The Constitution of the Philippines

1. De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together
with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay,
Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known
as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1,
1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the
other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be
declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall
continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their
position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor
no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that
the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six
years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made
during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8,
1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent
OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further
provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of
office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
2. Gonzales v. COMELEC
FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez
and PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and
3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following
resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):
1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the
present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and
that each province shall have at least one (1) member.
2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will
be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in
the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971.

3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act
fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the
people, and appropriates funds for said election.
Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law.
PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.
2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.
HELD:
1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this
provision that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election.
The Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed
amendments for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.
2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the
action taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to
review by the Court.
3. Imbong v COMELEC
FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as
candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967,
the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a
Constitutional Convention which shall have two delegates from each representative district.
On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by
providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates
from each representative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative
body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914
which previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and
par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec.
8(a) of said R.A. 6132.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the
parameters of such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?
HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent
assembly. The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in
Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within the competence of the Congress
in exercise of its legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of
Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection
of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding
the apportionment of delegates. The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from
running for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.
Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the
restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain
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substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the
constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners.
4. Occena v COMELEC
Facts:Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar
and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present
Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the
assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Issue: What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how
may it be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that
may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the
standard required for a proper submission?
Held:The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it
reads thus: The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members
shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as
the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members
thereof. One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973
Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to
propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore,
the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.
Marcos, met as a constituent body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and
did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be
observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the
authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. Considering
that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending the
retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65)
to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935
Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people
are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.
Issue: Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond
the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the
Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather than amendment?
Held: Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new
Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because
the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign
people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the
present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one is no argument against the
validity of the law because amendment includes the revision or total overhaul of the entire
Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or
totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign
people.
Issue: What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper
submission?
Held: The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible
proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body
applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could
be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is
not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its
constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the
requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not
disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential
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purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency,
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1
abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on
Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the
requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the
standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the
standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it
could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed
changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved.
There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or
revision. The three resolutions were approved by theInterim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date
of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.
5. TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702
FACTS:The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of
the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of
calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates
held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the
morning of September 28, 1970, the Conventionapproved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is
entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS
TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to
follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the
senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no
force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with
the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by
the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be
exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the
proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately
from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional
Conventionviolative to the Constitution.
HELD:NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to
the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of
a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient
time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as
well as its relation to the other parts of theConstitution with which it has to form a harmonious
whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits,
if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any
single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.
7. Santiago v COMELEC
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976
for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial
law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise bythe President of his present powers.
Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the
previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the
same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its
whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim
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National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar
as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031,
insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen
contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the
legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the
period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President
undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru
Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the
very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and
effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is
plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article
X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no
treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence
of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not
only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other
powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so
that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has
been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution
and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at
that time also sits as the legislature.
The Concept of the State
1. Bacani v Nacoco
G.R. No. L-9657 Nov. 29, 1956
Two-fold Function of the Government
FACTS:
1. Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers both assigned in the CFI of Manila. During the
pendency of another civil case (Civil Case No. 2293 entitled 'Francisco Sycip vs. NACOCO'),
Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO(Natl Coconut Corporation) , requested the said stenographers
for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their
fees. The NACOCO paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript
at the rate of P1 per page.

3.
Subsequently, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by
virtue of a DOJ circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt
from the payment of the fees in question.
4.
Petitioners countered that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of
section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court while the defendants set up as a defense that the
NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 hence, exempt from paying the stenographers fees under Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.
No, it is not.
1. GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose
of adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United
States and of providing Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper
utilization of coconut by-products, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to
promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the
government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its
corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private
corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.
2.
There are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its
objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of
sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people.
3.
President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:
(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from
violence and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the
determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external
danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.
4. The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public
charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles
deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions
are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital
would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its
very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individual.
2. PVTA v CIR
Facts:
Private respondents filed a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the
overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure
to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their
prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to them and the amount
allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration would predicate its
plea for the reversal of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the
jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt
from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue: Whether PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions
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Held: No. A reference to the enactments creating petitioner corporation suffices to

demonstrate the merit of petitioners plea that it performs governmental and not proprietary
functions. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, its purposes and objectives were
set forth thus: (a) To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic
and foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of
economic security; (b) To establish and maintain balanced production and consumption of
Virginia tobacco and its manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will insure
and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus reasonable
profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create, establish, maintain, and
operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the
selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that
secure a fair return of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the
grading, classifying, and inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and
economic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry. The amendatory statute,
Republic Act No. 4155, renders even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its
first section on the declaration of policy reads: It is declared to be the national policy, with
respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to encourage the production of local Virginia
tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign
markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and, to create a climate
conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public,
blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally
manufactured cigarettes. The objectives are set forth thus: To attain this national policy the
following objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financing; 2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks
of the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and conditions in order that a
reinvigorated Virginia tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving
the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virginia
leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of one kilo of
imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the importer-exporter from
the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration.
Functions relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating
property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the
determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign
relations may not be strictly considered constituent. Under the traditional constituentministrant classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people
these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the
government. Nonetheless, the growing complexities of modern society, however, have
rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to
say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally, and only because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the
government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards
a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned,
indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle
concerning the promotion of social justice.
3. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. MONTE DE PIEDAD
35 PHIL 728
FACTS:About $400,000 were paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants
of the Spanish Dominions for the relief of those damaged by the earthquake on June 3, 1863 in
the Philippines. Upon the petition of the governing body of respondent, the Philippine
government directed its treasurer to turn over to the respondent the sum of $80,000 of the
relief fund in instalments of $20,000 each. Petitioner now bring suit to recover said amount
with interest against respondents in behalf of the various petitions of the persons and heirs to
whom the relief was intended. Defendant contends that the amount was given as a donation
and that the court erred in stating that the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish
government in its rights.
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ISSUE:Does the government of the Philippines have authority to file a suit against the
respondent?
HELD: The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce
all charities of public nature. The court further asserted that said amount was not a donation
and that respondent is liable for the debt regardless of the cession of the Philippine Islands to
the United States. It is said that there is total abrogation of the former political relations of the
inhabitants of the ceded region, however, the circumstances present in the case are not
political in nature. The great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic
rights continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler, as such, the government
has the authority to file a suit in behalf of its people by virtue of the principle of parens
patriae.
4. Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh
75 PHIL 131
FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be
ordered to continue the proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. It is based on
the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines. Furthermore,
it was contended that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue
judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunct republic in the absence of enabling law.
ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de
facto government.
Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the
Philippine Executive Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation
of the Philippines by the US Forces.
HELD: In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive
and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government,
judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that
they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good.
All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and
valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the
power of true and original sovereign.
Wherefore, the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and
continue the proceedings.
5. People v Gozo, 53 SCRA 476
Facts: Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from
the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification,
alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity on the pretext that her house
was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to
the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she in effect
seek to emasculate the State's sovereign rights by the assertion that the latter cannot
exercise therein administrative jurisdiction.
Issue/s: Whether or not the State can exercise administrative jurisdiction within the naval
base leased by the Philippines to the American armed forces.
Held: The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of
the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential
but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from
the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of
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the treaty." There was a reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled
than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised
over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its
decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial
and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of it sovereignty." Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of autolimitation: "It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit
to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a
power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the
succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may
refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." 16 The opinion was at
pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional
rights, not it appearance. The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found
within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from
allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain
portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed
with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases
under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947.
They are not and cannot be foreign territory."
6. Laurel vs Misa
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
Facts:Petitioner Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus, asserting that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot
be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
Issue:Whether or not enemy occupation has the effect of suspending the allegiance of a
Filipino citizen during the period of said occupation
Ruling:NO. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
government or sovereign.
As decided by the court in cases, the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of
a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government
or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier.
Adoption of the petitioners theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of
humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit
or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own
government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even
compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy
forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all
of their own independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of invaders
in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of
depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by
them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide.
Change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth,
because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for
Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that The government established by this constitution
shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines.
7. Ruffy vs Chief of Staff
9

G.R. No. L-533 ,75 Phil 875

FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at
designated camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus
forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it
the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position
and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent
change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was
committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.
HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of
the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other
laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is
considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction
and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for the
military court's jurisdiction.
In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the
petition is hereby DENIED.
People
8. MOY YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien visiting the Philippines, whose authorized stay in the Philippines was
to expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Solicitor General opposes the ground that the marriage of the alien to a Filipino citizen does
not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. Plaintiff-appellant does not
possess all the qualifications required for applicant for naturalization (CA 473), even she has
proven that she possesses none of the disqualifications in said law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.
RULING:
Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso
facto, provided that she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA 473.
(Sections 15 and 4)
9. Po Yo Bi v Republic of the Philippines
Territory
10.Magalona v Ermita
655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory RA 9522 is Constitutional
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines
was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with
the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified
by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among
others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is
unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties
this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as archipelagic waters
which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage
by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty
and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
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c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo
de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to
acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the
acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes
to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of
sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones
and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old
law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the
Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But
under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime
was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
Government
11. Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh (see Page 7)
12. Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino
G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986
FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through
a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces
of the Philippines."
ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiceable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
The Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the
entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
13. Villavicencio vs Lukban
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.
Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the
respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty
of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the
women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.
Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of
Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters
consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where
they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case
saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in
the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
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For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or
(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons
could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to
show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.
Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos
each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if
the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a
private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when
called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person
was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he
has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed
has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of
law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents,
within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by
forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the
person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty
may not thus be easily evaded.
Sovereignty
14. Section 1, Art II of the 1987 Constitution
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
15. Laurel vs Misa (see page 8)
16. PERALTA V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
75 PHIL 285
FACTS: Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged
with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and
other necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. 9 of the National Assembly of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized
by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the same Assembly. He was found guilty and sentenced to life
imprisonmentby the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of
Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines,
pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said
Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in Chapter
II of Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, made applicable
to the trial violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance
No. 7.
The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive
Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military
forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those
aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the
United States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio, that the provisions of said
Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
and the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights; that the petitioner herein is
being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army
in the Philippines, and that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the
penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by the petitioner
and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are: that court
may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute;
that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to
him; that if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the
12

defendant is guilty, he may be immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the sentence
of the court is not appealable, except in case of death penalty which cannot be executed
unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed
of three Justices.
ISSUE: whether Ordinance No. 7 is functus officio by reason sentence of the reoccupation of
the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government
HELD: Yes. In general, the cast of the occupant possess legal validity, and under international
law should not be abrogated by the subsequent government. But this rule does not necessarily
apply to acts that exceed the occupants power (e.g., alienation of the domains of the State or
the sovereign), to sentences for war treason and war crimes, to acts of a political character,
and to those that beyond the period of occupation. When occupation ceases, no reparation is
legally due for what has already been carried out.
All judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be
valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium.
Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a
crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto
upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.
The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military
occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto
upon the reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth
Government.
17. Ruffy v Chief of Staff (see page 9)
18. Reagan v CIR
30 SCRA 968 Political Law Sovereignty
William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance
to the US Air Force (USAF). In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at
$6,443.83. Two months later, he got permission to sell the same car provided that he would
sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson, Jr. for
$6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of
this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income of
Reagan to be at P17,912.34 and that his income tax would be P2,797.00. Reagan paid the
assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is
exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in foreign soil since Clark Air Base, in legal
contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military
Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.
ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax?
HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over
its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its
decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial
and personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends
support to Reagans assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This countrys
jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the
Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases this is just a
matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed is employed by
the USAF and his income is derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not
of US source hence taxable.
19. PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL
FACTS: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD). This Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 is a codification of consensus points reached
between GRP and MILF Peace Panel and of the aspiration of the MILF to have a Bangasmoro
Homeland.
13

According to the stipulations in the MOA-AD, Ownership of the Bangasmoro Homeland is

vested to the Bangasmoro people. MOA-AD describes the Bangasmoro people as the first
nation with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of
amity and commerce with foreign nations. The Bangasmoro Juridical Entity (BJE) is granted by
the MOA-AD the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of
the Bangasmoro. It was also stipulated that BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural
resources within its internal waters.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
4. Whether there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters of public
concern.
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
BINDING itself.
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga,
Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas
covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7. Whether MOA-AD is constitutional
HELD:
Issue 1:
The court believes that the petitions in the case at bar provide an exception to the moot and
academic principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the
exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Issue 2:
Yes. Any alleged violation of the consti by any branch of the government is a proper matter for
judicial review. In the case at bar, the failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected amounts to a departure from the mandate under
E.O. No. 3 and the fact that the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of
guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution, rendered the petition ripe for adjudication.
Issue 3:
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law
notwithstanding, respondents almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the
legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave
abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation
of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the
sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.
Issue 4:
Yes, there is a violation of the peoples right to information.An essential element of this right is
to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people.The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public
interest in the highest order.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to
information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal
provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived
such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOAAD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
Issue 5:
No. The MOA-AD is not a document that can bind the Philippines under international law. It
would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not
parties to the Agreement, this would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under
international law.
Issue 6:
14

Yes. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North
Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and
Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the
future as respondents actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. These petitions
afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as
what it had done in a number of landmark cases.
Issue 7:
Yes. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional because it cannot be reconciled with the present
constitution. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them. The
associative relationship between the GRP and the BJE is unconstitutional because the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence.
The court denied the respondents motion to dismiss and granted the main and intervening
petitions.

15