THE SPCPD and the GRP-MNLF

Peace Agreement
-- the betrayal of the Bangsa-Moro struggle
for freedom and self-determination
by Atty. Marie J. Yuviengco
Introduction
The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) has been hailed
by both the GRP and the MNLF as the most concrete avenue for a political settlement of the 24year Bangsa Moro armed struggle. While both camps are one in trumpeting the SPCPD as the
facility within which Chairman Misuari and the Moro National Liberation Front shall lay down
their arms and join the mainstream of society, some have raised serious questions about its
nature, purpose and effective in finally and genuinely resolving the armed conflict in muslim
Mindanao.

Some sectors say that through the proposed council, President Fidel Ramos has granted
Misuari and the MNLF earth-shaking concessions that could undermine not only the presidency
but also the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the entire nation. Others would say that
Ramos has granted Misuari immese powers that threaten the alleged momentum of progress of
southern Philippines and the SPCDP is an actuality a provisional government in disguise.
Still others maintain that the SPCPD is the best way of arriving at a conclusion to the
armed struggle. So, why not give it the benefit of the doubt in order to give peace a chance?
Defense Secretary Renato De Villa dismisses the growing opposition to the SPCPD as
simply a problem of information dissemination. While it is true that there indeed is a failure
specifically on the part of the GRP to inform the public about the development in the GRPMNLF talks, we should examine the nature and thrusts of these so-called opposition forces. The
opposition basically comes from the following: the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, local
politicians, other Moro movements, lumads and other indigenous peoples and other political and
liberation forces.
Will the opposition succeed in slaying the SPCPD? Some would observe that the
opposition may not even be genuine. Of late, the tide of opposition is slowly but surely waning.
As of August 2, 1996, as reported in the national dailies, a majority of senators have withdrawn
their opposition to the SPCPD. The Catholic bishops have already expressed their support for it.
Analysts would say that the effect of most of the opposition is merely to push the MNLF
to agree to the barest of concessions from the government.

On another score, the agreement on the SPCPD has opened the doors for legislators to
resurrect their call to amend the Constitution. They have passed on first reading Resolution No.
23 which proposes to amend the charter through peoples initiative. The most vocal proponent of
this move is Speaker Jose de Venecia of the Lakas Party who has time and time again tried to sell
the idea of changing Charter. This raises suspicions that the same will be employed for a
possible extension of the legislators terms and that of Ramos. This idea of extending Ramos
term got the affirmative vote of Nur Misuari who has painted a picture necessitating Ramos
presence as chief executive in order to assure peace and development in the South.
In the recent past, moves to perpetuate Ramos and his people in power have been
strongly opposed by a wide range of political forces. Among the more significant attempts
include: first, the shift to a parliamentary system of government. Then the threat of terrorism
was dangled which would justify the declaration of martial law. And now comes the SPCPD.
If only for this reason, we cannot simply dismiss the SPCPD as it may be the subterfuge
for the possible extension of Ramos grand and insidious designs to coopt revolutionary forces in
the name of peace and development? A close scrutiny of its provisions is, therefore, in order.

The SPCPD: its Evolution

The MNLFs original reason for being was lead the Moro people towards the
revolutionary path for the primary objective of re-acquiring the Bangsa Moro peoples political
freedom and independence and settling themselves free from the clutches of Filipino terror and
enslavement. It became then a logical battlecry to fight for secession or complete political
independence and sovereignty.
After the Kuala Lumpur Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in 1974, Misuari and his
group lowered their demand from complete political independence to complete political
autonomy. The 1976 Tripoli Agreement is rife with provisions calling for such political
autonomy.
Based on the sequence of events, the shift in the avowed goal of the MNLF was in all
probability due largely to the pressure and influence of the Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC).
Several events ensued after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement which include, among
others, the signing of a three-point agreement between Libyan President Muamar Khadaffy and
President Ferdinand Marcos calling for the following:
1. Marcos would declare autonomy in the thirteen (13) areas defined in the Tripoli
Agreement.

2. Marcos would form a provisional government for the autonomy in which members of
the MNLF and the inhabitants of the areas covered by the autonomy may participate;
and
3. The provisional government would hold a referendum in the areas of autonomy on
the administrative arrangements in accordance with Article XI (3) of the 1973
constitution.2
To implement the accord, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1628 which declared
autonomy in Southern Philippines and held a plebiscite which resulted in the reduction of the
original (13) provinces to ten (10) and creation of two autonomous regions.
This was viewed by the MNLF as a blatant violation of the Tripoli agreement which later
resulted in the breakdown of the peace negotiations with the Marcos government. The violation
stemmed not from the act of reducing areas of autonomy but more substantially because of the
impotence of the law creating the autonomous government in Southern Philippines which
essence puts the Lupong Tagapagpaganap and the Sangguniang Pampook under the control and
supervision of the President.
Thereafter, President Corazon Aquino resumed peace negotiations with the MNLF
immediately upon her assumption to office. At issue again was the question of autonomy. Aquino
did a Marcos in the sense that she also held a plebiscite which resulted in the creation of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) through R.A. 6734 in four of the poorest
provinces in Mindanao.
In October 1992, peace negotiations between the Ramos government and the MNLF were
initiated. Misuari was summoned to the Libyan capital as there was a Manila contingent coming
over. In Libya, the GRP formally asked the MNLF to discuss the possibility of resuming the
talks. With the imprimatur of the OIC, Nur had the Manila contingent convey to FVR the
MNLFs readiness to return to the negotiating table, citing the fact that it was fully in accord with
Islamic principles.
The following conditions were laid down by Misuari for the resumption of peace talks:
1. Negotiations should take place outside the Philippines and only in a neutral country;
2. Peace talks should be conducted under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic
Conference, and
3. Peace talks must be devoted solely to seeking of modalities for the full
implementation of the letter and spirit of the Tripoli Agreement.
Two weeks later, instead of proceeding with formal talks, the parties decided to engage
in exploratory talks which led to the Cipanas talks in 1993.

The parties were able to forge an agreement indicating their desire to engage in the peace
talks. Thereafter, they began formal talks and engaged in a series of committee meetings which
spanned a period of four years until the 8th Mixed Committee Meeting in Davao City.
At issue now is the establishment of the Ramos version of autonomy in Muslim
Mindanao. Did the Ramos Government, via the SPCPD, accede to the demands of the MNLF for
political autonomy via a provisional government or autonomous government? Will the Ramos
government give in to the demand of Misuari for complete political autonomy? Will President
Ramos resort to the same process of holding a plebiscite?
The GRP-MNLF peace talks under the Ramos administration has produced several
agreements namely, the 1993 Interim Cease-fire Agreement, the 1993 Memorandum of
Agreement on the Formal Peace Talks and the 1994 and 1995 Interim Agreements and the Davao
Agreement. There has been talk of a forthcoming agreement which is referred to as the 1996
Jakarta Agreement which finally close the peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF.
General Alexander Aguirre of the GRP Negotiating Panel points out the following
contentious issues which have remained unresolved in the duration of the four-year GRP-MNLF
negotiations, to wit: the details of the joining of the MNLF with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), the details of the establishment of the Special Regional Security Force
(SRSF), the provisional government and the area of autonomy.3
The main issue, Aguirre explains, is whether the establishment of a provisional
government or transitional structure leading to a new autonomous government and the areas
included therein necessitates the holding of a plebiscite. The MNLF maintains there is no need to
do so, citing Paragraph 15, Article III of the Tripoli Agreement which stipulates that the
establishment of a Provisional Government will take effect upon the simple expedient of signing
the Final Agreement in Manila. The GRP, however, takes Paragraph 16, Article II of the Tripoli
Agreement as basis for resorting to a plebiscite, to wit:
The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for
the implementation of the entire Agreement.
But what does the term constitutional processes mean? In a paper entitled GRP
Panels Position: Meaning of term Constitutional Processes, the GRP took the following
position:
In sum, our constitutional processes mean:
1. Any agreement which runs counter to the provisions of the Constitution or goes
beyond its framework, needs to go through the tedious process of amending or
revising the Constitution, through a proposal made by a constitutional convention
called by Congress or a proposal made by Congress itself acting as a constituent
assembly or a proposal by peoples initiative; and approval or ratification of the
proposal by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite conducted throughout the
Philippines.

2. Any agreement which remains within the confines of the present constitutional
provisions but which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Organic Act, requires
an amendment of the Organic Act which provides specific procedures for its
amendment or revision
The Organic Act or the law creating the ARMM (R.A. 6734), on the other hand, can be
amended or revised by the following acts:
1. By a majority vote of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting
separately.
2. The Regional Assembly by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members or by
recalling for the Regional Consultative Commission to propose said amendment or
revision. In any case, the approval of Congress is still necessary.
3. Said amendment or revision shall be effective only upon approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose to be held not earlier than 60 days nor
later than 90 days from approval of such amendment or revision. 4
For the ostensible reason of trying to break the impasse, Aguirre suggested the creation
of a transitional body called the Southern Philippines Commission on Peace and Development
which later evolved into what is now known as the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and
Development (SPCPD). 5
This SPCPD, in the Panels view, shall be created not by a plebiscite, but merely by
executive action. But some quarters have taken the position that it should be created by
Congressional legislation. This issue has already been resolved in the subsequent agreements.
The establishment of the SPCPD is fleshed out in a document containing 37 Points of
Consensus arrived at by the 8th GRP-MNLF Mixed Committee Meeting with the Participation of
the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six on June 21-23, 1996 in Davao City which shall refer to
here as the Davao Consensus.
The GRP-MNLF Panel is composed of five (5) Support Committees, namely:
1. National Defense and Regional Security Force
2. Education
3. Economic and Financial System, Mines and Mineral
4. Administrative System, Representation in National Government, Legislative
Assembly and Executive Council
5. Judiciary and Introduction of Shariah Law.
These committees are tasked to examine all the relevant issues in their respective areas
of responsibility and submit their respective reports with the recommendations to the Mixed
Committee.6 The Mixed Committee, on the other hand, composed of representative of the
Central Government of the Republic of the Philippines and representative of MNLF, is tasked

to study in detail the points left for discussion in order to reach a solution in conformity with
the Tripoli Agreement. (See Article III, Paragraph 11 of the Tripoli Agreement).7
The Points of Consensus
The establishment of the SPCPD is divided in to two (2) phases. The first phase,
otherwise referred to as the transition phase or phase for the implementation of the Tripoli
Agreement, runs for a period of three years. During this phase, a Special Zone of Peace and
Development shall be established in the fourteen (14) provinces and all cities therein covered by
the Tripoli Agreement out of Mindanaos twenty-three (23) provinces and sixteen (16) cities. In
the Tripoli Agreement, the following provinces are included: Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat,
Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Palawan.
There has been some debate as to whether Davao City should be included in the SPCPD.
To this, Atty. Jose Lorena of the MNLF legal panel for the talks posited the MNLF position that
Davao City is indeed included in the SPCPD. It has been countered, however, by the GRP Panel
that this untenable. This is probably because at the time the Tripoli Agreement had been signed
on December 23, 1976, Davao was no longer a part of the province of Davao del Sur. Thus,
Davao, in the GRPs understanding, could not be contemplated to be within the coverage of the
SPCPD.
The first phase, in effect, involves those provisions in the agreement which would not
require legislative action for its implementation; the second phase, on the other hand, would be
reserved for those needing the appropriate legislative measures. In this sense, the question on
whether the SPCPD should be created by executive or legislative action has been resolved.

Phase I
The council will be headed by the MNLF, with three deputies representing the Muslims,
Christians and Lumads. There will be consultative assembly which shall be headed also by the
Council Chair. This consultative assembly shall have eighty-one (81) members composed of the
Governor and Vice-Governor for ARMM, the provincial governors and mayors of the areas
covered and representatives of NGOs and POs upon consultation with the MNLF. The Council
will basically perform administrative responsibilities and perform such other functions as may be
delegated by the President. The Consultative Assembly, on the other hand, shall be tasked to
serve as advisers to the council and to a certain extent, formulate policies for the President.
What does this implication of the said powers and functions? It is clear that the Council
shall merely perform a role of being the alter ego of the President. In this sense, the MNLF is
strictly obliged to abide by the dictates of the President even if, for instance, this may ultimately
run counter to the greater interests of the Moro people.

It is interesting to note that the Council shall also be empowered to assist in the holding
of elections, referenda or plebiscite and peoples initiative in the area deputized by the
COMELEC upon recommendation by the President. This is interesting because if we take the
aforequoted provision together with Misuris pronouncement supporting the proposal to extend
Mr. Ramos term, the stated powers may be conducive to manipulation and fraud in the electoral
process.
Point No. 13 of Phase 1 deserves attention. It states: The tenure of the Executive
Council and the Consultative Assembly shall be for a period of three years and extendable by the
President upon recommendations of the Council. Strictly speaking, tenure refers to the period
within which public official shall actually hold office. The absence of a term of office would,
therefore, imply that the Council and Executive Assembly shall serve at the entire pleasure of the
President.
Thus, it is clear that Phase 1 of the Davao Concensus is designed to provide a transitional
mechanism toward the setting up of a new autonomous government, if they are lucky,
particularly in overseeing Ramos so-called development efforts in the fourteen (14) provinces
and nine (9) cities in Mindanao including Palawan.

Phase II
The Second Phase, otherwise referred to as the implementation of the autonomous
government, will entail the amendment or repeal of R.A. 6734 through Congressional action.
Said amendment or repeal shall be initiated within the First Phase of the SPCPD. During the
Second Phase, a plebiscite will be held wherein the citizens residing within the proposed
provinces and cities will decide whether they would agree to join the areas of autonomy. The
holding of a plebiscite will determine:
a. The acceptability of the new ARMM law
b. The establishment of a new autonomous government
c. The specific areas of autonomy.8
The plebiscite curiously will be held in 1998 to coincide with the next Presidential
elections. After the plebiscite, either of two scenarios may take place:
1. New areas of autonomy may be created if there are provinces/cities which would
choose to form part of the autonomous regions;
2. No areas of autonomy at all will be created or, worse, the existing ARMM may even
be diminished!
Misuari claims that 99% of the issues have already been done away with in the course
of the three year talks and what still needs to be done is to resolve the issue of the integrationof
internal security forces. As to what particular aspect of security is still in contention, Misuari had

occasion to state that the only major obstacle as to the integration issue is simply a question of
budget!
In the remote possibility that a new regular autonomous government has been
successfully established, a PNP Regional Command for the said area shall likewise be created
and shall be called the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF). 9
Any law governing the SRSF must be consistent with the constitutional provision that
there shall be one police force in the country which the is national in scope and civilian in
character.
There shall be SRSFs in the provincial, district, city and municipal levels. The SRSF
shall be headed by the Provincial Director with the deputy each for the Administration and
Operations. Provincial and District offices shall be headed by directors while city and municipal
SRSFs shall be headed by a Chief of Police.
The Head of the Regional Autonomous Government shall also act as deputy of the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). A Regional Police Commission (REPOLCOM)
shall also be created which shall likewise be under the NAPOLCOM.

Legal infirmities & obstacles

Already, there has been talk that the SPCPD is legally and constitutionally infirm.
Early on, Ramon Gonzales in his capacity as a taxpayer, filed a prohibition suit before the
Supreme Court and questioned the constitutionally of the SPCPD. The SPCPD, he says, is
violative of the constitutional provisions relating to the creation of an office or the disbursement
of funds without legislative action.
It was noted further that the creation of an autonomous region under Section 18(2) Article
X of the 1987 Constitution has become functus oficio with the ratification by four provinces of
the law creating the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. 10
Another issue is whether of not Misuari can hold two concurrent positions in the
government as head of the SPCPD and as Governor for the ARMM. President Ramos himself
has given the opinion that such was untenable for in effect, Misuari would be holding not only
two, but three different positions, namely, as SPCPD Chair, ARMM Governor and Consultative
Assembly member. Of relevance,however, is the provision in the Organic Act of ARMM (R.A.
6734) which prohibits the governor from holding any other employment, if one can call the
position as an employment. 11 To this, Chairman Misuari reveals the existence of a deal with
the GRP which would allow him to old on the said positions at the same time. This could be the
same package proposals MNLF spokeperson Rev. Absalon Cerveza mentioned which the
Government presented to the MNLF in Jakarta on June 3-5, 1996. Misuari said:

(T)his is all part of the deal. The government proposed to us that it should be a single
leadership only, so we could guide institutions towards the direction we want. Without
this single leadership, there is no guarantee that we would get things done the way we
want them to be done. And besides, there would be demands from the other groups, other
parties. This agreement makes it certain that the MNLF will dominate the South. 12
It is specifically agreed upon the Council shall be assisted by a religious advisory council
or the Darul Iftah. This provision has been the subject of great concern especially from members
of the Christian community and the Catholic church as well. Why we give the Darul Iftah a
distinct role in the administration of the Council? Is it because the MNLF considers the struggle
a religious war between Muslims and Christians? Or is it the very nature of Muslim culture, they
consider Islam as the foundation upon which their society is instituted? Does this not violate the
principle of separation of church and state?

Who is to Gain From this Agreement

Jose Maria Sison, chief political consultant of the NDFP Peace Panel, is of the opinion
that (S)everal states belonging to the OIC, which are pro-US and on which Nur Misuari has
long depended, have finally pressed upon him to surrender completely to the Ramos regime. 13
The OIC has continued to prod the MNLF into arriving at a political settlement of the Bangsa
Moro struggle. This has been proven by their role in pushing the MNLF into agreeing to engage
in peace negotiations from the Tripoli Agreement up to the present negotiations with the Ramos
government. Misuari even admits that the Ministers made efforts to enable the two panels to
reach at a compromise solution in the present talks. 14
Professor Sison suspects that (t)he US is very much behind the Ramos-Misuari deal,
especially because the US is interested in bases and in the oil resources in the Moro areas. This
suspicion is not without basis. Already, members of the City Council of Zamboanga have filed a
resolution recommending the initiation of a study to invite the Americans to install their military
bases in Mindanao.
At present, there are massive development projects being undertaken in Southern
Philippines under the Brunei Darassalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines (BIMP-EAGA),
SOCSARGEN and Mindanao 2000 programs. The following are worth mentioning:
1. The construction of a US-AID designed and funded international airport in General
Santos City. This airport, covering 600 has. reservation area, has a 3,200 meter
concrete paved runway which accommodate wide-bodied aircrafts at full load
capacity.
2. the US-AID designed and funded expansion of the Makar Port which is strategically
located in the northwest coast of Sarangani Bay. The Bay is about 16 kms. at its
widest and is about 33 kms. long from its mouth entrance in the Celebes sea. The
10.11 has. wharf will again be expanded by reclaiming 3.9 has. As of 1978, the wharf

has a docking length of 561 meters with a controlling depth of 8.9 meters which can
accommodate berthing spaces for about seven vessels at a given time. 15
These investments coupled with heavy concentrations of large multinational firms and
investments could very well indicate that a political settlement of the issue is would greatly
benefit them.
What is clear, furthermore, is the categorical accession and subordination of the MNLF to
the limitations imposed by the Government. This is exemplified by the following:
1.

Resolution No. 18 at the Kuala Lumpur Conference in 1974 calling for the resolution
of the Moro issue within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Philippine Republic.

2.

The following provisions in the Tripoli Agreement:

a.

calling for (t)he establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within

the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines. 16

b.

requiring the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to take the

necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the Tripoli
agreement.

3.

A declaration from the OIC to the effect that the MNLF struggle is an internal
struggle and should, therefore, be resolved within the framework of local laws.

4.

The entering into an indifinite ceasefire agreement with the government at or about
the same time formal negotiations have started.

5.

The following provisions in the Davao Consensus:

That (t)he powers and functions of the SPCPD and the Consultative Assembly
are derivative and extentions of the President. 17
b. That (t)he local government units in the area including the ARMM, shall
continue to exist and exercise their functions in accordance with the existing
laws.
a.

c.

That the creation of additional administrative offices and instumentalities shall be

with the approval of the President and for budgetary purposes. 18

Even as Mr. Ramos denies that the suspicions that the SPCPD was created in order to
create a climate conductive for the entry of foreign investors from the Islamic countries and other
capitalists nations to take advantage of the cessation of armed hostilities 19 he himself admitted
the same by saying:
Continued conflict would mean to the international community lack of political will on
our part and resultant loss of business confidence in effecting a just resolution of the plight of our
Muslim countrymen and countrywomen. 20
These suspicions even become clearer when the Davao Consensus specifically makes
mention of the drive for attracting foreign investments, to wit:
The Council, in consultation with the Consultative Assembly, utilizing the funds from the
National
Government, shall orchestrate the development efforts in the area, including
the attraction of foreign investment, specially from the OIC countries and the ASEAN.

Conclusions
Is the SPCPD the correct framework for achieving peace and development in Muslim
Mindanao?
The Moro people have long been marginalized in almost all aspects of governance, i.e.
economically, politically and culturally. By giving Misuari a significant role albeit constrictive in
scope, a semblance of significant and relevant participation is created.
Many would recommend the SPCPD formula for the Mindanao prolem. For after all, the
same is a product of years and years of peace negotiations. The country, they say, is anxious for a
change of climate in Muslim Mindanao and if only for that temporary respite, the SPCPD is
worth trying out.
There is no guarantee that Misuari may get his autonomous government under the present
terms. Too much burden is given to Misuari to realize it. Even if all the provisions of the present
agreement are followed to the letter, ha may still come out of the exercise with nothing. When
this arises, unlike in the breakdown of the talks with Marcos, Misuari can no longer cry foul as
Misuari has placed his stamp of approval on each and every step of the process.

Most basic is the requirement of properly understanding the Moro problem in its entirety.
If we fail to fully comprehend the problem, then most likely, we will fail in arriving at a most
appropriate solution. This, we think, is the fundamental flaw in the creation of the SPCPD.
In essence, we venture to say that:
1.

The SPCPD is but a continuation of the MNLFs series of submissions to the

pressures and dictates coming from the OIC and foreign governments beholden to
monopoly capitalists interests which began from the Tripoli Agreement down to the
SPCPD.

2.

The SPCPD is a structure that may lend justification for the extension of Ramos term
beyond 1998.

3.

The SPCPD is a concession which will leave marginalized Moro community as the
losers in this so-called process for peace and development.

4.

The SPCPD is a grand scheme hatched from the highest levels of the reactionary
government and not surprisingly with the collaboration of government foreign
monopoly capitalist countries like the US and countries forming part of the OIC in
order to satisfy their growing need for markets and natural and human resources.

5.

The SPCPD does not address the fundamental problems of Bangsa Moro struggle and
instead, supports the perpetuation of feudal relationships, the use by government
functionaries of their power to pursue their economic interests and those of foreign
monopoly capitalism.

The Ramos government may have succeded in winning over the MNLF into the
mainstream. But this victory will have little effect on the fundamental problems and issues
subject of the 24-year Bangsa Moro struggle. What government has succeeded in doing is simply
to have diminished its oppositionists by one force. For once, I am in agreement with Gen.
Alexander Agurre when he said the MNLF will cease to exist as a revolutionary force once
Misuari accepts the offer to head the SPCPD. 21
By announcing his candidacy for the ARMM under a Lakas-MNLF alliance, Misuari
admits that he has totally rejected the armed struggle. 22

The MNLF has, therefore, surrendered its principles, abandoned its struggle and
embraced the line of the ruling elite. The MNLF is no longer a liberation force. The MNLF is
now a political party whose only chance for survival is to embrace wholeheartedly the oppressive
and repressive system of governance and for Misuari to engage in elitist politics. Thus:
Over time, objective reality may dictate that MNLF will cease to be a liberation front
and transform itself into a political party. Then it will have its share of politicians and
managers out of its commanders and security forces23
What then the alternative? We believe that there is no short and easy road to peace. So
long as the roots of social unrest and conflict remain, no genuine and lasting peace can ever take
place. Palliatives can at times even make matters worse.
Misuari claims that (P)eace is now very near, if not, already in the offing24 but we in the
Public Interest Law Center believe that there can be no fundamental change if reforms are made
within and under the framework of a reactionary system/state, as is the case at hand.

Notes
1

See Understanding Armed Political Movements, The Quest for Moro SelfDetermination, p. 55, citing Misuari, Rise and Fall of Moro Statehood.
2

See Satur C. Ocampo, Bangsa or Muslim Autonomous Regions, Notes for a lecture to
commemorate the Jabidah Massacre of March 18, 1968. Davao City, March 19, 1996, at
page 6.)
3

See Secretary Alexander Aguirre, 5th Draft Working Paper on the Transitional Structure
and Implementing Mechanism Re: GRP-MNLF Talks, May 9, 1996.
4

See Article XVIII Sections 1-3 R.A. 6734.

See Secretary Alexander Aguirre, 5th Draft Working Paper on the Transitional Structure
and Implementing Mechanism Re: GRP-MNLF Talks, May 9, 1996.
6

See GRP-MNLF Memorandum of Agreement of November 7, 1993, Jakarta.

See Article III, paragraph 11 of the Tripoli Agreement.

See Point No. 16 of the Davao Consensus.

See Point No. 17.

10

See Atty. Allan Tan, Hopes and Fears: On the Mindanao Peace Processes, June 30,

11

See Section 14, Article 8, of the Organic Act.

1996.

12

See Jomar Kho Indanan, Only MNLF can Guarantee Peace, Interview with MNLF
Chairman Nur Misuari, Today, July 21, 1996.
13

See Jose Maria Sison, Press Statement On the Ramos-Misuari Deal, July 11, 1996.

14

See Misuaris videotaped speech, June 28, 1996.

15

See SOCSARGEN, PDI, July 3, 1996.

16

See Article 1 of the Tripoli Agreement.

17

See Point No. 7

18

See Point No. 15(6)

19

See Rolly A. San Juan and PDI Mindanao Bureau, Govt MNLF agree on war
reparations, PDI, July 17, 1996.
20

See Carolyn O. Arguillas, PDI, August 1, 1996, citing FVRs speech delivered before
the graduates of the National Defense College.
21

See Ben Blin Gregorio, Mindanao Talks: No Deal, p. 1, Today, June 23, 1996.

22

See Jomar Kho Indanan, Only MNLF can Guarantee Peace, Interview with MNLF
Chairman Nur Misuari, Today, July 21, 1996.
23

Dean Merlin Magallona, Peacemaking: Issues and Themes in Perspective, June 1996,
General Santos City.
24

Misuari, Nur, The Ongoing Challenge, Speech on the occasion of a roundtable

discussion on the Mindanao Peace Process, Peacemaking:, General Santos City, June 28,
1996.