Professional Documents
Culture Documents
petitioner ,petitioner's position was declared vacant, was caged specifically to take
up the unfinished business of the Reorganizational Meeting of the Board of April 30,
1974. Hence, and act cannot be said to impart a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing to wrong but rather emanates from the desire of the
Board to reorganize itself.
Chato v. fortune tobacco
FACTS: This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune
against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be
charged an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be
less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a
rule, reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More (all manufactured by Fortune)
as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad
valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already
covered. In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the
issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property
without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her
part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of
action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official
function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as
an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts.
She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of
allegation of malice or bad faith. The order denying the motion to dismiss was
elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that underArticle 32,
liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
Champion, Hope, and More were considered local brands subject to ad valorem [accdg to value] tax [20-45%]. Two
days prior (1 Jul 93) to RA 7654s effectivity, VC [Comm., BIR] issued the RMC reclassifying the brands as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to 55% AV tax (brands were subjected to RA 7654, Sec. 142
(c)(1) before it took effect). On 2 Jul, BIR Deputy Comm sent a copy of RMC to Fortune via fax. It was only on 15 Jul
when Fortune received a certified photocopy of the RMC.
Fortune filed an MfR on 20 Jul, requesting the RMCs recall but it was denied on 30 Jul, and payment of the AV
tax deficiency (9M~) was demanded within 10 days. Fortune filed a petition for review with the CTaxApp (CTA) which
issued an injunction enjoining RMCs implementation (defective, invalid, unenforceable). This was affirmed by the CA,
and SC in Comm, BIR v. CA, since the RMC fell short of the requirements for a valid admin issuance.
Fortune filed a complaint for damages against VC in her private capacity in the RTC, saying that she should be
held liable for damages under NCC 32 (RMC issuance violated right against property deprivation without due process
+ equal protection of the laws). VC filed a motion to dismiss since she issued RMC in the performance of her fxn,
within authority, and said that being an agent of RP, the latter is the one responsible for her acts, and that the
complaint did have a cause of axn because there was no allegation of malice/bad faith.
RTC denied VCs motion to dismiss. CA dismissed the case as well, saying that under NCC 32, liability may
arise even if defendant did not act with malice/bad faith. CA also said that Admin Code is the general law on puboffs
civil liab while NCC 32 is the special law governing this case, and that malice/bad faith need not be alleged in the
complaint for damages. VC filed this complaint, saying that what shld be applied is the Admin Code [liab attaches only
when there is a clear showing of bad faith / malice / gross negligence] and said that Admin Code is the special law,
and that NCC is the general law.
ISSUES: Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her
office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code
HELD: On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official
duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his
authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for
damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge
against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims
without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope
of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official
actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise
where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public
officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officers act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In
Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the
constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in
his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the
functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or
negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the
plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a
special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a
tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one,
without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in
person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil
liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the
tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant
has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself,
would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather,
the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an
invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact
that defendant acted without evil intent.
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