EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-27489. April 30, 1970.]

LEONORA TANTOY VDA. DE MACABENTA, for herself
and in behalf of her minor child, RAQUEL
MACABENTA, claimants-appellees, vs. DAVAO
STEVEDORE TERMINAL COMPANY, respondentappellant.
Peregrino M. Andres for claimants-appellees.
H. A. Cabarroguis & Associates for respondentappellant.

3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LAW IS CLEAR;

DUTY OF COURT TO APPLY THE LAW TO
FACTS AS FOUND. Where the law is clear, our duty is
equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as
found. What is more, we have taken pains to defeat
any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an
interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility,
but likely to attach to it a significance different
from that intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrases of
an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate.

SYLLABUS

there can always occur to intelligence hostile to a

piece of legislation a misinterpretation that may,

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION ACT; DEPENDENTS OF INJURED

without due reflection, be considered not too farfetched.

EMPLOYER. From the express language of the

Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the

4. ID.; ID.; SETTLED RULE. The Court has constantly

held from the early cases of Ty Sue v. Hord,

deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or

partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of

12 Phil. 485, a 1909 decision, in United States v.

Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 and again in Riera v. Palmori, 40
Phil.

age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and

unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon
the deceased, are considered dependents.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. Claimant here is
clearly the widow of the deceased Conrado
Macabenta. It is true that the marriage took place after
the fatal accident but there was no question
that at the time of his death she was marked to him.

105 (1919) that , assuming a choice is necessary

between conflicting theories, that which best conforms
to the language of the statute and its purpose should
prevail and that no construction is to be adopted
that would "tend to defeat the purpose and object of
the legislator."
5. ID.; ID.; WHERE POLICY OF LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY
COURT TO GIVE EFFECT. Once the policy of

purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should

be given to it by the judiciary. Even if honest

accident resulting in the death of Conrado Macabenta

could not be considered as having arisen out of

doubts could be entertained, therefor, as to the

meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for

and in the course of employment is not to be taken too

seriously. The facts as set forth in the decision,

such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of

the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.

which must be accepted by us in view of their being

based on substantial evidence argue against the

6. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION ACT; INTERPRETATION AND

condensation of the Davao Stevedore Terminal

Company.

CONSTRUCTION, TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH

CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE. "To state the

8. ID.; ID.; APPEAL FROM DECISION OF THE

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION TO

constructions sought to be fastened on the clear and

explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It

SUPREME COURT ASCERTAINMENT OF CREDIBILITY

AND WEIGHT OF CONFLICTING EVIDENCE, BEYOND

comes into collision with the constitutional command

pursuant to the social justice principle that the

AUTHORITY IN APPEALS BY CERTIORARI. The task of

ascertaining the credibility and weight of

government extend protection to labor." How could

such an intent then be imputed to the legislative

conflicting evidence is, however, beyond the province

of our authority in appeals by certiorari. Even if

body. No such suspicious ought to be entertained that

it was contemplated by our lawmakers that any

the possibility that the Commission's conclusions were

erroneous could not be ruled out, still, to borrow

provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act could be

so worded as to deny protection to the laboring

the language of justice Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus

Lines, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation

elements and their dependents and thus frustrate the

constitutional objective of social justice.

Commission, 'such errors would constitute mere errors

of judgment but do not involve any grave abuse

7. ID.; ID.; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION;

FINDINGS OF FACT IT BASED ON

of discretion on its part.'

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL;

INSTANT CASE. The alleged error that the

DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:

The success of the employer Davao Stevedore

Terminal Company in imparting plausibility to the novel

was not yet married to the decedent although they

had already been living together as husband

question raised as to whether or not the widow of a

deceased employee whose marriage occurred after

and wife for the past three months. However. on the

day following the accident, they were lawfully

the accident as well as the posthumous child could be

considered dependents within the meaning of the

wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized at San

Pedro Hospital in Davao City where the deceased

Workmen's Compensation Act may be gauged by the

fact that we gave due course to the petition for

was hospitalized up to his death. It is noteworthy that

the marriage was facilitated through the

the review of a decision of the Workmen's

Compensation Commission answering the question in
the

intercession of the general manager of the respondent

company." 1 The decision likewise noted that

affirmative and sustaining the right to compensation of

the claimant Leonora Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta
for herself and in behalf of her minor child, Raquel
Macabenta. After hearing the parties and in the right
of the language of the law, its manifest purpose, and
the constitutional provisions on social justice and
protection to labor, we answer the question similarly.
We affirm the appealed decision of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission.
In the decision rendered by the then Chairman of the
Commission, Nieves Baens del Rosario, dated
September 27, 1966, it is stated that there is no
dispute "that at the time that the decedent met the
vehicular accident on September 13, 1961 which led to
his death on September 29, 1961, the claimantwidow

the claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the

posthumous daughter of the deceased who was
given the name Raquel Tantoy Macabenta.
As to how the deceased Conrado Macabenta met his
accident, the decision, after stating that the
deceased was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao
Stevedore Terminal Company at Manay, Panabo,
Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in
Davao City, went on as follows: "Although some sort of
quarters were provided by the respondent to its
employees at the sawmill, many of them apparently
preferred to commute, and the deceased in particular
went home about three times a week. While the
respondent, through its lone witness and at the same
time production manager, Sergio Dalisay,

disclaimed the claimant's declarations that the

company provided a service pickup to transport its

Conrado Macabenta. It is true that the marriage took

place after the fatal accident but there was no

employees to and from work, the synthesis of the very

same testimonial evidence does not support this

question that at the time of his death she was married

to him. She, therefore, comes entirely within the

denial, but on the contrary tends to bring out the fact

that the respondent did furnish transportation." 2

letter of the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the
child, Raquel Macabenta, also falls within the

As a result, it reversed the finding of the then acting

referee of its regional office in Davao City and

words the Act employs. As set forth in the decision,

while the marriage took place on Sept. 14, 1961, the

awarded to the claimant widow for herself and in

behalf of her minor child the amount of P2,708.00 as

widow and the deceased had already been living

together as husband and wife the preceding three

compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorney's

fees.

months. The child born of such relationship, later

legalized, is, as made clear in the decision, the

Hence, this petition for review, which, as noted, was

given due course primarily due to the question

posthumous daughter of the deceased. What the

employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company seems

raised being one of first impression. As announced at

the opening of this opinion, we uphold the

bent in ignoring is that our Civil Code, in no uncertain

terms, considers a conceived child born for all

Workmen's Compensation Commission.

purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is

attended with the conditions specified, namely,

1. From the express language of the Workmen's

Compensation Act, a widow living with the
deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or
partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of
age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and
unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon
the deceased are considered dependents. 3 Claimant
here is clearly the widow of the deceased

that she is alive at the time she is completely

delivered from the mother's womb. 4 Here, fortunately,
the child has survived the ordeal of the loss of the one
called upon to support her, her father, who,
unfortunately however, met his death before her birth.
Time and time again, we have stressed that where the
law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must

apply it to the facts as found. 5 What is more, we have

taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal

choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that

which best conforms to the language of the

language by rejecting an interpretation, even if not

totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it

statute and its purpose should prevail. Again, as far

back as United States v. Toribio, 8 decided the next

a significance different from that intended by the

lawmakers. A paraphrase of an aphorism from Holmes

year, we made unmistakable our view that no

construction is to be adopted that would bend "to
defeat

is not inappropriate. There can always occur to an

intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a
misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be
considered not too far-fetched. The employer in
this case, without impugning its motives, must have
succumbed to such a temptation, quite
understandable but certainly far from justifiable. It is
quite obvious then why we find its stand devoid of
merit.
2. Our conclusion likewise finds support in the
fundamental principle that once the policy or
purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should
be given to it by the judiciary. 6 Even if honest
doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to the
meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for
such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of
the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. We
have never deviated from our constant holding from Ty
Sue v. Hord, 7 a 1909 decision, that, assuming a

the purpose and object of the legislator." We made use

of an expression almost identical in Riera v.
Palmaroli 9 with our warning against so narrowly
interpreting a statute "as to defeat the manifest
purpose of the legislator." The employer in this case
should have been well advised to take into
consideration the teachings of the above cases before
it sought to press upon us the desirability of
imparting to the applicable statutory language a
meaning that would render fruitless the purpose so
clearly evident on the face of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
3. There is still another avenue of approach that
similarly calls for the affirmance of the decision of
the Workmen's Compensation Commission now on
appeal. This is apparent from an excerpt from a
recent case of Automotive Parts & Equipment
Company, Incorporated v. Lingad: 10 "To state the
construction sought to be fastened on the clear and
explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It

comes into collision with the constitutional command

pursuant to the social justice principle that the

Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. As we had

occasion to state only last month in B. F. Goodrich

government extend protection to labor." How could

such an intent then be imputed to the legislative

Philippines, Inc. v. Acebedo: 11 "Nor can the conclusion

reached by respondent Commission be

body. No such suspicion ought to be entertained that it

was contemplated by our lawmakers that any

repudiated unless 'on a clear showing of failure to

consider the evidence on record or failure to consider

provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act could be

so worded as to deny protection to the laboring

fundamental and patent logical relationships in the

evidence, amounting to a clear travesty of justice or

elements and their dependents and thus frustrate the

constitutional objective of social justice. To quote

grave abuse of discretion.' What was said by us in

Basaysay v. Workmen's Compensation Commission,

from the Lingad case anew: "For it is undeniable that

every statute, much more so one arising from a

through the present Chief Justice, bears repeating:

'The task of ascertaining the credibility and weight of

legislative implementation of a constitutional mandate,

must be so construed that no question as to its

conflicting evidence, is, however, beyond the province

of our authority in appeals by certiorari.' Even if

conformity with what the fundamental law requires

need arise.

the possibility that the Commission's conclusions were

erroneous could not be ruled out, still, to borrow

4. The basic question in this petition for review thus

disposed of, there is nothing to stand in the

the language of Justice Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus

Lines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation

way of the affirmance of the decision now on appeal.

The alleged error that the accident resulting in the

Commission. 'such errors would constitute mere errors

of judgment but do not involve any grave abuse

death of Conrado Macabenta could not be considered

as having arisen out of and in the course of

of discretion on its part.' "

employment is not to be taken too seriously. The facts

as set forth in the decision, which must be
accepted by us in view of their being based on
substantial evidence argue against the contention of
the

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen's

Compensation Commission of September 27, 1966 is
affirmed. With costs against respondent Davao
Stevedore Terminal Company.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Castro, Zaldivar,

Teehankee and Villamor, JJ. concur.
Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;

DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own
behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA,
ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and
AURELIO, JR., all surnamed LANUZA;

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-30642. April 30, 1985.]
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on
behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S.
FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO
S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S.
FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S.
FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf
and on behalf of her minor children LINDA,

EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf

and on behalf of her minor children JOSE,
LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed
ISLA, petitioners, vs. PHILEX MINING
CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding
Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.
Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.
SYLLABUS

ROMEO, ANTONIO, JEAN and ELY, all surnamed

Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; CAUSE

OF ACTION ASCERTAINED FROM

MARTINEZ;

AVERMENTS IN THE COMPLAINT; CASE AT BAR. It

should be underscored that petitioners' complaint

SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf

and on behalf of her minor children JOSE,
ESTELA, JULITA, SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed
OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf
and on behalf of her minor children EDNA,

is not for compensation based on the Workmen's

Compensation Act but a complaint for damages
(actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of
eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00)
pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to

compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation

appeared in the complaint that the employees died

Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a

theory of compensation distinct from the existing

from accident arising out of and in the course of their

employments. The complaint instead alleges gross

theories of damages, payments under the acts being

made as compensation and not as damages (99

and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the

part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a

C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the

harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the

consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in

the death of the employees working underground.

workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable

whether negligence exists or not since liability is

Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not

the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's

created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on

any theory of actionable wrong on the part of

compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant

to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the

the employer (99 C.J.S. 36). In other words, under the

compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay

averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres

vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100). In the

compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as

the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or

present case, there exists between Philex and the

deceased employees a contractual relationship. The

work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due

to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs.

alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate

failure that amount to bad faith on the part of

Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages

are awarded to one as a vindication of the

Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may

be held liable for damages.

wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity

recoverable by a person who has sustained injury

2. CIVIL LAW; AWARD OF COMPENSATION BENEFITS

UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT;

either in his person, property or relative rights, through

the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).

RATIONALE DIFFERS FROM AWARD OF DAMAGES

UNDER THE CIVIL CODE. The rationale in awarding

3. ID.; ID.; CLAIM FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE N.C.C.;

BURDEN OF PROOF. The claimant for

compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act

differs from that in giving damages under the

damages under the Civil Code has the burden of

proving the causal relation between the defendant's

negligence and the resulting injury as well as the

damages suffered. While under the Workmen's

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIMANTS NOT PRECLUDED FROM

BRINGING ACTION BEFORE THE REGULAR

Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of

the deceased or injured employee that the death

COURTS; RATIONALE. We hold that although the

other petitioners had received the benefits under

or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and

the employer has the burden to prove otherwise

the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not

preclude them from bringing an action before the

(De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Cario vs.

WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs.

regular court because they became cognizant of the

fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual

WCC, 60 SCRA 228).

obligations with the deceased miners only after

receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER UNDER THE

WORKMEN'S ACT AND THE CIVIL CODE.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
compensation benefits should be paid to an
employee who suffered an accident not due to the
facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his
employer but caused by factors outside the industrial
plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the
liability of the employer, depends on breach of
contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was
specifically enacted to afford protection to the
employees or workmen. It is a social legislation
designed

been aware of said violation of government rules and

regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmen's
Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first
remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of
fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice. The case should therefore be
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
However, should the petitioners be successful in
their bid before the lower court, the payments made
under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be

to give relief to the workman who has been the victim

of an accident causing his death or ailment or

deducted from the damages that may be decreed in

their favor.

injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs.

WCC, 54 SCRA 379).

6. ID.; NEGLIGENCE; RECOVERY OF DAMAGES UNDER

THE NEW CIVIL CODE; SUPREME COURT

DECISIONS FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.

Recovery under the New Civil Code for damages

his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss

of the life of the worker and the consequent loss

arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of

the New Labor Code. And the damages

to his family without due process of law. The dissent in

effect condones and therefore encourages such

recoverable under the New Civil Code are not

administered by the System provided for by the New

gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to

comply with his legal obligation to provide safety

Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to

the Government Service Insurance System or the

measures for the protection of the life, limb and health

of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint

Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the
New Labor Code). Furthermore, under Article 8 of

alone, such attitude is un-Christian. It is therefore

patent that giving effect to the social justice

the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court

form part of the law of the land. WE ruled that

guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the

provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an

judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the

same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs.

exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering

obedience to the mandates of the fundamental

Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).

law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SOCIAL JUSTICE

GUARANTEE; EMPLOYER NOT RELIEVED FROM
LIABILITY

8. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR LAW; NOFAULT LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER UNDER SEC.

FOR DEATH OF HIS WORKERS. The right to life is

guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of
the Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability
for the death of his workers arising from his gross
or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for
the protection of his employees or workers
against the dangers which are inherent in underground
mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and

5 OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AND ART. 173,

NEW LABOR CODE. It should be stressed that
the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the
New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury
caused by the nature of the work, without any
fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly
termed no-fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's

Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the

New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious

provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not

the Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint

liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or

culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety

involved in the instant case. That "special law", in

reference to the complaint, can be no other than the

devices required by the law for the protection of the

life, limb and health of the workers. Under either

Workmen's Compensation Law.

Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to

pay compensation benefits to the employee,
whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected,
even if the employer has faithfully and diligently
furnished all the safety measures and contrivances
decreed by the law to protect the employee.

2. ID.; ID.; OPTION TO SUE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE,

FORECLOSED; CASE AT BAR. There are two
considerations why it is believed petitioners should no
longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue
under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings
under the Workmen's Compensation Act have

MELENCIO-HERERA, J., dissenting:

already become the law in regards to the "election of

remedies", because those proceedings had

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTION FOR DAMAGES; DEATH

COMPENSATION OF WORKMEN; COMPLAINT

become a "finished transaction." In the second place, it

should be plainly equitable that, if a person

REGULATED BY THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW.

This case involves a complaint for damages

entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first

election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should

for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining

Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil

no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second

option. At the very least, if he wants to make a

Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides for its

non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically

second election, in disregard of the first election he

has made, when he makes the second election he

provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title

XVIII Damages, that: "Compensation for Workmen

should surrender the benefits he had obtained under

the first election. This was not done in the case

and other employees in case of death, injury or illness

is regulated by special laws." By the very

before the court.

3. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT; REMEDY UNDER THE

ACT, EXCLUSIVE. In providing for exclusiveness of

the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation

the legislative's continuing intent to maintain the

exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5

Act, the Philippine Legislature worded the first

paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows: "Sec. 5.

unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.

Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and

remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to
compensation shall exclude all other rights and
remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against
the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because
of said injury." (Paragraphing and underscoring

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT; REMOVAL OF
EXCLUSORY PROVISION, A LEGISLATIVE CONCERN.
To grant the petition and allow the victims of
industrial accidents to file damages suits based on
torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary
to the express provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a departure from the principles

supplied) There should be no question but that the

original first paragraph of Section 5 of the

evolved in the long history of workmen's

compensation. At the very least, it should be the
legislature

Workmen's Compensation Act, formulated in 1927,

provided that an injured worker or employee, or his

and not this Court which should remove the exclusory

provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a

heirs, if entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot

have independent recourse neither to the Civil

provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on

employees' compensation. Workmen's compensation

Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the

employer. After 1927, there were occasions

evolved to remedy the evils associated with the

situation in the early years of the industrial revolution

when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the

first paragraph of Section 5 such that the

when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits

to get recompense.

remedies under the Act would not be exclusive; yet,

the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows

2. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER PREDETERMINED;

RIGHT OF INJURED WORKER TO FILE TORT

SUIT, GIVEN UP. Workmen's compensation

represents a compromise. In return for the near
certainty
of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured
worker gives up the right to subject the employer
to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus,
liability not only disregards the element of fault but it
is also a pre-determined amount based on the wages
of the injured worker and in certain cases, the
actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not
receive the total damages for his pain and suffering

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of

Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred
to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines
underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June
28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried
them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the
complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of
government rules and regulations, negligently and
deliberately failed to take the required precautions for
the protection of the lives of its men working
underground. Portion of the complaint reads: LexLib

which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The

employer is required to act swiftly on compensation

"xxx xxx xxx

claims. An administrative agency supervises the

program. And because the overwhelming mass of

"9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28, 1967,

the defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless

workingmen are benefited by the compensation

system, individual workers who may want to sue for
big

negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to

take the required precautions for the due

amounts of damages must yield to the interests of

their entire working class.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J p:
This is a petition to review the order of the former
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, dated
December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint
for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

protection of the lives of its men working underground

at the time, and in utter violation of the laws and
the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the
Government pursuant thereto, allowed great amount
of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at
the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped
through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore
and rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous
pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level, with
the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock

in the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground

supports due to such enormous pressure,

"13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law

and the rules and regulations duly promulgated

approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores,

rocks, mud and water, accompanied by surface

by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the

Special Committee above referred to, in their

boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out

and filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5)

Report of Investigation, pages 7-13, Annex `B' hereof,

but also failed completely to provide its men

minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber

supports and carried off materials, machines and

working underground the necessary security for the

protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact

equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby

trapping within its tunnels of all its men above

that it had vast financial resources, it having made,

during the year 1966 alone, a total operating income

referred to, including those named in the next

preceding paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs

of P38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of

P19,117,394.00, as per its 11th Annual Report for the

herein;

year ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate

assets totalling P45,794,103.00 as of December 31,

"10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then

working at defendant PHlLEX's mine on the said
date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying
holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7 days;
and the rest, 21 in number, including those referred to
in paragraph 7 herein above, were left
mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that
up to then, a great many of them were still alive,
entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not
rescued due to defendant PHlLEX's decision to
abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its
bounded legal and moral duties in the premises;
"xxx xxx xxx;

1966;
"xxx xxx xxx" ( pp. 42-44, rec.).
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by
Philex alleging that the causes of action of
petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered
by the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772)
and that the former Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an
opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to
dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not
based on the provisions of the Workmen's

Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil

Code allowing the award of actual, moral and

negligence."

exemplary damages, particularly: LibLex

After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed,

respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes

damage to another, there being fault or negligence,

dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's

is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or

negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual

Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for

reconsideration of the said order, respondent

relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict

and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set

aside his order of June 27, 1968 and allowed Philex

"Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are

also applicable to a quasi-delict.

to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to

reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed

"(b) Art. 1173 The fault or negligence of the obligor

consists in the omission of that diligence

by petitioners.

which is required by the nature of the obligation and

corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles
1171
and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.

On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed

the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in
accordance with the established jurisprudence, the
Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive
original jurisdiction over damage or compensation
claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of

"Art. 2201. . . .

workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not

the employer was negligent, adding that if the

"In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude,

the obligor shall be responsible for all damages

employer's negligence results in work-connected

deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to

which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.

Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay

additional compensation equal to 50% of the

"Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may

be granted if the defendant acted with gross

compensation fixed in the Act. Cdpr

Petitioners thus filed the present petition.

In their brief, petitioners raised the following
assignment of errors:
I
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.
II
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR
DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR
COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT."
A

assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to

dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their
complaint including those contained in the annexes
are deemed admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners
asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the
distinction between the claims for compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act and the
claims for damages based on gross negligence of
Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that
workmen's compensation refers to liability for
compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability
or
death of the working man through industrial accident
or disease, without regard to the fault or

In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that

the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of

negligence of the employer, while the claim for

damages under the Civil Code which petitioners
pursued

action since the complaint is based on the provisions

of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles

in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability

for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the

2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the

provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. They

death of the employees and for which the regular court

has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.

point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen

negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take

On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected

injuries are compensable exclusively under the

the necessary security for the protection of the lives of

its employees working underground. They also

provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's

Compensation Act, which read:

"SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights

and remedies granted by this Act to an employee

exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's

Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of the

by reason of a personal injury entitling him to

compensation shall exclude all other rights and
remedies

Act provides an additional compensation in case the

employer fails to comply with the requirements of

accruing to the employee, his personal

representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against
the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because
of said injury . . .
"SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner shall have exclusive

safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact,

it points out that Philex voluntarily paid the
compensation due the petitioners and all the
payments have been accepted in behalf of the
deceased
miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who
insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of
damages under the Civil Code.

jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for

compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act,

In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of

Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara, now

subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, . . ."

President of the University of the Philippines, Justice

Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant

Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98

Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims
of workmen against their employer for damages due to
accident suffered in the course of employment
shall be investigated and adjudicated by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to
appeal

General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department,

and Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law
Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared as amici
curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective
memoranda.

to the Supreme Court. cdphil

The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution

of November 26, 1976, is: cdrep

Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was

negligent, does not remove the case from the

"Whether the action of an injured employee or worker

or that of his heirs in case of his death under the

Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or

cumulative, that is to say, whether his or his
heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the
limited compensation provided under the
Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a
right of selection or choice of action between
availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral
and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue
of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other
employees or whether they may avail
cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular
courts."

accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's

Compensation Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is
that
the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of the
employee in case of his death have a right of
choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided
under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue in
the regular court under the Civil Code for higher
damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of
the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of
Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect
the remedy provided for under the Act, they are no
longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy
provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action for
higher damages in the regular court, and vice
versa.

There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice

Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or

On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased

employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss

worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a

complaint to recover damages (not

on the ground that they have amicably settled their

claim with respondent Philex. In the resolution of

compensation under the Workmen's Compensation

Act) with the regular court on the basis of

September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only

insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it

negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code

provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise. He

appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.

submits that the remedy of an injured employee for

work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in

WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has

jurisdiction to try the case.

It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is

not for compensation based on the Workmen's

Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may

be held liable for damages. The provisions of the

Compensation Act but a complaint for damages

(actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of

Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is

fraud or bad faith, read:

eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00)

pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of

"Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court

may award exemplary damages if the

the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to

compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation

defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,

oppressive or malevolent manner.

appeared in the complaint that the employees died

from accident arising out of and in the course of

"Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the

damages for which the obligor who acted in good

their employments. The complaint instead alleges

gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure

faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and

probable consequences of the breach of the

on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers

as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred

obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or

could have reasonably foreseen at the time the

resulting in the death of the employees working

underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining

obligation was constituted.

whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of

workmen's compensation claim or a claim for
damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code,
the test is the averments or allegations in the
complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97
Phil. 100). LibLex
In the present case, there exists between Philex and
the deceased employees a contractual relationship.
The alleged gross and reckless negligence and
deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part
of

"In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude,

the obligor shall be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation."
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow
the payment of all kinds of damages, as assessed by
the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in

giving damages under the Civil Code. The

compensation acts are based on a theory of
compensation
distinct from the existing theories of damages,
payments under the acts being made as compensation
and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is
given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of
industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence,
an employer is liable whether negligence exists or
not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the
Act is not based on any theory of actionable
wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the
employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for
loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury
is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if
the death or injury is not due to the fault of the
employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the
other hand, damages are awarded to one as a
vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is
the
indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained
injury either in his person, property or relative
rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S.
452). prLL
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the
burden of proving the causal relation between

the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as

well as the damages suffered. While under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption
in favor of the deceased or injured employee that
the death or injury is work-connected or workaggravated; and the employer has the burden to prove
otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308;
Cario vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable
by the Workmen's Compensation Commission
then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is
strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil
Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not
contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and
exemplary damages. What the Act provided was
merely the right of the heirs to claim limited
compensation for the death in the amount of six
thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of
two
hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when
incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's
Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of
only 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the
part of the employer to "install and maintain safety
appliances or to take other precautions for the

prevention of accident or occupational disease"

(Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount

(actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by

virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers

sought to be recovered is over and above that which

was provided under the Workmen's Compensation

or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of

both actions, i.e., collect the limited

Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission.

compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act

and sue in addition for damages in the regular

Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act,

compensation benefits should be paid to an

courts.

employee who suffered an accident not due to the

facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs.

Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that

employer but caused by factors outside the industrial

plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the

an injured worker has a choice of either to recover

from the employer the fixed amounts set by the

liability of the employer, depends on breach of

contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was

Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an

ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher

specifically enacted to afford protection to the

employees or workmen. It is a social legislation
designed

damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action

simultaneously. cdphil

to give relief to the workman who has been the victim

of an accident causing his death or ailment or
injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs.
WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the
injured employee or his heirs in case of death have
a right of selection or choice of action between
availing themselves of the worker's right under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular
courts under the Civil Code for higher damages

In Pacaa WE said:
"In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma,
involving the application of Section 6 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers'
right to sue third-party tortfeasors in the regular
courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the
Court, pointed out that the injured worker has the
choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of
action simultaneously and thus balanced the
relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's
Compensation Act as against an ordinary action.

"As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot

maintain his action for damages against the

until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation

Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section

respondents (defendants below), because he has

elected to seek compensation under the Workmen's

6 aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker

Company recovers, by derivative action against the

Compensation Law, and his claim (case No. 44549 of

the Compensation Commission) was being

alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the

compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner,
the

processed at the time he filed this action in the Court

of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as

excess accrues to the latter."

the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are

much more extensive than the amounts that may be

Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs.

Muoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party

awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they

should not be deemed incompatible. As already

tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the

employer-tortfeasor.

indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to

choose either to recover from the employer the fixed

Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned,

as already stated, the petition has been

amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to

prosecute an ordinary civil action against the

dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in

view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex

tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as

profitable, the smaller indemnity obtainable by the

and the said heirs.

first course is balanced by the claimant's being

relieved of the burden of proving the causal connection
between the defendant's negligence and the resulting
injury, and of having to establish the extent of the
damage suffered; issues that are apt to be
troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having staked
his
fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is
precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least

With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by

Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968
before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased
employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr.,
Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez
submitted notices and claims for compensation to
the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of
Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of

August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose

heirs decided that they be paid in installments (pp.

compensation. The choice of the first remedy was

based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which

106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein

petitioners in their opposition to the motion to

nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice.

The case should therefore be remanded to the

dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the

lower court, but they set up the defense that the

lower court for further proceedings. However, should

the petitioners be successful in their bid before

claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation

Act before they learned of the official report of

the lower court, the payments made under the

Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted
from

the committee created to investigate the accident

which established the criminal negligence and
violation of law by Philex, and which report was
forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then
Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated
October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.). LLpr

the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion,
the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The

WE hold that although the other petitioners had

received the benefits under the Workmen's

Court merely applies and gives effect to the

constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured
by

Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from

bringing an action before the regular court

Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the

1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and

because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex

has been remiss in its contractual obligations with

9 of Article II of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND

STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as

the deceased miners only after receiving

compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been
aware of

amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177,

2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the
New Civil Code of 1950.

said violation of government rules and regulations by

Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have

To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:

sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation

Commission which awarded a lesser amount for

"Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the

well-being and economic security of all the people

should be the concern of the State" (Art. II).

"Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor,
especially to working women, and minors, and shall
regulate the relations between landowner and tenant,
and between labor and capital in industry and in
agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory
arbitration" (Art. XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to
"promote social justice to insure the dignity,
welfare, and security of all the people;" ". . . regulate
the use . . . and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits";
"establish, maintain and ensure adequate social
services in the field of education, health, housing,
employment, welfare and social security to guarantee
the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of
living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution);
". . . afford protection to labor, . . . and regulate the
relations between workers and employers . . ., and
assure the rights of workers to . . . just and humane
conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973
Constitution, italics supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of
labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article II of the
1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of
basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:

"Art 3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall

afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State
shall assure the rights of workers to selforganization,
collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work" (italics
supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as
implemented by the aforementioned articles of the
New
Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the
restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor
Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
(before it was amended by R. A. No. 772 on June
20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor
Code, has been superseded by the aforestated
provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law,
which took effect on August 30, 1950, which obey
the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing
as they do the rights of the workers as against
their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code
seems to diminish the rights of the workers and
therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of
the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the

New Civil Code. cdrep

The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections
6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are
statements of legal principles to be applied and
enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in
the
case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs.
Barnette, with characteristic eloquence, enunciated:
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;

promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six

months thereafter, provides that "all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing
rules
and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor"
(Art. 2, Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the law-making body intended right
and justice to prevail."
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code
likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor
legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in
favor of the safety and decent living of the
laborer."

they depend on the outcome of no elections" (319 U.S.

625, 638, 87 L. ed. 1638, italics supplied).

Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772

on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's

In case of any doubt which may be engendered by

Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New

Compensation Act provided:

Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts
should be resolved in favor of the workers and
employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise
known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,

"Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights

and remedies granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to
compensation shall exclude all other rights and
remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against
the

employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because

of said injury (italics supplied).

such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act

shall apply to injuries received outside the Island

"Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine

Islands for work outside the same may stipulate with

through accidents happening in and during the

performance of the duties of the employment. Such

such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act

shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside

stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers

to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation

the Islands through accidents happening in and during

the performance of the duties of the

Law of the place where the accident occurs, should

such law be more favorable to them (As amended by

employment; and all service contracts made in the

manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed

section 5 of Republic Act No. 772)."

to include such agreement."

Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was amended
by
Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
"Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights
and remedies granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to
compensation shall exclude all other rights and
remedies

Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal

expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions of
the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:
"Art, 173. Exclusiveness of liability. Unless otherwise
provided, the liability of the State
Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and
in place of all other liabilities of the employer to
the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise
entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents. The payment of
compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of

accruing to the employee, his personal

representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against
the

benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised

Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered

employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because

of said injury.

Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended,

Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty-six,
as

"Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine

Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with

amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred

ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Fortyeight
hundred Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose
benefits are administered by the System,

167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).

Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code,
decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law
of the land.

during the period of such payment for the same

disability or death, and conversely" (italics supplied).

Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:

As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code

expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised

"Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the

laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the

Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A.

No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended,

legal system of the Philippines."

R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose

benefits are administered by the System (referring

The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz

Castro, in People vs. Licera, ruled:

to the GSIS or SSS). cdll

"Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees

that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the

Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act

as afore-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor

laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's

legal system. These decisions, although in

Code does not even remotely, much less expressly,

repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore

themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the

laws mean. The application or interpretation

quoted.

placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of

the date of the enactment of the said law since

It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New

Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is
not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And
the damages recoverable under the New Civil
Code are not administered by the System provided for
by the New Labor Code, which defines the
"System" as referring to the Government Service
Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art.

the Court's application or interpretation merely

establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that
the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65
SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court
assume the same authority as the statute itself

(Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).

The afore-quoted provisions of Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it was
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20,
1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of the
deceased, ailing or injured employee to the
compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was
not
accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court
in the 1970 case of Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus
Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an
injured worker has a choice of either to recover from
the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages;
but he cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously. Said Pacaa case penned by Mr. Justice
Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil
Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act,
reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs.
Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30, 1969) and
the 1958 case of Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma (104
Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said
Pacaa case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L.
Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando
and Villamor.

Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor

Code is merely a re-statement of the first
paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even
refer,
neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did,
with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to
the same interpretation adopted in the cases of
Pacaa, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the
doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful
to and advances the social justice guarantees
enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar
provision on social justice in the American Federal
Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of
the American Union. Consequently, the restrictive
nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's
Compensation Act cannot limit the range and
compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws,
especially Article 1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis
Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to
Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the
1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of
Article II of the 1973 Constitution. llcd

The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the

laborer to the property rights of the employer. The
right
to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process
clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer
from liability for the death of his workers arising from
his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide
safety devices for the protection of his employees or
workers against the dangers which are inherent in
underground mining, is to deprive the deceased
worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity
for the loss of the life of the worker and the
consequent loss to his family without due process of
law.

aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant
case.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a
constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor
Code
subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs
of the deceased mining employees. Section 5 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of
the New Labor Code are retrogressive; because
they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire
doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his

The dissent in effect condones and therefore

encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part
of

treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol.

21, p. 93, 1964), which has been discarded soon

the employer to comply with his legal obligation to

provide safety measures for the protection of the

after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial

Revolution that generated the machines and

life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral
viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian.

other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's

cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social

justice guarantees of the Constitution, as

steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation

which are dangerous to life, limb and health. The

implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code,

is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but

old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-letlive is now superseded by the benign Christian

is rendering obedience to the mandates of the

fundamental law and the implementing legislation

shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who

profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's

selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper. In

this our civilization, each one of us is our
brother's keeper. No man is an island. To assert
otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the
1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint
1030) invoked by the dissent. The Prisley case was
decided in 1837 during the era of economic royalists
and robber barons of America. Only ruthless,
unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries
continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian
doctrine.
The Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him;
because the decision derisively refers to the lowly
worker as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic
arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his
inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To stress this
affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate
the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of
the master and the servant never can imply an
obligation on the part of the master to take more care
of the servant than he may reasonably be

"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law

sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law
insures
man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of
Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit
giveth life."
C
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the
myth that the courts cannot legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New
Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws."
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of
the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain
instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes,
"do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the
law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human
beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all
possible cases to which the law may apply. Nor has the
human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all

expected to do himself." This is the very selfish

doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which

situations. prcd

generated so much hatred and drew so much precious

blood on American plains and valleys from 1861

But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New

Civil Code, the founding fathers of the American

to 1864.

Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality

that the courts may have to legislate to supply the

omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American

Constitution and the statutes.

Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also

entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert

Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that

judicial legislation may be justified but denies that

Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the

courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert

the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give

rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist, Modern

pages of the Constitution and all statute books."

Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went

farther to concede that the court is even
independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American
Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).

It should be stressed that the liability of the employer

under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to
death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of

Many of the great expounders of the American

Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief Justice

the work, without any fault on the part of the

employers. It is correctly termed no-fault liability.
Section

Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province

and duty of the Judicial department to say what

5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or

Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not

the law is" (Marbury vs. Madison 1 Cranch 127 1803),

which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when

cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned

by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to

he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it

is" (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted by President

provide the safety devices required by the law for the

protection of the life, limb and health of the

Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was

reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced

workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the

employer remains liable to pay compensation

that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He
legislates only between gaps. He fills the open

benefits to the employee, whose death, ailment or

injury is work-connected, even if the employer has

spaces in the law." (The Nature of the Judicial Process,

p. 113). In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F.

faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety

measures and contrivances decreed by the law to
protect

Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the

restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1

the employee.

The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman."

In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice

more specific of them are found to terminate in a

penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the

Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of

formalism when the precise word was the

other. . . . When we come to the fundamental

distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be

sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs.

Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of

received with a certain latitude or our government

could not go on.

the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that:

"Sometimes the conservatism of judges has

"To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual

who but for such action would be free from it is to

threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its

efficacy. . . . Precedents established in those items

legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they

determine which of two competing principles of

exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound,

Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law

policy shall prevail.

Review 383, 387).

Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace
when he pragmatically admitted, although with a
cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must
legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are
confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern
Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917).
And in the subsequent case of Springer vs.
Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L. ed. 845, 852853),
Justice Holmes pronounced:
"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not
establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the

"xxx xxx xxx

"It does not seem to need argument to show that
however we may disguise it by veiling words we do
not and cannot carry out the distinction between
legislative and executive action with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into waterlight
compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the
Constitution requires."
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that
judges should not legislate, but grudgingly
concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They
criticize the assumption by the courts of such
lawmaking

power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial

tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy

use of force or intimidation to extort confession from

him. These rights are not found in the American

Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts,

Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf

Bill of Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in

Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.

Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But

said Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who

Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of

the activism of the American Supreme Court led by

either deny the power of the courts to legislate inbetween gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such

Chief Justice Earl Warren.

power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise

by the courts of such law-making authority in the
interpretation and application of the laws in specific
cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or
oppression or that such judicial legislation has not
protected public interest or individual welfare,
particularly the lowly workers or the under-privileged.
LLjur
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions
interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory
enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to
protect human rights. Foremost among them is
the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384
US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335),
Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed
the accused under custodial investigation his rights
to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of
such rights as even as it protects him against the

Even the definition of identical offenses for purposes of

the double jeopardy provision was developed by
American judicial decisions, not by amendment to the
Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice
Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And
these judicial decisions have been re-stated in
Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the
1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the
second offense is the same as the first offense if the
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or
frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first offense.
The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in
the Bill of Rights. They were also developed by
judicial decisions in the United States and in the
Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil.
851853).

Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in

the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as

Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where

the American Supreme Court upheld the rights of

securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities,

which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown

workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed

minimum wage for women and minors, working

vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding

that the equal protection clause means that the

hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity

leave for women employees.

Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools

attended by the whites equal facilities in the same

The power of judicial review and the principle of

separation of powers as well as the rule on political

school which was extended to public parks and

public buses. De-segregation, not segregation, is now

questions have been evolved and grafted into the

American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury

the governing principle.

vs. Madison, supra; Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83

L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US

Among other examples, the due process clause was

interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil.

210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).

440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate

a law granting maternity leave to working women

It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be

against judicial legislation, penned a separate

according primacy to property rights over human

rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no longer the

concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller,

supra, affirming the doctrine of political question

rule.

as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing

in both the American and Philippine

As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York

(198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice Holmes
had been railing against the conservatism of Judges
perverting the guarantee of due process to protect
property rights as against human rights or social
justice for the working man. The law fixing maximum
hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was
vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast

Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the

courts is limited by the principle of separation of
powers and the doctrine on political questions. There
are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence
applying the doctrines of separation of powers and
political questions and invoking American
precedents.

Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and

1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the

VICENTE GELLA, in his capacity as Treasurer of the

Philippines, defendants-appellees.

Supreme Court the power to review the validity or

constitutionality of any legislative enactment or

Rodegelio M. Jalandoni for appellant.

executive act.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF
DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND
THE

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Jose P.

Alejandro for appellee, Vicente Gella.
Nat. M. Balbao and F.E. Evangelista for appellee,
Central Bank of the Philippines.
SYLLABUS

CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES BE

1. TAXATION; FOREIGN EXCHANGE TAX; EXEMPTION OF

CHOCOLATE FROM TAXATION,

DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE

PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO

CONSTRUED. The exemption from taxation provided

in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 601 refers to

THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE

DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.

"chocolate" as a manufactured or finished product. It

does not include "cocoa beans".

SO ORDERED.

2. STATUTES; INTERPRETATION OF LAWS IS FOR THE

COURTS. The interpretation of laws is for

Fernando, C.J, Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente,

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

the courts. The courts are not bound by one

legislator's opinion, expressed in Congressional
dewbates,

Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.

concerning the application of existing laws.

EN BANC

DECISION

[G.R. No. L-8888. November 29, 1957.]

BENGZON, J p:

SONG KIAT CHOCOLATE FACTORY, plaintiff-appellant,

vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and

The question in this appeal is whether cocoa beans

may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes

of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed

by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.

soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup . . . shall

be refunded to any importer making application

During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9,

1953, the plaintiff-appellant imported sun-dried

therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation .

. .."

cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax

of 17 per cent totalling P74,671.04. Claiming

In support of its contention appellant quotes from

dictionaries and encyclopedias interchangeably using

exemption from said tax under section 2 of same Act,

it sued the Central Bank that had exacted

the words "chocolate", "cacao" and "cocoa". Yet we

notice that the quotations refer to "cocoa" as

payment; and in its amended complaint it included the

Treasurer of the Philippines. The suit was filed in

chocolate nut" "chocolate bean" or "chocolate tree."

And the legal exemption refers to "chocolate"

the Manila Court of First Instance, wherein defendants

submitted in due time a motion to dismiss on the

not the bean, nor the nut nor the tree. We agree with
the Solicitor General and the other counsel of

grounds: first, the complaint stated no cause of action

because cocoa beans were not "chocolate"; and

respondents that in common parlance the law is

presumed to refer to it 1 chocolate is a

second, it was a suit against the Government without

the latter's consent.

manufactured or finished product made out of cocoa

beans, or "cacao" beans as they are locally known.

The Hon. Gregorio S. Narvasa, Judge, sustained the

motion, and dismissed the case by his order of

We may take notice of the fact that grocery stores sell

powdered cocoa beans as chocolate, labeled

November 19, 1954. Hence this appeal.

"cocoa powder", or simply "cocoa". They are, however,

really chocolate; they are not cocoa beans. The

The lower court, appellant contends, erred in

dismissing the case and in holding that the term
"chocolate" does not include sun-dried cocoa beans.
SEC. 2 of the aforesaid Act provides that "the tax
collected or foreign exchange used for the payment of
costs transportation and/or other charges incident to
importation into the Philippines of rice, flour . . .

manufacture of chocolate involves several processes,

such as selecting and drying the cocoa beans, then
roasting, grinding, sieving and blending. 2 Cocoa
beans do not become chocolate unless and until they
have undergone the manufacturing processes above
described. The first is raw material, the other

finished product.
The courts regard "chocolate" as
"Chocolate" is a preparation of roasted cacao beans
without the abstraction of the butter and always
contains sugar and added cacao butter. Rockwood &
Co., vs. American President Lines, D.C.N.J., 68 F.
Supp. 224, 226.
Chocolate is a cocoa bean roasted, cracked, shelled,
crushed, ground, and molded in cakes. It contains
no sugar, and is in general use in families. Sweetened
chocolate is manufactured in the same way but
the paste is mixed with sugar, and is used by
confectioners in making chocolate confections. In re

approved Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by

substituting "cocoa beans" for "chocolate." This
shows, maintains the appellant the Legislature's
intention to include cocoa beans in the word
"chocolate." In fact, it goes on, the Committee
Chairman who reported House Bill No. 2576 which
became Republic Act 1197, declared before the House:
"Mr. ROCES: Mr. SPEAKER, on line 8 page 1, after the
word 'canned', strike out the words, 'fresh, frozen
and' and also the words 'other beef', on line 9 and on
the same line, line 9, after the word 'chocolate',
insert the words '(COCOA BEANS)' in parenthesis ( ). I
am proposing to insert the words '(COCOA BEANS)'

Schiling, 53 F. 81, 82, 3 C.C.A. 440.

in parenthesis ( ) after the word "chocolate", Mr.

Speaker, in order to clarify any doubt and manifest the

In view of the foregoing, and having in mind the

principle of strict construction of statutes exempting

intention of the past Congress that the word

'chocolate' should mean 'cocoa beans.'

from taxation, 3 we are of the opinion and so hold, that

the exemption for "chocolate" in the above

In reply to this, appellees point out that said chairman

could not have spoken of the Congressional

section 2 does not include "cocoa beans". The one is

raw material, the other manufactured consumer

intention in approving Republic Act 601 because he

was not a member of the Congress that passed said

product; the latter is ready for human consumption;

the former is not.

Act. Naturally, all he could state was his own

interpretation of such piece of legislation. Courts do
not

However, we cannot stop here, because in August

1954 suit was brought in May 1954 Congress

usually give decisive weight to one legislator's opinion,

expressed in Congressional debates concerning

the application of existing laws. 4 Yet even among the

legislators taking part in the consideration of the
amendatory statute (Republic Act 1197) the
impression prevailed that, as the law then stood 5
chocolate candy or chocolate bar was exempted, but
cocoa beans were not. Here are Senator Peralta's
statements during the discussion of the same House
Bill No. 2576:
"SENATOR PERALTA: I signed that conference report
and I am really bound by it, but, Mr. President, a
few hours ago I received some information which
maybe the chairman would like to know, to the effect
that we allow chocolate bar, chocolate candy to come
into this country exempt from the 17 per cent tax
when we do not allow cocoa beans, out of which our
local manufacturers can make chocolate candy,
exempted. So why do we not take off that exemption
for chocolate and instead put 'cocoa beans' so as
to benefit our manufacturers of chocolate candy?
xxx xxx xxx
Senator PERALTA: Yes, I agree with the chairman, only I
was just wondering if the chairman, might not
consider the fact that in view of the information, this
seems to be inconsistent we allow chocolate to
come here exempt and not exempt cocoa beans which
is used by our manufacturers in making

chocolate candy.
And Senator Puyat is quoted as saying in the same
connection:
"Mr. PRESIDENT, on the same page (page 1), line 9,
delete "cocoa beans". The text as it came to the
Senate was misleading. In the original law the
exemption is for chocolate, and the version that we got
from the Lower House is "(cocoa beans)" giving the
impression that chocolate and cocoa beans are
synonymous. Now I think this is a sort of a rider, so
your committee recommends the deletion of those
words." (Journal of the Senate, July 30, 1954, re H.B.
No. 2576, italics ours.)
Other parts of the Congressional record quoted in the
briefs would seem to show that in approving
House Bill No. 2576, the Congress agreed to exempt
"cocoa beans" instead of chocolate with a view to
favoring local manufacturers of chocolate products. 6
A change of legislative policy, as appellees
contend 7 not a declaration or clarification of
previous Congressional purpose. In fact, as indicating
the Government's new policy of exempting for the first
time importations of "cocoa beans," there is the
President's proclamation No. 62 of September 2, 1954
issued in accordance with Republic Act No. 1197

specifying that said exemption (of cocoa beans) shall

operate from and after September 3, 1954 not

3. Exemptions are never presumed, the burden is on

the claimant to establish clearly his right to

before. As a general rule, it may be added, statutes

operate prospectively.

exemption and an alleged grant of exemption will be

strictly construed and cannot be made out by

Observe that appellant's cocoa beans had been

imported during January-October 1953, i.e. before the

inference or implication but must be beyond

reasonable doubt. In other words, since taxation is the
rule

exemption decree.
After the foregoing discussion, it is hardly necessary to
express our approval of the lower court's opinion
about plaintiff's cause of action, or the lack of it. And it
becomes unnecessary to consider the other
contention of defendants that this is a suit against the
Government without its consent.
The order of dismissal is affirmed, with costs against
appellant.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. "As a general rule words used in a statute are to be
given their usual and commonly understood
meaning . . .." C.J.S. p. 639.
2. CF. Encyclopedia Americana (1954) Vol. V, p. 129,
130; Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 5 (1948 ed.)
p. 948.

and exemption the exception, the intention to make an

exemption ought to be expressed in clear and
unambiguous terms. (Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed. Vol. 2
p. 1303.)
4. Interpretation of laws is for the Courts (See 82 C. J.
S. pp. 745, 746). Even statutes declaring
"what the law was before" are not binding on courts.
Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil., 696, 49 Off. Gaz.,
4825.
5. Section 2 of Republic Act 601 was amended first by
Republic Act 814 and later by Republic Act
871. In both amendments "chocolate" was retained.
6. Whereas the exemption of "chocolate" aimed to
benefit consumers thereof.
7. See footnote 5.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000.]

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), JUNK VFA

MOVEMENT, BISHOP TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia

ESTRADA, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, DOMINGO L. SIAZON,

JR., ORLANDO B. MERCADO, MARCELO B.

Filipina Independiente), BISHOP ELMER BOLOCAN

(United Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR. REYNALDO

FERNAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, BLAS F. OPLE and

RODOLFO G. BIAZON, respondents.

LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS,

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR,

[G.R. No. 138680. October 10, 2000.]

and the PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners,

vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON,
DEFENSE SECRETARY ORLANDO MERCADO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT
MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON,
SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON,
and SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138572. October 10, 2000.]
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.
(PHILCONSA), EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, AMADOGAT
INCIONG, CAMILO L. SABIO, AND RAMON A. GONZALES,
petitioners, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as
Executive Secretary, HON. ORLANDO MERCADO, as
Secretary of National Defense, and HON. DOMINGO
L. SIAZON, JR., as Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
respondents.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by

its National President, Jose Aguila Grapilon,
petitioners, vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, in his
capacity as President, Republic of the Philippines, and
HON. DOMINGO SIAZON, in his capacity as Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138698. October 10, 2000.]
JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO TAADA, ZENAIDA
QUEZON AVENCEA, ROLANDO SIMBULAN,
PABLITO V. SANIDAD, MA. SOCORRO I. DIOKNO,
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCISCO C.
RIVERA JR., RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, KILOSBAYAN,
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, SENATE PRESIDENT

[G.R. No. 138587. October 10, 2000.]

MARCELO B. FERNAN, SENATOR BLAS F. OPLE,

SENATOR RODOLFO G. BLAZON, AND ALL OTHER

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., RAUL S. ROCO, and

SERGIO R. OSMEA III, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E.

PERSONS ACTING THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION,

DIRECTION, AND INSTRUCTION IN RELATION TO THE

VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA), respondents.

Romeo B. Igot and Victoria G. delos Reyes for
petitioner in G.R. No. 138680.
Eulogia M. Cueva for petitioner IBP.
Ramon A. Gonzales for PHILCONSA.
Wigberto E. Taada and Lorenzo Taada III for
petitioners Jovito R. Salonga, Wigberto E. Taada, Sr.,
Agapito A. Aquino, Joker P. Arroyo, and Rene A.V.
Saguisag.
Theodore O. Te for petitioners Avancea, Simbulan,
Sanidad, Diokno and Rivera, Jr.

From these consolidated petitions, petitioners as

legislators, non-governmental organizations,
citizens and taxpayers assailed the constitutionality
of the VFA and imputed to respondents grave
abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held:
that at the outset, petitioners have no locus standi to
bring the suit because they have not shown any
interest in the case nor have they substantiated that
they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the operation of the VFA; that as taxpayers,

SYNOPSIS

they have not established that the VFA involves the

illegal disbursement of public funds raised by

The instant petitions for certiorari and prohibition

assailed the agreement forged between the RP and

taxation; that whether the President referred the VFA

to the Senate and the latter extended its

the USA THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT, which

formalized, among others, the use of installations

concurrence under Section 21 , Article VII, or Section

25, Article XVIII, is immaterial, for in either case,

in the Philippine territory by the US military personnel

to strengthen their defense and security

the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence

of the Senate is mandatory; that with regard to

relationship. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E.

Estrada ratified the VFA, and then transmitted to

the ratification by the President of the VFA and the

exercise by the Senate of its constitutional power to

the Senate his letter of ratification and the VFA for

concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Art. VII of the

concur with the VFA, the Court, absent clear showing

of grave abuse of discretion on the part of

1987 Constitution. The Senate subsequently approved

the VFA by a 2/3 vote of its members.

respondents, is without power to meddle with such

affairs purely executive and legislative in character

and nature; and that with the ratification of the VFA,

which is equivalent to final acceptance and with

any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the

VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not

the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the

USA, it now becomes obligatory, under the

established that the VFA involves the exercise by

Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this

principles of international law, to be bound by the

terms of the agreement.

point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer's suit refers to

a case where the act complained of directly

SYLLABUS

involves the illegal disbursement of public funds

derived from taxation. . . Clearly, inasmuch as no
public

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; REQUIREMENTS TO

ALLOW A SUIT CHALLENGING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW, ACT OR STATUTE;
PETITIONERS HAVE NO LEGAL STANDING TO ASSAIL
THE LEGALITY OF THE VFA IN CASE AT BAR. A party
bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of

funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and

in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that
public funds are being misspent or illegally expended,
petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing

a law, act, or statute must show "not only that the law
is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in

to assail the legality of the VFA. Similarly,

Representatives Wigberto Taada, Agapito Aquino and
Joker

immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some

direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not

Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators, do not possess the

requisite locus standi to maintain the present suit. .

merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way."

He must show that he has been, or is about to

. [T]he allegations of impairment of legislative power,

such as the delegation of the power of Congress to

be, denied some right or privilege to which he is

lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to

grant tax exemptions, are more apparent than real.

While it may be true that petitioners pointed to

some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute

complained of. In the case before us, petitioners

provisions of the VFA which allegedly impair their

legislative powers, petitioners failed however to

failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that

they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining

sufficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct

injury. TcEAIH

2. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; PACTA SUNT

SERVANDA; EFFECT OF RP'S RATIFICATION

Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of

international law as part of the law of the land

OF THE VFA AND USA'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE

VFA AS A TREATY; CASE AT BAR. The records

and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,

freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. As

reveal that the United States Government, through

Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the

a member of the family of nations, the Philippines

agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for

United States government has fully committed to living

up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the

the conduct of its international relations. While the

international obligation devolves upon the state and

United States of America accepts or acknowledges the

VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply

not upon any particular branch, institution, or

individual member of its government, the Philippines is

with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed

marked compliance with the mandate of the

nonetheless responsible for violations committed by

any branch or subdivision of its government or any

Constitution. Worth stressing too, is that the

ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the

official thereof. As an integral part of the community of

nations, we are responsible to assure that our

concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear

an unequivocal expression of our nation's consent

government, Constitution and laws will carry out our

international obligation. . . Article 26 of the

to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty

to uphold the obligations and responsibilities

convention provides that "Every treaty in force is

binding upon the parties to it and must be performed

embodied thereunder. With the ratification of the VFA,

which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with

by them in good faith." This is known as the principle

of pacta sunt servanda which preserves the

the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the

United States of America, it now becomes

sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most

fundamental principles of positive international law,

obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the

principles of international law, to be bound by the

supported by the jurisprudence of international

tribunals.

terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2,

Article II of the Constitution, declares that the

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT;

POWER TO ENTER INTO TREATIES AND

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IS VESTED IN THE

PRESIDENT; CASE AT BAR. As regards the power to
enter into treaties or international agreements, the
Constitution vests the same in the President, subject
only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of
all the members of the Senate. In this light, the
negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification
of the agreement are exclusive acts which
pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of
his vast executive and diplomatic powers
granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself.
Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the
President involving the VFA specifically the acts of
ratification and entering into a treaty and those
necessary or incidental to the exercise of such
principal acts squarely fall within the sphere of his
constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly
struck down, much less calibrated by this Court, in
the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power
or discretion.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION; ACT OF THE PRESIDENT IN
SUBMITTING THE VFA TO THE SENATE FOR
CONCURRENCE UNDER SECTION 21 OF ARTICLE VII,
INSTEAD

OF SECTION 25 OF ARTICLE XVIII OF THE

CONSTITUTION, NOT A CASE OF. It is the Court's
considered
view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in
submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence,
acted within the confines and limits of the powers
vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no moment
that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude
of discretion and in the honest belief that the VFA
falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for
concurrence under the aforementioned provision.
Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave,
patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be
imputed to the President in his act of ratifying the VFA
and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose
of complying with the concurrence requirement
embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the
President merely performed a constitutional task and
exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the
functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting
the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of
Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the
President may not be faulted or scarred, much
less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of
discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious

manner.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;
TREATY-CONCURRING POWER OF THE
SENATE PERTAINS TO THE WISDOM OF AN ACT WHICH
IS BEYOND THE PROVINCE OF THE COURTS TO
INQUIRE. As to the power to concur with treaties,
the constitution lodges the same with the Senate
alone. Thus, once the Senate performs that power, or
exercises its prerogative within the boundaries
prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence
manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of power,
much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate,
in the exercise of its discretion and acting within
the limits of such power, may not be similarly faulted
for having simply performed a task conferred and
sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law. For
the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is
essentially legislative in character; the Senate, as an
independent body possessed of its own erudite
mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the
proposed agreement, and whatever action it
takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion,
pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of
the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal,
yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of

separation of powers and of checks and balances alive

and vigilantly ensures that these cherished
rudiments remain true to their form in a democratic
government such as ours. The Constitution thus
animates, through this treaty-concurring power of the
Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances
indispensable toward our nation's pursuit of political
maturity and growth. True enough, rudimentary is
the principle that matters pertaining to the wisdom of
a legislative act are beyond the ambit and
province of the courts to inquire.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEC. 25, ART. XVIII THEREOF;
TREATY ALLOWING PRESENCE OF
MILITARY BASES, TROOPS AND FACILITIES SHOULD
ALSO BE "RECOGNIZED AS A TREATY BY THE OTHER
CONTRACTING PARTY." . . . Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution requires that the treaty allowing the
presence of foreign military bases, troops, and
facilities should also be "recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting party." In plain language, recognition
of the United States as the other contracting
party of the VFA should be by the U.S. President with
the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TREATY AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT IN
U.S. PRACTICE, DISTINGUISHED; THE VFA IS

MORE AKIN TO A SOLE OR PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE

AGREEMENT. . . . In U.S. practice, a "treaty" is

prevail over prior inconsistent federal legislation.

CAIHTE

only one of four types of international agreements,

namely: Article II treaties, executive agreements

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; VFA, AS A SOLE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

UNDER U.S. LAW, FALLS SHORT OF THE

pursuant to a treaty, congressional-executive

agreements, and sole executive agreements. The term

CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT SET THEREIN

ALLOWING PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS IN PHILIPPINE

"executive agreement" is used both colloquially and in

scholarly and governmental writings as a

SOIL. In conclusion, after a macro view of the

landscape of U.S. foreign relations vis-a-vis U.S.

convenient catch-all to subsume all international

agreements intended to bind the United States and

constitutional law, with special attention on the legal

status of sole executive agreements, I respectfully

another government, other than those which receive

consent of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. The U.S.

submit that the Court will be standing on unstable

ground if it places a sole executive agreement like the

Constitution does not expressly confer authority to

make these executive agreements, hence the

VFA on the same constitutional plateau as a treaty.

Questions remain and the debate continues on the

authority to make them, their scope, and legal force

have been the subject of a long-ongoing debate. . .

constitutional basis as well as the legal effects of sole

executive agreements under U.S. law. The

At best, the VFA would be more akin to a sole or

presidential executive agreement which would be valid

observation of Louis Henkin, a noted international and

U.S. constitutional law scholar, captures the

if concluded on the basis of the US. President's

exclusive power under the U.S. Constitution. . . While

sentiments of the framers of the Philippine

Constitution and of the Filipinos in crafting Sec. 25, Art.
XVIII

treaties and sole executive agreements have the same

legal effect on state law, sole executive
agreements pale in comparison to treaties when pitted
against prior inconsistent acts of Congress.
[C]ommentators have been in general agreement that
unlike treaties, sole executive agreements cannot

of the 1987 Constitution "(o)ften the treaty process

will be used at the insistence of other parties to
an agreement because they believe that a treaty has
greater 'dignity' than an executive agreement,
because its constitutional effectiveness is beyond
doubt, because a treaty will 'commit' the Senate and

the people of the United States and make its

subsequent abrogation or violation less likely." With
the
cloud of uncertainty still hanging on the exact legal
force of sole executive agreements under U.S.
constitutional law, this Court must strike a blow for the
sovereignty of our country by drawing a bright
line between the dignity and status of a treaty in
contrast with a sole executive agreement. However we
may wish it, the VFA, as a sole executive agreement,
cannot climb to the same lofty height that the
dignity of a treaty can reach. Consequently, it falls
short of the requirement set by Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution that the agreement allowing the
presence of foreign military troops on Philippine
soil must be "recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state."
DECISION

On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United

States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement
which formalized, among others, the use of
installations in the Philippine territory by United States
military personnel. To further strengthen their defense
and security relationship, the Philippines and the
United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on
August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties
agreed to respond to any external armed attack on
their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and
aircraft. 1
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and
the United States negotiated for a possible extension
of the military bases agreement. On September
16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed
RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and

BUENA, J p:

Security which, in effect, would have extended the

presence of US military bases in the Philippines. 2

Confronting the Court for resolution in the instant

consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition

With the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases

Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted

are issues relating to, and borne by, an agreement

forged in the turn of the last century between the

between the two countries were held in abeyance.

Notwithstanding, the defense and security

Republic of the Philippines and the United States of

America the Visiting Forces Agreement.

relationship between the Philippines and the United

States of America continued pursuant to the

The antecedents unfold.

Mutual Defense Treaty. HIDCTA

On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by

US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia

The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee

on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F.

Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel,

headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo

Ople, and its Committee on National Defense and

Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for

Severino Jr., to exchange notes on "the complementing

strategic interests of the United States and the

their joint consideration and recommendation.

Thereafter, joint public hearings were held by the two

Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region." Both sides

discussed, among other things, the possible elements

Committees. 7

of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity).

Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a
consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final
series of conferences and negotiations 3 that
culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998.
Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved
the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada,
through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
ratified the VFA. 4
On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through
respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, 5
the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the
President 6 and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed

Senate Resolution No. 443 8 recommending the
concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation
of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee
its implementation. Debates then ensued.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443
was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds
(2/3) vote 9 of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443
was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No.
18. 10
On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force
after an Exchange of Notes between respondent
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador
Hubbard.
The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9)
Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating
the circumstances and conditions under which US
Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present

in the Philippines, and is quoted in its full text,

hereunder:

to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit

of this-agreement, and, in particular, from any

"Article I

political activity in the Philippines. The Government of

the United States shall take all measures within

Definitions
"As used in this Agreement, 'United States personnel'
means United States military and civilian
personnel temporarily in the Philippines in connection
with activities approved by the Philippine
Government.
"Within this definition:
"1. The term 'military personnel' refers to military
members of the United States Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard.
"2. The term 'civilian personnel' refers to individuals
who are neither nationals of, nor ordinary
residents in the Philippines and who are employed by
the United States armed forces or who are
accompanying the United States armed forces, such as
employees of the American Red Cross and the
United Services Organization.
"Article II
Respect for Law
"It is the duty of the United States personnel to respect
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and

its authority to ensure that this is done.

"Article III
Entry and Departure
"1. The Government of the Philippines shall facilitate
the admission of United States personnel and
their departure from the Philippines in connection with
activities covered by this agreement.
"2. United States military personnel shall be exempt
from passport and visa regulations upon
entering and departing the Philippines.
"3. The following documents only, which shall be
presented on demand, shall be required in respect
of United States military personnel who enter the
Philippines:
"(a) personal identity card issued by the appropriate
United States authority showing full name, date
of birth, rank or grade and service number (if any),
branch of service and photograph;
"(b) individual or collective document issued by the
appropriate United States authority, authorizing

the travel or visit and identifying the individual or

group as United States military personnel; and

1. Philippine authorities shall accept as valid, without

test or fee, a driving permit or license issued

"(c) the commanding officer of a military aircraft or

vessel shall present a declaration of health, and

by the appropriate United States authority to United

States personnel for the operation of military or

when required by the cognizant representative of the

Government of the Philippines, shall conduct a

official vehicles.

quarantine inspection and will certify that the aircraft

or vessel is free from quarantinable diseases. Any
quarantine inspection of United States aircraft or
United States vessels or cargoes thereon shall be
conducted by the United States commanding officer in
accordance with the international health
regulations as promulgated by the World Health
Organization, and mutually agreed procedures.
"4. United States civilian personnel shall be exempt
from visa requirements but shall present, upon
demand, valid passports upon entry and departure of
the Philippines
"5. If the Government of the Philippines has requested
the removal of any United States personnel
from its territory, the United States authorities shall be
responsible for receiving the person concerned
within its own territory or otherwise disposing of said
person outside of the Philippines.
"Article IV
Driving and Vehicle Registration

2. Vehicles owned by the Government of the United

States need not be registered, but shall have
appropriate markings.
"Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over
United States personnel with respect to
offenses committed within the Philippines and
punishable under the law of the Philippines. ETIcHa
(b) United States military authorities shall have the
right to exercise within the Philippines all
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them
by the military law of the United States over
United States personnel in the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over United States personnel with
respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the
security of the Philippines, punishable under the

laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of the

United States.

(1) offenses solely against the property or security of

the United States or offenses solely against

(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive

jurisdiction over United States personnel with

the property or person of United States personnel; and

respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the

security of the United States, punishable under
the laws of the United States, but not under the laws of
the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3
of this article, an offense relating to security
means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating
to national defense.
"3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is
concurrent, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right
to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses
committed by United States personnel, except in cases
provided for in paragraphs 1(b), 2(b), and 3(b) of

(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in

performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request
the authorities of the other government to
waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a
particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States
military authorities to maintain good order
and discipline among their forces, Philippine
authorities will, upon request by the United States,
waive
their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in
cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If
the Government of the Philippines determines that the
case is of particular importance, it shall
communicate such determination to the United States
authorities within twenty (20) days after the

this Article.

Philippine authorities receive the United States

request.

(b) United States military authorities shall have the

primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United

(e) When the United States military commander

determines that an offense charged by authorities

States personnel subject to the military law of the

United States in relation to.

of the Philippines against United states personnel

arises out of an act or omission done in the

performance of official duty, the commander will issue

a certificate setting forth such determination.
This certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate
authorities of the Philippines and will constitute
sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the
purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this Article. In
those cases where the Government of the Philippines
believes the circumstances of the case require a
review of the duty certificate, United States military
authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult
immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest
levels may also present any information bearing on its
validity. United States military authorities shall take full
account of the Philippine position. Where
appropriate, United States military authorities will take
disciplinary or other action against offenders in
official duty cases, and notify the Government of the
Philippines of the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not
exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the
authorities of the other government as soon as
possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United
States shall notify each other of the disposition
of all cases in which both the authorities of the
Philippines and the United States have the right to

exercise jurisdiction.
"4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the
authorities of the Philippines and United States
shall assist each other in the arrest of United States
personnel in the Philippines and in handling them
over to authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction in
accordance with the provisions of this article.
"5. United States military authorities shall promptly
notify Philippine authorities of the arrest or
detention of United States personnel who are subject
of Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction.
Philippine authorities shall promptly notify United
States military authorities of the arrest or detention
of any United States personnel.
"6. The custody of any United States personnel over
whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction
shall immediately reside with United States military
authorities, if they so request, from the commission
of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military authorities shall,
upon
formal notification by the Philippine authorities and
without delay, make such personnel available to
those authorities in time for any investigative or
judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which

the person has been charged in extraordinary cases,

the Philippine Government shall present its position

had their sentence remitted or suspended, or have

been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the

to the United States Government regarding custody,

which the United States Government shall take into

same offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this

paragraph, however, shall prevent United States
military

full account. In the event Philippine judicial

proceedings are not completed within one year, the
United

authorities from trying United States personnel for any

violation of rules of discipline arising from the

States shall be relieved of any obligations under this

paragraph. The one-year period will not include the

act or omission which constituted an offense for which

they were tried by Philippine authorities.

time necessary to appeal. Also, the one-year period

will not include any time during which scheduled

HIESTA

trial procedures are delayed because United States

authorities, after timely notification by Philippine
authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused,
fail to do so.
"7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United
States and Philippine authorities shall assist
each other in the carrying out of all necessary
investigation into offenses and shall cooperate in

"9. When United States personnel are detained, taken

into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine
authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural
safeguards established by the law of the Philippines. At
the minimum, United States personnel shall be
entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific
charge or charges made against them and to

providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the

collection and production of evidence, including

have reasonable time to prepare a defense;

seizure and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects

connected with an offense.

(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and

to cross examine such witnesses;

"8. When United States personnel have been tried in

accordance with the provisions of this Article

(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses;

and have been acquitted or have been convicted and

are serving, or have served their sentence, or have

(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of

their own choice on the same basis as

nationals of the Philippines;

(f) To have the service of a competent interpreter; and
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited
regularly by United States authorities, and to
have such authorities present at all judicial
proceedings. These proceedings shall be public unless
the
court, in accordance with Philippine laws, excludes
persons who have no role in the proceedings.
"10. The confinement or detention by Philippine
authorities of United States personnel shall be
carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate
Philippine and United States authorities. United States
Personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall
have the right to visits and material assistance.
"11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial
only in Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction,
and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine
military or religious courts.
"Article VI
Claims
"1. Except for contractual arrangements, including
United States foreign military sales letters of
offer and acceptance and leases of military equipment,
both governments waive any and all claims

against each other for damage, loss or destruction to

property of each other's armed forces or for death
or injury to their military and civilian personnel arising
from activities to which this agreement applies.
"2. For claims against the United States, other than
contractual claims and those to which
paragraph 1 applies, the United States Government, in
accordance with United States law regarding
foreign claims, will pay just and reasonable
compensation in settlement of meritorious claims for
damage, loss, personal injury or death, caused by acts
or omissions of United States personnel, or
otherwise incident to the non-combat activities of the
United States forces.
"Article VII
Importation and Exportation
"1. United States Government equipment, materials,
supplies, and other property imported into or
acquired in the Philippines by or on behalf of the
United States armed forces in connection with
activities to which this agreement applies, shall be free
of all Philippine duties, taxes and other similar
charges. Title to such property shall remain with the
United States, which may remove such property
from the Philippines at any time, free from export
duties, taxes, and other similar charges. The

exemptions provided in this paragraph shall also

extend to any duty, tax, or other similar charges which

Philippine duties, taxes, and other similar charges.

"Article VIII

would otherwise be assessed upon such property after

importation into, or acquisition within, the

Movement of Vessels and Aircraft

Philippines. Such property may be removed from the

Philippines, or disposed of therein, provided that

"1. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed

forces may enter the Philippines upon

disposition of such property in the Philippines to

persons or entities not entitled to exemption from

approval of the Government of the Philippines in

accordance with procedures stipulated in

applicable taxes and duties shall be subject to

payment of such taxes, and duties and prior approval
of

implementing arrangements.

the Philippine Government.

"2. Reasonable quantities of personal baggage,
personal effects, and other property for the
personal use of United States personnel may be
imported into and used in the Philippines free of all
duties, taxes and other similar charges during the
period of their temporary stay in the Philippines.
Transfers to persons or entities in the Philippines not
entitled to import privileges may only be made
upon prior approval of the appropriate Philippine
authorities including payment by the recipient of
applicable duties and taxes imposed in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines. The exportation of
such property and of property acquired in the
Philippines by United States personnel shall be free of
all

"2. Vessels operated by or for the United States armed

forces may enter the Philippines upon
approval of the Government of the Philippines. The
movement of vessels shall be in accordance with
international custom and practice governing such
vessels; and such agreed implementing arrangements
as necessary.
"3. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for
the United States armed forces shall not be
subject to the payment of landing or port fees,
navigation or over flight charges, or tolls or other use
charges, including light and harbor dues, while in the
Philippines. Aircraft operated by or for the United
States armed forces shall observe local air traffic
control regulations while in the Philippines. Vessels
owned or operated by the United States solely on
United States Government non-commercial service

shall not be subject to compulsory pilotage at

Philippine ports.

II

"Article IX

Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21,

Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the

Duration and Termination

Constitution? AaIDHS

"This agreement shall enter into force on the date on

which the parties have notified each other in

III

writing through the diplomatic channel that they have

completed their constitutional requirements for
entry into force. This agreement shall remain in force
until the expiration of 180 days from the date on
which either party gives the other party notice in
writing that it desires to terminate the agreement."

Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine

sovereignty?
a. Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to
hear and try offenses committed by US
military personnel?
b. Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction
over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua

Via these consolidated 11 petitions for certiorari and

prohibition, petitioners as legislators,
nongovernmental

or higher?

organizations, citizens and taxpayers assail the

constitutionality of the VFA and impute

Does the VFA violate:

to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in

ratifying the agreement.
We have simplified the issues raised by the petitioners
into the following:
I
Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA?

IV

a. the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article

III of the Constitution?
b. the prohibition against nuclear weapons under
Article II, Section 8?
c. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution granting
the exemption from taxes and duties for
the equipment, materials, supplies and other
properties imported into or acquired in the Philippines
by,

or on behalf, of the US Armed Forces?

LOCUS STANDI
At the outset, respondents challenge petitioners'
standing to sue, on the ground that the latter have not
shown any interest in the case, and that petitioners
failed to substantiate that they have sustained, or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the operation of
the VFA. 12 Petitioners, on the other hand,
counter that the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a
matter of transcendental importance which justifies

sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct

injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As
taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the
VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing
or spending powers. 15 On this point, it bears stressing
that a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the
act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. 16
Thus, in Bugnay Const. & Development Corp. vs.
Laron, 17 we held:

their standing. 13

". . . it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently

show that he would be benefited or injured by

A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality

of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that

the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a

real party in interest. Before he can invoke the

the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is

in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining

power of judicial review, he must specifically prove

that he has sufficient interest in preventing the

some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and

not merely that he suffers thereby in some

illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and

that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the

indefinite way." He must show that he has been, or is

about to be, denied some right or privilege to

enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is

not sufficient that he has merely a general

which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be

subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason

interest common to all members of the public."

of the statute complained of. 14

Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation

are involved in this case, and in the absence of

In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the

satisfaction of this Court, that they have

any allegation by petitioners that public funds are

being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as

taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality

of the VFA.

As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the IBP

lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the

Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Taada, Agapito

Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators,

absence of a board resolution from its Board of

Governors authorizing its National President to

do not possess the requisite locus standi to maintain

the present suit. While this Court, in Phil.

commence the present action. 19

Constitution Association vs. Hon. Salvador Enriquez, 18

sustained the legal standing of a member of the
Senate and the House of Representatives to question
the validity of a presidential veto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriation bill, we cannot,
at this instance, similarly uphold petitioners'
standing as members of Congress, in the absence of a
clear showing of any direct injury to their person
or to the institution to which they belong.
Beyond this, the allegations of impairment of
legislative power, such as the delegation of the power
of
Congress to grant tax exemptions, are more apparent
than real. While it may be true that petitioners
pointed to provisions of the VFA which allegedly impair
their legislative powers, petitioners failed
however to sufficiently show that they have in fact
suffered direct injury.
In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in these cases.

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance

and the constitutional significance of the issues
raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural
barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we
have done in the early Emergency Powers Cases, 20
where we had occasion to rule:
". . . ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive
orders issued by President Quirino although they were
involving only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. The Court
dismissed the objection that they were not proper
parties
and ruled that 'transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure' We have since then
applied the exception in many other cases.
(Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. v.

Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343)." (Italics

Supplied)

each others' acts, 25 this Court nevertheless resolves

to take cognizance of the instant petitions.

This principle was reiterated in the subsequent cases

of Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 21 Daza vs. Singson, 22

APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

and Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming

Corporation, 23 where we emphatically held:
"Considering however the importance to the public of
the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government
have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not
abused
the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed
aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of this petition. . . ."
Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, Jr., 24 this Court ruled that in cases of
transcendental importance, the Court may relax the
standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper
even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a
constitutional question based on the doctrine of
separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
departments of the government a becoming respect
for

One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the

determination of which provision of the Constitution
applies, with regard to the exercise by the Senate of its
constitutional power to concur with the VFA.
Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is
applicable considering that the VFA has for its subject
the presence of foreign military troops in the
Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary, maintain
that
Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the
VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement
which involves merely the temporary visits of United
States personnel engaged in joint military
exercises.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two
provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on
treaties or international agreements. Section 21,
Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:
AcICTS
"No treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least twothirds
of all the Members of the Senate."

Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:

valid and effective.

"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement

between the Republic of the Philippines and the United

In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special

provision that applies to treaties which involve the

States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign

military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be

presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities

in the Philippines. Under this provision, the

allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly

concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress

concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites

to render compliance with the constitutional

so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by

the people in a national referendum held for that

requirements and to consider the agreement binding

on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further

purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other

contracting State."

requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or

facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or

international agreements in general, in which case, the

virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate,

ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national

concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the

Members of the Senate is required to make the subject

referendum held for that purpose if so required by

Congress, and recognized as such by the other

treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding

on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays

contracting state.

down the general rule on treaties or international

agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a
wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited
to, extradition or tax treaties or those economic
in nature. All treaties or international agreements
entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject
matter, coverage, or particular designation or
appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to
be

It is our considered view that both constitutional

provisions, far from contradicting each other, actually
share some common ground. These constitutional
provisions both embody phrases in the negative and
thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and
character. In particular, Section 21 opens with the
clause
"No treaty . . .," and Section 25 contains the phrase
"shall not be allowed." Additionally, in both

instances, the concurrence of the Senate is

indispensable to render the treaty or international

however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will

find applicability with regard to the issue and for

agreement valid and effective.

the sole purpose of determining the number of votes

required to obtain the valid concurrence of the

To our mind, the fact that the President referred the

VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and
that the Senate extended its concurrence under the
same provision, is immaterial. For in either case,
whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25,
Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that
the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply
with the strict constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines
the treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits of military
personnel, and further defines the rights of the United
States and the Philippine government in the

Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.

It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory
construction that a special provision or law prevails
over a
general one. Lex specialis derogat generali. Thus,
where there is in the same statute a particular
enactment and also a general one which, in its most
comprehensive sense, would include what is
embraced in the former, the particular enactment
must be operative, and the general enactment must
be taken to affect only such cases within its general
language which are not within the provision of the
particular enactment. 26

matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel

and aircraft, importation and exportation of

In Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 27 we

enunciated:

equipment, materials and supplies.

". . . that another basic principle of statutory

construction mandates that general legislation must
give

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which

specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military
bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant
case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense,

way to special legislation on the same subject, and

generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases
in which the special provisions are not applicable (Sto.
Domingo vs. de los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139), that a

specific statute prevails over a general statute (De

Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760) and that where two

troops, or facilities." Stated differently, this prohibition

is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities

statutes are of equal theoretical application to a

particular case, the one designed therefor specially

without any foreign bases being established. The

clause does not refer to "foreign military bases, troops,

should prevail (Wil Wilhensen Inc. vs. Baluyot, 83 SCRA

38)."

or facilities" collectively but treats them as separate

and independent subjects. The use of comma and

Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25,

Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient

the disjunctive word "or" clearly signifies

disassociation and independence of one thing from the
others

agreements for the reason that there is no permanent

placing of structure for the establishment of a
military base. On this score, the Constitution makes no
distinction between "transient" and
"permanent." Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25,
Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or
facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the
Philippines.

included in the enumeration, 28 such that, the

provision contemplates three different situations a
military treaty the subject of which could be either (a)
foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign
facilities any of the three standing alone places it
under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
aTHASC

It is a rudiment in legal hermeneutics that when no

distinction is made by law the Court should not

To this end, the intention of the framers of the Charter,

as manifested during the deliberations of the

distinguish Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire

debemos.

1986 Constitutional Commission, is consistent with this

interpretation:

In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument

that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since

"MR. MAAMBONG. I just want to address a question or

two to Commissioner Bernas.

no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops

and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a

This formulation speaks of three things: foreign

military bases, troops or facilities. My first question is:
If

perusal of said constitutional provision reveals that the

proscription covers "foreign military bases,

the country does enter into such kind of a treaty, must

it cover the three-bases, troops or facilities or

could the treaty entered into cover only one or two?

FR. BERNAS. Definitely, it can cover only one. Whether
it covers only one or it covers three, the
requirement will be the same.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the Philippine
government can enter into a treaty covering not bases
but merely troops?
FR. BERNAS. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. I cannot find any reason why the,
government can enter into a treaty covering only
troops.
FR. BERNAS. Why not? Probably if we stretch our
imagination a little bit more, we will find some. We
just want to cover everything." 29 (Italics Supplied)
Moreover, military bases established within the
territory of another state is no longer viable because of
the alternatives offered by new means and weapons of
warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided
missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay
afloat in the sea even for months and years without
returning to their home country. These military
warships are actually used as substitutes for a
landhome
base not only of military aircraft but also of military
personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels are

mobile as compared to a land-based military

headquarters.
At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of
whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were
complied with when the Senate gave its concurrence
to the VFA.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it
must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum; and (c)
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two
requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence
handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution, whether under the general requirement
in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate
mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in
the latter article requiring ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a national referendum
being unnecessary since Congress has not required
it.

As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII

particularly requires that a treaty or international

the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more

particular language, the concurrence of the Senate

agreement, to be valid and effective, must be

concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members
of

contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means

that at least two-thirds of all the members of the

the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII

simply provides that the treaty be "duly

Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty the

VFA in the instant case.

concurred in by the Senate."

Under these circumstances, the charter provides that

the Senate shall be composed of twenty-four (24)

Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a twothirds vote of all the members of the Senate is

Senators. 30 Without a tinge of doubt, two-thirds (2/3)

of this figure, or not less than sixteen (16)

clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated

by law may be validly obtained and deemed

members, favorably acting on the proposal is an

unquestionable compliance with the requisite number

present. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII

requires, among other things, that the treaty the

of votes mentioned in Section 21 of Article VII. The fact

that there were actually twenty-three (23)

VFA, in the instant case be a "duly concurred in by

the Senate," it is very true however that said

incumbent Senators at the time the voting was made,

31 will not alter in any significant way the

provision must be related and viewed in light of the

clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII,

circumstance that more than two-thirds of the

members of the Senate concurred with the proposed

which in more specific terms, requires that the

concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be

VFA, even if the two-thirds vote requirement is based

on this figure of actual members (23). In this

made by a two-thirds vote of all the members of the

Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not

regard, the fundamental law is clear that two-thirds of

the 24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes,

be treated in isolation to Section 21, Article, VII.

suffice so as to render compliance with the strict

constitutional mandate of giving concurrence to the

As noted, the "concurrence requirement" under

Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in relation
to

subject treaty.

Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed

in Section 25, Article XVIII are present, we shall

United States of America in this case, to submit the

VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence

now pass upon and delve on the requirement that the

VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the

pursuant to its Constitution, 33 is to accord strict

meaning to the phrase. IacHAE

United States of America.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in

the Constitution are to be given their ordinary

Petitioners contend that the phrase "recognized as a

treaty," embodied in Section 25, Article XVIII,
means that the VFA should have the advice and
consent of the United States Senate pursuant to its
own

meaning except where technical terms are employed,

in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. Its language should be understood in
the sense they have in common use. 34

constitutional process, and that it should not be

considered merely an executive agreement by the

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United

States treats the VFA only as an executive

United States.

agreement because, under international law, an

executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. 35 To be

In opposition, respondents argue that the letter of

United States Ambassador Hubbard stating that the
VFA is binding on the United States Government is
conclusive, on the point that the VFA is recognized as

sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an

agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

a treaty by the United States of America. According to

respondents, the VFA, to be binding, must only be

A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties, is "an international instrument

accepted as a treaty by the United States.

concluded between States in written form and

governed by international law, whether embodied in a

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase

"recognized as a treaty" means that the other
contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a
treaty. 32 To require the other contracting state, the

single instrument or in two or more related

instruments, and whatever its particular designation."
36
There are many other terms used for a treaty or
international agreement, some of which are: act,

protocol, agreement, compromis d' arbitrage,

concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes,
pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers,
from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that
the names or titles of international agreements
included under the general term treaty have little or
no
legal significance. Certain terms are useful, but they
furnish little more than mere description. 37

concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In

Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, 40
we had
occasion to pronounce:
". . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long
usage. From the earliest days of our history we have

Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that

"the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of

entered into executive agreements covering such

subjects as commercial and consular relations,
mostfavored-

terms in the present Convention are without prejudice

to the use of those terms, or to the meanings

nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright

protection, postal and navigation

which may be given to them in the internal law of the

State."

arrangements and the settlement of claims. The

validity of these has never been seriously questioned
by

Thus, in international law, there is no difference

between treaties and executive agreements in their
binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within
their powers. 38 International law continues to make
no distinction between treaties and executive
agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon
nations. 39
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding
effect of executive agreements even without the

our courts.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has
expressly recognized the validity and
constitutionality of executive agreements entered into
without Senate approval." (39 Columbia Law
Review, pp. 753-754) (See, also, U.S. vs. Curtis Wright
Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L. ed. 255;
U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.S. vs.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S.

188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15 pp. 19051906; California Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675;

further to comply with its obligations under the treaty,

there is indeed marked compliance with the

Hyde on International Law [Revised Edition], Vol. 2, pp.

1405, 1416-1418; Willoughby on the U.S.

mandate of the Constitution.

Constitution Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540; Moore,

International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218;
Hackworth, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390407). "(Italics supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
which drafted the 1987 Constitution is enlightening
and highly-instructive:
"MR. MAAMBONG. Of course it goes without saying
that as far as ratification of the other state is
concerned, that is entirely their concern under their
own laws.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, but we will accept whatever they say.
If they say that we have done everything to
make it a treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we
will accept it as a treaty." 41
The records reveal that the United States Government,
through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has
stated that the United States government has fully
committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. 42
For as long as the United States of America accepts or
acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself

Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the

President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the
Senate should be taken as a clear and unequivocal
expression of our nation's consent to be bound by
said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the
obligations and responsibilities embodied
thereunder.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act,
undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government, as the case may be, through which the
formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. 43 A
State may provide in its domestic legislation the
process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the
State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by
ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such
ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the
negotiating States agreed that ratification should be
required, (c) the representative of the State has signed
the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the
intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to
ratification appears from the full powers of its
representative, or was expressed during the
negotiation. 44

In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the

President and not, as commonly believed, in the

official thereof. As an integral part of the community of

nations, we are responsible to assure that our

legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to

giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to

government, Constitution and laws will carry out our

international obligation. 47 Hence, we cannot

the ratification. 45

readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse

for non-compliance with our obligations, duties

With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to

final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes

and responsibilities under international law. DHaECI

between the Philippines and the United States of

America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on

Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and

Duties of States adopted by the International

our part, under the principles of international law, to

be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no

Law Commission in 1949 provides: "Every State has

the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations

less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, 46

declares that the Philippines adopts the generally

arising from treaties and other sources of international

law, and it may not invoke provisions in its

accepted principles of international law as part of the

law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,

constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to

perform this duty." 48

equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with

all nations.

Equally important is Article 26 of the Convention which

provides that "Every treaty in force is binding

As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines

agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for

upon the parties to it and must be performed by them

in good faith." This is known as the principle of

the conduct of its international relations. While the

international obligation devolves upon the state and

pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of

treaties and have been one of the most

not upon any particular branch, institution, or

individual member of its government, the Philippines is

fundamental principles of positive international law,

supported by the jurisprudence of international

nonetheless responsible for violations committed by

any branch or subdivision of its government or any

tribunals. 49
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

In the instant controversy, the President, in effect, is

heavily faulted for exercising a power and
performing a task conferred upon him by the
Constitution the power to enter into and ratify
treaties.
Through the expediency of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners in these consolidated cases impute
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Chief
Executive in ratifying the VFA, and referring the same
to the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Section 21,
Article VII of the Constitution.
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or,
when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law. 50
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his
office, the President, as head of State, is the sole
organ and authority in the external affairs of the
country. In many ways, the President is the chief
architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance
in the field of foreign relations is (then)
conceded." 51 Wielding vast powers and influence, his
conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as

Jefferson describes, is "executive altogether." 52

As regards the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the Constitution vests the
same
in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at
least two thirds vote of all the members of the
Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the
subsequent ratification of the agreement are
exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in
the lawful exercise of his vast executive and
diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation
the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it. 53 Consequently, the acts or
judgment calls of the President involving the VFA
specifically the acts of ratification and entering into
a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the
exercise of such principal acts squarely fall within
the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may
not be validly struck down, much less calibrated
by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave
abuse of power or discretion.
It is the Court's considered view that the President, in
ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to
the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines
and limits of the powers vested in him by the

Constitution. It is of no moment that the President, in

the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and

national security, it has not altogether done away with

political questions such as those which arise in

in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit
of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution,

the field of foreign relations. 54 The High Tribunal's

function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, "is

referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under

the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse

merely (to) check whether or not the governmental

branch or agency has gone beyond the

of discretion, much less a grave, patent and whimsical

abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the

constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred

or has a different view. In the absence of a

President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring

the same to the Senate for the purpose of

showing . . . (of) grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the

complying with the concurrence requirement

embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the

Court to exercise its corrective power . . . It has no

power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 55

President merely performed a constitutional task and

exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the

As to the power to concur with treaties, the

Constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone.
Thus,

functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting

the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of
Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the
President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be
adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of
discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious
manner.
For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of
the Constitution has broadened the scope of
judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political
departments to decide, such as those relating to

once the Senate 56 performs that power, or exercises

its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed
by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot, in like
manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of power,
much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate,
in the exercise of its discretion and acting within
the limits of such power, may not be similarly faulted
for having simply performed a task conferred and
sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law.
For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is
essentially legislative in character; 57 the Senate, as

an independent body possessed of its own erudite

mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject

metes and bounds within which each of the three

political branches of government may exercise the

the proposed agreement, and whatever action it takes

in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion,

powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by

law.

pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the

act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal,

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the

instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of

separation of powers and of checks and balances alive
and

SO ORDERED.

vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments

remain true to their form in a democratic government
such as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through
this treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a
healthy system of checks and balances indispensable
toward our nation's pursuit of political maturity
and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle
that matters pertaining to the wisdom of a
legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of
the courts to inquire. IEAacS
In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondents, this Court
as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch
sentinel of the rights of the people is then
without power to conduct an incursion and meddle
with such affairs purely executive and legislative in
character and nature. For the Constitution no less,
maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Kapunan, Quisumbing,

Purisima, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo and Vitug, JJ., join the dissent of J. Puno.
Puno, J., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., concurs in the result.
Panganiban, J., took no part due to close personal and
former professional relations with a petitioner,
Sen. J.R. Salonga.
Lina Obaa y Zamora vs. Hon. Andres B. Soriano CAG.
R. SP No. 60353 August 29, 2001
Facts of the Case:
Jaime Liron, private respondent, was earlier charged
before the trial court with rape, the
Information alleging that he had committed the crime
by inserting his finger in the

vagina of petitioner Jolyna Obana y Zamora against

her will and without her

The starting point of construction should not be

journals of debates or committee

consent. Acting on a motion in favour of respondent

Liron, the trial court referred the

discussion, but the text of the law itself. Dickerson, in

his well read treatise on statutory

case to the Office of the Prosecutor, this time charging

the accused no longer with rape

interpretation applies that the court should not

overthrow the principle by treating as

but with acts of lasciviousness.

co-equal the enacted statues and the legislative

hearings or committee reports.

Petitioners argue that to exclude fingers under the

context instrument or object,
absurdity will result.
Respondents, however, for their part, insist that what
the law reads is all the courts can
apply. Instrument or object is a phrase, they submit,
that does not include the fingers;
citing a piece of legislative history in the discussion in
the Bicameral Conference
Committee of Congress that apparently records the
decision to exclude the fingers.

It may be uncommon to refer to his finger as an object,

but it would not do such violence
to the term object for even in common use, it is
synonymous to a thing. Ballentines Law
Dictionary defines object as a material thing, any
tangible thing, visible or capable of
discernment by the senses. Clearly, a finger falls
within the ambit of this concept.
It is a rule in statutory construction that where such
construction is consonant and not

Hence, this petition.

in variance with the purpose of the statute, and does

not thwart or defeat the same, or

Issue: Whether or not the term instrument or object

into the genital or anal orifice of

where it is not obvious from the statute that the evil to

be suppressed, or the remedy to

another person include fingers under Article 266 A,

Paragraph 2 of R.A. 8353.

be advanced, requires that the construction be limited

or enlarged.

Ruling:

The title of the statute itself expands the definition of

the crime of rape. Excluding the

insertion of finger would be unintelligible, arbitrary and

capricious delimitation of what

complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 69262, sought to

collect the amount of P698,502.10 representing

the law had set out to expand. It is also based on the

rule that statutes should be

petitioner's unpaid balance of the car loan 4 advanced

to him by respondent when he was still a

construed as a whole for the purpose of the law itself.

member of its board of directors.

It falls under the consequential analysis or absurdity

rule where the courts must work

Personal service of summons to petitioner failed

because he could not be located in his last known

with norms of reasonableness or fairness.

address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently,

on respondent's motion, the trial court allowed

G.R. No. 170943 September 23, 2008

Santos, Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corp.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170943. September 23, 2008.]
PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., petitioner, vs. PNOC
EXPLORATION CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
This is a petition for review 1 of the September 22,
2005 decision 2 and December 29, 2005 resolution 3
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82482.
HDCTAc
On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration
Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money
against petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167. The

service of summons by publication.

Respondent caused the publication of the summons in
Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, on May 20, 2003. Thereafter,
respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of
the
advertising manager of Remate 5 and an affidavit of
service of respondent's employee 6 to the effect
that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail
to petitioner's last known address.
When petitioner failed to file his answer within the
prescribed period, respondent moved that the case
be set for the reception of its evidence ex parte. The
trial court granted the motion in an order dated
September 11, 2003.
Respondent proceeded with the ex parte presentation
and formal offer of its evidence. Thereafter, the

case was deemed submitted for decision on October

15, 2003.

copy of the September 11, 2003 order was actually

mailed to petitioner at his last known address. It also

On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an "Omnibus

Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached

denied the motion to admit petitioner's answer

because the same was filed way beyond the

Answer". He sought reconsideration of the September

11, 2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of

reglementary period. SIDTCa

service submitted by respondent failed to comply with

Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was
not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed
that he was denied due process as he was not
notified of the September 11, 2003 order. He prayed
that respondent's evidence ex parte be stricken off

Aggrieved, petitioner assailed the September 11, 2003

and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court in
the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. He
contended that the orders were issued with grave
abuse of discretion. He imputed the following errors to
the trial court: taking cognizance of the case

the records and that his answer be admitted.

despite lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of

summons; failing to furnish him with copies of its

Respondent naturally opposed the motion. It insisted

that it complied with the rules on service by

orders and processes, particularly the September 11,

2003 order, and upholding technicality over equity

publication. Moreover, pursuant to the September 11,

2003 order, petitioner was already deemed in

and justice.

default for failure to file an answer within the

prescribed period.
In an order dated February 6, 2004, the trial court
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
September 11, 2003 order. It held that the rules did
not require the affidavit of complementary service
by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of court.
It also ruled that due process was observed as a

During the pendency of the petition in the Court of

Appeals, the trial court rendered its decision in Civil
Case No. 69262. It ordered petitioner to pay
P698,502.10 plus legal interest and costs of suit. 7
Meanwhile, on September 22, 2005, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision 8 sustaining the
September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of
the trial court and dismissing the petition. It denied
reconsideration. 9 Thus, this petition.

Petitioner essentially reiterates the grounds he raised

in the Court of Appeals, namely, lack of
jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of
summons, failure of the trial court to furnish him
with copies of its orders and processes including the
September 11, 2003 order and preference for
technicality rather than justice and equity. In
particular, he claims that the rule on service by
publication

unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent

inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon
him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and in such places and for such times as
the
court may order. (emphasis supplied) STcEIC
Since petitioner could not be personally served with
summons despite diligent efforts to locate his

under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies

only to actions in rem, not actions in personam

whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted

leave of court to effect service of summons upon him

like a complaint for a sum of money. He also contends

that the affidavit of service of a copy of the

by publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Thus, petitioner was properly served with

summons should have been prepared by the clerk of

court, not respondent's messenger.

summons by publication.

The petition lacks merit.

PROPRIETY OF
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or
whereabouts are unknown. In any action where
the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or
the like, or whenever his whereabouts are

Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in

rem and an action in personam and claims that
substituted service may be availed of only in an action
in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in
personam distinction was significant under the old rule
because it was silent as to the kind of action to
which the rule was applicable. 10 Because of this
silence, the Court limited the application of the old
rule to in rem actions only. 11
This has been changed. The present rule expressly
states that it applies "[i]n any action where the

defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the

like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown

The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of

complementary service be executed by the clerk

and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it

now applies to any action, whether in personam,

of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the

mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty

in rem or quasi in rem. 12

to make the complementary service by registered mail

is imposed on the party who resorts to service by

Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the

relevant portion of Section 19, 13 Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court simply speaks of the following:
. . . an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the
summons and order for publication in the post
office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the
affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal
clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager
of the newspaper which published the summons.
The service of summons by publication is
complemented by service of summons by registered
mail to
the defendant's last known address. This
complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit
"showing
the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage prepaid,
directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last
known address."

publication.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons
was defective, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own
voluntary appearance in the action against him. In
this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court states: TDcAIH
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he
filed the "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and to Admit Attached Answer". 14 This was
equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial
court
with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.

ENTITLEMENT TO
NOTICE OF PROCEEDINGS
The trial court allowed respondent to present its
evidence ex parte on account of petitioner's failure to
file his answer within the prescribed period. Petitioner
assails this action on the part of the trial court as
well as the said court's failure to furnish him with
copies of orders and processes issued in the course of

SEC. 4. Effect of order of default. A party in default

shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (emphasis
supplied)
If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may
be declared in default upon motion of the
plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. In case he is
declared in default, the court shall proceed to

the proceedings.

render judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his

pleading may warrant, unless the court in its

The effects of a defendant's failure to file an answer

within the time allowed therefor are governed by

discretion requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The

defaulting defendant may not take part in the

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 9 (on Effect of Failure to Plead)

of the Rules of Court:

trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent

proceedings.

SEC. 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending

party fails to answer within the time allowed

In this case, even petitioner himself does not dispute

that he failed to file his answer on time. That was

therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming

party with notice to the defending party, and

in fact why he had to file an "Omnibus Motion for

Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer". But

proof of such failure, declare the defending party in

default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to

respondent moved only for the ex parte presentation

of evidence, not for the declaration of petitioner

render judgment granting the claimant such relief as

his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its

in default. In its February 6, 2004 order, the trial court

stated: ADSTCa

discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence.

Such reception of evidence may be delegated to

The disputed Order of September 11, 2003 allowing

the presentation of evidence ex-parte precisely

the clerk of court.

ordered that "despite and notwithstanding service of

summons by publication, no answer has been filed

with the Court within the required period and/or

forthcoming.["] Effectively[,] that was a finding that

to declare petitioner in default was filed, no default

order should have been issued.

the defendant [that is, herein petitioner] was in default

for failure to file an answer or any responsive

To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party

declared in default is entitled to notice of

pleading within the period fixed in the publication as

precisely the defendant [could not] be found and

subsequent proceedings, all the more should a party

who has not been declared in default be entitled to

for which reason, service of summons by publication

was ordered. It is simply illogical to notify the

such notice. But what happens if the residence or

whereabouts of the defending party is not known or

defendant of the Order of September 11, 2003 simply

on account of the reality that he was no longer

he cannot be located? In such a case, there is

obviously no way notice can be sent to him and the
notice

residing and/or found on his last known address and

his whereabouts unknown thus the publication
of the summons. In other words, it was reasonable to
expect that the defendant will not receive any
notice or order in his last known address. Hence, [it
was] impractical to send any notice or order to him.
Nonetheless, the record[s] will bear out that a copy of
the order of September 11, 2003 was mailed to
the defendant at his last known address but it was not
claimed. (emphasis supplied)
As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order
did not limit itself to permitting respondent to
present its evidence ex parte but in effect issued an
order of default. But the trial court could not validly
do that as an order of default can be made only upon
motion of the claiming party. 15 Since no motion

requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not

require that the impossible be done. 16 Nemo
tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one to
perform an impossibility. 17 Laws and rules must be
interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with
logic, common sense, reason and practicality. 18
Hence, even if petitioner was not validly declared in
default, he could not reasonably demand that
copies of orders and processes be furnished him. Be
that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003
order was nonetheless still mailed to petitioner at his
last known address but it was unclaimed. ITScAE
CORRECTNESS OF
NON-ADMISSION OF ANSWER

Petitioner failed to file his answer within the required

period. Indeed, he would not have moved for the

Roberto A. Barrios (deceased) and Mario L. Guaria III

of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals.

admission of his answer had he filed it on time.

Considering that the answer was belatedly filed, the
trial

Rollo, pp. 20-25.

court did not abuse its discretion in denying its

admission.

4. The car loan was originally for P966,000 which was

used to procure a Honda CRV for petitioner.

Petitioner's plea for equity must fail in the face of the

clear and express language of the rules of

The said loan was evidenced by a promissory note and

further secured by a chattel mortgage on the

procedure and of the September 11, 2003 order

regarding the period for filing the answer. Equity is

vehicle. One of the conditions of the promissory note

was that, in case of separation from the service,

available only in the absence of law, not as its

replacement. 19 Equity may be applied only in the

any unpaid balance shall immediately be paid in full.

(See May 19, 2004 Regional Trial Court decision,

absence of rules of procedure, never in contravention

thereof.

rollo, pp. 82-83.)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Azcuna and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. aDATHC
2. Penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada
(retired) and concurred by Associate Justices

3. Id., p. 27.

5. Allan Paul A. Plaza.

6. Vincent Panganiban. ETaHCD
7. See May 19, 2004 Regional Trial Court decision,
rollo, pp. 82-83. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the said decision remains pending.
8. Supra note 2.
9. Supra note 3.
10. The predecessor of this provision was Section 16,
Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure which
provided:

SEC. 16. Service upon an unknown defendant.

Whenever the defendant is designated as an

14. Herrera, supra note 12 citing Europa v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72827, 18 July

unknown owner, or the like, or whenever the address

of a defendant is unknown and cannot be

1989, 175 SCRA 394.

ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave

of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places
and for such time as the court may order.

15. Mediserv, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation, 408

Phil. 745 (2001).
16. Akbayan-Youth v. Commission on Elections, 407
Phil. 618 (2001).
17. Id.

11. Consolidated Plywood Industries, Inc. v. Breva, G.R.

No. L-82811, 18 October 1988, 166 SCRA

18. Id.

519; Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil.

536 (1998); Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil.

19. Heirs of Spouses de la Cruz v. Heirs of Quintos, Sr.,

434 Phil. 708 (2002) citing Tupas v. Court of

96 (1996).

Appeals, G.R. No. 89571, 06 February 1991, 193 SCRA

597. aCcSDT

12. See Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law, vol. I, pp.

699 and 702.

SECOND DIVISION

13. The provision states: ISTHED

[G.R. No. L-5872. November 29, 1954.]

SEC. 19. Proof of service by publication. If the

service has been made by publication, service

ENRIQUE BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners, vs.

CRISOSTOMO S. BERNARDO and the COURT OF
APPEALS,

may be proved by the affidavit of the printer, his

foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or

respondents.

advertising manager, to which affidavit a copy of the

publication shall be attached, and by an affidavit
showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and
order for publication in the post office, postage
prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail
to his last known address.

Cornelio R. Magsarili for petitioners.

De los Santos & De los Santos for respondents.
Alfonso S. Borja, as amicus curiae.
SYLLABUS

1. EMINENT DOMAIN; "BONA FIDE" OCCUPANT HAS

PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO BUY LANDS; MERE
LICENSE OF LESSEE IS NOT "BONA FIDE" OCCUPANT.
Any person who, at the time of the acquisition of
the estate by the Government, has been gratuitously
occupying a lot therein by mere tolerance of its
lessee, and who does not own the house erected on
such lot, is not a "bona fide occupant," entitled to
its acquisition, as the term is used in Commonwealth
Act No. 539.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ESSENCE OF TERM "BONA FIDE." The
essence of bona fide or good faith lies in
honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of
a superior claim, and absence of intention to
overreach another.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
Enrique Bernardo, his wife and children, petition this
Court for a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals (in its case No. 6677-R), declaring the
respondent Crisostomo R. Bernardo entitled to
preference
under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 20 and 539, in the
acquisition of lot No. 462-A of the "Capellana de
Concepcin", also known as lot No. 4, block No. 26, of
the Tambobong Estate plan, located in Malabon,

Rizal, and having an area of 208 square meters.

It is uncontested fact that on December 31, 1947, the
Republic of the Philippines purchased from the
Roman Catholic Church the estate known as the
"Capellania de Tambobong" in Malabon, Rizal, under
the provisions of section 1, of Commonwealth Act No.
539. Said Act authorizes the expropriation or
purchase of private lands and that lands acquired
thereunder should be subdivided into lots, for resale
at reasonable prices to "their bona fide tenants or
occupants." Crisostomo R. Bernardo, respondent
herein, applied to the Rural Progress Administration for
the purchase of the lot in question. Petitioners
Enrique Bernardo, et al., contested the application and
claimed preferential right to such purchase, and
on January 12, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration
resolved to recognize the petitioners as entitled
to preference. The respondents then appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the latter
upheld their claim, and the decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals expressly finds
that:
". . . It has been incontestably proven that the disputed
lot had been held under lease by appellee's

deceased parents and later by him (appellee)

continuously from 1912 to 1947. The appellee's

petitioner Enrique Bernardo to the respondent, who

thereby became its owner; that because of family

predecessors paid the rentals due on the said lot from

the commencement of their leasehold rights up

relationship, the petitioners "were able to remain in

the premises due to the tolerance of, and out of

to 1936, when Teodora Santos died. The appellee

continued paying the rents on the same lot from 1936

charity from, the appellee (respondent Crisostomo

Bernardo) and his deceased parents who were the

to December 31, 1947, when the Government acquired

the entire Capellania de Concepcin estate.

rightful lessees of the lot in question."

Since 1912 the values of the leasehold right of

appellee amounts to about P4,000.00.
The alleged preferential right of the appellants to the
purchase of the disputed lot, which was also the
main basis of the decision of the Rural Progress
Administration, is their claim of actual occupation of
the
lot for many years before the acquisition of the
Concepcin estate by the Government. The appellants'

The Court of Appeals likewise found and declared in its

decision that since February 1, 1945, the
respondent Crisostomo Bernardo required the
petitioner to vacate the premises. Finally, we
understand
that in Case No. 6734-R, the Court of Appeals declared
valid the sale of the house on the lot in question
made in 1944 by petitioner Enrique Bernardo in favor
of respondent Crisostomo R. Bernardo, and that
the aforesaid judgment is now final.

occupation of the premises is not denied by the

appellee. Appellee's witness Otilia Santos, however,
said

There are thus before us, disputing the right of

preference to the acquisition of the lot, the respondent

that the late Romulo Bernardo had allowed his uncle,

appellant Enrique Bernardo, to stay in the

who is the owner of the house standing on said lot

since 1944, and has held the land in lawful tenancy

premises since the year 1918. (Petitioner's Brief, pp.

72-73).

since 1912, paying rents and taxes thereon; and the

petitioner, who was allowed by respondent, out of

The Court of Appeals also found that the house

standing on the lot had been since July 13, 1944, sold
by

deference and charity, to gratuitously occupy the lot

and live therein since 1918. Upon the facts on

record, we are of the opinion that petitioner does not

come under the description "bona fide tenant or

house that was his remaining link with the occupancy

of the lot; and since 1945, even before the

occupant" employed in the statute (C. A. 539).

Government's purchase, he had been required to

vacate. Thus bereft of all stable interest in the land,

The term "bona fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner

is not a tenant) has been defined as "one who
supposes he has a good title and knows of no adverse
claim" (Philips vs. Stroup, 17 Atl. 220, 221); "one
who not only honestly supposes himself to be vested
with true title but is ignorant that the title is
contested by any other person claiming a superior
right to it" (Gresham vs. Ware, 79 Ala. 192, 199);
definitions that correspond closely to that of a
possessor in good faith in our Civil Law (Civil Code of
1889, art. 433; new Civil Code, art. 526). The essence
of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in

petitioner nevertheless seeks to turn respondent's past

deferential regard to his own advantage, and to
exploit his gratuitous stay at respondent's expense for
the purpose of ousting his benefactors and
wiping out the investment that the latter, and their
predecessors in interest, had established and
preserved by faithful payment for thirty years of the
rental charged for the lot in question. That the law,
in preferring "bona fide occupants,' intended to protect
or sanction such utter disregard of fair dealing
may well be doubted.

honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of

a superior claim, and absence of intention to

The petitioner seeks to justify his stand by claiming

that the policy of the government, ever since the

overreach another. The petitioner Enrique Bernardo

falls short of this standard: for the precarious

start of the American sovereignty, had been to acquire

the landed estates for the benefit of their "actual

nature of his occupancy, as mere licensee of

respondents, duty bound to protect and restore that

occupants," as allegedly exemplified in Acts 1170 and

1933 (Friar Lands' Acts), and Commonwealth Acts

possession to its real and legitimate holders upon

demand, could never be hidden from him. Moreover,

Nos. 20, 260, 378, and 539 (Homesite Acts); that the
words "bona fide occupants" employed in the

at the time the Government acquired the Tambobong

Estate, petitioner had already parted with the

Commonwealth Acts are equivalent to "actual"

occupants. Two powerful reasons nullify this
contention.

The first is that section 7 of Act 1170 of the old

Philippine Legislature, employs the terms "actual bona

the respondents rather than the petitioner, for it is an

inalterable fact on record that the rentals and

fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that

"actual" and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while

taxes on the lot in question were always paid by the

parents of respondent Crisostomo Bernardo and

the Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" and

solely used the words "bona fide occupants",

continued by the latter upon his parents' death, to the

exclusion of herein respondent.

thereby emphasizing the requirement that the

prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be
endowed

As pointed out by the decision under review, had not

the respondents taken and maintained sincere and

with legitimate tenure. The second reason is that in

carrying out its social readjustment policies, the

affirmative steps to own their lands through a

continuous and faithful payment of their obligations,
the

government could not simply lay aside moral

standards, and arm to favor usurpers, squatters, and

chances are that the petitioner would have been long

ago speedily ejected from the premises of the

intruders, unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin

and character of their occupancy. Such a policy

former landowners. To which may be added that at

present, not being the lessee of the lot, nor the

would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their

just solution. It is safe to say that the term "bona

owner of the house standing thereon, the petitioner's

interest in this particular lot appears to be a

fide occupants" was not designed to cloak and protect

violence, strategy, double dealing, or breach of

purely speculative one.

trust.

We therefore rule that a person who, at the time of the

acquisition of the Tambobong Estate by the

That the underlying motive behind the Homesite Acts

is the desire that "the heads of the families

Government, has been gratuitously occupying a lot

therein by mere tolerance of its lessee, and who

concerned be given opportunity to become the owners

of their homes and residential lots in which they

does not own the house erected on such lot, is not a

"bona fide occupant" entitled to its acquisition, as

and their forbears have been raised and born"

(Messages of the President, Vol. 4, pp. 288-290), favors

the term is used in Commonwealth Act No. 539.

Whether or not the situation would be different if the

occupant were a sublessee of the lot, need not be

decided in this case, the issue not being involved.

Act No. 20, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.

539. In its decision dated January 12, 1948, the Rural

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed,

with costs against the petitioner.

Progress Administration awarded the lot to the

petitioners, and on July 9, 1948 the corresponding
deed

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Jugo, JJ.,

concur.
Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring.
I concur with the majority solely because of the
peculiar facts of this case; but I am of the opinion that,
between a bona fide occupant and a tenant or lessee,
the spirit of the law is to prefer the former
especially if the latter has already a piece of land of his
own.

was executed in their favor.

On July 26, 1948, respondent Bernardo filed an action
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against the
petitioners and the Rural Progress Administration,
praying that the decision of the Rural Progress
Administration, as well as the corresponding sale in
favor of the petitioners, be declared null and void;
that respondent Bernardo be declared entitled to
purchase the lot in question; that the petitioners be

PARAS, C. J., dissenting:

ordered to vacate the lot and surrender the possession

thereof; and that the petitioners be sentenced

On December 12, 1947, the herein respondent

Crisostomo S. Bernardo filed an application with the

to pay respondent Bernardo, by way of damages, the

sum of P20.00 per month from February 1, 1945

Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of lot

No. 462-A of the "Capellana de Concepcin", now

until its surrender to said respondent. After hearing,

the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered on

lot No. 4, block No. 26, of the Tambobong Estate plan,

situated in Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal, and

February 15, 1950 a decision in favor of respondent

Bernardo, the dispositive part of which reads as

containing an area of 208 square meters. The herein

petitioners, Enrique Bernardo, his wife and

follows:

children, also applied for the purchase of the same lot.

The basis of both applications is Commonwealth

"In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment

in favor of the plaintiff and against the

defendants, declaring the decision of the Rural

Progress Administration dated January 12, 1948, as
well
as the sale of the lot in question by said Rural Progress
Administration to defendants Bernardo null and
void and of no effect; ordering said defendant Rural
Progress Administration to sell the lot in question to
the plaintiff who is the bona fide tenant of the lot in
dispute and the owner of the house standing
thereon; ordering the defendants Bernardo to vacate
the lot in question and to pay to the plaintiff
damages in the sum of P20.00 per month,
representing the reasonable rental value for their
illegal use

lessee of the lot from 1912 to 1947; that respondent's

predecessors paid its rental up to 1936 when his
mother Teodora Santos died; that from 1936
respondent Bernardo in turn paid the rentals up to
December 31, 1947, when the Government acquired
the entire "Capellana de Concepcin" estate; that
he owns the house standing on the lot; that while the
petitioners actually occupied said lot since 1918,
their occupancy was by mere tolerance of and out of
charity from respondent Bernardo and his
deceased parents; that the petitioners were required
by respondent Bernardo to vacate the premises on
February 1, 1945, or two years before the acquisition
of the "Capellana de Concepcin" estate by the

and occupation of said lot, from February 1, 1945 until

the said lot is vacated by defendant Bernardo;

Government.

and sentencing all defendants to pay the costs of the

suit."

Upon the other hand, the petitioners' preferential right

to acquire the lot is premised on their actual

From this decision the petitioners appealed to the

Court of Appeals which, on April 17, 1952, affirmed

occupancy since 1918.

the decision of the court of origin in toto, with costs

against the petitioners. The latter have elevated the

Commonwealth Act No. 20, enacted on July 11, 1936,

in section 1, provided that "the President of the

case before us on certiorari.

Philippines is hereby authorized to order the institution

of expropriation proceeding or to enter into

The facts relied upon by the Court of First Instance of

Rizal and the Court of Appeals are to the effect

negotiations for the purpose of acquiring portions of

large landed estates which are now used as home

that the deceased parents of the respondent Bernardo

and later said respondent himself had been the

sites and reselling them at costs to their bona fide

occupants." It will be noted that, under this provision,

portions of large landed estates used as homesites

would be expropriated or acquired by the

the lessee of the lot in question, he should enjoy

priority. It was reasoned out that said respondent

Government for resale to their bona fide occupants.

Commonwealth Act No. 539, enacted on May 26,

having paid, by his predecessors and himself, the

rentals for the land from 1912 to 1917, and owning the

1940, and amending Commonwealth Act No. 20,

provides that "the President of the Philippines is

house now standing on the lot, is a "tenant" within the

purview of Commonwealth Act No. 539; that the

authorized to acquire private lands or any interest

therein, through purchase or expropriation, and to

petitioners could not have stayed in the premises since

1918, without being ejected by the original

subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for

resale at reasonable prices and under such

owners of the "Capellana de Concepcin" estate, if

respondent Bernardo and his predecessors had not

conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or

occupants or to private individuals who will work

paid said rentals.

the lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire

and own lands in the Philippines." This latter
provision differs from Commonwealth Act No. 20 in the
sense that private lands are to be acquired or
expropriated for subdivision into lots or small farms for
resale to their bona fide tenants or occupants or
to private individuals who are qualified to acquire and
own lands in the Philippines, the important
change being, for the purposes of this opinion, that
resale now be made to "bona fide tenants or

We are of the opinion that the law in this case has

been misapplied. To determine the real purpose of
Commonwealth Act No. 20 and Commonwealth Act No.
539, we have only to recall that as early as April
26, 1904, Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the "Friar
Lands Act," was approved, providing that the
actual settlers and occupants of lands acquired by the
Government had preference over all others to
lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings. This was
followed on July 11, 1936, by Commonwealth Act

occupants."

No. 20, authorizing the resale of homesites to their

bona fide occupants. This trend was adopted in

The theory of the trial court and the Court of Appeals is

that, as respondent Bernardo was admittedly

Commonwealth Act No. 260, approved on April 18,

1938, and Commonwealth Act No. 378, approved on

August 23, 1938, which also expressly referred to bona

fide occupants. The purpose of Act No. 1120,

families as the factors of society, and thus promote

general welfare. The sentiment of patriotism and

known as the "Friar Lands Act" had already been

explained by this court in the case of Jocson vs.

independence, the spirit of free citizenship, the feeling

of interest in public affairs, are cultivated and

Soriano, 45 Phil. 375; 378-379; as follows:

fostered more readily when the citizen lives

permanently in his own home, with a sense of its
protection

"Acts 1120 and 926 were patterned after the laws

granting homestead rights and special privileges
under the laws of the United States and the various
states of the Union. The statutes of the United
States as well as of the various states of the Union
contain provisions for the granting and protection of
homesteads. Their object is to provide a home for each
citizen of the Government, where his family may
shelter and live beyond the reach of financial
misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals those
feelings of
independence which are essential to the maintenance
of free institutions. Furthermore, the state itself
is concerned that the citizens shall not be divested of a
means of support, and reduced to pauperism.
(Cook and Burgwall vs. McChristian, 4 Cal., 24; Franklin
vs. Coffee, 70 Am. Dec., 192; Richardson vs.

and durability. (Wapples on Homestead and

Exceptions, p. 3.)"
This objective is readily embedded in Commonwealth
Act No. 20 which speaks of bona fide occupants;
and we cannot suppose that, presumably aware of
legislative antecedents, our lawmakers ever intended
to depart from such purpose in enacting
Commonwealth Act No. 539. Indeed, the Rural
Progress
Administration in its resolution No. 32, dated August 7,
1949, (according to the petitioners should be
1939) resolved "that it is the sense of this Board that
the words "bona fide occupants, as used in
Commonwealth Act No. 20, as amended, applies to the
person actually occupying any given lot,

Woodward, 104 Fed. Rep., 873; 21 Cyc., 459.)

irrespective, of any former lease contract with the

previous owners of the homesite." It is significant

"The conservation of a family home is the purpose of

homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster

that this construction was given by the very agency

called upon to implement the law. But the Court of

Appeals argued that said resolution should be

construed in connection with paragraph 3 of resolution

Government of the lot to be resold; and as the

petitioners were required by respondent Bernardo to

No. 252, dated March 11, 1949, which reads in part as

follows:

vacate the premises on February 1, 1945, they could

not be considered as having occupied the lot bona

"Resolved, to adopt as tentative rules covering the

disposition of lot in the Tambobong Estate, Malabon,

fide for at least five years prior to December 31, 1947

when the "Capellana de Concepcin" estate was

Rizal, the following:

purchased by the Government. This construction is

untenable, since paragraph 3 of the resolution No.

"(1) To award to the lessees the lots under their

possession if they have houses thereon and the area
thereof does not exceed 1,000 square meters. The
RPA, however, reserves the right to take away from
said lessees any portion in excess of 1,000 square
meters.
"(2) That lots with houses even though surrounded by
fence be declared vacant.

252 does not say that the bona fide possession for five
years should be counted in relation or prior to
the date of acquisition by the Government. Said
resolution, it may fairly be supposed, contemplates
possession from the time the sublessee actually
occupies. In the present case it is admitted that the
petitioners have held possession since 1918.

"(3) That sublessees who have been occupying lots for

at least five years be considered as bona fide

In this connection it may not be amiss to make

reference to Republic Act No. 1162 which, in its section

occupants and as such with preferential right to

purchase said lots if they possess no other in the same

5, provides, among other things, that "from the

approval of this Act, and until the expropriation herein

estate."

provided, no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted

or prosecuted against any tenant or occupant of

The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that

paragraph 3 of resolution No. 252 requires bona fide
actual
occupation on the part of the sublessees for at least
five years prior to the acquisition by the

any landed estates or haciendas herein authorized to

be appropriated if he pays his current rentals." Of
course, said Act was approved in 1954, or after the
purchase by the Government of the "Capellana de

Concepcin" estate, but it is obvious therefrom that

the policy of the Government is to protect the
actual occupants as much as possible, with the view to
enabling them to acquire homesites. By analogy,
we may consider the efforts of respondent Bernardo to
oust the petitioners in 1945 as being of no
decisive consideration.
We are also inclined to the view that the term "tenant"
was added by Commonwealth Act No. 539, not
for the purpose of giving such tenant any preference
over an occupant, but merely to expand the scope
of the law by allowing resale to persons other than a
bona fide occupant; and this is clear from the use
of the alternative conjunction "or" between the words
"tenant" and "occupants" in Commonwealth Act
No. 539. If the intention were otherwise, the law would
have expressly provided that the tenant and the
occupant shall enjoy preference in the order in which
they are enumerated. This was exactly done in
Republic Act No. 1162 which provides, in its section 3,
that "the landed estates or haciendas
expropriated by virtue of this Act shall be subdivided
into small lots, none of which shall exceed one
hundred and fifty square meters in area, to be sold at
costs to the tenants, or occupants of said lots, and

to other individuals, in the order mentioned." In

essence and effect, Commonwealth Act No. 539 may
be
said to vest a certain degree of discretion in the
agency authorized to carry out the law, to determine
who is better qualified and should be preferred to a
given lot. In the case before us, the Rural Progress
Administration, after proper investigation, awarded the
lot to the petitioners and, in our opinion, this
exercise of discretion and judgment should not be
interfered with in the absence of gross abuse.
We are not ready to state that the Rural Progress
Administration had abused its discretion, because the
petitioners have lived on the lot since 1918 and they
are conceded more indigent than respondent
Bernardo, coupled with the fact that the latter
allegedly owns another property as his homesite. It is
immaterial whether the petitioners have occupied the
lot in question by mere tolerance and out of
charity of respondent Bernardo, since this would not
detract from the bona fide character of petitioners'
possession which is all that is required by the law. In
our opinion, the petitioners have occupied the land
with as much good faith as a sublessee actually paying
rentals; so much so that the former owners of the
land never attempted to oust them; and they cannot
be charged with either ingratitude or unfair dealing

and dishonesty towards respondent Bernardo, for they

merely accepted the benefit intended to be

Bernardo, occupied the lot subject of the land case.

There was a time however, when their parents died,

conferred in Commonwealth Act No. 539. The

petitioners do not deny having been the subject of

the grandmother of the plaintiff- appellee, together

with his parents (plaintiff-appellee's) left the

respondent's benevolence; and as to whether the

latter is entitled to demand an accounting and to be

premises, while the defendant appellant Enrique

Bernardo was left behind on the said lot. As the years

paid for such benevolence is another question which

he may ventilate.

went on the defendant-appellant erected a new house

on the lot the one now in question, and

The relation of the parties herein which naturally gave

way to petitioners continued possession of the

continued to live therein up to the present time with

his children, who are the other defendantsappellants

lot in question, and the manner the petitioners

acquired said possession, are contained in the
following

in the land case. (Please refer to defendantsappellants' brief in the land case and the

passage from the brief for the defendant-appellant in

CA-G. R. No. 6734-R, Crisostomo Bernardo vs.
Enrique Bernardo, in which the ownership of the house
standing on the lot was litigated and decided in

documents or exhibits therein mentioned, pages 3-5."

Supra, pp. 4-5.)
At any rate, from a technical point of view, the term
"tenant" as used in Commonwealth Act No. 539

favor of respondent Bernardo:

may be considered as referring only to a lessee who is

in actual possession, thereby preventing one with

"The plaintiff-appellee Crisostomo S. Bernardo and the

defendant- appellant Enrique Bernardo are blood

wealth from acquiring lots for business purposes.

Suppose a lessee of 25 lots in a big hacienda sublets

relatives. It appears that the grandmother of the

plaintiff-appellee, one by the name of either Aniceta or

the same to 25 actual occupants. In case the

Government should expropriate the hacienda for
resale in

Severina Bernardo, is the sister of the defendantappellant Enrique Bernardo. At one time, (the exact
time could no longer be remembered) the parents of
Aniceta or Severina Bernardo and Enrique

lots to "tenants or occupants," can it be seriously

contended that the lessee is to be preferred to the
actual occupants? An affirmative answer will be
revolting to our sense of proportion; and yet that is the

effect of the majority decision.

"SEC. 27. Necessity of Entry by Lessee. Upon the
execution of a lease, naming a present term,
the lessee has a right of entry and of possession, but it
seems well settled that he is not a tenant until he
enters. To create the relation of landlord and tenant,
there must be an entry by the lessee under the
lease, or a holding of the possession of the premises
by the lessee that will be referable to the lease as
his authority. There is also authority to the effect that a
lessee does not have an estate until he enters,

lessees. Commonwealth Act No. 539 was conceived to

solve a social problem, not merely as a direct or
indirect means of allowing accumulation of land
holdings. Indeed, in Republic Act No. 267, which
authorizes municipalities to expropriate lands for sale
in lots, preference being given to Filipino bona
fide occupants and to Filipino veterans, their widows,
and their children, the policy of the Government
was more or less announced that "no such lot shall be
sold to any person who already owns a residential
lot, and any sale made to such person shall be void."

and that under the common law, no estate for years

could be created by a lease or other common- law

The petitioners have called attention to the fact that

respondent Bernardo paid the rentals from July,

conveyance, without an actual entry made by the

person to whom the land was granted. . . . (32 Am.

1940 to December 31, 1947, only on April 2, 1947,

when steps were already being taken by the

Jur., p. 50.)

Government to acquire the Tambobong Estate for

resale to tenants or occupants. This fact may not of

The fact that respondent Bernardo had allowed the

petitioners to occupy the lot since 1918 is positive
evidence that said respondent has no need thereof;
and it cannot be gainsaid that Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 20 and 539 are obviously intended, as heretofore
already noted, to provide the actual occupants

course affect the status of respondent Bernardo as a

lessee, but it in a way justifies further the finding of
the Rural Progress Administration that the petitioners
should be preferred in the resale of the lot in
question.

with a piece of land which they may call their own.

Certainly the Government would have no reason to

Another circumstance that influenced the Court of

Appeals in affirming the decision of the Court of First

worry about those who were or are already home and

land owners, much less to encourage "absentee"

Instance of Rizal is that the house standing on the lot

belongs to respondent Bernardo. Apart from the

fact that said house assessed at P640, Philippine

currency, was sold by the petitioners to respondent
Bernardo in 1944 for P1,050 in Japanese military notes
(or less than P100, Philippine currency) and the
petitioners remained in possession, we do not think
that respondent's ownership can affect the status
of the petitioners as bona fide occupants for purposes
of Commonwealth Act No. 539. The same
considerations mentioned with respect to the
possession of the land are applicable.

SYNOPSIS
This is an automatic review of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, in Criminal
Case No. 4962-96-C finding Rodolfo dela Cuesta guilty
of rape and sentencing him to death. Dela Cuesta
interposed alibi and assailed the inconsistencies in the
testimony made by Cristina Gonzales, the private
complainant.
As long as the witness was found to be credible by the
trial court, especially after undergoing a rigid

Accordingly, we vote to reserve the appealed

judgment and to affirm the decision of the Rural
Progress

cross-examination, any apparent inconsistency may be

overlooked especially if the lapses concerned

Administration dated January 21, 1948, and the sale of

the land in question to the petitioners.

trivial matters. Anent the accused's alibi, the court

reiterated a well-settled doctrine, thus: in the

Pablo, J., concurs.

absence of strong and convincing evidence, alibi could

not prevail over the positive testimony of the

Copyright1994-1999CDTechnologie
s A s i a, I n c.
EN BANC

victim, who had no improper motive to testify falsely

against him. As to the death penalty imposed,

[G.R. No. 133904. October 5, 2000.]

while the trial court correctly found accused-appellant

to be the common-law spouse of the victim's

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

RODOLFO DELA CUESTA, accused-appellant.

mother, the Information, however, did not allege

accused-appellant as the common-law spouse of

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Cristina's mother, but that he was the step-father and

guardian of the victim. Hence, the trial court

Dominguez, Delani, Dominguez, Orsos & Fortuno for

accused-appellant.

cannot properly impose the death penalty considering

that his being the common-law spouse was not

alleged in the Information.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESSES; AS LONG AS THE WITNESS IS CREDIBLE,
INCONSISTENCIES IN HIS TESTIMONY MAY BE
OVERLOOKED. Courts cannot just discredit a witness
because there are gaps in her narration of facts, or
because her narration was presented not in a
chronological manner. Factors such as memory, length
of time, intelligence, articulateness, and
emotional condition all affect a witness' narration of
events. As long as the witness was found to be
credible by the trial court, especially after undergoing
a rigid cross-examination, any apparent
inconsistency may be overlooked. This is especially
true if the lapses concern trivial matters.
2. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER THE VICTIM'S
POSITIVE TESTIMONY. As repeatedly held
by this Court: "The defense of alibi is always viewed
with suspicion and received with caution, not only
because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also
because it can easily be fabricated. . . . For this
defense to prosper, it must be convincing enough to
preclude any doubt about the physical impossibility
of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or
its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.

In other words, he must prove not only that he was

somewhere else when the offense was committed,
but also that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at or near the crime scene. . . . In the
absence of strong and convincing evidence, alibi could
not prevail over the positive testimony of the
victim, who had no improper motive to testify falsely
against him." IASEca
3. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFIED RAPE; RELATIONSHIP OF
ACCUSED WITH RAPE VICTIM MUST BE
ALLEGED; REASON. While the trial court correctly
found accused-appellant to be the common-law
spouse of the victim's mother, the Information,
however, did not allege accused-appellant as the
common-law spouse of Divina, but that he was the
step-father and guardian of the victim. Hence, the
trial court cannot properly impose the death penalty
considering that his being the common-law spouse
of Divina Corsanis was not alleged in the Information.
Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which
may be proven even if not alleged, a qualifying
aggravating circumstance cannot be proven as such
unless alleged in the information. It must be properly
pleaded in order not to violate the constitutional
right of the accused to be properly informed of the
nature and cause of the accusations against him.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Rodolfo dela Cuesta was charged with the rape of 16year-old Cristina Gonzales. The Information 1 filed
against the accused reads:
"That on or about August 10, 1996 and prior thereto,
at Brgy. Maitim, Municipality of Bay, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused above-named being then the
stepfather and guardian and while armed with a bolo,
by means of force, violence and intimidation and
with lewd designs, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
(sic) one CRISTINA GONZALES, a sixteen (16) year old
girl, against her will and consent, to her damage
and prejudice."
On arraignment, accused pleaded "not guilty." Trial on
the merits ensued. EScHDA
The victim's birth certificate 2 indicates her name to
be Cristy Corsanis, born on February 14, 1980. It
appears that Cristy was sired by a certain Crispin
Gonzales but a year after her birth, her mother Divina
Corsanis became the common-law spouse of accused
Rodolfo dela Cuesta.
The following facts were established:

At around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of August 10,

1996 while Cristy was looking after their house at
Brgy. Maitim, Bay, Laguna, together with her stepbrothers and step-sisters, accused ordered her
stepbrothers
and step-sisters to go to the store. When accused and
Cristy were left alone, the former
forcibly undressed her and kissed her breast. Cristy
struggled but her efforts were in vain as accused got
his bolo and pointed it at her neck warning her, "Wag
kang sisigaw at magsusumbong kundi ay
papatayin kita at ang iyong nanay." He then tied her
hands behind her back and proceeded to sexually
assault Cristy. Accused was oblivious to Cristy's
entreaty, "Tay maawa na kayo sa akin, huwag ninyong
gawin sa akin yan." Failing in her plea, Cristy tried to
reason with the question, "Tay bakit mo ginagawa
ito wala naman akong kasalanan sa inyo?"
Cristy informed her mother about the incident but
instead of coming to her succor, her mother refused
to report the incident to the Barangay Captain, saying,
"Tanga ka ba, gusto mo bang mabilanggo ang
tatay mo? Walang magpapalamon sa mga kapatid
mo." Failing to get comfort and support from the one
person whom she expects to come to her aid, Cristy
herself reported the incident to the Barangay

Captain and eventually gave her statement in the

Municipal Hall of Bay, Laguna. DCTHaS

foster parents to give financial help to deserving

beneficiaries, instigated Cristy to file the rape

In an effort to stop her from filing the complaint,

Cristy's mother brought her to the house of accused's

complaint against him. According to accused, Susan de

Guzman had a special interest in the prosecution

sister in San Jose, Dasmarias, Cavite. However, she

was traced by policemen who brought her back to

of the case against him because of a

misunderstanding brought about by a $500.00
remittance from

Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and eventually entrusted her to the

Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) at Alabang. Accused was thereafter arrested.
Dra. Evelyn Macapagal of the Laguna Provincial
Hospital examined Cristy and found the following:

Cristy's foster parent in which Cristy only got

P2,000.00.
Accused also claimed that a certain Rosita Erasga of
DSWD at Bay, Laguna instigated the filing of the

"Pelvic exam: normal external genitalia, nulliparous

outlet, vagina admits two fingers with ease, cervix

complaint against him allegedly because of a

misunderstanding with regard to the construction of
the

close, firm, non tender body of uterus small, no

adnexal mass, no tenderness with vaginal bleeding

Pinatubo Housing Project at Bay, Laguna, of which he

was the foreman.

(menstruation)" 3

Accused also cast aspersions on Cristy's character by

suggesting that she had two boyfriends, named

In interpreting her findings, Dr. Macapagal testified

that "[n]ormally, vagina admits one finger with
difficulty. But in the case at bar, her vagina admits two
fingers with ease, that means, not normal for
her. Her hymen is not intact anymore." 4
Accused, on the other hand, tried to attribute motives
for the filing of the complaint against him. He
claimed that a certain Susan de Guzman, an employee
of PAG-ASA, an organization that arranges for

Doroteo and Gary, as evidenced by a letter signed by

Gary and a bus ticket.
Cristy's mother corroborated accused's testimony. She
stated that on the day in question, she was at
home washing clothes while accused was working at
Silang, Cavite. On that very same day, she claimed
that Cristy went to school for her Citizen Army Training
(CAT) but when she verified from Cristy's school

adviser whether she really attended her CAT, she was

told that Cristy was absent. She likewise averred

THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED IN NOT DISCREDITING

THE ENTIRE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT

that a certain Doroteo and a lesbian named Teresa

were courting Cristy. ScaAET

CRISTINA GONZALES CONSIDERING; THAT SAID

TESTIMONY WAS DIFFERENT FROM AND CONTRARY TO

Jeffrey dela Cuesta, Cristy's half brother, testified that

on the day Cristy was allegedly raped, she

HER OWN SWORN STATEMENT GIVEN TO THE POLICE.

attended her CAT while his father was in Dasmarias,

Cavite, working. He testified that he, together with
his brothers and sisters, was at home during the date
in question.
Noel Calle, accused's co-worker also claimed that on
August 10, 1996, he and accused worked overtime
at Silang, Cavite.
Finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape, the trial court sentenced him to death and to
pay the victim, Cristy Gonzales, P50,000.00 in
damages. 5
In this automatic review accused-appellant posits that:

III
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT GIVING
WEIGHT TO THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE THAT THE
CHARGE WAS CLEARLY FABRICATED, PRINCIPALLY
INSTIGATED BY THE DSWD AND PROJECT PAG-ASA
OFFICIALS WHO NURTURED ANGER AGAINST
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED IN COMPLETELY
DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF
COMPLAINANT'S OWN MOTHER, DIVINA CORSANES
(sic), AND HALF-BROTHER, JEFFREY DELA CUESTA,

THAT NO RAPE WAS COMMITTED ON AUGUST 10, 1996

BECAUSE CRISTINA GONZALES WAS IN SCHOOL

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL CREDIT

TO ITS OWN FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF

AND THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS WORKING AS

CARPENTER AT BIGA, SILANG, OR DASMARIAS,

DR. EVELYN MACAPAGAL HAD NO DIRECT AND

MATERIAL PROBATIVE VALUE TO PROVE THAT THE

CAVITE.

CRIME OF RAPE WAS COMMITTED.

II

V
THE TRIAL COURT FINALLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED

IN THE INFORMATION ON THE GROUND OF

REASONABLE DOUBT.

The above argument is too simplistic and takes the

trial court's conclusion out of context. This Court

The defense assails the credibility of Cristy by pointing

out that the medical findings showed that she

notes that, after the trial court concluded that Dr.

Macapagal's testimony had no direct and material

had no external abrasion, contrary to her testimony

that she struggled by pushing accused-appellant's

probative value to prove that the crime of rape was

committed, the trial court explained in the

arms away and kicking him while she was being

undressed. DHITcS

succeeding paragraph that:

This contention is totally unmeritorious. First, the rape

was committed on August 10, 1996, whereas the
victim underwent medical examination on August 27,
1996 or seventeen (17) days later. Second, Cristy's
testimony shows that she was the one who pushed
away and kicked accused-appellant and not the
other way around. The absence of external signs of
injury does not necessarily negate the commission of
rape, especially when the victim was intimidated by
the offender into submission. In this case,
accusedappellant
pointed a bolo at her neck.
The defense argues that since the trial court declared
that ". . . the testimony of Dr. Evelyn Macapagal
had no direct and material probative value to prove
that the crime of rape was committed," then rape
could not have been committed.

"In the case of People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo

San Juan, (G.R. No. 105556, April 4, 1997) the
Honorable Supreme Court ruled that well-settled is the
doctrine that lack of lacerated wound does not
negate sexual intercourse. Moreover, the fact that
hymenal lacerations were found to be healed and
that no spermatozoa was found does not necessarily
negate rape. A freshly broken hymen is not an
essential element of rape. For that matter, in crimes
against chastity, the medical examination of the
victim is not an indispensable element for the
successful prosecution of the crime, as her testimony
alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused."
The defense claims that Cristy must have had previous
sexual experience long before the date of the
alleged rape, considering that Dr. Macapagal found
that complainant's vagina admits two (2) fingers
with ease which should not be normally the case if
indeed she was raped.

The defense's reasoning is flawed if not misleading. Dr.

Macapagal only testified that, in her experience

out of the house before he started undressing her. In

her sworn statement, she narrated that when

as an examining physician, a vagina normally admits

one examining finger with difficulty. She did not

accused-appellant arrived, she was washing clothes.

Thereafter, accused-appellant ordered her to get

make any conclusion that Cristy must have had

previous voluntary sexual contacts prior to the

some clothes. While doing as she was told, accusedappellant started to undress her.

commission of the rape considering that her vagina

admits two (2) fingers with ease. If at all, it indicates

Chronologically, there is no inconsistency or

contradiction between Cristy's testimony before the
trial

that sexual congress had indeed transpired.

Next, the defense insists that the trial court should
have discredited Cristy's testimony during the trial,
noting that said testimony was different from and
contrary to her own sworn statement given to the

court and her sworn statement. Courts cannot just

discredit a witness because there are gaps in her
narration of facts, or because her narration was
presented not in a chronological manner.

police. ECISAD

In this case, the alleged inconsistency or discrepancy

is more apparent than real. In fact, the testimony

In particular, the defense invites the attention to the

following inconsistencies: (a) on what the victim

fills the gaps in the victim's narration of facts. This

Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General's

was doing prior to the arrival of accused-appellant; (b)

on the manner or conduct of her struggle to

observation, thus:

resist the attempt on her virtue; and (c) on who were

present when the rape was committed.
This Court does not find any inconsistency between
Cristy's testimony 6 given before the trial court, on
the one hand, and her statement 7 before the police
on the other hand. In her testimony, she narrated
that she was watching their house when accusedappellant ordered her step-brothers and step-sisters

"Relevantly, in the instant case, when Cristina was

called upon to testify on direct examination, she was
immediately made to identify her affidavit after a few
preliminary questions relating to her personal
circumstances and identification of the accused (pp. 34, TSN, May 22, 1997). Cristina understood that
her affidavit had substantially formed part of her
testimony especially since her answers to questions

that followed delved on supplying omissions or

correcting minor details. Accordingly, during
crossexamination,

Indeed, the alleged inconsistencies adverted to by

appellant were mere minor details which were not

Cristina confirmed and clarified that:

mentioned in her affidavit. There are no material

inconsistencies. There is nothing in Cristina's affidavit

Q. And you want to convey to this Honorable Court

that the answers to questions No. l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,

that would indicate that she was alone in their

residence when appellant arrived before the sexual

& 7 were all personally given by you in answer to all

these (8) questions?

abuse. Therefore, it cannot be held to be inconsistent

with her declaration on the witness stand that she

A. Yes, sir.

was in the company of her step-brothers and stepsisters until she was left alone because appellant told

Q. And you still confirm or affirm under oath that this is

what really happened to you on August 10,
1996 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning in Barangay
Maitim, Bay, Laguna?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, I want you to read this statement all over
again and please tell this Honorable Court
whether you want to deduct or add anything from
what you claimed happened to you on August 10,

them to go to another store. As to the specific

household chore she was attending to, it is submitted
that the same was sufficiently explained and clarified
by Cristina during cross-examination, thus:
"ATTY. DOMINGUEZ:
Q. In your statement you said that when the accused
arrived, you were washing clothes and not
watching?

1996?

WITNESS:

A. None, sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are you sure of that?

ATTY. DOMINGUEZ:

A. I wish to add something but I will not take away

anything from the statement. (pp. 10-11, TSN,

Q. So what you stated last time that you were

watching the house together with your brothers and

June 5, 1997)

sisters is not correct?

WITNESS:
A. I was at the time washing clothes and at the same
time me and my brothers and sisters were
also watching the house.
Q. You never said anything about your brothers and
sisters being in the house in your statement.
Do you remember having forgotten that important
fact?

In reconstructing the events that led to the incident in

question, courts should not expect the narration
or presentation to be strictly chronological. Factors
such as memory, length of time, intelligence,
articulateness, and emotional condition all affect a
witness' narration of events. As long as the witness
was found to be credible by the trial court, especially
after undergoing a rigid cross-examination, any

FISCAL:

apparent inconsistency may be overlooked. This is

especially true if the lapses concern trivial matters.

On what aspect, your honor.

ESTDIA

ATTY. DOMINGUEZ:

Corollarily, the defense alleges that the charge against

accused-appellant was fabricated and instigated

What happened. She is supposed to narrate

everything. The question is what happened to you.
She narrated she was washing clothes when the
accused arrived. In her statement, she was watching

by Susan de Guzman of PAG-ASA and Rosita Erasga of

DSWD who allegedly had axes to grind against
accused-appellant.

the house together with her brothers and sisters when

the accused arrived and ordered them to go out.

The above theory by the defense is speculative. De

Guzman and Erasga belong to organizations that

This is completely different from her written

statement.

would, by their mission and mandate, normally come

to the aid of the victim and facilitate the

I am testing the credibility of the witness.

prosecution of their case. EaCSHI

COURT:

Also, the defense maintains that the trial court should

not have disregarded the testimonies of

The witness may answer.

WITNESS:
A. No, sir. (pp. 20-21, TSN, June 5, 1997)"

complainant's mother and half-brother that Cristy

could not have been raped as she was then in school

attending her CAT training and that accused-appellant

was then working in Biga, Silang or Dasmarias,

"Neither can we rely on the testimony of Noel Calle. He

was obviously a friend trying to lend appellant a

Cavite.

helping hand. His testimony is incredible. While he had

a clear recollection that he and appellant worked

The above argument holds no water. As clearly

observed by the Office of the Solicitor General:
" . . . Cristina's half brother's declaration that she was
in school at the time the rape incident occurred on
August 10, 1996 is unreliable not only because he is
incompetent to so testify on the matter, but also

overtime in Biga, Silang, Cavite from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00

p.m. on August 10, 1996, a Saturday, the date the
rape incident occurred, he did not have any
recollection whether they worked overtime on other
Saturdays near said date, thus:

because it was denied by Cristina's school adviser."

Q. On August 17, did you do any overtime work?

xxx xxx xxx

A. I cannot remember because it happened a long time

ago.

It is understandable that Cristina's mother would

naturally concoct a story to save appellant. As may be
recalled, Cristina testified that her mother was the one
who dissuaded her from reporting the sexual
abuse to the Barangay Captain, saying "TANGA KA BA,
GUSTO MO BANG MAKULONG ANG TATAY MO
WALANG MAGPAPALAMON SA MGA KAPATID MO"; who
hid Cristina in San Jose, Cavite obviously to
prevent the complaint from being filed in court; and
who manifested to the police and DSWD personnel,
"SA INYO NA ANG ANAK KO, HUWAG LANG
MAKUKULONG ANG ASAWA KO."
Anent the accused-appellant's alibi, the Office of the
Solicitor General correctly concluded:

Q. On August 24, did you do any overtime work?

A. That already escaped in my mind.
Q. How about on August 3, did you render any
overtime work?
A. We reported for work but I cannot remember if we
rendered overtime work, sir. (p. 7, TSN, Nov.
4, 1997)
Furthermore, Calle's testimony does not clearly
indicate the physical impossibility of appellant being in
Bay, Laguna at 10:00 a.m. in the morning, and be
present to work overtime in Biga, Silang, Cavite at
5:00

p.m. in the afternoon of the same day. What Calle only

remembered is that they both worked overtime.

"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is

committed by having carnal knowledge of

But there is nothing in his testimony that appellant

was already in Biga from the hours of 10:00 a.m. to

a woman under any of the following circumstances:

4:00 p.m. that same day."

As repeatedly held by this Court:
"The defense of alibi is always viewed with suspicion
and received with caution, not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can
easily be fabricated. . . . For this defense to
prosper, it must be convincing enough to preclude any
doubt about the physical impossibility of the

1. By using force or intimidation.

xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw

presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its

immediate vicinity at the time of the incident. In

spouse of the parent of the victim. . . ."

other words, he must prove not only that he was

somewhere else when the offense was committed, but

The trial court imposed the death penalty on accusedappellant based on its finding that Divina Corsanis,

also that it was physically impossible for him to have

been at or near the crime scene. . . . In the absence

the victim's mother, is the common-law spouse of

accused-appellant. While the trial court correctly

of strong and convincing evidence, alibi could not

prevail over the positive testimony of the victim, who

found accused-appellant to be the common-law spouse

of the victim's mother, the Information,

had no improper motive to testify falsely against him."

8

however, did not allege accused-appellant as the

common-law spouse of Divina, but that he was the

However, we cannot agree with the trial court's

imposition of the death penalty. Article 335 of the

step-father and guardian of the victim. Hence, the trial

court cannot properly impose the death penalty

Revised Penal Code provides, thus:

considering that his being the common-law spouse of

Divina Corsanis was not alleged in the

Information. Unlike a generic aggravating

circumstance which may be proved even if not alleged,
a

to prove such fact.

Lastly, the victim, Cristina Gonzales a.k.a. Cristina
Corsanis, should be awarded moral damages of

qualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be proved

as such unless alleged in the information. It must

P50,000.00, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 12

be properly pleaded in order not to violate the

constitutional right of the accused to be properly

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36 in Criminal Case

informed of the nature and cause of the accusations

against him. 9 Specifically, in People v. Fraga, 10

No. 4962-96-C finding accused-appellant Rodolfo dela

Cuesta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is

this Court held that "(a)lthough the rape of a person

under eighteen (18) years of age by the commonlaw

AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is

reduced to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant

spouse of the victim's mother is punishable by death,

this penalty cannot be imposed on accusedappellant

is ordered to pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil

indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

. . . because his relationship was not what was alleged

in the informations. What was alleged

SO ORDERED.

was that he is the step-father of the complainant."

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,

Neither can he be declared as a step-father as the

court never made such a finding. The word "step,"

Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,

concur.

when used as prefix in conjunction with a degree of

kinship, is repugnant to blood relationship and is

Footnotes

indicative of a relationship by affinity. 11 Since

accused-appellant and the victim's mother were never
married, no such relationship by affinity existed
between accused-appellant and the victim. HTcADC
Accused-appellant cannot also be considered as
guardian for Cristy as no single evidence was
presented

1. Dated October 11, 1996, p. 50, Records.

2. Exhibit "1", Records, p. 99.
3. Exhibit "B", Records, p. 3.
4. TSN, July 28, 1997, pp. 6-7.
5. Penned by Judge Norberto Y. Geraldez of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch

36.
6. TSN, May 22, 1997, p. 6.

BALANZA (widow) and Children LEOPOLDO, ARMANDO,

ALFONSO, EMILIANO, MAGDALENA, ERLINDA

7. Exhibit "A", Records, p. 4.

and ESTRELLA (ESTER), all surnamed LUSIN, and Heirs

of CAROLINA LUSIN-LUCERO named MANOLITO

8. People v. Hofilea, G.R. No. 134772, June 22, 2000.

LUCERO and MARIO LUCERO, respondents-appellees.

9. People v. Mamac, G.R. No. 130332, May 31, 2000.

Isidoro Crisostomo for appellants Heirs of Julian

Santulan.

10. G.R. No. 134130-33, April 12, 2000.

11. People v. Hofilea, supra.
12. People v. Amban, G.R. No. 134286, March 1, 2000;
People v. Sapinoso, G.R. No. 122540, March
22, 2000; People v. Dreu, G.R. No. 126282, June 20,
2000; People v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 124368, June
8, 2000.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-28021. December 15, 1977.]
JULIAN SANTULAN, substituted by his children named
PATROCINIO, ADORACION, ARTURO,
CONSTANCIA, and PEPITA, all surnamed SANTULAN,
and minor grandchildren, JOCELYN, ROSAURO and
ROBERTO, all surnamed SANTULAN, assisted by their
guardian ad litem, PATROCINIO SANTULAN,
petitioners-appellants, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and ANTONIO
LUSIN, substituted by his Heirs named TEODOSIA

Romulo C. Felizmea for appellees Heirs of Antonio

Lusin.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Conrado T.
Limcaoco for The Executive Secretary, etc.
DECISION
AQUINO, J p:
This case is about the lease of a parcel of foreshore
land of the public domain with an area of about four
and one-half hectares located at Barrio Kaigin, Kawit,
Cavite abutting on Bacoor Bay and the Ankaw
Creek.
It is a protracted controversy that has been pending
for more than thirty years between the rival
claimants, Julian Santulan and Antonio Lusin, who have
been succeeded by their heirs.
Santulan claimed that foreshore land was an extension
of his land, Lot No. 986 of the Kawit cadastre,

with an area of 17,301 square meters, registered in his

name in 1937 under Original Certificate of Title

for an ordinary fishpond permit or lease of the said

foreshore land (Special Use Permit Fp. A. No. 5114,

No. 6 which was issued by virtue of a free patent. The

northern boundary of Lot No. 986 is Bacoor

Exh. H).

(Manila) Bay (Exh. A). The said foreshore land was

allegedly formed by soil deposits accumulated by the

At the instance of the Director of Fisheries, the Director

of Forestry investigated the condition of the

alluvial action of the sea.

said foreshore land. The latter in his first indorsement

dated June 19, 1950 found that it was swampy

On December 5, 1942 Santulan caused the said land

to be surveyed. The survey plan was approved by

"and not an improved fishpond as alleged by Antonio

Lusin" and that it is within the disposable areas for

the Director of Lands in 1944 (Exh. B). On December

29, 1942 Santulan, pursuant to Lands

agricultural purposes under the jurisdiction of the

Bureau of Lands (Exh. L-1).

Administrative Order No. 7-1, filed an application, F.L.A.

No. V-562, to lease for five years for agricultural

The chief of the division of commercial fisheries sent a

letter to Lusin dated April 28, 1950 apprising him

purposes an area of 36,120 square meters of the said

foreshore land (Exh. F).

that he was reported to have illegally entered the area

covered by Santulan's fishpond permit

On that same date, December 29, 1942, Santulan,

pursuant to Act No. 3077 and Lands Administrative

application and directing him to refrain from

introducing improvements, with the warning that court

Order No. 8-3, filed with the Bureau of Lands an

application for a revocable permit to occupy the said

proceedings would be taken against him (Exh. J).

land. He indicated therein that he would use the land

for "capiz beds and oyster beds, the planting of
bakawan and pagatpat and later to be developed into
a fishpond" (Exh. G).
Seven years later, or on December 22, 1949, Santulan
filed with the Bureau of Fisheries an application

On January 12, 1951 an attorney, acting for the

Director of Lands wrote the following letter to Lusin
advising him to vacate the disputed land and maintain
the status quo:
"Mr. Antonio Lusin
Caigin, Kawit, Cavite
"Sir:

"We have been informed that the area which is

presently controverted by and between you and Julian
Santulan, under the applications noted above, was
recently entered by you and some companions and
that you are destroying the dikes and other
improvements previously constructed thereon by said
Julian

took effect in 1948 and which cancelled Tax

Declaration No. 13816 also in Santulan's name, shows
that
the land was assessed at P460. He paid the realty
taxes due on the said land for the years 1945-46,
1948-55 and 1957-60 (Exh. C, D and E, et seq.)

Santulan.

On the other hand, Antonio Lusin in 1942 and 1945 (he

died in 1962) filed with the Bureau of Lands

"If this information is true, and inasmuch as you are

aware that the controversy is still pending final

applications for a revocable permit and lease of a

foreshore land, respectively, for the purpose of

adjudgment in this Office, it is desired that you take

proper advice and leave the area and its existing

producing salt on the said land. He claimed that he

had been in the continuous and exclusive possession

improvements in status quo in order to avoid possible

confusion of rights which may delay the final

of the land since 1920, when it was still under water,

and that he had used it as a site of his fish corrals.

disposition of the area in question.

He allegedly converted two hectares of the said land

into a fishpond. The entire area was enclosed with

"You are advised further that the acts imputed to you

may make you liable to prosecution and
punishment under the law; and that whatever
improvements you may make for yourself in the
premises

mud dikes and provided with a concrete sluice gate

and another sluice gate made of wood On the
northern part of the land bordering the bay were
bamboo stakes placed at close intervals to serve as

will not legally accrue to your benefit, nor will they

serve as basis for a claim to preferential rights."

water breakers to protect the mud dikes from being

washed away by the action of the sea. Lusin

(Paragraphing supplied, Exh. J-1)

introduced the alleged improvements from 1951 to

1953.

Santulan declared the said foreshore land in his name

for tax purposes. Tax Declaration No. 2923, which

The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Santulan and

Lusin gave rise to Bureau of Lands Conflict No. 8

(N). The Director of Lands in his decision in that case

dated February 1, 1951 found that the disputed

alleged possession and improvements could not nullify

Santulan's preferential right to lease the land by

land is foreshore land covered and uncovered by the

flow and ebb of the ordinary tides; that it is an

reason of his riparian rights. The Director ordered Lusin

to vacate the land within sixty days from notice

extension of Santulan's Lot No. 986 and it was formerly

a part of the sea; that Santulan was the first to

(Exh. L made a part hereof for reference as Annex B).

enter the land and to make dikes thereon, and that

Lusin entered the land later and made dikes also

Lusin appealed to the Acting Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources who in his decision of

(Exh. K made a part hereof for reference as Annex A).

October 13, 1952 dismissed the appeal and affirmed

the Director's 1951 decision (Exh. M made a part

The Director ruled that the disputed foreshore land

was subject "to riparian rights which may be invoked

hereof for reference as Annex C). Lusin's motion for

reconsideration was denied in the Secretary's order

by Santulan as owner of the upland in accordance with

section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-

of February 28, 1953 (Exh. N made a part hereof for

reference as Annex D).

1" (Exh. K). Hence, the Director rejected Lusin's

application for a foreshore lease and for a revocable

Lusin asked for a reinvestigation of the Case. His

request was granted. The Department ordered a

permit and gave due course to Santulan's foreshore

lease application.

reinvestigation on May 12, 1953.

Lusin filed a motion for reconsideration. The Director in

his order of October 19, 1951 denied that
motion. He found that Lusin was a possessor in bad
faith; that it is not true that Lusin had improved and
possessed the said foreshore land for twenty years;
that the disputed area is covered by water, two to
three feet deep during ordinary tides and is exposed
land after the ebb of the tides, and that Lusin's

After receipt of the report of reinvestigation, the

Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
by authority of the Secretary, in his order of December
14, 1954, reaffirmed the rejection of Lusin's
revocable permit and foreshore lease applications but
ordered Santulan to reimburse to Lusin the
appraised value of his improvements (Exh. O made a
part hereof for reference as Annex E).
Lusin appealed to the President of the Philippines after
his motion for reconsideration was denied in the

Undersecretary's order of May 19, 1955 (Exh. OO

made a part hereof for reference as Annex F).

interested parties pursuant to the provisions of Section

67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 be conducted

Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo, by authority of the

President, held in his decision of April 10, 1958 that

and the contract of lease awarded to the highest

bidder. Whoever shall be the highest bidder, if other

section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1

(promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and

than the appellant, shall be required to pay to the

appellant the appraised value of the improvements

Natural Resources on April 30, 1936 pursuant to Acts

Nos. 2874 and 3038) was "rendered obsolete" by

introduced by him on the land to be determined by

that Department.

section 67 of the Public Land Law which took effect on

December 1, 1936 (Exh. P made a part hereof for

"If the land in question has not been so declared, this

Office directs that a revocable permit under

reference as Annex G).

Section 68 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 be issued to

the appellant requiring him to pay permit fees

On the basis of the foregoing ruling and since the

record is silent as to whether or not the land in

since the year 1951.

question has been declared by the President as not

necessary for the public service and as open to

"Accordingly, the orders and decisions of that

Department and the Bureau of Lands are hereby

disposition (Sec. 61, Public Land Law), the Executive

Secretary sustained Lusin's appeal and reversed the

revoked."

orders of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources in favor of
Santulan. Secretary Pajo decided the case in the
alternative as follows:
"On the assumption that the land in question has been
declared open for disposition and is not
necessary for the public service, this Office directs that
an oral bidding for the leasing thereof to

Santulan's case was distinguished from that of Gonzalo

Monzon whose Lot No. 987 adjoins Santulan's
Lot No. 986. Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro (now
Chief Justice) in his decision of May 10, 1954
upheld the preferential right of Monzon to lease the
foreshore land north of his lot, which foreshore
land is adjacent to the foreshore land now in dispute in
this case (Exh. Q made a part hereof for
reference as Annex H).

Santulan's motion for reconsideration was denied in

the letter of the Acting Executive Secretary dated

115357) was approved by the Director of Lands in

1944. Santulan paid the realty taxes on that land.

August 20, 1959 (Exh. W).

It should further be underscored that the regulations

give him a preferential right to lease the land as a

On October 22, 1959 Santulan filed in the Court of First

Instance of Cavite a petition for certiorari
wherein he alleged that the Executive Secretary
committed a grave abuse of discretion in
misinterpreting certain provisions of Act No. 2874,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, and Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1.
In the lower court the parties agreed that the case
involves only a question of law. On August 18, 1961
the lower court dismissed the petition and affirmed the
Executive Secretary's decision. Santulan
appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its
resolution of July 21, 1967 elevated the record to this
Court on the ground that Santulan in his brief raised
only the legal questions of whether the Public Land
Law repealed section 32 of Lands Administrative Order
No. 7-1 and whether the Executive Secretary's
decision is "legally sound and correct" (CA-G. R. No.
30708-R).
It should be emphasized that, as found by the
investigators of the Bureau of Lands, Santulan was the
prior possessor of the foreshore land in question. He
had it surveyed in 1942. The survey plan (Psu-

riparian owner. Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1

dated April 30, 1936, which was issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon
the recommendation of the Director of Lands for
the disposition of alienable lands of the public domain,
provides:
"32. Preference of Riparian Owner. The owner of the
property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy
lands or lands covered with water bordering upon
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be
given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his
property as may not be needed for the public
service, subject to the laws and regulations governing
lands of this nature, provided that he applies
therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he
receives a communication from the Director of Lands
advising him of his preferential right."
Paragraph 32 quoted above is a substantial copy of
paragraph 4 of Lands Administrative Order No. 8-3
dated April 20, 1936, which was promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

upon the recommendation of the Director of Lands for

issuance of temporary permits of occupation and

141 or, as held by the trial court, Lands Administrative

Order No. 7-1 was repealed by the Public Land

use of agricultural lands of the public domain.

Law. Is that conclusion correct? We hold that it is

wrong.

The word "riparian" in paragraphs 32 and 4 of the

departmental regulations is used in a broad sense as
referring to any property having a water frontage
(Shepard's Point Land Co. vs. Atlantic Hotel, 44 S. E.
39, 45, 132 N. C. 517, 65 C. J. S. 143, note 84). Strictly
speaking, "riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian
owner is a person who owns land situated on the bank
of a river.

It is true that Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-1 and

8-3 were issued when the 1919 Public Land Act
was in force or before the present Public Land Law
took effect on December 1, 1936. But that
circumstance would not necessarily mean that the said
departmental regulations are not good under
the 1936 Public Land Law.

But in paragraphs 32 and 4, the term "riparian owner"

embraces not only the owners of lands on the

In rationalizing the alleged repeal of paragraph 32, the

Executive Secretary cited the following provisions

banks of rivers but also the littoral owners, meaning

the owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea

of Act No. 2874, the 1919 Public Land Act (15 Public
Land Laws 24):

or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal

region including both the land along the coast and

"SEC. 64. The lease or sale shall be adjudicated to the

highest bidder; and if there is no bidder

the water near the coast or the shore zone between

the high and low watermarks.

besides the applicant, it shall be adjudicated to him.

The provisions of section twenty-seven of this Act

Therefore, on the basis of paragraphs 32 and 4 of the

said administrative regulations, Santulan or his

shall be applied wherever applicable. If all or part of

the lots remain unleased or unsold, the Director of

heirs should be allowed to leased or occupy the said

foreshore land.

Lands shall from time to time announce in the Official

Gazette or otherwise the lease or sale of those

But the Executive Secretary ruled that paragraph 32

was rendered obsolete by Commonwealth Act No.

lots, if necessary." (Section 27 refers to sealed bidding)

The Executive Secretary held that the above-quoted
section 64 was repealed by the following provisions

of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which took effect on

December 1, 1936:

unimportant under section 67 of the 1936 Public Land

Law because in oral bidding the applicant is not

"SEC. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral

bidding; and adjudication shall be made to

entitled to equal the bid of the highest bidder.

the highest bidder. However, where an applicant has

made improvements on the land by virtue of a
permit issued to him by competent authority, the sale
or lease shall be made by sealed bidding as
prescribed in section twenty-six of this Act, the
provisions of which shall be applied wherever
applicable.
If all or part of the lots remain unleased or unsold. the
Director of Lands shall from time to time
announce in the Official Gazette, or in any other
newspapers of general circulation, the lease or sale of
those lots, if necessary." (Section 26, like section 27 of
Act No. 2874, refers to sealed bidding)
The Executive Secretary noted that under section 64 of
Act No. 2874 sealed bidding was the general rule
of procedure in determining an award of a lease of
foreshore land and that the applicant is entitled to
equal the bid of the highest bidder. On the other hand,
under section 67, oral bidding is the general rule.

The Executive Secretary concluded that, because the

preferential right of the applicant to lease
foreshore land was immaterial under section 67 of the
present Public Land Law, paragraph 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1, which gives such
preference, had become "idle and useless".
That conclusion is wrong because it is based on the
erroneous hypothesis that section 64 of the 1919
Public Land Act is different from section 67 of the 1936
Public Land Law. They are not different. The
truth is that section 64 was amended by Act No. 3517
which took effect on February 4, 1929 (24 Public
Laws 416). Section 64, as thus amended, is
substantially the same as section 67 of the 1936 Public
Land
Law.
That fact was overlooked by the Executive Secretary.
Hence, his conclusion, that paragraph 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1 was repealed or rendered
obsolete by section 67 of the present Public

Hence, the Executive Secretary assumed that, while

under section 64 of the 1919 old Public Land Act,

Land Law, is wrong because its premise is wrong.

the fact that the applicant has a preferential right to

lease foreshore land was a crucial factor, it is

In other words, paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative

Order No. 7-1, issued on April 30, 1936, was

promulgated under section 64 of the old Public Land

Law, as amended. And since the amended section

Administrative Order No. 7-1 held that Monzon, the

littoral owner of the registered land abutting upon

64 was substantially reproduced in section 67 of the

present Public Land Law, it is glaringly incorrect to

the foreshore land, has the preferential right to lease

the foreshore land.

say that section 67 rendered obsolete the said

paragraph 32. Paragraph 32 is still in force and is good

The location of the lots of Santulan and Monzon and

the foreshore lands abutting thereon is shown in

under the existing Public Land Law.

the following sketch based on the plan, Psu-115357

(Exh. B):

The foregoing discussion reveals that the Executive

Secretary's rationalization of the alleged repeal of
paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1
(identical to paragraph 4 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 8-3) is not only deficient in clarity and
cogency but is predicated on the false assumption that
section 64 of the 1919 Public Land Act is different from
section 67 of the present Public Land Law.
Consequently, the aforementioned decision of
Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo under review has to
be
set aside.
This case is governed by the precedent established in
the case of Gonzalo Monzon, which, as already
noted, is similar to this case since the foreshore land
involved in the Monzon case is adjacent to the

Considering that the foreshore land abutting upon

Santulan's lot is in the same situation as the
foreshore land abutting upon Monzon's lot, there is no
reason why Santulan should not enjoy, with
respect to the disputed foreshore land, the rights given
to Monzon over the foreshore land adjacent to
his lot.
Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the
littoral owner the preferential right to lease the
foreshore land abutting on his land?
That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article
4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which
provides that, while lands added to the shores by
accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action

foreshore land involved in this case.

of the sea forth part of the public domain, such lands,

"when they are no longer washed by the waters

In the Monzon case, the Office of the President,

applying the oftcited paragraph 32 of Lands

of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public

utility, or for the establishment of special

industries, or for the coast guard service", shall be

declared by the Government "to be the property of

land adjacent to navigable waters has certain riparian

or littoral rights of a proprietary nature not

the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as

increment thereof ." (cited in Ignacio vs. Director of

possessed by the general public which rights are

incident to the ownership of the banks or the uplands:

Lands, 108 Phil. 335, 338).

riparian as respects the waters of a river and littoral as

to sea waters or the waters of a lake (65 C. J. S.

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential

right of the littoral owner (riparian according to

143-145).

paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by

accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the

It may be mentioned that the Director of Lands stated

in his manifestation of October 26, 1977 that

sea (Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil. 732, 736, 223 U. S.
268, 56 L. Ed. 432, 435; Jover vs. Insular

Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-1 and 8-3 are still

in force and have not been superseded by any

Government, 10 Phil. 522, 40 Phil. 1094, 1100, 221 U.

S. 623, 55 L. Ed. 884).

later regulations and that the directive of the President

of the Philippines to the Director of Lands dated

The reason for that preferential right is the same as

the justification for giving accretions to the riparian

May 24, 1966, stopping the grant of foreshore leases

all along Manila Bay, towards Cavite and Bataan,

owner, which is that accretion compensates the

riparian owner for the diminutions which his land

has not rendered the instant case moot and academic

"because the foreshore lease application involved

suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters

(Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). So, in the

is pending award."

case of littoral lands, he who loses by the

encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession
(Banks
vs. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57, 67, 17 L Ed. 818, 821).
That preferential right is recognized in American
jurisprudence where the rule is that the owner of the

In view of the foregoing considerations, the trial court's

decision and the decision of the Executive
Secretary dated April 10, 1958 are reversed and set
aside and the order of the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources dated December 14,
1954 and the orders of the Director of Lands
dated February 1 and October 19, 1951 are affirmed.

The lease application of Julian Santulan mentioned in

the order of February 1, 1951 should be recorded

Julian Santulan, Applicant-Appellee vs. Antonio Lusin,

Applicant-Appellant, D.A.N.R. Case No. 625, Psu-

in the names of his heirs and the obligation to make

reimbursement mentioned in the dispositive part of

115357, Kawit, Cavite.

the Undersecretary's order should now devolve upon

the heirs of Santulan. The reimbursement should
be made to the heirs of the late Antonio Lusin. The
obligation to vacate the disputed land, as required in
the Director's order of October 19, 1951 devolves upon
the heirs of Lusin. Costs in both instances
against respondent heirs of Lusin. (As amended by
Resolution of February 17, 1977.

Annex A Order of Director of Lands dated February

1, 1951.
Annex B Order of Director of Lands dated October
19, 1951.
Annex C Decision of Acting Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources dated October 13, 1952.
Annex D Order of Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources dated February 28, 1953.

SO ORDERED.

Annex E Order of Undersecretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources dated December 14, 1954.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Guerrero, JJ.,

concur.

Annex F Order of Undersecretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources dated May 19, 1955.

Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second

Division.

Annex G Decision of Executive Secretary Juan C.

Pajo dated April 10, 1958.

Fernando and Santos, JJ., are on leave.

Annex H Decision of Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz

Castro dated May 10, 1954 in Emiliano del Rosario

Annexes to Opinion in L-28021, Julian Santulan

vs. Executive Secretary, et al.
F.L.A. No. V-562, R.P.A. (New). Julian Santulan,
Applicant & Contestant vs. F.L.A. (New), R.P.A. (New),
B.L.
Conflict No. 8 (N) Psu-115357, Kawit, Cavite.

vs. Gonzalo Monzon.

ANNEX A
ORDER
Julian Santolan, who owns Lot No. 986 of the Kawit
Cadastre, under a free patent grant with Original

Certificate of Title No. 6 issued to him on June 9, 1937,

claims preferential rights to all the areas

bounded on the north by the Bacoor Bay. It is evident

therefore that the areas now comprised in

extending seaward from the said lot. He caused the

said areas to be surveyed for him in 1942, and the

Santolan's Survey Psu-115357 were formerly parts of

the bay, and that presently they exist as a result of

survey plan thereof was approved in 1944, as may be

seen in the Survey Plan Psu-115357 of this Office

the recession of the waters of the sea. Investigation

disclosed that these areas are now foreshore lands,

which is reproduced in the sketch drawn on the back of

the last page hereof. Except the portion marked

covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of the

ordinary tides. Santolan was found to have

"A" in the sketch, he made a foreshore lease

application and a revocable permit application for
these

entered the areas first and made dikes. Lusin was

found to have entered lately and made dikes also.

areas in 1942 to devote the areas applied for to

fishpond purposes. Presently, he now includes the
portion "A" in his applications herein mentioned to be
devoted to the same purposes, in fact, he now
intends to utilize the entire area comprised in his
Survey Psu-115357 for fishery purposes and has filed
therefor with the Bureau of Fisheries fishpond permit
application No. 5114. Upon this claim he contests
the revocable permit (new) application and the
foreshore lease (new) application for the portion of
these areas marked "X" in the sketch which were filed
by Antonio Lusin in 1942 and 1945, respectively,

None of them, however, has obtained from this Office

any permit of occupancy and use, and their
applications are not yet approved.
On the basis alone of actual occupancy or introduction
of improvements neither of the parties here may
claim preferential rights, for under the law and
regulations, it is only such occupancy and introduction
of
improvements as are made upon the authority of an
official permit issued by this Office which could
serve as a reason for holding a sealed bidding in a
public auction of the right to lease at which the

for salt-producing purposes.

permittee is given the preferred right to equal the

highest bid that might be put by any other party. This

Lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre, mentioned above as

owned by Julian Santolan, appears to be

is the rule prescribed by Section 67 of Commonwealth

Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act). It appears,

however, that the areas, portions "A", "X" and the

parts extending up to the Bacoor Bay now, as may

revocable (new) application of Antonio Lusin, both

covering the portion marked "X" in the sketch, are

be seen in the sketch, which are comprised by

Santolan's Survey Plan Psu-115357, are immediately

hereby rejected. The base application of Santolan,

shall be recorded as Foreshore Lease Application No.

adjoining Lot No. 986, which is his private property,

and are extensions of the said lot to the sea. The

562 and given due course for the whole area (including
portion "A") shown in the said sketch.

areas, being foreshore lands, are therefore subject to

riparian rights which may be invoked by Santolan

SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, February 1, 1951.

as owner of the upland in accordance with Section 32

of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 which

JOSE P. DANS

provides the following:

Director of Lands

"Sec. 32. The owner of the property adjoining

foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered

ANNEX B

with water bordering upon the shores or banks of

navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to
apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not
be needed for the public service, subject to the
laws and regulations governing lands of this nature,
provided that he applies therefor within 60 days
from the date he receives a communication from the
Director of Lands advising him of his preferential
right."
As Julian Santolan is interested in utilizing the entire
areas covered by his Survey Psu-115357 over which
he is fully entitled to exercise his riparian rights, the
above-noted foreshore lease (new) application and

ORDER
Counsel for respondent Antonio Lusin has filed in due
time a motion for the reconsideration of our
Order of February 1, 1951, which resolved this case in
favor of contestant Julian Santolan, praying that
the said order be set aside and the case, reopened for
purposes of a formal hearing for the submission
of evidence. Substantially stated, respondent Lusin
claims that he is entitled to preference because he
has been in possession of the premises for a period of
over twenty years, placing stakes and planting
aquatic trees for the raising and cultivation of shell fish
and sea shells, besides constructing dikes for

ponding fish and making salt beds, all these works

undertaken by him being the cause for the gradual

Julian Santolan with the Bureau of Fisheries which is

also contested by Antonio. It appears that upon

filling of the area and its conversion into a productive

state. He contends that the areas under question

request of the Director of Fisheries to the Bureau of

Forestry for certification as to the availability of the

had been formed thru "artificial accretion" caused by

his own labor and, consequently, he has the right

areas for fishery purposes, the latter made

investigation, inquiring at the same time into the claim
of

of pre-emption.
There is no question, however, that the areas under
question are parts of the foreshore. Under Section
61 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act),
they are disposable to private parties by lease only
and not otherwise; and under Section 67 of the same
Act, the lease shall be made thru oral bidding, the

Antonio Lusin, made formally in writing, that he has

improved the areas into a fishpond and has been in
occupation thereof for more than 20 years. The Bureau
of Forestry made the findings that those areas
are within the disposable areas for agricultural
purposes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands;

adjudication to be made to the highest bidder.

and that they are swampy lands, formerly under sea

water of the Bacoor Bay, "and not an improved

There is no question also that the areas under question

extend to the sea from Lot No. 986 of the Kawit

fishpond as alleged by Antonio Lusin". These findings

were transmitted to the Director of Fisheries

Cadastre, which is actually owned by respondent

Santolan under Original Certificate of Title No. 6 of the

under first indorsement dated June 19, 1950.

land records of Cavite. Undoubtedly, respondent has

riparian rights to the foreshore in question which
he can invoke against contestant Lusin under the
provisions of Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order
No. 7-1, quoted in toto in the order sought to be
reconsidered.
Records show that the areas under question are also
involved in the Fishpond Application No. 5114 of

Our own investigating officer, reporting on this case on

January 25, 1951, stated the following: "On
December 15, 1950, when I conducted the first ocular
inspection of the premises in the presence of
both parties, the only visible improvements found
thereon are the newly constructed dikes made
thereon by Julian Santolan, a few bacauan and ape-ape
trees of about two to three years old, bamboo

stakes placed thereon at intervals, and a small old hut

located at almost the middle of the land in

possession of the premises for over 20 years and has

gradually improved them because, aside from the

question. All these improvements were claimed to

have been introduced by Julian Santolan. Antonio

fact that the allegation is belied by the physical

condition of the premises, whatever evidence may be

Lusin, however, claimed that those bamboo stakes

found therein were his."

gathered on that allegation could not change the

nature of the areas as foreshore, nor would it avoid

It is evident from the findings of both the inspecting

officer of the Bureau of Forestry and our own

the rights of contestant as riparian owner. The

presence of the respondent in the premises has not
been

investigating officer that the areas under question are

foreshore lands, and that they have not been
really improved and possessed by respondent Lusin for
over twenty years as he alleged. The
improvements found therein have been recently made,
and they are not of such nature and extent as
would have changed the character of the areas as
foreshore. In fact, according to the investigating
officer, the areas have been seen by him on different
occasions, and he found that the same, as well as
the neighboring areas in the same belt, were covered
by tidal waters of from 2 to 3 feet deep during
ordinary rise of the tides, and uncovered by the tides
at ebb.
There is, therefore, no reason for changing our
disposition in our order of February 1, 1951. It is not
necessary to re-open the case to receive evidence on
respondent's allegation that he has been in

authorized by competent authorities, and his

introduction of improvements thereon was not done
with
proper permit of temporary occupancy and use such
as is prescribed in our administrative practice. The
circumstances under which he made improvements
cannot justify his claim for a preferred right under
Section 67 of the Public Land Act; on the contrary, he
stands to forfeit the improvements to the
Government for, as reported by our investigating
officer, he entered the premises and commenced
making the improvements after contestant Santolan
himself has already made improvements, and after
he has been warned on December 15, 1950 by the
investigating officer not to continue working, which
warning was confirmed by us in our letter to him of
January 12, 1951. His bad faith is quite evident, and

he cannot avail of his presence in the premises now to

demand the issuance to him of a provisional or

Application No. 562 of Julian Santolan. Antonio Lusin

claims that the order is against the fact and the

revocable permit of temporary occupancy and use

under our rules and regulations in order to legalize

law. He presented three (3) motions for

reconsideration: one on October 19, 1951; the other on

his entry and give validity to his improvements. The

right to demand issuance of such a permit is

December 12, 1951; and the last on April 9, 1952. Said

motions were all denied. Hence, the present

concomitant to the right of contestant Santolan to be a

preferred applicant by virtue of his riparian right

appeal.

recognized in Section 32 of Land Administrative Order

No. 7-1 cited hereinabove.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the instant motion for
reconsideration and reinvestigation of respondent
Antonio

The subject of contention is the strip of land having an

area of 4 1/2 hectares from Lot No. 986 of the
Kawit Cadastre No. 203 to the waters of Bacoor Bay.
Lot No. 986 is covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 6 issued to Julian Santolan on June 9, 1937.
Santolan's titled property is bounded on the north

Lusin is hereby denied, and he shall vacate the

premises within 60 days from receipt of notice hereof.

by Bacoor Bay.

SO ORDERED.

On December 5, 1942, Santolan filed his foreclosure

lease application for the entire tract intervening

Manila, Philippines, October 19, 1951.

JOSE P. DANS

between his property and Bacoor Bay. So he caused

Psu-115357 to be executed and same was approved

Director of Lands

in 1944 by the Director of Lands.

ANNEX C

On November 26, 1945, Antonio Lusin applied for

permit for an area of 4.5 hectares for salt bed

DECISION
The order of the Director of Lands dated February 1,
1951, rejected Foreshore Lease Application (New)
and Revocable Permit Application (New) of Antonio
Lusin and gave due course to the Foreshore Lease

purposes. The area for which permit was asked, is

covered by his F.L.A. (New) filed on November 17,
1945, the boundaries of which are as follows:
NE V. del Rosario and E. del Rosario

SE Julian Santolan
SW Ankaw River

It is true that applicant Lusin introduced improvements

on the land in question, but that fact does not

NW Bacoor Bay.

give him preferential right thereto, not only because

he had not acquired any permit from the Bureau of

The two applications of Santolan and Lusin cover the

same area. Julian Santolan duly protested in 1946

Lands before doing so, but also because his entry on

the premises was duly protested by Santolan.

against Lusin's application. The question to be decided

in this appeal is: Which of the two applicants,

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, and finding that the

order of the Director of Lands on February 1,

Julian Santolan or Antonio Lusin, has right of

preference to the land in controversy?

1951, is in accordance with the facts of record and the

provisions of the law on the matter, the herein

By virtue of the fact that he is a riparian owner, Julian

Santolan has the right of preference pursuant to

appeal from said order should be, as hereby it is,

dismissed.

the provisions of Section 32 of Administrative Order

No. 7-1, which reads as follows:

SO ORDERED.

"Sec. 32. The owner of the property adjoining

foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered
with water bordering upon the shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to
apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not
be needed for the public service, subject to the
laws and regulations governing lands of this nature,
provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60)
days from the date he receives a communication from
the Director of Lands advising him of his
preferential right."

Manila, Philippines, October 13, 1952.

JOSE S. CAMUS
Acting Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
ANNEX D
ORDER
This is a motion filed by Antonio Lusin, thru counsel,
for the reconsideration of the decision of this Office
dated October 13, 1952, dismissing his appeal from
the decision of the Director of Lands under date of
February 1, 1951.

In support of the said motion for reconsideration, Lusin

substantially alleges that he has been improving

thereon by Julian Santolan, a few bacauan and ape-ape

trees of about two to three years old, bamboo

the land in question since 1920, spending for such

improvements no less than P20,000.00, and for that

stakes placed thereon as intervals and a small old hut

located at almost the middle of the land in

reason, he should be given the preferential right to

acquire the said land. To reinforce his allegation,

question. All these improvements were claimed to

have been introduced thereon by Julian Santolan.

movant cites the case of Rosalia Vida Vda. de Tirona

vs. Magdaleno Tragico, TA-G.R. No. 9050, decided

Antonio Lusin, however, claimed that the bamboo

stakes found thereon were his."

by the Court of Appeals on June 30, 1943, wherein it

was held that because Tragico has constructed

Moreover, according to the further finding of the said

investigating officer, the land in question falls

fishpond on a portion of the land in question by means

of the improvements he has introduced thereon

under the category of foreshore land. That portion of

his report referring to this finding is hereby quoted

and has possessed the land for sufficient time to

acquire the land by right of prescription, he was

as follows:

awarded the land in dispute.

"It may not be amiss to state in this connection that I

have on different occasions, the opportunity to

We have found this allegation of movant to be far from

the truth. It is the finding of the investigating

inspect the land subject hereof on both high and low

tides. During ordinary low tide, the whole areas

officer who made an investigation of this case that it is

Julian Santolan and not movant Lusin who has

and further seaward, is entirely exposed to the surface

while during ordinary high tide, it is wholly

been actually occupying the land in question and

introducing improvements thereon. The pertinent

covered with tidal water with an approximate depth of

two to three feet. The land in question in its

portion of his report reads as follows:

entirety is marshy covered and uncovered by the ebb

and flow of tidal water."

"On December 16, 1950, when I conducted the first

ocular inspection of the premises in the presence of
both parties, the only visible improvements found
thereon were the newly constructed dikes made

As the land is a foreshore land, the same is susceptible

to the riparian right of the owner of the adjoining

land. According to Section 32 of Lands Administrative

Order No. 7-1, the owner of the property adjoining
foreshore land, shall be given preference to apply for
such land adjoining his property as may not be

ANNEX E
ORDER
On October 13, 1952, this Office rendered a decision in
connection with the above entire case, the

needed for the public service. Inasmuch as the land in

question adjoins Lot No. 980, Kawit Cadastre,

dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

which is a private property of Julian Santolan, said

Julian Santolan shall have the preference right to

"In view of all the foregoing and finding that the order
of the Director of Lands on February 1, 1951, is in

apply therefor over and above any other applicant. It

may be mentioned, in this connection, that the

accordance with the facts of record and the provisions

of law on the matter, the herein appeal from the

said case of Rosalia Vida Vda. de Tirona vs. Magdaleno

Tragico who had possessed and improved the

said order should be, as hereby it is dismissed."

land claimed by him, it is Santolan and not movant

Lusin who has been actually occupying and improving
the land subject of the present controversy.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration
filed by Antonio Lusin, as well as his request for
reinvestigation of this case, should be, as hereby it is,
denied.
SO ORDERED.

From the said decision Antonio Lusin filed a motion for

reconsideration which was denied as per order
of this Office dated February 28, 1953. Still not
satisfied with the aforementioned order, Lusin again
filed
a second motion for reconsideration predicating his
motion on the following grounds:
1. That he (Lusin) is in actual possession of the land in
question since 1920;

Manila, Philippines, February 28, 1953.

2. That said area is an agricultural land actually

devoted to fishpond and, therefore, is not a

FERNANDO LOPEZ

foreshore land;

Secretary of Agriculture

3. That even granting without admitting that Santolan

is a riparian owner, Santolan had lost his

and Natural Resources

riparian right thereto in view of the continuous

possession by Lusin of the area since 1920; and

being evidenced by a free patent grant with Original

Certificate of Title No. 6 issued on June 9, 1937. The

4. That in the investigation relied upon by the Director

of Lands in his decision and confirmed by

only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not

Julian Santolan, as riparian owner, is entitled to

this Office, the movant herein was not given

opportunity to be heard because the said investigation
was

the preference provided for in Section 32, Lands

Administrative Order No. 7-1, which reads as follows:

never completed, and as a result, the conclusions of

the investigator thereat were one sided.
Adhering to its policy of giving party litigants the
utmost opportunity to present their respective sides of
the case, this Office ordered a reinvestigation of the
case to determine whether is not the allegations of

"32. Preference of Riparian Order. The owner of the

property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy
lands, or lands covered with water bordering upon the
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall
be given preference to apply or such lands adjoining
his property as may not be needed for the public

Antonio Lusin are true.

service, subject to the laws and regulations governing

lands of this nature, provided that he applies

From the said reinvestigation, the facts of this case

may be stated as follows:

therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he

receives a communication from the Director of Lands

The disputed area is a strip of land containing an

approximate area of 4-1/2 hectares located at the

advising him of his preferential right."

Barrio of Kaingin, Municipality of Kawit, Province of

Cavite. It is bounded on the North by Bacoor Bay, on

During the reinvestigation of this case by a

representative of this Office, it was disclosed that
Antonio

the East by the property occupied by Vicente del

Rosario and E. del Rosario, on the South by Lot No. 896

Lusin is the actual occupant of the area in question

his present possession thereof dating back as of

of Kawit Cadastre No. 203; and on the West by Ankaw

River. Lot 986, mentioned above as the boundary

1951. During his occupation, Lusin has introduced

considerable improvements in the area investing his

of the area in question on the South, is owned and

possessed by Julian Santolan, his ownership thereof

life savings therein. Today, a portion of approximately

two hectares of the said area is a complete

fishpond surrounded with dikes. A concrete gate was

constructed or the western side of the fishpond in

exclusion of the other. Rather, there are good reasons

to believe that both parties fished in the premises

1951. Water breakers were constructed around the

dikes to protect them from the action of the waves.

jointly and/or simultaneously without claiming the

property exclusively for themselves because then the

The remaining portion of the area in question is fenced

with bamboo stakes. LibLex

area was covered with water which at that time was

still deep. It was only in 1942 that Julian Santolan

On the other hand, it is apparent that the area in

question is an extension of Lot 986 to the sea and that

took positive step to claim the property by filing a

foreshore lease and a revocable permit application for

its present existence is the result of the continuous

rescission of the water of the sea. There is no doubt

said area with the intention of converting the same

into a fishpond. Santolan caused said area to be

that the area in question is a foreshore, it being

situated along the shore lying between medium high

surveyed in 1942, the survey plan thereof was

approved in 1944 as may be seen in survey Plan Psu-

and low water marks and is covered and uncovered by

the flow and ebb of ordinary tide.

115357 of the Bureau of Lands. Since 1942, Santolan

exercised dominion over the property although

Both parties claim prior possession of the disputed

area, Santolan's claim dating way back in 1907, the

Lusin occasionally entered the premises with a similar

intention of claiming the area for himself. In

year he claims said area was donated to him by his

father-in-law, while Lusin alleges that he was already

January of 1951 Lusin entered the area in question and

wrested the possession thereof from Santolan.

in possession of the same since 1920. The evidence

presented by both parties during the reinvestigation

Since then up to the present, Lusin is in continuous

possession of the same notwithstanding the vigorous

were so diametrically opposed with each other that

they only create doubts as to the veracity of the

opposition of Santolan.

respective claims of said parties. From the testimonies

of witnesses for both sides, there could be
gathered sufficient grounds to believe that prior to
1942, neither party possessed the area to the

Lusin alleges that the area in question does not fall

within the purview of the above quoted Section 32
of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 on the theory
that the lands enumerated in said provision,

whether foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands

covered with water, must be bordering upon the
shores
or banks of navigable lakes or rivers. And it is argued
that since the area in question is bordering the
shores of Manila Bay, which is neither a lake nor a
river, the owner of the adjoining property is not
entitled to the preferential right accorded by said
Lands Administrative Order.

making said provision to appear as follows:

"The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands,
marshy lands or lands covered with water,
bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes
or rivers . . ."
The use of the alternative "or" instead of the
conjunction "and" shows the intention of the law in
segregating foreshore lands from marshy lands and
those two from lands covered with water bordering

We cannot agree with this contention. This Office is of

the opinion and so holds that the said provision

upon shores of navigable lakes or rivers.

of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, Section 32

speaks of the following kinds of lands, distinct and

It is also alleged that even granting that Santolan was

entitled to the preferential rights accorded to a

separate from one another:

riparian owner, said right has prescribed on the ground

that Lusin has been in continuous possession of

(1) Foreshore lands

(2) Marshy lands, or

the said area since 1920. This allegation was not duly
proven during the reinvestigation. While Lusin

(3) Land covered with water bordering upon the shores

of navigable lakes or rivers.

claims possession of the disputed area since 1920, on

the other hand. Santolan claims that he possessed

The phrase "bordering upon the shores of navigable

lakes or river" in said provision modifies only the

the same since 1907 when it was donated to him by

his father-in-law. As we have already stated, it is the

third classification, that is, "lands covered with water",

for if the law intends that said phrase should

finding of this Office that prior to 1942, neither party

possessed the premises exclusively. It was only in

modify the three types of land enumerated above,

then the punctuation mark, comma, should not have

1942 when Santolan took positive steps to claim the

area for himself. There are even evidence on record

been placed before the alternative "or" but instead

between the words "water" and "bordering",

that Santolan paid the land taxes for the area in 1936.
In 1951, Lusin effected his entry to the area up to

the present. It may be recalled, however, that these

actuations of Lusin had been the subject of a

improvements in the premises and had invested his

life savings therefor, and considering further that if

criminal complaint filed by Santolan before the Justice

of the Peace Court of Kawit, Cavite, wherein Lusin

Santolan were the one who converted the area into a

fishpond, as he intends to do, he would have

was acquitted on the ground that his guilt was not

proven beyond reasonable doubt.

incurred the same expenses as was incurred by Lusin

in the premises in question, it is the belief of this

Needless to say, proof beyond reasonable doubt is

absolutely necessary before conviction in criminal

Office that justice would be fully served if Santolan he

required to reimburse Lusin of the value of the

cases could be had. On the other hand, preponderance

of evidence is sufficient to prove a matter of fact

improvements now existing in the area as may be

appraised by the Committee on Appraisal of the

in civil and/or administrative cases. The

preponderance of evidence adduced at the
reinvestigation of

Bureau of Lands.

this case conducted by a representative of this Office,

shows that the present occupation of Lusin of the
area in question was effected by force, although there
are good reasons to believe that such force was
employed by Lusin to assert what he believed was his
right over the property in question.
From the foregoing facts and circumstances, it is
therefore, apparent that the area in question is a
foreshore land, and Santolan, being the riparian owner,
is entitled to the preferential rights accorded by
the provision of Section 32 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1. Considering, however, the fact that
during the reinvestigation of this case, it was disclosed
that Antonio Lusin had introduced considerable

WHEREFORE, the above-noted foreshore lease (New)

application and revocable permit (New)
application of Antonio Lusin should remain, as hereby
it is, REJECTED; and Foreshore Lease Application
No. V-65 of Julian Santolan given due course,
PROVIDED, he reimburses Antonio Lusin of the
appraised
value of the improvements now existing in the area
within sixty (60) days after notification of said
appraisal.
The Director of Lands is hereby directed to instruct the
Committee on Appraisal concerned to make the
necessary appraisal of the value of the improvements
now existing in the area in question within thirty

(30) days from receipt of this order and to notify Julian

Santolan of the result of said appraisal.
In the event that Julian Santolan fails to reimburse
Antonio Lusin of the appraisal value of the said
improvements within the period specified in this order,
he shall lose his preferential rights over the area
and Antonio Lusin will be allowed to file an appropriate
public land application therefor.

sixty (60) days after notification of said appraisal.

From said order, both parties to this conflict filed
separate motions seeking reconsideration of the same.
Santolan premised his motion on the theory that as far
as that portion of the order which requires him
to reimburse Lusin of the appraised value of the
improvements within sixty (60) days after notification

SO ORDERED.

of said appraisal is concerned, same is contrary to the

provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and of

Manila, Philippines, December 14, 1954.

the New Civil Code. LexLib

By Authority of the Secretary:

Santolan argues that the best procedure that should

have been followed in the disposition of this case

JAIME M. FERRER
Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
ANNEX F
ORDER
On December 14, 1954, this Office issued an order in
connection with the above-entitled case wherein
the rejection of the foreshore lease application and
revocable permit (both new) of Antonio Lusin was
upheld and Foreshore Lease Application No. V-62 of
Julian Santolan given due course provided he
reimburses Antonio Lusin of the appraised value of the
improvements now existing in the area within

was for the Government to forfeit all the improvements

introduced by Lusin in the area in question in its
(Government's) favor and then let Santolan pay to the
Government the appraised value of said
improvements within ten (10) years after notification
of said appraisal. He further argues that the "law
does not authorize the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to dispose of the proceeds of the
sale of the improvement to any person whomsoever",
and "certainly the Secretary does not claim the
prerogative of disbursing government funds without
authority of law."
In the first place, the order sought to be reconsidered
does not contemplate any sale from which

proceeds could be disposed of by the Secretary "to any

person whomsoever". In the second place, in the

justice and equity demands that Lusin should be

compensated of the improvements introduced by him

issuance of the order sought to be reconsidered, this

Office has taken into consideration the provisions

in the area in question by whomsoever shall enjoy the

fruits of his (Lusin's) toil. Julian Santolan, being

of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and those of the Civil

Code cited by movant Santolan with respect to the

the person who shall benefit from said improvements,

it is only his and just that he should reimburse

forfeiture in favor of the government of the

improvements found in the areas covered by rejected

Lusin of the value of said improvements, especially

considering that the said area adjudicated to

applications. However, this Office is also fully aware of

that cardinal principle that "no man shall enrich

Santolan is already a producing fishpond.

himself at the expense of another."

During the reinvestigation of this case by a
representative of this Office, it was found that Lusin
was the
actual occupant of the disputed area since 1951.
During his occupation, Lusin was introduced
considerable improvements in the area, investing his
life savings therein. At the time of inspection,
approximately two (2) hectares of the said area was a
veritable fishpond complete with dikes and water
breakers, and the remaining portion was surrounded
with bamboo stakes. While this Office found

Antonio Lusin, on the other hand, contends that the

order sought to be reconsidered is contrary to the
facts of the case and to the law applicable thereto.
Lusin assigns the following errors as having been
allegedly committed by this Office:
(1) In holding that the possession of Lusin dated only
as of 1951;
(2) In holding that the possession of Lusin was effected
through force;
(3) In holding that Section 32 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1 is applicable in the instant case;
(4) In not holding that the preferential rights of Julian
Santolan, granting that he has any, has

Lusin's occupation as having effected by force, this

Office also believes that such force was employed by

already prescribed; and

Lusin only to enforce what he believed was his right

over the property in question. This being the case,

(5) In giving due course to the foreshore lease

application of Santolan for the entire area in

question.
With respect to the first two assignments of errors, a
review of the records of this case shows that the
findings of this Office are in accordance with the facts
of the case as deduced from the reinvestigation of

riparian owner cannot stand to lose more than what he

owns, and therefore, since Santolan's property,
which adjoins the area in question, is only two (2)
hectares, Santolan can never lose more than two
hectares.

this conflict, and as supported by previous records of

this case. This Office, therefore, finds no sufficient

Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 71, the

particular point of law involved, provides as

ground to disturb its findings of facts.

follows:

Anent the next two assignments of errors, which are

mere reiteration of movant's allegation in his

"32. Preference of Riparian Owner. The owner of the

property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy

previous memorandum, and which were thoroughly

passed upon by this office, it is believed that

lands, or lands covered with water bordering upon the

shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall

discussing them further is no longer necessary since

after another close examination of the case, this

be given preference to apply for such lands, adjoining

his property as may not be needed for the public

office finds its disposition in this particular respect well

justified and in accordance with the law and

service, subject to the laws and regulations governing

lands of this nature, provided that he applied

regulations applicable thereto.

therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he

receives a communication from the Director of Lands

Now coming to the last allegation, Lusin contends that

the foreshore lease application of Julian
Santolan, if given the course, should not cover the
entire area in question. Movant Lusin advances the
theory that since the reason behind the law in granting
preferential rights to riparian owners is to
compensate for whatever loss said riparian owner may
suffer from the actions of the water, said

advising him of his preferential right."

The above-quoted provision of the Lands
Administrative Order does not impose any restriction
or
limitation with respect to the extent of the area to
which a riparian owner is preferred as long as said
area is not needed for public service. The said order,
being clear on this point, this Office has no other

alternative but to interpret said regulation in the

meaning it clearly conveys.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
the instant motion for reconsideration filed
respectively by the conflicting parties herein. should
be, as hereby they are, denied.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, May 19, 1955.
By authority of the Secretary:
JAIME N. FERRER
Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
ANNEX G
4th Indorsement
Manila, April 10, 1958.
Respectfully returned to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, Manila.
This is with reference to the appeal by Antonio Lusin
from the order of that Department in DANR Case
No. 625 (Julian Santolan vs. Antonio Lusin) dated May
19, 1955, whereby his motion for reconsideration
of the order of that office of December 14, 1954,
rejecting his foreshore lease application for the

disputed land but awarding to him the right of

reimbursement for the improvements he had
introduced
thereon and giving due course to appellee's
application therefor, was denied.
The land in question is a foreshore land of about 4-1/2
hectares located along Bacoor Bay in barrio
Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite. A preferential right to lease it is
claimed by the appellant on the ground that he
has been in the continuous and exclusive possession
thereof since 1920, when said land was still under
water and used as a site of his fish corals. On the other
hand, it is alleged by the appellee that the
disputed lot is an extension of his property into the
sea, as he is the owner of Lot No. 986 which,
according to its technical description, borders Bacoor
Bay on the North; that the present foreshore land
was formed by soil deposits brought by the action of
the sea; and that he has the right of preference to
apply for the land in question in accordance with
Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1.
Upon the foregoing facts, the Director of Lands in an
order dated February 1, 1951, rejected the
appellant's foreshore lease application and forfeited
the improvements he had introduced thereon in
favor of the appellee. From this order, Lusin appealed
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources after his three motions for reconsideration

had been denied. On October 13, 1952, the

in December 1942, Santulan caused the survey of the

land, and the survey plan was approved by the

Secretary dismissed his appeal. Thereafter, the

appellant moved for a reconsideration of the
Secretary's

Director of Lands in 1944; that on December 29, 1942,

Santulan filed a foreshore lease application

decision but his motion was denied on February 28,

1953. He then filed another motion requesting a
formal reinvestigation of the case. The motion was
granted and that Department ordered a

covering an area of 36,120 square meters of the land

in dispute; that the filing of Santulan's foreshore
lease application resulted in the investigation of the
case in March 1943, involving the parties herein;

reinvestigation of the case on May 12, 1953.

and that said investigation was not finally terminated

for unknown reasons.

In the reinvestigation of the case, the following facts

were established: That Lusin had converted two (2)

After receiving and considering the report of the

reinvestigation, that office on December 14, 1954,

hectares of the area in dispute into a veritable

fishpond; and that the entire area in question was

issued an order modifying its previous stand by giving

the appellant the right to reimbursement for the

enclosed with dikes and provided with two (2) sluice

gates, one of which was made of concrete and the

improvements he had introduced on the disputed lot,

the dispositive part of which reads:

other of lumber; that on the northern part of the

disputed land bordering Bacoor Bay were bamboo

"Wherefore, the above noted foreshore lease (New)

application and revocable permit (New) application

poles placed at close intervals serving as water

breakers to protect the mud dikes from being washed

of Antonio Lusin should remain, as hereby it is,

REJECTED; and Foreshore Lease application No. V-62 of

away by the action of the sea; that all of these

improvements were introduced by Lusin in 1951 up to

Julian Santulan given due course, PROVIDED, he

reimburse Antonio Lusin of the appraised value of the

the time of the reinvestigation; that the disputed land

was, as it still is, bounded on the South by Lot No.

improvements now existing in the area within sixty

(60) days after notification of said appraisal.

986 of Julian Santolan; that said land was formed by

soil deposits brought by the action of the sea; that

"xxx xxx xxx

"In the event that Julian Santulan fails to reimburse

Antonio Lusin of the appraised value of the said

The main issue presented by the parties to be resolved

in this controversy is, which of them has a better

improvements within the period specified in this order,

he shall lose his preferential rights over the area

right to lease the foreshore land under consideration?

For a clear resolution of the question, it is

and Antonio Lusin will be allowed to file an appropriate

public and application therefor".

necessary to look into the legal provisions governing

the administration and disposition of foreshore

The appellant moved for a reconsideration of the

foregoing order but his motion was denied on May 19,

lands. As correctly held by that Department and the

Bureau of Lands, the administration and disposition

1955. Dissatisfied, he appealed to this Office, averring

that the Department erred in finding the

of foreshore lands are governed by Chapter IX, Title III

of Commonwealth Act No. 141, (Secs. 58 and 59),

following: That the possession of Antonio Lusin of the

land in question began only in 1951; that since

otherwise known as the Public Land Act.

1942, Julian Santulan had been exercising dominion

over the property in question; that the area in
question is apparently an extension of lot No. 986 into
the sea and that its present existence was the
result of the continuous recession of the sea; that the
possession of Antonio Lusin over the property in
question was effected through force; that Section 32,
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, is applicable
to the instant case; and that the preferential rights of
Julian Santulan, granting he has any, has not
prescribed. He contends further that the Department
erred in rejecting his foreshore lease application
and in giving due course to that of the appellee. LLpr

Section 61 of said law provides that foreshore lands

shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only
and not otherwise, as soon as the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not
necessary for the public service and are open to
disposition. The procedure for the award of a lease of
foreshore land, is found in Section 67 of the same
law which provides, as a general rule, that the award
of the right to lease a foreshore land shall be
determined by oral bidding, except where
improvements were introduced thereon by reason of a
permit issued by competent authority, in which case
the award thereof shall be determined by sealed

bidding pursuant to the provisions of section 26,

whereby the permittee is granted the right to equal
the

therefor, citing Section 32 of Lands Administrative

Order No. 7-1, which reads:

highest bidder.

"Sec. 32. The owner of the property adjoining

foreshore lands marshy lands, or lands covered

Noteworthy is the fact that both parties herein claim to

have been in prior possession of the land in

with water bordering upon the shores or banks of

navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to

controversy than the other. Not one of them, however,

was granted a permit by competent authority to

apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not

be needed for the public service, subject to the

occupy and use the land and introduce improvements

thereon. Since not one of them was granted such

laws and regulations governing lands of this nature,

provided that he applies therefor within 60 days

a permit, the fact that one or the other had been in

prior possession of the premises in question is

from the date he receives a communication from the

Director of Lands advising him of his preferential

immaterial, as will be seen hereafter, in the

determination of the instant controversy. Neither is the

right."

alleged finding that one of the parties herein entered

the premises and introduced improvements
thereon in bad faith material to the resolution of the
case.
It is likewise significant to note that while the Bureau
held that none of the parties herein was entitled
to a preferential right to lease the land in question "on
the basis alone of actual occupancy or
introduction of improvements," it ruled that the
appellee, Julian Santulan, by reason of the fact that he
was, as he still is, a riparian owner of the disputed
area, had a preferential right to apply for a lease

In this appeal, the appellant reiterates his contention

before that Department that the foregoing is not
applicable to the instant case "because the property in
question borders upon the shores or banks of the
Manila Bay and not upon navigable lakes or rivers."
The fallacy of the argument is too obvious to require
any discussion since the provision expressly speaks of
foreshore lands. At any rate, this Office finds that
Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 has
been rendered obsolete by Commonwealth Act
No. 141.
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated April 30,
1936, but made effective on January 1, 1936, was

promulgated before the passage of Commonwealth Act

No. 141. Its provisions which have not been
altered, modified or amended, particularly Section 32
thereof, were promulgated pursuant to the
existing public land law at the time of its promulgation,
namely, Act No. 2874. A perusal of Section 32 of
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 will show that while
it speaks of a preferential right to apply for a
foreshore land, it does not specify the mode of
application, i.e., whether by sale, lease, homestead,
permit, etc., contemplated by it. Nevertheless, it is
clear under Act No. 2874 that a foreshore land may

other regulations promulgated thereunder."

Since Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 expressly
exempts from its operation temporary permits for
the use and occupation of public lands, the conclusion
is inescapable that Section 32 thereof
contemplates an application for a lease under Section
58 of Act No. 2874 only and does not include a
revocable permit application under Section 65 of said
Act.
The procedure for the award of the right to lease a
foreshore land under Act No. 2874 is found in
Section 64 thereof, which reads: Cdpr

be the subject only of a lease (Sec. 58), or of a

revocable permit to occupy and use it (Sec. 65).
Seemingly

"Sec. 64. The lease or sale shall be adjudicated to the

highest bidder; and if there is no bidder

therefore Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No.

7-1 contemplates an application for a lease of

besides the applicant, it shall be adjudicated to him.

The provisions of Section twenty-seven of this Act

foreshore land or a revocable permit to use or occupy

it. However, Section I of said order provides,

shall be applied wherever applicable. . . ."

among other things, the following:

Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, repealing

the foregoing provisions, provides:

". . . Those rules and regulations shall not apply to

applications for temporary occupation or provisional

"Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral

bidding; and adjudication shall be made to

use of said lands and property which shall be governed

by the provisions of Section 1844 of the

the highest bidder. However, where an has made

improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued

Administrative Code, as amended, by Acts Nos. 3077

and 3852, Lands Administrative Order No. 8 and

to him by competent authority, the sale or lease shall

be made by sealed bidding as prescribed in section

twenty-six of this Act, "the provisions of which shall be

applied wherever applicable. . ." (Emphasis

Since Section 64 of Act No. 2874 provides that Section

27 thereof should be applied wherever applicable

supplied).

in determining an award of a lease of foreshore land,

the mere fact that the land is covered by a lease

While Section 64 of Act No. 2874 makes a reference to

Section 27 of the same Act, Section 67 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 also makes a reference to
Section 26 of the latter law, Section 26 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 is practically a
reproduction of Section 27 of Act No. 2874 and
prescribes

application therefor warrants the holding of a sealed

bidding for its disposition, whereby the applicant
therefor should be granted the option or right to equal
the highest bid. In such a legal setup, the
question of preference in the right to apply for a lease
of foreshore land became a necessary

the manner or procedure of determining an award

through sealed bidding in the sale of a public land.

consequence, as one need only apply to be entitled to

the right to equal the highest bid; hence, the

Under its provision, an applicant is given the option or

right to equal the highest bidder.

applicability of Section 32 of Lands Administrative

Order No. 7-1.

Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 differs,

however, from Section 64 of Act No. 2874 in that

On the other hand, under Section 67 of

Commonwealth Act No. 141, a foreshore land may be
leased, as

while the latter provides that "section twenty-seven of

this Act shall be applied wherever applicable,"
making sealed bidding the general rule of procedure in
determining an award of a lease of foreshore
land, the former provides the contrary, as under its
provisions sealed bidding is not the general rule of
procedure in the determination of lease awards of
foreshore lands but may be resorted to only when
the conditions specified therein are present.

a general rule, by oral bidding only. In such a case, the

award of the foreshore lease shall always be
made to the highest bidder, notwithstanding the fact
that one among the bidders is an applicant, as no
one in an oral bidding is entitled to equal the highest
bid, unlike in the case of a sealed bidding either
under Section 27 of Act No. 2874 or under Section 26
of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Since the award of
a foreshore lease shall be given to the highest bidder
in an oral bidding, the necessity of determining

who among several interested parties has a

preferential right to apply for the land has been
obviated
under the present law, because the mere fact that one
is an applicant does not entitle him to equal the
highest bid, rendering the provisions of Section 32 of
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 idle and

recognized applicant therefor should be given the right

accorded to applicants under Section 26 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. The only instance under
Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 when a
foreshore land may be leased through sealed bidding
is when the conditions specified therein

useless.

namely, (a) that improvements had been introduced

on the land and (b) that said improvements were

Parenthetically, it may be stated that the appellee

brought to the attention of this Office its previous

introduced thereon by reason of a permit issued by

competent authority are present, in which case

decision in DANR Case No. 694 (Del Rosario vs.

Monzon), where the facts involved therein are more or

the permittee shall be granted the right to equal the

highest bid. In the absence of these conditions, the

less similar to those in the present controversy. While

this Office in that case relied on Section 32 of

land should be leased through oral bidding only and,

as stated earlier, the question of preference in the

Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 in resolving the

appeal therein, it did not touch on the question of

right to apply therefor is immaterial.

whether or not said provision is still enforceable, as the

same was not squarely placed in issue. For this

As the conditions specified in Section 67 of

Commonwealth Act No. 141 are not present in the
instant

reason, the ruling in that case can not be availed of as

a precedent in the adjudication of the one under

case, the land in question can be leased only through

oral bidding, if it can be disposed of under the

consideration. Cdpr

provisions of Section 61 of said Act, which requires as

a condition sine qua non in the lease of foreshore

In the instant case the parties are vying for the

preferential right to apply for a lease of the disputed
land, as if by the mere fact of application the land
should be disposed of by sealed bidding, whereby the

lands that the same have been declared by the

President not necessary for the public service and are
open for disposition. Without such a declaration, a
foreshore land may only be occupied and used by

private persons for lawful purposes upon the issuance

of a revocable permit therefor under Section 68
of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Since the record is
silent as to whether or not the land under
consideration has been so declared, this Office is
constrained to render two alternative resolutions of
the instant case.
On the assumption that the land in question has been
declared open for disposition and is not necessary
for the public service, this Office directs that an oral
bidding for the leasing thereof to interested parties
pursuant to the provisions of Section 67 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 be conducted and the
contract
of lease awarded to the highest bidder. Whoever shall
be the highest bidder, if other than the appellant,
shall be required to pay to the appellant the appraised
value of the improvements introduced by him on
the land to be determined by that Department.
If the land in question has not been so declared, this
Office directs that a revocable permit under Section

Accordingly, the orders and decisions of that

Department and the Bureau of Lands are hereby
revoked.
The record of the case is returned herewith.
By authority of the President:
(SGD) JUAN C. PAJO
Executive Secretary
ANNEX H
5th Indorsement
Manila, May 10, 1954
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Manila.
In his decision of February 4, 1952, the Director of
Lands amended the miscellaneous sales application of
Emiliano del Rosario by excluding therefrom portion
"B" and adjudicating the same to Gonzalo Monzon
under his foreshore lease application. On appeal by
Del Rosario, the decision of the Director of Lands
was affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on February 6, 1953. Del Rosario

68 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 be issued to the

appellant requiring him to pay permit fees since the

now appeals to this Office.

year 1951.

The question presented for determination is, which of

the parties has a better right to the area in
question?.

It appears that the area in dispute, portion "B", is a

foreshore land, an extension of portion "A", which
lies immediately adjacent to lot No. 987, private
property of Monzon. The record shows that Monzon
and his predecessor in interest have been in
possession of said area since before the war, using it
as site
for their oyster and "kapis" beds and for their fish
corral. It was only in 1951 that Del Rosario through
stealth occupied a portion of the area in question,
building earthen dikes preparatory to converting the
land into a fishpond. His entry upon the area was duly
protested by Monzon with the Bureau of Lands
and the Bureau of Fisheries, both of which advised Del
Rosario to vacate the premises and to refrain,

The record of the case is returned herewith.

By authority of the President:
(SGD.) FRED RUIZ CASTRO
Executive Secretary
Copyright1994-1999CDTechnologie
s A s i a, I n c.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. L-12860-61. December 29, 1960.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
IGMEDIO SANTIAGO, EPITACIO SANTIAGO,
FLAVIANO SANTIAGO, DIOSDADO SANTIAGO, ELIAS
SALMORIN, ADOLFO SALMORIN and SALUSTIANO
SANTIAGO, defendants-appellants.

from introducing further improvements thereon. cdphil

Nicanor D. Sorogon for appellants.

Upon the facts and circumstances narrated above, and

pursuant to Section 32 of Lands Administrative

Solicitor Meliton G. Solimn and Solicitor Antonio M.

Consing for appellee.

Order No. 7-1, which gives to the owner of the property

adjoining foreshore lands the preferential right

SYLLABUS

to apply therefor under the provisions of the Public

Land Act, it is evident that Monzon has a better right
than Del Rosario to the area in dispute which, as
stated above, is a foreshore land.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed.

1. THE CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; FRUSTRATED

MURDER; CONSPIRACY. The fact that the seven
appellants were seen gathered together before the
commission of the crimes charged, and one of them
was heard to have remarked that soon there would be
a wake for the dead, strongly evinces conspiracy

among them, specially when these same appellants,

moments later, in unison executed acts of violence.

from 4 months of arresto mayor to 1 year and 1 day of

prisin correccional and to pay the costs. The

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; SUPERIOR STRENGTH

ABSORBED BY TREACHERY. While abuse of

weapons Exhibits D to M were confiscated. They

appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter certified

superior strength was also shown to have attended the

commission of the crimes charged, the same

the cases to this tribunal, stating that the crimes

committed are murder and frustrated murder and that

cannot be considered a separate and distinct

aggravating circumstances, because it is deemed
absorbed

the penalties imposable thereon are beyond its power

to apply.

by the circumstance of treachery.

DECISION
PAREDES, J p:
Prosecuted for murder and frustrated murder, the
appellants were sentenced for homicide and serious
physical injuries, as follows: In the case of homicide,
taking into account the aggravating circumstance of
superior strength and the mitigation circumstance of
voluntary surrender, each to suffer an
indeterminate penalty from 6 years and 1 day of
prisin mayor 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusin temporal, with the accessories of the law and
to indemnify jointly and severally, the heirs of
deceased Blas Bernal in the amount of P6,000.00 and
to pay the costs; and in the serious physical
injuries case, considering the same modifying
circumstances, each to suffer an indeterminate penalty

Accused Igmedio, Epitacio, Flaviano and Diosdado, all

surnamed Santiago, are brothers, sons of one
Anacleta Panaguiton by her second marriage, and Elias
Salmorin, Adolfo Salmorin and Salustiano
Santiago, are close relatives of the Santiago brothers.
The deceased Blas Bernal in G.R. No. L-12860 and
Ciriaco Bernal, offended party in G.R. L- 12861, are
brothers, also sons of Anacleta Panaguiton by her
first marriage. Toms Santiago, now deceased, second
husband of Anacleta Panaguiton, had been
previously married to one Margarita Bernal, an aunt of
the Bernal brothers. She died intestate leaving
some real properties acquired during her marriage
with the father of the Santiagos, but without any
issue. The Bernals, believing that they had a right to
inherit from their aunt Margarita Bernal,
commenced Special Proceedings No. 1014 in the court
of first instance of Iloilo, and had their elder

brother Teodorico Bernal appointed as coadministrator, together with their mother Anacleta

the house of Epitacio Santiago and saw the seven

appellants squatted and huddled in front of the house.

Panaguiton. The Santiagos, believing that they were

the sole heirs of their deceased father Toms

When Gerardo was within a hearing distance from the

group, he heard Igmedio Santiago say, "very soon

Santiago, sought the revocation of Teodorico's

appointment. Bad blood then existed between the two

there will be a 'velacion' (wake for the dead)". Sensing

that the remark was meant for the Bernals,

sets of brothers and their enmity flared up into

violence sometime in October, 1953, when Ciriaco

Gerardo tried to look for his uncles to warn them.

Meantimes, when the Bernals arrived at the house of

Bernal was waylaid by the Santiagos by reason of

Bernal's gathering coconuts from the properties under

Severo Salvidico for the haircut, they found that the

barber was not in, so they retraced their steps

administration.

towards the field of Victoriano. Ciriaco was then

unarmed and Blas had a scythe girded on his waist,

The prosecution has established that the Santiagos

and the Bernals were living in their respective
houses in the barrio of Tarong, municipality of Carles,
provinces of Iloilo. On July 3, 1954, Blas Bernal,
Ciriaco Bernal and their nephew Gerardo Bernal were
engaged, with several others, by Victoriano
Paglinawan to plant rice in the latter's field in their
barrio of Tarong. they began planting early in the
morning, and at about ten o'clock they were told by
Victoriano Paglinawan to cease working and have
breakfast. Thereafter, the Bernal brothers went to the
house of Severo Salvidico to have a haircut, while
their nephew Gerardo went to see his carabao
pasturing in the field. In so doing, Gerardo passed near

which he usually used in cutting coconut buds to

extract "tuba". On their way, however, the seven
appellants suddenly appeared, running towards them
and brandishing their heels, but were overtaken
at a place where there were bamboo clumps and
bushes, and there simultaneously attacked by
appellants from different directions, Epitacio delivering
the first blow on Blas Bernal's left face with a
bolo, followed by an arrow shot by Diosdado, Ciriaco,
on his part, was hit by Ignacio on the left arm and
by Flaviano on the right ear which downed him. Ciriaco
played possum, feigning death; whereupon
appellants concentrated their attack on the wounded
Blas, who died on the spot. At this juncture,

Ciriaco seeing an opportunity for escape, sprinted

towards the field where he timely met Victoriano

left hand, another longer one in his right, and a scythe

on his waist; while Ciriaco had a fighting bolo on

Paglinawan about 30 yards away, and leaned on him.

This deterred appellants from further pursuing

his waist, a "palma brava" club in his left hand, and a

spear on his shoulder. Ciriaco then shouted at

him. Victoriano then took Ciriaco to town for medical

attendance and to report to the police authorities.

Flaviano to come down and fight, but as Flaviano and

his companions inside the house did not make any

Dr. Telesforo de los Reyes, the town medical officer,

accompanied by the Mayor, a police sergeant and a

move, the Bernals then slashed the mat and entered

the house; whereupon Elias, Salustiano, Flaviano

sanitary inspector, on the same day, repaired to the

spot where Blas died and found the body lying on

and Igmedio jumped out and scampered away,

Flaviano following Elias and Salustiano, while Igmedio

one side, with an arrow stuck on the back which he

pulled with difficulty. He found nine serious wounds

took a different direction. Flaviano, thinking that he

might be overtaken without any body helping him,

on the body, two of which were mortal (Exhibit A). He

likewise certified to the nine different injuries

changed his mind and ran, with the Bernals close to

his heels, to the direction of the house of Epitacio

sustained by Ciriaco, which took some 40 to 50 days to

heal (Exhibit C).

which was about 400 brazas away. He saw his other

brother Diosdado planting rice some 50 meters

Appellants, on the other hand, presented an entirely

different picture of the incident. Their version, as

away, so he shouted at him for help, who in turn got a

piece of wood and ran to the rescue of Flaviano.

related by Flaviano and Diosdado, is an follows:

While the four were thus running, Blas threw his short
bolo at Flaviano, hitting the latter on the back.

That morning, while Flaviano was resting in his house

together with Igmedio and Elias after planting rice
in his own field, Salustiano came warning them that
the Bernal brothers were coming, both heavily
armed. After pulling a mat to cover the door, Flaviano
peeped and saw that Blas really had a bolo in his

Whereupon Flaviano picked it up and faced Blas. Blas

then started to hack him with the longer bolo, but
he parried the blow, causing Blas to drop it. Then Blas
drew his scythe and again tried to slash him, but
Flaviano parried it again, and Blas became weak. At
this instance, Blas called out his brother Ciriaco, who

was then fighting with Diosdado, for help. So Flaviano

shoved Blas who fell on his back. Ciriaco then

one contused and two lacerated wounds on Diosdado

that could have healed from 5 to 7 days (Exh. 14).

detached from his fight with Diosdado and went to

succor Blas. Diosdado, in turn, followed Ciriaco and

The doctor admitted, however, that these contused

and lacerated wounds found on both brothers were

at the same time alerting his brother Flaviano, saying,

"Nene, be careful, Ciriaco is going to you." Ciriaco

merely the result of physical struggle, such as

wrestling and not caused by any weapon.

then struck Flaviano which the latter parried, and then

Flaviano countered with his bolo. At this time,

The case hinges on the question of credibility. We have

examined the record with meticulous care, and

Diosdado clubbed Ciriaco hitting the latter on the left

arm and right ear. After receiving these blows,

have come to the conclusion that the version of the

defense, does not deserve any credence.

Ciriaco said, "I am giving up; I don't want to fight

anymore."

The four medical certificate on record are self

revealing. Whereas the Bernals received wounds
inflicted

Appellants presented Clementina Bernal, full-blood

sister of the Bernals. She said that when she saw her
brothers Blas and Ciriaco chasing Flaviano, she
followed them so as to dissuade her brothers from
fighting and she even saw Flaviano from afar wresting
the scythe from Blas, but that when she overtook
them, Blas was already bathed in his own blood,
kneeling, and about to die. Anacleto Panaguiton stated
that when she refused to give the Bernals their claim
in the inheritance, Blas had intimidated to her that
they might obtain their share "through the flow of
blood". Dr. De los Reyes testified that he found two
contused and three lacerated wounds on Flaviano that
could have healed from 6 to 8 days (Exh. 13): and

by sharp instruments like bolo, as asserted by Dr. De

los Reyes, the Santiagos, on the other hand, merely
showed contusions and lacerations which, according to
the same doctor, were simply the result of
wrestling or caused by fist, and not by any weapon,
blunt or otherwise. This being the case, the said
medical certificates confirm the version of the
prosecution that the Bernals only fought with their
bare
hands, as against the onslaught of appellants who
were all armed with different weapons. Were the
Bernals really armed, as claimed by the Santiagos, at
least Flaviano or Diosdado, or any of the

appellants, for that matter, would have received some

scratches caused by either bolo, scythe, spear or

him, they desisted from their pursuit. The defense was

not able to offer any explanation regarding the

"palma brava" club with which the Bernals were

allegedly armed. It is claimed by the defense that

arrow which was found embedded on the back of the

deceased. On the other hand, prosecution witness

Flaviano was the only one who fought with the

deceased Blas, while Ciriaco and Diosdado were
fighting

Gerardo Bernal positively declared that such arrow was

shot by Diosdado. Again, when Flaviano,

and that Flaviano merely parried one bolo blow and

one scythe slash from Blas, an then shoved the
latter in order to face Ciriaco who was coming to aid
the deceased. If this were true, then said deceased
could not have received nine wounds, considering that
Flaviano did not hit the deceased even once and
that Diosdado was only armed with a piece of wood
which he picked at random in the field, moments
before. This once more confirms the version of the
prosecution that the other appellants participated
directly in the killing of the deceased and near-killing
of Ciriaco. Moreover, Ciriaco's testimony dovetails
with that of Victoriano Paglinawan. The latter told that
court that the met Ciriaco, wounded and weak,
running to him saying that he and his brother were
intercepted by seven armed men. Paglinawan, only
neutral witness in this case, for not being related to
either the Bernals or the Santiagos, asserted that
when the seven appellants, who were some 30 brazas
away, saw that Ciriaco was already leaning on

Diosdado, Epitacio, Igmedio and Salustiano (Saling)

Santiago, surrendered to police Sgt. Crisanto
Carmen, they told him they fought with the Bernal
brothers.
The testimony of Anacleta Panaguiton, that it was the
Bernals who had a grudge against the Santiagos
on account of inheritance, does not help the cause of
the appellants, as it is undisputed that there had
been a mutual pent-up hatred against each other
which erupted in open violence when Ciriaco was
waylaid by the Santiagos, eight months prior to the
slaying of Blas Bernal. The story of Clementina
Bernal who sided with the Santiagos, against her fullblood Bernal brothers, is hard to believe,
considering that her testimony is in direct contrast
with her written statement (Exhibit O) made before
the chief of police on July 7, 1954, when the incident
was still fresh in her mind. In said written
statement she said that while she was planting rice in
the field, she heard shouts coming from behind

the bamboo clumps about 300 meters away; that

when she approached the place and was at a distance

The fact that the seven appellants were seen gathered

together in front of the house of Epitacio

of ten meters, she saw her deceased brother Blas

already bathed in blood, kneeling, with several

Santiago and one of them was heard to have remarked

that soon there would be a wake for the dead,

wounds on his body and an arrow sticking on his back;

that she saw Igmedio, Epitacio, Flaviano and

strongly evinces conspiracy among them, specially

when these same appellants, moments later, in

Diosdado, walking fast heading to town, and likewise

saw Adolfo Salmorin, Elias Salmorin and Salustiano

unison executed acts of violence.

Santiago equally walking fast toward their houses; and

that while she was returning home, she also saw
her brother Ciriaco, aided by Victoriano, walking in
another road towards the town. Although she
attempted to repudiate this statement, by alleging
that the mayor did not faithfully translate its
contents in the Visayan dialect, we have no ground for
believing that said mayor would capriciously and
deliberately distort the translation.
The simple denial made by the other appellants
regarding their participation in the crime at bar can
not
overcome the direct, positive and straightforward
testimony of the surviving victim Ciriaco Bernal and
eyewitness Gerardo Bernal, who narrated convincingly
the bloody manner with which the weaponless
Bernals were surrounded and attacked by the armed
appellants.

With the exception of Elias Salmorin and Adolfo

Salmorin, all the appellants surnamed Santiago,
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities right
after the crime was committed. The slaying of Blas
Bernal was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery (alevosia). Abuse of superior strength,
was also shown but it is absorbed by the circumstance
of treachery.
The five appellants surnamed Santiago, in the murder
case, are, therefore, sentenced to suffer each an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 6 years, 8 months
and 1 day of prisin mayor to 14 years and 8
months of reclusin temporal; and appellants Adolfo
Salmorin and Elias Salmorin, to suffer each
reclusin perpetua.
In the frustrated murder case, committed on the
person of Ciriaco Bernal, the Santiagos are hereby
sentenced to suffer each an indeterminate penalty
ranging from 2 years, and 4 months of prisin

correccional to 7 years, and 4 months of prision mayor;

and the Salmorins, to suffer each an

certiorari involving two rival multinational softdrink

giants; petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc.

indeterminate sentence ranging from 6 years, 8

months and 1 day of prisin mayor to 12 years, 10

(Coca-Cola) accuses Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc.

(Pepsi), represented by the respondents, of hoarding

months and 21 days of reclusin temporal.

empty Coke bottles in bad faith to discredit its

business and to sabotage its operation in Bicolandia.

With the modification above indicated, the decision

appealed from hereby in affirmed in all other

IAaCST

respects.

BACKGROUND

Pars, C.J., Bengzon, Labrador, Concepcin , Reyes,

J.B.L., Barrera, Gutirrez David and Dizon, JJ., concur.

The facts, as culled from the records, are summarized

below.

SECOND DIVISION

On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant

against Pepsi for hoarding Coke empty bottles in

[G.R. No. 154491. November 14, 2008.]

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. (CCBPI), Naga
Plant, petitioner, vs. QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. "KIT"
GOMEZ and DANILO E. GALICIA, a.k.a. "DANNY
GALICIA", respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
Is the hoarding of a competitor's product containers
punishable as unfair competition under the
Intellectual Property Code (IP Code, Republic Act No.
8293) that would entitle the aggrieved party to a
search warrant against the hoarder? This is the issue
we grapple with in this petition for review on

Pepsi's yard in Concepcion Grande, Naga City, an act

allegedly penalized as unfair competition under the
IP Code. Coca-Cola claimed that the bottles must be
confiscated to preclude their illegal use, destruction
or concealment by the respondents. 1 In support of the
application, Coca-Cola submitted the sworn
statements of three witnesses: Naga plant
representative Arnel John Ponce said he was informed
that
one of their plant security guards had gained access
into the Pepsi compound and had seen empty Coke
bottles; acting plant security officer Ylano A. Regaspi
said he investigated reports that Pepsi was

hoarding large quantities of Coke bottles by requesting

their security guard to enter the Pepsi plant and

In their counter-affidavits, Galicia and Gomez claimed

that the bottles came from various Pepsi retailers

he was informed by the security guard that Pepsi

hoarded several Coke bottles; security guard Edwin

and wholesalers who included them in their return to

make up for shortages of empty Pepsi bottles;

Lirio stated that he entered Pepsi's yard on July 2,

2001 at 4 p.m. and saw empty Coke bottles inside

they had no way of ascertaining beforehand the return

of empty Coke bottles as they simply received

Pepsi shells or cases. 2 DAHCaI

what had been delivered; the presence of the bottles

in their yard was not intentional nor deliberate;

Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Executive Judge Julian C.

Ocampo of Naga City, after taking the joint
deposition of the witnesses, issued Search Warrant No.
2001-01 3 to seize 2,500 Litro and 3,000 eight
and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles at Pepsi's Naga
yard for violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. 4
The local police seized and brought to the MTC's
custody 2,464 Litro and 4,036 eight and 12 ounces
empty Coke bottles, 205 Pepsi shells for Litro, and 168
Pepsi shells for smaller (eight and 12 ounces)
empty Coke bottles, and later filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Naga a complaint against
two Pepsi officers for violation of Section 168.3 (c) in
relation to Section 170 of the IP Code. 5 The
named respondents, also the respondents in this
petition, were Pepsi regional sales manager Danilo E.
Galicia (Galicia) and its Naga general manager Quintin
J. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez). aEHTSc

Ponce and Regaspi's statements are hearsay as they

had no personal knowledge of the alleged crime;
there is no mention in the IP Code of the crime of
possession of empty bottles; and that the ambiguity of
the law, which has a penal nature, must be construed
strictly against the State and liberally in their
favor. Pepsi security guards Eduardo E. Miral and Rene
Acebuche executed a joint affidavit stating that
per their logbook, Lirio did not visit or enter the plant
premises in the afternoon of July 2, 2001.
The respondents also filed motions for the return of
their shells and to quash the search warrant. They
contended that no probable cause existed to justify the
issuance of the search warrant; the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; and their Naga
plant was in urgent need of the shells. CHDaAE
Coca-Cola opposed the motions as the shells were part
of the evidence of the crime, arguing that Pepsi

used the shells in hoarding the bottles. It insisted that

the issuance of warrant was based on probable

explaining that the issue of whether there was unfair

competition can only be resolved during trial.

cause for unfair competition under the IP Code, and

that the respondents violated R.A. 623, the law

The respondents responded by filing a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court

regulating the use of stamped or marked bottles,

boxes, and other similar containers.

before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City on

the ground that the subject search warrant was

THE MTC RULINGS

issued without probable cause and that the empty

shells were neither mentioned in the warrant nor the

On September 19, 2001, the MTC issued the first

assailed order 6 denying the twin motions. It explained
there was an exhaustive examination of the applicant
and its witnesses through searching questions and
that the Pepsi shells are prima facie evidence that the
bottles were placed there by the respondents.
In their motion for reconsideration, the respondents
argued for the quashal of the warrant as the MTC
did not conduct a probing and exhaustive examination;
the applicant and its witnesses had no personal
knowledge of facts surrounding the hoarding; the court
failed to order the return of the "borrowed"
shells; there was no crime involved; the warrant was
issued based on hearsay evidence; and the seizure
of the shells was illegal because they were not
included in the warrant. ITScHa
On November 14, 2001, the MTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in the second assailed order, 7

objects of the perceived crime.

THE RTC RULINGS
On May 8, 2002, the RTC voided the warrant for lack of
probable cause and the non-commission of the
crime of unfair competition, even as it implied that
other laws may have been violated by the
respondents. The RTC, though, found no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the issuing MTC judge.
8 Thus, SAHaTc
Accordingly, as prayed for, Search Warrant No. 200102 issued by the Honorable Judge Julian C. Ocampo
III on July 2, 2001 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Orders issued by the Pairing Judge of Br. 1, MTCC of
Naga City dated September 19, 2001 and November
14, 2001 are also declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The
City Prosecutor of Naga City and SPO1 Ernesto Paredes
are directed to return to the Petitioner the

properties seized by virtue of Search Warrant No.

2001-02. No costs.

petitioner further argues that the IP Code was enacted

into law to remedy various forms of unfair

SO ORDERED. 9

competition accompanying globalization as well as to

replace the inutile provision of unfair competition

In a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied

on July 12, 2002, the petitioner stressed that the
decision of the RTC was contradictory because it
absolved Judge Ocampo of grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the search warrant, but at the same time
nullified the issued warrant. The MTC should have
dismissed the petition when it found out that Judge
Ocampo did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion.
Bypassing the Court of Appeals, the petitioner asks us
through this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse the
decision of the RTC. Essentially, the petition raises
questions against the RTC's nullification of the warrant
when it found no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the issuing judge. IEAaST
THE PETITION and THE PARTIES' POSITIONS
In its petition, the petitioner insists the RTC should
have dismissed the respondents' petition for
certiorari because it found no grave abuse of
discretion by the MTC in issuing the search warrant.
The

under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. Section

168.3 (c) of the IP Code does not limit the scope of
protection on the particular acts enumerated as it
expands the meaning of unfair competition to include
"other acts contrary to good faith of a nature
calculated to discredit the goods, business or services
of
another". The inherent element of unfair competition is
fraud or deceit, and that hoarding of large
quantities of a competitor's empty bottles is
necessarily characterized by bad faith. It claims that
its
Bicol bottling operation was prejudiced by the
respondents' hoarding and destruction of its empty
bottles. CETIDH
The petitioner also argues that the quashal of the
search warrant was improper because it complied
with all the essential requisites of a valid warrant. The
empty bottles were concealed in Pepsi shells to
prevent discovery while they were systematically
being destroyed to hamper the petitioner's bottling
operation and to undermine the capability of its
bottling operations in Bicol.

The respondents counter-argue that although Judge

Ocampo conducted his own examination, he

namely, the substantive issue of whether the

application for search warrant effectively charged

gravely erred and abused his discretion when he

ignored the rule on the need of sufficient evidence to

an offense, i.e., a violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the

IP Code; and the procedural issue of whether the

establish probable cause; satisfactory and convincing

evidence is essential to hold them guilty of unfair

MTC observed the procedures required by the Rules of

Court in the issuance of search warrants.

competition; the hoarding of empty Coke bottles did

not cause actual or probable deception and

OUR RULING

confusion on the part of the general public; the alleged

criminal acts do not show conduct aimed at
deceiving the public; there was no attempt to use the
empty bottles or pass them off as the
respondents' goods.
The respondents also argue that the IP Code does not
criminalize bottle hoarding, as the acts penalized
must always involve fraud and deceit. The hoarding
does not make them liable for unfair competition as
there was no deception or fraud on the end-users.
cITaCS
THE ISSUE
Based on the parties' positions, the basic issue
submitted to us for resolution is whether the Naga MTC
was correct in issuing Search Warrant No. 2001-01 for
the seizure of the empty Coke bottles from
Pepsi's yard for probable violation of Section 168.3 (c)
of the IP Code. This basic issue involves two subissues,

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.

We clarify at the outset that while we agree with the
RTC decision, our agreement is more in the result
than in the reasons that supported it. The decision is
correct in nullifying the search warrant because it
was issued on an invalid substantive basis the acts
imputed on the respondents do not violate Section
168.3 (c) of the IP Code. For this reason, we deny the
present petition. CcAITa
The issuance of a search warrant 10 against a personal
property 11 is governed by Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court whose relevant sections state:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A
search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

particularly describing the place to be searched and

the things to be seized which may be anywhere in

application for search warrant is filed, as he has to

examine under oath or affirmation the applicant and

the Philippines.

his or her witnesses in the form of "searching

questions and answers" in writing and under oath. The

Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. The

judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the

warrant, if issued, must particularly describe the place

to be searched and the things to be seized.
DHcSIT

complainant and the witnesses he may produce on

facts personally known to them and attach to the

We paraphrase these requirements to stress that they

have substantive and procedural aspects.

record their sworn statements together with the

affidavits submitted. HDATSI

Apparently, the RTC recognized this dual nature of the

requirements and, hence, treated them

Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If

the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts

separately; it approved of the way the MTC handled

the procedural aspects of the issuance of the search

upon which the application is based or that there is

probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall

warrant but found its action on the substantive aspect

wanting. It therefore resolved to nullify the

issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the

form prescribed by these Rules. [Emphasis

warrant, without however expressly declaring that the

MTC gravely abused its discretion when it issued

supplied]

the warrant applied for. The RTC's error, however, is in

the form rather than the substance of the

To paraphrase this rule, a search warrant may be

issued only if there is probable cause in connection
with a specific offense alleged in an application based
on the personal knowledge of the applicant and
his or her witnesses. This is the substantive
requirement in the issuance of a search warrant.
Procedurally, the determination of probable cause is a
personal task of the judge before whom the

decision as the nullification of the issued warrant for

the reason the RTC gave was equivalent to the
declaration that grave abuse of discretion was
committed. In fact, we so rule as the discussions below
will show.
Jurisprudence teaches us that probable cause, as a
condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is

such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as

will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his

right in the goodwill of the said goods, business or

services so identified, which will be protected in the

action and the means taken in prosecuting it are

legally just and proper. Probable cause requires facts

same manner as other property rights.

and circumstances that would lead a reasonably

prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and the objects sought in connection with
that offense are in the place to be searched. 12
Implicit in this statement is the recognition that an
underlying offense must, in the first place, exist. In
other words, the acts alleged, taken together, must
constitute an offense and that these acts are
imputable to an offender in relation with whom a
search warrant is applied for. DcITHE
In the context of the present case, the question is
whether the act charged alleged to be hoarding of
empty Coke bottles constitutes an offense under
Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. Section 168 in its
entirety states:
SEC. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and
Remedies.
168.1. A person who has identified in the mind of the
public the goods he manufactures or deals in, his
business or services from those of others, whether or
not a registered mark is employed, has a property

168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any

other means contrary to good faith by which he
shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in
which he deals, or his business, or services for those
of the one having established such goodwill, or who
shall commit any acts calculated to produce said
result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall
be subject to an action therefor. EcDSTI
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting
the scope of protection against unfair competition,
the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair
competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives
them the general appearance of goods of another
manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods
themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in
which
they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or
in any other feature of their appearance, which
would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that
the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or
dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer,
or who otherwise clothes the goods with such

appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud

another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent

We do not agree with the petitioner's expansive

interpretation of Section 168.3 (c).

vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor

engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;

"Unfair competition", previously defined in Philippine

jurisprudence in relation with R.A. No. 166 and

(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who

employs any other means calculated to induce

Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code, is now

covered by Section 168 of the IP Code as this

the false belief that such person is offering the

services of another who has identified such services in

Code has expressly repealed R.A. No. 165 and R.A. No.
166, and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised

the mind of the public; or SAHIaD

Penal Code. IHaECA

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in

the course of trade or who shall commit any

Articles 168.1 and 168.2, as quoted above, provide the

concept and general rule on the definition of

other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated

to discredit the goods, business or services of

unfair competition. The law does not thereby cover

every unfair act committed in the course of

another.

business; it covers only acts characterized by

"deception or any other means contrary to good faith"
in

168.4. The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157

and 161 shall apply mutatis mutandis. (Sec. 29, R.A.
No. 166a)

the passing off of goods and services as those of

another who has established goodwill in relation with

The petitioner theorizes that the above section does

not limit the scope of protection on the particular

these goods or services, or any other act calculated to

produce the same result.

acts enumerated as it expands the meaning of unfair

competition to include "other acts contrary to

What unfair competition is, is further particularized

under Section 168.3 when it provides specifics of

good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the

goods, business or services of another". Allegedly, the

what unfair competition is "without in any way limiting

the scope of protection against unfair

respondents' hoarding of Coca Cola empty bottles is

one such act.

competition". Part of these particulars is provided

under Section 168.3 (c) which provides the general

"catch-all" phrase that the petitioner cites. Under this

phrase, a person shall be guilty of unfair

The act alleged to violate the petitioner's rights under

Section 168.3 (c) is hoarding which we gather to

competition "who shall commit any other act contrary

to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit

be the collection of the petitioner's empty bottles so

that they can be withdrawn from circulation and

the goods, business or services of another". TDCAHE

thus impede the circulation of the petitioner's bottled

products. This, according to the petitioner, is an

From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been

defined as the passing off (or palming off) or
attempting to pass off upon the public the goods or
business of one person as the goods or business of
another with the end and probable effect of deceiving
the public. It formulated the "true test" of unfair
competition: whether the acts of defendant are such
as are calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer
making his purchases under the ordinary conditions
which prevail in the particular trade to which the
controversy relates. 13 One of the essential requisites
in an action to restrain unfair competition is proof

act contrary to good faith a conclusion that, if true,

is indeed an unfair act on the part of the
respondents. The critical question, however, is not the
intrinsic unfairness of the act of hoarding; what is
critical for purposes of Section 168.3 (c) is to
determine if the hoarding, as charged, "is of a nature
calculated to discredit the goods, business or services"
of the petitioner. DcSTaC
We hold that it is not. Hoarding as defined by the
petitioner is not even an act within the contemplation
of the IP Code.

of fraud; the intent to deceive must be shown before

the right to recover can exist. 14 The advent of the

The petitioner's cited basis is a provision of the IP

Code, a set of rules that refer to a very specific subject

IP Code has not significantly changed these rulings as

they are fully in accord with what Section 168 of

intellectual property. Aside from the IP Code's actual

substantive contents (which relate specifically to

the Code in its entirety provides. Deception, passing

off and fraud upon the public are still the key

patents, licensing, trademarks, trade names, service

marks, copyrights, and the protection and

elements that must be present for unfair competition

to exist.

infringement of the intellectual properties that these

protective measures embody), the coverage and

intent of the Code is expressly reflected in its

"Declaration of State Policy" which states:

a) Copyright and Related Rights; b) Trademarks and

Service Marks; c) Geographic Indications; d)

Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. The State

recognizes that an effective intellectual and

Industrial Designs; e) Patents; f) Layout-Designs

(Topographies) of Integrated Circuits; and g) Protection

industrial property system is vital to the development

of domestic and creative activity, facilitates

of Undisclosed Information.

transfer of technology, attracts foreign investments,

and ensures market access for our products. It shall
protect and secure the exclusive rights of scientists,
inventors, artists and other gifted citizens to their
intellectual property and creations, particularly when
beneficial to the people, for such periods as

Given the IP Code's specific focus, a first test that

should be made when a question arises on whether a
matter is covered by the Code is to ask if it refers to an
intellectual property as defined in the Code. If it
does not, then coverage by the Code may be negated.
THaAEC

provided in this Act. aCTcDH

A second test, if a disputed matter does not expressly

refer to an intellectual property right as defined

The use of intellectual property bears a social function.

To this end, the State shall promote the diffusion

above, is whether it falls under the general "unfair

competition" concept and definition under Sections

of knowledge and information for the promotion of

national development and progress and the

168.1 and 168.2 of the Code. The question then is

whether there is "deception" or any other similar act

common good.

in "passing off" of goods or services to be those of

another who enjoys established goodwill.

It is also the policy of the State to streamline

administrative procedures of registering patents,
trademarks and copyright, to liberalize the registration
on the transfer of technology, and to enhance
the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the
Philippines. (n)
"Intellectual property rights" have furthermore been
defined under Section 4 of the Code to consist of:

Separately from these tests is the application of the

principles of statutory construction giving particular
attention, not so much to the focus of the IP Code
generally, but to the terms of Section 168 in
particular. Under the principle of "noscitur a sociis",
when a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in

itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its

correct construction may be made clear and

intruded into or used without proper authority from the

petitioner. Nor are the respondents alleged to

specific by considering the company of words in which

it is found or with which it is associated. 15

be fraudulently "passing off" their products or services

as those of the petitioner. The respondents are

aCTcDH

not also alleged to be undertaking any representation

or misrepresentation that would confuse or tend

As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that

Section 168.1 speaks of a person who has earned
goodwill with respect to his goods and services and
who is entitled to protection under the Code, with
or without a registered mark. Section 168.2, as
previously discussed, refers to the general definition of
unfair competition. Section 168.3, on the other hand,
refers to the specific instances of unfair

to confuse the goods of the petitioner with those of the

respondents, or vice versa. What in fact the
petitioner alleges is an act foreign to the Code, to the
concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates;
as alleged, hoarding inflicts unfairness by seeking to
limit the opposition's sales by depriving it of the
bottles it can use for these sales. cHDAIS

competition, with Section 168.1 referring to the sale of

goods given the appearance of the goods of

In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is

closer to what another law R.A. No. 623 covers,

another; Section 168.2, to the inducement of belief

that his or her goods or services are that of another

to wit:

who has earned goodwill; while the disputed Section

168.3 being a "catch all" clause whose coverage

SEC. 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the

manufacture, bottling or selling of soda water,

the parties now dispute.

mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other

lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or

Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the

"hoarding" as defined and charged by the

barrels, and other similar containers, with their names

or the names of their principals or products, or

petitioner does not fall within the coverage of the IP

Code and of Section 168 in particular. It does not

other marks of ownership stamped or marked thereon,

may register with the Philippine Patent Office a

relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or service

mark that the respondents have invaded,

description of the names or are used by them, under

the same conditions, rules, and regulations, made

applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of

trademarks. ScCEIA

kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers who

are given special protection with respect to the

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the

written consent of the manufacturer, bottler or

containers they use. In this sense, it is in fact a law of

specific coverage and application, compared with

seller who has successfully registered the marks of

ownership in accordance with the provisions of the

the general terms and application of the IP Code. Thus,

under its Section 2, it speaks specifically of

next preceding section, to fill such bottles, boxes,

kegs, barrels, or other similar containers so marked or

unlawful use of containers and even of the

unlawfulness of their wanton destruction a matter
that

stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of,

buy, or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same,
whether filled or not, or to use the same for drinking
vessels or glasses or for any other purpose than

escapes the IP Code's generalities unless linked with

the concepts of "deception" and "passing off" as
discussed above. ACDTcE

that registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller.

Any violation of this section shall be punished by a

Unfortunately, the Act is not the law in issue in the

present case and one that the parties did not

fine or not more than one hundred pesos or

imprisonment of not more than thirty days or both.

consider at all in the search warrant application. The

petitioner in fact could not have cited it in its

As its coverage is defined under Section 1, the Act

appears to be a measure that may overlap or be

search warrant application since the "one specific

offense" that the law allows and which the petitioner

affected by the provisions of Part II of the IP Code on

"The Law on Trademarks, Service Marks and Trade

used was Section 168.3 (c). If it serves any purpose at

all in our discussions, it is to show that the

Names". What is certain is that the IP Code has not

expressly repealed this Act. The Act appears, too, to

underlying factual situation of the present case is in

fact covered by another law, not by the IP Code that

have specific reference to a special type of registrants

the manufacturers, bottlers or sellers of soda

the petitioner cites. Viewed in this light, the lack of

probable cause to support the disputed search

water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream,

or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks,

warrant at once becomes apparent.

Where, as in this case, the imputed acts do not violate

the cited offense, the ruling of this Court penned

of a search warrant because no crime in the first place

was effectively charged. This conclusion renders

by Mr. Justice Bellosillo is particularly instructive:

ScTCIE

unnecessary any further discussion on whether the

search warrant application properly alleged that the

In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court

requires a finding of probable cause in connection

imputed act of holding Coke empties was in fact a

"hoarding" in bad faith aimed to prejudice the

with one specific offense to be determined personally

by the judge after examination of the

petitioner's operations, or whether the MTC duly

complied with the procedural requirements for the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

particularly describing the place to be searched

issuance of a search warrant under Rule 126 of the

Rules of Court. DHEaTS

and the things to be seized. Hence, since there is no

crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of

merit. Accordingly, we confirm that Search

begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is

therefore defective on its face. The nullity of the

Warrant No. 2001-01, issued by the Municipal Trial

Court, Branch 1, Naga City, is NULL and VOID. Costs

warrant renders moot and academic the other issues

raised in petitioners' Motion to Quash and Motion

against the petitioner.

for Reconsideration. Since the assailed search warrant

is null and void, all property seized by virtue

SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Acting C.J., Carpio Morales, Tinga and
Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance

with established jurisprudence. 16

Footnotes

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the RTC

correctly ruled that the petitioner's search warrant

1. See Paragraph 3 of the Application; records, p. 96.

aECSHI

should properly be quashed for the petitioner's failure

to show that the acts imputed to the respondents

2. Id., pp. 98-101.

do not violate the cited offense. There could not have

been any probable cause to support the issuance

3. Id., pp. 108-109.

4. Sec. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulations
and Remedies.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 168.3: In particular, and without in any way
limiting the scope of protection against

8. Decision penned by Judge Ramon A. Cruz, RTC,

Branch 21; id., pp. 202-211.
9. Id., p. 210. TECIaH

unfair competition, the following shall be deemed

guilty of unfair competition: TcADCI

10. Rule 126, Section 1. Search warrant defined. A

search warrant is an order in writing issued in

xxx xxx xxx

the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a

judge and directed to a peace officer,

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in

the course of trade or who
shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a
nature calculated to discredit the goods, business
or service of another.
5. Sec. 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and
administrative sanctions imposed by law, a

commanding him to search for personal property

described therein and bring it before the court.
11. Rule 126, Section 3. Personal property to be
seized. A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property: HSDCTA
(a) Subject of the offense;

criminal penalty of imprisonment from two years to

five years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of

the offense; or

pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos

(P200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of

committing an offense.

found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned

in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1.

12. La Chemise Lacoste, S. A. v. Judge Fernandez, G.R.

Nos. 63796-97, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 373.

HCaIDS

cHSIDa

6. Penned by Pairing Judge Irma Isidora M. Boncodin,

MTC, Branch 1, Naga; records, p. 23.

13. Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Co v.

Mojica, 27 Phil. 266 (1914).

7. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Jose P. Nacional,

MTC, Branch 1, Naga; id., p. 22.

14. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v.

Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Co., 33
Phil. 485 (1916). DCTHaS

15. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 3rd (1995) Ed., at

p. 159, citing Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh,

because that term should be considered in relation to

the terms with which it is associated "writing,

75 Phil 371, and Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.

65952, July 1, 1984, among others.

printing, lithography, engraving . . . phonograph,

painting, theatrical exhibition" all of which, unlike an

16. Supra note 12, pp. 705-706. ICHcTD

amplifier system, have a common characteristic,

namely, in their permanent nature as a means of

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 8 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a,
I n c.
People v. Santiago
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17663. May 30, 1962.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. ISAURO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellee.
Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Roces, Alidio & Ceguera for defendant-appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ORAL DEFAMATION; USE OF
AMPLIFIER SYSTEM. The utterance of
defamatory statements thru the medium of an
amplifier system constitutes the crime of oral
defamation and prescribes in six (6) months. This
medium does not fall within the term "radio", which is
one of the media thru which libel may be committed
under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code,

publication, and this explains the graver penalty for

libel than that prescribed for oral defamation.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J p:
The information herein alleges that defendant Isauro
Santiago has committed the crime of "libel" as
follows:
"That on or about the 5th day of October, 1959, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, for
the evident purpose of injuring the name and
reputation of Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, and of
impeaching
and besmirching the latter's virtue, honesty, honor and
reputation, and with the malicious intent of
exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, maliciously and publicly call said Mayor
Arsenio H. Lacson, in the course of a political speech
delivered at 392 Fraternal, Quiapo, in said city, thru
the medium of an amplifier system and before a

crowd of around a hundred persons, the following, to

wit: 'Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang

"ART. 358 Slander. Oral defamation shall be

punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period

Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma

Cafe and another City Hall employee in the

to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a

serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the

Shellborne Hotel', which are false, malicious and highly

defamatory statements against Mayor Arsenio

penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding

200 pesos." '

H. Lacson, delivered with no good intentions or

justifiable motive, but solely for the purpose of injuring

ART. 355. Libel by means of writing or similar means.

A libel committed by means of writing,

the name and reputation of said Mayor Arsenio H.

Lacson and to expose him to public hatred, contempt

printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph,

painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic

and ridicule."

exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by

prision correccional in its maximum and medium

Defendant moved to quash this information upon the

ground that the crime charged therein is, not libel,
but oral defamation, which has already prescribed, it
having been allegedly committed on October 5,

periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or

both, in addition to the civil action which may be
brought by the offended party."

1959, or more than six (6) months prior to the filing of

the information on August 11, 1960. The Court of

"ART. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is a public and

malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice

First Instance of Manila granted this motion and,

accordingly, quashed the information, with costs de

or defect, real and imaginary, or any act, omission,

condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause

officio. Hence, this appeal by the prosecution.

the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or

juridical person or to blacken the memory of one

The only issue in this case is whether the crime

charged in the information is oral defamation, under

who is dead."

Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under

Article 355, in relation to Article 353, of the same

The prosecution maintains that "the medium of an

amplifier system", thru which the defamatory

Code. Said provisions read:

statements imputed to the accused were allegedly

made, falls within the purview of the terms "writing,

printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph,

painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic

than that prescribed for oral defamation. Thus, it has

been held that slanderous statements forming part

exhibition, or any similar means", appearing in said

Article 355, in the sense, at least, that an "amplifier

of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio

constitute libel (Sorensen vs. Wood, 243 N. W. 82, 82

system" is a means "similar" to "radio".

A.L.R. 1109; Nules vs. Wasmer, 20 P. [2d] 487, 104

A.L.R. 877), whereas the rules governing such offense

This pretense is untenable. To begin with, as correctly

stated in defendant's brief, "radio as a means of
publication is "the transmission and reception of
electromagnetic waves without conducting wires
intervening between transmitter and receiver' (Library
of Universal Knowledge)" (see, also, 18
Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 885), "while transmission
of words by means of an amplifier system", such as
the one mentioned in the information, "is not thru
'electromagnetic waves' and is with the use of
'conducting wires' intervening between the transmitter
. . . and the receiver . . .".
Secondly, even the word "radio" used in said Article
355, should be considered in relation to the terms
with which it is associated "writing, printing,
lithography, engraving . . . phonograph, painting,
theatrical exhibition or cinematographical exhibition"
all of which have a common characteristic,
namely, their permanent nature as a means of
publication, and this explains the graver penalty for
libel

were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous

remarks of scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the
course of a radio broadcast by a person hired to read a
prepared text, but not appearing thereon
(Summit hotel Co. vs. National Broadcasting Co., PA124 A.L.R. 963)
IN SHORT, the facts alleged in the information
constitute the crime of oral defamation punished in
Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, which
prescribed six (6) months after its commission, or on
April
5, 1960 (Articles 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code), over
four (4) months before the filing of said
information, in view of which the order appealed from
is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes
and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., is on leave.

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