G.R. No.

L-45459

March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from
this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized
by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested
Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite
of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the
designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown,
cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos."
The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further
sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case, although
he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary
legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J.,
6580, its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals,
corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess of
the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The
terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and
include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be
violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in the
jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits
of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the
writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of
the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez
[1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this
action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the
use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the
necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our
history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both,
for ocassions might arise when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the
furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional
development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898,
reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902
and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme
expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil
freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend
the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its

inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is
religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man
to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is
deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid
of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the
patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who
guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our
Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3,
Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344,
par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13,
subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional
mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and
Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code)
because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but
punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the
fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the
provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE
OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES
AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by
the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds
in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new
designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby
authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as
often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and printing of postage
stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval
of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated
and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps
in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September
1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the
Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale
of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth
P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power
to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course,
the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not
authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director
of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The
stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of

the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936,
incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an
event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the
Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's
complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a
Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila,
and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is
not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious
that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a
religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and
purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities
simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could
legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to
mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law.
ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete
separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the
Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our
political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the
Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection,
examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there
has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor
judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in
weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is
yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-9637

April 30, 1957

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellee.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Juan Nabong for appellant.
Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Naawa for appellee.
FELIX, J.:
Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing
business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898, with its principal
office at 636 Isaac Peral in said City. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be
exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions
thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several
Philippine dialects. On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary
Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529,
3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together
with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of
P5,821.45 (Annex A).
Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded that plaintiff deposit and pay under
protest the sum of P5,891.45, if suit was to be taken in court regarding the same (Annex B). To avoid the closing of its
business as well as further fines and penalties in the premises on October 24, 1953, plaintiff paid to the defendant
under protest the said permit and license fees in the aforementioned amount, giving at the same time notice to the
City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which, the said fees
were being collected (Annex C), which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise to this action.
In its complaint plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered declaring the said Municipal Ordinance No. 3000, as
amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364 illegal and unconstitutional, and that the defendant be ordered

to refund to the plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 paid under protest, together with legal interest thereon, and the costs,
plaintiff further praying for such other relief and remedy as the court may deem just equitable.
Defendant answered the complaint, maintaining in turn that said ordinances were enacted by the Municipal Board of
the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative
Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila, and praying that the complaint be dismissed, with costs against plaintiff. This answer was
replied by the plaintiff reiterating the unconstitutionality of the often-repeated ordinances.
Before trial the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, thru their undersigned attorneys and respectfully submit
the following stipulation of facts:
1. That the plaintiff sold for the use of the purchasers at its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral, Manila, Bibles,
New Testaments, bible portions and bible concordance in English and other foreign languages imported by it
from the United States as well as Bibles, New Testaments and bible portions in the local dialects imported
and/or purchased locally; that from the fourth quarter of 1945 to the first quarter of 1953 inclusive the sales
made by the plaintiff were as follows:

Quarter

Amount of Sales

4th quarter 1945

P1,244.21

1st quarter 1946

2,206.85

2nd quarter 1946

1,950.38

3rd quarter 1946

2,235.99

4th quarter 1946

3,256.04

1st quarter 1947

13,241.07

2nd quarter 1947

15,774.55

3rd quarter 1947

14,654.13

4th quarter 1947

12,590.94

1st quarter 1948

11,143.90

2nd quarter 1948

14,715.26

3rd quarter 1948

38,333.83

4th quarter 1948

16,179.90

1st quarter 1949

23,975.10

2nd quarter 1949

17,802.08

3rd quarter 1949

16,640.79

4th quarter 1949

15,961.38

1st quarter 1950

18,562.46

2nd quarter 1950

21,816.32

3rd quarter 1950

25,004.55

4th quarter 1950

45,287.92

1st quarter 1951

37,841.21

2nd quarter 1951

29,103.98

3rd quarter 1951

20,181.10

4th quarter 1951

22,968.91

1st quarter 1952

23,002.65

2nd quarter 1952

17,626.96

3rd quarter 1952

17,921.01

4th quarter 1952

24,180.72

1st quarter 1953

29,516.21

2. That the parties hereby reserve the right to present evidence of other facts not herein stipulated.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this case be set for hearing so that the parties may present further
evidence on their behalf. (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-16).
When the case was set for hearing, plaintiff proved, among other things, that it has been in existence in the Philippines
since 1899, and that its parent society is in New York, United States of America; that its, contiguous real properties
located at Isaac Peral are exempt from real estate taxes; and that it was never required to pay any municipal license
fee or tax before the war, nor does the American Bible Society in the United States pay any license fee or sales tax for
the sale of bible therein. Plaintiff further tried to establish that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles,
which are disposed of for as low as one third of the cost, and that in order to maintain its operating cost it obtains
substantial remittances from its New York office and voluntary contributions and gifts from certain churches, both in
the United States and in the Philippines, which are interested in its missionary work. Regarding plaintiff's contention of
lack of profit in the sale of bibles, defendant retorts that the admissions of plaintiff-appellant's lone witness who
testified on cross-examination that bibles bearing the price of 70 cents each from plaintiff-appellant's New York office
are sold here by plaintiff-appellant at P1.30 each; those bearing the price of $4.50 each are sold here at P10 each;
those bearing the price of $7 each are sold here at P15 each; and those bearing the price of $11 each are sold here at
P22 each, clearly show that plaintiff's contention that it never makes any profit from the sale of its bible, is evidently
untenable.
After hearing the Court rendered judgment, the last part of which is as follows:
As may be seen from the repealed section (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and the repealing portions
(o) of section 18 of Republic Act No. 409, although they seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent is
expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in
said legal provisions, and that the taxes to be levied by said ordinances is in the nature of percentage
graduated taxes (Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Sec. 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No. 2529, as
amended by Ordinance No. 3364).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that this case should
be dismissed, as it is hereby dismissed, for lack of merits, with costs against the plaintiff.

Not satisfied with this verdict plaintiff took up the matter to the Court of Appeals which certified the case to Us for the
reason that the errors assigned to the lower Court involved only questions of law.
Appellant contends that the lower Court erred:
1. In holding that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are not unconstitutional;
2. In holding that subsection m-2 of Section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code under which Ordinances
Nos. 2592 and 3000 were promulgated, was not repealed by Section 18 of Republic Act No. 409;
3. In not holding that an ordinance providing for taxes based on gross sales or receipts, in order to be valid
under the new Charter of the City of Manila, must first be approved by the President of the Philippines; and
4. In holding that, as the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumed commercial proportions, it cannot
escape from the operation of said municipal ordinances under the cloak of religious privilege.
The issues. As may be seen from the proceeding statement of the case, the issues involved in the present
controversy may be reduced to the following: (1) whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as
amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid; and (2) whether the provisions of said ordinances
are applicable or not to the case at bar.
Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, provides that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Predicated on this constitutional mandate, plaintiff-appellant contends that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as
respectively amended, are unconstitutional and illegal in so far as its society is concerned, because they provide for
religious censorship and restrain the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession, to wit: the distribution and
sale of bibles and other religious literature to the people of the Philippines.
Before entering into a discussion of the constitutional aspect of the case, We shall first consider the provisions of the
questioned ordinances in relation to their application to the sale of bibles, etc. by appellant. The records, show that by
letter of May 29, 1953 (Annex A), the City Treasurer required plaintiff to secure a Mayor's permit in connection with the
society's alleged business of distributing and selling bibles, etc. and to pay permit dues in the sum of P35 for the
period covered in this litigation, plus the sum of P35 for compromise on account of plaintiff's failure to secure the
permit required by Ordinance No. 3000 of the City of Manila, as amended. This Ordinance is of general application and
not particularly directed against institutions like the plaintiff, and it does not contain any provisions whatever
prescribing religious censorship nor restraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession. Section 1
of Ordinance No. 3000 reads as follows:
SEC. 1. PERMITS NECESSARY. It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to conduct or engage in any of the
businesses, trades, or occupations enumerated in Section 3 of this Ordinance or other businesses, trades, or
occupations for which a permit is required for the proper supervision and enforcement of existing laws and
ordinances governing the sanitation, security, and welfare of the public and the health of the employees
engaged in the business specified in said section 3 hereof, WITHOUT FIRST HAVING OBTAINED A PERMIT
THEREFOR FROM THE MAYOR AND THE NECESSARY LICENSE FROM THE CITY TREASURER.
The business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff involved in this case is not particularly mentioned in Section 3 of the
Ordinance, and the record does not show that a permit is required therefor under existing laws and ordinances for the
proper supervision and enforcement of their provisions governing the sanitation, security and welfare of the public and
the health of the employees engaged in the business of the plaintiff. However, sections 3 of Ordinance 3000 contains
item No. 79, which reads as follows:
79. All other businesses, trades or occupations not
mentioned in this Ordinance, except those upon which the
City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00
Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax said business,
trade or occupation.

As to the license fees that the Treasurer of the City of Manila required the society to pay from the 4th quarter of 1945
to the 1st quarter of 1953 in the sum of P5,821.45, including the sum of P50 as compromise, Ordinance No. 2529, as
amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028 prescribes the following:
SEC. 1. FEES. Subject to the provisions of section 578 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, as
amended, there shall be paid to the City Treasurer for engaging in any of the businesses or occupations below
enumerated, quarterly, license fees based on gross sales or receipts realized during the preceding quarter in
accordance with the rates herein prescribed: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That a person engaged in any businesses
or occupation for the first time shall pay the initial license fee based on the probable gross sales or receipts for
the first quarter beginning from the date of the opening of the business as indicated herein for the
corresponding business or occupation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

GROUP 2. Retail dealers in new (not yet used) merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the
payment of any municipal tax, such as (1) retail dealers in general merchandise; (2) retail dealers exclusively
engaged in the sale of . . . books, including stationery.
xxx

xxx

xxx

As may be seen, the license fees required to be paid quarterly in Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 2529, as amended,
are not imposed directly upon any religious institution but upon those engaged in any of the business or occupations
therein enumerated, such as retail "dealers in general merchandise" which, it is alleged, cover the business or
occupation of selling bibles, books, etc.
Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code which includes section 2444, subsection (m-2) of said legal body, as
amended by Act No. 3659, approved on December 8, 1929, empowers the Municipal Board of the City of Manila:
(M-2) To tax and fix the license fee on (a) dealers in new automobiles or accessories or both, and (b) retail
dealers in new (not yet used) merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the payment of any municipal
tax.
For the purpose of taxation, these retail dealers shall be classified as (1) retail dealers in general merchandise,
and (2) retail dealers exclusively engaged in the sale of (a) textiles . . . (e) books, including stationery, paper
and office supplies, . . .: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the combined total tax of any debtor or manufacturer, or
both, enumerated under these subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles
mentioned herein, SHALL NOT BE IN EXCESS OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS PER ANNUM.
and appellee's counsel maintains that City Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, were enacted in virtue of the
power that said Act No. 3669 conferred upon the City of Manila. Appellant, however, contends that said ordinances are
longer in force and effect as the law under which they were promulgated has been expressly repealed by Section 102
of Republic Act No. 409 passed on June 18, 1949, known as the Revised Manila Charter.
Passing upon this point the lower Court categorically stated that Republic Act No. 409 expressly repealed the
provisions of Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code but in the opinion of the trial Judge, although Section 2444
(m-2) of the former Manila Charter and section 18 (o) of the new seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent was
expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in both
legal provisions and, consequently, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, are to be considered as still in full
force and effect uninterruptedly up to the present.
Often the legislature, instead of simply amending the pre-existing statute, will repeal the old statute in its
entirety and by the same enactment re-enact all or certain portions of the preexisting law. Of course, the
problem created by this sort of legislative action involves mainly the effect of the repeal upon rights and
liabilities which accrued under the original statute. Are those rights and liabilities destroyed or preserved? The
authorities are divided as to the effect of simultaneous repeals and re-enactments. Some adhere to the view
that the rights and liabilities accrued under the repealed act are destroyed, since the statutes from which they
sprang are actually terminated, even though for only a very short period of time. Others, and they seem to be
in the majority, refuse to accept this view of the situation, and consequently maintain that all rights an
liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore, continuing the law in force without interruption. (CrawfordStatutory Construction, Sec. 322).
Appellant's counsel states that section 18 (o) of Republic Act No, 409 introduces a new and wider concept of taxation
and is different from the provisions of Section 2444(m-2) that the former cannot be considered as a substantial re-

enactment of the provisions of the latter. We have quoted above the provisions of section 2444(m-2) of the Revised
Administrative Code and We shall now copy hereunder the provisions of Section 18, subdivision (o) of Republic Act No.
409, which reads as follows:
(o) To tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including importers and indentors, except
those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some other municipal tax under the provisions
of this section.
Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes
of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be classified into four main classes: namely (1) luxury
articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license
shall be prescribed for each class but where commodities of different classes are sold in the same
establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher
or highest rate of tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be
provided by ordinance.
For purposes of this section, the term "General merchandise" shall include poultry and livestock, agricultural
products, fish and other allied products.
The only essential difference that We find between these two provisions that may have any bearing on the case at bar,
is that, while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both,
enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein,shall
not be in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not
contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in
accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that maintain that "all rights and liabilities which have
accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal,
therefore continuing the law in force without interruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of
Manila are still in force and effect.
Plaintiff, however, argues that the questioned ordinances, to be valid, must first be approved by the President of the
Philippines as per section 18, subsection (ii) of Republic Act No. 409, which reads as follows:
(ii) To tax, license and regulate any business, trade or occupation being conducted within the City of Manila,not
otherwise enumerated in the preceding subsections, including percentage taxes based on gross sales or
receipts, subject to the approval of the PRESIDENT, except amusement taxes.
but this requirement of the President's approval was not contained in section 2444 of the former Charter of the City of
Manila under which Ordinance No. 2529 was promulgated. Anyway, as stated by appellee's counsel, the business of
"retail dealers in general merchandise" is expressly enumerated in subsection (o), section 18 of Republic Act No. 409;
hence, an ordinance prescribing a municipal tax on said business does not have to be approved by the President to be
effective, as it is not among those referred to in said subsection (ii). Moreover, the questioned ordinances are still in
force, having been promulgated by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila under the authority granted to it by law.
The question that now remains to be determined is whether said ordinances are inapplicable, invalid or
unconstitutional if applied to the alleged business of distribution and sale of bibles to the people of the Philippines by a
religious corporation like the American Bible Society, plaintiff herein.
With regard to Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028, appellant contends that it
is unconstitutional and illegal because it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and
worship of appellant.
Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution of the Philippines aforequoted, guarantees the freedom of religious
profession and worship. "Religion has been spoken of as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to its Creator" (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil., 201).It has reference to one's views of his relations to His
Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character, and obedience to His Will
(Davis vs. Beason, 133 U.S., 342). The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraints of such right can
only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger
of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". (Taada and Fernando on the Constitution of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its
distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature:
In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, it was held that an ordinance requiring that a license be obtained
before a person could canvass or solicit orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares or merchandise cannot be

made to apply to members of Jehovah's Witnesses who went about from door to door distributing literature
and soliciting people to "purchase" certain religious books and pamphlets, all published by the Watch Tower
Bible & Tract Society. The "price" of the books was twenty-five cents each, the "price" of the pamphlets five
cents each. It was shown that in making the solicitations there was a request for additional "contribution" of
twenty-five cents each for the books and five cents each for the pamphlets. Lesser sum were accepted,
however, and books were even donated in case interested persons were without funds.
On the above facts the Supreme Court held that it could not be said that petitioners were engaged in
commercial rather than a religious venture. Their activities could not be described as embraced in the
occupation of selling books and pamphlets. Then the Court continued:
"We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial burdens of government.
See Grosjean vs. American Press Co., 297 U.S., 233, 250, 80 L. ed. 660, 668, 56 S. Ct. 444. We have here
something quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of one who engages in religious activities or a
tax on property used or employed in connection with activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or
property of a preacher. It is quite another to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The
tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise of
these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress
its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as
to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in
this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading
religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. . . .
It is contended however that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if
it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax a flat tax imposed on the
exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights . . . The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of
these freedom is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. . . .
It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in
question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of
activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably
tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat
license tax."
Nor could dissemination of religious information be conditioned upon the approval of an official or manager
even if the town were owned by a corporation as held in the case of Marsh vs. State of Alabama (326 U.S.
501), or by the United States itself as held in the case of Tucker vs. Texas (326 U.S. 517). In the former case
the Supreme Court expressed the opinion that the right to enjoy freedom of the press and religion occupies a
preferred position as against the constitutional right of property owners.
"When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom
of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred
position. . . . In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of
property here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's
permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the
enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute." (Taada and Fernando on the Constitution
of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 304-306).
Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code, provides:
SEC. 27. EXEMPTIONS FROM TAX ON CORPORATIONS. The following organizations shall not be taxed under
this Title in respect to income received by them as such
(e) Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational
purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties,
real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income,
shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code;
Appellant's counsel claims that the Collector of Internal Revenue has exempted the plaintiff from this tax and says that
such exemption clearly indicates that the act of distributing and selling bibles, etc. is purely religious and does not fall
under the above legal provisions.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some
instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the provisions of City of

Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention the Mayor's permit before any person
can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, We do not find that it imposes any
charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. In the
case of Coleman vs. City of Griffin, 189 S.E. 427, this point was elucidated as follows:
An ordinance by the City of Griffin, declaring that the practice of distributing either by hand or otherwise,
circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or
whether same are being sold within the city limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written
permission from the city manager of the City of Griffin, shall be deemed a nuisance and punishable as an
offense against the City of Griffin, does not deprive defendant of his constitutional right of the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing and carrying
out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit to claim as a part of his religious system.
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff
Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and
defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before,
it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its
rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended is also inapplicable to said
business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision appealed from,
sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it. Without pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-5917

January 28, 1955

SANTIAGO A. FONACIER, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABELO DE LOS REYES, Jr., respondents.
Alejo Mabanag for petitioner.
Claro M. Recto for the respondents.
Ferdinand E. Marcos as amicus curiae.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This case was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, represented by its
Supreme Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca, against Bishop Santiago A. Fonacier seeking to require the latter to render an
accounting of his administration of all the temporal properties he has in his possession belonging to said church and to
recover the same from him on the ground that he had ceased to be the Supreme Bishop of said religious organization.
Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., having been elected as Supreme Bishop after the filing of the original complaint, was
later made a co-plaintiff in a supplementary complaint.
Mons. Fonacier claims as a defense that he has not been properly removed as Supreme Bishop; that his legal
successor was Juan Jamias who had been elected in accordance with the constitution of the church; that he had
already rendered an accounting of his administration to Bishop Jamias and turned over all the properties to the latter;
that Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. formally joined the Protestant Episcopal Church of America and for this reason he
has ceased to be a member of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente; and that Bishops De los Reyes and Bayaca having
abandoned the faith, fundamental doctrines and practices of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, they ceased to be
members thereof and consequently, have no personality to maintain the present action.
On May 17, 1950, the court rendered judgment declaring Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate
Supreme Bishop of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, and ordering Mons. Fonacier to render an accounting of his
administration of the properties and funds of the church "from the time he began occupying the position of Secretario
de Economia Temporal thereof until the present time.".
When the case was taken to the Court of Appeals, the latter found the decision of the Court of origin in accordance
with law and the evidence and affirmed the same in toto, and the case is now before us by virtue of a petition for
review interposed by defendant Mons. Fonacier.

Petitioner assigns in this instance twelve errors as allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals which, in his opinion,
merely involve or raise legal questions which can be looked into in the present petition for review, but this assertion is
disputed by respondent who claims that the issues herein involved call for factual conclusions inasmuch as they
require an examination of the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. As to which of these
contention is correct, we are not in a position to determine at the moment, the only thing clear being that in a petition
for review, "The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. The entry of such judgment is the end of all questions of fact." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 1, 1952, ed., p. 952), or, as section 2, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides, "only questions of law may be
raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth", and conformably with this provision this Court has constantly
ruled that it would not disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals in an appeal by certiorari (De Vera vs.
Fernandez, 88 Phil., 668; Velasco vs. The Court of Appeals, 90 Phil., 689; Monfort vs. Aguinaldo, L-4104, May 2, 1952.)
Considering the nature of the present appeal, we would therefore proceed to restate the facts as found by the Court of
Appeals, limiting our function to ascertaining or determining if the conclusions drawn from said facts are in accordance
with law or the constitution of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente which, in our opinion, is the key to the solution of the
present controversy, and in our discussion of the issues as reflected in the various assignments of error, we will follow
the same arrangement made in petitioner's brief without prejudice of discussing together or in a group those which we
believe are interrelated and can be better elucidated than by discussing them separately.
The main facts which led to the present controversy as found by the Court of Appeals are: "It is not disputed that upon
the death of Mons. Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the IFI since 1902, Mons. Fonacier was elected Obispo Maximo, on
October 14,1940, in accordance with the constitution of the church. The latter's successor should have been elected
by the Asemblea Magna of the Church on September 1, 1943. However, due to circumstances brought about by the
Pacific War, it was agreed, on December 16, 1941, by the Bishops stationed in Manila and neighboring provinces that
Mons. Fonacier should hold over as Obispo Maximo of IFI, for the duration of the emergency created by the war. After
the liberation of the Philippines, and on September 1, 1945, an attempt was made to convene the Asemblea Magna for
the purpose of electing the Bishop Maximo, but owing to lack of quorum, the Bishops present agreed that Mons.
Fonacier would continue for another year, or until September 1, 1946.
On September 2, 1945, the Consejo Supremo de Obispos (Supreme Council of Bishops) of the IFI convened and
approved the designation of bishops to their respective bishoprics. Here began the conflict which culminated in the
division Mons. Alejandro Remollino was assigned as bishop of the diocese of Cavite. Upon learning that the latter
notified the priests of his bishopric regarding his assignment, Mons. Fonacier wrote him a letter dated September 18,
1945 enjoining him from assuming the duties of his office and from taking possession of the diocese of Cavite until he
(Fonacier) had approved the appointment made by the Supreme Council as provided for in the constitution. To this
letter Bishop Remollino replied explaining his side and adding that he was ready to defend his stand on the matter
before the courts of justice. In view of this attitude, Mons. Fonacier ordered the expulsion of Bishop Remollino from the
church and also of Bishop Manuel Aguilar (Exhibits 3 and 4) whom Mons. Fonacier suspected to be the instigator of
certain acts of insubordination and defamation against him.
"On December 1, 1945, Bishop Manuel Aguilar filed charges (Exhibit B) against Mons. Fonacier as Supreme Bishop
which were submitted to a meeting of the Supreme Council of Bishops, held on January 21, 1946, which decreed the
forced resignation of appellant, and to the Asemblea Magna or Asemblea General of the church, held on January 22,
1946. This body approved the forced resignation of appellant (petitioner Fonacier) and elected Bishop Gerardo M.
Bayaca as Supreme Bishop to succeed Mons. Fonacier.
"When notified of his removal as Obispo Maximo and required to turn over all the funds, documents and other
properties of the church to his successor, appellant refused. Hence, the commencement of the instant action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
On September 1, 1946 the Asemblea Magna convened and elected Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as Obispo Maximo
(respondent herein). On the same date Mons. Fonacier and some of his followers met at the Manila Hotel and elected
Mons. Juan Jamias as their Supreme Bishop. Thus two factions of the IFI were created.
"The faction under Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. according to the statement (Exhibit EE) of the Director of National
Library, issued on May 22, 1947, have nineteen bishops and 252 priests while the faction under Mons. Juan Jamias had
ten bishops and only 40 priests. Thus on June 23, 1947, the Secretary of Public Instruction promulgated an order to the
effect that for administrative purposes, Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., was recognized as sole head of IFI and the
applications of priests of said church for permits to solemnize marriages would be granted if it were shown thereon
that they recognized Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., as the Obispo Maximo of said church. The Supreme Court, however,
denied the power of the Secretary to stop the Fonacier group from obtaining licenses to solemnize marriages.
"On January 22, 1948, the bishop and priests under Mons. De los Reyes, Jr., had increased from 252 to 293 while those
under Mons. Jamias were only 64 (Exhibit)25) and Mons. De los Reyes, Jr. was duly registered as corporation sole for
the administration of the temporalities of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 154164 of the Corporation Law.'".

I.
The petitioner assigns as first error the following: The Court of Appeals erred "in holding that the ouster of Bishops
Manuel Aguilar, Alejandro Remollino, Isabelo de los Reyes Jr., Gerardo Bayaca, Juan Quijano and Pablo Tablante decreed
by the Supreme Council and the petitioner as Obispo Maximo was illegal," and the facts concerning the ouster of
Bishops Remollino and Aguilar as narrated by the Court of Appeals are:.
At the meeting of the Supreme Council of Bishops held on September 2, 1945, Mons. Alejandro Remollino was
appointed to the diocese of Cavite. He at once advised the priests of his bishopric Fonacier, wrote Bishop
Remolino a letter, dated September 18, 1945 (Exhibit T) calling his attention to the fact that the latter had
been quite hasty in returning to the diocese of Cavite without waiting for the approval by the Obispo Maximo of
the Supreme Council's resolution of September 2, 1945 as provided for in the constitution of the church, which
requires the approval of the Obispo Maximo to all resolutions of the Supreme Council before becoming
effective and enjoining him from assuming the duties of his office and from taking possession of said diocese.
Mons. Remollino answered appellant with a letter (Exhibit U) dated September 19, 1945, stating that he had
been appointed Bishop of the diocese of Cavite by the late Mons. Aglipay; that said appointment was
subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Council of Bishops; that he had ever since been the Bishop of said
diocese; and that, therefore, he was ready to defend his stand on the matter before the courts of justice.
Resenting such attitude of Bishop Remollino, taking it as a defiance and an insult, considering it as a direct
contempt of the Supreme Head of the church, and suspecting Bishop Manuel Aguilar as the one who drafted
said letter and as the instigator, among the priests and followers of the church, of what he considered as acts
of insubordination, defamation and vilification against him, appellant prepared and signed a document, dated
October 8, 1945, purporting to be a decree of expulsion, whereby he decreed the expulsion of Msgrs. Aguilar
and Remollino from the church (Exhibit 3). This document was signed by appellant, countersigned by the
Secretary General Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. and agreed to by Bishops Juan Jamias, Martin Jamias,
Gregorio Gaerlan, Leopoldo Ruiz, Gerardo Bayaca and Pablo Tablante. On October 16, 1945 the last-named six
bishops approved a resolution decreeing the expulsion of Aguilar and Remollino from the church (Exhibit 4),
which they signed and appears to have been countersigned by the Secretary General and approved by
appellant as Obispo Maximo. It is claimed by appellant that due to the intervention of persons interested in
settling the controversy within the church, said decree of expulsion (Exhibit 4) was not put into effect
immediately and that the, appellant, agreed to consider the matter closed after receiving from Aguilar and
Remollino a letter of apology which the latter promised to write. In other words, there was an understanding
that if no letter of apology was written by Bishops Aguilar and Remollino. Exhibits 3 and 4 will become
operative. Appellant also contends that having been informed by Bishop De los Reyes, Jr. that Bishops Aguilar
and Remollino refused to sign a letter of apology, appellant issued the communication (Exhibit BB) on
November 20, 1945, whereby he declared the effectivity of the decree of ouster of the aforesaid two bishops,
dated October 8, 1945. (Exhibit 3).
The issue now to be determined is: Was the ouster of Bishops Manuel Aguilar and Alejandro Remollino legal and valid?.
Petitioner contends that such ouster was legal and valid because it was decreed by him as Supreme Bishop and the act
was sanctioned by the Supreme Council in accordance with the constitution of the church as a punishment for the
action of said bishops in defying and slandering the Supreme Head of the church and in campaigning to destroy the
unity of the church. Furthermore, petitioner contends that, under the constitution of the church Bishops Aguilar and
Remollino had the right to appeal from the decree of expulsion to the Curia de Apelaciones which had jurisdiction to
review and render final judgment thereon, but that they did not avail themselves of this remedy and, hence, this
decree became final and executory and cannot now be attacked collaterally outside of the church, for the civil courts
have no jurisdiction to review or revise it.
We find that this claim is but a reiteration of what petitioner has advanced when this case was brought before the
Court of Appeals and the latter has already passed upon it after making a careful discussion of the evidence, oral and
documentary, in connection with the pertinent provisions of the constitution of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente
touching upon the powers of the Supreme Bishop concerning removal of bishops of the church, and in connection with
pertinent authorities relative to the doctrine of interference which civil courts might have regarding ecclesiastical
matters. And we find that the discussion made by the Court of Appeals on the points raised by petitioner is correct.
Take for instance the question relative to the authority of the civil courts to review or revise an action of decree of the
ecclesiastical courts or authorities concerning which the Court of Appeals upheld the power of the civil courts to look
into the propriety of the decree of ouster because of the plea of respondent that it was not issued in accordance with
the procedure laid down in the constitution of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente. The Court of Appeals entertained the
view that since it is claimed that the ouster was made by an unauthorized person, or in a manner contrary to the
constitution of the church, and that the ousted bishops were not given notice of the charges against them nor were
they afforded an opportunity to be heard, the civil courts, have jurisdiction to review the action regarding said ouster
citing in support of its view some authorities from Vol. 45 of the American Jurisprudence which we believe to be
pertinent and decisive of the issue under consideration (45 Am. Jur. pp. 751-754). And, for the purposes of this
decision, it is enough for us to quote the following as a representative authority: "Where, however, a decision of an

ecclesiastical court plainly violates the law it professes to administer, or is in conflict with the laws of the land, it will
not be followed by the civil courts. * * * In some instances, not only have the civil courts assumed the right to inquire
into the jurisdiction of religious tribunals and the regularity of their procedure, but they have subjected their decisions
to the test of fairness or to the test furnished by the constitution and laws of the church. Thus, it has been held that
expulsion of a member without notice or an opportunity to be heard is not conclusive upon the civil courts when a
property right is involved." (45 Am. Jur., p. 77.).
The claim that the ouster in question was legal and valid because petitioner, as Supreme Bishop, could act alone
pursuant to the constitution of the church wherein it is provided that the Supreme Bishop is the supreme head of the
Iglesia Filipina Independiente and as such shall have full powers to impose the penalties of dismissal, confinement in
the seminary, suspension, fine, transfer, etc. which, without contravening the penal laws of the constituted
government, can be imposed upon the bishops, and that said power can be exercised even without the intervention of
the Supreme Council, cannot be entertained in the light of the very provisions of the constitution of the church, it
appearing that the alleged power of the Supreme Bishop under the constitution is not all-embracing but limited and, in
any event, the final action shall be taken by the Supreme Council. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the constitution of
the church are quoted hereunder for ready reference:.
Tendra omnimodas facultades para imponer las penas deseparacion, reclusion en el Seminario, suspension,
multa, translado y otras, que, sin contravenir las leyes penales del Gobierno civil establecido, se puedan
imponer a los Apostoles * * *.
Sin embargo el Obispo Maximo no podra castigar a nadie, sinoir al acusado y sin darle medios para justificarse,
y aun asi, tendra que oir la opinion del Juez de la Curia de Apelaciones, y en caso gravisimo, al Consejo
Supremo de Obispos (Sec. VI, Cap.III, Parte II, p. 39., Reglas Constitucionales, Exhibit K).
Los Obispos, en caso de delinquir, seran juzgados por el ConsejoSupremo, bajo la sancion del Obispo Maximo
(Sec. VII, id., p. 40).
Los que se crean condenados injustamente podran apelar a la Curia de Apelaciones, la cual fallara
inapelabelemente.
La Curia de Apelaciones dirimira las competencias y conocera en primera instancia de las condenas que
dictare el Obispo Maximo, pudiendose apelar al Consejo Supremo de Obispos, en los casos enque se impongan
exageradas penas. (Sec. VIII, Ibid., p. 40).
It can be plainly seen from a cursory reading of the foregoing provisions that the Supreme Bishop cannot punish an
erring member without first giving him an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself, and, in any event, without
first securing the opinion of the Judge of the Curia de Apelaciones, and in serious cases, the case needs to be referred
to the Supreme Council of Bishops. With regard to a case where a bishop is involved, the action shall be submitted to
the Supreme Bishop for approval. And in case of guilt, the accused may appeal to the Curia de Apelaciones, whose
decision shall be final. Such is the procedure laid down by the constitution of the church when disciplinary action needs
to be taken against a delinquent member. It is not, therefore, correct to say that the Supreme Bishop can take action
alone in connection with an erring bishop, even in disregard of the Supreme Council, in view of the over-all powers he
claims to possess under the circumstances.
That the procedure above outlined is correct and apparently is in line with the practice consistently followed by the
Iglesia Filipina Independiente against its erring officials, finds reaffirmation in the alleged ouster of Bishops De los
Reyes, Jr. Bayaca, Quijano, and Tablante wherein it appears that, in effecting said ouster, the group headed by
petitioner followed a procedure which apparently is in accordance with the above quoted provisions of the constitution
and which, as found by the Court of Appeals is as follows: "Formal charges were filed with the Supreme Council. This
body convened on January 29, 1946, for the purpose of considering said charges. A President of the Supreme Council
was elected. A bishop was appointed as judge of the Curia de Apelaciones. The charges were referred to the President
of the Curia de Apelaciones for action, who reported that the same being so serious should be taken cognizance of by
the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council resolved to notify the respondents of the charges requiring them to answer
within 24 hours should they wish to plead any defense. Two bishops were commissioned to serve notices upon the
respondents. Since propositions of an amicable settlement failed, the Supreme Council constituted itself into a tribunal
to hear the charges. A hearing was held at which the respondents failed to appear or to present any defense. At said
hearing the Supreme Council received evidence and, after hearing the opinion of the judge of the Curia de
Apelaciones, approved and promulgated a decision ordering the ouster of the respondents.".
Since, according to the Court of Appeals, no procedure similar to the one followed by the faction of petitioner in
connection with the case of Bishop De los Reyes, Bayaca and others, was ever adopted as far as Bishops Aguilar and
Remollino are concerned, or no formal charges were filed against the latter, nor an investigation or hearing ever held,
it follows that the ouster of said two bishops was null and void, it being in violation of the constitution of the church.

Let us now take up the alleged ouster of Bishops De los Reyes, Bayaca, Quijano and Tablante which, according to
petitioner, has been validly decreed by him as Supreme Bishop, and, as usual, let us refer to the facts as found by the
Court of Appeals:.
After having been noticed of his removal as Supreme Bishop of the IFI and required to turn over all the funds,
documents and other properties of the Church he had in his possession to his successor by letter, Exhibit I,
dated January 23, 1946, the appellant organized a group of rebels of the church which, on January 29,1946,
formed a Supreme Council composed of appellant himself, Bishop Jamias (J.) Jamias (M.), Gaerlan and Ruiz and
the bishops he illegally consecrated, namely, Evangelista, Elegado, Bergonia, Pasetes and Mondala. Said
Supreme Council met in Pasay; elected Juan Jamias as President of the Supreme Council, who, in turn,
appointed Gaerlan and Ruiz, as Juez de la Curia de Apelaciones and Secretary General, respectively; and took
cognizance of the charges of Rev. Flaviano Lorenzo against Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., Gerardo Bayaca,
Juan Kijano and Pablo Tablante for alleged high treason to the IFI (Exh. 31). On January 30, 1946 the same
Supreme Council met, constituted itself as a tribunal and rendered decision decreeing the separation of the
above mentioned Bishops Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. et al., from the IFI.
It should be noted that the action against the abovementioned bishops was taken after petitioner had been notified of
his removal as Supreme Bishop of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente and required to turn over all the funds, documents,
and properties of the Church to his successor by the Supreme Council of Bishops which decreed his forced resignation
on January 21, 1946. If petitioner has ceased to be the Supreme Bishop when he took that action against the four
bishops, then it would seem that he had no further authority to convoke a Supreme Council of Bishops or a meeting of
the Asemblea Magna to sit in judgment of them in accordance with the constitution of the church and, therefore,
whatever action his group might have taken leading to their ouster would necessarily be void and without effect. While
apparently the ouster of said bishops was made in accordance with the procedure laid down by the constitution of the
church wherein the four bishops were given an opportunity to be heard and defend themselves, the validity of the
action taken will necessarily have to be premised on the legality of the forced resignation decreed against petitioner
which is also one of the issues raised by petitioner in this appeal. This will be taken up in the latter part of this
decision. In the meantime, suffice it to state that the Court of Appeals has found the ouster of Bishop De los Reyes and
his companions to be without justification in view of the conclusion it has reached that petitioner has been validly
removed as Supreme Bishop since January 22, 1946 and the Supreme Council of Bishops he had convened was illegal
it being composed merely of himself and the bishops he had consecrated without the sanction of the legitimate
members of the Supreme Council of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente. If this premise is correct, as will be discussed
elsewhere in this decision, then the ouster of Bishop De los Reyes and his companions is unjustified and illegal.
II.
In this second assignment of error, petitioner claims that it was a mistake for the Court of Appeals to consider Irineo C.
de Vega as bishop and as member of the Supreme Council, the Asemblea Magna, and the Asemblea General of the
church and this claim is predicated upon the fact that Bishop Vega has already severed his connection with the church
by voluntary resignation because of his desire to engage in the practice of law.
We are afraid that this assignment of error raises a question of fact which was already resolved by the Court of Appeals
against the petitioner. The only purpose of this assignment is to show that petitioner was not properly ousted as
Supreme Bishop and that Monsignors Bayaca and De los Reyes were not duly elected as Supreme Bishops because
Bishop Vega had no right to participate in the proceeding affecting them, but in justifying his stand, petitioner brings
into play his own assumption of facts which have already been rejected by the Court of Appeals. Thus, in discussing
the evidence submitted by both parties relative to the alleged resignation of Vega as bishop of the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:.
Testifying, appellant averred that it was the Secretary General Mons. De los Reyes, Jr., who informed him that
Vega did not want to continue as Bishop of the IFI and that he preferred to engage in the practice of law (p.
188, tsn, First Trial), but Mons. De los Reyes, Jr., testified that Bishop Vega did not actually resign but only
asked for a vacation which the Supreme Council granted, the reason for such vacation being that his parish
church in Paco had been burned during the war. And Bishop Vega himself testified that he never resigned as
Bishop and that, in spite of the letter Exhibit 45 cancelling his permit to solemnize marriages, he continued to
exercise the other powers and privileges of his position; and that the appellant wrote a letter to the National
Library for the cancellation of Vega's permit to solemnize marriages because of the differences between the
two or the grudge of appellant since the election in 1940 when the former was the campaign manager of
Bishop Castro who ran against the appellant for the position of Supreme Bishop.
On the other hand, it appears that at the meeting on September 2, 1945 Vega was assigned or appointed by
the Consejo Supremo to the diocese of Tayabas, Marinduque, Batangas and Mindoro (Exhibit M) and on
October 18, 1945 the minutes of said meeting were duly approved by the Supreme Council (Exhibit AA) and
appellant, although present in both meetings, never protested to such appointment of Bishop Vega.

We hold, therefore, that the alleged resignation of Vega or the voluntary relinquishment of his position as
Bishop, has not been established by clear and convincing evidence, and Error No. III assigned was not
committed by the trial court.".
Note that, after discussing the evidence in the manner above stated, the Court of Appeals held "that the alleged
resignation of Vega or the voluntary relinquishment of his position as Bishop, has not been established by clear and
convincing evidence", and this finding we cannot now disturb.
III
The third assignment of error refers to the finding of the Court of Appeals that Monsignors Apostol, Evangelista,
Mondala, Pasetas, Bergonia, Ramos and Elegado have not been validly consecrated as bishops and therefore cannot
be considered members of the Supreme Council, Asemblea Magna, and Asemblea General of the church.
In this connection, the Court of Appeals found that the aforementioned seven individuals were consecrated by
petitioner without the approval of the Supreme Council and in violation of the constitution of the church for, according
to said court, "In fact one of the charges filed against the (petitioner) which culminated in his forced resignation was
the latter's having consecrated said bishops not only without the consent or approval of the Consejo Supremo but also
over its express objection as in the case of P. Evangelista." And, in assailing this finding, petitioner merely makes the
comment that the appointments of these bishops is an ecclesiastical matter which cannot be revised by the civil
courts. We have already stated that while the civil courts will ordinarily leave ecclesiastical matters to church
authorities, they may however intervene when it is shown, as in this case, that they have acted outside the scope of
their authority or in a manner contrary to their organic law and rules (45 Am. Jur., 751,754). This assignment,
therefore, is without merit.
IV and V.
The fourth and fifth assignments of error read:.
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that the so called Supreme Council and Asemblea General that
met on January 21 and 22, 1946, respectively, upon the call of Aguilar, were illegally constituted, and that,
therefore, their actuations were null and void, more particularly, the ouster of the petitioner as Obispo Maximo
decreed by them.
V. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Asemblea General and the Asemblea Magna referred to and
defined in the Church's constitution is one and the same body.
The fourth assignment of error is important because it calls for a determination of the validity of the ouster of
petitioner as Supreme Bishop of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente. It involves an inquiry into the propriety of the
meeting held by the Supreme Council of Bishops and Asemblea General on January 21, and January 22,1946,
respectively, upon the call of Bishop Aguilar. For the determination of the pertinent issues, it is necessary to make a
review of the facts leading to the forced resignation of petitioner as Supreme Bishop as found by the Court of Appeals.
It appears that on December 1, 1945, Bishop Aguilar filed charges against petitioner as Supreme Bishop which he
outlined in detail in a letter he addressed to him on said date and which appears copied verbatim in the decision of the
Court of Appeals (Exhibit B). On December 4, 1945, Bishop Aguilar issued a call for meeting of the Asemblea General
to be held on January 22, 1946 (Exhibit D), and on January 2, 1946, he issued another call for a meeting of the
Supreme Council to be held on January 21, 1946 for the purpose of hearing and considering the charges contained in
the aforesaid letter. Petitioner answered the charges, through a counsel, in a written statement dated January 18, 1946
(Exhibit N) wherein he challenged the authority of Bishop Aguilar to summon the council of bishops for the purpose of
hearing the charges and the authority of Bishop Remollino to attend the same on the ground that the two bishops had
already been expelled by him from the church. The Supreme Council of Bishops convened on January 21, 1946 as
scheduled and proceeded to deliberate on the charges against petitioner, and after finding them proven and
substantiated, it approved a decree ordering the forced resignation of petitioner as Supreme Bishop of the church. The
decree was submitted to the Asemblea Magna or Asemblea General which convened on January 22, 1946. Petitioner
did not attend this meeting but sent a printed answer to the charges (Exhibit O). The assembly, after deliberating on
the merits of the decree as well as the reasons and explanations advanced in petitioner's answer, unanimously
approved said decree and immediately thereafter elected Bishop Gerardo Bayaca as Supreme Bishop in place of
petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the meeting of the Supreme Council held on January 21, 1946 was illegal because (1) it was
called by Bishop Aguilar, an unauthorized person, who already ceased to be a bishop and president of the Supreme
Council by reason of his previous ouster, and (2) the bishops who were present did not constitute a quorum. Likewise,
petitioner assails the legality of the meeting of the Asemblea General or Asemblea Magna held on January 22, 1946 for

the reasons that (1) it was called by Bishop Aguilar alone and not by the Supreme Council as provided for in the
constitution, and (2) the persons who attended said meeting did not constitute a quorum. Petitioner further contends
that the Asemblea General and the Asemblea Magna are two different bodies, their differences being, to wit: the
Asemblea General is called by the Supreme Council while the Asemblea Magna is called by the Obispo Maximo; the
Asemblea Magna is composed of all bishops, one priest from each diocese elected by the parish priests of the same,
and one layman from each diocese elected by the presidents of the parochial committee, while the Asemblea General
is composed of all bishops, parish priests, and presidents of the parochial committees; and that the sole function of the
Asemblea General is to try to the Supreme Bishop, while the Asemblea Magna is called upon to elect the Supreme
Bishop and to amend the constitution of the church.
The claim that Bishop Aguilar had no authority to convene the Supreme Council by reason of his previous ouster
cannot now be sustained in view of our finding that said ouster was made in violation of the constitution of the church.
The same thing may be said with regard to the claim that Bishop Vega had no right to participate in the meeting
because of his voluntary separation from the church. It is only important to note in this connection that in the session
of the Supreme Council held on September 2,1945, (Exhibit M), Bishop Aguilar was elected president of said council
and his designation has not been disputed by petitioner. It was in this capacity that he issued the call for a meeting of
the Asemblea General on January 22, 1946 and the call for a meeting of the Supreme Council on January 21, 1946.
As regards the existence of a quorum in the meeting held by the Supreme Council of January 21, 1946, the following is
the finding of the Court of Appeals: "After examining the whole record, we believe, and so hold, that on January 21 and
22, 1946 there were only thirteen legitimate bishops of the IFI, namely: Fonacier, Jamias (J.), Jamias (M.), Gaerlan, Ruiz,
De los Reyes, Jr. Bayaca, Kijano, Tablante, Felipe, Aguilar, Remollino and Vega. Buyser is not included because he was
ill and never heard of. Seven out of these 13 attended the meeting of the Consejo Supremo held on January 21, 1946,
namely: De los Reyes, Jr., Bayaca, Kijano, Tablante, Aguilar, Remollino and Vega. It is, therefore, beyond question that
there was a quorum present in that session." This finding we cannot now disturb.
On the question whether or not the Asemblea General and the Asemblea Magna are one and the same body, the Court
of Appeals, after examining all the provisions of the constitution of the church (Exhibits K and L), found that the finding
of the trial court in the affirmative sense was correct making its own the reasons advanced by the said trial court in
support of said conclusion. This is now assailed by petitioner as erroneous because it ignored the amendment
introduced in the original provision of the constitution as regards the composition of the Asemblea Magna.
While apparently the trial court overlooked the amendment pointed out by the petitioner regarding the composition of
the Asemblea Magna, we do not however consider material the nature of the change made as to effect the substance
of the finding of the trial court it appearing that the change is merely nominal and does not make any reference to the
composition of the Asemblea General. The ambiguity in the composition of the latter body is still there for it nowhere
appears in the constitution any definition or explanation as regards its composition in the same manner as it does with
regard to the Asemblea Magna. It is perhaps for this reason that the authorities of the church have involved
themselves in a confusion as to the real body that should be called upon to act on the different problems of the church
which accounts for their differences of opinion as to whether said two bodies are really one and the same. As the
situation now stands, we do not feel justified in nullifying the actuation of the assembly called by Bishop Aguilar in his
capacity as President of the Supreme Council of Bishops simply because it was called Asemblea Magna and not
Asemblea General as now pretended by petitioner.
The legality of the meeting of the Asemblea Magna held on January 22, 1946 is also assailed because it was called by
Bishop Aguilar alone and not by the Supreme Council of Bishops as a body as provided for in the constitution. While
there is some merit in this contention, it cannot, however, have the effect of nullifying the actuation of said body for
this reason alone considering the other factors that had intervened, namely: that the meeting was called by Bishop
Aguilar in his capacity as President of the Supreme Council; that this body actually met in pursuance of that call and
took action on the charges referred to it by Bishop Aguilar, and that the action taken by the council was submitted to
the Asemblea General which the council well knew was to convene on January 22, 1946. All these acts of the council
have the effect of ratifying the call made by Bishop Aguilar.
Petitioner also argues that there was no quorum in the meeting of the Asemblea General held on January 22,1946
because of the thirty-one (31) person present thereat, only nineteen (19) were qualified to attend it because the other
twelve (12) were neither bishops nor parish priests, nor presidents of local committees. This issue was also resolved by
the Court of Appeals in the affirmative sense. The finding of the court on this matter is as follows:.
Pursuant to the Reglas Constitucionales the Asemblea Magna is composed of all the bishops, and one parish
priest delegate and one layman delegate from each diocese. Accordingly, the total numbers of the members
allowed to attend the Asemblea Magna is equal to the number of the dioceses multiplied by three. To find out
how many delegates should be present in the session of the Asemblea Magna on January 22, 1946, the
number of dioceses into which the IFI was then divided should be ascertained. According to the minutes of the
meeting of September 2, 1945 Exhibit M) there were sixteen dioceses, two of which were vacant. In the
minutes (Exhibit 12) of the meeting of the Asemblea Magna, formed by the faction of the appellant, on
September 1, 1946 only fifteen dioceses were listed. The total number of members or delegates allowed to

attend the Asemblea Magna on January 22, 1946, was, therefore, (48.) Only twenty-five of them were needed
to constitute a quorum. Since there were thirty-one members or delegates present in that meeting, it is
beyond question that a quorum was present.".
As a corollary to the above findings, the Court of Appeals held that the Supreme Council and the Asemblea Magna that
met on January 21, and January 22, 1946 respectively, were legally constituted and that the forced resignation and
ouster of petitioner taken therein and the designation of Bishop Bayaca as Supreme Bishop, conducted on January 22,
1946, are valid. These findings, which involve questions of fact, cannot now be looked into, and, therefore, should be
affirmed.
VI and VII.
The next error assigned by petitioner refers to the legality of the election of Bishop De los Reyes, Jr., as Supreme
Bishop of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente.
It appears that on September 1, 1946, upon the call made by Mons. Bayaca as incumbent Supreme Bishop, the
Asemblea Magna held a meeting and elected Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as his successor. This election is now
assailed on the ground that Mons. Bayaca had no authority to issue the call as he was not legally elected Supreme
Bishop and had been ousted as member of the church by the Fonacier faction, and because there was no quorum
present in that meeting.
With regard to the first ground, we have already seen that the election of Mons. Bayaca was found to be valid and his
ouster by the Fonacier faction null and void so that it cannot be said that he acted outside the scope of his authority in
calling the meeting in question. And with regard to the question of quorum, the Court of Appeals found that there was,
and this finding cannot now be looked into.
Petitioner next takes up the legality of the election of Bishop Jamias as Supreme Bishop of the church contending that
the Court of Appeals committed an error in declaring said election invalid and without effect.
On this point, the evidence shows that petitioner Fonacier, calling himself as Supreme Bishop of the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente, issued a call to all those bishops and rebels belonging to his faction for a meeting to be held by the
Asemblea Magna on September 1, 1946 for the election of his successor, and it was in that meeting where Bishop
Jamias was elected to take his place as Supreme Bishop; but such election was found by the Court of Appeals to be
illegal because, "It has been conducted not by a quorum of qualified and legitimate members of the IFI but by rebels
thereof who were not authorized to organize the so-called Asemblea Magna", and so it concluded that Mons. Juan
Jamias was not legally elected as Supreme Bishop of said church. This finding also involves a question of fact which we
cannot now look into.
IX, X, XI, and XII.
Finally petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred:.
IX. In holding that the abandonment of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of
faith or abjuration alleged by petitioner are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts.
X. In holding that the new declaration of faith and the abandonment of the constitution of the church were
legally and validly adopted by the duly constituted Consejo Supremo and Asemblea Magna composed of
legitimate members of the IFI headed by responded Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., and duly empowered by the
reglas constitucionales (Exhibits K, and L,) to take such actions.
XI. In holding that the consecration of Reyes, Bayaca, and Aguilar as bishops by the American Protestant
Episcopal Church was merely for the purpose of conferring upon them apostolic succession and there is no
factual basis for their alleged abjuration or separation from the IFI.
XII. In not holding that the respondent Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., and Gerardo M. Bayaca, having abandoned the
faith, fundamental doctrines and practices, as well as the constitution of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, and
having adhered to those of others, have automatically ceased to belong to said church, and consequently,
have no personality to maintain the present action." (9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th assignments of error.).
The issues raised in the foregoing assignments of error were squarely met by the Court of Appeals whose decision on
the matter, because of its lucidity and the interesting discussion made therein concerning the importance of the
alleged abandonment of the Constitution, restatement of articles of religion, and abandonment of faith or abjuration on

the part of Bishop De los Reyes, Bayaca and Aguilar in relation to the tenets of the original constitution of the church
and the conclusions it has drawn in line with the authorities cited in support thereof, we can do no better than to
quote in toto hereunder:.
Sometime in April 1947, Bishops De los Reyes, Jr., Gerardo Bayaca and Manuel Aguilar, upon their petition,
were consecrated as bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States. On August 5, 1947, the
Obispo Maximo, the Supreme Council, the Asemblea Magna of appellee's faction amended the constitution of
the IFI (Exhibit 55) and restated its articles of religion (Exhibit 54).
On January 10, 1948, the appellant amended his answer by further alleging that: "in or about the month of
August, 1947, plaintiff Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as alleged Obispo Maximo of the plaintiff's Iglesia Filipina
Independiente, formally joined the Protestant Episcopal Church of America, a duly existing religious
corporation, and therefore, has ceased to be a member of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, and has no legal
capacity to sue, allegedly as Obispo Maximo of the last mentioned church.".
On this point the court below took the view that the alleged doctrinal changes, abandonment of faith and acts
of abjuration complained of are purely ecclesiastical matters and that since Bishop De los Reyes, Jr. allowed
himself to be consecrated bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church under the conviction that he was so
authorized by the Supreme Council of the IFI and with the condition that he would not be bound by any
obligation to the Episcopal Church, his consecration will not affect his affiliation as member of the IFI unless
the latter takes action against him and expels him, if found guilty.
Appellant now claims that the trial court committed the first error assigned because it should have held that
appellees De los Reyes, Jr. and Bayaca, having abandoned the faith, fundamental doctrines and practices, as
well as the Constitution of the IFI, and having adhered to those of others, have automatically ceased to belong
to said church, and consequently, have no personality to maintain the present action.
The arguments of appellant may be summarized as follows:.
(1) that the civil courts have jurisdiction to revise decisions on ecclesiastical matters where it is necessary to
do so for the purpose of settling question of civil and property rights or when property rights are affected; (2)
that the amendment of the constitution of the IFI approved in August, 1947, were illegal and ineffective,
inasmuch as they were not approved by the duly constituted authorities of the church; (3) that said
amendments introduced radical and substantial changes in the profession of faith and fundamental doctrines
and practices of the church; and (4) that in view of said amendments and subsequent consecration of
plaintiffs-appellees as bishops by the Protestant Church of the United States they have lost their rights to claim
any participation in the properties and to use the name of the IFI.
The position of appellant is that appellees having taken part in adopting and sanctioning amendments to the
church's constitution which radically and substantially changed the profession of faith and fundamental
doctrines and practices of the church, his faction cannot now be compelled to deliver to the appellees
whatever property of the church are in its hands particularly because said faction continues to be loyal and
faithful to the original doctrines and practices of said church. In support of this stand appellant cites several
authorities (Watson vs. Jones, 20 L-ed. 666; 45 Am. Jur., 764, 765; Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ, L.D.S.
vs. Church of Christ, 60 Fed. 937; Paraaque Methodist Episcopal Church, et al. vs. Methodist Episcopal Church,
et al., 38 O.G. 534, C.J. 71) Holding that in case of schism within a church its properties should remain with the
faction that continues adhering to the original doctrines and practices of the church irrespective of whether it
constitutes a majority or a minority of the members thereof. .
It is to be recalled that the forced resignation of appellant as Obispo Maximo of the IFI was ordered on January
22, 1946 and on the same day, appellee, Mons. Gerardo Bayaca was elected as Obispo Maximo to replace him.
On January 23, 1946, appellant was notified of his removal and required to surrender and deliver all personal
properties of the church still in his possession or under his control. Instead of doing so, he with a few members
of the Consejo Supremo, with the help of some members of the laity, because of dissatisfaction with the action
of the majority in removing the appellant as Supreme Bishop, erected themselves into a new organization
formed a rump Consejo Supremo and a rump Asemblea Magna and claiming to speak for the church, decreed
the ouster of Mons. Bayaca, De los Reyes, Jr., Kijano and Tablante on January 30, 1946. On February 9, 1946
this action was commenced by Mons. Bayaca and the IFI seeking to compel appellant to render an accounting
of his management of the properties of the church and deliver the same to the plaintiffs. The alleged doctrinal
changes took place in August, 1947. It is thus clear that the present action sprang out a mere division not a
schism in the church. Schism is a "division or separation in a church or denomination of Christians, occasioned
by diversity of opinions, breach of unity among people of the same religious faith (45 Am. Jur., 775), a division
occasioned by diversity of opinion on religious subjects (38 Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed. 303), while division
means "no more than a separation of the society into two parts, without any change of faith or ulterior

relations" (45 Am. Jur., p. 775). Such being the case, the doctrinal changes and abandonment of faith are
irrelevant and immaterial in the case at bar and the invoked rule of doctrinal adherence does not apply.
But assuming that there was a real schism in the IFI, the situation, under the facts of record, would not help
appellant's contention because pursuant to the ruling in the case of Watson vs. Jones, 20 Law Ed., pp. 674-676,
cited by both parties, the use of properties of a "religious congregation" in case of schism, "is controlled by the
numerical majority of the members, such ruling admitting of no inquiry into the existing religious opinions of
those who comprise the legal and regular organization.".
The law is stated in that case as follows:.
The question which have come before the civil courts concerning the rights to property held by
ecclesiastical bodies, may as far as we have been able to examine them, be profitably classified under
three general heads, which of course do not include cases governed by considerations applicable to a
church established and supported by law as the religion of the state.
1. That first of these is when the property which is the subject of controversy has been, by the deed of
will of the donor, or other instrument by which the property is held, by the express terms of the
instrument devoted to the teaching, support or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or
belief.
2. The second is when the property is held by a religious congregation which, by the nature of its
organization, is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church
government is concerned owns no fealty or obligation to any higher authority.
3. The third is where the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body holding the property is but a
subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical
tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or less complete in some supreme
judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization.
The second class of cases which we have described has reference to the case of a church of a strictly
congregational or independent organization, governed solely within itself, either by a majority of its
members or by such other local organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical
government; and to property held by such a church, either by way of purchase or donation, with no
other specific trust attached to it in the hands of the church than that it is for the use of that
congregation as a religious society.
In such cases, where there is a schism which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies,
the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be determined by ordinary principles which
govern voluntary associations. If the principle of government in such cases is that the majority rules,
then the numerical majority of members must control the right to the use of the property. If there be
within the congregation officers in whom are vested the powers of such control, then those who adhere
in the acknowledged organism by which the body is governed are entitled to the use of the property.
The minority in choosing to separate themselves into a distinct body, and refusing to recognize the
authority of the government body, can claim no rights in the property from the fact that they had once
been members of the church or congregation. This ruling admits of no inquiry into the existing religious
opinions of those who comprise the legal or regular organization; for, if such was permitted, a very
small minority, without any officers of the church among them, might be found to be the only faithful
supporters of the religious dogmas of the founders of the church. There being no such trust imposed
upon the property when purchased or given, the court will not imply one for the purpose of expelling
from its use those who by regular succession and order constitute the church, because they may have
changed in some respect their views of religious truth.
Of the cases in which this doctrine is applied no better representative can be found than that of Shannon vs.
Nelson, 18 Vt. 511, which asserts this doctrine in case where a legacy was left to the Associate congregation of
Ryegate, the interest whereof was to be annually paid to their minister forever. In that case, though the
Ryegate congregation was one of a number of Presbyterian churches connected with the general Presbyterian
body at large, the court held that the only inquiry was whether they have a minister chosen and appointed by
the majority and regularly ordained over the society, agreeably to the usage of that denomination. And though
we may be of opinion that the doctrine of that case needs modification, so far as it discussed the relation of
the Ryegate congregation to the other judicatures of the body to which it belongs, it certainly lays down the
principle correctly if that congregation was to be treated as an independent one." (Watson vs. Jones, 20 Law
Ed., pp. 674-676).

It goes without saying that the properties of the IFI are held by a religious congregation; that said church
comes under the second class described in the above-quoted decision; and that the numerical majority is on
the side of the faction of the appellees, because 7 out of the 13 bishops of the church went to them and
according to the statement of the Director of National Library, issued on May 22, 1947, appellee's faction was
composed of 19 bishops and 252 priests whereas appellant's faction had only 10 bishops and 40 priests, and
on January 22, 1948 its bishops and priests were 293 as against 64 of appellant's group (Exhibit 25).
The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration
alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and
rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those who allegedly unworthy
of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts (45
Am. Jur. 748-752,755).
It appears that the main complaint of the appellant is that the appellees upon adopting their new declaration
of faith and the amendments of the constitution of the church, as appears in Exhibits 54 and 55, they have
repudiated the Oficio Divino which is the definite statement of the doctrines and rites of the IFI and the official
book of the church. But appellant admits that said Oficio Divino "does not pretend to close the way for any
change which the progress of religious science may in the course of time show to be true and acceptable."
(Appellant's Memorandum, pp. 28-29). Indeed, the Oficio Divino itself says that it was an `ensayo' and that its
purpose was merely to give definite forms to the then accepted doctrines of the church without however
closing the doors to, or making impossible any future changes that the progress of religious science might
demand. Thus the note on page 221 of the Oficio Divino (Exhibit 57) reads as follows:.
Con la publicacion del presente libro, damos formas definitivasa nuestras doctrinas, pero sin cerrar
jamas el camino del progreso de la ciencia religiosa como si pretendieramos pasar por dogmas el
resultado de nuestras investigaciones.
It cannot be gainsaid that since the establishment of the IFI in 1902 there have been some changes and
revisions of some of its tenets and articles of faith. This is quite understandable in a church like the Aglipayan
Church which is not an ancient one and has not had the opportunity to make any of its doctrines and tenets
clear and dogmatic. And it is but natural and fitting that new doctrines in religious matters be subjected to
investigation and revision or even rejection in harmony with the advancement of religious science.
Appellants contends however, that any such changes should be adopted by the church (Memorandum supra).
Without resolving whether the amendments in question (Exhibits 54 and 55) constitute repudiation of faith or
involve wide departure from the fundamental and characteristic beliefs or policy of the IFI, we believe, and so
hold, that the same were legally and validly adopted by the duly constituted Consejo Supremo and Asemblea
Magna composed of legitimate members of the IFI, headed by Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. and duly
empowered by the Reglas Constitucionales, as amended (Exhibits K and L), to take such action. Appellant's
insistence that Bishops Aguilar, Remollino, De los Reyes, Jr., Bayaca, Kijano and Tablante who took part in the
adoption of said amendments having been ousted by appellant's faction were not authorized to act for the IFI,
is untenable. We have already discussed and held somewhere in this opinion that the alleged ouster of the
aforementioned bishops was null and void and the election of Bishop De los Reyes, Jr., as Obispo Maximo was
valid and we did recognize him as the sole and legitimate head of the IFI.
Anent the consecrations of Mons. De los Reyes, Jr., Bayaca, and Aguilar as bishops of the American Protestant
Episcopal Church, we find that the preponderating weight of evidence reveals, as questions of fact, that the
purpose of said consecrations was merely the conferring of apostolic succession upon said bishops; that the
American Episcopal Church did not acquire any authority, ecclesiastical or otherwise over the IFI or over the
bishops thus consecrated; and that the latter were not required to take oath nor were they accepted as
bishops of the aforesaid episcopal church by virtue of their consecrations, according to the uncontradicted
testimony of Bishop Norman Spencer Binstead, of the American Episcopal Church, who consecrated them and
of Bishops Bayaca, Aguilar and De los Reyes themselves. Hence, there is no factual basis for the alleged
abjuration or separation from the IFI of said bishops and, consequently, appellees Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. and
Gerardo M. Bayaca are still members of the IFI, and do not lack personality to maintain the present action.".
We can hardly add to the above findings to which we agree. We wish only to make the following observations. The
complaint in this case was filed on February 9, 1946 raising as the main issue whether petitioner should still be
regarded as legitimate Supreme Bishop of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente or whether he has been properly replaced
by Bishop Gerardo Bayaca. This has been recognized by petitioner himself who, in the brief he submitted to the Court
of Appeals, maintained that the only issue was, "Who is the true and legitimate Obispo Maximo of the IFI?" The alleged
abjuration of respondent De los Reyes and Bishops Bayaca and Aguilar and the alleged restatement of articles of
religion and doctrinal differences between the new and original constitutions of the church were never alleged directly
or indirectly in the pleadings of the parties. These questions were raised for the first time on January 10, 1948 when
petitioner filed a supplementary answer alleging that on August, 1947, the respondent "formally joined the Protestant
Episcopal Church of America." The alleged doctrinal changes and abjuration took place therefore after this case was

filed in court, and after the division of the church into two groups had occurred and consequently, they could not have
been the cause of the division. Under these circumstances, it would seem clear that the allegation regarding the
alleged changes in doctrinal matters or in matters of faith incorporated in the constitutions of the church are entirely
irrelevant in the present case. And, on this matter, this observation of the Court of Appeals comes in very fittingly:
"The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion, and abandonment of faith or abjuration
alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of
a church having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." (45 Am. Jur., 748-752, 755.)
To this we agree.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-10185

November 24, 1915

ANGEL GONZALEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JEREMIAS J. HARTY, Archbishop of Manila, and THOMAS L. HARTIGAN, administrator of the Sagrada
Mitra, defendants-appellants.
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellants.
A. Cruz Herrera for appellee.

TORRES, J.:
This appeal by bill exceptions was taken by counsel for the defendants from a judgment, rendered on June 12, 1914,
by the Court of First Instance of Manila, which held the plaintiff, Angel Gonzalez, entitled to collect the income from
certain property, situated in Calle Rosario, District of Binondo, this city, assigned by its owner, Petronila de Guzman, for
the maintenance of a collative chaplaincy founded by her; ordered the defendants, as agents of the foundress, to
reimburse and deliver to the plaintiff the sum of P19,090.28, and to pay the costs.
By a written complaint of November 15, 1912, presented in the Court of First Instance of this city, counsel for the
plaintiff alleged that Mgr. Harty is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Manila; that Thomas
L. Hartigan is the administrator of the funds of the Sagrada Mitra; that since June 20, 1901, the plaintiff has been the
owner of a chaplaincy founded in the Archdiocese of Manila by Doa Petronila de Guzman; that the capital of the said
chaplaincy is a rubble-work building located at Nos. 210, 212 and 214, Calle Rosario, Binondo; that the plaintiff, as the
chaplain, incumbent and beneficiary of the said chaplaincy, had the right, by virtue of a title in perpetuity, from June
20, 1901, to receive and to retain all the income and revenues of the said property; that the property mentioned had
been producing and yielding from the said date to the present time not less than P650 per month; that said sums had
been collected by the defendants who had refused to deliver to the plaintiff the property in question and its revenues
except a small portion of the latter, that is to say, the sum of P12,500; that the said chaplaincy had not been filed
was without any incumbent during the four years immediately preceding the 20th of June, 1901; that during said
period the Sagrada Mitra collected the revenues and income of the said property at the rate of P400 per month, with
the obligation of delivering them to the plaintiff; and that the defendants, in whose control and possession are the
revenues produced by the property during the four years immediately preceding the 20th of June, 1901, refused to
deliver same to the plaintiff and to render him a detailed account thereof. Therefore plaintiff's counsel prayed the court
to order the defendants (a) to deliver to the plaintiff the aforementioned property, together with its products, income
and revenues at the rate of P650 per month from the 20th of June, 1901, until the termination of this suit, after
deducting the amounts defendants may prove they delivered to the plaintiff on account or in partial payment of the
said income and revenue; (b) to render an account of the income and revenues produced by the said property during
the four years immediately preceding the 20th of June, 1901, and to promptly deliver them to the plaintiff, and (c) to
pay to the plaintiff the legal interest, and the costs.
A demurrer was filed to the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked personality to bring this suit; that the
facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action; and that the complaint is vague, ambiguous and
unintelligible. The demurrer was overruled and the defendants, after excepting to this ruling, on January 18, 1913,
answered the said complaint by a general and specific denial of each and all of the allegations therein contained, and,
as a special defense, alleged that, on September 16, 1910, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Manila substantially identical with the one herein, against the defendant corporation sole, by means of which all the
rights alleged by the plaintiff in this case were definitely compromised, adjusted and settled; that as a result thereof he
waived all his rights forever and resigned his office of chaplain; and that by the said compromise the case was close
and the complaint finally dismissed.
The plaintiff answered the special defense filed by the defendants by denying each and all of the facts alleged therein.

After a hearing of the case, during which the plaintiff desisted from his demand for the delivery of the property in
question, conflicting himself solely to a petition for payment of the revenues and for an accounting of the
administration of the property from the year 1901 to the date of the termination of this suit, the court rendered the
judgment aforementioned, to which the defendants excepted and, in writing, moved for a rehearing and a new trial.
This motion was overruled, with exception on the part of the defendants, and when the proper bill of exceptions had
been presented, it was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this court.
The question to be decided in this litigation consists of whether, after the plaintiff had received the sum of P12,500 and
executed, on November 15, 1910, the document Exhibit 3 (p. 41, record) in favor of the "Administracion de Obras Pias
de la Sagrada Mitra," he is still entitled to collect further sums of revenues of the chaplaincy which he had filled, and,
in the event that he has such a right, whether the administrator of the chaplaincy that belonged to the deceased
Petronila de Guzman is obliged to render to the plaintiff accounts of the said revenues.
The following facts are proved by the evidence: By virtue of the provisions contained in the will executed by Doa
Petronila de Guzman on March 13, 1816, a collative chaplaincy was founded in this Archdiocese of Manila. It entailed
certain obligations of a spiritual character and possessed a capital of 1,700 pesos, invested in a house of strong
materials, belonging to the foundress, designated as Nos. 210, 212 and 214, Calle Rosario, District of Binondo, Manila,
(Exhibit 4). There was also provided, in clause 11 of the said will, that the first executor of the estate of the testatrix
should act as administrator of the property subject to the chaplaincy during the minority of Esteban de Guzman, the
first chaplain appointed for the foundation. In due course of time the foundation of this chaplaincy was approved by
the ecclesiastical authorities who agreed to all the conditions contained in the foundation charter (p. 11, Exhibit 4).
The resignation of the then incumbent chaplain being on November 17, 1897, (Exhibit 5; p. 45, record) the spiritual
charge remained unfilled until the 21st of August, 1901, the date when the plaintiff, Angel Gonzalez de Guzman, a
descent of the foundress Petronila de Guzman, was appointed chaplain of the said foundation which was to be
"administered as up to the present time by the administrator of the funds of the Sagrada Mitra," with the proviso that if
the new appointee failed to perform the duties appertaining to his charge, the revenues which he might be entitled to
collect should be reduced or withheld in such proportion as might be necessary (Exhibit A and 5). The new chaplain,
Angel Gonzalez, undertook to pursue such studies as are indispensable to the ecclesiastical profession, for the better
performance of his spiritual duties, and, for this purpose, entered the San Carlos Seminary; but, after a stay therein of
fifteen days, he left the institution on September 21, 1909, without prior authorization of his superiors. On the
following day he informed the Archbishop of Manila of his departure, stating that, owing to his weak constitution, he
could not live on the food furnished him in the said seminary: and at the same time requesting that the administrator
of the chaplaincy be ordered to proceed with a general settlement of accounts; that they pay him "the accumulated
interest;" and that the question of the chaplaincy be submitted to the head ecclesiastical authority for such action in
the premises as the same might deem proper (Exhibit 2).
Granting the petition above referred to, the Archbishop ordered the administrators of the "Obras Pias de la Sagrada
Mitra" to effect a final settlement of the accounts of the chaplaincy with relation to the plaintiff and, when it had been
made, the said administrators delivered to Gonzalez, on November 15, 1910, the sum of P12,500 in full satisfaction for
the revenues of the benefice enjoyed by him (Exhibit 3); and, in accordance with the decree transcribed in the
document Exhibit C (p. 21, record) the Archbishop of Manila declared the chaplaincy founded by Petronila de Guzman,
of which the plaintiff was chaplain, to be unfilled on and after December 6, 1910.
The plaintiff's claim amounts to a prayer that the defendants be compelled to restore and deliver to him the net
revenue obtained from the property subject to the chaplaincy from the 20th of June, 1901, to the date of a rendition of
accounts, and to pay him the proceeds derived from the said property for the four years immediately preceding the
said 20th of June, 1901.
It is an indisputable fact that, from June, 1901, when the plaintiff was appointed to fill the chaplaincy founded by
Petronila de Guzman, until the month of December, 1906, he received at the end of each year the balances of the
accounts which the administrator of the "Obrias Pias" rendered him, and that such sums, according to the statement
furnished by plaintiff's counsel, taken from the account-book Exhibit B, amounted to P16,100.81, the net amount of the
revenues of the said property for six years. In the respective pages of this account-book, Exhibit B, appears the
plaintiff's signature together with a record of his having received the sums which constitute the balances of the annual
accounts to which they refer, and in each record, at the foot of the accounts and included in the writing immediately
preceding the signature, appear the words: "I have received the amount above specified;" or "the said amount;" or,
"the foregoing amount."
The said account-book of this chaplaincy, Exhibit B, contains entries only up to December 31, 1906, and no debit
accounts have been recorded therein from the 1st of January, 1907, to the present date. For this reason the
defendants had to admit at trial that from January 1, 1907, the property had been producing P550 in monthly rental,
according to the agreement found on page 125 of the record. Although no account was carried of the debits and
credits after the said date, the administrator of the Mitra, charged also with the administration of the property of this
chaplaincy, must have made a final settlement of all the sums due the plaintiff as chaplain of the said foundation up to
December 31, 1910, and that settlement must have obtained the consent and approval of the plaintiff chaplain, for on
November 15, of the same year, 1910, he received from the said administrator the sum of P12,500 in full satisfaction

of all the revenues due him, as derived from the property up to December 31 of that year, and his receipt of this sum
is evidenced by the document Exhibit 3 which literally transcribed runs thus:
I have received from the "Administracion de Obras Pias de la S. Mitra" the sum of twelve thousand five
hundred pesos (P12,500), as the liquidated balance of, and in full satisfaction for, all the revenues due me or
appertaining to the chaplaincy of Doa Petronila de Guzman, from the 18th of October, 1901, to the 31st of
December of the present year, 1910.
Manila, November 15, 1910.
Witnesses:
DANIEL BOQUER,
PHIL. C. WHITAKER.
(Sgd.) ANGEL GONZALEZ.
In spite of this receipt and of those which for six years were annually affixed at the end of the accounts of the years
from 1901 to 1906 in the book Exhibit B, the plaintiff now contends the said accounts should be revised in order that
he may recover the amounts due which he did not collect and which he should have collected, as he alleges, while he
held the chaplaincy in question.
When consent is given to a contract through error, the law declares that it shall be void, whenever the error affects the
substance of the thing that may be the subject matter of the contract, or those conditions thereof which were the
principal reason for execution; but when the error is merely one of account, it shall only give rise to its correction.
(Arts. 1265, 1266, Civ. Code.)
The plaintiff who went on receiving sums, as balances of accounts during the years from 1901 to 1906 inclusive, did
not prove, nor even try to prove, that, in signing the receipts in each of the said accounts, he did so under compulsion
or by reason of any violence or intimidation, or that the nature and amount of the sums debited against him in these
accounts were erroneous and prejudicial to his interests. On the contrary, he received the said amounts without any
protest or reservation, giving the impression that in so doing correct and detailed accounts were presented to him to
his entire satisfaction, for which reason he approved them.
The only case where the law allows the revision of approved accounts, without the reasons aforementioned for their
correction appearing, is where there has been simply as error of account, and no such error has been proven by the
plaintiff. Therefore, it is neither lawful nor just that, without proof of the existence of any of the reasons specified by
law, he may demand a rendition of accounts already approved by him, for, as the supreme court of Spain held in its
decision of February 7, 1895:
The consent of the parties interested to a settlement of accounts, when there is perfect agreement with
respect to the nature and amount of the items debited, necessarily implies their assent to the resultant
balance and a simple error in the sum cannot vitiate the contract.
The plaintiff did not prove, nor try to prove, that he did not give his assent to the debit items and the amounts thereof,
in the accounts of the book Exhibit B, when these accounts were presented to him. It necessarily follows then, that,
when he signed the receipt attesting his collection of the respective balances in the said accounts, he gave his
approval to them as rendered and, in the absence of proof that he acted under an erroneous belief in giving his
consent, it must be understood that the accounts rendered for the years 1901 to 1906, inclusive, were approved, and
it would be improper to revise and correct them.
Neither may a revision be demanded of the accounts for the years 1907 to 1910, inclusive, during which period no
entries were made in the account-book, Exhibit B, of the said chaplaincy, inasmuch as the plaintiff approved the
settlement, presented by the administrator, up to December 31, 1910, showing a balance in plaintiff's favor of P12,500
which he accepted "as the liquidated balance and in full satisfaction of all revenues that were due or might be due him
from the chaplaincy of Doa Petronila de Guzman, from the 18th of October, 1901, to the 31st of December" of the
year 1910, as set forth in Exhibit C, and did not then record his disagreement or protest with reference to the accounts
rendered disclosing the amount of the balance he admits having received.
A settlement presupposes a balancing of accounts after due examination of the items which compose them and,
although the truth is the record does not disclose that any document was drawn up containing a statement of such
accounts from the 1st of January, 1907, to December 31, 1910, it is no less true that when, in November, 1910, an
effort was made to determine the amount the plaintiff was entitled to collect, statements must have been made to him
relative to the revenues and expenses of the property, which statements undoubtedly satisfied him since he made no
objection to signing the receipt Exhibit C. With regard to presumptions concerning a person's business affairs and his
acts, the Code of Civil Procedure, in section 334, subsections 3 and 25, respectively, provides that a person intends the

ordinary consequence of his voluntary act, and that assent resulted from a belief that the thing assented to was
conformable to the law or fact. Has the plaintiff shown that his act in signing the receipt Exhibit C was performed
against his will, or that the settlement which he accepted is not correct, was not in accord with the facts? The record
does not so demonstrate.
Revision of accounts that have already been approved may be demanded only in the cases in which the law so permits
for justifiable reasons, and as was said in the decision of Pastor vs. Nicasio (6 Phil. Rep., 152), such revision will not be
permitted unless the plaintiff can show that there was fraud, deceit, error, or mistake in the approval of the accounts.
The plaintiff is now barred from assailing as false and incorrect the accounts approved by him for the years 1907 to
1910, inasmuch as he made no objection and took no exception to them before their acceptance and approval, nor has
he shown that he was deceived for the purpose of obtaining his approval thereof. Even if the accounts were erroneous,
they could not now be revised, since the plaintiff, by stating in his receipt that the sum received by him was the
liquidated balance of, and full satisfaction for, all the revenues that appertained or might appertain to him, has
explicitly and completely waived all right, he might have had to any amounts he may then have failed to collect.
With respect to the prayer for an accounting of the revenues of the property for the four years immediately preceding
the appellant's appointment as chaplain, that is, from November, 1897, to June 20, 1901, the record shows that entries
of the revenues and expenses of the property in question were made in the account-book of the said chaplaincy from
the back of page 34 to page 36; that on December 31, 1900, the said account was closed and disclosed a balance in
favor of the chaplaincy of P3,222.67 which was received by the plaintiff on October 18, 1901. For the same reasons
hereinbefore stated, it must be held that the accounts from 1897 to December 31, 1900, were approved, and another
accounting for the same period of time would not be lawful; still less would be the revision and correction of such
accounts, because no error has been disclosed therein. lawph!1.net
Our attention has been invited to the fact that the property affected by the chaplaincy should have been administered
by the chaplains and not by the administrators of the Sagrada Mitra, inasmuch as clause 11 of the foundress' will so
provided. To refute this assertion, it suffices to say that the provisions of the said will set forth that the first
testamentary executor of the estate of the testatrix should act as the administrator of the property during the minority
of the first chaplain appointed in that document, Esteban de Guzman. This provision must be understood to be
mandatory, except as otherwise provided by the canonical laws and as, pursuant therewith, the chief ecclesiastical
authority may order for, after the latter had accepted the foundation of the chaplaincy, the administration of its
property appertains to the authorities established by the Church, pursuant to the latter's own laws, and this rule has
been observed since 1863.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is reversed and we should, as we do hereby, absolve the
defendants from the complaint filed by Angel Gonzalez, without special finding as to the costs in both instances. So
ordered.

G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981

ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS
EDULLANTES, petitioners,
vs.
Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch
V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen
GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA
MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZAR, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:1wph1.t
This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding
the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. That
issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the
image.
On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia".

That resolution designated the members of nine committees who would take charge of the 1976 festivity. lt provided
for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's
projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations " (Exh A or 6).
On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with the practice
in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker
of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election
of his successor as chairman of the next feast day.
It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during
the celebration of the saint's feast day (Exh. B or 7).
Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite and were duly ratified by the barangay general assembly on
March 26, 1976. Two hundred seventy-two voters ratified the two resolutions (Exh. 2 and 5).
Funds were raised by means of solicitations0 and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the
neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San
Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred pesos (Exh. F-l, 3 and 4).
On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the
devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta.
A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return that image
to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its
acquisition.
Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmea
allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection with
the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmea in the city court of Ormoc City a
charge for grave oral defamation.
Father Osmea retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's office and the
Department of Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of
authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law.
Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmea did
not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's
Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a
replevin case against Father Osmea for the recovery of the image (Exh. C or 8). On June 14, 1976, the barangay
council passed Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case (Exh. D or 9).
The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmea and Bishop Cipriano Urgel (Exh. F).
After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmea turned over the image to
the council (p. 10, Rollo). ln his answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said
resolutions (Exh. F-1).
Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus
Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a
complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said resolutions (Civil Case No.
1680-0).
The lower court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the validity of the resolutions. The petitioners appealed under
Republic Act No. 5440. The petitioners contend that the barangay council was not duly constituted because lsidoro M.
Maago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not allowed to participate in its sessions.
Barangays used to be known as citizens assemblies (Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A). Presidential Decree No.
557, which took effect on September 21, 1974, 70 O.G. 8450-L, directed that all barrios should be known as barangays
and adopted the Revised Barrio Charter as the Barangay Charter.
Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are situated. They are quasi-municipal
corporations endowed with such powers" as are provided by law "for the performance of particular government
functions, to be exercised by and through their respective barrio governments in conformity with law" (Sec. 2, Revised
Barrio Charter, R.A. No. 3590).

The barrio assembly consists of all persons who are residents of the barrio for at least six months, eighteen years of
age or over and Filipino citizens duly registered in the list kept by the barrio secretary (Sec. 4, Ibid).
The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay captain and six councilmen (Sec. 7, Ibid).
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 684, which took effect on April 15, 1975, provides that "the barangay youth
chairman shall be an ex-officio member of the barangay council", having the same powers and functions as a
barangay councilman.
In this case, Maago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangay council to be held on
March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not able to attend those sessions because he was working with a construction
company based at Ipil, Ormoc City (Par. 2[d] Exh. 1).
Maago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the said resolutions void. There was a
quorum when the said resolutions were passed.
The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium (Sec. 8, Article IV
and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution).
That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any
religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or
clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is
entirely a secular matter.
Manifestly puerile and flimsy is Petitioners argument that the barangay council favored the Catholic religion by using
the funds raised by solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron saint's wooden image and making the
image available to the Catholic church.
The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact that counsel advanced that argument in
behalf of the petitioner, Father Osmea the parish priest.
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San
Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious
beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron
saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any
activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot
be branded as illegal.
As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in
rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion
that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed
in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with
prayers and novenas.
The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner Garces swore that the said
resolutions favored the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swore that the
resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image in the church only once a year or during the
fiesta (Exh. H and J).
We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion annd the use of public
money to favor any sect or church are not involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly. lt is not a
microcosmic test case on those issues.

This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never have arisen if the parties had been
more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmea had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from
his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.
There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmea claim that it
belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should
have custody thereof.
If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church. that action would not violate the
Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property.
The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the
use of public money or property.
In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which appropriated sixty thousand pesos for the
cost of plates and the printing of postage stamps with new designs. Under the law, the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Department Head and the President of the Philippines, issued in 1936 postage stamps to
commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic
Church.
The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines. The design of the stamps showed a
map of the Philippines and nothing about the Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended.
Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine Independent Church, sought to enjoin the sale of
those commemorative postage stamps.
It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an event of a religious character, was not
designed as a propaganda for the Catholic Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit was dismissed.
The instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49 Phil., 627 and 55 Phil. 307, where a religious
brotherhood, La Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the purpose of raising funds to meet the
expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the Most Holy Sacrament and the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held
accountable for the funds which it held as trustee. 0
Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the barangay resolutions, the lower court's
judgment dismissing their amended petition is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.