad

1.9

Butil

1.10

Coop-Natco [sic]

1.11

Anak Pawis

1.12

ARC

1.13

Abono

1.14

AGAP

1.15

AMIN

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan

(BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and
Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has
been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their
petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers,

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in
the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating
additional seats for the "First Party" violates the principle of
proportional representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one
for the "First Party" and another for the qualifying parties, violates
Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are
different from those required under RA 7941;
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list
system as provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et
al. v. COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the FirstParty Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same
being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v.
COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are
constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and implementation of
RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.17
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these
cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on
22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to

qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties
be barred from participating in the party-list elections? 18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at
least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall

constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.

Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;

xxx

Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying"
and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the
term "proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the
allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number
of
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Party-List

Representatives:

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law."
The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list
representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members
of the House of Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats
available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point,
we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number
of
available to legislative districts

seats
x .20 =

Number of seats available

party-list representatives

.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for partylist representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress
of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives.

to

220
x .20 =

55

.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to partylist representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation
of
Seats
for
The
Statutory
Limits
Presented
by
and the Three-Seat Cap

the

Party-List
Two

Representatives:
Percent
Threshold

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under
the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list
candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are
numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional
seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice
Vicente V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula21 as an
alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for
party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section
11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, 22 the following procedure shall be
observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat
each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC
shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank
them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis
supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate
party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2%
requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total
Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups
as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA
7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220
District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List
Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per
centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list
groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list
groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their
total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum
three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA
7941.23
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is
declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide
basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of

votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system.24
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional
percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes,
and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the
divisor in computing the allocation of seats." 25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be
awarded under BANATs second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs
original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list
seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of
seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the
three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second
percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all
qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by
multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first
round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of
seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a
second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole
integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking
are allocated until all the seats are filled up.26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes garnered during the elections.27

GABRIELA

621,171

51

AHONBAYAN

78,424

APEC

619,657

52

BIGKIS

77,327

A TEACHER

490,379

53

PMAP

75,200

AKBAYAN

466,112

54

AKAPIN

74,686

ALAGAD

423,149

55

PBA

71,544

COOP-NATCCO

409,883

56

GRECON

62,220

10

BUTIL

409,160

57

BTM

60,993

11

BATAS

385,810

58

A SMILE

58,717

12

ARC

374,288

59

NELFFI

57,872

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

60

AKSA

57,012

14

ABONO

339,990

61

BAGO

55,846

15

AMIN

338,185

62

BANDILA

54,751

16

AGAP

328,724

63

AHON

54,522

17

AN WARAY

321,503

64

ASAHAN MO

51,722

18

YACAP

310,889

65

AGBIAG!

50,837

19

FPJPM

300,923

66

SPI

50,478

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

67

BAHANDI

46,612

21

ABS

235,086

68

ADD

45,624

22

KAKUSA

228,999

69

AMANG

43,062

23

KABATAAN

228,637

70

ABAY PARAK

42,282

Rank

Party

Votes
Garnered

Rank

Party

BUHAY

1,169,234

48

KALAHI

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

71

BABAE KA

36,512

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

49

APOI

25

ALIF

217,822

72

SB

34,835

CIBAC

755,686

50

BP

26

SENIOR CITIZENS

213,058

73

ASAP

34,098

27

AT

197,872

74

PEP

28

VFP

196,266

75

ABA ILONGGO

29

ANAD

188,521

76

VENDORS

30

BANAT

177,028

77

ADD-TRIBAL

31

ANG KASANGGA

170,531

78

ALMANA

32

BANTAY

169,801

79

AANGAT KA PILIPINO

33

ABAKADA

166,747

80

AAPS

34

1-UTAK

164,980

81

35

TUCP

162,647

36

COCOFED

37

Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The
percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list
candidates.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered
over the total votes for the party-list.28

Rank

Party

Votes
Garnered

Votes Garnered over

Total Votes for Party- Guaranteed
List, in %

HAPI

BUHAY

1,169,234

7.33%

82

AAWAS

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

6.14%

155,920

83

SM

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

AGHAM

146,032

84

AG

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

38

ANAK

141,817

85

AGING PINOY

APEC

619,657

3.88%

39

ABANSE! PINAY

130,356

86

APO

A TEACHER

490,379

3.07%

40

PM

119,054

87

BIYAYANG BUKID

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

41

AVE

110,769

88

ATS

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

42

SUARA

110,732

89

UMDJ

COOP-NATCCO

409,883

2.57%

43

ASSALAM

110,440

90

BUKLOD FILIPINA

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

44

DIWA

107,021

91

LYPAD

11

BATAS29

385,810

2.42%

45

ANC

99,636

92

AA-KASOSYO

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

46

SANLAKAS

97,375

93

KASAPI

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

47

ABC

90,058

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

TOTAL

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

Total
18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the
total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or
the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the
guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two
percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives." 30
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes." This is where petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to
be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express
language of R.A. No. 7941.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph

1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes
until all the additional seats are allocated.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the
two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
shall consist of party-list representatives.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties
all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats.
Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if
we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to
100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for
every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50
seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by
each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party
by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in
the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share
in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the
remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap
to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank

Party

Votes
Garnered

Votes
Garnered
over
Total Votes
for Party
List, in %
(A)

Guaranteed
Seat
(First
Round)
(B)

Additional
Seats
(Second
Round)
(C)

(B) plus
(C), in
whole
integers
(D)

BUHAY

1,169,234

7.33%

2.79

BAYAN
MUNA

979,039

6.14%

2.33

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

1.80

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

1.48

APEC

619,657

3.88%

1.48

A Teacher

490,379

3.07%

1.17

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

1.11

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

1.01

931

COOPNATCCO

409,883

2.57%

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

11

BATAS

385,810

2.42%

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

N.A.

18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

N.A.

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

N.A.

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

N.A.

21

ABS

235,086

1.47%

N.A.

22

KAKUSA

228,999

1.44%

N.A.

23

KABATAAN

228,637

1.43%

N.A.

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

1.37%

N.A.

25

ALIF

217,822

1.37%

N.A.

26

SENIOR
CITIZENS

213,058

1.34%

N.A.

27

AT

197,872

1.24%

N.A.

28

VFP

196,266

1.23%

N.A.

29

ANAD

188,521

1.18%

N.A.

30

BANAT

177,028

1.11%

N.A.

31

ANG
KASANGGA

170,531

1.07%

N.A.

32

BANTAY

169,801

1.06%

N.A.

33

ABAKADA

166,747

1.05%

N.A.

34

1-UTAK

164,980

1.03%

N.A.

35

TUCP

162,647

1.02%

N.A.

36

COCOFED

155,920

0.98%

N.A.

Total

17

55

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from
the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 partylist representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list
seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for
one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column
(D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political
parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party
list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through
a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very
much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling
on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50
allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and
Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they
be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan
dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list
election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of
citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political
party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo
ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi
ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito
sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30
percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list
system.

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can
also participate in the party list system?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

xxxx

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and
mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the
UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass
organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the
participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will
be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question
that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we
belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their
participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this
amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the
political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is
open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC
the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in
time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and
cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming
effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology

or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates
and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the
Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party,
meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not
combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we
set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and
more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It
installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the
sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list
system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting
political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional
Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the partylist system.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory
of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is
spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of
citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact,
the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral
seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. 33 In
defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a
sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate
in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No.
7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state
that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral

organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for
example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal
ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus
organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista
Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk
wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the
same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration
of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations
nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" 34 as there is no financial status
required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, 35 that is, if the nominee represents
the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens,
he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of
the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The
20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives
cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we
cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The
three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization
may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the
party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance
with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections
joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate
party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of
the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated
9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the
distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the PartyList System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major
political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 12
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

x-----------------------x
of

the

Philippines
COURT

KAPATIRAN
NG
MGA
NAKULONG
(KAKUSA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 203766

G.R. No. 203958

NA

WALANG

SALA,

INC.

April 2, 2013
x-----------------------x

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 203960

x-----------------------x

1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

G.R. Nos. 203818-19

x-----------------------x
AKO
BICOL
POLITICAL
PARTY
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

(AKB), Petitioner,

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203922
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented
by
its
President
Congressman
Ponciano
D.
Payuyo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203936
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President
Michael
Abas
Kida,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

G.R. No. 203976

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN
(ARARO), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

RECONSTRUCTION,

INC.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203981
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL)
PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the partys Secretary
General, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204002

ALLIANCE
FOR
RURAL
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

CONCERNS, Petitioner,

AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA),

represented
by
its
Secretary
General,Ronald
D.
Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204094
G.R. No. 204126
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DEMOCRACY

(ANAD), Petitioner,

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204100
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly
PGBI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204122
1
GUARDIANS
NATIONALIST
PHILIPPINES,
INC.,
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES,
JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO, Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
Commissioner,ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
Commissioner, andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner,Respondents.

KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP),

formerly known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO
AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204139
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Catalua
Causing, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204141
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by
President, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204125

G.R. No. 204153

Maria

Evangelina

F.

Palparan,

PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet"

Martin, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204236

x-----------------------x
FIRM
24-K
ASSOCIATION,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 204158

ABROAD
PARTY
LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA,
LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR
BEHALF, Respondents.
x-----------------------x

INC., Petitioner,

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204238
ALLIANCE
OF
BICOLNON
PARTY
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

(ABP), Petitioner,

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204174

AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva,
Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204239

GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF
MOTHER
EARTH
(GREENFORCE),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204216

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 204240

x-----------------------x

AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT

(AGRI), represented by its Secretary General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

G.R. No. 204220

x-----------------------x

ABANG
LINGKOD
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 204263

A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND
FISHERMEN
INTERNATIONAL,
INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented

herein
by
its
President
Fatani
S.
Abdul
Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 204318

x-----------------------x

UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTYLIST, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 204356

BUTIL
FARMERS
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

PARTY, Petitioner,

x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204321
G.R. No. 204358
ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General
Jose
C.
Policarpio,
Jr.,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL

PROGRESS
(AAMA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204323
G.R. No. 204359
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de
Castro,
Dante
Navarroand
Guiling
Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA
GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART),

represented
by
its
Chairman,
Carlito
B.
Cubelo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204364

G.R. No. 204341

ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY,

HANAPBUHAY
AT
KAUNLARAN
(AKO
BUHAY), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.

YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in

their capacities as Commissioners thereof, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204367

ASSOCIATION
OF
GUARD
UTILITY
HELPER,
AIDER,
RIDER,
DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
INC.
(GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

AKBAY
KALUSUGAN
INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 204402

x-----------------------x

KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and

Secretary
General,
Frances
Q.
Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

G.R. No. 204370

AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T.
Tuazon, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204374

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204408
PILIPINO
ASSOCIATION
FOR
COUNTRY-URBAN
POOR
YOUTH
ADVANCEMENT
AND
WELFARE
(PACYAW),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x

1-UNITED
TRANSPORT
KOALISYON
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 204379

ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle
Lorenz, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204394

G.R. No. 204410

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204421

(1-UTAK), Petitioner,

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES,

INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its 1st nominee and
Chairman,
Francisco
G.
Datol,
Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204436

G.R. No. 204425

ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T.

Suplico, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES,

INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS,
ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERSOF
THE COMMISSION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204426
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS,
INC.
(ALA-EH), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in
their respective capacities as COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R.
Corella,
Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204435

(1AAAP), Petitioner,

x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204455
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204484
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger
M.
Federazo,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204485
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
INC.
(ALONA),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204486

Resolution dated 23 November 20128

1st
KABALIKAT NG
BAYAN
GINHAWANG
KABAGIS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

SANGKATAUHAN

(1st

204379

12-099
(PLM)

Alagad
Sining (ASIN)

G.R. No. 204490

PILIPINAS
PARA
SA
PINOY
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

(PPP), Petitioner,

Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129

204455

12-041
(PLM)

Manila
Savings
Loan
Association,
(Manila
Teachers)

204426

12-011
(PLM)

Association
Local
Entrepreneurs
and
Inc. (ALA-EH)

PERLAS-BERNABE,*
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Cases

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13
10
May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the Resolution dated 27 November 2012
party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
204435
12-057
1
organizations.
(PLM)
Advocating
Autonomy
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November
(1AAAP)
2012,2 20 November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and
19 February 2013.7
The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations
Resolution dated 27 November 201211
registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
204367
G.R. No.

SPP No.

Group

Grounds for Denial

A.
Via
the
COMELEC
En
Bancs
automatic
review
Divisions resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations

of

the

ng - The "artists" sector is not

considered
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
Failure
to
prove
track
record;
and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify
under
RA
7941
and
Ang Bagong Bayani.

12-104 (PL)

Akbay
Kalusugan
(AKIN), Inc.

COMELEC
Resolution dated 29 November 201212

Teachers A
non-stock
savings
and
and loan
association
cannot
be
considered
marginalized
and
Inc. underrepresented;
and
The
first
and
second
nominees
are
not
teachers
by
profession.
of Failure
to
show
that
its
Athletics members
belong
to
the
marginalized;
and
Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to
qualify.

Alliance - Failure of the nominees to

qualify:
although
registering
Party as
a
regional
political
party,
two of the nominees are not
residents
of
the
region;
and
four of the five nominees do
not
belong
to
the
marginalized and underrepresented.

- Failure of the group to show

that
its
nominees
belong
to
the urban poor sector.

204370

12-011 (PP)

Ako
(AAB)

Resolution dated 4 December 201213

7

204436

12-009 (PP), Abyan

12-165
Party (AI)
(PLM)

An

Bisaya Failure
to
representResolution
a
dated 7 November 201215
marginalized
sector
of
204139
12-127 (PL)
Alab
society,
despite
the
formation
Mamamahayag
of
a
sectoral
wing
for
the
(ALAM)
benefit
of
farmers
of
Region
8;
Constituency
has
district
representatives;
Lack
of
track
record
in
representing
peasants
and
farmers;
and
Nominees
are
neither
Resolution
dated 7 November 201216
farmers nor peasants.
10 204402
12-061 (PP)
Kalikasan
(KALIKASAN)
Ilonggo Failure
to
show
that
the
party
represents
a
marginalized
and
underrepresented
sector,
as
the
Province
of
Iloilo
has
district
representatives;
Untruthful
statements
in
the
memorandum;
and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.

Resolution dated 4 December 201214

8

204485

12-175 (PL)

Alliance
of
Organizations,
Networks and Associations of
the
Philippines,
Inc. (ALONA)

- Failure to establish that the

group
can
represent
14
sectors; - The sectors of homeowners
Resolution dated 14 November 201217
associations,
entrepreneurs
204394
12-145 (PL)
Association
and
cooperatives
are 11 not
Guard,
marginalized
and
Helper,
underrepresented;
and
Rider,
- The nominees do not belong
Domestic
to
the
marginalized
and
Helper,
underrepresented.
Janitor,
B.
Via
the
COMELEC
En
Bancs
review
on
motion
for
reconsideration
and
of
the
COMELEC
Divisions
resolutions
denying
registration
of
groups
Nanny
of
and organizations
Philippines,
(GUARDJAN)

ng Failure
to
prove
track
record
as
an
organization;
Failure
to
show
that
the
group
actually
represents
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
and
- Failure to establish that the
group
can
represent
all
sectors it seeks to represent.

Party-List The
group
reflects
an
advocacy
for
the
environment,
and
is
not
representative
of
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
There
is
no
proof
that
majority
of
its
members
belong
to
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
The
group
represents
sectors
with
conflicting
interests;
and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.

of
Utility
Aider,
Driver/

Failure
to
prove
membership
base
and
track
record;
Failure
to
present
activities
that
sufficiently
benefited
its
intended
constituency;
and
Agent - The nominees do not belong
to any of the sectors which
the the group seeks to represent.
Inc.

Resolution dated 5 December 201218

12 204490

sa Failure
to
show
that
the
group
represents
a
marginalized
and
underrepresented
sector,
as
Region
12
has
district
representatives;
and
Failure
to
show
a
track
record
of
undertaking
programs
for
the
welfareOmnibus
of Resolution dated 11 October 201225
the sector the group seeks to
203766
12-161 Atong
Paglaum,
represent.
(PLM) Inc.
(Atong
Paglaum)
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
Second Divisions resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list
group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the
lives
of
the
"marginalized
and
underrepresented." 20
203981
12-187 Association
for
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA,
(PLM)
Righteousness
ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory
Advocacy
on
injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No.
Leadership
9604,21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for
(ARAL)
the
13
May
2013
party-list
elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and
organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
204002
12-188 Alliance
for

G.R. No.

12-073
(PLM)

Pilipinas
Pinoy (PPP)

SPP No. Group

Para

(PLM)

Rural
(ARC)

12-220
(PLM)

United
Movement

Grounds for Denial

Resolution dated 10 October 201224

1

20381819

12-154
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

AKO
Political
(AKB)

Bicol Retained
Party accreditation
party,
but
in
the
elections

registration
as
a
denied
May
2013

and
political
participation
party-list
204318

Failure
to
represent
marginalized
underrepresented
The
Bicol
region
has
representatives
Congress;
The
nominees
are
marginalized
underrepresented.

any
and
sector;
already
in
and
not
and

Cancelled
registration
and
accreditation
The
nominees
do
not
belong
to
the
sectors
which
the
party
represents;
and
The
party
failed
to
file
its
Statement
of
Contributions
and
Expenditures
for
the
2010 Elections.
Cancelled
registration
and
accreditation
Failure
to
comply,
and
for
violation
of
election
laws;
The
nominees
do
not
represent
the
sectors
which
the
party
represents;
and
There
is
doubt
that
the
party
is
organized
for
religious
purposes.

Cancelled
registration
and
Concerns accreditation
Failure
of
the
nominees
to
qualify;
and
Failure
of
the
party
to
prove
that
majority
of
its
members
belong
to
the
sectors
it
seeks
to represent.
Cancelled
accreditation

registration

and

Against
Foundation
(UNIMAD)

Drugs The
sectors
of
Resolution
drug
dated 16 October 201227
counsellors
and
lecturers,
203960
12-260 1st
veterans
and
the
youth,
are
(PLM) Consumers
not
marginalized
and
Alliance
underrepresented;
Rural
Failure
to
establish
track
Inc. (1-CARE)
record;
and
Failure
of
the
nominees
to
qualify
as
representatives
of
the
youth
and
young
urban
professionals.

Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226

6

204100

204122

20426

12-196
(PLM)

12-223
(PLM)

12-257
(PLM)

1-Bro
Philippine
Guardians
Brotherhood,
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI)

Cancelled
registration
Failure
to
define
the
Resolution
sector
dated 16 October 201228
it
seeks
to
represent;
and
203922
12-201 Association
The
nominees
do
not
belong
(PLM) Philippine
to
a
marginalized
and
Electric
underrepresented sector.
Cooperatives
1
Guardians Cancelled
registration
(APEC)
Nationalist
The
party
is
a
military
Philippines,
Inc. fraternity;
(1GANAP/
The
sector
of
community
GUARDIANS)
volunteer
workers
is
too
Resolution dated 23 October 201229
broad
to
allow
for
meaningful
representation;
and
204174
12-232 Aangat
The
nominees
do
not
appear
(PLM) Party-List
to
belong
to
the
sector
of
( AT )
community
volunteer
workers.
Blessed
Federation
Farmers
Fishermen
International,
Inc.
BLESSED
Party-List)

Cancelled
registration
The
sector
of
rural
energy
for consumers
is
not
Energy, marginalized
and
underrepresented;
The
partys
track
record
is
related
to
electric
cooperatives
and
not
rural
energy
consumers;
and
The
nominees
do
not
belong
to
the
sector
of
rural
energy
consumers.

Cancelled
registration
of Three
of
the
seven
and nominees
do
not
belong
to
the
sector
of
farmers
and
fishermen,
the
sector
sought
(A to
be
represented;
and
None
of
the
nominees
are
registered
voters
of
Region
XI,
the
region
sought
to Omnibus
be Resolution dated 24 October 201230
represented.
203976
12-288 Alliance

of Cancelled
registration
accreditation
Failure
to
represent
marginalized
underrepresented
sector;
The
nominees
do
not
to
the
sector
that
the
claims to represent.

and
a
and
and
belong
party

Tayo Cancelled
registration
and
Party accreditation
The
incumbent
representative
in
Congress
failed
to
author
or
sponsor
bills
that
are
beneficial
to
the
sectors
that
the
party
represents
(women,
elderly,
youth,
urban
poor);
and
The
nominees
do
not
belong
to
the
marginalized
sectors
that
the
party
seeks
to
represent.

for Cancelled

registration

and

(PLM)

Rural
Agrarian
Reconstruction,
Inc. (ARARO)

and accreditation
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231
The
interests
of
the
peasant
and
urban
poor
sectors
that
the
party
represents
differ;
The
nominees
do
not
belong
to
the
sectors
that
the
party
seeks
to
represent;
Failure
to
show
that
three
of
the
nominees
are
bona
fide
party
members;
and
Lack
of
a
Board
resolution
to
participate
in
the
party-list
elections.

1
3

1
4

1
5

204240

203936

204126

12-279
(PLM)

12-248
(PLM)

12-263
(PLM)

Agri-Agra
Reporma
Magsasaka
Pilipinas
Movement
(AGRI)

Para

na Cancelled
registration
204364
sa The
party
ceased
to
exist
for
ng more
than
a
year
immediately
after
the
May
2010
elections;
The
nominees
do
not
belong
to
the
sector
of
peasants
and
farmers
that
the
party
seeks
to
represent;
Only
four
nominees
were
204141
submitted
to
the
COMELEC;
and
Failure
to
show
meaningful
activities for its constituency.

Aksyon
Cancelled
registration
Magsasaka-Partido Tinig Failure
to
show
that
ng
majority
of
its
members
are
Masa (AKMA-PTM)
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
204408
Failure
to
prove
that
four
of
its
nine
nominees
actually
belong
to
the
farmers
sector;
and
Failure
to
show
that
five
of
its
nine
nominees
work
on
uplifting
the
lives
of
the
members of the sector.
Kaagapay
Nagkakaisang
Agilang
Pilipinong
Magsasaka
(KAP)

ng Cancelled
registration
The
Manifestation
of
Intent
and
Certificate
of
Nomination
were
not
signed
by
an
appropriate
officer
of
the
party;
Failure
to
show
track
record
204153
for
the
farmers
and
peasants
sector;
and
Failure
to
show
that
nominees
actually
belong
to
the
sector,
or
that
they
have
undertaken
meaningful
activities for the sector.
203958

12-180
(PLM)

Adhikain
at Cancelled
Kilusan
ng Failure
to
Ordinaryong
nominees
actually
Tao
Para
sa the
sector,
or
that
Lupa,
Pabahay, undertaken
Hanapbuhay
at activities for the sector.
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

12-229
(PLM)

The
True
Marcos
Loyalist
(for
God,
Country
and
People)
Association
of
the
Philippines,
Inc. (BANTAY)

12-217
(PLM)

Pilipino
Association
Country

Poor
Advancement
and
( PA C YAW )

12-277
(PLM)

Pasang
Nationwide
Party
MASDA)

12-015
(PLM)

Kapatiran
mga

Cancelled
Failure
majority
of
marginalized
underrepresented;
Failure
to
its
nominees
to
the
underrepresented.

registration
show
that
belong
to
they
have
meaningful

registration
show
that
members
are
and
and
prove
that
two
of
actually
belong
marginalized
and
to
its

Cancelled
registration
for Change
of
sector
(from
Urban urban
poor
youth
to
urban
Youth poor)
necessitates
a
new
application;
Welfare Failure
to
show
track
record
for
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
Failure
to
prove
that
majority
of
its
members
and
officers
are
from
the
urban
poor
sector;
and
The
nominees
are
not
members
of
the
urban
poor
sector.
Masda Cancelled
registration
The
party
represents
drivers
(PASANG and
operators,
who
may
have
conflicting
interests;
and
Nominees
are
either
operators or former operators.
ng Cancelled
Nakulong Failure

to

prove

registration
that

na
Walang
Inc. (KAKUSA)

Resolution dated 30 October 201232

2
1

204428

12-256
(PLM)

Ang
Pinoy (AG)

Sala, na
Walang
Sala,
Inc.
(KAKUSA)
majority
of
its
officers
and
members
belong
to
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
The
incumbent
representative
in
Congress
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234
failed
to
author
or
sponsor
bills
that
are
beneficial
to
the
204239
12-060 Green
Force
for
sector
that
the
party
(PLM) the
Environment
represents
(persons
Sons
and
imprisoned
without
proof
of
Daughters
of
guilt
beyond
reasonable
Mother
Earth
doubt);
(GREENFORCE)
Failure
to
show
track
record
for
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
and
The
nominees
did
not
appear
to
be
marginalized
and
204236
12-254 Firm
24-K
underrepresented.
(PLM) Association,
Inc.
(FIRM 24-K)
Galing Cancelled
registration
and
accreditation
Failure
to
attend
the
summary
hearing;
Failure
to
show
track
record
for
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
and
The
nominees
did
not
appear
to
be
marginalized
and
underrepresented.
204341

Resolution dated 7 November 201233

2
2

204094

12-185
(PLM)

Alliance
Nationalism
Democracy
(ANAD)

for Cancelled
registration
and
and accreditation
Failure
to
represent
an
identifiable
marginalized
and
underrepresented
sector;
Only
three
nominees
were
submitted
to
the
COMELEC;

12-269
(PLM)

The
nominees
do
not
belong
to
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
and
Failure
to
submit
its
Statement
of
Contribution
and
Expenditures
for
the
2007 Elections.

Cancelled
registration
and
accreditation
The
party
is
an
advocacy
group
and
does
not
represent
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
Failure
to
comply
with
the
track
record
requirement;
and
The
nominees
are
not
marginalized citizens.
Cancelled
registration
and
accreditation
The
nominees
do
not
belong
to
the
sector
that
the
party
seeks
to
represent
(urban
poor
and
peasants
of
the
National
Capital
Region);
Only
two
of
its
nominees
reside
in
the
National
Capital
Region;
and
Failure
to
comply
with
the
track record requirement.

Action
League Cancelled
registration
and
of
Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM)
Failure
to
establish
that
its
nominees
are
members
of
the
indigenous
people
in
the
Mindanao
and
Cordilleras
sector
that
the
party
seeks
to
represent;
Only
two
of
the
partys
nominees
reside
in
the

Mindanao
and
Three
not
appear
marginalized.

and
of

the
to

Cordilleras;
Resolution dated 7 November 201238
nominees
belong
to

204323
do
the

12-210
(PLM)

Bayani
List (BAYANI)

Resolution dated 7 November 201235

2
6

204358

12-204
(PLM)

Alliance
Advocates
Mining
Advancement
for
Progress
(AAMA)

Resolution dated 7 November 201236

2
7

204359

12-272
(PLM)

Social
Movement
Active
and
Transparency
(SMART)

Resolution dated 7 November 201237

2
8

204238

12-173
(PLM)

Alliance
Bicolnon
(ABP)

of Cancelled
registration
in The
sector
it
represents
is
a
specifically
defined
group
which
may
not
be
allowed
National registration under the party-list system; and
Failure
to
establish
that Resolution
the
dated 7 November 201239
nominees
actually
belong
to
204321
12-252 Ang
the sector.
(PLM) Natin
(AANI)
Cancelled
registration
for The
nominees
are
Reform disqualified
from
representing
the
sectors
that
the
party
represents;
Failure
to
comply
with
the
track
record
requirement;
and
There
is
doubt
as
to
whether
majority
of
its
members Resolution
are
dated 7 November 201240
marginalized
and
204125
12-292 Agapay
underrepresented.
(PLM) Indigenous
Peoples
Alliance,
of Cancelled
registration
and
(A-IPRA)
Party accreditation
Defective
registration
and
accreditation
dating
back
to
2010;
Failure
to
represent
any
sector;
and
Failure
to
establish
that
the
nominees are employed in the construction industry,
Resolution dated 7 November 201241
the
204216
12-202 Philippine
sector it claims to represent.
(PLM) Coconut

Party Cancelled
registration
and
accreditation
Failure
to
prove
a
track
record
of
trying
to
uplift
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented
sector
of
professionals;
and
One
nominee
was
declared
unqualified
to
represent
the
sector of professionals.

Agrikultura Cancelled
registration
and
Isulong accreditation
Failure
to
establish
a
track
record
of
enhancing
the
lives
of
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented
farmers
which
it
claims
to
represent;
and
More
than
a
majority
of
the
partys
nominees
do
not
belong to the farmers sector.

ng Cancelled
registration
and
accreditation
Rights Failure
to
prove
that
its
five
Inc. nominees
are
members
of
the
indigenous
people
sector;
Failure
to
prove
that
its
five
nominees
actively
participated
in
the
undertakings
of
the
party;
and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees are bona fide
members.

Cancelled
accreditation

registration

and

Producers
Federation,
(COCOFED)

Resolution dated 7 November 201242

3
3

204220

12-238
(PLM)

Abang
Party-List
(ABANG
LINGKOD)

Resolution dated 14 November 201243

3
4

204158

12-158
(PLM)

Action
Brotherhood
Dreamers,
(ABROAD)

The
party
is
affiliated Resolution
with
dated 28 November 201244
Inc. private
and
government
204374
12-228 Binhi-Partido
ng Cancelled
agencies
and
is
not
(PLM) mga
Magsasaka accreditation
marginalized;
Para
sa
mga The
The
party
is
assisted
by
the
Magsasaka
assistance
government
in
various
(BINHI)
government
projects;
and
Department
The
nominees
are
not
and
members
of
the
marginalized
Failure
sector
of
coconut
farmers
and
group
is
producers.
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 28 November 201245
Lingkod Cancelled
registration
204356
12-136 Butil
Failure
to
establish
a
track
(PLM) Party (BUTIL)
record
of
continuously
representing
the
peasant
farmers
sector;
Failure
to
show
that
its
members
actually
belong
to
the
peasant
farmers
sector;
and
Failure
to
show
that
its
nominees
are
marginalized
and
underrepresented,
have
actively
participated
in
programs
for
the
Resolution
dated 3 December 201246
advancement
of
farmers,
and
204486
12-194 1st
adhere to its advocacies.
(PLM) Kabalikat
Bayan
Ginhawang
Cancelled
registration
and
Sangkatauhan
for Active accreditation - Failure to show that the
(1st
Inc. party
is
actually
able
to
KABAGIS)
represent
all
of
the
sectors
it
claims
to
represent;
Failure
to
show
a
complete
track
record
of
its
activities
since
its
registration;
and
The
nominees
are
not
part
of
any
of
the
sectors
which
Resolution
dated 4 December 201247
the party seeks to represent.

to

registration

and

party
from
through
of

receives
the
the
Agriculture;

prove
that
marginalized

the
and

Farmers Cancelled
registration
and
accreditation
Failure
to
establish
that
the
agriculture
and
cooperative
sectors
are
marginalized
and
underrepresented;
and
The
partys
nominees
neither
appear
to
belong
to
the
sectors
they
seek
to
represent,
nor
to
have
actively
participated
in
the
undertakings of the party.

Cancelled
registration
and
ng accreditation
Declaration
of
untruthful
statements;
Failure
to
exist
for
at
least
one
year;
and
None
of
its
nominees
belong
to
the
labor,
fisherfolk,
and
urban
poor
indigenous
cultural
communities
sectors
which
it
seeks to represent.

3
8

204410

12-198
(PLM)

1-United
Transport
Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

Resolution dated 4 December 2012

3
9

204421,
204425

12-157
(PLM),
12-191
(PLM)

Cancelled
accreditation
203922
The
party
represents
drivers
and
operators,
who
may
have
203960
conflicting
interests;
and
The
partys
nominees
do
not
belong
to
any
marginalized
and underrepresented sector.
203936

12-201
(PLM)

Association
(APEC)

12-260
(PLM)

1st
Consumers
(1-CARE)

for

Rural

12-248
(PLM)

Aksyon
Magsasaka-Partido
(AKMA-PTM)

Tinig

203958
registration
election
nominees
203976
term-sharing

12-015
(PLM)

Kapatiran
ng
Inc. (KAKUSA)

mga

12-288
(PLM)

Alliance
for
Inc. (ARARO)

Rural

48

Coalition
Senior
in
Philippines,
(SENIOR
CITIZENS)

of
Citizens
the
Inc.

Cancelled
The
laws
had
agreement.

party
because
a

violated
its

SPP No.

Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012

203818-19

203981
204002

Philippine

Alliance

Electric

Nakulong
and

Cooperatives

Energy,

Inc.

ng

na

Masa

Walang

Agrarian

Sala,

Reconstruction,

Resolution dated 20 November 2012

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,

1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI,
AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA,
AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI,
A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court,
directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the
official
ballot
for
the
13
May
2013
party-list
elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs
only the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:
G.R. No.

of

12-154
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

12-187
(PLM)

Association
for
Leadership (ARAL)

12-188
(PLM)

Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)

Righteousness

Advocacy

204094

12-185
(PLM)

Alliance
(ANAD)

for

Nationalism

204125

12-292
(PLM)

Agapay
ng
Inc. (A-IPRA)

204100

12-196
(PLM)

1-Bro
Philippine
(1BRO-PGBI)

Indigenous

and

Peoples

Democracy

Rights

Guardians

Alliance,

Brotherhood,

Inc.

Resolution dated 27 November 2012

204141

12-229
(PLM)

The
True
and
People)
(BANTAY)

Marcos
Loyalist
Association
of

204240

12-279
(PLM)

Agri-Agra
na
Reporma
Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)

204216

12-202
(PLM)

Philippine
(COCOFED)

204158

12-158
(PLM)

Action
Brotherhood
(ABROAD)

Coconut

(for
the

Para

sa

Producers
for

Active

God,
Country
Philippines,
Inc.
Magsasaka
Federation,
Dreamer,

ng
Inc.
Inc.

Resolutions
dated 4 December 2012
on
204122

12-223
(PLM)

1
Guardians
Nationalist
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

203766

12-161

Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

Philippines,

Inc.

(PLM)

(PLM)

204318

12-220
(PLM)

United
Movement
(UNIMAD)

Against

Drugs

204263

12-257
(PLM)

Blessed
Federation
of
Farmers
International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)

204174

12-232
(PLM)

Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)

204126

12-263
(PLM)

Kaagapay
ng
Magsasaka (KAP)

204364

12-180
(PLM)

Adhikain
at
Kilusan
Lupa,
Pabahay,
(AKO-BAHAY)

204139

12-127 (PL)

Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)

204220

12-238
(PLM)

Abang
LINGKOD)

204236

12-254
(PLM)

Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)

204238

12-173
(PLM)

Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)

204239

12-060
(PLM)

Green
Force
for
the
Environment
Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)

204321

12-252
(PLM)

Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)

204323

12-210
(PLM)

Bayani Party List (BAYANI)

204341

12-269
(PLM)

Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)

204358

12-204
(PLM)

Alliance
of
Advocates
for National Progress (AAMA)

204359

12-272
(PLM)

Social
Movement
Transparency (SMART)

204356

12-136

Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

Nagkakaisang

Foundation
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204402
Fishermen
204394

12-061 (PL)

Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)

and

12-145 (PL)

Association
of
Guard,
Rider,
Driver/Domestic
and
Nanny
of
(GUARDJAN)

Agilang

Pilipinong
204408

12-217
(PLM)

Pilipino
Association
for
Country
Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)

Para204428
sa
Kaunlaran

12-256
(PLM)

Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)

204490

12-073
(PLM)

Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)

(ABANG
204379

12-099
(PLM)

Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)

204367

12-104 (PL)

Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

204426

12-011
(PLM)

Association
of
Local
and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)

204455
and

12-041
(PLM)

Manila
Teachers
Inc. (Manila Teachers)

Savings

204374

12-228
(PLM)

Binhi-Partido
ng
Magsasaka (BINHI)

mga

204370

12-011 (PP)

Ako An Bisaya (AAB)

204435

12-057
(PLM)

1
Alliance
(1AAAP)

204486

12-194
(PLM)

1st
Kabalikat
ng
Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)

12-198
(PLM)

1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

12-157
(PLM)
12-191

Coalition
of
Senior
Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)

ng
Ordinaryong
Tao
Hanapbuhay
at

Lingkod

Party-List

for

in

Mining
Active

Sons

Advancement
204410
Reform

and
204421,
204425

Utility
Helper,
Helper,
Janitor,
the
Philippines,

Urban

Athletics
and

Advocating

Citizens

Para

Autonomy
Bayan

in

Poor

Entrepreneurs

Loan

Magsasaka

Aider,
Agent
Inc.

Association,
sa

mga

Party
Ginhawang

the

Philippines,

that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one
for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of
choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:

(PLM)
204436

12-009
12-165
(PLM)

(PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)

204485

12-175 (PL)

Alliance
of
Organizations,
Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)

204484

11-002

Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)

and Section 5, Article VI

Networks

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204153

12-277
(PLM)

Pasang
MASDA)

Masda

Nationwide

Party

(PASANG

The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration
under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation
as party-list organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list
system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by
the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The Courts Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in
the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying
petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid,
except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system,
shall not be represented in the voters registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards
of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers
in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that
"the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The
constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following
discussion among its framers:

The Party-List System

MR. MONSOD: x x x.

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply
put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list
system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list

system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the
sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems
precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a
sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved
seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And
then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9,
the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business,
military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were
identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The
problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to
stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a
caucus of which sector should be included which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know,
the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become because when we
make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the
problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These
days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer;
a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a
farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in
the Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We
sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system,
there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral
party or a sectoral organization that will then register and present candidates of their party.
How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes,
so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district.
That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition
do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties,
organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to
be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,
Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the
farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the
end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each
party or each organization one does not have to be a political party and register in order to
participate as a party and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes
that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will
be for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the
maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they
then submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these nominees have
to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the
day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10

percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a womens party gets 2 1/2 percent
and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are
apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say,
500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that?
When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes
gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a
sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also
means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a
group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not
entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common
interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and,
therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the
same time making sure that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral
constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these
groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may
not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide
basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So,
they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives
in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of
party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather
than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even
have to mention sectors because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They
can be sectoral parties within the party list system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party
list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through

a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very
much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling
on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50
allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to
political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list
concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30
percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list
system.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of
citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political
party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo
ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi
ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito
sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates
and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from
the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan
dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list
election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang
labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem
of sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he
qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party
is really organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the
political party may submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such
sectors. The lists are to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to
such sector the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of membership in the
said sector or to question the claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations or
parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in
character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and
unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not
only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner
Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long
as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral
parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system
exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting
Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987
Constitution took off from two staunch positions the first headed by Commissioner
Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated
to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the
view that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their
development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to
further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral
contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more
established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern
when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list
elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The
advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a
compromise that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized
sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the
party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of
votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The
only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats
for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution,
by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and brace
themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political
groups.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was
outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the
first three consecutive terms. 55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987

Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for
sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect
to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the
same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The
party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for
both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list
system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of
the Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The
commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from
sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional
parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral
parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list
system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any
clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties
belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt
that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."
This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral
parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list
system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties
applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,"
clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional
terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type
of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section
5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system
is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the
party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3.Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition
may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members
as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory
of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is
spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of
citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party.
Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941
provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of
the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a
political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and
regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and causeoriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if
they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to
prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly
different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and
need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a
national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented"

sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same
ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their
economic status as citizens.

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."56The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all
necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by
definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth.
However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political
constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the
special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.

None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the

"marginalized and underrepresented."

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does
not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A.
No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the
grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations
after due notice and hearing.
Section 6.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on
any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in
Section 2 on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list
system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to the"marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to
become members of the House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2
of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require
that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the
contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and
underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941
with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the
1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in
Section 5 that are,by their nature, economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For
these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must
belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one
must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector,
is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and
underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National
Statistical Coordination Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals,
the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will
allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political
constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand,
limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas

workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will
give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the
House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise
to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic
and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and
transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to
masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions
in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections.
Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack
"well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily
those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national
and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of
Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation
of parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly
allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must
comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives.
"However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political
party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified
major political parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent
inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELECs refusal to
register sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely
formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from
participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the
Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. 59 Thus, major
political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is
expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties
should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of
major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will

facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack welldefined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in partylist elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to
the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be
geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized
and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them
a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that
fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the
party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws,
platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong
to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of
R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form
part does not participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9.Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.1wphi1
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she
seeks to represent.In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one

must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such
sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who
desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the
day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term."

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for

religious purposes;

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis
supplied)

xxxx

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling
further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating
in party-list elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to
the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in partylist elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the
party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the
major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent
of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-

political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law." 61 The experimentations
in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list
system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941, must now come to an end.

that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in

disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not
have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and
authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a
new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which
followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court
did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as
we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we
declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply
the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our
rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who
lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC
shall adhere to the following parameters:

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that
did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all
nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional
parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent
may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their
sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they
do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or
more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified
nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under
such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties
or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need
to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist
from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the
Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the
Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because
petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have
been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names
of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under
the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013
part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to
include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on
Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list
system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary
hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

NO
.

TITLE

NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS
1

Edu v Ericta, 34 SCRA 481

Eastern Shipping Lines v POEA, 166 SCRA 533

Gerochi v Separtment of Energy, GR No. 159796, July 17, 2007

Tatas v Secretary of Department of Energy, GR No. 124360, November 5, 1997

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Sema v COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16 2008 (composition)

Tobias v Abalos, GR No. 114783, December 8, 1994 (House of rep sec 5-8)

Mariano v COMELEC, GR No. 118577, March 7, 1995

Quinto v COMELEC, GR No. 189698, February 22 2010

Senator Benigno Aquino v COMELEC, GR No.189793, April 7, 2010

Victorino Aldaba v COMELEC, GR No. 188078

Ang Ladlad LGBT v COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010

Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC, 342SCRA 344

Bagong Bayano-OFW v COMELEC, GR No. 147589, June 26, 2001

10

Bantay Republic Act v COMELEC, GR No.177271, May 4 2007

11

Banat v COMELEC, GR No. 179271, April 21m 2009

Atung Paglaum v COMELEC, GR No. 203766, April 2, 2013

12