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POSSESSION

that they were tenants of the property. Petitioner only informed them that he
was the new owner of the property. This attempt at a factual presentation
hardly signifies that he exercised possession over the property.

ART.523
BENNY GO, PETITIONER, VS. ELIODORO BACARON, RESPONDENT.

Also, payment of taxes is a usual burden attached to ownership. Coupled


with continuous possession of the property, it constitutes evidence of great
weight that a person under whose name the realty taxes were declared has
a valid and rightful claim over the land.

Eliodoro Bacaron conveyed a 15.3955-hectare parcel of land in favor of


Benny Go for P20,000.00 as evidenced by the Transfer of Rights. About a
year thereafter, Bacaron, seeking to recover his property, went to Go to pay
his alleged P20,000.00 "loan" but the latter refused to receive the same and
to return his property saying that the transaction between the two of them
was a sale and not a mortgage as claimed by Bacaron.

Petition was DENIED. CA decision Affirmed.


FELICIANO GAITERO and NELIA GAITERO, Petitioners,
GENEROSO ALMERIA and TERESITA ALMERIA, Respondents
G.R. No. 181812, June 8, 2011

Respondent alleged that he suffered business reversals which prompted


him, being in urgent need of funds, to borrow P20,000.00 from the petitioner.
He however averred that prior to extending said loan to him, the petitioner
required him to execute a document purporting to be a Transfer of Rights but
was told that the same would only be a formality as he could redeem the
unregistered land the moment he pays the loan. To support this claim,
respondent stressed the fact that the consideration in the instrument was
merely P20,000.00, which is grossly inadequate as the selling price of a 15hectare land considering that, at that time, the market value of land in Davao
City amounts to P100,000.00 per hectare.

vs.,

FACTS: Following a cadastral survey a land registration court issued an


original certificate of title to Rosario O. Tomagan, designated as Lot 9960.
Subsequently, Tomagan subdivided the lot awarded to her into four and
waived her rights over Lots 9960-A and 9960-C in favor of petitioner
Feliciano Gaitero.
Lot 9960-A that went to Gaitero adjoined Lot 9964 which belonged to
respondent spouses Generoso and Teresita Almeria (the Almerias) and was
covered by OCT P-14556. In June 2000, the Almerias commissioned a
relocation survey of their lot and were astonished to find that Gaitero, who
owned adjoining Lot 9960-A, intruded into their lot by as much as 737 sq m.

Trial court said that respondents claim of possession is belied by the fact
that the actual occupants of the property recognize that the petitioner owns
the same and in fact said occupants prevented respondent's wife from
entering the premises. The court, noting that the petitioner also paid the
realty taxes, was also of the opinion that respondent merely made such
payments in order to lay the basis of his allegation that the contract was a
mere equitable mortgage.

Apparently, to settle the dispute, the Almerias waived their rights over a 158
sq m portion of the disputed area in Gaiteros favor but maintained their claim
over the remaining 579 sq m. Subsequently, however, Gaitero filed an
affidavit of adverse claim on the Almerias title over the remaining 579 sq m.
When barangay conciliation proceedings failed to settle the differences
between the two neighbors, Gaitero filed an action for recovery of
possession against the Almerias.

Appellate court ruled that the Contract entered into by the parties should be
deemed an equitable mortgage, because the consideration for the sale was
grossly inadequate. By continuing to harvest the crops and supervise his
workers, respondent remained in control of the property. True, upon the
institution of this case, petitioner paid the required real estate taxes that were
still in arrears. Respondent, however paid the taxes for 1995, 1996 and 1997
-- the years between the dates when the alleged absolute sale was entered
into on October 1, 1993, and when this case was instituted on March 5,
1997.

The MCTC rendered a decision, holding that that the Almerias were entitled
to the possession of the disputed area considering that it is included in the
technical description of their registered title.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the decision of the
MCTC. The RTC held that, while the Almerias were the rightful owners of
the disputed area, laches prevented them from asserting their right over the
same since it took them 15 years before they did so.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
respondent remained in possession of the land in question.

On review, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered judgment on May 21, 2007,
reversing the decision of the RTC and reinstating that of the MCTC. The CA
held that the Almerias owned the disputed area since, between a registered
title and a verbal claim of ownership, the former must prevail.

Held: No.
Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right, whether by
material occupation or by the fact that the right -- or, as in this case, the
property -- is subjected to the will of the claimant. In Director of Lands v.
Heirs of Abaldonado, the gathering of the products of and the act of planting
on the land were held to constitute occupation, possession and cultivation.

The CA did not consider the Almerias in laches since no one had lodge a
claim of ownership against their title to the disputed property.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in holding that the Almerias are entitled to the
possession of the disputed area as against Gaitero.

In the present case, the witnesses of respondent swore that they had seen
him gather fruits and coconuts on the property. Based on the cited case, the
witnesses' testimonies sufficiently establish that even after the execution of
the assailed Contract, respondent has remained in possession of the
property. The testimonies proffered by petitioner's witnesses merely indicated

RULING: NO.
Here, between the Almerias registered title of ownership and Gaiteros
verbal claim to the same, the formers title is far superior. As the MCTC, the
RTC, and the CA found, the disputed area forms part of the Almerias

registered title.The evidence shows that the Almerias bought Lot 9964, which
includes the disputed area, from the Asenjo heirs in whose names the land
was originally registered. Since Gaitero was unable to prove that fraud
attended the titling of the disputed area, the Almerias right over the same
became indefeasible and incontrovertible a year from registration.

ISSUE: Whether the pendency of a land registration case will bar the
institution of an action for the recovery of possession?
HELD: NO
The respondent court's action in dismissing Civil Case No. 4353M on the ground that there is another pending case (L. R. C. No. 2814 of
Branch VI of the same court) between the same parties over the same
property is to Our mind rather precipitate, for We find sufficient merit in
petitioners' contention that the rights sought to be enforced and the reliefs
prayed for in Civil Case 4353-M (recovery of possession and damages) are
entirely separate and distinct from that sought in L. R. C. Case No. 2814
(where petitioners as oppositors are seeking the exclusion of their land from
that of private respondents' claim of title over a bigger tract of land). It is
likewise true that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VI) acting as
a land registration court has a limited and special jurisdiction confined to the
determination of the legality and propriety of the issue of title over the land
subject matter of registration, and it has no power to entertain issues of
rightful possession and claim for damages emanating from ownership. It is a
fundamental principle in the law governing unlawful detainer cases (including
recovery of possession cases) that a mere plea of title or ownership over the
disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as a sound legal basis for
dismissing an action for recovery of possession because an action for
recovery of possession can be maintained even against the very owner of
the property. (Prado vs. Calpo et al, G. R. No. L-19379, April 30, 1964) In the
case at bar, there is not even a plea of title on the part of private respondents
over the disputed property but a mere allegation that there is another action
(L. R. C. No. 2814 pending in Branch VI of that court) for registration of title
to that land the possession of which is being recovered by petitioners in Civil
Case No. 4353-M. An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and
different from an action for recovery of title or ownership. In fact, a judgment
rendered in a case of recovery of possession is conclusive only on the
question of possession and not that of ownership. It does not in any way bind
the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. (Sec. 7, Rule 70,
Revised Rules of Court).

The Court cannot consider Gaiteros claim of ownership of the disputed area,
based on his alleged continuous possession of the same, without running
afoul of the rule that bars collateral attacks of registered titles. Gaiteros
action before the MCTC is one for recovery of possession of the disputed
area. An adjudication of his claim of ownership over the same would be out
of place in such kind of action. A registered title cannot be impugned, altered,
changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in a direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise, reliance on registered titles would be lost.
Gaiteros action is prohibited by law and should be dismissed.
Gaiteros theory of laches cannot vest on him the ownership of the disputed
area. To begin with, laches is a consideration in equity and therefore, anyone
who invokes it must come to court with clean hands, for he who has done
inequity shall not have equity.
Here, Gaiteros claim of laches against the Almerias can be hurled against
him. When the lot that the Almerias acquired (Lot 9964) was registered in
1979, Gaitero had constructive, if not actual, notice that the cadastral survey
included the disputed area as part of the land that Leon Asenjo claimed. Yet,
neither Gaitero nor his mother complained or objected to such inclusion.
Worse, when Gaitero saw the subdivision plan covering Tomagans original
Lot 9960 in 1993, it showed that the disputed area fell outside the
boundaries of Lot 9960-A which he claimed. Still, Gaitero did nothing to
correct the alleged mistake. He is by his inaction clearly estopped from
claiming ownership of the disputed area. He cannot avail himself of the law
of equity.

The inevitable conclusion from the foregoing is that Civil Case No. 4353-M
(for recovery of possession and damages) was arbitrarily and erroneously
dismissed on the basis of the alleged pendency of another action (L.R.C. No.
2814 pending in Branch VI of the same court), because while identity of
parties may be established in both cases, there is no identity of cause of
action or of rights asserted and relief prayed for, so that judgment which may
be rendered in one case would not necessarily result in res judicata for the
other case.

SPOUSES DOLORES MEDINA AND MOISES BERNAL v. THE


HONORABLE NELLY L. ROMERO VALDELLON
G.R. No. L-38510, March 25, 1975, FIRST DIVISION, (ESGUERRA, J.)
Plaintiffs are the owners of a parcel of land situated at Bo. San Pascual,
Hagonoy, Bulacan "that as defendants are family friends of the plaintiffs,
defendants were allowed to remain in the premises and to construct their
residential house, subject to the condition that defendants will return unto the
plaintiffs the premises upon demand"; "that much to the surprise of the
plaintiffs-spouses, on demand, defendants-spouses refused and remain
obstinate in their refusal to surrender the property in question"; that because
of said defendants' unjustified acts plaintiffs had to institute action and incur
damage of P500 as expenses for court litigation; that "the reasonable value
of the use of the premises is P100 a month, taking into consideration its
commercial value"; and prayed that the defendants be ordered "to vacate the
premises and surrender unto plaintiffs" the said property and defendants be
ordered to pay plaintiffs "the amount of P500 as incidental expenses and the
amount of P100 a month from the filing of this action to the time they
surrender its possession to the plaintiffs.

We cannot see any sufficient reason for any of the parties in this case to
object to the consolidation of the trial of both cases (L.R.C. Case No. 2814
and Civil Case No. 4353-M), since the evidence that may be presented by
the parties involving possession and ownership of the disputed parcel of land
may facilitate an expeditious termination of both cases. While the issues
raised in both cases are not exactly identical, the evidence involving the
issues of possession and ownership over the same land must be related and
its presentation before one court of justice would redound to a speedy
disposition of this litigation.
ART 525

Plaintiffs amended information that defendants are claiming that they are
the owners thereof;"The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
and an opposition to the motion to amend and admit the amended complaint
on the ground of "there being another case pending between the same
parties over the same property, namely Land Registration Case No. 2814 of
this Court."

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA AND HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO


PLAZA
G.R. No. 108926, July 12, 1996, SECOND DIVISION (Torres, Jr., J.)
According to the heirs of Plaza, the property was first owned by Santos de la
Cruz. The property was successively bought by Cristobal, Gervacio,
Calugdan and Alhambra. After Alhambra died, his heirs extrajudicially
partitioned the property and declared it in their names. They executed a

"Deed of Sale With Mortgage" deeding the subject property to Plaza. Upon
receipt of the full payment, they executed a "Release of Mortgage". After the
sale, Plaza took possession of the subject property and paid the taxes due
from 1966-1986, and in 1985 declared it in his name. He appointed Mauricio
Plaza and Jesus Magcanlas as the administrator and caretaker, respectively.
Due to losses, the property in question was cultivated only for a while. 5
years according to Mauricio, and from 1966-1978 according to Magcanlas.

FACTS.
Teodoro Vao (Teodoro), as attorney-in-fact of Jose Vao, sold seven lots to
Benito Liu, through petitioner Frank Liu (Frank), and to Cirilo Pangalo. The
lots sold to Benito Liu were Lot Nos. 5, 6, 13, 14, and 15 while the lots sold
to Cirilo Pangalo were Lot Nos. 14 and 15. When Jose Vao passed away
Benito Liu stopped further payments but after the Supreme Court declared
Joses will as valid, Teodoro informed Frank that he could already transfer
the titles to the buyers names upon payment of the balance of the purchase
price.

Plaza filed a petition for the registration and confirmation of his title over the
subject property alleging that: 1.) by virtue of the deed of sale, he is the
owner; 2.) he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
property prior to, and since 12 June 1945; 3.) other than himself, there is no
other person occupying, or having any interest over the property; and, 4.)
there are no tenants or agricultural lessees. The Republic filed its opposition.
Aside from the Republic, there were others who filed their opposition prior to,
or were allowed to submit their opposition despite, and after, the issuance of
the order of general default. From among the oppositors, only the Republic
filed a notice of appeal which was approved.

It was only after nine years that Frank responded that he was ready to pay
the balance of the purchase price of the seven lots after he had purchased
the lots formerly sold to Benito Liu and Cirilo Pangalo. He requested for the
execution of a deed of sale of the lots in his name and the delivery of the
titles to him. Despite repeated demands by Frank, Teodoro sold Lot No. 6 to
respondent Teresita Loy. Frank then filed a complaint against Teodoro for
specific performance, execution of deed of absolute sale, issuance of
certificates of title and construction of subdivision roads, before the CFI and
a notice of lis pendens on the seven lots was filed before the Register of
Deeds.
A year after, Teodoro sold Lot No. 5 to respondent Alfredo Loy.
When the complaint filed by Frank was dismissed, he filed his claim to the
probate court which was subsequently granted. Milagros Vao, who
succeeded as administratrix of the Estate of Jose Vao, executed a deed of
conveyance covering the seven lots in favor of Frank. The probate court,
however, also approved the sale to respondents Teresita and Alfredo Loy
upon their motion and new titles were issued under their name. As a result,
Frank Liu filed a complaint for reconveyance or annulment of title of Lot Nos.
5 and 6 but it was dismissed by the RTC.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in granting the private respondents application for
registration?
HELD: No.
Considering the dates of the tax declarations and the realty tax payments,
they can hardly be said to be of recent vintage indicating Plazas pretended
possession of the property. On the contrary, they are strong evidence of
possession in the concept of owner by Plaza and his predecessors-ininterest. Moreover, the realty tax payment receipts show that Plaza has been
very religious in paying the taxes due on the property. This is indicative of his
honest belief that he is the owner of the subject property. The Court is of the
opinion that Plaza has proved that he and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
property in the concept of owner for a period of 30 years since 12 June 1945
and earlier. By operation of law, the property in question has become private
property.

ISSUE. Whether the Loys were in good faith when they built on the Lots.
HELD.
NO. The Civil Code describes a possessor in good faith as follows:
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who
is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses
in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may
be the basis of good faith.

Contrary to the representations of the Republic, Plaza had introduced some


improvements on the subject property from the time he purchased it. His
witnesses testified that Plaza developed the subject property into a ricefield
and planted it with rice, but only for about 5 years because the return on
investment was not enough to sustain the continued operation of the
riceland. Though not in the category of permanent structures, the preparation
of the land into a ricefield and planting it with rice are considered
improvements thereon.

Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in


the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership.

Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not


conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

In Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court explained possession


in good faith in this manner:
Guided by previous decisions of this Court, good faith consists in the
possessors belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the
owner of the same and could convey his title (Arriola vs. Gomez de la Serna,
14 Phil. 627). Good faith, while it is always presumed in the absence of
proof to the contrary, requires a well-founded belief that the person from
whom title was received was himself the owner of the land, with the right to
convey it (Santiago vs. Cruz, 19 Phil. 148). There is good faith where there
is an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage from
another (Fule vs. Legare, 7 SCRA 351).

ART 526- FRANK LIU v. ALFREDO LOY, JR., TERESITA LOY, and
ESTATE OF JOSE VANO
Art. 526

The Loys were not in good faith when they built on the lots because
they knew that they bought from someone who was not the registered
owner. The registered owner on the TCTs of the lots was the Estate of
Jose Vao, clearly indicating that the sale required probate court
approval. Teodoro Vao did not show any court approval to the Loys when
they purchased the lots because there was none. To repeat, anyone who
buys from a person who is not the registered owner is not a purchaser
in good faith. If the Loys built on the lots before the court approval, then
they took the risk.

extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good


faith and with just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription ownership
and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years without need of title
or of good faith. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable
belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner
thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes of prescription, there
is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership
or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit
any right.

SOLEDAD CALICDAN, REPRESENTED BY HER GUARDIAN


GUADALUPE CASTILLO, PETITIONER, VS. SILVERIO CENDAA,
SUBSTITUTED BY HIS LEGAL HEIR CELSA CENDAA-ALARAS,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 155080, February 05, 2004, FIRST DIVISION, YNARESSATIAGO, J.

Assuming arguendo that ordinary acquisitive prescription is unavailing in the


case at bar as it demands that the possession be in good faith and with just
title, and there is no evidence on record to prove respondents good faith,
nevertheless, his adverse possession of the land for more than 45 years
aptly shows that he has met the requirements for extraordinary acquisitive
prescription to set in1.

Facts: The case involves a 760 sqm. parcel of unregistered land located in
Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The land was formerly owned by Sixto
Calicdan, who died intestate in 1941 survived by his wife, Fermina, and three
children, namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno. Fermina executed a
deed of donation inter vivos whereby she conveyed the land to respondent
Silverio Cendaa in 1947, who immediately entered into possession of the
land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey residential
house thereon sometime in 1949, where he resided until his death in 1998.

Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been
executed by one who was not the owner of the property donated, may still be
used to show the exclusive and adverse character of respondents
possession.
Petition Denied
527- LORETO BOTE, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES ROBERT VELOSO
AND GLORIA VELOSO, RESPONDENTS.

In 1992, petitioner, filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession


and Damages against the respondent, alleging that the donation was void;
that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land.
On the other hand, respondent answered that the land was donated to him
by Fermina in 1947; and that he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously,
and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years.

FACTS: Gloria Veloso was awarded a residential lot at the Dagat-Dagatan


Project. She then constructed a two (2)-storey house thereon and resided
therein until 1991. In 1995, Gloria leased the house to Loreto Bote (Bote)
from October to December. Thereafter, Bote executed a Promissory Note
undertaking to pay Gloria Veloso and her husband the purchase price for
property. Bote failed to pay. Thus, the spouses Veloso, through counsel,
issued a Demand Letter demanding the payment of the purchase price.
Despite such demand, Bote still failed to pay the purchase price.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner while the CA reversed the lower
courts decision.

The spouses Veloso filed a complaint against Bote for Sum of Money and/or
Recovery of Possession of Real Property with Damages. In his Answer, Bote
alleged that the subject property is not owned by the spouses Veloso but by
Cynthia T. Baello (Cynthia) as shown in the TCT covering the subject
property, an alleged heir of Pedro Baello. He further alleged that he
purchased the property from Cynthia as evidenced by a Contract to Sell. The
trial court ruled against the spouses Veloso for their failure to adduce
evidence to show a rightful claim over the subject property. The RTC noted
that the spouses Velosos reliance on the award made by the NHA is
misplaced, the expropriation case filed by the NHA having been dismissed
and thus, concluded that because the NHA failed to expropriate the property,
the spouses Veloso could not derive any right from the award.

Issue
WON the donation inter vivos is valid;
WON petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription
Held: The donation is void. It is for the reason that Fermina was not the
owner of the property, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his
parents. Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses
Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law
applicable when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of
usufruct only over the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently,
respondent, who derived his rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of
usufruct as it was the only right which the latter could convey.

On appeal, the spouses interposed for the first time their status as builders in
good faith and are, thus, entitled to possession of the house that Gloria built.

Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find that respondent has


become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive
prescription. Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and
other real rights over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time
in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the
possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or

1 The court noted that respondent had paid realty tax. In considering such, it
ruled that although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.

The CA ruled that a proper determination of the value of the controverted


residential house shall be made and which shall be forthwith paid by Bote to
the spouses, otherwise, the latter shall be restored to the possession of the
said residential house until payment of the required indemnity.

ISSUE:
Are the premises leased by BGC from MSBF within the sevenhectare area that Proclamation No. 1670 granted to MSBF by way of
usufruct?
RULING:

Hence, this petition.

YES.
A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and under
such conditions as the parties may deem convenient subject to the
legal provisions on usufruct. A usufructuary may lease the object held
in usufruct. Thus, the NHA may not evict BGC if the 4,590 square meter
portion MSBF leased to BGC is within the seven-hectare area held in
usufruct by MSBF. The owner of the property must respect the lease
entered into by the usufructuary so long as the usufruct exists.
However, the NHA has the right to evict BGC if BGC occupied a portion
outside of the seven-hectare area covered by MSBF's usufructuary rights.

ISSUE: WON the spouses Veloso can validly claim being builders in good
faith
RULING. NO.
Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always presumed and
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the
burden of proof.

MSBF conducted at least two surveys. Although both surveys


covered a total of 16 hectares, the second survey specifically indicated a
seven-hectare area shaded in yellow. MSBF made the first survey in 1984
and the second in 1986, way before the present controversy started. MSBF
conducted the two surveys before the lease to BGC. The trial court ruled that
MSBF did not act seasonably in exercising its right to conduct the survey.
Confronted with evidence that MSBF did in fact conduct two surveys, the trial
court dismissed the two surveys as self-serving. This is clearly an error on
the part of the trial court. Proclamation No. 1670 authorized MSBF to
determine the location of the seven-hectare area. This authority, coupled with
the fact that Proclamation No. 1670 did not state the location of the sevenhectare area, leaves no room for doubt that Proclamation No. 1670 left it to
MSBF to choose the location of the seven-hectare area under its usufruct.

To stress, the issue of whether or not the spouses Veloso were builders in
good faith is a factual question that was never alleged, let alone proven.
Thus, in order to refute the spouses Velosos contention that they are
builders in good faith, it is necessary that Bote present evidence that they
acted in bad faith. Understandably, Bote did not present such evidence
before the trial court because good faith was not an issue then. It was only
on appeal that the spouses Veloso belatedly raised the issue that they were
builders in good faith. Justice and fair play dictate that the spouses Velosos
change of their theory of the case on appeal be disallowed and the instant
petition granted.

On the other hand, the Court cannot countenance MSBF's act of


exceeding the seven-hectare portion granted to it by Proclamation No. 1670.
A usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges. A usufructuary has
the duty to protect the owner's interests. One such duty is found in
Article 601 of the Civil Code.

USUFRUCT
ART 565, 6O1, 6O5

A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with


the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title
constituting it or the law otherwise provides. This controversy would not
have arisen had MSBF respected the limit of the beneficial use given to it.
MSBF's encroachment of its benefactor's property gave birth to the confusion
that attended this case. To put this matter entirely to rest, it is not enough to
remind the NHA to respect MSBF's choice of the location of its sevenhectare area. MSBF, for its part, must vacate the area that is not part of its
usufruct. MSBF's rights begin and end within the seven-hectare portion of its
usufruct. This Court agrees with the trial court that MSBF has abused the
privilege given it under Proclamation No. 1670.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. CA, BULACAN GARDEN CORP. &


MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION, INC.
G.R. No. 148830, 12 April 2005, FIRST DIVISION, (Carpio, J.)
Proclamation No. 481 set aside a 120-hectare portion of land in QC owned
by the NHA as reserved property for the site of the National Government
Center ("NGC"). Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1670, which removed a
seven-hectare portion from the coverage of the NGC and gave MSBF
usufructuary rights over this segregated portion.

Article 605 of the NCC clearly limits any usufruct constituted


in favor of a corporation or association to 50 years. A usufruct is meant
only as a lifetime grant. Unlike a natural person, a corporation or
association's lifetime may be extended indefinitely. The usufruct would
then be perpetual. This is especially invidious in cases where the
usufruct given to a corporation or association covers public land.
Proclamation No. 1670 was issued 19 September 1977 Hence, under Article
605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has 22 years left. MO 127 released
approximately 50 hectares of the NHA property as reserved site for the
National Government Center. However, MO 127 does not affect MSBF's
seven-hectare area since under Proclamation No. 1670, MSBF's sevenhectare area was already "exclude[d] from the operation of Proclamation No.
481, dated October 24, 1968, which established the National Government
Center Site."

MSBF occupied the area granted by Proclamation No. 1670. Over the years,
MSBF's occupancy exceeded the 7-hectare area subject to its usufructuary
rights until it occupied approximately 16 hectares. By then the land occupied
by MSBF was bounded by EDSA to the west, Agham Road to the east,
Quezon Avenue to the south and a creek to the north. Then, MSBF leased a
portion of the area it occupied to Bulacan Garden Corporation (BGC).
Cory issued Memo Order 127 which revoked the reserved status of the 50
hectares remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as
site of the NGC and authorized the NHA to commercialize the area and to
sell it to the public. Acting under MO 127, the NHA gave BGC ten days to
vacate its occupied area. Any structure left behind after the expiration of the
ten-day period will be demolished by NHA.
The RTC denied BGCs complaint for injunction. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling.

Case is REMANDED to Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of


Quezon City, which shall order a joint survey by the National Housing

Authority and Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. to determine the metes
and bounds of the seven-hectare portion of Manila Seedling Bank
Foundation, Inc. under Proclamation No. 1670.

profit, although declared in stock, it should be held to be income. A dividend,


whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and, consequently, should go
to the usufructuary, taking into consideration that a stock dividend as well as
a cash dividend can be declared only out of profits of the corporation, for if it
were declared out of the capital it would be a serious violation of the law.
Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is considered part of the
capital and belongs to the remainderman; while under the Pennsylvania rule,
all earnings of a corporation, when declared as dividends in whatever form,
made during the lifetime of the usufructuary, belong to the latter. The
Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our statutory laws than the
Massachusetts rule.

ART 566 In the matter of the testate estate of Emil Maurice Bachrach,
deceased. MARY McDONALD BACHRACH,petitioner-appellee,
vs.
SOPHIE SEIFERT and ELISA ELIANOFF, oppositors-appellants.
Facts:

Art. 596- THE BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF ZAMBOANGA


DEL SUR VS. SAMAR MINING COMPANY, INC. AND THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS

The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow
Mary McDonald Bachrach, in his last will and testament made various
legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his estate. The estate of E. M.
Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge
Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50 per
cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On June 10, 1948, Mary
McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned
the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as
administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to transfer to her the said
54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the
corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid
out in the form of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as
usufructuary or life tenant.

Samar is a domestic corporation engaged in the mining industry. As the


mining claims and the mill of Samar are located inland and at a great
distance from the loading point or pier site, it decided to construct a gravel
road as a convenient means of hauling its ores from the mine site at Buug to
the pier area at Pamintayan, Zamboanga del Sur; that as an initial step in the
construction of a 42-kilometer road which would traverse public lands Samar,
filed with the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry miscellaneous
lease applications for a road right of way on lands under the jurisdiction of
said bureaus where the proposed road would traverse; that having been
given temporary permit to occupy and use the lands applied for by it, said
respondent constructed a road thereon, known as the Samico road. Although
the gravel road was finished in 1959, and had since then been used by the
respondent in hauling its iron ores from its mine site to the pier area, the
execution of the corresponding lease contracts were held in abeyance even
up to the time this case was brought to the Court of Tax Appeals.

Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said
petition on the ground that the stock dividend in question was not income but
formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but
to the remainderman. While appellants admit that a cash dividend is an
income, they contend that a stock dividend is not, but merely represents an
addition to the invested capital.

On June 5, 1964, Samar received a letter from the Provincial Assessor of


Zamboanga del Sur assessing the 13.8 kilometer road constructed by it for
real estate tax purposes in the total sum of P1,117,900.00. On July 14, 1964,
Samar appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of Zamboanga del Sur,
, contesting the validity of the assessment upon the ground that the road
having been constructed entirely on a public land cannot be considered an
improvement subject to tax within the meaning of section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 470.

Issue:
Is a stock dividend fruit or income, thus rightfully belonging to the
usufructuary?
Held:
Yes.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Samar should pay realty tax on the
assessed value of the road it constructed on alienable or disposable public
lands that are leased to it by the government?

Article 471, now Art. 566 provides:


The usufructuary shall be entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits
of the property in usufruct. With respect to hidden treasure which may be
found on the land or tenement, he shall be considered a stranger.

Held: No.
As in the case of Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. vs. Provincial Government of
Surigao, where a similar issue was raised, the Court ruled that:

The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000
shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They
represent profits, and the delivery of the certificate of stock covering said
dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares may be
sold independently of the original shares, just as the offspring of a domestic
animal may be sold independently of its mother. If the dividend be in fact a

In the first place, it cannot be disputed that the ownership of the road
that was constructed by appellee belongs to the government by right of
accession not only because it is inherently incorporated or attached to
the timber land leased to appellee but also because upon the expiration
of the concession, said road would ultimately pass to the national
government. In the second place, while the road was constructed by

appellee primarily for its use and benefit, the privilege is not exclusive,
for, under the lease contract entered into by the appellee and the
government, its use can also be availed of by the employees of the
government and by the public in general. x x x In other words, the
government has practically reserved the rights to use the road to
promote its varied activities. Since, as above shown, the road in
question cannot be considered as an improvement which belongs to
appellee, although in part is for its benefit, it is clear that the same
cannot be the subject of assessment within the meaning of section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 470.

RULING: NO. The surrender mentioned in Paragraph 4 of Article 513 to


our minds does not include such an act as this. It refers to a voluntary
surrender of the very rights which the usufructuary has, made by him
with the intent to so surrender them. It does not relate to a forfeiture
which may be claimed to be the result of some act performed by the
insufructuary inconsistent with the relation which exists between him
and the owner of the property.
The judgment, however, should, we think, be modified in one respect. The
defendant has its possession registered on the ground that it was the owner.
It was not the owner, and the inscription should be canceled in its entirety.

We are not oblivious of the fact that the present assessment was
made by appellant on the strength of an opinion rendered by the
Secretary of Justice, we find that the same is predicated on authorities
which are not in point, for they refer to improvements that belong to the
lessees although constructed on lands belonging to the government. It
is well settled that a real tax, being a burden upon the capital, shod be
paid by the owner of the land and not by a usufructuary. Appellee is but
a partial usufructuary of the road in question."

ART. 6O7- ROSARIO GREY VDA. DE ALBAR and JOSE M. GREY v


JOSEFA FABIE DE CARANDANG and THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-18003, September 29, 1962, EN BANC, (DIZON, J.)
Rosario, Grey Vda. de Albar and Jose M. Grey filed an appeal on certiorari.
In her will the deceased Doa Rosario Fabie y Grey bequeathed the naked
ownership of a parcel of land situated at Ongpin St., Manila, and of the
building and other improvements existing thereon, to petitioners, and the
usufruct thereof to respondent for life. Because the improvements were
destroyed during the battle for the liberation of the City of Manila, the
Philippine War Damage Commission paid petitioners a certain sum of money
war damage. It was respondent, however, who paid the real estate taxes due
on the land for the years 1945 to 1954.

Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals appealed from was affirmed


Art. 6o3 THE CITY OF MANILA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. EL MONTE DE
PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORROS DE MANILA, Defendant-Appellee.
G. R. No. 1975, November 10, 1905

Petitioners filed a civil case to limit respondent's usufruct to the legal interest
on the value of the land. Trial court ruled that the right of appellees to
usufruct subsist. The CA affirmed the decision appealed from upon the
Ongpin lot and the building now existing thereon, and that she is entitled to
receive from appellants 6% of the amount the latter actually received from
the Philippine War Damage Commission, and we hereby reverse said
decision, declaring that reimbursement to appellee of the sum of P1,989.27
paid by her for real estate taxes is deferred until the termination of the
usufruct, and that she is not entitled to any amount for attorney's fees. On
appeal, petitioners should not be made to reimburse the real estate taxes
and on MR it was further modified to eliminate security for the payment of
legal interest on the amount of the war damage. Respondent filed a motion
for the "payment of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, 11,
1950 to January 11, 1960. Petitioners opposed the motion averring that the
property was declared delinquent for non-payment of taxes and it sold at
public auction to Mrs. Pilar T. Bautista and it was petitioners who recovered
and paid all the taxes due. Therefore, extinguishing the usufruct of
respondents. The Sheriff was ordered to withhold the sum of P3,495.90
which the plaintiffs claim to be reimbursable to them for real estate taxes
paid on the property for the years 1954, 1955, 1957 and 1959, as well as the
sum spent in repurchasing the property from the buyer at public auction, Mrs.
Pilar T. Bautista

FACTS: On and prior to the 6th day of July, 1887, the owner of the land in
the Plaza de Goiti, on which the building of defendant now stands is the City
of Manila.
The defendant presented a petition to the city of Manila, in which
it asked that the city give to the defendant permission to erect a building in
the land in question. On the 6th day of July, 1887, resolution was adopted
granting 'the gratuitous use of the land' asked for the erection of the
building for its offices by Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros on condition
that should the building be abandoned or cease to be devoted to the purpose
for which it will be erected, the possession of the land will revert to the
municipal corporation in the same form as a land
On the 14th of May 1901, filed a petition to the CFI Manila asking
that its possession as owner of the land and building in question be
inscribed. The plaintiff then brought this action against the defendant, asking
that the inscription be canceled. Judgment was entered in the court in favor
of the plaintiff so far as to order that the inscription be so modified as to show
that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and that the defendant had a right
to occupy it gratuitously, so long as devoted the land to the purpose above
mentioned. Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment, but the defendant has
not.

ISSUE: Whether the order July 2 and August 25, 1960 issued by the Court
of First Instance of Manila to withhold the real estate taxes modify our
decision in G.R. No. L-13361, as modified by our resolution of February 10,
1960?

On appeal, the City of Manila asserted that the defendant, by


claiming in the proceedings relating to the possessory information to be the
absolute owner of the land and building, forfeited all the rights which it
acquired by virtue of the cession of 1887; that by this claim it repudiated the
relation which had theretofore existed between it and the appellant, and
virtually said that it no longer occupied the land under the terms of the grant,
but was the absolute owner thereof.

HELD: NO
It is, of course, the law in this jurisdiction that a decision, once
executory, is beyond amendment, the prevailing party being entitled to its
execution as a matter of right; that the writ of execution to be issued must
form with the decision (Buenaventura vs. Garcia, 78 Phil. 759); but it is
likewise settled that a stay of execution of a final judgment may be
authorized if necessary to accomplish the aims of justice, as for instance,
where there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes
such execution inequitable (Chua Lee vs. Mapa, 51 Phil. 624-625, Li Kim
Tho vs. Sanchez, 83 Phil. 776, 778).

ISSUE: WON upon claiming to be the owner of the property, the


defendant surrendered its rights as such usufructuary.

parcel of land and formed part of the open space required to be reserved by
the subdivision developer under P.D. 957.

As stated heretofore, when petitioners opposed respondent Carandang's


motion for execution, they alleged that because the latter did not pay the real
estate taxes on the property over which she had usufructuary rights, for the
years 1954 to 1959, the property was declared delinquent and sold at public
auction; that because Carandang failed to repurchase it, petitioners made
the purchase for the sum of P715.05, and paid all the back taxes up to 1957
as well as those for the year 1959, having paid the total sum of P3,495.00 as
real estate taxes, which amount they claimed reimbursement from
respondent Carandang.

ISSUE: Does an easement for the water facility over the contested lot exist?
HELD:
YES. In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on Lot 11,
Block 5 of the Subdivision for the benefit of the community. It is continuous
and apparent, because it is used incessantly without human intervention,
and because it is continually kept in view by the overhead water tank, which
reveals its use to the public.

Upon the above facts if proven it would seem that petitioners had at
least a prima facie case against the aforesaid respondent. It was in this
connection precisely that the order of July 2, 1960 provided that "the Sheriff
of Manila is hereby ordered to withhold the sum of P3,495.98 . . ., as well as
the sum spent in repurchasing the property . . .", providing further that "the
disposition of said sum should be threshed out by the parties in a separate
incident either in this action or in the independent litigation." This order, in our
opinion, does not amount to a modification of our final decision in the
principal case, nor to the imposition of a condition upon its enforcement. It
amounts to a mere stay of execution and is authorized by our decisions in
the Chua Lee and Lim Kim Tho cases (supra).

Contrary to petitioners contention that the existence of the water


tank on Lot 11, Block 5 is merely tolerated, we find that the easement of
water facility has been voluntarily established either by Marcelo, the
Subdivision owner and developer; or by F.G.R. Sales, his predecessor-ininterest and the original developer of the Subdivision. For more than 30
years, the facility was continuously used as the residents sole source of
water. The Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent easements are
acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of 10 years. It is therefore
clear that an easement of water facility has already been acquired through
prescription.
SPOUSES ELIZABETH & ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ v. OLGA RAMISCAL
Art. 613
FACTS.
Respondent Olga Ramiscal is the registered owner of a parcel of
land located at the corner of 18th Avenue and Boni Serrano Avenue. On the
other hand, spouses De La Cruz are occupants of a parcel of land located at
the back of Ramiscals property. The subject matter of this case is a 1.10meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land owned by respondent which is
being used by petitioners as their pathway to and from 18 th Avenue, the
nearest public highway from their property. Petitioners had enclosed the
same with a gate, fence, and roof.

EASEMENT
ART.613
EMETERIA LIWAG v. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 189755, July 4, 2012, SECOND DIVISION (Sereno, J.)
F.G.R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop,
obtained a loan from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T.P. Marcelo Realty
Corporation. To settle its debt after failing to pay its obligation, F.G.R. Sales
assigned to Marcelo all its rights over several parcels of land in the
Subdivision, as well as receivables from the lots already sold. As the
successor-in-interest of the original developer, Marcelo represented to
subdivision lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility was
available in the Subdivision. For almost 30 years, the residents of the
Subdivision relied on this facility as their only source of water. This fact was
acknowledged by Marcelo and Hermogenes Liwag, Emeterias late husband
who was then the president of respondent Happy Glen Loop Homeowners
Association.

In 1976, respondent leased her property, including the building thereon, to


Phil. Orient Motors. Phil. Orient Motors also owned a property adjacent to
that of respondents. In 1995, Phil. Orient Motors sold its property to San
Benito Realty. After the sale, Engr. Rafael Madrid prepared a relocation
survey and location plan for both contiguous properties of respondent and
San Benito Realty. It was only then that respondent discovered that the
aforementioned pathway being occupied by petitioners is part of her
property.

Marcelo sold a lot to Hermogenes. When Hermogenes died,


Emeteria wrote a letter to the Association, demanding the removal of the
overhead water tank from the subject parcel of land. Refusing to comply with
Emeterias demand, the Association filed an action against T.P. Marcelo
Realty Corporation, Emeteria and the other surviving heirs of Hermogenes.
HLURB Arbiter ruled in favor of the Association. He invalidated the transfer of
the parcel of land in favor of Hermogenes. On appeal, it was found that the
lot is not an open space. It ruled that Marcelo had complied with the
requirements of P.D. 1216 with the donation of 9,047 square meters of open
space and road lots. It further stated that there was no proof that Marcelo or
the original subdivision owner or developer had at any time represented that
the lot was an open space. It therefore concluded that the use of the lot as
site of the water tank was merely tolerated. The Association interposed an
appeal to the OP, and affirmed that of the HLURB Arbiter. The OP ruled that
it was an open space, because it was the site of the water installation of the
Subdivision. The CA affirmed that the HLURB possessed jurisdiction to
invalidate the sale of the subject parcel of land to Hermogenes. The CA
agreed with the OP that an easement for water facility existed on the subject

Ramiscal, through her lawyer, filed a complaint seeking to demolish the


structure illegally constructed by the Spouses and asserted that petitioners
have an existing right of way to a public highway other than the pathway in
litigation. The petitioners, on the other hand, contend that such use was with
the knowledge of Ramiscal.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Ramiscal. Hence this petition.
ISSUE. WON the petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement of
right of way.
HELD.
NO. An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the
corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of which the owner has to
refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his property,
for the benefit of another thing or person. The statutory basis for this right is
Article 613, in connection with Article 619, of the Civil Code.

PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND GENERAL SANTOS


DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC., RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 136897, November 22, 2005, THIRD DIVISION, GARCIA, J.

Petitioners herein failed to show by competent evidence other than their bare
claim that they and their tenants, spouses Manuel and Cecilia Bondoc and
Carmelino Masangkay, entered into an agreement with respondent, through
her foreman, Mang Puling, to use the pathway to 18 th Avenue, which would
be reciprocated with an equivalent 1.50-meter wide easement by the owner
of another adjacent estate. The hands of this Court are tied from giving
credence to petitioners self-serving claim that such right of way was
voluntarily given them by respondent for the following reasons:
First, petitioners were unable to produce any shred of document
evidencing such agreement. The Civil Code is clear that any transaction
involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in writing. Thus, the
dearth of corroborative evidence opens doubts on the veracity of the naked
assertion of petitioners that indeed the subject easement of right of way was
a voluntary grant from respondent.
Second, as admitted by the petitioners, it was only the foreman,
Mang Puling, who talked with them regarding said pathway on the northern
side of respondents property. Thus, petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz testified
that she did not talk to respondent regarding the arrangement proposed to
them by Mang Puling despite the fact that she often saw respondent. It is,
therefore, foolhardy for petitioners to believe that the alleged foreman of
respondent had the authority to bind the respondent relating to the easement
of right of way.
Third, their explanation that said Mang Puling submitted said
agreement to the Quezon City Engineers Office, in connection with the
application for a building permit but said office could no longer produce a
copy thereof, does not inspire belief. As correctly pointed out by the trial
court, petitioners should have requested a subpoena duces tecum from said
court to compel the Quezon City Engineers Office to produce said document
or to prove that such document is indeed not available.

Facts
Agustin Narciso and Aurora Narciso were the original owners of
two lots situated at Barrio Lagao, General Santos City, Cotabato. On
September 25, 1968, the interior lot was bought by General Santos Doctors
Hosptal, Inc. (GSDHI) subject to a condition3. On September 30, 1977, the
exterior lot was mortgaged by the Narcisos to one of the petitioners herein,
Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP). The mortgage
was foreclosed and was bought by PDCP in a public auction.
On April 18, 1988, in the RTC of General Santos City, GSDHI,
claimed that it has an easement of right-of-way over the foreclosed property
(exterior lot), filed a complaint for specific performance against PDCP,
therein impleading the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Pelagio T.
Tolosa, as a nominal party-defendant, to compel PDCP to present before the
Register of Deeds its duplicate copy of TCT No. 23202 over the exterior lot
for the annotation thereon of the Memorandum of Agreement establishing
an easement of right-of-way in favor of GSDHI4. GSDHI alleged that the
easement was a condition and primary consideration for its purchase from
the Narcisos of the interior lot so that the hospital it intends to build thereat
would have an access to the national highway; that the grant is evidenced by
two public documents executed between it and the Narcisos5; that the portion
covered by the easement was inadvertently and erroneously included in the
mortgage of the exterior lot as the same was not segregated from the mother
title.
In its answer, PDCP denied any knowledge of the alleged
easement of right-of-way, averring that it was not a party to any of the
transactions between respondent and the Narcisos. Even assuming that the
Memorandum of Agreement created such an easement, PDCP contended
that it cannot be bound thereby because said agreement was not duly

Likewise futile are petitioners attempts to show that they are legally entitled
to the aforesaid pathway under Article 649 of the Civil Code. The conferment
of a legal easement of right of way under Article 649 is subject to proof of the
following requisites: (1) it is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the
isolation is not the result of its own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent
with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest. The first three requisites are not
obtaining in the instant case.

said lot since the 1960s. this knowledge was passed to


him by Miranda thus actual notice to him.

3 The vendors (Narcisos), shall construct a ten (10)


meter wide road commencing from the National
Highway, traversing the property of the vendors and
terminating perpendicularly at the mid-point of the
Southern boundary of the property subject of the sale
facing the National Highway. Additionally, the vendors
or party of the first part, shall also construct a ten (10)
meter wide road alongside the same Southern
boundary of the subject land, forming a right angle
with the road first above-described. The vendors shall
also provide drainage facilities.

Petitioners have an adequate outlet to a public highway (Boni Serrano


Avenue), they have no right to insist on using a portion of respondents
property as pathway towards 18th Avenue and for which no indemnity was
being paid by them.
Petition denied.

PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,


PELAGIO TOLOSA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS REGISTER OF DEEDS,
GENERAL SANTOS CITY, AND ATANACIO M. VILLEGAS2,

4 The easement was not registered when GSDHI


bought the interior property

2 Bought the exterior property during the pendency of

5 i.e., "Option to Buy" the interior lot dated

the case, he also not considered as an innocent


purchaser for his attorney-in-fact, Benjamin Miranda,
was very much aware of the existence of a road over

September 6, 1968 and "Memorandum of Agreement"


dated September 25, 1968

inscribed and registered with the Registry of Deeds. Furthermore, PDCP


asserted that it is an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith; hence,
the alleged easement cannot be enforced against it. The RTC and CA ruled
in favor of respondents.

claimed that they were tenants or lessees of the subject land owned by the
latter; that the land has been converted by Reta into a commercial center;
and that Reta is threatening to eject them from the land. They assert that
they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with
Section 3(g) of PD No. 1517 since they are legitimate tenants or lessees
thereof. They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between
Reta and Roble, one of the petitioners, was void ab initio for being violative
of PD No. 1517.

Issue
(1) WON GSDHI has an easement of right-of-way over the exterior lot
and (2) WON petitioners are innocent mortgagees/purchasers for value
of the same lot.

On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is beyond the ambit of
PD No. 1517 since it has not been proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform
Zone; that the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 for failure of the
plaintiffs to pay the rentals for the use of the land; and that the amicable
settlement was valid.

Decision
1. The property has an easement of right-of-way. An easement "is a real
right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of
the latter must refrain from doing or allow somebody else to do or something
to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement".
Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owner. The
former are called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements. As correctly
found by the trial court, the easement of right-of-way over the exterior lot in
favor of respondent GSDHI was voluntarily constituted by agreement
between the latter and the original owner thereof, the Narcisos. Verily, the
Deed of Absolute Sale between respondent and the Narcisos covering the
interior lot did not embody the aforementioned condition. It was precisely to
cure this deficiency, however, that on the very same day the deed of sale
was executed, the Narcisos and respondent forged a "Memorandum of
Agreement" to reflect what they failed to state in the document of sale.

The RTC ruled in favor of Reta and ordered the petitioners to pay
rentals. On appeal, the CA affirmed.

ISSUE Whether petitioners have the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517

RULING: NO.
Article 614, NCC:

2. Petitioners are not innocent mortgagees/purchasers for value.


Concededly, a person, be he a buyer or mortgagee, dealing with a titled
property, as the exterior lot is, is not required to go beyond what appears on
the face of the covering title itself. However this does not apply to banks of
which, PDCP is. In Tomas vs. Tomas, Banks, indeed, should exercise more
care and prudence in dealing even with registered lands, than private
individuals, for their business is one affected with public interest, keeping in
trust money belonging to their depositors, which they should guard against
loss by not committing any act of negligence which amounts to lack of good
faith by which they would be denied the protective mantle of land registration
statute, Act 496, extended only to purchasers for value and in good faith, as
well as to mortgagees of the same character and description.

Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or


of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not
belong.
Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use sixty-two
(62) coconut trees for P186 from where he gathered tuba. This arrangement
would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease. Usufruct gives a right to
enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on the
land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This would be in
the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code.

PDCP's feigned ignorance of the road right-of-way, much less of


the existence of the road itself along the exterior lot, is simply ridiculous, to
say the least, more so in the light of the factual findings of the two courts
below that PDCP, contrary to its assertion, had indeed sent its personnel to
inspect the land when the same was mortgaged to it by the Narcisos. We
cannot allow actual notice of knowledge of the burden on the property to be
denied on the mere pretension alone that the title does not bear any
annotation of such burden.

Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, the conclusion


would still be the same since the agreement was one of usufruct and not of
lease. Thus, petitioner Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined by
Presidential Decree No. 1517.

ALCANTARA, et al., PETITIONERS, VS RETA, JR. RESPONDENT.

Moreover, the area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban


Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). PD 1517, otherwise known as "The Urban Land
Reform Act," pertains to areas proclaimed as ULRZ. Consequently,
petitioners cannot claim any right under the said law since the land involved
is not an ULRZ, i.e. they are not entitled to the right of first refusal to
purchase the property should the owner of the land decide to sell the same
at a reasonable price within a reasonable time.

FACTS

ART.617 G.R. No. L-37409 May 23, 1988

Petitioners filed with the RTC of Davao City a complaint against Reta for the
exercise of the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517, with preliminary
injunction, attorney's fees and nullity of amicable settlement. The former

NICOLAS VALISNO, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
FELIPE ADRIANO, defendant-appellee.

Petition Denied.

ART,614

10

Facts:

ART.619 LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

The plaintiff-appellant Valisno bought the land from the defendant-appellees


sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco, on June 6,1959. (Deed of Absolute Sale,
Exh. "A".) The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn,
tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that of the appellee Felipe Adriano on
the bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels of land had been inherited by
Honorata Adriano Francisco and her brother, Felipe Adriano, from their
father, Eladio Adriano. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land
was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about
seventy (70) meters long, traversing the appellee's land.

MANGYAN ROAD is a 15-meter wide thoroughfare in Quezon City abutting


Katipunan Avenue on the west, traversing the edges of La Vista Subdivision
on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll (now
Miriam) College on the south. Mangyan Road serves as the boundary
between LA VISTA on one side and ATENEO and MARYKNOLL on the other.
It bends towards the east and ends at the gate of Loyola Grand Villas
Subdivision.
The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was originally part of a vast
tract of land owned by the Tuasons in Quezon City and Marikina. The
Tuasons sold to Philippine Building Corporation, acting for and in behalf of
Ateneo de Manila University (ATENEO), a portion of their landholdings
amounting to 1,330,556 square meters by virtue of a Deed of Sale with
Mortgage. Paragraph three (3) of the deed provides that x x x the boundary
line between the property herein sold and the adjoining property of the
VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of which shall
be taken from the property herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half
from the portion adjoining belonging to the VENDORS.

On December 16, 1959, the appellee levelled a portion of the irrigation canal
so that the appellant was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from
cultivating his 57-hectare land.
The appellant filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a
complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered on March
22, 1960 ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal, "otherwise
judicial action shall be taken against him under the provisions of Section 47
of Act 2152 (the Irrigation Act), as amended." Instead of restoring the
irrigation canal, the appellee asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the
Bureau of Public Works and Communications. A reinvestigation was granted.

On their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the
portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into a residential village known
as La Vista Subdivision. Thus the boundary between LA VISTA and the
portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation was the 15-meter wide
roadway known as the Mangyan Road.

In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own
expense because his need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields was
urgent.

ATENEO sold to MARYKNOLL the western portion of the land adjacent to


Mangyan Road. They also sold a portion of its property to Solid Homes Inc,
which Solid Homes developed as a Subdivision, Loyola Grand Villas.
LA VISTA President however informed Solid Homes, Inc., that LA VISTA
could not recognize the right-of-way over Mangyan Road because, first,
Philippine Building Corporation and its assignee ATENEO never complied
with their obligation of providing the Tuasons with a right-of-way on their 7.5meter portion of the road and, second, since the property was purchased for
commercial purposes, Solid Homes, Inc., was no longer entitled to the rightof-way as Mangyan Road was established exclusively for ATENEO in whose
favor the right-of-way was originally constituted. LA VISTA, after instructing
its security guards to prohibit agents and assignees of Solid Homes, Inc.,
from traversing Mangyan Road, then constructed one-meter high cylindrical
concrete posts chained together at the middle of and along the entire length
of Mangyan Road thus preventing the residents of LOYOLA from passing
through.

Issue: WON the easements in question rightfully belong to the plaintiff.


Held: Yes.
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively
or passively belong.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of
the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's
property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata
Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas
Valisno all "rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of land
above. According to the appellant, the water right was the primary
consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the
property would be unproductive.

Issue: Is there an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road?


Held: Yes.
A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law for
public use or for private interest. By express provisions of Arts. 649 and 650
of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim a legal or
compulsory right-of-way only after he has established the existence of four
(4) requisites, namely,
(a) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway;
(b) after payment of the proper indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the proprietors own acts; and,
(d) the right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. A voluntary
easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the
parties.

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes,
which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the
land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's
easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person (Watson
vs. French, 112 Me 371 19 C.J. 868-897). The fact that an easement by
grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from
its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the
necessit .
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he
is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful
interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation
canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and their
respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of

11

right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant
and servient estates. This is quite evident when: (a) the Tuasons and the
Philippine Building Corporation in 1949 stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed of
Sale with Mortgage that the boundary line between the property herein sold
and the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15)
meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein sold
to the VENDEE and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the
vendors; (b) the Tuasons in 1951 expressly agreed and consented to the
assignment of the land to, and the assumption of all the rights and
obligations by ATENEO, including the obligation to contribute seven and onehalf meters of the property sold to form part of the 15-meter wide roadway;
(c) the Tuasons in 1958 filed a complaint against MARYKNOLL and ATENEO
for breach of contract and the enforcement of the reciprocal easement on
Mangyan Road, and demanded that MARYKNOLL set back its wall to restore
Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters, after MARYKNOLL
constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway; (d) LA VISTA
President admitted and clarified in 1976, in a letter to ATENEO President Fr.
Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, onehalf of which is taken from your property and the other half from the La Vista
Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion
was created in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-way was
created on our 7 1/2 m. portion of the road in your favor; (e) LA VISTA, in its
offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO property in 1976,
acknowledged the existence of the contractual right-of-way as it manifested
that the mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de Manila University and La
Vista Homeowners Association would be extinguished if it bought the
adjacent ATENEO property and would thus become the owner of both the
dominant and servient estates; and, (f) LA VISTA President Luis G. Quimson,
in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, received by this Court on 26 March
1997, acknowledged that one-half of the whole length of (Mangyan Road)
belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc. The other half is owned by Miriam (Maryknoll)
and the Ateneo in equal portions; These certainly are indubitable proofs that
the parties concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of rightof-way over Mangyan Road and, like any other contract, the same could be
extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of
the dominant estate.

expense and to leave them open for the use of the plaintiffs and the general
public.
However, on appeal by the defendants and intervenors (now
private respondents), the appellate court on October 17, 1990, reversed the
appealed judgment for the reason that: the requisites essential for the
grant of an easement of right of way are not obtaining in this case
hence no alternative presents itself except reversal of the judgment
below.
ISSUE: WON Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way
is continuous and apparent and may be acquired by prescription under
Article 620 of the Civil Code is correct
RULING: Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is
continuous and apparent and may be acquired by prescription under
Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous.
The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a
continuous easement because its use is at intervals and depends upon
the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts his
feet over somebody else's land. Hence, a right of way is not acquirable
by prescription.
Neither may petitioners invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which provides:
Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road. The owner
or developer of a subdivision without access to any
existing public road or street must secure a right of
way to a public road or street and such right of way
must be developed and maintained according to the
requirement of the government authorities concerned.
The municipal ordinances which declared subdivision roads open
to public use "when deemed necessary by the proper authorities"
(p. 7, Rollo) simply allow persons other than the residents of the
Nonoc Homes Subdivision, to use the roads therein when they
are inside the subdivision but those ordinances do not give
outsiders a right to open the subdivision walls so they can enter
the subdivision from the back.

ART. 62O
CONCORDIO ABELLANA, SR., et al. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et.
al G.R. No. 97039 , April 24, 1992
FACTS: The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the
northwestern side of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, sued to establish an
easement of right of way over a subdivision road which, according to the
petitioners, used to be a mere footpath which they and their ancestors had
been using since time immemorial, and that, hence, they had acquired,
through prescription, an easement of right of way therein. The construction of
a wall by the respondents around the subdivision deprived the petitioners of
the use of the subdivision road which gives the subdivision residents access
to the public highway. They asked that the high concrete walls enclosing the
subdivision and cutting of their access to the subdivision road be removed
and that the road be opened to them.

ART.624
NICOLAS VALISNO v. FELIPE ADRIANO
G.R. No. L-37409, May 23, 1988, FIRST DIVISION (Grino-Aquino, J.)
Valisno is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a parcel of
land and more particularly described in his TCT. Valisno bought the land from
the Adriano's sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. The land which is planted
with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that
of the Felipe Adriano on the bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels of
land had been inherited by Honorata Adriano Francisco and her brother,
Felipe Adriano, from their father, Eladio Adriano. At the time of the sale of the
land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River
through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing Felipes land. Adriano
levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the
irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.

The private respondents denied that there was a pre-existing


footpath in the place before it was developed into a subdivision. They alleged
furthermore that the Nonoc Subdivision roads are not the shortest way to a
public road for there is a more direct route from the petitioners' land to the
public highway.

Valisno filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications


(BPWC) a complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered
ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal. Instead of restoring the

After trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the


petitioners, ordering the demolition of the fences and any enclosure at their

12

irrigation canal, Adriano asked for a reinvestigation which was granted. In the
meantime, Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because his
need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent. The Secretary of
BPWC dismissed Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio
Adriano's water rights which had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed
by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of
the water right since then for a period of more than 5 years extinguished the
grant by operation of law, hence the water rights did not form part of his
hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves. Valisno, as
vendee of the land which Honorata received from her father's estate did not
acquire any water rights with the land purchased. The RTC held that Valisno
had no right to pass through Adriano's land to draw water from the
Pampanga River.

Tanedo built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also asked
Tanedo to remove that portion of his building encroaching on Lot 7501-B.
Eduardo Tanedo filed legal redemption and damages, with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Spouses Romeo
and Pacita Sim filed motions to dismiss the complaint and the cross-claim,
for lack of cause of action. The judge dismissed the complaint and the crossclaim. The trial court found that Tanedo's right to continue to use the septic
tank, erected on Lot 7501-B, ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its
subsequent sale to different owners who do not have the same interest, also
appears to be contrary to law.
ISSUE:
Did the easement of right to use the septic tank extinguished?

ISSUE: Is Valisno entitled to damages due to Adriano's violation of his right


to continue to enjoy the easement of aqueduct or water through Adriano's
land?

HELD: NO
"Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:

HELD: YES. The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance
and transfer of the water rights add improvements" appurtenant to Honorata
Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor
Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr.
Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of
land above-described, together with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal
Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No. 5415812 and
one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples, flanges
and footvalves," and the water rights and such other improvements
appertaining to the property subject of this sale. According to the appellant,
the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's
property, for without it the property would be unproductive. Water rights, such
as the right to use a drainage ditch for

(1) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and
servient estates;
(2) By nonuser for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this
period shall be computed from the day on which they ceased to be used;
and, with respect to continuous easements, from the day on which an act
contrary to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the
easement cannot be used; but it shall revive if the subsequent condition
of the estates or either of them should again permit its use, unless when
the use becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding number;

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation
purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantors land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by
a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified
as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as
property right, which survives the determination of the necessity.

(4) By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the condition, if the
easement is temporary or conditional;
(5) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;
(6) By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and
servient estates."
As can be seen from the above provisions, the alienation of the dominant
and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds for the
extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is
continued by operation of law. Article 624 of the Civil Code provides:

As an easement of waters in favor of Valisno has been


established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or
wrongful interference, such as the Adriano's act of levelling the irrigation
canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

"Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two


estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered,
should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may
continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two
estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance
of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the
execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division
of a thing owned in common by two or more persons."

EDUARDO C. TANEDO v. HON. JUANITO A. BERNAD


G.R. No. 66520, August 30, 1988, SECOND DIVISION, (PADILLA, J.)
Antonio Cardenas was the owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of
land situated in Cebu City known as Lot 7501-A, with an area of 140 square
meters and Lot 7501-B, with an area of 612 square meters. Antonio
Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Eduardo C. Tanedo. Antonio
Cardenas, on that same day, also mortgaged Lot 7501-B to said Eduardo C.
Tanedo as a security for the payment of a loan in the amount of P10,000.00.
Antonio Cardenas further agreed that he would sell Lot 7501-B only to
Eduardo Tanedo in case he should decide to sell it, as the septic tank in Lot
7501-B services Lot 7501-A and the apartment building on Lot 7501-A has a
part standing on Lot 7501-B. This was confirmed in a letter. Antonio
Cardenas, however, sold Lot 7501-B to the herein respondent spouses
Romeo and Pacita Sim. Upon learning of the sale, Eduardo Tanedo offered
to redeem the property from Romeo Sim. But the latter refused. Instead,
Romeo Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo

In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of


drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo
Tanedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic
tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo
Tanedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law.
Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim, the new owners of the
servient estate (Lot 7501-B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the
use of the servitude.[17]

13

Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among


themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and
Rufina abutting the municipal road. The share of Anastacia, located at the
extreme left is bounded on the right by the property of Sotero. Adjoining
Soteros property on the right are lots originally owned by Rufina and
Sulpicio, but which were later acquired by a certain Catalina Santos. Located
directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother
Antonio which the latter divided into two equal parts, now Lot A and Lot B 6,
each with an area of 92 square meters. Lot A is located behind Anastacias
Lot, while Lot B is behind the property of Sotero, father of respondent
Yolanda. In 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot A from her uncle Antonio through
her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. Though
hesitant, Yolanda claimed that Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot
with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining
property for P200.00 per square meter.

ART. 631
CARIDAD ONGSIACO, ET AL. v. EMILIA ONGSIACO, ET AL.
Prescription of easements: Presupposes that the easement had been used
before but it was abandoned later for 10 years.
FACTS.
The partnership Ongsiaco, Lim y Cia. owned 1/3 of the Hacienda
Esperanza in Nueva Ecija. On March 25, 1929, the partners agreed to
dissolve the partnership and divide their share among themselves. In said
partition, plaintiff-appellant Caridad received Lot 7 with 565 ha. while
defendant-appellee Emilia got lots 9 and 9A with 826 ha. On Jul. 31, 1929,
the mother of herein parties, Doa Gorgonia Ongsiaco executed a deed of
donation, turning over her whole 3/18 interest in the Hacienda to her heirs,
on the conditions that: it will be held in usufruct in favor of their father Don
Lucio Ongsiaco; and that each of the heirs must give their father a 1000peso annual pension. Titles to the subdivided lots were subsequently
issued.

In 1986, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio, Lot B,


located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a
pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending about nineteen (19)
meters from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of Sotero, and
Anastacias perimeter fence. The store is made of strong materials and
occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and
nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is
not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached
with facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to
pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the
road.

From time immemorial before the partition of the Hacienda


Esperanza, the water coming from the portion of the estate assigned to
plaintiffs had been flowing regularly and without artificial obstruction towards
the other areas of that same hacienda subsequently assigned to the
defendants, as a result of the aforesaid partition. However the defendants
violated this legal easement by constructing in 1937 dikes that obstructed the
natural flow of excess water from plaintiffs higher tenement. Plaintiff sued
for the destruction of the dikes in 1951.

On 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for
a right of way through Anastacia s property proposing the right of way was at
the extreme right of Anastacias property facing the public highway, starting
from the back of Soteros sari-sari store and extending inward by one meter
to her property and turning left for about five meters to avoid the store of
Sotero in order to reach the municipal road and the way was unobstructed
except for an avocado tree standing in the middle, but the same was
dismissed. On appeal, Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held
that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioners property and that the
way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least damage and detriment to
the servient estate.

ISSUE. Whether or not the cause of action for violation of the legal
easement of drainage has been barred by prescription.
HELD.
YES. When the present case was instituted in 1951, more than
20 years had run since the partition. Hence, the legal easement sought to
be enforced had already been extinguished by non-user, and the action is,
therefore, barred by prescription.

Issue

Emilia received a larger share in the partition because the land


assigned to her served as catchbasin for the higher areas, such as that
assigned to Caridad. It was found that Emilia built dikes on her land in 1937.
Such act is covered by the provision on legal easement of drainage of rural
lands. Such easement does not depend upon acts of man but upon the
natural flow of rainwater from higher to lower areas. It is thus a continuous
easement which is extinguished by non-user for 10 years.

WON the lower court erred holding that the one-meter by five-meter
passage way proposed by private respondent is the least prejudicial
and the shortest distance to the public road.
Decision
No, Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the
easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the
criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation.
While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always
so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance;
while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions
and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where
the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding

ART.649 AND 65O


ANASTACIA QUIMEN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 112331, May 29, 1996, FIRST DIVISION, BELLOSILLO,J.
Facts
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero,
Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in

6 Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B , respectively


14

the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the
least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two
(2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will
cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

highway may be the shortest.


It must be stressed that, by its very nature, and when considered
with reference to the obligations imposed on the servient estate, an
easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the
servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient
estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before
his claim for easement of right of way may be granted. Petitioners failed in
this regard.

In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of


Appeals declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1)
meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioners
property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the
suggested passage through the property of Yolandas father which would
mean destroying the sari-sari store made of strong materials. Absent any
showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in
the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, the court accepted and adopted
such findings. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of
strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of
way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down,
the second alternative should be preferred.

Admittedly, petitioners had been granted a right of way through the


other adjacent lot owned by the Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners use
the said outlet in going to and coming from the public highway. Clearly, there
is an existing outlet to and from the public road.
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous,
and they have to pass through other lots owned by different owners before
they could get to the highway. We find petitioners concept of what is
"adequate outlet" a complete disregard of the well- entrenched doctrine that
in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there
must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as
the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the
same should not be imposed.

Decision of CA affirmed.

CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, AND ROSEMARIE


DICHOSO PE BENITO, PETITIONERS,vs.PATROCINIO L. MARCOS,
RESPONDENT.
FACTS
In 2002, Petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against
respondent. As petitioners had no access to a public road to and from their
property, they claimed to have used a portion of the respondents lot in
accessing the road since 1970. Respondent, however, blocked the
passageway with piles of sand. In his Answer, respondent denied that he
allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as passageway. He maintained that there
is an existing easement of right of way available to petitioners granted by the
Spouses Arce. Thus, there is no need to establish another easement over
respondents property. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners but was
reversed by the CA on appeal.

We quote with approval the CAs observations in this wise:


As it shows, [petitioners] had been granted a right of way through the
adjacent estate of Spouses Arce before the complaint below was even filed.
[Respondent] alleged that this right of way is being used by the other estates
which are similarly situated as [petitioners]. [Petitioners] do not dispute this
fact. There is also a reason to believe that this right of way is Spouses Arces
outlet to a public road since their property, as it appears from the Sketch
Map, is also surrounded by other estates. The fact that Spouses Arce are not
insisting on a right of way through respondents property, although an
opening on the latters property is undoubtedly the most direct and shortest
distance to P. Gomez St. from the formers property, bolsters our conviction
that they have adequate outlet to the highway which they are now likewise
making available to [petitioners].[21]The convenience of the dominant
estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of
way. To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is
"adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet
from the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even
when the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the
need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.

ISSUE: WON respondent is under obligation to grant a right of way on the


desired passageway

RULING NO.
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following
requisites should be met:

Petition denied.

1.The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables


and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;

LORETO VDA. DE BALTAZAR & NESTOR BALTAZAR v. COURT OF


APPEALS & DANIEL PANGANIBAN
G.R. No. 106082, 27 June 1995, THIRD DIVISION, (Romero, J.)

2.There is payment of proper indemnity;


3.The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; and

Daniel Panganiban is the owner of a parcel of residential land denominated


as Lot no. 1027. Immediately to the front of said land is Lot 1026 of Loreto
Vda. de Baltazar and her son Nestor Baltazar. Immediately behind is the Sta.
Ana River. On either side are Lots 1025 and 1028 owned by Ricardo
Calimon and Jose Legaspi, respectively. Braulio Street, a provincial road,
runs along the frontage of Lots 1025, 1026 and 1028.

4.The right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to


the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public

15

SPOUSES MANUEL MEJORADA AND ROSALINDA P. MEJORADA v.


GLORIFICACION VERTUDAZO

Sometime in 1989, Daniel Panganiban filed a complaint against the


Baltazars who are owners of Lot 1026 for the establishment of a permanent
and perpetual easement of right of way for him to have access to the
provincial road.

Glorificacion and Sol Vertudazo established their permanent residence on a


300-square meter. Their property is landlocked being bordered on all sides
by different lots. As an access route going to Quiones Street and the public
highway, they utilized a proposed undeveloped barangay road on the south
side of their property owned by Rosario Quiones. In 1988, spouses Manuel
and Rosalinda Mejorada, petitioners, bought Rosarios 646-square meter lot
adjacent to respondents property. Included therein is an area measuring
55.5 square meters which serves as an adequate outlet to Quiones Street,
now the subject of the present controversy. For several years, respondents
and the general public have been using that area as a passageway to and
from Quiones Street but petitioners closed the passageway by building a
new garage for their service jeep.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed. The CA found that the
two passageways before were mere temporary pathways which Panganiban
requested successively from his two neighbors Calimon and Legaspi when
Baltazar closed the passageway through his property. When the path on the
eastern side (Lot 1025) was closed to Panganiban, he was granted the use
of the other on the western side (Lot 1028).
ISSUE:
Is Panganiban entitled to claim an easement of right of way over
the Baltazars' property?

Issue: Whether respondents are entitled to the easement of right of way on


the property owned by petitioners?

RULING:
YES.
In Locsin v. Climaco, this Court said:
By express provision of Articles 649 and
650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of
an estate may claim a compulsory right
of way only after he has established the
existence of four (4) requisites, namely,
(1) the estate is surrounded by other
immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway; (2) after
payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the
isolation was not due to the proprietor's
own acts; and (4) the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate, and in so far as
consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest.
It is not disputed that the first requisite has been established by
the court a quo in its Order. Panganiban's property is indeed surrounded by
immovables on three sides and a river on the fourth.
As for the second requisite, the Court agrees with the CA when it
ordered the remand of this case to the lower court for the purpose of fixing
the proper indemnity.
With respect to the third requisite, respondent Panganiban was
likewise able to establish that the isolation of his property was not due to his
own act for he merely bought Lot 1027, which was formerly part of the
Baltazars' Lot 1026-A, 11 from petitioner Baltazar's predecessors-in-interest.
The CA found that Lot 1026-B which Panganiban have been using as a right
of way, has been "existing, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used by
the appellant as a right of way for 30 years during the lifetime of Baltazars
grandfather, Fidel and his father, Onisimo Baltazar." It was also established
that the right of way was "closed and obstructed by the petitioners when they
closed the gate and placed plants across the gate of Lot 1026-B when
petitioners constructed their present residence."
As regards the fourth requirement, both parties agreed that the
passage claimed by respondent as his right of way, compared to the other
passageways, is the shortest distance from respondent's lot to Braulio
Street. Baltazars could not have been inconvenienced by the passageway
for, as borne out by the records, the same is separate and distinct from the
gate used by them to enter their lot and residence. Such being the case, we
conclude that Panganiban is entitled to claim a compulsory easement of
right of way over petitioners' Lot 1026-B.

Held: Yes.
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate
or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining
to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled
to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of
the proper indemnity. xxx
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law for public
use or for private interest. Pursuant to the above provisions, the owner of an
estate may claim a legal or compulsory right of way only after he has
established the existence of these four (4) requisites:
(a) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway;
(b) after payment of the proper indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the proprietors own acts; and
(d) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate.
Here, these four requisites have been satisfied. First, as found by the Court
of Appeals, there is no other road which respondents could use leading to
Quiones Street except the passageway on petitioners property. Second,
respondents have offered to pay petitioners proper indemnity for the
easement of way. Third, the Court of Appeals likewise found that the isolation
of respondents property was not due to their acts. Fourth, the easement is at
the point least prejudicial to petitioners property. In fact, the area of the
easement which is 55.5 square meters is located at the corner of
petitioners landholding, hence, does not cause them inconvenience in
anyway.
Petition was denied.

ART 66O
DOMINGO LAO and ALBINA DE LOS SANTOS, applicants-appellants,
vs. THE HEIRS OF LORENZA ALBURO, objectors-appellees.

16

G.R. No. L-10372, December 24, 1915

and examined it, testified that the aforesaid drain caught the rain water from
the eaves of the applicants' roof, and that from the outside the division or
space between the applicants' wall and the wall on the objectors' land could
be seen; that the lower part of this latter wall had two arch like hollows; that
according to the testimony of the objector, Ireneo Mendoza, the latter wall
was that of an old building that had belonged to the said deceased and was
destroyed by an earthquake; and that in the rear of the objectors' land were
the ruins of a wall which had also flanked the wall in dispute, and these ruins,
according to the said witness Mendoza were what was left of the wall of a
latrine formerly existing there.

FACTS: On May 8, 1914, counsel for the said husband and wife filed a
written application in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of
four parcels of land, together with the buildings thereon, of which they
claimed to be the absolute owners. Lot No. 2 comprises of a house of strong
materials erected thereon.
After due service of notice, counsel for the administrator of the
estate of the deceased Lorenza Alburo filed in court a written objection,
alleging that in the part of the application relative to the second parcel of the
plan No. 1, a stone wall shown in that plan belongs to the said Lorenza
Alburo, for it had existed since March 8, 1881; that the principal timbers of
the building that had belonged to the said deceased had rested on it for more
than thirty-five years, and the latter's successors had been and were now in
the quiet, peaceable and uninterrupted possession of the said wall.

These exterior signs contrary to the existence of a party-wall


easement cannot be offset by the circumstance that the dispute wall projects
into Calle Juan Luna 74 centimeters farther than the applicants' building, and
neither can the fact that the face of this projecting wall is on the same street
line as the objectors' building, for the reason that, in view of the said signs
contrary to the existence of the easement of party wall, the projection of the
wall does not prove that it was a party wall belonging in common to the
applicants and the objectors and that the latter shared in the ownership
thereof.

The Court of Land Registration held that the applicants, Domingo


Lao and Albina de los Santos were the lawful owners and possessors of the
four properties sought to be registered; wherefore the court decreed the
registration thereof in their names, but ordered that record be made in the
decree that the wall marked on the plan of the parcel No. 2 as a stone
wall was a party wall.

The objectors have not proved that a part or one-half of the wall in
litigation was erected on the land that belonged to the deceased Lorenza
Alburo. The fact that the owners of the objectors' property may have
surreptitiously inserted some of the timbers or joists of their building in the
wall belonging to the applicants is not enough to convert this latter into a
party wall, when there are so many exterior signs to indicate the exclusive
ownership of the wall and to conflict with the existence of the easement that
the objectors endeavor to establish. The wall in litigation is fully proven by
the record to belong exclusively to the applicants.

ISSUE: WON the stone wall is a party wall


RULING: The wall in litigation is fully proven by the record to belong
exclusively to the applicants.
Article 573 of the Civil Code also declares that it shall be understood that
there are exterior signs which conflict with the easement of party wall, when,
among other circumstances, the entire wall is built on one of the lots and not
on the line dividing the two adjoining parcels; when the dividing wall, being
constructed of stone and cement, has stone projecting at intervals from the
surface on one side only and not on the other; and when it supports joists,
beams, floors, and the roof timbers of one of the houses but not of the
adjoining building.

ART.668
MIGUEL FABIE v. JULITA LICHAUCO & CHILDREN OF FRANCISCO
ROXAS
G.R. No. 3598, July 24, 1908, (Mapa, J.)
Fabie applied for the registration his property free from all
incumbrances with the exception of an easement of right of way which he
recognizes as existing in favor of respondents. In addition to the said
easement of right of way the respondents claim that of light, view, and
drainage in favor of their respective properties; said claim was modified in
part during the course of the litigation as far as it referred to Lichauco, who
finally, reduced her opposition to the easement of right of way and of light
and view. In the judgment appealed from it is held that the easement of right
of way exists in favor of the respective properties of Julita Lichauco and Hijos
de Roxas, and the latter are further entitled to the easement of drainage. The
claim of both respondents as to other easements was dismissed on the
ground that the easement of light and view is a negative easement and
should begin to run not from the existence of the window or balconies, but
from the day when the owner of the dominant estate, by means of a formal
act, might have prohibited the owner of servient estate to do something
which he could properly execute if the easement did not exist. The balconies
in question were said to be projecting over the lot of Fabie and therefore,
according to respondent, the easement was positive and not negative.
Hence, according to them the prescription began to run from the time of the
invasion of the rights of property of Fabie.

The record shows it to have been duly proven that the enclosing
wall of Lot No. 2 of the plan Exhibit A, belonging to the applicants, is much
higher than the adjoining building of the objectors; that along the top of the
said wall there is a gutter which catches the rain water from the eaves of the
roof of the applicants' building and carries it thence to Calle Juan Luna
through an iron pipe fastened to the said wall; that one-half of the top of the
said wall is covered by the roof of the applicants' building; that the supports
of the said wall project toward the side of the applicants' land and that none
of the buttresses are on the side of the objectors' lot; that the stones of the
wall in dispute are bound or inset in the rear enclosing wall of the applicants'
property in such wise that the two walls that inclose the lot form but a single
construction, the exterior signs of which show that the wall in question is not
a party wall, but that it forms a part of the applicant's building and belongs to
them.
Besides the signs just referred to, the evidence also shows that
on the objectors' land and flanking the disputed wall there is another and
lower wall which has no connection with the one in question. Cayetano
Arguelles, a master builder, who climbed to the top of the wall in question

ISSUE: Did the balconies exceed the lot of Fabie?


HELD:

17

NO. Therefore, it does not appear from the agreement, which is


the only evidence we have before us, no other having been offered at the
hearing, that the house of the respondents has balconies over the land of the
petitioner; and as it is, since it has not been positively shown that the said
balconies exceed the limit of the lot owned by the former, nor less that they
invade the atmospheric area of the lot belonging to the latter, it follows that,
even in accordance with the theory maintained by the respondents with
which, on account of its lack of basis, we consider it unnecessary to deal
herein as to its other aspect, the easement of view, which might result in
such case from the existence of the balconies alluded to, would be negative
and not a positive one, because the erection of the same would not
constitute, according to their own statement, an invasion of the right of
another, but the lawful exercise of the right inherent to the dominion of the
respondents to construct within their, own lot. And as said easement is
negative, it cannot have prescribed in favor of the property of the
respondents in the absence of any act of opposition, according to the
agreement, by which they or their principals would have prohibited the
petitioner or his principals to do any work which might obstruct the balconies
in question, inasmuch as said act of opposition is what constitutes the
necessary and indispensable point of departure for computing the time
required by law for the prescription of negative easements.

Castro averred that when she bought the property, no such annotation of
easement exists over the property. Respondent neither asked permission
nor talked to her with regard to the use of 65 sq.m. of her property as
easement. For his part, respondent claimed that he and his family had been
residing in Moonwalk Village since June 1984. When he bought the property
in 1983, the land elevation of Moonwalk Village was almost on the same
level as Manuela Homes. However, sometime in 1985 and 1986, the
developer of Manuela Homes, bulldozed, excavated, and transferred
portions of the elevated land to the lower portions of Manuela Homes. Thus,
Manuela Homes became lower than Moonwalk Village.
ISSUE. WON an easement of lateral and
subjacent support exists on the subject adjacent properties and, if it does,
whether the same may be annotated at the back of the title of the servient
estate.
HELD.
YES an easement of lateral and subjacent support exists. Article
437 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a parcel of land is the owner
of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any
works, or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper.
However, such right of the owner is not absolute and is subject to the
following limitations: (1) servitudes or easements, (2) special laws, (3)
ordinances, (4) reasonable requirements of aerial navigation, and (5) rights
of third persons.

After the foregoing it is not necessary to say anything further to


show the impropriety of the claim of the respondents in connection with the
other easement of balconies (projiciendi). They claim this easement on the
supposition that the balconies of their house are or look over the lot of the
petitioner; therefore, considering that this fact has not been proven, as
shown heretofore, said pretension fails and cannot prosper in any way.

Respondents assertion that he has an adverse claim over the 65 sq.m.


property of petitioner is misplaced since he does not have a claim over the
ownership of the land. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered
land under Section 70 of PD 1529 requires a claim on the title of the disputed
land. Annotation is done to apprise third persons that there is a controversy
over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the
adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It is a notice to
third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to
the outcome of the dispute.

ART. 684
MARGARITA CASTRO v. NAPOLEON MONSOD
Art. 684. Lateral and Subjacent Support
FACTS.
Petitioner Margarita Castro is the registered owner of a parcel of
land located on Garnet St. Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las Pinas City.
Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner of the property adjoining the lot
of petitioner located on Lyra St. Moonwalk Village, Phase 2, Las Pinas City.
There is a concrete fence, more or less 2 meters high, dividing Manuela
Homes from Moonwalk Village.

In reality, what respondent is claiming is a judicial recognition of the


existence of the easement of subjacent and lateral support over the 65 sq.
m. portion of petitioners property covering the land support/embankment
area. His reason for the annotation is only to prevent petitioner from
removing the embankment or from digging on the property for fear of soil
erosion that might weaken the foundation of the rear portion of his property
which is adjacent to the property of petitioner.

There are deposits of soil and rocks about two (2) meters away from the front
door of the house of Castro. As such, she was not able to park her vehicle at
the dead-end portion of Garnet Street. She also noticed a leak that caused
the front portion of her house to be slippery so she hired construction
workers to see where the leak was coming from. The workers had already
started digging when police officers sent by respondent came and stopped
the workers from finishing their job.

A permanent injunction on the part of petitioner from making injurious


excavations is necessary in order to protect the interest of respondent.
However, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral
support is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated
or registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same
already binds the property and the owner of the same, including her
successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to
court or have the easement of subjacent and lateral support registered in
order for it to be recognized and respected.

On February 29, 2000, Monsod caused the annotation of an adverse claim


against sixty-five (65) sq.m. of the property of petitioner. The adverse claim
was filed without any claim of ownership over the property. Respondent was
merely asserting the annotation of the existing legal easement of lateral and
subjacent support at the rear portion of his estate to prevent the property
from collapsing, since his property is located at an elevated plateau of fifteen
(15) feet, more or less, above the level of petitioners property. This is in
view of petitioners manifest determination to remove the embankment left by
the developer of Manuela Homes.

Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make
such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or

18

building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. An owner, by virtue


of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is
subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two adjacent
landowners, each has an absolute property right to have his land laterally
supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own
premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbors land as to
cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away
or slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable.

subject embankment and, unless restrained, the continued excavation of the


embankment could cause the foundation of the rear portion of the house of
respondent to collapse, resulting in the destruction of a huge part of the
family dwelling.

In the instant case, an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in


favor of respondent. It was established that the properties of petitioner and
respondent adjoin each other. The residential house and lot of respondent is
located on an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet above the level of
petitioners property. The embankment and the riprapped stones have been
in existence even before petitioner became the owner of the property. It was
proven that petitioner has been making excavations and diggings on the

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