Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45950

June 20, 1938

LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, petitioner,

vs.
DIEGO LOCSIN, Judge of First Instance of Tarlac,
FELIX IMPERIAL, Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, and the ANTI-USURY BOARD, respondents.
Benigo S. Aquino and Marcial P. Lichauco for petitioner
Adolfo N. Feliciano for the respondent Anti-Usury Board.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search warrant and two orders of
the respondent judge, and the restoration of certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by
an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board.
It appears that on November 10, 1934, Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained
from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search warrant(Exhibit B) commanding any officer of the
law to search the person, house or store of the petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer." The search warrant was issued
upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there (is) just and probable cause to believe
and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her house and store at Victoria,
Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers relating to her activities as
usurer, all of which is contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided." On the same date, the
said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of
the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the petitioner's bookkeeper,
Alfredo Salas, and, without the presence of the petitioner who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded
with the execution thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several Papers
and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor issued by him to Salas. The papers and
documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter
were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed, in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, six separate criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On
several occasions, after seizure, the petitioner, through counsel, demanded from the respondent AntiUsury Board the return of the documents seized. On January 7. and, by motion, on June 4, 1937, the
legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases and
the devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution of October 5, 1937, the respondent Judge of
First Instance denied the petitioner's motion of June 4 for the reason that though the search warrant was
illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner. "En el caso presente," declared the respondent
judge, "teniendo en cuenta que la acusada Por si o por medio de su representante, no presento protests
alguna contra el registro de autos, at verificarse el mismo, o despues de un tiempo rezonable, el juzgado
declare que la citada con su silencio y conducta, ha renunciado implicitanmente a su derecho a no ser

sometido a un registro irrazonable, por lo que no le es pemitido quejarse despues, puesto que cualquier
defecto queha adolecido lo expedicion de la orden de registro y su ejecucion, ha quidado implilcitamente
subsanado." A motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied by order of January 3, 1938.
Petitioner registered her exception. The resolution of October 5, 1937 and the order of January 3, 1938
are sought, together with the search warrant, Exhibit B, to be nullified in these proceedings.
Paragraph 3, section 1 of the bill of right of our Constitution provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant
to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized. These requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure (G. O. No.
58), particularly with reference to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the
officer seizing the property to deliver the same to the corresponding court (secs. 102-104). On more than
one occasion, since the approval of the Constitution, we had emphasized the necessity of adherence to
the constitutional requirements on this subject (Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and AntiUsury Board [1937], 35 Off. Gaz., 1183; People vs. Sy Juco [1937], G.R. No. 41957; Rodriguez vs.
Villamiel [1937], G.R. No. 44328; and Molo vs. Yatco [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1935) and we do not deem it
necessary to reiterate what has been said or observed in these cases.
In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the
applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not
decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even
accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the
receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not
delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law. (See, secs. 95 and 104, G. O. No.
58.) instead, they were turned over to the respondent provincial fiscal and used by him in building up
cases against the petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no case
pending against the petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration
purposes is not without basis. The lower court is, therefore, correct in reaching the conclusion that the
search warrant (Exhibit B) was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac.
The important question presented is whether upon the facts and under the circumstances of the present
case, there has been a waiver by the petitioner of her constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures. While the Solicitor-General admits that, in the light of decisions of this court, the
search warrant was illegally issued, he maintains "(1) that the petitioner had waived her constitutional
right by her acquiescence after the search and seizure, and (2) that the application for the return of the
documents illegally seized was made after an unreasonable length of time after the date of seizure."
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. (People vs. Kagui Malasugui, 34 Off. Gaz., pp. 2163, 2164; 56 C.J., pp. 1178,

1179; Cf. Rodriguez vs. Villamiel, supra.) The waiver may be either express or implied (67 C.J., p. 304).
No express waiver has been made in the case before us. It is urged, however, that there has been a
waiver by implication. It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear,
first, that the right exists; secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
(67 C. J., 299.) It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made.
She could not have objected because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served
upon Alfredo Salas. Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures,
being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one
who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. (56 C. J., p. 1183.) Of course, the petitioner
came to know later of the seizure of some of her papers and documents. But this was precisely the
reason why she sent her attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usuary Board to demand the return of the
documents seized. In any event, the failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or
object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as
Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority of the law. (Const. Lim., 8th ed., Vol., I, p. 630.)
As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not
place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56
C.J., pp. 1180, 1181.)
As a general proposition, it may be admitted that waiver may be the result of a failure to object within a
reasonable time to a search and seizure illegally made. It must be observed, however, that the petitioner,
on several occasions, and prior to the filing of criminal actions against her, had demanded verbally,
through counsel, the return by the Anti-Usuary Board of the properties seized. This is admitted by Adolfo
N. Feliciano, acting chief of the board, who said that the demand was refused simply because
no habiamos terminado con nuestra investigacion. (T.s.n., pp. 24-25.) On July 7, 1936, counsel for the
petitioner wrote a letter to the Anti-Usuary Board demanding again the return of the documents withheld.
And in connection with the criminal cases pending against the petitioner, similar demands were made on
January 7, 1937 and on June 4, 1937. In the light of these circumstances, we find that the petitioner did
not waive her constitutional right. The delay in making demand for the return of the documents seized is
not such as to result in waiver by implication.
In view of the foregoing, the writ prayed for is granted. The search warrant, Exhibit B, is hereby declared
void and of no effect; the orders of October 5, 1937 and January 3, 1938 of the respondent judge are set
aside; and the respondents Anti-Usuary Board and the provincial fiscal of Tarlac or those acting in their
behalf, are hereby ordered to return and restore to the petitioner all the properties, documents, papers
and effects illegally seized from her, within forty-eight (48) hours from the time this decision becomes
final. Without costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin

[GR 45950, 20 June 1938]
First Division, Laurel (J): 6 concur
Facts: On 10 November 1934, Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the
justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the
person, house or store of Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia at Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer." The search warrant was issued
upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there is just and probable cause to believe
and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her house and store at Victoria,
Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers relating to her activities as
usurer, all of which is contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided." On the same date,
Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of Pasion de Garcia
in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the latter's bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and,
without Pasion de Garcia's presence who was ill and confined at the time, preceded with the execution
thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents
were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor issued by him to Salas. The papers and documents seized
were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it
to the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who subsequently filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac,
6 separate criminal cases against Pasion de Garcia for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several
occasions, after seizure, Pasion de Garcia, through counsel, demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the
return of the documents seized. On January 7, and, by motion, on 4 June 1937, the legality of the search
warrant was challenged by Pasion de Garcia's counsel in the 6 criminal cases and the devolution of the
documents demanded. By resolution of 5 October 1937, Judge Diego Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de
garcia's motion of June 4 for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on
the latter's part. A motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied by order of 3 January 1938.
Pasion de Garcia registered her exception.
Issue: Whether the lack of personal examination of witnesses renders the warrant void.
Held: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search
warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be

determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. These
requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly with reference to the
duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to deliver
the same to the corresponding court. Herein, the existence of probable cause was determined not by the
judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent
Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his
witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the
assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties
seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were
turned over to the provincial fiscal and used by him in building up cases against Pasion de Garcia.
Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no case pending against Pasion de Garcia,
the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis. The
search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac. In any event, the failure
on the part of Pasion de Garcia and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant
does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a
submission to the authority of the law. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration
of regard for the supremacy of the law.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 47021

June 25, 1940

YEE SUE KOY and YEE TIP, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
MARIANO G. ALMEDA and JOSE ESTRADA, ET AL., respondents.
M. H. de Joya and Godofredo P. Escalona for petitioners.
Adolfo N. Feliciano and Edmundo S. Picio for respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, dated May
5, 1938, the justice of the peace of Sagay, Occidental Negros, after taking the testimony of applicant's
witness, Jose Estrada, special agent of the Anti-Usury Board, issued on the same date a search warrant
commanding any peace officer to search during day time the store and premises occupied by Sam Sing &
Co., situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, as well as the person of said Sam Sing & Co., and to seize the
documents, notebooks, lists, receipts and promissory notes being used by said Sam Sing & Co. in
connection with their activities of lending money at usurious rates of interest in violation of law, or such as
may be found, and to bring them forthwith before the aforesaid justice of the peace of Sagay. On the
same date, May 5, 1938, at 10:30 a. m. search was accordingly made by Mariano G. Almeda, Jose the
Philippine Army, who seized certain receipt books, vales or promissory notes, chits, notebooks, journal
book, and collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and enumerated in the inventory receipt issued by
Mariano G. Almeda to owner of the documents, papers and articles seized Immediately after the search
and seizure thus effected, Mariano G. Almeda filed a return with the justice of the peace of Sagay
together with a request that the office of the Anti-Usury Board be allowed to retain possession of the
article seized for examination, pursuant to section 4 of Act 4109, which request was granted. The first
unsuccessfully effort exerted by Sam Sing & Co. with a view to recovering the articles seized, was when

their attorney, Godofredo P. Escalona, under date of March 4, 1939, addressed a letter to the Executive
Officer of the Anti-Usury requesting the return of said articles, on ground that the search warrant and
seizure of May 5, 1938 were illegal, only to receive the reply the request "cannot be complied with until
after have served the purpose for which they were seized" and that "the return of the papers must be with
the consent and knowledge of the court which issued the search warrant." Thereafter, under date of
March 11, 1939, the same attorney filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros
praying that the search warrant issued on May 5, 1938 by the justice of the peace of Sagay and the
seizure effected there under be declared illegal and set aside and that the articles in question be ordered
returned to Sam Sing & Co., which motion was denied in the order dated July 24, 1939. A similar motion
was presented to the justice of the peace of Sagay on October 27, 1939 but was denied the next day,
October 28, 1939, Meanwhile, an information dated September 30, 1939 had been filed in the Court of
First Instance of Occidental Negros, charging Yee Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and A. Sing, managers
of Sam Sing & Co., with a violation of Act No. 2655, the case being docketed as No. 11591. Before this
criminal case could be tried, the present petition was filed in this court on November 6, 1939, in which the
petitioners pray that the search warrant of May 2, 1938 and the seizure of May 5, 1938 of the articles
described in annex "D" of the petition be declared illegal and set aside; that the respondents Mariano G.
Almeda and Jose S. Estrada, as agent of the Anti-Usury Board, the ordered and directed to return to the
petitioners the articles listed in said annex "D" of the petition; that pending these proceedings the
provincial fiscal of Occidental Negros be commanded to refrain from using said articles as evidence in
criminal case No. 11591 which was set for trial; on November 13, 1939; that the respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, in case all or more of the articles in question should be
introduced as evidence for the prosecution in criminal case No. 11591, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Yee Fock (alias Yee Sue Koy), Y. Tip and A. Sing," be likewise commanded to refrain from
admitting the same.
The petition is grounded on the propositions (1) that the search warrant issued on May 2, 1938, by the
justice of the peace of Sagay and the seizure accomplished there under are illegal, because the warrant
was issued three days ahead of the application therefor and of the affidavit of the respondent Jose
Estrada which is insufficient in itself to justify the issuance of a search warrant, and because the issuance
of said warrant manifestly contravenes the mandatory provisions both of section 1, paragraph 3, of Article
III of the Constitution and of 97 of General Orders No. 58, and (2) that the seizure of the aforesaid articles
by means of a search warrant for the purpose of using them evidence in the criminal case against the
petitioners, is unconstitutional because the warrant thereby becomes unreasonable and amounts to a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against compelling the accused to testify against themselves..
In their answers the respondents deny that the articles in question were seized by the Anti-Usury Board to
provide itself with evidence in the criminal prosecution against the petitioners, and allege that the seizure
of said articles was an incident of the Government's duty of apprehending violations of the Usury Law, in
connection with which the agents of the Anti-Usury Board are authorized, under section 4 of Act No. 4109
in relation to Act No. 4168, to examine the documents, papers and articles seized from the petitioners;
that the search warrant complied of is valid and legal; that, granting the existence of any irregularity in the
issuance of said warrant, the same has been waived the return of the articles in question because the
same constitute of corpus delicti or are pertinent or relevant thereto.
The petitioners contend that the search warrant herein complained of is illegal because it was issued
three days before the application therefor and the supporting affidavit were signed by Mariano G. Almeda
and Jose Estrada respectively. This contention finds no support in the record before us. In the letter of
March 4, 1939, written by the attorney for Sam Sing &. Co. to the Executive Officer of the Anti-Usury
Board, requesting the return of the articles seized, reference was made to the search warrant and seizure

"of May 5, 1938." (Annex F of the petition) In the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, praying for
the return of the aforesaid articles, the search warrant was again referred to as having been issued on
"May 5, 1938." (Annex H of the petition.) It follows, therefore, that there is truth in the allegation of the
respondents that although the original order on which the warrant was issued was prepared on May 2,
1938, when the justice of the peace signed the order for search warrant, he placed the date "May 5,
1938."
The criticism of the petitioners that the search warrant in question was not issued in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by section 1, paragraph, 3, of Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of
General Orders No. 58, is unfounded. On the contrary, we are satisfied that strict observance of such
formalities was followed. The applicant Mariano G. Almeda, in his application, swore that "he made his
own personal investigation and ascertained that Sam Sing & Co. is lending money without license,
charging usurious rate of interest and is keeping, utilizing and concealing in the store and premises
occupied by it situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks, lists, receipts, promissory
notes, and book of accounts and records, all of which are being used by it in connection with its activities
lending money rate interest in violation of the Usury Law." In turn, the witness Jose Estrada, in his
testimony before the justice of the peace of Sagay, swore that he knew that Sam Sing & Co. was lending
money without license and charging usurious rate of interest, because he personally investigated the
victims who had secured loans from said Sam Sing & Co. and were charged usurious rate of interest; that
he knew that the said Sam Sing & Co. was keeping and using books of accounts and records containing
its transactions relative to its activities as money lender and the entries of the interest paid by its debtors,
because he saw that said Sam Sing & Co. make entries and records of their debts and the interest paid
thereon. As both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada swore that they had personal knowledge, their
affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they could be held liable for perjury if the facts would turn out to
be not as they were stated under oath. (Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, et al., 35 Off. Gaz.,
1183; People vs. Sy Juco, 37 Off. Gaz., 508; Rodriguez vs. Villamiel, 37 Off. Gaz., 2406.) That the
existence of probable cause has been determined by the justice of the peace of Sagay before issuing the
search warrant complained of, is shown by the following statement in the warrant itself, to wit: "After
examination under oath of the complainant, Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-Usury Board,
Department of Justice and Special Agent of the Philippine Army, Manila, and the witness he
presented, . . . and this Court, finding that there is just and probable cause to believe as it does believe,
that the above described articles, relating to the activities of said Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at
usurious rate of interest, are being utilized and kept and concealed at its store and premise occupied by
said Sam Sing & Co., all in violation of law." The description of the articles seized, given in the search
warrant, is likewise sufficient. Where, by the nature of the goods seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could
issue. (Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas et al., 35 Off. Gaz., 1183, citing People vs. Rubio, 57
Phil., 384; and People vs. Kahn, 256, Ill. App., 415.) Neither can there objection to the fact the objects
seized from the petitioners were retained by the agents of the Anti-Usury Board, instead of being turned
over to the justice of the peace of Sagay, for the reason that the custody of said agents is the custody of
the issuing officer or court, the retention having been approved by the latter. (Molo vs. Yatco et al., 35 Off.
Gaz., 1335.) .
But it is further contended that the articles seizes should be ordered returned to the petitioners because
the seizure is unconstitutional, having been made for the purpose of using the articles as evidence in the
criminal case against the petitioners. While we reiterate the rule that the seizure of books and documents
by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the
person whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant
unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion

of an accused to testify against himself (Rodriguez et al. vs. Villamiel et al., 37 Off. Gaz., 2416, citing Uy
Kheytin vs. Villa-Real, 42 Phil., 886; Alvarez vs.Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board,
35 Off. Gaz., 1183; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U.S. 620; Temparani vs. U. S., 299 Fed. 365; U. S. vs. Madden,
297 Fed. 679; Boyd vs. U. S. 116 U. S. 616; Carroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S. 132), the said rule has no
applicable force in the present case. While in the cases of Rodriguez et al. vs. Villamiel et al., supra , and
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, supra , it appeared that the documents therein involved
were in fact seized for the purpose of discovering evidence to be used against the persons from whom
they were seized, in the case at bar this fact is not clear and is furthermore denied. In the application for
the issuance of the search warrant in question, it was alleged that the articles seized were "being used by
it (Sam Sing & Co.) in connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate of interest in
violation of the Usury Law," and it is now suggested (memoranda for respondents) that the only object of
the agents of the Anti-Usury Board in keeping the articles is to prevent the petitioners from em plying
them as a means of further violations of the Usury Law. In this state of the record, without deciding the
question whether the petitioners will in fact use the articles in question, if returned, for illegal purposes, we
are not prepared to order the return prayed for by the petitioners. (Cf. People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384,
394-395.) If it be` true, furthermore, without, however, deciding the point, that as alleged by the
respondents the articles in question constitute the corpus delicti of the violation of the Usury Law, their
return to the petitioners cannot be ordered. (People vs.Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas et
al., G. R. No. 46361, resolution of February 14, 1939, citing 56 C. J. 1166, 1250 and 1251; Uy
Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil., 886; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384; People vs.Malasugui, 34 Off. Gaz.,
2163, 2165.)
The petition is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Moran, J., concurs in the result.

Yee Sue Koy vs. Almeda

[GR 47021, 15 June 1940]
Laurel (J): 3 concur, 1 concurs in result
Facts: In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board,
dated 5 May 1938, the justice of the peace of Sagay, Occidental Negros, after taking the testimony of
applicant's witness, Jose Estrada, special agent of the Anti-Usury Board, issued on the same date a
search warrant commanding any peace officer to search during day time the store and premises occupied
by Sam Sing & Co., situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, as well as the person of said Sam Sing & Co.,
and to seize the documents, notebooks, lists, receipts and promissory notes being used by said Sam Sing
& Co. in connection with their activities of lending money at usurious rates of interest in violation of law, or
such as may be found, and to bring them forthwith before the aforesaid justice of the peace of Sagay. On
the same date, at 10:30 a. m., search was accordingly made by Mariano G. Almeda, Jose Estrada, 2
internal revenue agents and 2 members of the Philippine Army, who seized certain receipt books, vales or
promissory notes, chits, notebooks, journal book, and collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and
enumerated in the inventory receipt issued by Mariano G. Almeda to the owner of the documents, papers
and articles seized. Immediately after the search and seizure thus effected, Mariano G. Almeda filed a
return with the justice of the peace of Sagay together. With a request that the office of the Anti-Usury
Board be allowed to retain possession of the articles seized for examination, pursuant to section 4 of Act
4109, which request was granted. Under the date of 11 March 1939, Godofredo P. Escalona, counsel for
Sam Sing & Co. filed a motion with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Occidental Negros praying that the
search warrant and the seizure effected there under be declared illegal and set aside and that the articles
in question be ordered returned to Sam Sing & Co., which motion was denied in the order dated 24 July
1939. A similar motion was presented to the justice of the peace of Sagay on 27 October 1939 but was
denied the next day. Meanwhile, an information dated 30 September 1939 had been filed in the CFI
Occidental Negros, charging Yee Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and A. Sing, managers of Sam Sing &
Co., with a violation of Act 2655. Before the criminal case could be tried, Yee Sue Koy and Yee Tip filed
the petition with the Supreme Court on 6 November 1939. The petition is grounded on the propositions (1)
that the search warrant issued on 2 May 1938, by the justice of the peace of Sagay and the seizure
accomplished there under are illegal, because the warrant was issued three days ahead of the application

therefor and of the affidavit of the Jose Estrada which is insufficient in itself to justify the issuance of a
search warrant, and because the issuance of said warrant manifestly contravenes the mandatory
provisions both of section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General
Orders 58, and (2) that the seizure of the aforesaid articles by means of a search warrant for the purpose
of using them as evidence in the criminal case against the accused, is unconstitutional because the
warrant thereby becomes unreasonable and amounts to a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against compelling the accused to testify against themselves.
Issue: Whether the application of the search warrant is supported by the personal knowledge of the
witness, besides the applicant, for the judge to determine probable cause in issuing the warrant.
Held: Strict observance of the formalities under section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution
and of section 97 of General Orders 58 was followed. The applicant Mariano G. Almeda, in his
application, swore that "he made his own personal investigation and ascertained that Sam Sing & Co. is
lending money without license, charging usurious rate of interest and is keeping, utilizing and concealing
in the store and premises occupied by it situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks,
lists, receipts, promissory notes, and book of accounts and records, all of which are being used by it in
connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate of interest in violation of the Usury Law." In
turn, the witness Jose Estrada, in his testimony before the justice of the peace of Sagay, swore that he
knew that Sam Sing & Co. was lending money without license and charging usurious rate of interest,
because he personally investigated the victims who had secured loans from said Sam Sing & Co. and
were charged usurious rate of interest; that he knew that the said Sam Sing & Co. was keeping and using
books of accounts and records containing its transactions relative its activities as money lender and the
entries of the interest paid by its debtors, because he saw the said Sam Sing & d make entries and
records of their debts and the interest paid thereon. As both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada swore
that they had personal knowledge, their affidavits were sufficient for, there under, they could be held liable
for perjury if the facts would turn out to be not as their were stated under oath. That the existence of
probable cause had been determined by the justice of the peace of Sagay before issuing the search
warrant complained of, is shown by the following statement in the warrant itself, to wit: "After examination
under oath of the complainant, Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-Usury Board, Department of
Justice and Special Agent of the Philippine Army, Manila, and the witness he presented, . . . and this
Court, finding that there is just and probable cause to believe as it does believe, that the above described
articles, relating to the activities of said Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at usurious rate of interest, are
being utilized and kept and concealed at its store and premises occupied by said Sam Sing & Co., all in
violation of law."

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45358

January 29, 1937

NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY BOARD, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Adolfo N. Feliciano for respondents Anti-Usury Board.
No appearance for other respondent.
IMPERIAL, J.:
The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas,
ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain accounting
books, documents and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Province of Tayabas,
as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles
seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.
On the date above-mentioned, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department
of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in
Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with
his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the
and of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to
the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own
knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit
in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering
the search of the petitioner's house at nay time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and

documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance
with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and
residence at seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the following
articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks,
nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts,
four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one
bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence,
one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many
documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs
of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. The search for and a seizure of said
articles were made with the opposition of the petitioner who stated his protest below the inventories on
the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the articles had not been
brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney, filed
a motion on June 8, 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered
immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be
declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. On said date the court issued an
order directing Emilio L. Siongco to deposit all the articles seized within twenty-four hours from the receipt
of notice thereof and giving him a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt of court. On June 10th, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury
Board, filed a motion praying that the order of the 8th of said month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury
Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for the necessary
investigation. The attorney for the petitioner, on June 20th, filed another motion alleging that,
notwithstanding the order of the 8th of said month, the officials of the Anti-Usury Board had failed to
deposit the articles seized by them and praying that a search warrant be issued, that the sheriff be
ordered to take all the articles into his custody and deposit of the Anti-Usury Board be punished for
contempt of court. Said attorney, on June 24th, filed an ex parte petition alleging that while agent Emilio L.
Siongco had deposited some documents and papers in the office of the clerk of court, he had so far failed
to file an inventory duly verified by oath of all the documents seized by him, to return the search warrant
together with the affidavit it presented in support thereof, or to present the report of the proceedings taken
by him; and prayed that said agent be directed to filed the documents in question immediately. On the
25th of said month the court issued an order requiring agent Emilio L. Siongco forthwith to file the search
warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the proceedings taken by him, and to present an
inventory duly verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2d of said year, the attorney for the
petitioner filed another petition alleging that the search warrant issue was illegal and that it had nit yet
been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said
warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return of all the articles seized to the petitioner,
that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges be filed against
him for abuse of authority. On September 10, 1936, the court issued an order holding: that the search
warrant was obtained and issued in accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and,
consequently, should not be cancelled, and that agent Emilio L. Siongco did not commit any contempt of
court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to
show case, if any, within the inextensible period of two (2) days from the date of notice of said order, why
all the articles seized appearing in the inventory, Exhibit 1, should not be returned to the petitioner. The
assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons
stated therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an investigation
of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by the petitioner. In view of the opposition of the attorney
for the petitioner, the court, on September 25th, issued an order requiring the Anti-Usury Board to specify
the time needed by it to examine the documents and papers seized and which of them should be
retained, granting it a period of five (5) days for said purpose. On the 30th of said month the assistant
chief of the Anti-Usury Board filed a motion praying that he be granted ten (10) days to comply with the
order of September 25th and that the clerk of court be ordered to return to him all the documents and
papers together with the inventory thereof. The court, in an order of October 2d of said year, granted him
the additional period of ten(10) days and ordered the clerk of court to send him a copy of the inventory.
On October 10th, said official again filed another motion alleging that he needed sixty (60) days to
examine the documents and papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by
Nos. 5, 1016, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, and praying that he be

granted said period of sixty (60) days. In an order of October 16th, the court granted him the period of
sixty (60) days to investigate said nineteen (19) documents. The petitioner alleges, and it is not denied by
the respondents, that these nineteen (19)documents continue in the possession of the court, the rest
having been returned to said petitioner.
I. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine
Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property and bring it before the court (section 95, General Orders. No.
58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater
importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and
that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and
scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railways Commission, 32 Fed., 241; Interstate Commerce
Commission vs Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U. S., 29 Law. ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69
Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it
must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen,
for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basis
principles of government (People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).
II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the
highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal
construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment
upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac.,
362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it
is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants must be
strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353;
Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).
III. The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been
based upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no
personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant
but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person whom he
considered reliable. To the question "What are your reason for applying for this search warrant",
appearing in the affidavit, the agent answered: "It has been reported to me by a person whom I
consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said premises, books, documents, receipts,
lists, chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender,
charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law" and in attesting the truth of his
statements contained in the affidavit, the said agent states that he found them to be correct and
true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights, provides that
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place top be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provides
that "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported
by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." It
will be noted that both provisions require that there be not only probable cause before the
issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application
supported by oath of the applicant ands the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an
oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to
perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined asan outward pledge given by
the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God (Bouvier's Law Dictionary; State vs. Jackson, 137 N. W., 1034; In re Sage,
24 Oh. Cir. Ct. [N. S.], 7; Pumphery vs.State, 122 N. W., 19; Priest vs. State, 6 N. W., 468;

State vs. Jones, 154 Pac., 378; Atwood vs. State, 111 So., 865). The oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause (U. S. vs. Tureaud,
20 Fed., 621; U. S. vs. Michalski, 265 Fed., 8349; U. S. vs. Pitotto, 267 Fed., 603; U. S.vs. Lai
Chew, 298 Fed., 652). The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and
affiant be held liable for damages caused (State vs. Roosevelt Country 20th Jud. Dis. Ct., 244
Pac., 280; State vs.Quartier, 236 Pac., 746).
It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizure. Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against
which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and
seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no
fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general
language. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely
a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U.
S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413;
U. S. vs.Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).
In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit, which
served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason
of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search
warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are
illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.
IV. Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be declared illegal
and cancelled is that it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the
applicant. In other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot be issued unless it be
supported by affidavits made by the applicant and the witnesses to be presented necessity by
him. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 98 of General Orders,
No. 58 provides that the judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing. It is the
practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the
application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied
exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor
take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58
provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented
by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in
requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate
of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is
sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the
agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but
merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search
warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his
personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable
cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more
witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the

warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had
no personal knowledge of the facts.
V. The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of the illegality of the search
warrant and the cancellation thereof, the fact that it authorized its execution at night. Section 101
of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively
asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched.
As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal,
our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally
be made at night.
VI. One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his contention that the warrant was
issued illegally is the lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be seized.
Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97 of General Orders, No.
58 provide that the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for determining
whether probable cause exist and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a
particular description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. These
provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with (Munch vs. U. S., 24 Fed. [2d], 518;
U. S. vs. Boyd, 1 Fed. [2d], 1019; U. S. vs. Carlson, 292 Fed., 463; U. S. vs. Borkowski, 268 Fed.,
408; In re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co., 253 Fed., 605; People vs. Mayen, 188 Cal., 237;
People vs. Kahn, 256 Ill. App., 4125); but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather generally, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this
would mean that no warrant could issue (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284;
People vs. Kahn, supra). The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the
judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts,
lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender,
charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of
the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could
have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents
thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the
officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to
identify the articles, which he did.
VII. The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his claim that the search warrant was
obtained illegally, is that the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board might provide
itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases which might be filed against him
for violation of the Anti-usury Law. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the
court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the AntiUsury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as
evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of
books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence
in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional
because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional
provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy
Kheytin vs.Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed.,
365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S.,
132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for
the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or
proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that
the documents should be returned to him.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the
search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his
constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose
of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver,

first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if
there was a compromise it referred but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the AntiUsury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily
consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the
petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory
furnished him by the agents.
Said board alleges as another defense that the remedy sought by the petitioner does not lie because he
can appeal from the orders which prejudiced him and are the subject matter of his petition. Section 222 of
the Code of Civil Procedure in fact provides that mandamus will not issue when there is another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. We are of the opinion, however, that an
appeal from said orders would have to lapse before he recovers possession of the documents and before
the rights, of which he has been unlawfully deprived, are restored to him (Fajardo vs. Llorente, 6 Phil.,
426; Manotoc vs. McMicking and Trinidad, 10 Phil., 119; Cruz Herrera de Lukban vs. McMicking, 14 Phil.,
641; Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456).
Summarizing the foregoing conclusions, we hold:
1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No. 58, relative to search and
seizure, should be given a liberal construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain the
constitutional guaranties whole and in their full force;
2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and fundamentally restrict the
enjoyment of the ownership, possession and use of the personal property of the individual, they
should be strictly construed;
3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the warrant
was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts
of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing
evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against
the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury Law;
4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear positively in the
affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated,
neither could the search and seizure be made at night;
5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant
or a complainant in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts, when the
applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to
require affidavits of other witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause exists;
6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be seized
is necessary, but whereby, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be
rather general, but is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that
no warrant could issue;
7. That the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of compromise or
settlement attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the search
and seizure; and
8. That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if taken by him, would not be an
effective, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and, consequently, the
petition for mandamus filed by him, lies.

For the foregoing considerations, the search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the orders of
the respondent court authorizing the relation of the books and documents, are declared illegal and are set
aside, and it is ordered that the judge presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas direct the
immediate return to the petitioner of the nineteen (19) documents designated on pages 1 to 4 of the
inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25,26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, without
special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
My views on the fundamental questions involved in this case are fully set forth in my dissenting opinion
filed inPeople vs. Rubio (57 Phil., 384, 395). I am gratified to see that, in the main, those views have now
prevailed. I therefore concur in the decision of the court herein.
LAUREL, J., concurring:
I subscribe to the views expressed in the foregoing carefully prepared opinion, with the reservation now to
be stated. To my mind, the search warrant in this case does not satisfy the constitutional requirement
regarding the particularity of the description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized" (par. 3, sec. 1, Art. III, Constitution of the Philippines). Reference to "books, documents, receipts,
lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging
usurious rates of interest in violation of the law" in the search warrant is so general, loose and vague as to
confer unlimited discretion upon the officer serving the warrant to choose and determine for himself just
what are the "books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers" used by the petitioner in
connection with his alleged activities as money-lender. The evident purpose and intent of the
constitutional requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described
in the search warrant, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, that
abuses may not be committed (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil., 886).

Alvarez vs. CFI

64 Phil. 33 (1937)
ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses
Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that
a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money
lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt say
that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable
source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez house. On June 4,
1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks,
stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought
immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board
be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW
issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain
custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latters motion.
Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the
judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.
Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent
Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to
serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information
secured from a person whom he considered reliable.
Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58
require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search
warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he
is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an
outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate

sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince
the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which
the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books,
documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit
of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the
search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did
not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an
imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or
complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of
other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the
facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more
witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the
search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his
personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause;
when the applicants knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses
having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because
it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts