Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

Referendum Counterplan Table of Contents

Summary................................................................................................................................................2
Glossary.................................................................................................................................................3
First Negative Constructive (1NC) Shell ............................................................................................4
Answers to Permutation
AT: Perm Does Both................................................................................................................................5
AT: Advisory Perm....................................................................................................................................6
Solvency Extensions
AT: No Solvency Polls Arent Trustworthy.............................................................................................7
AT: No Solvency Process Manipulation................................................................................................8
AT: No Solvency Delays.......................................................................................................................9
AT: No Solvency Rollback...................................................................................................................10
AT: No Solvency Experts Key.............................................................................................................11
AT: No Solvency No Direct Democracy..............................................................................................12
AT: No Solvency No Intrinsic Benefit..................................................................................................13
AT: No Solvency Not Allowed.............................................................................................................14
AT: Solvency Turn Capitalism.............................................................................................................15
AT: Solvency Turn Poverty..................................................................................................................16

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

Summary
The Referendum Counterplan is the only generic counterplan in the Varsity Packet. The outline of the
counterplan changes the process of decision making proposed by the Affirmative teams plan. In
each case, the Affirmative team argues that the United States Federal Government should take some
sort of action. In the Referendum Counterplan, the Negative team is not arguing against the
government taking that action, but instead they are arguing that the decision should be made by a
binding national referendum. In other words, the entire country should vote on the issues highlighted
by the Affirmative team, and the federal government should be required to adhere to the decision of
the voters.
The remainder of the evidence discusses why the use of a binding referendum is the best course of
action. For example, a binding referendum would lead to high voter turnout and provide the
government an opportunity to enact a reform based on direct democracy. This power of direct
democracy would give citizens an enhanced ownership of the policy that they otherwise cannot
experience. Furthermore, referendums draw politically engaged voters and statistics show that unlike
policies enacted by government representatives, there can be no doubt that the decision represents
the will of the people. The counterplan evidence continues on to explain that direct democracy is the
best form of government, and thus the best way to enact any plan. Finally, the evidence explains that
direct democracy is key to increasing political engagement and helping end poverty.

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

Glossary
Advisory Referendum When a legislative body can choose to enact or not enact the outcome of a
direct vote by an entire group on a proposal.
Binding Referendum When a legislative body is bound to the outcome of a direct vote by an entire
group on a proposal.
Civil Liberties The state of being subject only to laws established for the good of the community,
especially with regard to freedom of action and speech; individual rights protected by law from unjust
governmental or other interference.
Direct Democracy A form or system of democracy giving citizens an extraordinary amount of
participation in the legislation process and granting them a maximum of political self-determination.
Electoral Law Laws defining what is and is not allowed in elections
Fiat Latin for let it be done A theoretical construct in policy debate derived from the word in the
resolution whereby the substance of the resolution is debated, rather than the political feasibility of
enactment and enforcement of a given plan
Judicial Review The doctrine under which legislative and executive actions are subject to review
by the judiciary. A court with judicial review power may invalidate laws and decisions that are
incompatible with a higher authority, such as the terms of a written constitution.
National Referendum A direct vote in which an entire nation is asked to vote on a particular
proposal.
Petition Clause The formal name for the right to petition as referred to in the First Amendment.
Political Actor (Political Agent) A person responsible for decision making about and enacting of a
policy.
Political Elites A small group of people who control a disproportionate amount of wealth or political
power.
Popular Sovereignty The principle that the authority of the government is created and sustained
by the consent of its people, through their elected representatives (Rule by the People), who are the
source of all political power.
Public Deliberation A conversation or discussion that includes citizens who reflect diverse
viewpoints on the topic or issue under consideration.
Rollback The process of restoring something to its previously defined state.
Special Interest Subversion An attempt to transform the established social order and its structures
of power, authority, and hierarchy by a special interest group.

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

1NC Shell (1/2)

Counterplan Text: The United States Federal Government should put to vote a direct binding
national referendum regarding the passage of the plan.
1. The Counterplan has the following net benefits: ___________________________________.
2. The Counterplan solves The public supports the curtailing of surveillance, the
counterplan poses a better solution by erring on the side of liberty.
Pew Research Center, 2015
(Lee Rainie and Mary Madden for the Pew Research Center on Internet, Science, and Tech;
Americans View On Government Surveillance Programs; 03/16/2015; accessed 07/01/2015;
<http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/03/16/americans-views-on-government-surveillance-programs/>.)
Americans are divided in their concerns about government surveillance of digital
communications In this survey, 17% of Americans said they are very concerned about government
surveillance of Americans data and electronic communication; 35% say they are somewhat
concerned; 33% say they are not very concerned and 13% say they are not at all concerned
about the surveillance. Those who are more likely than others to say they are very concerned
include those who say they have heard a lot about the surveillance efforts (34% express
strong concern) and men (21% are very concerned). When asked about more specific points of
concern over their own communications and online activities, respondents expressed somewhat
lower levels of concern about electronic surveillance in various parts of their digital lives: Americans
Have More Muted Concerns about Government Monitoring of their Own Digital Behavior 39% say
they are very concerned or somewhat concerned about government monitoring of their
activity on search engines. 38% say they are very concerned or somewhat concerned
about government monitoring of their activity on their email messages. 37% express concern
about government monitoring of their activity on their cell phone. 31% are concerned about
government monitoring of their activity on social media sites, such as Facebook or Twitter. 29% say
they are concerned about government monitoring of their activity on their mobile apps. In addition,
notable numbers of respondents said that some of these questions were not applicable to them. In
general, men are more likely than women to say that they are very concerned about government
surveillance of Americans data and electronic communications (21% vs. 12%). Men are also more
likely than women to be very concerned about surveillance over their own activities on mobile apps
and search engines. When asked to elaborate on their concerns, many survey respondents were
critical of the programs, frequently referring to privacy concerns and their personal rights.

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

AT: Perm Do Both

[___] Only committing to a binding referendum will encourage voter participation.
DuVivier, 2006
(KK DuVivier; Professor of Law at University of Denver; The United States as a Democratic Ideal?:
International Lessons in Referendum Democracy p 845-848; University of Denver Sturm College of
Law; 2006; accessed 07/01/2015; <http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=
373087070022101004087096120125013018017088025072063003074023127092024105002114099
002045016030042041027026000020084097120093127055081055054007093093107114121075111
058058016098092084100075069070095012066082076123123019120031080077112085094067072
013&EXT=pdf&TYPE=2>.)
In contrast to votes that bind in legal terms, some referendums are only advisory or consultative.170
Advisory referendums are not as common in the United States, and some state constitutions
disallow ballot questions that have no legal effect.171 Yet New Zealand172 and several
European countries, including Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom,173
have used referendums that do not formally bind. Critics of the New Zealand advisory referendum
process, however, call it a fraud on the community because the government asks the public
for its opinion when the Government has said that it will not necessarily follow that
opinion.174 Consequently, New Zealands advisory referendum statute, although popular at
first,175 [w]ithin a decade . . . appears to have fallen into desuetude.176 This conclusion presumes,
however, that the primary objective of citizen initiated referendums is for them to create positive law.
The reality, in fact, is that most initiatives fail,177 and despite low passage rates and despite high
costs, the main reason interest groups in the United States continue to pursue unsuccessful
initiatives is that they can be an effective route to exert pressure on other political actors.178
Thus, these advisory referendums allow citizens to place pressure on legislative bodies to take
a certain course of action.179 In the United States, citizens have used advisory referendums in
the local government arena. For example, in 1983, local voters passed Proposition 0 that asked the
City of San Francisco to notify President Reagan that they favored the repeal of bilingual ballot
provisions of the Federal Voting Rights Act.180 In addition, during the late 1970s, advisory
referendums directed attention to national environmental and nuclear-freeze issues.181 More
significantly, the experience in Europe has shown that advisory referendums often effectively bind
governments. No parliament in Europe has explicitly disregarded the verdict delivered by the people,
and were this to happen on a major issue, the fallout would be severe.182 Furthermore, an advisory
referendum often proves preferable to one that binds. First, it does not conflict with an existing system
of government that requires legislative supremacy. For example, in the United Kingdom, the notion of
parliamentary sovereignty183 dictates that Parliament cannot be formally bound by an advisory
referendum.184 Consequently, an advisory referendum exerts pressure while simultaneously
preserving the existing governance system.185 Second, an advisory process better reflects the reality
that government actors must interpret and implement any measure.186 An advisory referendum
allows a legislature flexibility to predict the outcome of a provision in a manner that reconciles
possible conflicts187 and anticipates constitutional challenges in the courts.188

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

AT: Advisory Perm

[___]

[___] An advisory referendum eliminates direct democracy. Every instance of direct

democracy is key.
Robinson, 2007
(Nick, Yale Law School, J.D., Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the
Decentralization of Foreign Policy, Akron Law Review, 40 Akron L. Rev. 647)
The argument in this article for local democratic participation is also, perhaps primarily, a humanist
one. With more possibility for participation, we become thicker citizens. We have greater ability
to engage in our communities and in turn more control over and understanding of our own
lives as humans. For Durkheim, government had its own consciousness. Such a characterization
highlighted that although government at its root might merely be a shared idea in a community of
conscious humans, it could also have its own agency. The state had its own logic that was removed,
and even unknown, from those that "thought" government into existence. He writes of a democratic
state that "the closer communication becomes between the government consciousness and
the rest of society, and the more this consciousness expands and the more things it takes in, the
more democratic the character of the society will be." n14 For Durkheim, it is the democratic
state's reflection upon its citizens through its citizens that gave democracy a moral
superiority. n15 [*655] When we debate where and how democratic governance will occur, we
are battling over what choreography of thought will define our state and we as citizens. Such
stakes are not easily quantifiable. If our aim in structuring governance, however, is not to reach
definable utopias, but rather to balance as best we can the competing interests and tensions of being
human and being governed, then we must take into account governance's transcendent depths and
not just its readily chartable currents.

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

AT: No Solvency Polls Arent Trustworthy

[___] Referendums draw the most politically engaged voters who are educated on the issue at
hand.
Donovan and Karp, 2006
(Todd Donovan, professor of political science at Western Washington University; Jeffrey A. Karp,
professor of politics at the University of Exeter; Popular Support for Direct Democracy p 683-684;
Party Politics Vol 12 No 5; SAGE Publications; 2006; accessed 07/01/2015;
<http://www.jkarp.com/pdf/pp_2006.pdf>.)
In a survey of the effects of political reforms designed to lower barriers to participation (e.g. postal
voting, absentee voting, election-day registration), Berinsky (2005) notes that such reforms often
have the effect of mobilizing higher proportions of interested voters than less interested ones.
He finds that when rules are changed to make it easier to vote, people with higher levels of
political interest are most likely to take advantage of the rule change. The less interested, in
contrast, lack sufficient levels of interest to be engaged, even when barriers to participation are
reduced. From this perspective, it seems plausible that when democratic institutions require
additional effort from citizens, those institutions will elicit less support from people with low
levels of interest in politics than from those with more interest. For many people, the desire to
participate in initiative and referendum decisions probably corresponds with some level of
political interest. Perhaps we should not be too surprised, then, to find some evidence here
consistent with the cognitive mobilization thesis. Referendums and initiatives do require that
citizens make more political decisions than they would have to do otherwise, and possibly
require that they must also obtain additional cues and information to make such decisions.
Although there is ample evidence suggesting that readily available cues assist people in making such
decisions (Bowler and Donovan, 1998; Lupia, 1994), the act of participating in a referendum
nevertheless presents the citizens with additional cognitive costs of participation. Unlike previous
studies of attitudes about direct democracy, some of our findings are consistent with the idea that the
politically interested and politically engaged, at least in some nations, are less sensitive to such
costs, and, thus, more supportive of direct democracy. These findings are also consistent with
other research suggesting that referendums may encourage the politically interested and educated to
turn out at elections (Donovan et al., 2005). Results from this study also have implications for
normative assessments of direct democracy. Our results provide little support for the idea that direct
democracy may be used as a tool to mobilize those most peripheral to politics, nor do they
demonstrate that direct democracy finds particular support on the far right of the ideological spectrum.
This might be possible, but we find little support for those ideas here. This point is important. Although
we do find some mixed support for the political disaffection thesis, the patterns we observe in our
multivariate analysis suggest different conclusions than those reached by Dalton et al. (2001).
Although we do find that frequent use of referendums had more opposition among those with a
university education (in some nations), many of our multivariate findings fail to conform with the
results they report from Germany and elsewhere in Europe.2

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

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AT: No Solvency Process Manipulation

[___]

[___] Statistical data shows that the desires of the majority are met.
Matsusaka, 2005
(John G., Professor of Finance and Business Economics in the Marshall School of Business,
Professor of Business and Law in the Law School, and President of the Initiative & Referendum
Institute, all at the University of Southern California, Direct Democracy Works, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Volume 19, Number 2, Spring pg. 185206)
Despite the concerns of special interest subversion, the evidence generally shows that direct
democracy serves the many and not the few. Matsusaka (2004) examines fiscal data spanning
the entire twentieth century at both the state and local level to determine whether the initiative
promotes tax and spending policies favored by the majority or, as the special interest view maintains,
leads to policies favored by a minority and opposed by the majority. The study first documents three
significant policy changes brought about by the initiative: 1) spending and tax cuts; 2) decentralization
of spending from state to local governments; and 3) a shift of revenue out of broad-based taxes and
into user fees and charges for services. Numerous opinion surveys are then examined, which
generally show that a majority of people favored the three changes brought about by the initiative.
Thus, as far as fiscal policy is concerned, the initiative appears to have delivered policies desired
by the majority.

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

AT: No Solvency Delays

[___] The counterplan mandates the process begin immediately, but setup takes 90 days.
Singer, 2011
(Bill, member of the Herskovits PLLC law firm, Time for a National Referendum on Economic Policy,
Broke & Broker, August 8th, http://www.brokeandbroker.com/1013/national-economic-referendum-billsinger)
Let us then submit those proposals to a popular vote with the requirement that the two plans
receiving the most votes after a primary-type ballot would then be ultimately submitted to the
American public for a vote within, say, 90 days. During that interim, Congress would be welcome
to draft a super-majority counter-plan that would be listed on the same final ballot. It would be an
interesting challenge to the House and Senate to see if they can forge a single piece of legislation
that the public will support.

[___] Implementation only takes two days.

Shermer, 1969
(Shermer, Ph.D. Govt Studies American University, American Referendum Association, The Sense
of the People)
Probably the best answer to this seemingly valid argument is contained in the following statement of
the late U.S. Sentaor Jonathan Bourne, Jr., in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Sept., 1912, issue: In my opinion, the individual voters of the state (Oregon) in the
quiet of their own homes in the evening could better consider and decide upon an average of
one bill in two days than members of the legislature, amid the hurry and strife and personal
feeling incidence to a legislative session, could consider and decide upon an average of twelve bills a
day. It is erroneous to assume that the voter is required to pass upon a large number of measures in
the few minutes he occupies the booth on election day. Such is not the case. He has several weeks
to determine how he will vote, and merely takes a few minutes in which to mark his ballot. To
support his contention, Senator Bourne added, that in one year (about 1911) each member of the
Oregon Legislature had to consider five hundred bills in forty days (approx. twelve per day), plus
political questions, resolutions, and problems of parliamentary procedure. With todays shorter
work week, and tomorrows thirty-hour-week resulting inevitably from automation, it is not a
question of whether people have the timethe question is whether they have the inclination. The
referendum system is designed to create the desire and the incentive to study the issues.

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

AT: No Solvency Rollback

[___] Precedents are already set rollback only occurs when the results of the ballot are
unconstitutional or not deemed procedurally valid, and standards check.
U.N. Commission for Human Rights, 2001
(U.N. Commission for Human Rights, Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights;
Guidelines for Constitutional Referendums at National Level; Adopted by the Venice Commission at
its 47 th Plenary Meeting; 07/6-7/2001; accessed 07/07/2015;
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/guidelines1.htm>.)
I. THE GENERAL CONTEXT Recent experience of constitutional referendums in the new
democracies has highlighted a number of issues which the present guidelines seek to address.
These guidelines set out minimum rules for constitutional referendums and are designed to
ensure that this instrument is used in all countries in accordance with the principles of
democracy and the rule of law. Constitutional referendums are taken as referring to popular
votes in which the question of partially or totally revising a State's Constitution (and not of its
federated entities) is asked, irrespective of whether this requires voters to give an opinion on a
specific proposal for constitutional change or on a question of principle. By definition a constitutional
referendum is concerned with a partial or total revision of the Constitution. A constitutional referendum
may : be required by the text of the Constitution which provides that certain texts are automatically
submitted to referendum after their adoption by Parliament (mandatory referendum); take place
following a popular initiative : - either a section of the electorate puts forward a text which is then
submitted to popular vote; - or a section of the electorate requests that a text adopted by Parliament
be submitted to popular vote; be called by an authority such as : - Parliament itself or a specific
number of members of Parliament; - the Head of State or the government; - one or several territorial
Entities. Constitutional referendums may be held both with respect to texts already approved or not
yet approved by Parliament. They may take the form of : a vote on specifically-worded draft
amendments to the constitution or a specific proposal to abrogate existing provisions of the
Constitution; a vote on a question of principle (for example: "are you in favour of amending the
constitution to introduce a presidential system of government?"); or on a concrete proposal which
does not have the form of specifically worded amendments, know as a "generally worded proposal"
(for example: "are you in favour of amending the Constitution in order to reduce the number of seats
in Parliament from 300 to 200?"). It could be a question of a legally binding referendum or a nonlegally binding referendum II. GUIDELINES A. Legal basis The following issues must be expressly
regulated at constitutional level: - types of referendum and the bodies competent to call a
referendum; - the subject-matter of referendums; - the effects of referendums; - general norms
and principles (point II.B), including the franchise; - the main rules governing procedural and
substantive validity (points II.C and II.D); - judicial review (point II.P). All the guidelines outlined
below should be covered by the Constitution or legislation. B. General norms and principles 1. The
constitutional principles of electoral law (universal, equal, free, direct and secret suffrage) apply
to referendums. 2. Equally, fundamental rights, especially freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly and freedom of association must be guaranteed and protected. 3. The use of
referendums must comply with the legal system as a whole and especially the rules governing
revision of the Constitution. In particular, referendums cannot be held if the Constitution does not
provide for them, for example where constitutional reform is a matter for Parliament's exclusive
jurisdiction. 4. Judicial review should be available in the field covered by the present guidelines.
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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

AT: No Solvency Experts Key

[___] Experts overestimate their own knowledge, have tunnel vision, and engage in group
think. Engaging the public is key to involve public values and create more popular policies.
Shane, 2012
(Peter M. Shane, Chair in Law at the Moritz College of Law of Ohio State University; Cybersecurity
Policy as if Ordinary Citizens Mattered: The Case for Public Participation in Cyber Policy Making pg
455-458; Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society; 09/02/2012; accessed 07/01/2015; <
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2012/02/9.Shane_.pdf>.)
The most intense objections from agency policy makers are likely to appear in the form of doubts as
to the utility of deliberation with non-experts. In research I did in 2009 on early efforts by the current
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) leadership to expand public input in FCC decision
making,72 a number of senior staff expressed genuine uncertainty as to the role non-expert
opinion was supposed to play in their decision making. In the words of one staff member, Arent
we supposed to be the expert agency? Whats the general public going to tell me about the hard
technical choices we face that I do not already know?73 Such an objection, however, ignores two
critical points. The first is that decision making confined to experts is prone to its own kinds of
deficiencies. Happily, evidence does suggest that experts are less likely to make certain sorts of
predictable errors, such as overestimating the likely recurrence of vivid events, and more likely to
gain some adaptive ability to overcome erroneous judgments as a result of repeat encounters with
specific factual scenarios.74 Experts, however: are subject to three distinct biases of their own.
First, they are likely to overestimate their actual knowledge. In the experimental setting, they
demonstrate levels of confidence in their judgments that exceed the actual advantages conferred by
their expertise, the propensity to be "often wrong, but never in doubt." Second, they are likely to
adopt a world view that turns largely on the area of their expertise and are unable to weigh its
relative merits against other matters outside the zone of their expertise . . . Third, and relatedly,
they are subject to routinized ways of approaching problems and to an unreflective "group
think" style of inbred behavior.75 Melding expert analysis with broad-based deliberation can help
offset each of these biases. Indeed, public deliberation may be critical for countering the
tendency among experts to pose problems solely within the technical frameworks with which
they feel most comfortable. Whether to devote public resources to better firewalls, for example, or to
various kinds of workarounds that would permit critical infrastructure to function even in the face of
cyber aggression is a determination as likely to involve political, social, and economic tradeoffs as it is
a technical assessment regarding the possible success of such strategies. So are decisions regarding
our national doctrine on cyber war, investments in systems designed to improve cyber attribution, the
allocation of cyber authority among military and civilian authorities, and the scope of presidential
authority over the Internet. One does not have to impute ill motive to imagine how specialists in law,
economics, military science, and information science might be tempted to characterize these issues
as ultimately about legality, efficiency, operations research, or sound management. All of these
disciplines are implicated, but so are public values regarding liberty, privacy, accountability, and
competing priorities. These values should not be subordinated in the creation of public policy. The
second point is that good design for a policy process intended from the outset to accommodate nonexpert policy input is quite likely to improve the quality of the relevant technical analysis as well.

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Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

AT: No Solvency No Direct Democracy

[___]

[___] Direct referendums can enact positive law or repeal and veto existing laws and bills, and
they encourage the best voter turn-out.
DuVivier, 2006
(KK DuVivier; Professor of Law at University of Denver; The United States as a Democratic Ideal?:
International Lessons in Referendum Democracy p 845-848; University of Denver Sturm College of
Law; 2006; accessed 07/01/2015; <http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?
ID=373087070022101004087096120125013018017088025072063003074023127092024105002114
0990020450160300420410270260000200840971200931270550810550540070930931071141
210751110580580160980920841000750690700950120660820761231230191200310800771120850
94067072013&EXT=pdf&TYPE=2>.)
B. Effect of Referendums: Binding v. Advisory Referendum outcomes vary. Some bind or make their
terms obligatory. Others simply advise and allow legislators and executives to retain some discretion
over implementation. Binding referendums compel governments to implement them.162 What the
referendum compels the government to do, however, depends on the process established. The
direct referendum provides the most common binding process and becomes positive law
once passed.163 Switzerland, Australia, and approximately half of the states in the United
States offer this direct referendum process.164 The opportunity for citizens to flex their
muscles in this way encourages use: Switzerland and Australia account for the most frequent
referendums on a national level.165 Likewise, Oregon, California, Colorado, North Dakota, and
Arizona historically represent states with the highest initiative use, and all offer direct initiative
processes.166 Italy has used a unique version of the direct initiative. Article 75 of Italys
Constitution contains the referendum abrogativo, which allows citizens to nullify legislation enacted at
the national level.167 This veto can apply to all or portions of legislation. Because the process
allows citizens to negate actions by the legislature and because the threat of a referendum
veto has often motivated the parliament to act, commentators have argued that it has done much
to serve the long-term interests of the Italian people and has transformed Italy from a partyocracy to
democracy.168 The effectiveness of this process has made Italy the European country with the
second highest use of referendums, surpassed only by Switzerland.169

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

AT: No Solvency No Intrinsic Benefit

[___]

[___] Direct democracy is the best form of decision making in government.

Robinson, 2007
(Nick, Yale Law School, J.D., Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the
Decentralization of Foreign Policy, Akron Law Review, 40 Akron L. Rev. 647)
The argument in this article for local democratic participation is also, perhaps primarily, a humanist
one. With more possibility for participation, we become thicker citizens. We have greater ability
to engage in our communities and in turn more control over and understanding of our own
lives as humans. For Durkheim, government had its own consciousness. Such a characterization
highlighted that although government at its root might merely be a shared idea in a community of
conscious humans, it could also have its own agency. The state had its own logic that was removed,
and even unknown, from those that "thought" government into existence. He writes of a democratic
state that "the closer communication becomes between the government consciousness and
the rest of society, and the more this consciousness expands and the more things it takes in, the
more democratic the character of the society will be." n14 For Durkheim, it is the democratic
state's reflection upon its citizens through its citizens that gave democracy a moral
superiority. n15 [*655] When we debate where and how democratic governance will occur, we are
battling over what choreography of thought will define our state and we as citizens. Such stakes are
not easily quantifiable. If our aim in structuring governance, however, is not to reach definable
utopias, but rather to balance as best we can the competing interests and tensions of being human
and being governed, then we must take into account governance's transcendent depths and not just
its readily chartable currents.

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

AT: No Solvency Not Allowed

[___]

[___] Nothing in the Constitution forbids this.

Tutt, 2014
(Andrew Tutt, law clerk in Washington, D.C. and a Visiting Fellow at the Yale Information Society
Project.; McCutcheon Calls for a National Referendum on Campaign Finance (Literally); Columbia
Law Review; 10/2014; accessed 07/06/2015; <http://columbialawreview.org/nationalreferendum_tutt/>.)
But the analysis is somewhat more difficult when one speaks of the possibility of a binding national
referendum, where a laws legal force is conditioned on its endorsement by a majority of
voters during, for example, a national presidential election.27 Nothing in the Constitution
affirmatively precludes such an outcome, and indeed, tens of thousands of laws are
conditioned on the actions of some other party before they take effect. Many regulatory
delegations, for example, provide that they will not bind regulated parties until such time as the
administrator of the agency charged with administering the regulatory program takes certain
ministerial actssuch as promulgating a regulation implementing the statute.28 In principle, a
national referendum is entitled to analysis under the same logic. If such a law were passed,
Congress and the President, in their collective judgment, will have elected to delegate to the
People themselves the decision of whether the law should or should not bind them. 29 There
are limits to this principle, however, though where they are to be found is a complex question. For
instance, both the legislative veto (by which Congress allowed itself to veto a law at a later date) and
the line-item veto (by which the President was authorized to pick and choose which parts of each law
he would veto) have been held unconstitutional because they violate the Constitutions deep
structural principles.30 In light of these cases, it can safely be said that any law that meddles with
how the Constitution fundamentally works is vulnerable to collateral constitutional attack on
structural and separation-of-powers grounds.

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

AT: Solvency Turn Capitalism

[___]

[___] Money has little proven influence in referenda. The most popular option garners the
most monetary support, increasing access to popular majority viewpoints to all participants.
Stratmann, 2005
(Thomas Stratmann, Department of Economics, George Mason University; The Effectiveness of
Money in Ballot Measure Campaigns pg 103-104; Symposium on the Impact of Direct Democracy;
09/02/2005; accessed 07/03/2015; http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/faculty
%20pages/stratmann/vitae%20files/effectmoney.pdf)
On one side of the debate on money in ballot measure campaigns are those who are concerned that
interest groups have too much influence in the process.7 This side of the debate is concerned about
the influence of money on outcomes. Spending by wealthy or well-funded interests may give those
interests an advantage with respect to the passage or defeat of ballot measures over those who do
not have the financial means to present their views though an advertising campaign. Some claim
that if those who spend are more likely to win, than those without the financial means to
compete are limited in their political participation. David Broder for example, suggests that the
initiative process has become the favored tool of millionaires and interest groups that use their
wealth to achieve their own policy goals.8 Broder continues to argue that initiative campaigns have
become a money game, where average citizens are subjected to advertising blitzes of distortions and
half-truths and are left to figure out for themselves which interest groups pose the greatest threats to
their selfinterest.9 As mentioned in the Introduction, the academic literature has found little
evidence that interest groups can purchase their preferred policies through the initiative
process. The literature has found that money has only a small influence on whether initiatives
pass. Campaigning to maintain the status quo is more successful than campaigning to change it and
successful campaigning in part depends on the type of interest groups involved. Moreover, even if
there was evidence that the side which spends more money is also more likely to win, this
does not necessarily imply an inequality in access to political participation. The reason that the
winning side spends more simply reflects that this side represents the views of many voters
and thus was able to attract many funds.

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Referendum Counterplan

Boston Debate League

Varsity Division

AT: Solvency Turn Poverty

[___]

[___] Democratic inclusion is the only way to solve poverty and limited political engagement.
Weeks, 2014
(Daniel Weeks, former president of Americans for Campaign Reform and a fellow at the Edmond J.
Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University; How to Solve America's Democracy and Poverty
Crisis; The Atlantic Politics Division; 01/10/2014; accessed 07/06/2015;
<http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/how-to-solve-americas-democracy-and-povertycrisis/282983/>.)
However you slice and dice the numbers, people in poverty are at a serious, structural
disadvantage when it comes to making their voices heard and having their interests represented
in Washington. They are far from equal citizens in the public square. A democracy problem
requires a democracy solution. Just as the gains made during the first decade of the War on
Poverty cannot be separated from another pair of bills Johnson signed into lawthe Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965so too must the work of combatting systemic poverty
today confront the lack of political equality for all. Fortunately, democratic-process reforms
abound. If states are the laboratories of democracy, then we need look no further than American
states that effectively enable their citizens to participate in public life for examples to introduce to the
nation as a whole. Not surprisingly, politically inclusive states also experience considerably
lower levels of poverty and higher voter turnout than other states. Some reforms are simply a
matter of equal justice under law. Denying approximately 10 million taxpaying U.S. citizens the
right to vote or voting representation in Congress, because of a prior conviction or the district or
territory in which they live, is morally and constitutionally suspect. To right the first of these wrongs, all
states should ensure that voting and other constitutional rights are restored to people with felony
convictions once they have completed their sentence and reenter society. In no instance should a
former felon be permanently disenfranchised under the Constitution. State legislation or a
constitutional challenge or amendment could accomplish this task. Likewise, Congress should pass a
law granting voting representation to Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, and the territories in the House
and Senate. A constitutional challenge or amendment based on Equal Protection could also
accomplish the task.

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