Repeal of Laws (Art.

7)
1. Kinds of Repeal
a. Express
b. Implied (not favored)
2. Effects
3. Sec. 444, Local Government Code

Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129

[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY,
respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific
acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between
Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27,
1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to
45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers
that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone
else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge
and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No.
94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy," which is still pending.

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act
of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated
from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit
issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.i[1] With
respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between
Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code
which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in
question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings
submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.ii[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have
not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and
respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by
themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the
wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a
joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn
to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.iii[3]
The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but
merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew
Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983;
that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left
the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been
heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is
already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient
proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with
the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance

where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law
is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a
missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest
error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by
the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage
shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under
Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7.
(1)

Marriage may be solemnized by:

Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8.
The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul
or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29
of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them
in a sworn statement to that effect."

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his
having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be
held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at
the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon
request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense
that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place.
Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by
only one party, Gemma del Rosario.iv[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of
the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop.
An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,
may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.v[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein
as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law.
The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due
to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient
in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be
skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they

be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.vi[6] It is
not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.vii[7] Otherwise,
the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors
committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make
mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the
status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and
void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a
six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary
authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is
advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Beso vs. Dagunan, 323 SCRA 566
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000]
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta.
Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty
and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S.
Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his
jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage
contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging

"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A.

YMAN got married and our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan
Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar;
xxx
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted
as our principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA
DEAN; xxx
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned
me without any reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City
and wrote the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding my Marriage
Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of
Calbayog City that my marriage was not registered; xxx
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge Juan
Daguman, to inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the
copies of the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my
interest such as:
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage
before the office of the Local Civil Registrar."
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman
had to be solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though outside his
territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the following
and pressing circumstances:

1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and

unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita. In the forenoon of that
date, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman
unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City, urgently
requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there, first,
because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able to
fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to
go to another town for the marriage would be expensive and would
entail serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another
pair of witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former Undersecretary
Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean
were already with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get married
on August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a
long period and their marriage license would lapse and necessitate
another publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their
plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would
complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as
to date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the
parties;
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments
(sic) for a valid marriage, which respondent found all in
order.
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who,
respondent realized, deserved more than ordinary official attention
under present Government policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed
in good faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the
law so that it may be not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get
married.
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration
of the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure
was also occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the control of
respondent:
3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriage
certificate, respondent left the three remaining copies on top of the
desk in his private office where the marriage ceremonies were held,
intending later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep
the forth (sic) in his office.

3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all
the papers relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent
search in the premises and private files, all the three last copies of the
certificate were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena
xxx Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing documents and he said he
saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage certificate in her
bag during the wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contact
complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Ymans claim.
3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is
out of the country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis
of the established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim of
complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr.
Yman, abandoned her without any reason xxx but that said husband
admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" xxx
it seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting parties
probably absconded with the missing copies of the marriage
certificate.
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but
to protect the public interest by trying all possible means to recover
custody of the missing documents in some amicable way during the
expected hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the City of
Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would confer with the
Civil Registrar General for possible registration of reconstituted copies
of said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11,
1998 found that respondent Judge " committed non-feasance in office" and
recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the
commission of the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out
that:
"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan,
Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those
municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer
within his area of jurisdiction.
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the
Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his
chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house
or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when
he failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code
which provides:
"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish
either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate
referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of
the certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local
civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. xxx"
(underscoring ours)
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent
Judge committed non-feasance in office, he also undermined the very
foundation of marriage which is the basic social institution in our society
whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting
that respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate
copies of the marriage certificate, he should have exerted more effort to
locate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is
expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His imputation
that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito
Yman is based merely on conjectures and does not deserve consideration for
being devoid of proof."
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation
report of the OCA well-taken.
Jimenez v. Republic1[1] underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution
thus: "[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply
interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity
and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It
is the interest and duty of each and every member of the community to prevent the

bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its
destruction."
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides,
among others, that
"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction;
xxx" (Italics ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the
judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere,
except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to
that effect." (Italics ours)
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judges
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in
remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was at
the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made
by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside
his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that
respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso
and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized
deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy."
Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e
believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law
so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get
married."
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live
and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly

uncalled for.2[2] A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law;3[3] he must also be
conscientious and thorough in doing so.4[4] Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature
of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.5[5]
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization
of the marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoyed by
marriage in the hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betray
respondents cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more disposed
towards an extended period of engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty, illadvised and ill-timed marital unions.
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to
preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of
judicial doctrines laid down by superior authority should have given respondent judge
pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the performance
of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know the
constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court. 6[6] Thus respondent
Judge should be reminded that
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the
faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice of this Court
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.7[7]

Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.

Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.8[8]
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should
exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in
its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that
the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code
which states in no uncertain terms that
ART. 23. - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to
furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract
referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the
certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil
registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts
shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall
retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the
original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the
contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place
other than those mentioned in Article 8. (Italics supplied)
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent
Judge was less than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged
with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official
documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events.9[9] However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a
system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt
and efficient dispatch of business.10[10] It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.11[11]
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur
Mecano v. COA, G.R. No. 103928, 11 December 1992
G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision
of the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement,
dated January 16, 1992, denying his claim for reimbursement under Section
699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the total
amount of P40,831.00.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was
hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account
of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of
which he is claiming from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim
(Director Lim, for brevity), he requested reimbursement for his expenses on the
ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 1 of the RAC, the pertinent
provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty.
When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or
municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual
physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any
period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months,
and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medical
attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person.
Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there
be.

xxx xxx xxx

In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the
line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the
necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary
of Justice, along with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI,
"recommending favorable action thereof". Finding petitioner's illness to be service-connected, the
Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of
petitioner's claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated November 21,
1990, returned petitioner's claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the
COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September 1990, to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 2 dated April
26, 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity) stating that "the
issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter".
On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement transmitted anew Mecano's claim to then
Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2, 1991, Secretary
Drilon forwarded petitioner's claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA
Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January 16, 1992, however, denied petitioner's
claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987,
solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of
1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation
Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director
Lim under a 9th Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner "elevate the matter to
the Supreme Court if he so desires".
On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699
of the RAC, this petition was brought for the consideration of this Court.
Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended, and on the aforementioned Opinion
No. 73, S. 1991 of Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a claim is filed with the
Employees' Compensation Commission, as suggested by respondent, he would still not be barred from
filing a claim under the subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether or not there was a repeal of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 would decide the fate of petitioner's claim for reimbursement.
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Exec. Order No. 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code of
1917. The COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the new Administrative Code, it can be gleaned
that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code. Moreover, the COA questions the
applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA
contends that employment-related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees'
Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both
laws on account of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the Government.
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of
legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision

which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to
be repealed. 3 A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law,
identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. 4
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the
intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the
repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions
thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an
express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be
repealed. 5 Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991.
It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be
found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was
not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of
the new and old laws. 6 This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given
effect. 7 Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker
that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear
and manifest; 8 otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of,
and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of
the first enactment. 9
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same
subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an
implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one
and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. 10
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject
matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or
harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the
other. 11
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire
subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in
the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject
claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on
sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative
Code of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated
in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. It further maintained
that to allow the particular provisions not restated in the new Code to continue in force argues against the
Code itself. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative
Code which incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles and rules of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx

It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative Code of 1987. This
contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of
itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative
or a continuation of the old one. 12 What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to
repeal. 13
We come now to the second category of repeal the enactment of a statute revising or codifying the
former laws on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended
to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It is the rule that a subsequent
statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the former statute.
14 When both intent and scope clearly evidence the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the
prior act that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed. 15 Furthermore, before there can be
an implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the later act be the
substitute to the prior act. 16
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover
only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure,
understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government structure since the
enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight that this opinion carries in
the determination of this controversy inasmuch as the body which had been entrusted with the
implementation of this particular provision has already rendered its decision. The COA relied on the rule in
administrative law enunciated in the case of Sison vs. Pangramuyen 17 that in the absence of palpable
error or grave abuse of discretion, the Court would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency entrusted with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not hold
water. This principle is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon
a showing that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. 18 It has been held that Opinions of
the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of statutes in pari materia. 19
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to
know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. 21
This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by implication are not favored,
and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be
passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to
conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating
to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject
matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence,
every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be
reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier. 22
Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the recovery of
benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence
of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book
IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation
under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by
other agencies of the government."
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby
ordered to give due course to petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.

Judicial Decisions form part of the law of the land (Art. 8)

Doctrine of stare decisis

People v. Licera G.R. No. L-39990, July 2, 1975

G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor Pedro A. Rami rez for plaintiffappellee.
Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August 14, 1968 of the Court of First Insta nce of Occidental
Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We reverse the
judgment of conviction, for the reasons hereunder stated.
On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint, subscribed and sworn to by hi m, with the
municipal court of the said municipality, charging Rafael Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August
13, 1966 the municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to suffer an indete rminate penalty
ranging five years and one day to six years and eight months of imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occ idental
Mindoro.
In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal possession of firearm and another case, likewise filed
against Licera with the municipal court but already forwarded to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person in
authority, the two offenses having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by the Chief of Police and a patrolman of Abra de
Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor.
On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault upon an agent of a person in authority, but
convicting him of illegal possession of firearm, sentencing him to suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of the
Winchester rifle in favor of the Government.
Licera's appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as involving only one question of law.
Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his appointment as secret agent on December 11, 1961 by
Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs.
Macarandang, 1 was exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. He

alleges that the court a quo erred in relying on the later case of People vs. Mapa 2 which held that section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by
provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to the case at
bar that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.
The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date "December 11, 1961" includes
a grant of authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to

bear a firearm ... for use in connection with the performance of your duties." Under the rule then prevailing,
enunciated in Macarandang, 3 the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance
of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a
"peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police" whom section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not
laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court
upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or
interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to
carry into effect. 4
At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for
possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code - formed
part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang
precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should
operate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those
who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the application or
interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any other, it is imperative
that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. 5
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera's appointment as secret agent,
which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at the time as
of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his
non-compliance with the legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.1wph1.t
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs de oficio.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

People v. Jabinal G.R. No. L-30061, February 27, 1974

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused
guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1)
year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction
based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1

The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion,
Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a
revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells
without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was
accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be
entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret
Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess
and carry the firearm in question.
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His
appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:
Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an
effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the
province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives,
jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms,
you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take
effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent,
your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the
preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or
twice a month. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall
be considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and
immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a
firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of your
duties.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking
your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.
Very truly
yours,
(Sgd.)
FELICIAN
O LEVISTE
Provincial
Governor
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: ROHM-Revolver
Make: German
SN: 64
Cal: .22

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as
Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose
firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in
Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM
revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.
Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of
record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial
Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry
the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27,
1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of
the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs.
Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v.
Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused
because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without
license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said
firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue
any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
"peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess
firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to
a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We
held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the
accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the
capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication,
that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised
Administrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and
lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered
"when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962,
and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was
that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in
People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is:
Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his

conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The
Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a
law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this
Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim
"legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court
has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and
when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is
necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in
spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may
not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de
oficio.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Duty of Judges (Art. 9)

Chuayan vs. Bernas, 34 Phil 631
G.R. No. L-10010

August 1, 1916

CHU JAN, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUCIO BERNAS, defendant-appellant.
Sulpicio V. Cea for appellant.
ARAULLO, J.:
On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the municipality
of Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendant
respectively. Each of said persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the referee of the
cockpit had declared the defendant's cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff brought

suit against the defendant in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, asking that
his own rooster be declared the winner. The justice of the peace court decided that the
bout was a draw. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the Court of First
Instance of the province. For the purposes of the appeal, the plaintiff filed his complaint
and prayed this court to render judgment ordering the defendant to abide by and comply
with the rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay the stipulated wager of
P160; to return the other like amount (both sums of wager being held for safe-keeping
by the cockpit owner, Tomas Almonte) and to assess the costs of both instances against
the defendant.
The defendant denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint and moved to
dismiss with the costs against the plaintiff. On September 11, 1913, the said Court of
First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as to
costs. The defendant excepted to this judgment as well as to an order dictated by the
same court on November 8th of the same year, on the plaintiff's motion, ordering the
provincial treasurer of Albay and, if necessary, the municipal treasurer of Tabaco of the
same province, to release the deposit of P160 and return it to its owner, the plaintiff
Chinaman, Chu Jan. These proceedings have come before us on appeal by means of the
proper bill of exceptions.
The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgment appealed
from ere that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar
with the rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that he does not
know where to find the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of no law
whatever that governs the rights to the plaintiff and the defendant in questions
concerning cockfights.
The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a
case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules
applicable to a certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by
him and his not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that
can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them
without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing
that a case might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in
the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the place shall be
observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, hereinbefore mentioned, are
reversed and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from whence they
came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made with
regard to costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., took no part
People vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 251
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila,
HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused individual in a criminal case has, on the occasion
of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?
The facts antecedent to the case before this Court, as narrated by petitioner, 1

involve the perpetration of acts so bizarre and

devoid of humanity as to horrify and numb the senses of all civilized men:
On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a
sack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from
it was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.
When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the victim was seen clad only in
a light colored duster without her panties, with gaping wounds on the left side of the face, the
left chin, left ear, lacerations on her genitalia, and with her head bashed in.
On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report of
the victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288
Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an
Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial
Region. Said Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071, reads:
That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together with one alias "LANDO" and other persons whose true
names, identifies and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with
treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength and nocturnity, and ignominy, and with
the use of force and violence, that is, by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a
warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick piece of
wood and stabbing her neck did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7)
years of age, against the latter's will and consent and on said occasion the said ABUNDIO
LAGUNDAY, a.k.a. "LANDO" and others, caused her fatal injuries which were the direct
cause of her death immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a. "Booster," of 1198 Sunflower
St., Tondo, Manila, Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. "Lando," of 1274 Kagitingan St.,
Tondo, Manila, Richard Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a. "Curimao," also of 1274 Kagitingan St.,
Tondo, Manila, and Catalino Yaon y Aberin, a.k.a. "Joel," of 1282 Lualhati St., Tondo, Manila
were accused of the same crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 11,
1994, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138138, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused conspiring and confederating with ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY
Alias "JR," JEOFREY and HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA who have already
been charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila of the same offense under
Criminal Case No. 94-138071, and helping one another, with treachery, taking
advantage of their superior strength and nocturnity and ignominy, and with the
use of force and violence, that is, by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a
pedicab, and once helpless, forcibly bringing her to a nearby warehouse,
covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick piece of
wood and stabbing her neck, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y
LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the latter's will and consent
and on said occasion the said accused together with their confederates
ABUNDIO LAGARTO y PETILLA caused her fatal injuries which were the direct
cause of her death immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
presided over by respondent Judge.
Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, (allegedly
shot by police escorts after attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D. Vidad
on August 12, 1994), pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio Lagunday was dropped from the
Information.
After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered a
decision 2 on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y
Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused
with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law." 3 Disagreeing with the
sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents
Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits of
the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying
the same for lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portion reads:
The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the accused Lagarto and Cordero have
complied with the legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal. Consequently, for lack
of jurisdiction, this Court cannot take cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Public Prosecutor of Manila.
WHEREFORE, the order earlier issued by this Court regarding the Notices of Appeal filed by
both herein accused is hereby reiterated.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to transmit the complete records of these cases,
together with the notices of appeal, to the Honorable Supreme Court, in accordance with
Sec. 8, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition.
The trial court's finding of guilt is not at issue in the case at bench. The basis of the trial court's
determination of guilt and its conclusions will only be subject to our scrutiny at an appropriate time on
appeal. We have thus clinically limited our narration of events to those cold facts antecedent to the instant
case relevant to the determination of the legal question at hand, i.e., whether or not the respondent judge

acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose
the mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime
of Rape with Homicide.
We find for petitioner.
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of
laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority.
Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear
or favor," 4 resist encroachments by governments, political parties, 5 or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.
In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the defendant
at trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Since the
law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent judge found the accused guilty
was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its provisions.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides:
Sec. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death. . . . 6
Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion
Perpetua but Death. While Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape with the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion depending on the existence of circumstances
modifying the offense committed to impose the penalty of either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three
instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide is not one of these three instances. The law plainly and
unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial
judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.

We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of his religious
convictions. While this Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that a
court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law
itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances. The discomfort
faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter upon which
judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. In People
vs. Limaco 7 we held that:
[W]hen . . . private opinions not only form part of their decision but constitute a decisive factor in arriving at a conclusi on and
determination of a case or the penalty imposed, resulting in an illegality and reversible error, then we are constrained to
state our opinion, not only to correct the error but for the guidance of the courts. We have no quarrel with the trial judge or
with anyone else, layman or jurist as to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty. Today there are quite a number of people
who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that
penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty
of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts are
not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of the
Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to
interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance of the members of the
judiciary we feel it incumbent upon us to state that while they as citizens or as judges may regard a certain law as harsh,
unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or department concerned, its amendment, modification, or
repeal, still, as long as said law is in force, they must apply it and give it effect as decreed by the law-making body. 8

Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the proper
penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." 9 This is not a case of a magistrate
ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law,
refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing, respondent judge acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private
respondents in consonance with respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the instant case
had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the decision
imposing the death penalty.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur

Caltez, Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247

G.R. No. L-19650

September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,
respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex)
conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up
patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for
participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each
Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex
(Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families
excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners
and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is
required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms
are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be
provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called
"Dealer Contest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters
dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest,
the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene
stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an
Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The firstprize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in
seven different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified contestants in each region
will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize
winners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to
make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by their
respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest". The regional
second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300,
respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize winners
will be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize,
second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at
this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as
consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing
the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto,
representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be
cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any
of the following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be
imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by

the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or

employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner
pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning
any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon
lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or
property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or
company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme,
device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the
mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the
Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the
Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word
"fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail
matter of whatever class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the
representative or agent of such person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic
transfer service.The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him
that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or
scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any
scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through
the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise,
forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal money order or
telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person
or company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank,
corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by regulation for the
return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers
drawn in favor of such person or company or its agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October
31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and
endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery
provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined
that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to
grant the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought
a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no

consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under controlling
authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the
Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of
1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally
banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the
use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the
contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all
its representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for
declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be
rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal
Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the
contest to the attention of the public". After issues were joined and upon the respective
memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the
rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the
respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first,
whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second,
whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall
take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the
applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is
available to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of
his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In
amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid
down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board
of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al.,
G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the appellant's stand being that the

petition herein states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is to
assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a
number of significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business
enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every
legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate
increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged
with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to
suppress transgressions thereof particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under
Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, against legally nonmailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for
the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in
the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was
found expedient to request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However,
likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent
provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed
scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the correct
construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in
which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The
confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the
obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by
the appellant's open warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted,
a fraud order will have to be issued against it and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The
appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest,
and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege
demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute
cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side
and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical question
or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the
uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of construction hampers
or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the
appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and
enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the
appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are
confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their
differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al.
vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the
insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely
the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others"

which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened
into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive
claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251,
284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of
construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law
to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room
for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the
assumption that, if the circumstances here presented, the construction of the legal
provisions can be divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest.
This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others,
by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black,
Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme
proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the
Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used
therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any
other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter
at hand can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of
which is anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law
has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no
longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly
defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in
a manner of speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity of setting the dispute at rest
before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a fullblown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed.,
p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs.
Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur.,
2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which it has
been cast, would be to force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot
obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of
the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it
launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk,
but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its
concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated;
if it abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to
put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally

unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of

liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their
object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) which, in the instant case, is to
settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties
under a law we can see in the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or
any futility or prematurity in our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we
hand down in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying
function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the
appellant will be bound. But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this
jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the
legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions
assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must
control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in
duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that
our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just
reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117
A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the
county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a
lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be
subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain
a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its
sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d.,
207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J.
Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost
identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as
absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders
against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any
information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".
Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El
Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the

power of the postal authorities under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law,
this Court declared that
While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one
for this jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases
having to do with the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The
term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such
as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various
forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First,
consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147
U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart
and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395;
U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs.
Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance
are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as
the appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of
the element of consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably
lightened inasmuch as in the same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive
yard-stick in the following terms
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the
gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived
directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as
criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly
or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the
language in which the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't
have to buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas
pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from to , and
win valuable prizes . . . ." .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be
bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the
entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the
drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned inside out, the contest fails to
exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as
we head the stern injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to

unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent"
("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the
scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property
by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy
Caltex products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a
consideration for the privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the
purchase of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to
participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs reiterating, does not have to buy
anything or to give anything of value.1awphl.nt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales
promotion, would naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by
those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to
draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The required element of consideration does not
consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test, as laid down
in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the
participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those
conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the
prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters,
not that of the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set
the matter at rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does
receive, some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the
drawing; does not supply the element of consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. vs.
Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and
adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind",
which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have
concentrated on the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if
the remedy here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both
curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated,
amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which
opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of consideration, may
nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, the determination

of whether or not the proposed contest wanting in consideration as we have found it

to be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in
explicit words, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard
authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods
are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a
chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed.,
p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of
Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker
vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed,
507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As
already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an
inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective
of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be
encompassed within the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of
being extended, we think that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated
in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise
involving an award by chance, even in default of the element of consideration necessary
to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73;
Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford
vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But
this is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a
lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the
tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d.,
139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People
vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389,
394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing:
Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm.
ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the
specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out
in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably
(Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of consideration or
chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs.
State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The
lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that
every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory
provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in
association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant

to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion

217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is
concerned it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no
other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must
the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the
slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift
enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law,
resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory
construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the
mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy
are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes,
justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the
gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa.
Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded for a
chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is
paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to
obtain. If, as it has been held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if
it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived,
directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not
being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286,
41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are
persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we
have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding
none in the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the use
of the mails for purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules
submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270

G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor Pedro A. Rami rez for plaintiffappellee.
Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August 14, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We reverse the
judgment of conviction, for the reasons hereunder stated.
On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint, subscribed and sworn to by hi m, with the
municipal court of the said municipality, charging Rafael Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August
13, 1966 the municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to suffer an indete rminate penalty
ranging five years and one day to six years and eight months of imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Mindoro.
In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal possession of firearm and anoth er case, likewise filed
against Licera with the municipal court but already forwarded to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person in
authority, the two offenses having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by the Chief of Police and a patrolman of Abra de
Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor.
On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault upon an agent of a person in authority, but
convicting him of illegal possession of firearm, sentencing him to suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of the
Winchester rifle in favor of the Government.
Licera's appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as involving only one question of law.
Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his appointment as secret agent on December 11, 1961 by
Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs.
Macarandang, 1 was exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. He

alleges that the court a quo erred in relying on the later case of People vs. Mapa 2 which held that section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by
provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to the case at
bar that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.
The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date "December 11, 1961" includes
a grant of authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to
bear a firearm ... for use in connection with the performance of your duties." Under the rule then prevailing,
enunciated in Macarandang, 3 the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance
of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a
"peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police" whom section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not
laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court
upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or

interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to
carry into effect. 4
At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for
possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code - formed
part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang
precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should
operate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those
who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the application or
interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any other, it is imperative
that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. 5
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera's appointment as secret agent,
which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at the time as
of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his
non-compliance with the legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.1wph1.t
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs de oficio.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave

Doubtful Statues (Art. 10)

People vs. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS,
NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C.
MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON,
GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON,
ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES,
JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,

BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON,

VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y
CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y UBALDO,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of
Fiscal of Manila and the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUOZ PALMA, J.:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines
represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are
consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P.
Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII,

presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First

Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused
with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree
No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned
above issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which
will be recounted below an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations,
on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed
to state one essential element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance
to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized
under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue which
we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not being
indispensable for the moment.
A The Information filed by the People
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge
Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO
CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF
PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a
violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation
1081, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6 inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of
11- inches, which the said accused carried outside of his residence,

the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to

earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused,
the date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon
involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided
by Judge Maceren follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO
LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO.
29677
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
PD 9 IN REL. TO
LOI
No. 266 of the
Chief
Executive dated
April 1, 1975
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a
VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in
relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated
April 1, 1975, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed
weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8 inches,
the same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his
livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)

The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the
accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of
weapon involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is
quoted hereunder:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO
REFUNCION, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO.
933
For:
ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF
DEADLY
WEAPON
(VIOLATION OF
PD NO. 9)
INFORMATION
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses
PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the
President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at
Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao, Province of Samar
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the
abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
carried with him outside of his residence a deadly weapon called
socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no such as
could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood,
which act committed by the accused is a Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B. The Orders of dismissal

In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the
submittal of the defense that one essential element of the offense charged is
missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the accused's
residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the
occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion,
organized lawlessness or public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed
weapon or the like outside residence may be prosecuted and tried
under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the
possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of
abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality,
organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and
recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of
this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the
information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to
constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in
these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to
believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a
charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more
than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless
now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for
extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to
imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of
scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before
martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of
the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive
message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a
sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may
already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more
incriminating than the infamous paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and
wisely applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But it seems it is
back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are
inclined to backsliding.

The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the

heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, and hence this
resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of
this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by
Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order
throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing
premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons
outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by
said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one that abets subversion, insurrection or
rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is
intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further
strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that also
made the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that
Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or
provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly
weapons if not concealed in one's person and if not carried in any of
the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and
punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the
prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his
opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful
and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the
intention of the person carrying such weapon because the law makes
it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then
if a person happens to be caught while on his way home by law
enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just
bought from a store in order that the same may be used by one's
cook for preparing the meals in one's home, such person will be liable

for punishment with such a severe penalty as imprisonment from five

to ten years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said
knife is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood because he
intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9
were to be interpreted and applied in the manner that that the
prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President
in promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some
unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of
oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the
act which the President intended to make unlawful and punishable by
Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one
that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30,
rollo of L-46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order
dismissing the Information filed before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited
Presidential decree, the same should be or there should be an
allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance
of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public
disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial
law throughout the country was issued because of wanton destruction
to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And in
order to restore the tranquility and stability of the country and to
secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest
possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly
weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under the
exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling
when we consider the penalty imposable, which is from five years to
ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would
mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.
xxx xxx xxx

It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during

martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying deadly weapons is
very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their farm
implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would
arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before
arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the Court of (First
Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to
quash the Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest,
the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless held on other charges.
C. The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the
People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with
illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9,
Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO.
7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972,
RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21,
1972, the Philippines has been placed under a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order
No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated
September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid
Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of
firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-inChief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in older to attain the

desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General

Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is
unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution
as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm
involved in the violation is unlicensed and is attended by assault
upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the
performance of their official functions resulting in death to said
persons in authority or their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is
used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or
chastity causing the death of the victim used in violation of any other
General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated under said
Proclamation No. 1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life
imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/commission may direct,
when the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be
imposed upon the owner, president, manager, members of the board
of directors or other responsible officers of any public or private firms,
companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly
allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation
or entity concerned to be used in violation of said General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades,
rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill
box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other
incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or
detonating agents containing combustible units or other ingredients in
such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, by
friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or part
of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden
generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous
pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on
continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a person; and any
person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging

from ten to fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may

direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or
blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo,"
"balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are
being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and
while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty
thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to
ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3
is committed during the commission of or for the purpose of
committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for
the particular offenses committed or intended to be committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
(SGD) FERDINAND E.
MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
D. The arguments of the People
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated
earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in
seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the main
argument advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of
paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum
penalized for reasons of public policy. 1
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who
commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9
provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the
crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence
which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 2
E. Our Ruling on the matter

1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or
information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the
accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact,
another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these cases. As
stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject
of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any
bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions
of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a
fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six
months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on
December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more
than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in
any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly
weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be specified as
there exists a substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3)
on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the
offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed
repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by
implication is not favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which
as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article
7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or
non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police
officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That
being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts
constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy
pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action a fear understandably
shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial functions are daily exposed to such
dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body of
the Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in
the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed,
blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that
the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the
scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of
the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act

criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls
within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction
given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries
outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation,
intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the
presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When
ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the
measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor
of the accused and strictly against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a presidential decree in these cases
the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee,
whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the
letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly
spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the
country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation
1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the
alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder
mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and
other deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word
"whereas", is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects
in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it
indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory
note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo
of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the
purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be
found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which
justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs
which are to be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the
statute." (West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases,
"Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in
itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or
uncertainty which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294,
cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to state that
'(L)egislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an
isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the
abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended

and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an
apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with other provisions. 9
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation
No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired
result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7
refer to firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed
weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance
are quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted
government and against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of
armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes,
wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private
buildings, and attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of
which activities have seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety
and the security of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness,
chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war
between the forces of our duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their
satellite organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults,
violence, murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations,
treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations committed and being committed
by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will not
stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary
and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this country by
overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on
the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp.
13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or
related to the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and
nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to
be remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v.
Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the
statute should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory
Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)

5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the measure if a
strict adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute
is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil,
and injurious consequences. 9-a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no
intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming
one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. 10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under
P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless
now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the
terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen
knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before
martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and
even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has
the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already
serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous
paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity
at times. To his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after
gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30
meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being
carried by that citizen places him under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the
presidential decree have been conceived to produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the rights of
individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment
through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 12
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms
who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made
clearly so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to
be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5
SCRA 684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the
latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by

the facts alleged therein. 13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime,
the quashing of the accusation is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the complaint
or information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the
judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice
of the Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did
not constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other
available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. If the motion to quash is
sustained the court may order that another information be filed. If such order is made the
defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is
not made or if having been made another information is not filed withuntime to be specified in
the order, or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the
defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some
other charge.
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to include
the second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled
that if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the case should not be
dismissed but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the Information. 16
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No.
1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially
since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a
motion to quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f)
and (h) of this rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the criminal action
or liability had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of
double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])

As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all these
cases should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.
H. We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the
government true to the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in
evaluating the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation falls
within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This
obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe penalty imposed for the offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of
Manila on October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the
following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of
carrying bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly
constituted authorities, may not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D.
No. 9. 17
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a
judicial task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if
basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of
its implementation. We have to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary
and justified under prevailing circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument of oppression and
evil and leads the citizenry to lose their faith in their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent
Judges dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in
the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file
either an amended Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other
existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.
Aquino, J, took no part.

In Re: Padilla, 74 Phil. 377

G.R. No. L-48137

October 4, 1943

In re testate estate of NARCISO A. PADILLA.

CONCEPCION PATERNO VDA. DE PADILLA, widow-appellee,
vs.
ISABEL BIBBY VDA. DE PADILLA, executrix-appellant.

BOCOBO, J.:
This case is an incident of the settlement of the testate estate of the late Narciso A.
Padilla. In order that his property may be divided according to his last will and
testament, it is necessary first to liquidate the conjugal partnership. It was in connection
with such liquidation that the widow, Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, commenced
the instant proceedings by filing a petition wherein she prayed, inter alia, that her
paraphernal property be segregated from the inventoried estate and delivered to her
together with the corresponding reimbursements and indemnities; that she be given onehalf of the conjugal partnership property; and that her usufructuary right over one-half
of the portion pertaining to the heir instituted in the will be recognized. The Court of
First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring certain pieces of real estate and
jewelry as well as certain sums of money to be paraphernal, and ordering the same to be
delivered to the widow (appellee herein). The trial court's judgment, as amended, reads:
En vista de los hechos y consideraciones que preceden, el Juzgado dicta sentencia
y declara:
(a) Que todos los bienes que constan en el inventario, y sobre los cuales no se ha
suscitado controversia por las partes, son bienes gananciales;
(b) Que se nombran tres (3) Comisionados, uno a recomendacion de la heredera
instituida en el testamento, otro a recomendacion de Da. Concepcion Paterno Vda.
de Padilla, y el tercero por el Juzgado, para que se hagan cargo de avaluar las
fincas o partes de fincas que se deben justipreciar de conformidad con las
conclusiones sentadas en esta decision hagan las computaciones correspondientes
a fin de determinar el remanente liquido de la sociedad de gananciales, tomando
por base los precios calculados y avaluados sobre dichos bienes, y dividan por
mitad el remanente liquido entre Da. Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, y la
heredera testamentaria Da. Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla, especificando los bienes
que a cada una debe corresponder;
(c) Que pagadas todas las deudas de la sociedad de gananciales, dichos
comisionados procederan a dividir en tres partes los bienes que deben
corresponder al difunto, a fin de que las dos terceras partes sean adjudicadas a la
heredera testamentaria en pleno dominio, y la otra tercera parte en nuda propiedad
a la misma heredera testamentaria y en usufructo a la viuda Concepcion Paterno
mientras ella viva.lawphil.net
(d) Que los gastos en que incurra esta Testamentaria por los servicios de los
Comisionados se paguen por ambas partes, por mitad.

From the foregoing judgment the testator's mother and instituted heir, Isabel Bibby Vda.
de Padilla, appeals.
I
The value in controversy being over P50,000, we have reviewed the evidence. After a
careful examination of the oral and documentary proof, we find no error in the findings
of fact made by the trial court. From the evidence it appears that Narciso A. Padilla and
Concepcion Paterno were married on December 12, 1912. The husband, who was a
medical student, contributed a small capital to the conjugal partnership at the time of the
marriage. The wife, on the other hand, brought to the marriage considerable property in
real estate, jewelry and cash. Practically all of the conjugal partnership property came
from the fruits of the paraphernal property. The conjugal partnership lasted twenty-one
years, the husband having died on February 12, 1934. (The wife also died recently,
during the pendency of this appeal, but in this decision she is referred to as if still
living.) The common fortune, consisting of real and personal property, is fairly large.
The husband, who left no children, executed a will giving his whole estate to his
mother, Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla, appellant herein. The property included in the
inventory is appraised at P261,000. Seven pieces of real estate are in controversy in this
case. The remaining ten real properties left by the deceased husband admittedly pertain
to the conjugal partnership.
A thorough study of the evidence convinces us that the trial court was right in finding
that the following properties in Manila are paraphernal: (1) the lot at 305 Arquiza Street
and the demolished improvements; (2) the lot at 1393-1409 Juan Luna Street and the
improvements that had been torn down; (3) the lot and improvements (except the
building constructed during the marriage for P4,000) at 401-407 Camba Street; (4) the
lot at 613-631 and 634-636 Martin Ocampo Street, with the original "accesorias" and a
camarin which was destroyed in order that new "accesorias" might be constructed, these
new "accesorias" being of the conjugal partnership; (5) the property at 620-A-H
Callejon De la Fe; (6) one-half of the property at 631 Regidor Street; and (7) nine
twenty-ninths (9/29) of the property at 302-306 R. Hidalgo Street.
We also agree with the finding of the lower court that certain jewels, namely: two pairs
of ear-rings, a bracelet, and a gold watch, belong to the widow.
In like manner, we see no error in the following findings of the trial court: (1) that the
husband borrowed P7,000 from the wife to meet his personal obligations; and (2) that
the amount of P21,046.52 (the remainder of P66,046.52) received by the wife during the
marriage was commingled with the conjugal partnership funds.
II

Several questions of law are raised in the present appeal. We shall discuss them one by
one.
1. The first legal controversy is on a sort of no-man's land where many a legal battle has
been fought. The issue is, How far is a Torrens title conclusive and incontestable?
Various manifestations of this legal question have been decided by the courts, and while
certain of its aspects may still be doubtful, we are persuaded, however, that there can be
no doubt, as will presently be shown, that what appears in the Torrens certificate in this
case is neither final nor incontrovertible.
Appellant contends that because certain of these real estates (on Camba, Martin
Ocampo and Regidor Streets) have been registered in the names of both spouses,
Narciso Padilla and Concepcion Paterno de Padilla, and considering the presumption in
Art. 1407 of the Civil Code, these properties must be held to be of the conjugal
partnership. The trial court, however, found that the whole purchase price of the Camba
and Martin Ocampo properties, and one-half of the purchase price of the Regidor
property, were from the wife's exclusive funds, and therefore the whole of the original
Camba and Ocampo estates and one-half of the Regidor realty must be adjudged
paraphernal, in spite of the fact that the certificates of title are in the names of both
spouses.
There is nothing sacrosanct and definitive in the certificate of title when the conjugal
partnership is liquidated. The true and real owner may be shown whether it be the
husband, or the wife, or both. Thus, in Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, this Court held
that property acquired during the marriage but registered in the husband's name still
belonged to the conjugal partnership. A similar ruling was announced when the real
estate was registered in the wife's name. Romero vs. Sheriff, 53 Phil., 51. But the
appellant maintains that the converse is not true; and that even if evidence is admissible
to alter the conjugal character of the property, such evidence must be clear, strong and
convincing (citing Art 1407, Civil Code, and Ahern vs. Julian, 39 Phil., 607).
We are of the opinion that an exception should in no wise be made when the property is
registered in the names of both spouses. In such instances, the property may be shown
to be really of either spouse, though recorded in the names of both. The underlying
reason is the same in all cases, which is the confidential relation between husband and
wife. Because of the feelings of trust existing between the spouses, certificates of title
are often secured in the name of both, or of either, regardless of the true ownership of
the property, and regardless of the source of the purchase money. It is thus but fair that
on liquidation of the partnership, the trust should be recognized and enforced, so that the
real ownership of the property may be established. The principle that a trustee who
takes a Torrens title in his name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration,
is one of the well-known limitations upon the finality of a decree of title. (See Severino
vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343). It is because a certificate of title under the Torrens system

should not be turned into an instrument for deprivation of ownership. The Torrens plan,
created to protect dominion, is not a Frankenstein that destroys this very dominion. A
trust, deriving its strength from confidence, which runs though with the woof and warp
of the social fabric, does not lose that character on the plea that a Torrens certificate of
title is conclusive. It is meet and seemly that this should be so, for any rule that permits
the violation of a fiduciary duty would be a reproach to any legal system. These
observations apply with peculiar force to the relations between husband and wife. In a
normal marriage, the spouses trust each other so implicitly that they attach little or no
importance to what appears in legal documents, fully and unreservedly believing that no
technicality would be availed of to claim what in very truth pertains to one or the other.
Things would indeed come to a sorry pass if the jurisprudence of this country should
harbor any theory which would impair this intimate reliance, this unquestioning loyalty,
this befitting faith between husband and wife.
There is another reason why evidence of the nature of any property as paraphernal
should be allowed, despite the Torrens certificate. It is this: the manager of the conjugal
partnership is the husband. He may, without let or hindrance, deal with and dispose of
any property appearing in the names of both spouses, even if the property should really
be paraphernal. In the course of years, any such property may have been sold,
transformed or substituted. Upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, to forbid an
investigation of the true source of the purchase price of the original property, after many
years of marriage, would make liquidation a mockery, for it would be well nigh
impossible to trace and identity the paraphernal property. The law positively ordains
that the wife's property (dowry and paraphernal) should be returned, even before the
payment of the debts of the conjugal partnership (Art. 1421 and 1422, Civil Code). But
how can this mandate of the law be complied with when the means to that end are
withheld and forbidden?
As for the appellants proposition that the evidence to rebut the Torrens certificates and
the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership (Art. 1407) should be clear,
strong and convincing, we find that the proof, both oral and documentary, in the record
is more than sufficient to offset and counteract the certificates of title and the
presumption of law.
2. The second legal inquiry is the interpretation of Article 1404, par. 2, Civil Code:
whether the value of the paraphernal land to be reimbursed to the wife is that obtaining
at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. With conjugal funds the
husband constructed buildings on the wife's lots on Arquiza, Juan Luna, Camba and
Martin Ocampo streets. The court a quo ordered that the value of the lots occupied by
these constructions, to be paid to the widow, should be that prevailing at the time of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Appellant claims such pronouncement of the trial court to be erroneous because from
the time of the construction of the buildings, the conjugal partnership became the owner
of the whole property (lot and building) in each instance, and therefore the subsequent
increase in value should accrue to the conjugal partnership, and any depreciation should
be suffered by the partnership.
Article 1404, Civil Code, provides:
Las expensas utiles hechas en los beines peculiares de cualquiera de los conyuges
mediante anticipaciones de la sociedad o por la industria del marido o de la mujer,
son ganaciales.
Los seran tambien los edificios construidos durante el matrimonio en suelo propio
de uno de los conyuges abonandose el valor del suelo al conyuge a quien
pertenezca.
Appellant's theory is untenable. The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until
she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
The mere construction of a building from common funds does not automatically convey
the ownership of the wife's land to the conjugal partnership. Such a mode of using the
land, namely, by erecting a building thereon, is simply an exercise of the right of
usufruct pertaining to the conjugal partnership over the wife's land. As Manresa says,
"la sociedad de gananciales es realmente la usufructuaria de los bienes privativos de
cada conyuge." (Comment on Art. 1408.) In consequence of this usufructuary right, the
conjugal partnership is not bound to pay any rent during the occupation of the wife's
land because if the lot were leased to a third person, instead of being occupied by the
new construction from partnership funds, the rent from the third person would belong to
the conjugal partnership. Therefore, before payment of the value of the land is made
from the common funds, inasmuch as the owner of the land is the wife, all the increase
or decrease in its value must be for her benefit or loss. And when may she demand
payment? Not until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership because up to that time, it
is neither necessary nor appropriate to transfer to the partnership the dominion over the
land, which is lawfully held in usufruct by the conjugal partnership during the marriage.
The foregoing finds support, by analogy, in Article 361, Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 361. El dueo del terreno en que se edificare, sembrare o plantare de buena fe,
tendra derecho a hacer suya la obra, siembra o plantacion, previa la indemnizacion
establecida en los arts. 453 y 454, o a obligar al que fabrico o planto a pagarle el
precio del terreno, y al que sembro, la renta correspondiente. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, no reimbursement for the value of the lots was made from the
common funds during the marriage.

Moreover, Sanchez Roman declares:

Los derechos de la muyer en la sociedad legal de gananciales se remiten todos a la
epoca de su disolucion y liquidacion, cuando se trata de la existencia normal de la
sociedad legal de gananciales. (Emphasis supplied.)
And Manresa states:
El valor fijado a los bienes debe ser el que realmente tengan el dia de la disolucion
de la sociedad, con las necesarias aclaraciones, para conocer lo que pueda tener
caracter propio o ganancial. (Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, the wife should not be allowed to demand payment of the lot during the
marriage and before liquidation because this would unduly disturb the husband's
management of the conjugal partnership. The scheme of the Civil Code is that in the
interest of successful administration of the common property, the wife should not
interfere with the husband's way of directing the affairs of the partnership. Besides, such
premature requirement of the value making improvements, whereas article 1404, par. 2,
has for its purpose the encouragement of construction by the husband. (Manresa's
comment on Art. 1404.) On the other hand, if the payment for the lot is deferred till the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the initial outlay for the erection of the building
would be less, and consequently the construction would be facilitated.
3. The next question of law is whether the value of the paraphernal buildings which
were demolished to make possible the construction of new ones, at the expense of the
conjugal partnership, should be reimbursed to the wife. Such tearing down of buildings
was done with regard to the Arquiza, Juan Luna and Martin Ocampo properties.
Appellant maintains that it is doubtful if these buildings had any value at the time they
were destroyed, and that there is no evidence that the conjugal partnership realized any
benefit therefrom. However, we are certain these old buildings had some value, though
small, and it will be the duty of the commissioners mentioned in the judgment appealed
from, to assess that value. We entertain no manner of doubt that the conjugal
partnership derived a positive advantage from the demolition, which made it possible to
erect new constructions for the partnership. It is but just, therefore, that the value of the
old buildings at the time they were torn down should be paid to the wife. We dismiss, as
without any merit whatever, the appellant's contention that because article 1404, par. 2,
of the Civil Code does not provide for the reimbursement of the value of demolished
improvements, the wife should not be indemnified. Suffice it to mention the ancient
maxim of the Roman law, "Jure nature aequum est, meminem cum alterius detrimento
et injuria fieri locupletiorem" which was restated by the Partidas in these terms:
"Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." When the statutes
are silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental principles which the courts

invoke in order to arrive at a solution that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience.
4. Then, there is the total amount of P7,000 borrowed by the husband from the wife,
thus itemized: (1) P3,000 lost in horse-races and in poker; (2) P3,000 spent for pastime
("diversion"); and (3) P1,000 to pay a personal debt of the husband. The trial court
applied article 1386 of the Civil Code, and ordered that said amount of P7,000 be
deducted from the husband's share. But appellant's theory is that articles 1408 (par. 1)
and 441 should govern, so that the amount is chargeable against the conjugal
partnership. These provisions read thus:
Art. 1408. Seran de cargo de la sociedad de gananciales:
1.o. Todas las deudas y obligaciones contraidas durantes el matrimonio por el
marido, y tabien las que contrajere la mujer en los casos en que pueda legalmente
obligar a la sociedad. . . .
Art. 1411. Lo perdido y pagado durante el matrimonio por alguno de los conyuges
en cualquier clase de juego, no disminuira su parte respectiva de los ganaciales. . .
.
It is true that article 1385 ordains that the fruits of the paraphernal property form part of
the conjugal partnership and are subject to the payment of the charges against the
marriage. But as Manresa says, article 1386 contains a limitation on the first part (just
cited) of article 1385.
It is likewise true that under article 1408, par. 1, all debts and obligations contracted by
the husband during the marriage are chargeable against the conjugal partnership, but
article 1386 is an exception to the rule, and exempts the fruits of the paraphernal
property from the payment of the personal obligations of the husband, unless there is
proof that they redounded to the benefit of the family. It is self-evident that the amounts
in question did not benefit the family. Hence, they cannot be charged against the fruits
of the paraphernal property. They should be paid from the husband's funds. We quote
from Manresa's comment on article 1386:
No hay, desde luego, contradiccion entre los preceptos de los articulos 1408 y
1386; hay solo una regla general contenida en aquel, y una excepcion contenida en
este. El articulo 1386, como especial, modifica la regla, y ha de aplicarse siempre
que las obligaciones personales contraidas por el marido quieren hacerse efectivas
en frutos o rentas de los bienes parafernales de la mujer.
La frase 'obligaciones personales', se reduce a deudas u obligaciones contraidas
privativamente por el marido, deudas y obligaciones que son desde luego
propiamente personales o no reales, pues si se reclamase contra bienes o derecho

especial y legalmente efectos al cumplimiento de la obligacion, no podria haber

inconveniente para que esta se hiciese efectiva. Por lo demas, el espiritu del
precepto es que el marido no puede aprovecharse en interes proprio o para
atenciones privativas o personales suyas, de los frutos de los bienes parafernales;
que estos se destinen a las verdaderas necesidades y cargas de la sociedad
conyugal, y, por tanto, se emplean, como deben, en beneficio de la familia.
Valverde in his "Tratado de Derecho Civil Espaol," Vol. 4, pp. 347-348, says:
Consecuencia natural de esta especie de separacion de responsabilidades y de
patrimonios, es que el Codigo ordene que 'las obligaciones personales del marido
no podran hacerse efectivas sobre los frutos de los bienes parafernales, a menos
que se pruebe que redundaron en provecho de la familia'. En efecto, el marido,
como administrador de la sociedad legal, obliga a esta con sus actos, y por eso los
gananciales responden de las deudad y obligaciones contraidas por el marido
durante el matrimonio, presumiendose hechos en interes de la sociedad, a no ser
que se pruebe lo contrario, pero como caso de excepcion, si los gananciales son
frutos de bienes parafernales, entonces, para que respondan tales frutos de las
obligaciones del marido, es preciso que prueba este que las dichas obligaciones
redundaron en provecho de la familia, pues por el precepto del codigo, si los frutos
de los parafernales son gananciales, cuando de las deudad del marido se trata,
solo son responsables esos frutos en el caso que se demuestre que redundaron en
provecho de aquella. (Emphasis supplied.)
Oyuelos, in his work, "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia Referentes al
Codigo Civil Espaol" (Vol. 6, pp. 79-80), has this to say:
(c) Fundamento de la exencion de los frutos. El articulo 1386 es un
complemento de los articulos 1385, 1408, 1413, 1417, 1433 y 1434, y se inspira
en los mismos principios economicos de la familia, porque si los frutos de los
parafernales forman parte de la sociedad conyugal, que subsiste mientras no se
disuelva el matrimonio o se decrete la separacion de bienes, y si a cargo de la
misma corre el sostenimiento de la familia, la educacion de los hijos y las deudas
que el marido contraiga como jefe de ella, es logico concluir, sobre todo teniendo
presente el articulo 1385, que aun prescindiendo del texto claro y terminante del
articulo 1386, las responsabilidades del marido en tanto puedan hacerse efectivas
con los productos de dichos bienes en cuanto se hubiesen contraido en provecho
de la familia; no existiendo contradiccion entre los articulos 1386 y 1408, numero
1.0 (alegada en el concepto de que el articulo 1386 no puede aplicarse al caso de
subsistencia del matrimonio), por cuanto la esfera de actuacion del 1386 no se
contrae al estado de derecho consiguiente a la separacion de bienes de los
respectivos esposos.

Is the amount under consideration, P7,000, being enforced against the fruits of the
paraphernal property? Yes, because practically all of the conjugal partnership assets
have been derived from the fruits of the wife's exclusive property.
In the case of Fidelity and Surety Co. vs. Ansaldo, 37 Off. Gaz., 1164, (promulgated
November 26, 1938), this Court held:
Article 1386 of the Civil Code provides that the personal obligations of the husband
may not be paid out of the fruits of the paraphernal property, unless it be proved that
such obligations redounded to the benefit of the family. It, as contended by the
appellant, the properties levied upon in Civil Case No. 33923 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, entitled "Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippines Islands vs.
Romarico Agcaoili and Angel A. Ansaldo" were acquired with the fruits of the
paraphernal properties belonging to Margarita Quintos, said properties, although
conjugal (art. 1385, par. 1 and art. 1408, Civil Code; Mirasol vs. Lim, 59 Phil., 701,
709) are not liable for the personal obligations of the husband, unless said obligations
redounded to the benefit of the family. Paragraph 1 of article 1408 of the Civil Code
makes all debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband
chargeable against the conjugal partnership, as a general rule, that is to say, although the
fruits of the paraphernal property of the wife are conjugal, they do not respond for the
personal obligations of the latter unless said obligations have redounded to the benefit
of the family."
In the sentence of January 15, 1917, of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, the following
doctrine is enunciated:
Considerando a mayor abundamiento que si bien en orden al regimen familiar y
conforme a la doctina legal establecida por el Tribunal Supremo, interpretando el
art. 1385 del expresado Codigo, al marido incumbe exclusivamente la
administracion de los frutos de los bienes parafernales como parte del haber de la
sociedad conyugal, esta potsted esta condicionada y regulada por el 1386, al
prohibir al esposo el aprovechamiento de tales rendimientos en benficio propio o
sea de sus obligaciones personales, imponiendole por modo expreso, el deber de
aplicarlos al levantamiento de las cargas matrimoniales, pues de otra forma se
desnaturalizaria la reserva y privilegio que constituye el concepto del patrimonia
parafernal, con riesgo de infringir la disposicion legal que precede invocada.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, it is quite plain that if the amount of P7,000.00 under review should
be charged against the conjugal partnership property which came almost exclusively
from the fruits of the paraphernal property, the reservation and privilege established by
law on behalf of the paraphernal patrimony would be encroached upon and tempered
with.

There are just and sound reasons for article 1386. The wife contributes the fruits,
interests, and rents of her paraphernal property to help bear the expenses of the family.
When the husband contracts any debt in his own name, it is chargeable against the
conjugal partnership as a general rule (article 1408, par. 1) because it is presumed that
the debt is beneficial to the family. But when such a debt is enforced against the fruits of
the paraphernal property, such a presumption no longer applies, considering article
1386. On the contrary, it must be proved that the purpose for which the wife contributes
the fruits of her paraphernal property has been accomplished through such personal debt
of the husband.
Appellant relies on article 1411 which reads:
Lo perdido y pagado por alguno de los conyuges en juego licito, sera a cargo de la
sociedad de gananciales.
Lo perdido y no pagado por alguno de los conyuges en juego licito, sera a cargo de
la sociedad de ganaciales.
But this provision should be applied only when the debt is not being charged against the
fruits of the paraphernal property. If the conjugal partnership assets are derived almost
entirely, if not entirely, from the fruits of the paraphernal property, as in this case, it is
neither lawful nor equitable to apply article 1411 because by so doing, the fruits of the
paraphernal property would in reality be the only kind of property to bear the husband's
gambling losses. In other words, what the husband loses in gambling should be
shouldered by him and not by the conjugal partnership if the latter's assets come solely
from the fruits of the paraphernal property. This is but just, because gambling losses of
the husband cannot by any process of reasoning be considered beneficial to the family.
By the same token, to charge the gambling losses against the conjugal partnership in
such a situation would fly in the case of the stern prohibition of article 1386, which
protects the fruits of the paraphernal property precisely against expenses of the husband
that are of no help to the family.
We are satisfied that the foregoing is by and large a fair and rational interpretation of
articles 1408 and 1411, which must be read in the light of article 1386. If such a
qualification of articles 1408 and 1411 is not made, article 1386 becomes nugatory.
5. The next question is whether interest should be paid by the widow on the amount of
P9,229.48 withdrawn by her from the Monte de Piedad savings account No. 3317 of the
conjugal partnership. There is no question that the principal should be credited to the
partnership as the appellee's counsel does not dispute this point. The withdrawal of said
amount was made on April 7, 1934, about two months after the husband's death, and
while the widow was a special administratrix. There being no evidence in the record as
to the purpose for which this amount was used, although counsel for appellee suggests

the possibility that the same might have been disbursed for funeral and similar expenses,
we believe she should pay such interest, if any, as the Monte de Piedad would have paid
on the amount aforesaid, had not the same been withdrawn by the widow.
Wherefore, with the modification that the appellee shall pay such interest, if any, on
P9,229.48 as the Monte de Piedad would have paid if the amount had not been
withdrawn, the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.
Customs (Art. 11-12)
1. Requisites to make a custom an obligatory rule
a. Plurality or repetition of acts;
b. Practiced by the great mass of the social group;
c. Continued practice for a long period of time;
d. The community accepts it as a proper way of acting, such that it is considered
as obligatory upon all
Martinez vs. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil 79