SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005.]

CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA and
PRESCILLA, all surnamed HILARIO, petitioners, vs. ALLAN T. SALVADOR, respondent.
HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and VIRGINIA
SALVADOR-LIM, respondents-intervenors.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision
1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 as well as its Resolution 2 denying the
motion for the reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario,
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against
private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged therein, inter alia, as follows:
2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a
parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at
Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the
hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father
was still single, and which adjudication was known by the plaintiffs[']
father's co-heirs;

3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the
property of the plaintiffs' father without the knowledge of the herein
plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest;

4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter
manifested that he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their
grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;

5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the
Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the
CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached as ANNEX B;

6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the
plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and
sleepless nights; CSDTac

7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services

of a lawyer. 3

The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be
issued for the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the
occupied property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:

a. actual damages, as follows:

a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the case
amounting to P1,500.00 and for the subsequent
attendance to the hearing of this case at P1,500.00
each schedule;

a.2. attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and P500.00 for every court appearance;

b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the Honorable Court to
determine; and

c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises. 4

The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by
Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691. 5 He averred that
(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;

(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to
as the subject-matter of this action;

both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the
case is filed. In this case, however, the assessed value of the land in question is
totally absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in the relief
prayed for which can be picked-up for determining the Court's jurisdiction as
provided by law.

In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the
lines, that the assessed value of the land in question cannot exceed P20,000.00
and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon
and should have been filed before said Court rather than before the RTC. . . . 6

The petitioners opposed the motion. 7 They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action
since the court can take judicial notice of the market value of the property in question, which was
P200.00 per square meter and considering that the property was 14,797 square meters, more or less,
the total value thereof is P3,500,000.00. Besides, according to the petitioners, the motion to dismiss
was premature and "the proper time to interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence that
the land is of such value."
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order 8 denying the motion to dismiss, holding that the
action was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in
Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with counterclaim. 9
Traversing the material allegations of the complaint, he contended that the petitioners had no cause
of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the
spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador. caIEAD
On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-Intervention 10 making common
cause with the private respondent. On her own motion, however, Virginia Salvador was dropped as
intervenor. 11
During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that in 1991 the
property had an assessed value of P5,950.00. 12
On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:

Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied
property; and

Dismissing defendant's counterclaim.

SO ORDERED. 13

Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador appealed the
decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003 reversing the ruling of the RTC and
dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case
DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refilling in the proper court.

SO ORDERED. 14

The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership and
possession of real property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the
property, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the action, conformably to
Section 33 15 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court
denied. 16 Hence, they filed the instant petition, with the following assignment of errors:
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE, ACCION REIVINDICATORIA, FALLS
WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ROMBLON.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR

IN ORDERING THE REFILING OF THE CASE IN THE [PROPER] COURT,
INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS BASED ON THE
COMPLETE RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT AND
IN NOT AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 17

The Ruling of the Court

The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners,
the plaintiffs in the RTC, against the private respondent, who was the defendant therein. SCaIcA
The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reivindicatoria, an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject
property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in their
opposition to respondent's motion to dismiss, they made mention of the increase in the assessed

value of the land in question in the amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that
their action is also one for damages exceeding P20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691.
The petition has no merit.
It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for
by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. 18 The caption of the complaint is not
determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the
answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the
petitioners in the RTC was an accion reivindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the
petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property
subject matter thereof. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of
possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based
on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession
of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year
after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty. 19
The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over
the property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and
that the private respondent, who was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without
their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed
that the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them.
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect.
Section 33(3) of the law provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by
the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: cCAIES

xxx xxx xxx

(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined
by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of
real property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the assessment level. It is
synonymous to taxable value. 20 The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold
by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the
assessed value of the property subject of the complaint. 21 The court cannot take judicial notice of
the assessed or market value of lands. 22 Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed
value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A,
showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was P5,950.00. The petitioners, however,
did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property
when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in
1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the
petitioners since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of
less than P20,000.00. 23
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CA's disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reivindicatoria is, as RA 7691
discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the
provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and
the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have
reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located,
and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax
declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The
loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to
mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of
the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration
that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit
B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the
territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo. 24

It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the
presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency. 25
Unavailing also is the petitioners' argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery
of damages exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section

33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination of the
jurisdictional amount the demand for "interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs." This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in
the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount
of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
acADIT

Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended,
which states:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such
other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).

The said provision is applicable only to "all other cases" other than an action involving title to, or
possession of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the
court's jurisdiction. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause
of action for recovery of possession of real property. 26
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein,
including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed. 27
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
||| (Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, [April 29, 2005], 497 PHIL 327-339)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156360. January 14, 2005.]
CESAR SAMPAYAN, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CRISPULO
VASQUEZ and FLORENCIA VASQUEZ GILSANO, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
In this verified petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Cesar
Sampayan seeks the annulment and setting aside of the following issuances of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 43557, to wit:
1. Decision dated May 16, 2002, denying his petition for review and affirming an earlier decision of
the Regional Trial Court at Agusan del Sur, Branch VII, which in turn reversed on appeal a favorable
judgment of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur in a
forcible entry case thereat commenced against him by herein private respondents, the brother-andsister Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano; and
2. Resolution dated November 7, 2002, which denied his motion for reconsideration. ScCDET
From the pleadings and memoranda respectively filed by the parties, the Court gathers the following
factual antecedents:
On July 8, 1992, in the MCTC of Bayugan and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, the siblings Crispulo
Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed complaint for forcible entry against Cesar Sampayan
for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1959, PLS-225, and
built a house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority, the entry having been supposedly
effected through strategy and stealth.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs (now private respondents), substantially alleged that their mother
Cristita Quita was the owner and actual possessor of Lot No. 1959; that after their mother's death on
January 11, 1984, they became co-owners pro-indiviso and lawful possessors of the same lot; that on
June 1, 1992, while they were temporarily absent from the lot in question, defendant Cesar
Sampayan, through strategy and stealth, entered the lot and built a house thereon, to their exclusion;
and that, despite their repeated demands for Sampayan to vacate the lot and surrender the
possession thereof to them, the latter failed and refused to do so.
In his answer, defendant Sampayan denied the material allegations of the complaint and averred that
neither the plaintiffs nor their mother have ever been in possession of Lot No. 1959 and that he does
not even know plaintiffs' identities or their places of residence. He claimed that he did not enter the
subject lot by stealth or strategy because he asked and was given permission therefor by Maria
Ybaez, the overseer of the lot's true owners, Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado who were then
temporarily residing in Cebu City for business purposes. In the same answer, Sampayan alleged that
the plaintiffs' claim has long prescribed for the reason that the lot in dispute had been possessed and
declared for taxation purposes by the spouses Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol in 1960,
and that in 1978, the Oriol spouses sold one-half (1/2) of the lot to the spouses Mr. and Mrs.
Anastacio Terrado, while the other half, to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida in
1979. Both vendees, so Sampayan averred, have actually possessed the respective portions
purchased by them up to the present. He thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
In the ensuing proceedings following the joinder of issues, the plaintiffs, to prove that they have been
in actual possession of Lot No. 1959 when defendant Sampayan effected his entry thereto, submitted
in evidence the following documents: HTCIcE
1. Tax Declaration No. 3180 in the name of Cristita Quita;
2. Certificate of Death showing the date of death of Cristita Quita on January 11, 1984;
3. Certificate issued by Fermina R. Labonete, Land Management Officer-III of CENRO X-3-E, DENRX-3-9, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur showing that Lot 1959, PLS-225 is covered by a Miscellaneous
Sales Application of Cristita Quita; jurcda2005
4. Affidavit of one Emiliano G. Gatillo to the effect that he was the one who gave the lot in question to
Cristita Quita sometime in 1957 and that since then the latter had been occupying the lot;

Plaintiffs also filed a Supplemental Position Paper dated July 13, 1994 for the purpose of showing
that Cristita Quita is one of the oppositors in Cadastral Case No. 149. Together with said position
paper, they submitted a copy of the Answer/Opposition earlier filed in Cadastral Case No. 149. In said
cadastral case, Cristita Quita was claiming Lot 1959, thus her name appeared in the list of oppositors
therein.
5. The decision in the said Cadastral Case No. 149 showing that the then Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Sur declared Lot No. 1959 as one of the lots subject of the same cadastral case.
For his part, defendant Sampayan, to prove the allegations in his answer, offered in evidence the
following:
1. Tax Declaration No. A-11698 in the name of Felicisimo Oriol, which cancels Tax Declaration 8103;
DIEACH
2. Tax Declaration No. GRB-01-930 in the name of Felicisimo Oriol which cancels Tax Declaration
No. A-11698;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land, dated April 30, 1979, executed by Jesus Oriol for and in
behalf of the spouses Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol, conveying the one-half (1/2)
portion of Lot No. 1959 to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida who possessed
the one-half (1/2) portion and introduced improvements thereon, such as coconut and caimito trees;
4. Deed of Relinquishment of Rights of Portion of Land, executed by the spouses Oriol in favor of the
same couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida, to further strengthen the transfer of
possession and whatever possessory rights the Oriols had in the lot in question;
5. Deed of Absolute Sale of Land executed by Concordia Balida-Oriol with the conformity of Teodosio
Mosquito (another claimant), to prove that the other half of Lot No. 1959 was sold in 1978 to Mr. and
Mrs. Anastacio Terrado whose overseer allowed Sampayan to enter and occupy the premises;
6. Protest filed with the CENRO, Agusan del Sur by the vendee Juliana Sambale-Occida against the
Miscellaneous Sales Application of Cristita Quita;
7. Affidavit of Dionesia Noynay attesting to the fact that she is residing in Lot No. 1957, a lot adjacent
to the lot in question, since 1960 up to the present. In the same affidavit, Dionisia claimed that neither
Cristita Quita, much less the plaintiffs, had ever possessed Lot No. 1959. She claimed that it was the
Occida couple who possessed said lot and introduced improvements thereon; and
8. Affidavit of Juliana Occida and Maria Ybaez to show the impossibility of plaintiffs' possession of
the same lot. aCTADI
Meanwhile, on March 21, 1996, while the case was pending with the MCTC, the presiding judge
thereof personally conducted an ocular inspection of the contested lot in the presence of the parties
and/or their counsels. Among those found in the area during the inspection are: the house of
defendant Sampayan; the dilapidated house of a certain Peter Siscon; and a portion of the house of
Macario Noynay, husband of Dionisia Noynay, one of Sampayan's witnesses.
Based on his ocular findings, the judge concluded that the improvements he saw in the premises
could never have been introduced by the plaintiffs nor by their mother Cristita Quita but by the
vendees of the same lot. Reproduced by petitioner Jose Sampayan in the instant petition as well as in
the Memorandum he subsequently filed with this Court, the MCTC judge's findings and observations
during the ocular inspection, about which the herein private respondents took no exception
whatsoever, are hereunder quoted, as follows:
"Noted inside the land are the house of the defendant, Cesar Sampayan, of Peter Siscon, which
appears to be dilapidated, and part of the house of Macario Noynay which encroached to the land in
question. Planted on the land are five (5) coconut trees, fruit bearing, three (3) not fruit bearing
coconut trees, and three (3) star apple or caimito trees. Defendant Sampayan admitted that he
started occupying the land since 1992. It is admitted by the parties during the ocular inspection that
one-half (1/2) portion of the land was bought by a certain Occida from certain Mr. and Mrs. Felicisimo
Oriol.
The findings in the ocular inspection have confirmed the allegation of the defendant that his
predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and
others on the land in question.

Nothing can be seen on the land that plaintiffs had once upon a time been in possession of the land.
The allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession
of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an
owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence. ADHaTC
Clearly, from the appearance of the improvements introduced by the predecessors-in-interest of the
defendant, it is showed that they have been in possession of the land for more than one(1) year.
Hence, the action of the plaintiffs, if any, is accion publiciana or plenaria de possession" 1 (Emphasis
supplied).
In time, the MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint "for lack of merit".
Therefrom, the plaintiffs appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Agusan del Sur, which appeal
was raffled to Branch VII thereof. In a decision dated December 5, 1996, said court reversed that of
the MCTC, taking note of the fact that Cristita Quita was among the oppositors in Cadastral Case No.
149 and that she filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the lot. On the basis of such finding,
the RTC concluded that it was Cristita Quita, predecessor-in-interest of the herein private
respondents, who was in actual prior physical possession of Lot No. 1959.
Unable to accept the RTC judgment, Sampayan went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review,
thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43557.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in the herein assailed Decision dated May 16,
2002, 2 denied Sampayan's petition. His motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by
that court in its Resolution of November 7, 2002, 3 Sampayan is now with us via the present
recourse, it being his submissions
"I.
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT OF BAYUGAN, AGUSAN DEL SUR, HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
CONSIDERING THAT DURING THE HEARING THEREOF IT WAS FOUND OUT BY THE SAID
MUNICIPAL COURT THAT ACCION PUBLICIANA OR PLENARIA DE POSESION, AND NOT
FORCIBLE ENTRY, IS THE PROPER ACTION; EDcIAC
II.
THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN PRIOR ACTUAL POSSESSION IS CONTRADICTED BY
EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND CONSIDERING THAT THE POSSESSION TO BE LEGALLY
SUFFICIENT, CONSIST (SIC) IN THE EXERCISE OF DOMINIUM OVER IT, SUCH AS FENCING,
CULTIVATING OR OTHER UNMISTAKABLE ACTS OF EXCLUSIVE CUSTODY AND CONTROL
FACTS WHICH THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NEVER DONE IS CONTRARY TO LAW".
4
In the main, petitioner maintains that based on the pieces of evidence on record, he had sufficiently
proven his prior physical possession of the subject lot. Upon this premise, he argues that private
respondents' complaint for forcible entry has no leg to stand on, adding that the proper remedy
available to the latter is accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion which falls under the original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and not of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
As we see it, the arguments put forward by the petitioner crystallize to one pivotal question: will the
complaint for forcible entry in this case prosper? To resolve this, however, we must first determine as
to who between the herein parties was in prior actual physical possession of the subject lot at the
time the complaint was filed in the MCTC. For, as we have said in Gaza vs. Lim 5 ,
". . . In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land
or building and that he was deprived thereof by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. . . ."
We emphasize, absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry case warrants
the dismissal of his complaint. ISaCTE
Undoubtedly, the issue of prior physical possession is one of fact, and settled is the rule that this
Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence

adduced by the parties during trial. Of course, the rule admits of exceptions. So it is that in Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA, 6 we wrote:
"[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a
trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties' during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this
rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion."
To our mind, exceptions (5) and (11) are present in this case.
However, before delving into the question of who as between the petitioner and private respondents
had prior physical possession of the subject lot, we deem it best to first resolve the issue of whether
or not the MCTC had jurisdiction over the complaint filed in this case, an issue also raised by the
petitioner.
Relying on the conclusion of the MCTC that private respondents' proper remedy is accion publiciana
or plenaria de posesion, and not forcible entry, petitioner would deny the MCTC's jurisdiction over the
case.
Petitioner is in error. aEcHCD
In Sarmiento vs. CA 7 , we held:
"[t]o give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary
in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. . . ."
Clear it is from the above that for the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, it is
enough that the complaint avers the jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the plaintiff had prior physical
possession and that he was deprived thereof by the defendant through force, intimidation, threats,
strategy and stealth. 8 The complaint in this case makes such an averment. Hence, the irrelevant
circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing rendered improper an action for forcible
entry is of no moment and cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the case. The MCTC
continues to have that jurisdiction.
We shall now address the more decisive question of prior physical possession.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence at hand, we find for the petitioner.
To begin with, we are at once confronted by the uncontested findings of the MCTC judge himself
during his ocular inspection of the premises in dispute that what he saw thereat "confirmed the
allegations of the defendant [now petitioner Sampayan] that his predecessors-in-interest have
introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in
question", adding that "[N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had once upon a time been in
possession of the land", and categorically stating that "[T]he allegation that Cristita Quita, the
predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since 1957,
openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim,
unsupported by any evidence". aETAHD
Then, too, there is the sworn affidavit of Dionesia Noynay to the effect that she had been residing
since 1960 onward on Lot No. 1957, the lot adjacent to Lot No. 1959, and that neither the private

respondents nor their mother had ever possessed Lot No. 1959. Coming as it does from an
immediate neighbor, Dionesia's statement commands great weight and respect. Incidentally, the
MCTC judge himself found during the ocular inspection that a portion of the house of Macario
Noynay, husband of Dionesia, protruded on Lot No. 1959.
We note that in the herein assailed decision, the Court of Appeals attached much significance to the
fact that private respondents' mother Cristita Quita was an oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149. We
rule and so hold that the mother's being an oppositor in said cadastral case does not, by itself,
establish prior physical possession because not all oppositors in cadastral cases are actual
possessors of the lots or lands subject thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Decision and Resolution,
respectively dated May 16, 2002 and November 7, 2002, of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
||| (Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, [January 14, 2005], 489 PHIL 200-211)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137013. May 6, 2005.]
RUBEN SANTOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES TONY AYON and MERCY AYON, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated October 5, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 4735 and its Resolution 2 dated December 11,
1998 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The petition alleges that on November 6, 1996, Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City a complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Tony
and Mercy Ayon, respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 3506-B-96.
In his complaint, petitioner averred that he is the registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona
Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 108174,
108175, and 108176. Respondent spouses are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-247792. The previous occupant of this property built a building which straddled
both the lots of the herein parties. Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse.
Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he informed
respondents that the building occupies a portion of his land. However, he allowed them to continue
using the building. But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that
respondents demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his property and turn over to
him their possession. But they refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion and
even made improvements on the building. The dispute was then referred to the barangay lupon, but
the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, on March 27, 1996, a certification to
file action was issued.
In their answer, respondents sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction over it since there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Respondents
denied they were occupying petitioner's property by mere tolerance, claiming they own the contested
portion and have been occupying the same long before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985.
On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner, thus:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the
latter, their successors-in-interest and other persons acting in their behalf to vacate the portion of the
subject properties and peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff as well as
dismantle/remove the structures found thereon. IDAESH
Defendants are further ordered to pay reasonable value for the use and occupation of the encroached
area in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) a month beginning September 1996 and the
subsequent months thereafter until premises are vacated; to pay attorney's fees of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00); and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED." 3
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Davao City, in its Decision dated February 12,
1998 in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment. 4 The RTC upheld the finding
of the MTCC that respondents' occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance. Hence,
when petitioner needed the same, he has the right to eject them through court action.
Respondents then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review. In its
Decision dated October 5, 1988 now being challenged by petitioner, the Court of Appeals held that
petitioner's proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the RTC, not an action for
unlawful detainer, thus:
"In this case, petitioners were already in possession of the premises in question at the time private
respondent bought three (3) lots at the Lanzona Subdivision in 1985, a portion of which is occupied
by a building being used by the former as a bodega. Apart from private respondent's bare claim, no
evidence was alluded to show that petitioners' possession was tolerated by (his) predecessor-ininterest. The fact that respondent might have tolerated petitioners' possession is not decisive. What
matters for purposes of determining the proper cause of action is the nature of petitioners' possession

from its inception. And in this regard, the Court notes that the complaint itself merely alleges that
defendants-petitioners have been 'occupying a portion of the above properties of the plaintiff for the
past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff.' Nowhere is it alleged that his predecessor
likewise tolerated petitioners' possession of the premises. . . .
Consequently, . . ., respondent should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion
publiciana and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
complaint for unlawful detainer is ordered DISMISSED." 5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution
dated December 11, 1998.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following
errors:
"I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT
CASE ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER SHOULD PRESENT HIS CLAIM BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA.
II
THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH
EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE."
The sole issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in holding
that petitioner's complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.
Petitioner contends that it is not necessary that he has prior physical possession of the questioned
property before he could file an action for unlawful detainer. He stresses that he tolerated
respondents' occupancy of the portion in controversy until he needed it. After his demand that they
vacate, their continued possession became illegal. Hence, his action for unlawful detainer before the
MTCC is proper.
Respondents, in their comment, insisted that they have been in possession of the disputed property
even before petitioner purchased the same on April 10, 1985. Hence, he cannot claim that they were
occupying the property by mere tolerance because they were ahead in time in physical possession.
We sustain the petition.
It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer
or pleadings filed by the defendant. 6 This rule is no different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. 7 All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall
include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs
arising therefrom. 8 The said courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if the
defendants therein raises the question of ownership over the litigated property in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. 9
Section 1, Rule 70 on forcible entry and unlawful detainer of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, reads:
"Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of
any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person may, at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs."

Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a
case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant
whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for
recovery of possession from defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by
virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his
possession despite the termination of his right thereunder. 10
Petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96 is properly within the
competence of the MTCC. His pertinent allegations in the complaint read:
"4. That defendants (spouses) have constructed an extension of their residential house as well as
other structures and have been occupying a portion of the above PROPERTIES of the plaintiff for the
past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff since at the time he has no need of the
property;
5. That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of 1996 and made demands to the defendants to
vacate and turn over the premises as well as the removal (of) their structures found inside the
PROPERTIES of plaintiff; that without any justifiable reasons, defendants refused to vacate the
portion of the PROPERTIES occupied by them to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.
6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Matina Crossing 74-A,
Davao City for a possible settlement sometime in the latter part of February 1996. The barangay case
reached the Pangkat but no settlement was had. Thereafter, a 'Certification To File Action' dated
March 27, 1996 was issued . . .;
xxx xxx xxx." 11 (emphasis ours)
Verily, petitioner's allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer. We find
no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. A complaint for unlawful
detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is
unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 12 Here, there is an allegation in
petitioner's complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his
tolerance. Petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents' failure to vacate
the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom, or on
November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.
It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when
the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Our ruling in Roxas
vs. Court of Appeals 13 is applicable in this case: "A person who occupies the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against him."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47435 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
February 12, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97,
affirming the Decision dated July 31, 1997 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Davao City
in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96, is hereby REINSTATED. CHcETA
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Corona, Carpio Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
||| (Santos v. Spouses Ayon, G.R. No. 137013, [May 6, 2005], 497 PHIL 415-423)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150755. June 28, 2005.]
RENE GANILA, * EDUARDO DUMADA-OG, SR., RAFAEL GANILA, JOSE PASTRANA, LOURDES
GANILA, FLORENTINO GANILA, SERAFIN GANILA, LORETO ARELLANO, CONRADO GANILA,
VIVENCIO ALVIOR, EDUARDO GANTALA, AMPARO VILLANUEVA, ELEUTERIO SILVA, ADELINA
GANILA, FELIZARDO GANILA, SR., ENRIQUE GANILA, ABRAHAM TANONG, EMILIO ALFARAS,
JR., BAPTIST CHRISTIAN LEARNING CENTER, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
VIOLETA C. HERRERA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
For review on certiorari are the Decision 1 dated March 30, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 58191, and its Resolution 2 dated October 18, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The assailed decision denied the petition to set aside the Resolution 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras, Branch 65, affirming the Order of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) for the 19 petitioners to vacate the contested parcel of land.
The facts are as follows:
On March 19, 1997, private respondent Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment Complaints 4 before the
16th MCTC, Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Valencia, Jordan, Guimaras. Private respondent alleged that
she owns Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras, with an area of 43,210 square
meters; that she inherited the lot from her parents; and that she only tolerated petitioners to construct
residential houses or other improvements on certain portions of the lot without rental. Sometime in
September or October 1996, private respondent demanded that the petitioners vacate the lot and
remove their houses and other improvements thereon. Petitioners refused, despite offer of money by
way of assistance to them. After the barangay conciliation failed, private respondent filed the
complaints.
In their Answers, 5 eight 6 of the petitioners claimed that Lot 1227 was formerly a shoreline which
they developed when they constructed their respective houses. Another eight 7 maintained that their
houses stood on Lot 1229 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras. The other three 8 asserted
that Lot 1227 is a social forest area.
At the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to designate two geodetic engineers as
commissioners of the MCTC to conduct a relocation survey of Lot 1227 and to identify who among
the petitioners have houses within the lot. 9
The commissioners reported that: (1) the house of Henry Gabasa, defendant in Civil Case No. 288-J,
is almost outside Lot 1227; (2) the house of Ludovico Amatorio, defendant in Civil Case No. 289-J,
diagonally traversed the boundary; and (3) the houses of the 19 petitioners are inside Lot 1227. 10
Eight months after herein petitioners' failure to comment on the manifestation of private respondent to
terminate the preliminary conference, the MCTC terminated the preliminary conference. 11
Thereafter, petitioners' counsel Atty. Nelia Jesusa L. Gonzales failed to file her clients' position
papers and affidavits, even after they sought a 30-day extension to file the same. 12
Consequently, the MCTC decided the cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff whereby
each of the twenty-one (21) defendants are hereby ordered:
1. To vacate Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras; THaDEA
2. To pay Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) per month from October, 1996 as compensation for the use
of the property until the same is vacated; and
3. To pay Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED. 13
Petitioners appealed to the RTC, Branch 65, at Jordan, Guimaras, which decided as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision in Civil Cases Nos. 0270-J, 0272-J, 0273-J, 0274J, 0275-J, 0276-J, 0277-J, 0278-J, 0279-J, 0280-J, 0281-J, 0282-J, 0283-J, 0284-J, 0285-J, 0286-J,
0287-J, 0291-J and 0292-J are hereby affirmed.

The decision of the court below in Civil Cases Nos. 0288-J and 0289-J are set aside. Civil Cases
Nos. 0288-J and 0289-J are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 14
The RTC ruled that the evidence showed the better right of private respondent to possess Lot 1227.
Private respondent's position paper, affidavit and tax declaration supported her allegations. In
addition, the commissioners' report and sketch plan showed that indeed petitioners occupy Lot 1227.
On the other hand, according to the RTC, the petitioners failed to present evidence which would show
that they are entitled to possess the lot.
Based on the sketch plan, the RTC dismissed the cases against Gabasa and Amatorio since their
houses occupy only a small area of Lot 1227. It declared that Gabasa and Amatorio believed in good
faith that the whole area they occupied was part of the seashore.
The 19 petitioners, who were ordered to vacate the lot, filed a joint petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court denied the petition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration and filed an
amended petition. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the factual findings and conclusions
arrived at by the trial courts and denied the amended petition for lack of merit. 15 It also denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners are now before us, on a petition for review, alleging that:
The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect and deference, committed a reversible error in the
interpretation/application of the law in the instant case and in the appreciation of the facts and
evidence presented. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it denied and
dismissed the petition filed by the petitioners. 16
After considering the parties' submissions, we find three basic issues: (1) Did the MCTC err in taking
jurisdiction over and deciding the cases? (2) Did the RTC err in sustaining the MCTC's judgment? (3)
Did the CA err in denying the petition for review filed by the 19 petitioners ordered to be ejected?
Petitioners insist that private respondent should have filed an action to recover possession de jure,
not a mere complaint for ejectment, for two reasons. One, they possessed Lot 1227 in good faith for
more than 30 years in the concept of owners. And two, there was no withholding of possession since
private respondent was not in prior possession of the lot.
Private respondent states in her Comment before us that the allegations in her Complaints make out
a clear case of unlawful detainer which is cognizable by the MCTC. We are in agreement with her
stance. There was no error in the choice of the complainant's remedy, a matter left to her
determination as the suitor. And the complaint itself is defined by the allegations therein, not the
allegations of the defendants. HIAESC
At the outset, we note that petitioners question the MCTC's jurisdiction yet they admit in their
preliminary statement that the Complaints filed are indeed for unlawful detainer, and that the only
issue to be determined is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not juridical
possession (possession de jure), much less ownership. 17
While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation of possession, they confuse the
remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior physical
possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession.
Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases.
In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but
his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. 18
Thus, the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically entitle them to
remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at all
in a suit for unlawful detainer, simply because prior lawful possession by virtue of contract or other
reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in forcible entry where defendants, by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession. Here there is no
evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts.
If only to stress the fundamental principles related to present controversy, jurisdiction over unlawful
detainer suits is vested in municipal trial courts. 19 And in ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. 20

In this case for ejectment, private respondent's allegations sufficiently present a case of unlawful
detainer. She alleged that (1) she owns Lot 1227; (2) she tolerated petitioners to construct their
houses thereon; (3) she withdrew her tolerance; and (4) petitioners refused to heed her demand to
vacate the lot. The Complaints were also filed within one year from the date of her demand. The
cause of action for unlawful detainer between the parties springs from the failure of petitioners to
vacate the lot upon lawful demand of the private respondent. When they refused to vacate the lot
after her demand, petitioners' continued possession became unlawful. Her complaint for ejectment
against respondent, to put it simply, is not without sufficient basis.
Petitioners' contention that private respondent should have filed an action to recover possession de
jure with the RTC is not supported by law or jurisprudence. The distinction between a summary action
of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is settled in
our jurisprudence.
What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana)
and from a reivindicatory action (accion reivindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of
possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the
two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the
summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of
possession and accion reivindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of
possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession. 21
It is not up to defendants, now petitioners herein, to dictate upon plaintiff, now the private respondent,
what her initial recourse should be. Her choice of an action for ejectment against so-called squatters
is well within her rights.
Petitioners cite the case of Bayubay v. Court of Appeals, 22 and argue that the MCTC's decision was
without jurisdictional or legal basis because the MCTC did not issue a preliminary conference order.
They assert that the 10-day period to file position papers and affidavits only starts after the parties
had received a preliminary conference order. They insist they were denied due process when the
MCTC decided the cases based merely on private respondent's Complaints and affidavit, without
considering their Answers.
For her part, private respondent maintains that there was substantial compliance with the rules in the
MCTC's conduct of the preliminary conference, hence there was no violation of due process nor
disregard of its proper jurisdiction.
Petitioners' present contention was first raised only in their appeal to the RTC. Raising it before the
appellate tribunal is barred by estoppel. 23 They should have raised it in the proceedings before the
MCTC. In our view, this issue is a mere afterthought, when the MCTC decided against them. Basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process require that as a rule an issue cannot be raised by the
petitioners for the first time on appeal. 24
Besides, petitioners did not question initially the MCTC's Order dated February 19, 1999, when they
moved for an extension of time to file their position papers and affidavits. They wanted another 30
days on top of the 30 days set by the MCTC, which strictly should have been 10 days only. In this
regard, petitioners could not claim that they were denied sufficient time to file their position papers
and affidavits before the trial court. Further, they cannot validly invoke our ruling 25 in Bayubay, for in
that case there was no order at all terminating the preliminary conference and requiring the parties to
submit position papers and affidavits. HDATCc
We note with dismay petitioners' insistence that we order the MCTC "to conduct the requisite
preliminary conference." The summary character of ejectment suits will be disregarded if we allow
petitioners to further delay this case by allowing a second preliminary conference. Ejectment by way
of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings, designed to provide an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession over the property
involved. It is a timely procedure designed to remedy the delay in the resolution of such cases. 26
Lastly, petitioners aver that private respondent failed to prove her allegation of ownership of Lot 1227
as it is only based on a tax declaration which is not an evidence of ownership. They also claim that

their possession of the lot was not and could not be by mere tolerance. However, this is a factual
matter best left to the trial courts.
What we have now is sufficient evidence showing that private respondent has a better right to
possess Lot 1227. The commissioners' report and sketch plan show that the 19 petitioners occupy
the lot, which corroborate private respondent's allegation and disprove petitioners' defense that Lot
1227 is a shoreline; or that Lot 1227 is a social forest area. While not a conclusive evidence of
ownership, private respondent's tax declaration constitutes proof that she has a claim of title over the
lot. It has been held that:
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration
of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 27
The lower courts did not err in adjudicating the issue of possession. Mere absence of title over the lot
is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case. Plainly stated,
the trial court has validly exercised its jurisdiction over the ejectment cases below. The policy behind
ejectment suits is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder, and to compel the party out
of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what she claims is hers. The party
deprived of possession must not take the law into his or her own hands. 28 For their part, herein
petitioners could not be barred from defending themselves before the court adequately, as a matter of
law and right.
However, petitioners in their defense should show that they are entitled to possess Lot 1227. If they
had any evidence to prove their defenses, they should have presented it to the MCTC with their
position papers and affidavits. But they ignored the court's order and missed the given opportunity to
have their defenses heard, the very essence of due process. 29 Their allegations were not only
unsubstantiated but were also disproved by the plaintiff's evidence. DSHcTC
In sum, we find no reversible error much less any grave abuse of discretion committed by the Court of
Appeals. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. 30 His
status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose
occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. 31
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 30, 2001 and its Resolution dated October 18, 2001 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
||| (Ganila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150755, [June 28, 2005], 500 PHIL 212-225)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132197. August 16, 2005.]
ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS, INC., petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH ONG, respondents.
Ernesto L. Abijay and Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for petitioners.
Edgar F. Gica for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; DISMISSAL OF APPEAL; FILING OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DEEMED AN EFFECTIVE WITHDRAWAL OF THE DEFECTIVE NOTICE OF
APPEAL. Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC,
petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of
Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the
withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee's brief. Applying
this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective
withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion
for Reconsideration and started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of
Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and
the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review
on time.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS; PROPER MODE OF
APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. Petitioners invoke to the ruling
in People v. De la Cruz that once a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way
to a motion for reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the two cases are different. De la Cruz
is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and an
appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal. In the case at bar, a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing
of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
3.ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; UNLAWFUL DETAINER; AN ALLEGATION THAT THE
DEFENDANT IS UNLAWFULLY WITHHOLDING POSSESSION FROM THE PLAINTIFF IS
DEEMED SUFFICIENT WITHOUT NECESSARILY EMPLOYING THE TERMINOLOGY OF THE
LAW. Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners' possession was originally
lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express or
implied contract. The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a
requisite to qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing
on the matter. In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals, it was held that the allegation in the complaint that
there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It
is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law. Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession
on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract,
express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. In Rosanna
B. Barba v. Court of Appeals, we held that a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient. Based on this premise, the allegation in the
Complaint that: . . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate
said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of
the use of their lots; is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; SUMMARY IN NATURE; TECHNICALITIES OR DETAILS OF PROCEDURE SHOULD

BE CAREFULLY AVOIDED. In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the
registered owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied
tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the former owners of the properties, to remain therein.
Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots.
Respondents refused, thereby depriving petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint
establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of
vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC. Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited
in the case of Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis. But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. The case does not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the ejectment
complaint. The case of Co Tiamco v. Diaz justifies a more liberal approach, thus: . . . The principle
underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases rests
upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for
they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and,
accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF POSSESSION IS PRIMORDIAL WHILE THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP
IS GENERALLY UNESSENTIAL. The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of
ownership of real property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of
possession or possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or
possession de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while
the issue of ownership is generally unessential.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY ONLY SEEKS TO RECOVER PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY; CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WILL NOT DEPRIVE
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JURISDICTION. Neither the allegation in petitioners'
complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised by respondents sufficiently convert this case
into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not
institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming or obtaining ownership of the properties.
The acknowledgment in their pleadings of the fact of prior ownership by respondents does not
constitute a recognition of respondents' present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the
necessary elements for a case of unlawful detainer, specifically the unlawful withholding of
possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to recover physical possession of the
subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land as well did not
deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PENDING ACTIONS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF DEED OF SALE
AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND QUIETING OF TITLE ON THE SAME PROPERTY
WILL NOT ABATE THE EJECTMENT CASE; RATIONALE. Even if respondents claim ownership
as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of
ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not therefore oust the municipal court of its
summary jurisdiction. This Court in Ganadin v. Ramos stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or
recovery of possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the
pending actions for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting
of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case. In Drilon v. Gaurana, this Court
ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of
the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or
unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while there may be identity of parties and
subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the
rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LOWER COURT'S ADJUDICATION OF OWNERSHIP IS MERELY
PROVISIONAL. In Oronce v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the fact that respondents had
previously filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de
retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate
the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff. Consequently, an adjudication

made in an ejectment proceeding regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely
provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving
title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over
the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The Court reiterated this in
the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez when it ruled: We must stress, however, that before us is only the
initial determination of ownership over the lot in dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of
possession, although the issue of ownership is inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court's
adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial
courts' decisions as well, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title
to the property, if and when such action is brought seasonably before the proper forum. The long
settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack. In Apostol v. Court
of Appeals, this Court had the occasion to clarify this: . . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or
cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the
validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond
the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
In a Decision 1 dated 6 January 1998, the Former First Division of the Court of Appeals overturned
the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City,
ruling instead that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject complaint for unlawful detainer. This
petition for review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid Court of Appeals' Decision.
The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents, docketed
as Civil Case No. 2376, before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In the complaint, petitioners
alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ong's
ownership of the lots previous to theirs. On 26 January 1995, Atty. Joseph M. Baduel, representing
Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote respondents informing them of its intent to use the lots and
asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But respondents refused to
vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners alleged.
Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had acquired the lands
from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In turn, it appears that
Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title
consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by respondents in a complaint filed
on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. 2 Per record,
this case is still pending resolution.
Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment case on 24 April 1996, with the decision ordering
respondents to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over possession thereof to
petitioners.
On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March 1997 a judgment affirming the MTC's decision in its
entirety.
On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal. However, on the following day, they filed a
motion for reconsideration.
On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently gave due course to respondents'
notice of appeal filed on 8 May 1997; denied their motion for reconsideration dated 9 May 1997, 3
and granted petitioners' motion for immediate execution pending appeal.
In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and treated as a Petition for
Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there was no

contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful
detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside.
Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
principal issues raised before this Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has already become final
and executory at the time the petition for review was filed; (ii) whether the allegations in the complaint
constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC; and, (iii) whether petitioners,
as registered owners, are entitled to the possession of the subject premises.
We resolve the first argument to be without merit.
The following sequence of events is undisputed:
(1)On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned decision affirming the judgment of the MTC.
(2)On 28 April 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned decision.
(3)On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. SAcaDE
(4)On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision.
(5)On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue issued an Order denying respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration.
(6)On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned 23 June 1997 Order.
(7)On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their motion for an additional period
of ten (10) days within which to file their Petition for Review.
(8)On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review.
Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period for appeal.
They theorize that the period started running on 28 April 1995, the date of receipt of the RTC
decision, and ended on 13 May 1997. According to them, this reglementary period could not have
been interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of the Motion for Reconsideration because of the filing
one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal. This Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997, albeit the wrong
mode of appeal, expressly manifested their intention to file a petition for review to either the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court. 4
Petitioners further argue that respondents, after having filed the Notice of Appeal which was given
due course by the RTC, cannot take an inconsistent stand such as filing a Motion for
Reconsideration. Such filing, therefore, did not toll the fifteen (15)-day period which started running
from the date of receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on 13 May 1997.
Respondents, in their Comment, 5 submit that the filing of the Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997
was improper, and as such did not produce any legal effect. Therefore, the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration immediately on the following day cured this defect. The RTC refused to subscribe
respondents' position. It justified the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the
respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal. The Order dated 23 June 1997 stated:
On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari filed by Defendants on May 8, 1997.
Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for Reconsideration.
Considering the Notice of Appeal filed earlier which the court hereby approves, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.
The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal being meritorious, is GRANTED. 6 (Emphasis in
the original.)
Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point when it took cognizance of
respondents' position and reversed the RTC. But does this necessarily mean that the RTC was
correct when it declared that the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of
Appeal, no matter how erroneous the latter mode was?
Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1.How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and
other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court
and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen

(15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for
new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of
the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of
the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only
within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should
have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal
of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule
contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of
the defective Notice of Appeal.
Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again
from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to
File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is
clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.
Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz 7 that once a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot
be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the two
cases are different.
De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and
an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal.
In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal from
a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no
appeal was interposed.
Now on the second and more important issue raised by petitioners: whether the Complaint satisfies
the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC.
The MTC considered itself as having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and disposed of the
same in favor of petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the
lower courts and found the complaint to be one not for unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds,
namely: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract, express or implied, between the
parties as would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals.
The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material allegations:
xxx xxx xxx
3.That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36466 of the Register of
Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of Deeds
of Mandaue City and Lot No. 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City, all situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of said Transfer Certificate of Titles are
hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", and "C" respectively and made an integral part hereof;
4.That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said lots;
5.That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant Elizabeth Ong and her husband and
co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in the house constructed on said lots;
6.That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel, wrote defendants a letter
informing them or their intent to use said lots and demanded of them to vacate said lots within 30
days from receipt of said letter. Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made an
integral part thereof;

7.That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots,
thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of
their lots;
8.That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the plaintiffs, plaintiffs have suffered
damages in the form of unearned rentals in the amount of P10,000.00 a month
xxx xxx xxx 8
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. 9
Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners' possession was originally
lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express or
implied contract. IASEca
The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to qualify
the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on the matter.
In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals, 10 it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was
unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally
settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law. 11
Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant,
which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and
which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. 12 In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of
Appeals, 13 we held that a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession
from plaintiff is sufficient.
Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that:
. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus,
unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their
lots; 14
is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.
In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the
former owners of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to
respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents refused, thereby depriving
petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic elements of an
unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo dela Paz v.
Panis. 15 But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 70 16 of the Rules of Court. The case
does not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the ejectment complaint. The case of Co Tiamco
v. Diaz 17 justifies a more liberal approach, thus:
. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are
summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly
as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided. 18
Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case involving the annulment
of deed of sale and title over said property. Petitioners know better than to question this in an
ejectment proceeding, which brings us to the nature of the action in this case.
Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it being an accion
reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground that petitioners were constantly claiming ownership
over the lands in the guise of filing an action for ejectment. In their Comment, 19 respondents
maintain that they occupy the subject lots as the legal owners. Petitioners, on the other hand, are
seeking recovery of possession under a claim of ownership which is tantamount to recovery of
possession based on alleged title to the lands, and therefore is within the original jurisdiction of the
RTC, so respondents conclude.

This contention is not tenable.

The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs
from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession de jure, and
accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession de facto. In an action for
unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally
unessential. 20
Neither the allegation in petitioners' complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised by
respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province
of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming
or obtaining ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in their pleadings of the fact of prior
ownership by respondents does not constitute a recognition of respondents' present ownership. This
is meant only to establish one of the necessary elements for a case of unlawful detainer, specifically
the unlawful withholding of possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to recover
physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels
of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the conclusion
would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not
therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. 21 This Court in Ganadin v. Ramos 22
stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not matter if ownership
is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and
Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate the
ejectment case.
In Drilon v. Gaurana, 23 this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the
same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its
jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while
there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for
annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same.
24
In Oronce v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court held that the fact that respondents had previously filed a
separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or
equitable mortgage in the same Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary
remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff. Consequently, an adjudication made in an
ejectment proceeding regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional
and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real
property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.
The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez 26 when it ruled:
We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of ownership over the lot in
dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, although the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case
is merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well, would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property, if and when such action is
brought seasonably before the proper forum. IECcaA
The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack.
In Apostol v. Court of Appeals, 27 this Court had the occasion to clarify this:
. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that
purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be
assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the

right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an
action for unlawful detainer. 28
With the conclusion of the second issue in favor of petitioners, there is no need to discuss the third
assignment of error which is related to the second issue.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 January
1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 24 April 1996 of the Municipal Trial
Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
||| (Ross Rica Sales Center Inc. v. Spouses Ong, G.R. No. 132197, [August 16, 2005], 504 PHIL 304320)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 165177. August 25, 2005.]
LILIA V. PERALTA-LABRADOR, petitioner, vs. SILVERIO BUGARIN, substituted by his widow,
CONSOLACION BUGARIN, 1 respondent.
Luperio F. Villanueva and Jethro L.F. Villanueva for petitioner.
Michael Fabunan for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; FORCIBLE ENTRY; NATURE OF ACTION FOR
FORCIBLE ENTRY, EXPLAINED. In Lopez v. David Jr., it was held that an action for forcible entry
is a quieting process and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in pursuance of the summary nature
of the action. Thus, we have nullified proceedings in the MTCs when it improperly assumed
jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded
one year. After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an
accion publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment
suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty independently of title. Likewise, the case may be instituted
before the same court as an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as
possession.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OF A COURT IS DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
COMPLAINT; SUSTAINED IN CASE AT BAR. Corollarily, jurisdiction of a court is determined by
the allegations of the complaint. Thus, in ascertaining whether or not the action falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought are to be examined. It is clear that petitioner's averment make out a case for forcible
entry because she alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the
forcible entry thereon by respondent. Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of
respondent occurred two years prior to the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1996, the cause of
action for forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
Petitioner's complaint therefore should have been filed with the proper RTC. It is settled that
jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence,
acquiescence or even express consent. Hence, the failure of respondent to insist on the defenses of
lack of cause of action and prescription stated in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim will not vest
the MTC with jurisdiction over the case.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the March 12, 2004 decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57475, which affirmed with modification the January 26, 2000 judgment 3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. RTC-1590-I, which
in turn affirmed the decision 4 dated May 16, 1999 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Felipe,
Zambales, in Civil Case No. 328, and its September 6, 2004 resolution 5 denying reconsideration
thereof.
On January 18, 1996, petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for "Recovery of Possession
and Ownership," docketed as Civil Case No. 328, with the MTC of San Felipe, Zambales. She alleged
that she is the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 2650, with an area of 400 sq. m. located at Sitio
Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales, having purchased the same in 1976 from
spouses Artemio and Angela Pronto. In 1977, she was issued Tax Declaration No. 10462 and paid
the taxes due thereon. 6
In 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways constructed a road which traversed Cadastral
Lot No. 2650 thereby separating 108 sq. m. from the rest of petitioner's lot, for which she was issued
Tax Declaration No. 02-2460R in 1991. 7

Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m. lot and
refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of petitioner. Hence, on January 18, 1996, she instituted
a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership against respondent. HEDCAS
In his Answer with Counterclaims, 8 respondent contended that the area claimed by petitioner is
included in the 4,473 square meter lot, covered by the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13011;
and that he has been in continuous possession and occupation thereof since 1955. In his Amended
Answer with Counterclaim, 9 however, respondent failed to allege that the questioned lot is covered
by the OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that he planted fruit bearing trees in the property.
Respondent further pleaded the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription.
On May 16, 1999, the court a quo ruled in favor of respondent declaring him as the owner of the
controverted lot on the basis of the OCT No. P-13011. The complaint was dismissed for failure of
petitioner to prove prior physical possession and ownership thereof. The dispositive portion thereof,
reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered and for failure on the part of the plaintiff to
establish the preponderance of evidence of prior actual physical possession and present title over the
lot in her favor, let the instant case be ordered DISMISSED, and the defendant be awarded the
rightful possession and ownership of the same and the plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay FIFTEEN
THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS as reasonable Attorney's fee and FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS as appearance fee plus costs.
SO ORDERED. 10
The RTC affirmed the assailed decision, 11 hence petitioner filed a petition for review before the
Court of Appeals which was however denied for insufficiency of evidence to prove ownership or prior
actual physical possession. The appellate court deleted the monetary awards in favor of respondent
as well as the declaration of the MTC that respondent is the owner of the questioned lot on the
ground that the OCT No. P-13011, relied upon by said court was not formally offered in evidence,
hence, cannot be considered by the court. The decretal portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing discussion, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated January 26, 2000, in Civil Case No. RTC 1590 I of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Iba, Zambales, and Decision dated May 16, 1999, in Civil
Case No. 328 of the Municipal Trial Court of San Felipe, Zambales are MODIFIED by deleting the
declaration of ownership as to the disputed 108 square meters and the monetary award in favor of
respondent Silverio Bugarin. However, the dismissal of the complaint is AFFIRMED. cHCaIE
SO ORDERED. 12
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied. Hence the instant petition.
Pertinent portion of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. . . . a person deprived of the possession
of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, . . . may at any time within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with the damages and costs. (Emphasis supplied)
In Lopez v. David Jr., 13 it was held that an action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one
year time bar for filing a suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. Thus, we have
nullified proceedings in the MTCs when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in which the
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded one year. After the lapse of the one
year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an accion publiciana, a suit for recovery of
the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year
from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty
independently of title. Likewise, the case may be instituted before the same court as an accion
reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession. 14

Corollarily, jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Thus, in

ascertaining whether or not the action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the
averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined. 15
In the instant case, petitioner's complaint alleges that:
2.That plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of land denominated as Cadastral lot No. 2650, San Felipe
Cadastre, situated at sitio Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales which she
bought in 1976 from Spouses Artemio Pronto and Angela Merano when she was still a widow, with
the following boundaries: North, Alipio Abad, East, Antonio Cueva, South, Juan Borja, and West, Old
Provincial Road, containing an area of 108 square meters, declared under Tax Declaration No. 0021860R and assessed at P1,120.00;
3.That plaintiff has been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse as well as notorious possession
of the said lot and in the concept of an owner since she [acquired] it in 1976 until the time when
defendant took possession forcibly, two years ago;
4.That in or before 1990 the land was traversed by a new National Highway and the land was
segregated from a bigger portion of the land, the western portion is now the land in question and
since the new provincial road which traversed the whole land of the plaintiff, the old highway which is
west of Lot 2650 shall belong to the plaintiff in compensation of the portion of her lot traversed by the
new highway, said old highway is also taken by defendant unlawfully; 16
It is clear that petitioner's averment make out a case for forcible entry because she alleged prior
physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by respondent.
Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred two years 17 prior to
the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1996, the cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed
and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. Petitioner's complaint therefore should have
been filed with the proper RTC.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their
silence, acquiescence or even express consent. 18 Hence, the failure of respondent to insist on the
defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription stated in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim
will not vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the case. cTECHI
On this point, the Court held in Bongato v. Malvar 19 that:
It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is
prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within
which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the
land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time
the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel
of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of
possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as
possession.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible entry filed by
respondents had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint for ejectment on July 10, 1992.
Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the owner of the land, possession thereof cannot be wrested
through a summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than one
(1) year. Respondents should have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an
accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their cause of
action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.
xxx xxx xxx
Further, a court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured
by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A party may assail the jurisdiction of the
court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. That the MTCC can take
cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has been
belatedly filed we likewise held in Bayog v. Natino[.]

Moreover, even if the MTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the complaint should still be
dismissed because petitioner failed to prove that the controverted 108 sq. m. lot is part of Cadastral
Lot No. 2650. Petitioner admitted that she has never seen the Cadastral Map of San Felipe,
Zambales, and relied only on the Survey Notification Card 20 from the Bureau of Lands, 21 with a
sketch of Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Said card, however, does not reflect the 108 sq. m. lot subject of
this case. Neither did petitioner cause the survey of Cadastral Lot No. 2650 after the construction of a
new road to prove that the segregated portion on the western side is part thereof. Ei incumbit probotio
qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. 22 Failing to discharge this
burden, the dismissal of the complaint is proper. HaTAEc
In the same vein, ownership of the lot in question cannot be awarded to respondent considering that
OCT No. P-13011, 23 and the Survey Plan 24 were not formally offered in evidence. While the issue
of ownership may be passed upon in ejectment cases for the sole purpose of determining the nature
of possession, 25 no evidence conclusively show that the lot in question is covered by said OCT No.
P-13011 or any other title of respondent.
WHEREFORE, the May 16, 1999 decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San Felipe, Zambales, the
January 26, 2000 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Iba, Zambales, and the March 12,
2004 decision of the Court of Appeals, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction. The
complaint in Civil Case No. 328 is DISMISSED. SHDAEC
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
||| (Peralta-Labrador v. Bugarin, G.R. No. 165177, [August 25, 2005], 505 PHIL 409-417)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127382. August 17, 2004.]
DR. JESUS SERIA and ENRIQUETA SERIA (deceased), represented by DR. JESUS SERIA,
JR., ANTONIO SERIA, VIOLETA SERIA TAN, REYNALDO SERIA and EMMANUEL SERIA,
petitioners, vs. VICTOR CABALLERO, TEODORO DONELA, OLIVER DONELA, COURT OF
APPEALS, and THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, MISAMIS ORIENTAL,
respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
August 23, 1996, affirming the dismissal of the complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession,
and damages by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, in Civil
Case No. 8716.
The Antecedents
On August 11, 1982, Dr. Jesus Seria and his wife, Enriqueta Seria filed a Complaint for quieting of
title, recovery of possession, and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against respondents Victor Caballero and his tenants, Teodoro Donela and Oliver Donela. When Dr.
Seria died on August 6, 1983, he was substituted by his children, petitioners Jesus, Jr., Antonio,
Violeta, Reynaldo and Emmanuel. 2
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are the absolute owners and have been in actual
and constructive possession for thirty-five (35) years of a parcel of land described as follows:
Lot No. 3533-A, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre
Tax Declaration No. 02161
Location - Mantadiao, Opol, Misamis Oriental
Area - 2.5000 has.
Boundaries:
North - Alejo Seria
South - T. Sabornido
East - A. Seria & T. Sabornido
West - F. Caballero 3
The petitioners averred that sometime in March 1982, they discovered that respondent Caballero was
claiming ownership over the said land and offering it for sale or mortgage to third parties. They also
discovered that the respondents Donelas were occupying the land as tenants and caretakers of the
land. 4
The petitioners claimed that their father, Dr. Seria, bought the land from Lucia Vda. de Marbella who
inherited it from her father, Ramon Neri. 5 They presented a Deed of Sale 6 dated August 23, 1947
showing that Dr. Seria bought 5 hectares of ricefield, bounded on the North by Raymundo Seria,
on the East by Teofilo Saburnido, on the South by Obdelio Caballero, on the West by Obdullo
Caballero, from Lucia Vda. de Marbella. Dr. Seria was issued Tax Declaration No. 4029 allegedly for
the said property. As indicated in the tax declaration and subsequent tax declarations issued in the
name of Dr. Seria, they were issued for Cadastral Lot No. 3533 and covered a 2.5-hectare ricefield
with the same boundary owners as those in the complaint. 7 The petitioners also averred that they
regularly paid taxes thereon since 1947 up to the present. 8
In his answer, respondent Caballero alleged that he was the lawful owner, and had been in actual
physical possession of the disputed land since time immemorial. He averred that the disputed land is
part of Cadastral Lot No. 3533, C-7 of the Cagayan Cadastre and originally owned by his grandfather,
Eustaquio Caballero. 9
The respondents averred that Eustaquio Caballero declared the entire parcel of land for tax purposes
even before the war. Tax Declaration No. 2442 was issued in lieu of the records that were destroyed
during the war.

This tax declaration indicated that the 119,490 square-meter parcel of land was located at Pontacon,
Iponan, Cagayan de Oro City, bounded on North by Rustico Dablio, on the East by J. Seria and T.
Saburnido, on the South by Victor Obsioma, and on the West by Victorino Caballero. 10
Emiliana Ibarat, respondent Caballero's sister, testified that when Eustaquio Caballero died in 1944,
the land was divided among his three children, Vicenta, Benita and Victorino, the father of respondent
Caballero. Lot A, with an area of 39,625 square meters, was given to Victorino, which was later
inherited by the respondent. Lot B, with an area of 71,450 square meters, was given to Benita; and
Lot C, with only 7,938 square meters was given to Vicenta. Lots B and C were, thereafter, sold to one
Gaga Yasay. Because of the trouble between the petitioners and the respondents, Yasay agreed to
buy only a portion of Lot A. 11
The land was surveyed during the trial and it was determined that it now consisted of only 23,373
square meters, 12 and not 25,000 square meters as claimed by the petitioners. Gliceria Legaspi,
respondent Caballero's other sister, also testified that the disputed land was now bounded on the
North by Seria and Nangcas, on the East by Teofilo Saburnido, on the South by Gaga Yasay, and
on the West by Nangcas. 13
The RTC rendered judgment 14 on January 21, 1992, dismissing the complaint, and upholding the
right of the respondents over the land. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant Victor Caballero and against
the plaintiffs herein, to wit:
1. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint with costs.
2. Ordering the defendant Victor Caballero as the absolute and lawful owner and possessor of the
land in question.
3. Ordering the plaintiffs, their heirs, lawyers, servants or privies not to disturb or molest the
possession and ownership of Victor Caballero over the land in question.
4. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay to defendant Victor Caballero, jointly and severally the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) pesos for expenses of litigation, and THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00)
pesos for and as attorney's fees having been compelled to retain the services of counsel to protect
his interest herein. TaSEHD
SO ORDERED. 15
The trial court ruled that it was not clearly shown that the land bought by Dr. Seria from Lucia Vda.
de Marbella was the same land owned by Victor Caballero, and that the petitioners failed to show that
Lucia Vda. de Marbella bought the land from Eustaquio Caballero, the original owner and cadastral
claimant of the land. It also noted that the deed of sale between Lucia Vda. de Marbella and Dr.
Seria showed that the land had an area of 5 hectares, whereas, the petitioners only claimed 2.5
hectares. Furthermore, the boundaries of the land stated in the complaint did not coincide with what
was stated in the Deed of Sale, or in Tax Declaration No. 2442 in the name of Eustaquio Caballero.
The trial court ruled that the petitioners failed to explain these discrepancies, and that there was no
showing that Tax Declaration No. 2442 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 4029 in the name of Dr.
Seria. The trial court interpreted this to mean that Eustaquio Caballero's right as owner of the land
remained.
Dissatisfied, the petitioners appealed the case to the CA, which rendered a Decision 16 affirming in
toto the decision of the RTC. The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 30,
1996. 17 The CA denied the motion. 18
Hence, the instant petition.
The petitioners assign the following errors:
1. THAT IT IS ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO UPHOLD THE
HONORABLE RTC ON THE ISSUE THAT THE ALLEGED IDENTITY OF THE LAND IN LITIGATION
IS UNESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE PARTIES-LITIGANTS.
2. THAT IT IS ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO FAIL TO APPRECIATE
THE 35-YEAR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS. 19

The issues in this petition are, therefore, the following: (1) whether the petitioners were able to
establish the identity of the land being claimed by them; and (2) whether acquisitive prescription
should be appreciated in favor of the petitioners. IDSaTE
The Ruling of the Court
The first issue deals clearly with a question of fact which is beyond the province of this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari. Well-entrenched is the rule that the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for
review is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this
Court and they carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of
the trial court. 20 The exceptions to this rule are the following:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
facts are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
21
We find no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the CA. None of the aforementioned exceptions is
present in this case. The CA was correct in concluding that the petitioners failed to establish that the
parcel of land in the possession of the respondents is the same as that subject of their complaint.
The CA noted that the land subject of the complaint has boundaries different from the land in
possession of the respondents. In fact, the land described in the complaint appears to be different
from the land described in the Deed of Sale which the petitioners invoke as the basis of their
ownership.
First. The petitioners alleged in their complaint that the boundaries of their property are as follows:
North - Alejo Seria
South - T. Sabornido
East - A. Seria & T. Sabornido
West - F. Caballero 22
On the other hand, the Deed of Sale provides that the property sold to them has the following
boundaries:
North - Raymundo Seria
South - Obdullo Caballero
East - Teofilo Saburnido
West - Obdullo Caballero 23
Second. The complaint 24 of the petitioners states that the property they are claiming has an area of
2.5 hectares. On the other hand, the Deed of Sale 25 provides that the subject property has an area
of 5 hectares.
Third. The complaint alleged that the property is located in "Mantadiao, Opol, Misamis Oriental," 26
while the Deed of Sale shows that the property purchased is located in "Puntakon, Igpit, Cagayan Or.
Misamis." 27
We agree with the CA that there was no showing that Tax Declaration No. 2442 in the name of
Eustaquio Caballero was cancelled. Absent any specific statement therein to that effect, it cannot be
presumed that Tax Declaration No. 4029 in the name of Dr. Seria cancelled Tax Declaration No.
2442. IEAHca
Moreover, the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2442 is different from that covered by Tax
Declaration No. 4029 for the following reasons:

The boundary owners of the land as indicated in Tax Declaration No. 2442 differ from those stated in
Tax Declaration No. 4029. The boundary owners as indicated in Tax Declaration No. 2442 are as
follows:
North - Rustico Dablio
South -Victor Obsioma
East - J. Seria & T. Saburnido
West - Victorino Caballero 28
Under Tax Declaration No. 4029, on the other hand, the boundary owners are as follows:
North - Alejo Seria
South - Teofilo Saburnido
East - A. Seria [and] T. Saburnido
West - Eustaquio Caballero 29
Moreover, Tax Declaration No. 2442 covers an area of 119,490 square meters 30 while Tax
Declaration No. 4029 covers only 25,000 square meters or 2.5 hectares. 31
The petitioners argue that the Deed of Sale and Tax Declaration No. 4029 should not be compared to
Tax Declaration No. 2442 and the Technical Description of Cadastral Lot No. 3533 because the
former refers only to a portion of the area referred to by the latter. 32 While the petitioners are correct
on this point, such mistake would still not justify a different conclusion. The fact remains that the
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the petitioners did not prove the identity of the
land being claimed. The petitioners did not present evidence to prove that the land registered in the
name of Eustaquio Caballero was sold to Lucia Vda. de Marbella or her predecessor-in-interest from
whom they purchased the land subject of their complaint.
The failure to establish the identity of the land is obviously fatal to the petitioners' case. In Beo vs.
Court of Appeals, 33 a case which also involves an action for possession and quieting of title, the
Court had the occasion to state:
. . . [B]ecause petitioners failed to explain the discrepancy or present other evidence to prove with
certainty the location and area of the land they seek to recover, respondent court correctly applied the
invariable rule that a person who claims ownership of real property is duty-bound to clearly identify
the land being claimed, in accordance with the title on which he anchors his right of ownership. When
the record does not show that the land subject matter of the action for recovery of possession has
been exactly determined, such action cannot prosper, as in the case of petitioners. In sum, proof of
ownership coupled with identity of the land is the basic rule.
Corollarily, the rule is likewise well-settled that in order that an action for recovery of possession may
prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action fully proves not only his ownership but also
the identity of the property claimed, by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. As the
appellate court succinctly stated, he who claims to have a better right to the property must clearly
show that the land possessed by the other party is the very land that belongs to him. 34
On the second issue, the CA ruled that inasmuch as the petitioners failed to establish that the parcel
of land in possession of the respondents is the same as the subject of their complaint, their claim of
acquisitive prescription is clearly untenable.
The petitioners argue that they would not have regularly paid taxes on the land since 1947 had they
not believed that they owned the same. 35 The respondents, for their part, aver that the petitioners
were only able to prove seven (7) years of actual possession of the land through cultivation by their
tenants. They argue that such seven-year period of cultivation cannot be considered in the petitioners'
favor, since the witness who testified on this fact did not personally know the boundaries of the land
cultivated, or whether it was the same land bought by Dr. Seria. The respondents contend that
acquisitive prescription applies only when there is no dispute as to the identity of the property. 36
We agree with the respondents. Since the property has not been clearly identified by the petitioners,
their claim of acquisitive prescription cannot be considered. Insufficient identification of the portion of
land claimed in absolute ownership cannot ripen into ownership. Possession as a means of acquiring
ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction. 37

Assuming, however, that the disputed land has been clearly identified, acquisitive prescription will still
not lie in favor of the petitioners because they were not able to prove that they have been in
possession of the property for the requisite number of years. Prescription requires public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner for ten years, in
case the possession is in good faith and with just title. 38
Aside from the testimony of Leonardo Vacalares that certain tenants of the petitioners cultivated the
land for a total of seven years, the petitioners did not present any other evidence to show that they
have been in actual possession of the property for at least ten years.
The petitioners' argument that the payment of taxes on the property since May 31, 1948 constitutes
proof of their possession of the subject land for thirty-five years is untenable. Tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of
ownership of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual, public and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. 39
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. ESCacI
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ ., concur.
||| (Seria v. Caballero, G.R. No. 127382, [August 17, 2004])

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-22006. July 28, 1975.]
BASILIO PEREZ and PETRA MONTALBO, petitioners, vs. NICOLAS MENDOZA, MARGARITA
MACALALAD and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Pedro T. Panganiban for petitioners.
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In 1922, Felisa Montalbo-Ortega exchanged the land she inherited from her father with the land of her
aunt, Andrea Montalbo, because the latter wanted to donate a piece of land to the municipality of
Taysan, Batangas, to be used as a school site and the municipality preferred the land belonging to
Felisa as it was adjacent to the other properties of the municipality. After the exchange, Andrea
donated almost one-half of the land to the municipality and gave the other to her daughter Margarita
when the latter married Nicolas Mendoza in 1972. Since then, Margarita and Nicolas possessed and
occupied the land continuously, in the concept of owners. When Nicolas sought the transfer of the
property in their names he submitted the deed of exchange of property executed by Felisa and
Andrea in the presence of, and witnessed by the Municipal Secretary, Rafael Manahan. When Basilio
Perez came to know of the alleged deed of exchange, he had it investigated and found that the
signature of the municipal secretary was forged. Accused of falsification of private document,
Mendoza was convicted; but the Court of Appeals acquitted him for insufficiency of evidence.
On March 20, 1959, petitioner Basilio and his wife Petra brought an action against respondent
spouses Margarita and Nicolas for quieting of title, alleging that the land in dispute was inherited by
Petra and Felisa from Estanislao Montalbo who died in 1918; that the heirs partitioned said land in
1934 and the share of Felisa, the land in question, was sold by her husband, Jose Ortega, and her
children to petitioners; that they leased the said parcel of land to respondents in 1946, but that when
the lease expired in 1951, the latter refused to return the land prompting the former to file an unlawful
detainer action which was still pending during the trial of this case. The trial court dismissed the
complaint and declared respondents with a better right over the property in litigation. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.
Finding no reversible error, Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review with costs against
petitioners.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENT; RES JUDICATA; FINDINGS OF FACT IN A CRIMINAL CASE CONCERNING THE
OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY CANNOT BE PLEADED AS RES JUDICATA IN A CIVIL
ACTION. The pronouncements or findings of fact in a criminal case concerning the possession
and ownership of a parcel of land do not constitute the law on the matter, and cannot be taken or
adopted as a basis for deciding the question of ownership of said land in subsequent civil action
because there is no identity of parties in the two cases and the object or subject matter in the criminal
case is different. The judgment in the criminal action cannot be used as evidence in the civil case
where the issue is ownership of a piece of land. It is the rule that the plea of res judicata generally
cannot be interposed except where the parties, facts and questions are the same, and a judgment in
a criminal case cannot be pleaded as res judicata in a civil action.
2. PROPERTY; MODE OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP POSSESSION MAY RIPEN INTO
OWNERSHIP. The claim of private respondents that they are the owners of the land in dispute
must be upheld on the ground that they were in actual and continuous possession of the land, openly,
adversely, and in the concept of owners thereof since 1927 thereby acquiring ownership of the land
through acquisitive prescription.
3. ID.; POSSESSION; PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP. Possession is an indicium of ownership
of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the presumption that he holds the thing under a
claim of ownership. Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that "(A)ctual possession under claim of
ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of the property."

4. ID. ;ID.; CO-POSSESSION; RULE ON PREFERENCES UNDER ARTICLE 538 OF THE CIVIL
CODE. Article 538 of the Civil Code provides that possession as a fact cannot be recognized at
the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question
arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two
possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
5. EVIDENCE; WEIGHT; EFFECT OF PRESENTING A FORGED DOCUMENT IN EVIDENCE.
The rule that the introduction of a forged document by a witness renders his testimony practically
worthless is applicable to a situation where the particular document or receipt introduced was found
to be entirely false as to its contents, handwriting, and signature but not to a situation where all that
was found to be false is the signature of a witnessing official.
6. PARTITION; PARTIES; DEED OF PARTITION BINDS ONLY PARTIES THERETO. A deed of
partition binds only the parties thereto but does not affect third persons in the absence of proof that
they participated one way or another in the preparation of the document. Any recital in the deed of
partition concerning the property under litigation cannot be used as evidence to prejudice third
persons and their successors-in-interest or place them in estoppel as to their claims over said
property. Res inter alios acta alteri nocera nondebet. A transaction between two parties ought not to
operate to the prejudice of a third person or stranger.
7. APPEALS; FINDINGS OF FACT; FINDINGS OF FACT OF LOWER COURT GENERALLY
BINDING UPON THE APPELLATE COURT. It is a well-entrenched precept in Philippine
jurisprudence that findings of fact of the lower court are as a rule conclusive and binding upon the
appellate court.
DECISION
MUOZ PALMA, J p:
Civil Case 689 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas was an action to quiet title over a piece of
land filed on March 20, 1959, by spouses Basilio Perez and Petra Montalbo with spouses Nicolas
Mendoza and Margarita Macalalad as defendants. According to the complaint, the land in controversy
is located in barrio Dagatan, municipality of Taysan, Batangas, with an area of approximately 4,765
sq. meters, declared for taxation purposes in the name of the "Heirs of Estanislao Montalbo", and is
"bounded on the north by a school site on the east by Calixto Flores, on the south by a creek, and on
the west by a creek and the land of Gregorio Mendoza." On the basis of the evidence adduced by the
parties, the trial court then presided by Hon. Lorenzo Relova rendered judgment on February 19,
1962, dismissing the complaint and declaring the spouses Mendoza "to have a better right to the
property in question." 1
Spouses Perez elevated the Relova decision to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed in toto
the findings of the court a quo, and declared that "upon the evidence it has been shown by a great
preponderance that the land in question belongs to the defendants." 2
The case is now before Us on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Perez.
The findings of fact both of the trial court and the Court of Appeals may be briefly summarized as
follows:
The litigated parcel of land was originally part of a bigger tract owned by Estanislao Montalbo. When
Estanislao died in 1918, his properties passed on to his children Petra, Felisa, and Pedro all
surnamed Montalbo, and because Pedro died single the two women remained as the only heirs. By
mutual agreement Petra and Felisa divided between themselves the lands of their father and the
parcel of which the litigated land was a part was assigned to Felisa. Sometime in 1922 Felisa
exchanged the above-mentioned parcel with a land belonging to her aunt, Andrea Montalbo, a sister
of her father. The reason for the exchange was that Andrea wanted to donate a piece of land to the
municipality for use as a school site and the land of Felisa was what the municipality preferred as it
was adjacent to other properties of the municipality. (Exh. 5 for defendants Mendoza) Upon her
acquisition of Felisa's aforementioned land, Andrea donated to the municipality the northern portion
thereof which constituted almost one-half of the entire parcel, and since then that portion was

declared for taxation purposes by the municipality together with its adjoining properties (Exhs. 6, 6-A,
6-B). In 1927 the remainder of the lot was given by Andrea Montalbo to her daughter Margarita
Macalalad on the occasion of her marriage to Nicolas Mendoza, and from the time of their marriage
the couple possessed the said property. That donation was confirmed subsequently in a public
instrument dated August 15, 1951 (Exh. 2 for the Mendozas). Nicolas Mendoza sought to transfer the
tax declaration of the property to his name and of his wife and for that purpose he submitted a deed
of exchange of property dated January 14, 1922, allegedly executed by Felisa Montalbo and Andrea
Montalbo in the presence of the municipal secretary Rafael Manahan (Exh. 5). When Basilio Perez
came to know about the supposed deed of exchange, he had it investigated and upon discovering
that the signature of Rafael Manahan appearing on the document was forged, he filed a criminal
complaint before the Fiscal's office which led to an accusation for falsification of private document
against Andrea Montalbo and Nicolas Mendoza. Only Nicolas Mendoza was arraigned and tried and
was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Batangas, but on appeal he was acquitted by the
Court of Appeals for insufficiency of evidence to show that he participated in affixing the signature of
Rafael Manahan or that he was aware of the falsity of the document in question when he presented it
to the tax assessor's office. 3 Notwithstanding the forged signature of Rafael Manahan on the
document Exhibit 5, there is sufficient evidence to prove that an exchange of property did in fact
occur in 1922 between Andrea and Felisa Montalbo, and that Felisa's land passed on to Andrea who
in turn gave part of it to the municipality and part to her daughter, Margarita; hence, the decision in
favor of the spouses Mendoza.
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the disputed property was inherited by Petra and Felisa
Montalbo from their father Estanislao who died in 1918 and since that date the two sisters were in
possession of said land. In 1934 a deed of partition of the various properties of Estanislao was
executed between Petra and the heirs of Felisa, and the land in question was divided equally
between them; among those who signed as witnesses to that agreement was Andrea Montalbo (Exh.
D for petitioners). In 1952 Felisa's husband, Jose Ortega, and children sold their one-half share to
spouses Petra Montalbo and Basilio Perez, now petitioners, but the deed of sale was lost a year after.
Sometime in 1946 petitioners leased the property to the Mendozas and when the lease expired in
1951 they demanded for the return of the land but the Mendozas refused and so petitioners had to file
an ejectment suit before the justice of the peace court of Taysan which was still pending at the time of
the trial of the civil case in 1960. (tsn. witness Basilio Perez, December 15, 1960, pp. 16-34).
For not giving credit to the foregoing evidence, petitioners now assail the adverse decision of
respondent court on four assigned errors.
1. Petitioners contend that respondent court erred in considering the criminal case for falsification res
adjudicata on the matter of ownership of the land in litigation when the "question of ownership was
not actually and directly in issue in the criminal case and the latter was not the proper vehicle for the
determination of the ownership of the land." (p. 9, petitioners brief) Petitioners refer to portions in the
decision of respondent court, viz:
"The land in question, together with that portion that was acquired by the municipality of Taysan, the
identity of which is admitted by the parties, belonged to Felisa Montalbo, as held is the decision of the
Court of Appeals, thus 'The said parcel of land previously belonged to Felisa Montalbo (married to
Jose Ortega), who inherited it from her deceased father, the aforecited Estanislao Montalbo;', and the
land in question was donated propter nuptias by Andrea Montalbo to Margarita Macalalad and
Nicolas Mendoza, the defendants, (Margarita Macalalad is the daughter of Andrea Montalbo) on the
occasion of their marriage on February 27, 1927, as found and held in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, thus 'and this land was acquired by the donor (Andrea Montalbo) by means of a barter
with her own parcel of land planted with bamboos and mango trees'.
"Upon the basis of the findings of fact and conclusion arrived at in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, it clearly appears that although the document of exchange of the lands was found to be
falsified, nevertheless the Court found upon the facts as demonstrated by the evidence that the land
in question 'previously belonged to Felisa Montalbo (married to Jose Ortega), who inherited it from

her deceased father, the aforesaid Estanislao Montalbo . . .'; that said land was donated propter
nuptias by Andrea Montalbo to the defendants on the occasion of their marriage on February 27,
1927; and that 'this land was acquired by the donor by means of a barter with her own parcel of land
planted with bamboos and mango trees'. From the context of the decision the natural and logical
inference is that factually the exchange of the lands had been consummated. . . ." (pp. 6-7, CA
decision at pp. 20-21, rollo; emphasis supplied to indicate disputed statements)
Undoubtedly, there is merit to the contention of petitioners that the pronouncements or findings of fact
made by the Court of Appeals in the criminal case concerning the possession and ownership of the
land now in litigation in the civil case, do not constitute the law on the matter and cannot be taken or
adopted as a basis for deciding the question of ownership of said land in this civil case. Since there is
no identity of parties in the two cases the petitioners here not being parties in the criminal case
and the object or subject matter in the criminal prosecution is different, the latter being concerned with
the guilt or innocence of accused Nicolas Mendoza for falsification of private document, it follows that
the judgment in the criminal action cannot be used as evidence in the civil case where the issue is
ownership of a piece of land. It is the rule that the plea of res judicata generally cannot be interposed
except where the parties, facts, and questions are the same, 4 hence, the judgment in a criminal case
cannot be pleaded as res judicata in a civil action. 5
But whatever error was committed by respondent court in this regard, the same is not sufficient to
nullify the appealed decision.
Analyzing the decision of respondent court. We see that the latter made its own appraisal and
evaluation of the evidence existing in the record relative to the possession and ownership of the land
in question. Thus it said that the conclusions arrived at by the Court of Appeals in the criminal case to
wit (1) that there was an exchange of lands consummated between Andrea and Felisa and (2) that
the exchanged land was later donated by Andrea to her daughter Margarita in 1927, "can hardly be
doubted if we take account of the undisputed fact that the defendants have been in possession of the
land since 1927, and the plaintiffs (meaning spouses Perez) have not attempted to disturb
defendants' possession of the land until 1952 when said plaintiffs filed an action of unlawful detainer
against the defendants." (p. 7 of appealed decision at p. 21, SC rollo; italics supplied) Continuing,
respondent court expounded:
"Contrary to the allegation in the complaint 'That plaintiffs were in possession of the land prior and
up to January, 1946, when the same was leased to the defendants . . .', and the testimony of Basilio
Perez to the same tenor, the evidence has conclusively shown that the defendants have been in
continuous possession of the land since 1927 to the present time, and they have built a house on the
land in 1928 where they have resided and lived to the present, as testified to by the defendant
Mendoza, . . .
"The plaintiffs have intended, however, with the support of the testimony of Basilio Perez, that the
possession of the defendants since 1946 was that of a mere lessee of the land. On this matter, the
trial court said, 'the records do not show any documentary evidence to support such contention. Nor
is any document, say receipts of payment of rentals presented to bolster their theory. On the contrary
their averment has been strongly denied by the defendants and the records show that it was only in
1952 that a civil action was instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendants in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Taysan, Batangas, for detainer and damages', and said allegation of possession of
the defendants as lessees of the land is not supported by positive and convincing evidence." We find
no reason to disagree with the foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of the trial court because the
same is supported by the preponderance of evidence, and the plaintiffs have not pointed to Us any
fact of significance or influence which have been disregarded by the court other than the testimony of
Basilio Perez who testified about the supposed contract of lease." (pp. 21-22, 23, ibid.; emphasis
supplied)
Digging further into the evidence of herein petitioners, respondent court found for itself that the
agreement of partition dated May 27, 1934, Exhibit D, is not incontrovertible proof that in 1934 the
litigated property belonged in common to Petra and the heirs of Felisa Montalbo both of whom may
have been guided by the fact that the property was still declared for taxation purposes in the name of

Estanislao Montalbo, and that the document of partition "did not overcome the evidence on record
that Andrea Montalbo became the owner of the land, and that since 1927 the defendants have been
in continuous possession of the land, openly, adversely and in the concept of owners thereby
acquiring ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription." (p. 10 of CA decision at p. 24, SC
rollo).
Independently therefore of the pronouncements of the Court of Appeals in the criminal case,
respondent court examined the evidence in this civil case and made its own findings of fact on the
basis of which it affirmed the decision of the trial court.
We could have stopped here and resolved this petition under well-entrenched precepts in Philippine
jurisprudence that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are as a rule conclusive and binding upon
this Court; 6 nonetheless, to set our mind at rest that the conclusions of respondent court were not
grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures, 7 We went over the evidence before Us.
Certain salient facts strongly support the claim of respondents Mendoza over the property in dispute:
First, the northern boundary of the land in controversy is undisputably a school site which originally
was part of a bigger tract belonging to Estanislao Montalbo. This is admitted by petitioner Basilio
Perez who to a question propounded by his counsel, Atty. Panganiban, declared:
"Mr. Panganiban: (Counsel of petitioners).
Q. According to these tax declarations which you said covers the land in question, the boundaries on
the north, school site; on the east, land of Calixto Flores; on the south, estero; and on the west,
estero and Gregoria Mendoza, why is it that there is a discrepancy?
A. Because from the whole parcel of land a portion was taken for the school site, and that which
remains now is the land in question, sir." (tsn December 15, 1960, pp. 22-23)
No explanation however was offered by Perez as to how that portion became a school site. On the
other hand, there is evidence of respondent Mendoza that because Andrea Montalbo wanted to
donate a piece of land to be used as a school site and the municipality preferred the location of the
land inherited by Felisa from her father, the two women exchanged lands after which Andrea gave
one-half of the property to the municipality while the remaining portion which is the land now in
litigation was donated propter nuptias to her daughter Margarita way back in 1927. (tsn October
24,1961, pp. 14-18) This donation of Andrea was not disproved by any evidence of petitioners. On
the part of respondents Mendoza, their documentary evidence, Exhibits 6, 6-A and 6-B, show that the
municipality of Taysan declared the donated property in its name as early as July, 1925, which
supports respondents' claim that the exchange of properties between Andrea and Felisa Montalbo
took place sometime in 1922.
Second, the provincial authorities dealt with the Mendozas for the widening of the provincial road
which traverses the land in question. Nicolas Mendoza testified that the land covered by the
complaint actually consists of two lots which he described in his sketch, Exhibit 1, with letters "A" and
"B" respectively, separated by a provincial road leading to the municipality of Lobo; that lot "A" which
is the bigger parcel is the one donated to his wife, Margarita, by Andrea Montalbo on the occasion of
their marriage in 1927 (Exh. 2); while lot "B" was bought from Donata Mendoza in 1951 as shown by
the deed of sale, Exhibit 7; that sometime in 1937-38, the province widened the provincial road
traversing the two lots, and he and his wife were approached by the provincial authorities more
particularly, Engineer Ramirez, for them to give without compensation from lot "A" a stretch of land of
one meter in width to widen said road, and they agreed. At that time Donata Mendoza still owned lot
"B" and she was also asked to give part of her land for the road but she was paid for the value of the
plants destroyed in the process. (tsn October 24, 1961, pp. 32-34) For his part, petitioner Perez
admitted during the cross-examination conducted by the opposite counsel, Atty. Julio Enriquez, that
the provincial authorities did not deal with him at all during the widening of that particular road. (tsn
September 25, 1961, p. 34) This is of marked significance, because if it were true as claimed by
petitioners that they were in possession of the property since the death of Estanislao Montalbo in
1918 or even after the deed of partition in 1934, they would have been the persons approached by
the authorities for the widening of the road. The fact that the Mendozas were the ones who gave

away part of the land for the widening of the Lobo road shows that they were in possession of the
property and were living there at the time.
Third, respondents Mendoza have been in possession of the property since 1927 in concept of
owners thereof. We have the testimony of respondent Nicolas Mendoza that after the land was
donated to his wife in 1927 they built a house on it and lived there continuously, witness referring
particularly to what he described as lot "A" in his sketch Exhibit 1. (tsn October 24, 1961, pp. 7, 3031) Respondent's testimony was found both by the trial and appellate courts credible because (1)
petitioner Basilio Perez himself admitted during cross-examination that even before the last world war
the Mendozas had constructed a house on the land in litigation (tsn September 25, 1971, pp. 37-39;
see Exh. E-3) which admission disproves the allegation in the complaint and Perez' testimony that it
was only in 1946 when the Mendozas occupied the property as lessees; (2) the testimony of Nicolas
Mendoza was corroborated by witness Adriano Gonzales, a retired justice of the peace of Taysan,
Batangas, who declared that he knew the Mendozas since 1937 and he saw them living on the land
in question and they have not changed residence at all since he had known them (tsn December 6,
1961, pp. 5-6); and (3) the respondents Mendoza were the ones who were living on the property and
not the petitionersat the time the provincial government in 1937 widened the Lobo road which crosses
said land.
The court a quo and the respondent appellate court did not err when they upheld the claim of
ownership of the Mendozas principally on the ground that the latter were in actual possession of the
property since 1927 and were sought to be dispossessed by petitioners herein only in 1952 when an
ejectment suit was filed against them.
Possession is an indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the
presumption that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. 8 Article 433 of the Civil Code
provides that "(A)ctual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property." In Chan
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, this Court upheld the finding of
the Court of Appeals that the litigated property belonged to the private respondents therein based on
their possession of the property, not only because such findings of fact of the appellate court are
conclusive and binding on this Court but because the conclusion is in accordance with Articles 433
and 531 of the Civil Code. 9
As we have here conflicting claims of possession by the parties over the land in controversy and
because the fact of possession cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities
except in cases of co-possession, the present possessor is to be preferred pursuant to Article 538 of
the Civil Code which We quote:
"Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in
the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present
possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of
the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the
thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through
proper proceedings." 10
The pretension of petitioners that the possession of the Mendozas is that of a mere lessee was not
believed by the trial judge and the appellate court not only because of the absence of any written or
oral evidence on the matter other than the bare testimony of petitioner Basilio Perez, but also due to
the circumstances present in the case which We indicated and enumerated at pages 7 to 9 of this
decision. In fine, it is a fact that the Mendozas are presently in possession of the property and the
presumption of ownership in their favor has not been successfully rebutted by evidence that they are
mere lessees of the land in their possession as claimed by petitioners.
2. In their second assigned error, petitioners contend that respondent court should not have given
weight to the evidence of respondent Mendoza because the latter's Exhibit 5 was proven to be a
falsified document.
To recall, Exhibit 5 is the alleged deed of exchange or barter of lands between Andrea and Felisa
Montalbo dated January 14, 1922. On this point, petitioners overlook the fact that Exhibit 5 was made

the basis of a criminal accusation of falsification of private document solely on the allegation that the
signature of Rafael Manahan, the person before whom the parties to the document allegedly
appeared, was not his. There was no finding in that criminal case as per decision rendered therein
that the barter or exchange of lands between Andrea and Felisa Montalbo did not in effect take place.
On the contrary, what appears in said decision offered by petitioners as their Exhibit J are the
following findings of the Court of Appeals, viz: that the land donated by Andrea Montalbo to her
daughter Margarita Macalalad "was acquired by the donor by means of a barter with her own parcel
of land planted with bamboos and mango trees"; that while it is true that because of this presentation
of the falsified document appellant (now respondent Nicolas Mendoza) was able to secure the
declaration of the property donated in his name, no criminal liability should be imposed upon him in
the absence of any evidence that he presented said exhibit with the knowledge that it was forged
"especially if we take into consideration the fact that he and his wife were and are still in possession
of the land donated since 1927"; that in fact, the color and appearance of the document in question
show that it is not a new document but an old one thus confirming Mendoza's theory that it was
executed in or about the year 1922 as appearing in the document or five years before his marriage.
(pp. 1, 5, 6 of Exh. J, folder of exhibits) Thus, if the document Exhibit 5 was held to be forged, it was
simply because the municipal secretary, Rafael Manahan, did not sign it and not for any other reason.
What is material and relevant to the civil case is that both the trial court and respondent appellate
court found for a fact that there was an exchange of lands between Andrea and Felisa Montalbo on
the basis of evidence other than the disputed Exhibit 5. As to what the evidence is, has been
discussed above.
Petitioners cite Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil. 728 where this Court stated inter alia that the
introduction of a forged instrument by a witness renders the testimony of the latter practically
worthless. That statement however is not applicable to the situation before Us because in Gonzalez
the particular document or receipt referred to was found to be entirely false as to its contents,
handwriting, and signature, whereas here all that was found to be false is the signature of a
witnessing official.
3. The last argument of petitioners is the object of the third assigned error. It is contended that the
appellate court erred in not giving effect to the deed of partition, Exhibit D, notwithstanding the fact
that the name of Andrea Montalbo appears in the document as one of the witnesses thereto.
Exhibit D appears to be a document dated May 27, 1934, wherein certain properties allegedly
belonging to Estanislao Montalbo were divided between Petra Montalbo and Jose Ortega, husband of
deceased Felisa Montalbo. Petitioner Basilio Perez declared that one of the parcels of land
mentioned in the document is the land now in litigation which is particularly marked as Exhibit D-1. He
also testified that Exhibit D was signed by him and his wife, Petra Montalbo, by Jose Ortega, husband
of deceased Felisa Montalbo, and thumbmarked by the latter's children all in his presence. (tsn
December I5, 1960, pp. 19-24) Surprisingly, however, Basilio Perez did not at all mention during the
course of his testimony that the old woman Andrea Montalbo, signed the deed of partition as a
witness. We have gone over the transcript of Basilio Perez' declaration on direct and crossexamination (tsn December 15, 1960, pp. 15-34; September 25, 1961, pp. 3-40) and at no instance
did he ever state that Andrea Montalbo was present during the preparation of the document, that she
read or knew the contents thereof which by the way consists of six handwritten pages, and that she
signed her name on the document. It was incumbent upon petitioners to identify the signature of
Andrea Montalbo on the document if her signature was truly there. As a matter of fact, examining the
document Exhibit D We entertain doubts whether the name referred to by petitioners is "Andrea
Montalbo", for, as written, it also can read "Maria Montalbo". At any rate, whatever is the import of
said deed of partition, the same binds only the parties thereto but does not affect third persons such
as Andrea Montalbo or the herein Mendozas in the absence of proof that they participated in one way
or another in the preparation and execution of the document. As it is, Andrea Montalbo was a
stranger to that deed of partition and any recital therein concerning the property under litigation
cannot be used as evidence to prejudice her and her successors-in-interest or place her in estoppel

as to her claims over the property. Res inter alias acta alteri nocere non debet. A transaction between
two parties ought not to operate to the prejudice of a third person or stranger. 11
4. In the fourth assignment of error, petitioners claim that the appellate court should have rendered a
decision in their favor. That both the trial court and respondent appellate court have correctly
evaluated the evidence, has been clearly demonstrated by Us.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find no reversible error in the decision under
review and We AFFIRM the same with costs against petitioners.
So Ordered.
Castro (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
||| (Perez v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-22006, [July 28, 1975], 160 PHIL 496-511)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 101929. January 6, 1993.]
BENJAMIN DIZON, ZACARIAS DIZON, AFRICA DIZON, PERFECTO DIZON, CARMEN DIZON
(Heirs of Paula Galang), JULIA GALANG, CONSOLACION TABORA, ABELARDO TABORA,
CECILIA TABORA, AVELINA TABORA, TRINIDAD TABORA, REMEDIOS TABORA, VIRGINIA
TABORA, DELFIN TABORA, PENINA TABORA, FRANCISCO TABORA, CIPRIANA GALANG,
RUFINO DELOS SANTOS, PEPITO DELOS SANTOS (Heirs of Donata Vergara), ARNEO
VERGARA, BENIGNO VERGARA, JOSE VERGARA, SCION VERGARA, DEMETRIA VERGARA (all
heirs of Dionisio Galang), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUREO REYES, AURELIO SAMIA,
ALFONSO SAMIA, POTENCIANO GALANG, LEONCIA GARCIA, BIENVENIDO TAPNIO, LYDIA
BALINGIT VDA. DE GARCIA, BENEDICTO GARCIA, ROMULADO GARCIA, AMY GARCIA,
ALEXANDER GARCIA, LUDIVINA GARCIA, MONTANO GUEVARRA, CORAZON LAMPA, RUDY
LAMPA, EDUARDO LAMPA, ILLUMINADA GUEVARRA, CARMELITA MASANQUE VDA. DE
GARCIA, MA. CONCEPCION AQUINO VDA. DE GUEVARRA, HONZAI GUEVARRA, RODA
REBECCA GUEVARRA, RUTH GUEVARRA, minors represented by their mother Ma. Concepcion
Vda. de Guevarra, PRIMITIVA GUEVARRA, JOSIAS N. GARCIA, LUCITA M. GARCIA, VICTOR M.
GARCIA, LUTERO M. GARCIA, SAMSON M. GARCIA, FELIXBERTO M. GARCIA, JR.,
HERMENIGILDA GARCIA, CONSTANCIO GARCIA, REYNALDO GARCIA, AGAPITA GARCIA,
ERNESTO GARCIA, NORICO GARCIA, PACIFICO GARCIA, NORMANDO GARCIA, ARTURO
GARCIA, ESTELLA GARCIA, DIOSDADO GARCIA (representing LEONCIA GARCIA), GREGORIA
MENDOZA, ELEUTERIA BAUTISTA, PEDRO ATIENZA, BENITA SAMANIEGO, NENE
SAMANIEGO (representing FLAVIANA GALANG), LETICIA REYES, MANUEL REYES (representing
MARCIANA GALANG), CARMEN ROQUE VDA. DE DIMABUYU, PORFIRIO R. DIMABUYU,
CARMEN R. DIMABUYU, CARIDAD R. DIMABUYU, PEDRO R. DIMABUYU, MARCOS DIMABUYU
(representing GERTRUDES GALANG), respondents.
Herminio Z. Canlas for petitioners.
Lagunsad, Juan, Rubin & Cabaron Law Office for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION;
TORRENS TITLE; INDEFEASIBLE AND INCONTROVERTIBLE UPON EXPIRATION OF ONE
YEAR PERIOD FROM ENTRY OF DECREE; CASE AT BAR. It is a fact that Dionisio Galang's
ownership over the disputed lots (3548 and 3562) had been judicially confirmed on 19 May 1919 in
Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. No. 51, which is a proceeding in rem and hence binding "on the
whole world." OCT No. 1056 (9010) and OCT No. 1057 (9102) were, as a consequence, issued on 9
January 1922. None of Galang's co-heirs objected to or protested their issuance. These titles became
indefeasible and incontrovertible. Then it was only after sixty-one (61) years or on 24 March 1983 that
the descendants of Galang's co-heirs asserted co-ownership claims over the subject lots.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, UPHELD ON
APPEAL. It is true that Galang executed an affidavit, unnotarized at that, on 27 June 1920.
However, as can be gleaned from the foregoing, there is no reference to Lot Nos. 3548 and 3562.
Said affidavit is not therefore a sufficient basis or support for what is alleged by respondents as a
partition among Dionisio and his now deceased sisters. It does not, as correctly stated by the trial
court, amount to anything insofar as the two (2) lots involved in this case are concerned. We likewise
agree with the trial court that in the absence of definite proof establishing respondents'
link/relationship to their alleged predecessors-in-interest, i.e., the Galang sisters, they do not have
any cause of action, and the suit for partition must necessarily fall.
DECISION
PADILLA, J p:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to nullify the decision * of the Court of Appeals,
dated 29 April 1991, in CA-G.R. CV. No. 14312, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby REVERSED; and the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the deceased Dionisio Galang (Exh. 'D'), in so far as it relates to Lots

3548 and 3562 of the Bacolor Cadastre, and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 182670-R and
182671-R issued by virtue thereof are hereby declared null and void.
"Conformably, the Register of Deeds concerned is hereby ordered to cancel the said titles; and
subject Lots 3548 and 3562 are hereby adjudicated to the heirs of the deceased co-owners to be
partitioned among them as follows:
a. one-sixth to the Heirs of Marciana Galang; b. one-sixth to the Heirs of Dionisio Galang; c. one-sixth
to the Heirs of Flaviana Galang; d. one-sixth to the Heirs of Gertrudes Galang; e. one-sixth to the
Heirs of Potenciana Galang; f. one-sixth to the Heirs of Leoncia Galang.
"Costs against defendants-appellees.
"SO ORDERED." 1
It appears that on 21 August 1984, Aureo Reyes, et al. (hereafter "respondents") filed an amended
complaint before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No.
6752, for the annulment of a deed of extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate of Dionisio
Galang, claiming to have been deprived thereby of their shares, as co-owners, in Lot Nos. 3548 and
3562 Bacolor cadastre, and that OCT Nos. 9010 and 9102, issued in the name of Dionisio Galang,
covering said lots, are fraudulent and should therefore be annulled and cancelled. cdrep
The facts of the case, as culled from the Court of Appeals decision, are as follows:
The spouses Hilario Galang and Martina Laxamana owned two (2) lots located in San Agustin,
Potrero, Municipality of Bacolor, Province of Pampanga. They had six (6) children, namely, Dionisio,
Marciana, Potenciana, Flaviana, Leonora and Gertrudes.
The spouses (Hilario and Martina) mortgaged the aforesaid lots to Camilo Angeles. It is alleged by
the respondents that Dionisio Galang redeemed these lots in his own name, despite the fact that part
of the funds used for the redemption came from his sisters. 2 A cadastral survey involving the two (2)
lots was conducted, and on 19 May 1919, the Court of First Instance ordered the issuance in
Cadastral Case No. 14, of OCT Nos. 9010 (for lot 3548) and 9102 (for lot 3562) in the name solely of
Dionisio Galang (hereafter Galang).
Respondents, who are heirs of Galang's sisters, claim that Galang and his five (5) sisters had
partitioned the subject lots on 27 June 1920, as embodied in an unnotarized affidavit executed by
Galang (Exh. "C"). As a consequence thereof, Galang's sisters constructed their houses on Lot 3548.
The structures passed on from generation to generation, with each of Galang's sisters and their
descendants enjoying the benefits therefrom. No one questioned for disturbed them until the
petitioners (heirs of Galang) informed them that the lots in question were titled in Galang's name and
had been partitioned, on the basis of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition (Exh. "D"), into three (3) equal
parts corresponding to his (Galang's) three (3) children; that petitioners had succeeded in subdividing
the lots and in obtaining titles thereto in their name (TCT Nos. 182670-R and 182671-R) despite their
(respondents') earlier demands for an extrajudicial settlement of their dispute.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the cadastral case which culminated in the issuance of
the original certificates of title over the subject lots in the sole name of Galang, was a proceeding in
rem, thus binding on the whole world; that when original certificates of title (OCT Nos. 9010 and
9102) were issued on 9 January 1922 to Galang, respondents did not raise any objection until March
1983 when they filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 6752, or after a lapse of sixty-one (61) years.
The trial court 3 upheld Galang's titles over the lots which, as aforestated, had been issued as early
as 1922 in his name. The trial court further held that respondents' action had long prescribed, having
been filed only on 24 March 1983, or after a lapse of sixty-one (61) long years from the issuance of
said titles. The court also noted respondents' failure to establish their relationship to Galang's five (5)
sisters, premising their claim solely on an unsubstantiated assertion that they are descendants of the
deceased Galang sisters. 4 The presence or construction of the houses on Lot No. 3548 was also not
considered as evidence in respondents' favor, since no proof was submitted establishing
respondents' right to occupy the place. The documentary evidence (Exh. "C" and "C-1") allegedly
showing co-ownership among Dionisio and his co-heirs, was likewise ignored by the trial court as this
did not specifically refer to the disputed Lots 3548 and 3562. llcd

On appeal by the respondents, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the trial court by upholding
respondents' rights. It focused on two (2) issues. Thus
"Are the properties in question owned in common by the predecessors-in-interest of appellants and
appellees? And has appellants' present action for partition prescribed?" 5
The appellate court declared that co-ownership existed between respondents' predecessors-ininterest and those of petitioners, on the basis of Galang's affidavit which, although unnotarized, was
nonetheless an ancient document, pursuant to Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, since it was
executed on 27 June 1920. As such, proof of its due execution and authentication could be dispensed
with, according to the appellate court.
Hence, this recourse in turn by the petitioners.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
It is a fact that Dionisio Galang's ownership over the disputed lots (3548 and 3562) had been judicially
confirmed on 19 May 1919 in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. No. 51, which is a proceeding in rem
and hence binding "on the whole world." OCT No. 1056 (9010) and OCT No. 1057 (9102) were, as a
consequence, issued on 9 January 1922. None of Galang's co-heirs objected to or protested their
issuance. These titles became indefeasible and incontrovertible. Then it was only after sixty-one (61)
years or on 24 March 1983 that the descendants of Galang's co-heirs asserted co-ownership claims
over the subject lots.
It is true that Galang executed an affidavit, unnotarized at that, on 27 June 1920 which states in part
as follows (per English translation [Exh. "C-1]): 6
That on this date, I have received from all my sisters and nephews who are my co-heirs, namely
Potenciana Galang, Flaviana Galang, Gertrudes Galang, who are may sisters, and Silverio Garcia
and Hilarion Samia, in their own names and for their brothers and sisters who are also co-heirs, the
sum of ONE HUNDRED AND SIX PESOS (P106.00), Philippine Currency, as complete payment for
the discharge of the land we co-inherited, which is the one we partitioned this date also, which was
mortgaged to the Angeles family." 7
However, as can be gleaned from the foregoing, there is no reference to Lot Nos. 3548 and 3562.
Said affidavit is not therefore a sufficient basis or support for what is alleged by respondents as a
partition among Dionisio and his now deceased sisters. It does not, as correctly stated by the trial
court, amount to anything insofar as the two (2) lots involved in this case are concerned: LLpr
"Even their presentation of the document purportedly executed by Dionisio Galang on June 27, 1920
(Exh. "C" and "C-1) where the latter acknowledges that he and his co-heirs named therein are coowners of a certain property which they had mortgaged to a certain family surnamed Angeles does
not amount to anything for nothing in this document shows that it pertains to the two lots involved
herein. It merely referred to a certain 'land' which Dionisio Galang and his co-heirs 'co-inherited' and
partitioned without any indication as to which property is being referred to." 8
We likewise agree with the trial court that in the absence of definite proof establishing respondents'
link/relationship to their alleged predecessors-in-interest, i.e., the Galang sisters, they do not have
any cause of action, and the suit for partition must necessarily fall. The trial court aptly observed:
". . . the plaintiffs thru their witnesses Bienvenido Tapnio, Marcos Dimabuyu, Pedro Atienza, and
Carmelita Galang, tried to prove that all the plaintiffs herein are heirs and direct descendants,
respectively, of Marciana Galang, Potenciana Galang, Flaviana Galang, Leoncia Galang and
Gertrudes Galang who, in their lifetime, together with their late brother Dionisio Galang, are the coowners of these two lots, namely, Lots Nos. 3548 and 3562. Lamentably, all that was proved in the
process by the plaintiffs thru these witnesses despite several proddings and suggestions made by the
court toward this end was that each of these plaintiffs are just related to one another in varying
degrees of relationship. They failed to establish their connection or relationship with any of these five
sisters save for their unfounded averment that they are indeed descendants and heirs of these
deceased individuals." 9

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court dated 3 October 1986 in Civil Case No. 6752 is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
||| (Dizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101929, [January 6, 1993])

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 93213. August 9, 1991.]
LUCIO TAN ALIM, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PACIFIC COAST TIMBER
PRODUCTS, INC., respondents.
Celestino R. Calautit for petitioner.
Jose S. Santos, Jr. for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; TERMS OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT BINDING
UPON THE PARTIES; LITERAL MEANING OF THE STIPULATION FOLLOWED IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF ITS PROVISIONS. Nothing is more settled than the rule that the terms of a
written contract are binding on the parties thereto. In the interpretation of the provisions of a written
contract, the courts should follow the literal meaning of the stipulation. Otherwise, the evident
intention of the parties must prevail (Art. 1370, Civil Code) (Spouses Roberto E. Fermin and Maylinda
Ferraren v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. 95146, May 6, 1991).
2. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; DELIVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY;
RESTORATION BY MEANS OF WRIT OF REPLEVIN. There is no merit in the petitioner's
allegation that the seizure was wrongful for which he must be compensated. The ownership or right of
possession over the subject equipment belonged to the Pacific Coast Timber Products, Inc. at the
time it was seized. The seizure of the equipment was ordered by the trial court for its restoration by
means established in the laws of procedure. Thus, the requisites for the issuance of the writ of
replevin (Sec. 2, Rule 60) have been satisfied.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF THE WRIT OF REPLEVIN. The writ is a provisional remedy in
replevin suits. It is in the "nature of a possessory action and the applicant who seeks the immediate
possession of the property need not be the holder of the legal title to the property." It is sufficient that
at the time he applied for a writ of replevin he is found to be "entitled to a possession thereof" as
stated in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court (Yang v. Valdez, 177 SCRA 141 [1989]).
4. CIVIL LAW; TORTS AND DAMAGES; AWARD OF DAMAGES; LACK OF BASIS THEREOF.
The Appellate Court correctly observed that the trial court was right in holding that "the plaintiff may
not anymore be judicially compelled to deliver the tractor to the defendant since after the expiration of
the lease period, it is legally entitled to its possession, as the owner thereof ". It is very clear
therefore, that Alim is not entitled to any award of damages based on the foregoing facts and
evidence presented. Neither can he claim moral and exemplary damages. The records show that the
petitioner was not able to adduce any evidence before the trial court to prove facts upon which the
award for such damages may be predicated. In fact, even in the petition and memorandum for the
petitioner, there was no discussion of the evidence upon which Alim relies for his claim.
5. ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES; CONCEPT. Moral damages have to do with injury personal to the
awardee such as physical sufferings and the like, while exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good (Makabili v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 253 [1988]).
Indisputably, moral damages cannot generally be awarded in the absence of bad faith (De Aparico v.
Paraguya, 150 SCRA 279 [1987]). Otherwise stated, moral damages can be awarded if they are the
proximate results of a wrongful act or omission (Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Mendez, 152 SCRA
593 [1987]).
6. ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; BASIS FOR THE AWARD THEREOF. Exemplary damages
are not awarded if the defendant had not acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner (Zenith
Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 398 [1990]), neither can claim for exemplary
damages be granted in the absence of gross or reckless negligence (Delos Santos, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. 51165, June 21, 1990), which misfeasance is not true in the case at bar.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDY; REPLEVIN; REPLEVIN BOND; PURPOSE. A
replevin bond is simply intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he may suffer by
being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed property pending the trial of the action.
He cannot recover on the bond as for a reconversion when he has failed to have the judgment
entered for the return of the property.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SURETY NOT LIABLE IN THE BOND UNTIL THE JUDGMENT IS ENTERED
AND RESTORATION OF PROPERTY DECREED. Nor is the surety liable for payment of the
judgment for damages rendered against the plaintiff on a counterclaim or punitive damages for
fraudulent or wrongful acts committed by the plaintiffs and unconnected with the defendant's
deprivation of possession by the plaintiff. Even where the judgment was that the defendant was
entitled to the property, but no order was made requiring the plaintiff to return it or assessing
damages in default of a return, it was declared that until judgment was entered that the property
should be restored, there could be no liability on the part of the sureties (Sapugay v. Court of
Appeals, 183 SCRA 464 [1990]).
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the February 27, 1990 decision * of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 10603 entitled "PACIFIC COAST TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. vs. LUCIO TAN
ALIM", affirming the decision ** of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch LXXXIX in Civil
Case No. Q-24970 which dismissed private respondent's complaint, but allowed the petitioner to
exercise his option to buy the tractor in question, which decision was later amended in its Order,
dated September 19, 1985, partially granting petitioner's motion for reconsideration but denying his
plea therein to grant damages for unrealized income in his logging business due to the alleged
irregular and illegal seizure of the said equipment leased to him. Cdpr
The case arose out of a Lease Contract with Option To Buy, dated January 5, 1977, which was
entered into by and between respondent PACIFIC COAST TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., as lessor,
and petitioner LUCIO TAN ALIM, as lessee, for a term of fifteen months over a unit of tractor at a
monthly rental of P10,000.00 subject to the stipulation, among others, that after payment of five
months, the lessee is given an option to purchase the equipment at the price of P150,000.00, in
which event the rental paid shall be considered as part payment of the consideration and that the
subject equipment has to remain at the lessee's jobsite at PARCEL III-R, between Dianawan Creek
and Bazal, San Joaquin, Baler (Original Record, p. 7; Exhibit "1" and Exhibit "A").
However, upon its delivery on January 15, 1977, the tractor was discovered to be defective.
Consequently, petitioner Alim informed the private respondent's manager at San Luis, Quezon of
such fact in his letter, dated January 25, 1977, relaying likewise the need for the tractor's
reconditioning or replacement with another unit in good running condition and the immediate repair
thereof as may be arranged by him with the Manila Office (Ibid., p. 96, Exhibit "2"). The Logging
Manager of the respondent corporation, Luis O. Barredo, issued a certification on June 11, 1977 that
a defective tractor was delivered to the petitioner (Ibid., p. 98, Exhibit "5"). The amount of P5,000.00
for the repair of the tractor was then paid by the private respondent to petitioner Alim on January 29,
1977 (Ibid., p. 97, Exhibit "4"). Petitioner Alim expended the amount of P36,130.60 for its repair and
reconditioning, as specifically contained in his letter to respondent corporation of June 25, 1977 (Ibid.,
p. 99, Exhibit "3").
On July 1, 1977, the parties amended the lease contract with petitioner's obligation to execute a Deed
of Chattel Mortgage for his three motor vehicles in favor of the respondent to guarantee his
undertaking in the amended lease contract (Ibid., pp. 101-102; Rollo, pp. 12-13). Respondent
corporation's counsel, Lino M. Patajo, formally informed Alim in a letter dated March 16, 1978 that
under the amended contract wherein payment of rentals commenced in August, 1977, the latter failed
to pay rentals for seven months, from September, 1977 to February, 1978 in the amount of
P70,000.00, for which reason the contract of lease as well as the option to buy, are automatically
terminated. The same counsel likewise sent a notice of default in obligation secured by the Chattel
Mortgage (Ibid., Exhibit "C"; p. 11, Exhibit "D"; Original Records, p. 12). However, the petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure thereon was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied (Ibid., p. 12). Thereafter, a
complaint for recovery of possession with replevin (of a unit of tractor (Ibid., pp. 13-15-A; Rollo, pp.
15-18), was filed by private respondent before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City due to
petitioner's refusal to pay the arrears and to deliver the subject equipment.

Upon the filing of a bond by Pacific Coast Timber Products, Inc., furnished by Pioneer Insurance and
Surety Corporation in the sum of P300,000.00 (Ibid., p. 26), the trial court issued a writ of replevin for
the seizure and delivery of the property in question on April 13,1978 (Ibid., p. 36; Rollo, p. 20). On
April 16, 1978, Deputy Sheriff Reynaldo P. Lopez of the then Court of First Instance of Aurora Subprovince at Baler, Quezon, seized the tractor from the petitioner and turned it over to the respondent
corporation on April 26, 1973 (Ibid ., p. 45, Sheriff's Return of Service).
In his answer (Ibid., pp. 38-43), the petitioner deemed having defaulted in the payment of rentals and
claimed to have sustained damages for unrealized income in his logging business as a result of the
wrongful seizure of the tractor (Rollo, p. 21).
Both parties having failed to reach an agreement at the pre-trial, the case was tried on the merits.
LLphil
In the order of the trial court dated December 17, 1980, respondent corporation's motion to recall or
lift the Order of Seizure and to cancel the replevin bond the same having already served their
purposes, (Ibid., pp. 142-143), which was opposed by petitioner Alim (Ibid., pp. 144-146), was denied
for lack of merit since the case was still pending in court (Ibid., p. 149).
On the scheduled hearing of July 14, 1981, both parties failed to attend. Hence, the dismissal of the
case (Ibid., p. 158). However, the order of dismissal was reconsidered upon explanation of the parties
(Ibid., p. 159). The case was finally resolved in favor of petitioner Alim on July 31, 1985 by the trial
court (RTC, Quezon City), the dispositive portion of which states:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, and allowing the
defendant within fifteen days from and after this judgment becomes final and executory to exercise
his option under the Lease Contract with Option to Buy, as amended, to buy the tractor, in question,
by paying to the plaintiff the balance of P90,000.00 after deducting from the purchase price of
P150,000.00, in rentals, already paid by him, and ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the
amount of P36,130.60 as reimbursement for the expenses for repairs made by the defendant on the
tractor which may be offsetted from the remaining purchase price of P90,000.00 if the defendant
exercises his option to buy, plus reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00, with costs
against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 32-33)
The said decision was, however, partially modified upon motion for reconsideration of the petitioner,
dated August 19, 1985 (Original Record, pp. 259-261), in its Order dated September 19, 1985, in this
wise:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, and allowing the
defendant, within fifteen (15) days from and after (sic) this judgment becomes final and executory, to
exercise his option under the Lease Contract with Option To Buy, as amended, to buy the tractor, in
question by paying to the plaintiff the balance of P80,000.00 after deducting from the purchase price
of P150,000.00, the amount of P70,000.00 in rentals, already paid by him, and ordering the plaintiff to
pay to the defendant the amount of P36,130.60 as reimbursement for the expenses for repairs made
by the defendant on the tractor, which may be offsetted (sic) from the remaining purchase price of
P80,000.00, if the defendant exercises his option to buy, plus reasonable attorney's fees in the
amount of P5,000.00, with costs against the plaintiff " (Rollo, pp. 37-A-38).
Not satisfied with the modified decision, petitioner Alim appealed, claiming damages because of the
wrongful seizure of the tractor, but the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals which denied said
petitioner's claim for compensation and concurred with the following findings of the trial court:
"However, since the fifteen (15) month lease period provided in the contract had already expired . . .
the plaintiff may not be judicially compelled to deliver the tractor to defendant since after the
expiration of the lease period, it is legally entitled to its possession, as the owner thereof " (Rollo, p.
62)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated April
30, 1990 (Rollo, p. 65). Hence, this petition.

The issues raised in this case are: (1) whether or not the fifteen (15) month lease period had
commenced from August 1977 and expired in October 1978; (2) whether or not the petitioner is
entitled to collect/recover damages as prayed for in the complaint; and (3) whether or not petitioner is
entitled to recover the sum of P300,000.00 from the replevin bond, all of which may be synthesized in
one pivotal issue, the interpretation of the "Amendment to Contract of Lease" (Exhibit "6", Original
Records, p. 9) in relation to the "Original Lease Contract with Option to Buy (Exhibit "1". Original
Records, p. 7).
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are of the view that there is no amendment as to the
duration of the Contract of Lease; that the contract expired as originally stipulated on April 5, 1978
and that when the tractor was seized by virtue of a writ of replevin on August 16,1978, the contract of
lease had expired and the lessee Alim was consequently not entitled to damages.
A careful review of the records shows that in the original contract, it was expressly stipulated that the
lease shall be for a period of fifteen (15) months (Exhibit "1". par. 2) and that the lessee is given an
option to purchase the equipment for ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS,
after Alim has completed and religiously paid the 5-month rentals which shall be considered as part
payment of the consideration (Ibid., par. 4).
On the other hand, there is no provision in the amended contract as to the period of the lease.
Instead, it provides that "All provisions of the original lease contract not amended by the foregoing
provisions shall remain in full force and effect." (Exhibit "6", par. 5). The alteration is evidently focused
on the period for the right to exercise the option to buy. Originally, the period was five (5) months of
regular payment but under the amended contract, the period was changed to fifteen (15) months,
unquestionably including the period from the commencement of the original contract on January 7,
1977, as specifically provided in paragraph 4 thereof, which states:
"4. The monthly rentals of the equipment which on the date of the execution of this amendment to the
original lease contract have not been paid shall be considered as paid obligation of LESSEE to
LESSOR, the payment of which will be the subject of negotiation between LESSOR and LESSEE."
The letter of Atty. Lino M. Patajo, counsel of respondent corporation, on which Alim heavily relied in
his arguments in his favor, unmistakably confirms the fact of non-extension of the lease agreement
when he spoke of the commencement of the payment of the rentals, not on the commencement of
the new period of lease (Exhibit "C", Original Records, p. 11). Inevitably, the courts cannot go beyond
what appears in the documents submitted by the parties. LLphil
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the terms of written contract are binding on the parties
thereto. In the interpretation of the provisions of a written contract, the courts should follow the literal
meaning of the stipulation. Otherwise, the evident intention of the parties must prevail (Art. 1370, Civil
Code) (Spouses Roberto E. Fermin and Maylinda Ferraren v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
95146, May 6, 1991).
There is therefore no merit in the petitioner's allegation that the seizure was wrongful for which he
must be compensated. The ownership or right of possession over the subject equipment belonged to
the Pacific Coast Timber Products, Inc. at the time it was seized. The seizure of the equipment was
ordered by the trial court for its restoration by means established in the laws of procedure. Thus, the
requisites for the issuance of the writ of replevin (Sec. 2, Rule 60) have been satisfied.
The writ is a provisional remedy in replevin suits. It is in the "nature of a possessory action and the
applicant who seeks the immediate possession of the property need not be the holder of the legal title
to the property." It is sufficient that at the time he applied for a writ of replevin he is found to be
"entitled to a possession thereof" as stated in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court (Yang v.
Valdez, 177 SCRA 141 [1989]).
The Appellate Court correctly observed that the trial court was right in holding that "the plaintiff may
not anymore be judicially compelled to deliver the tractor to the defendant since after the expiration of
the lease period, it is legally entitled to its possession, as the owner thereof (p. 5, RTC decision;
Rollo, p. 31)". It is very clear therefore, that Alim is not entitled to any award of damages based on the
foregoing facts and evidence presented. Neither can he claim moral and exemplary damages. The
records show that the petitioner was not able to adduce any evidence before the trial court to prove

facts upon which the award for such damages may be predicated. In fact, even in the petition and
memorandum for the petitioner, there was no discussion of the evidence upon which Alim relies for
his claim.
Moral damages have to do with injury personal to the awardee such a physical sufferings and the like,
while exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good (Makabili
v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 253 [1988]).
Indisputably, moral damages cannot generally be awarded in the absence of bad faith (De Aparico v.
Paraguya, 150 SCRA 279 [1987]). Otherwise stated, moral damages can be awarded if they are the
proximate results of a wrongful act or omission (Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Mendez, 152 SCRA
593 [1987]), while exemplary damages are not awarded if the defendant had not acted in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner (Zenith Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 398
[1990]), neither can claim for exemplary damages be granted in the absence of gross or reckless
negligence (Delos Santos, et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 51165, June 21, 1990), which misfeasance
is not true in the case at bar.
A replevin bond is simply intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he may suffer by
being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed property pending the trial of the action.
He cannot recover on the bond as for a reconversion when he has failed to have the judgment
entered for the return of the property. Nor is the surety liable for payment of the judgment for
damages rendered against the plaintiff on a counterclaim or punitive damages for fraudulent or
wrongful acts committed by the plaintiffs and unconnected with the defendant's deprivation of
possession by the plaintiff. Even where the judgment was that the defendant was entitled to the
property, but no order was made requiring the plaintiff to return it or assessing damages in default of
a return, it was declared that until judgment was entered that the property should be restored, there
could be no liability on the part of the sureties (Sapugay v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 464 [1990]).
cdll
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ ., concur
||| (Alim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93213, [August 9, 1991])