THIRD DIVISION

VICTORIA S. JARILLO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 164435

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
September 29, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, praying that the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
July 21, 2003, and its Resolution[2] dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in
Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S.
JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously

united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel
Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12,
1999.
Contrary to law.

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and,
thereafter, trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married
in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag,
then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O,
O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again
celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel
Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated
November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a
daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent
marriage
with
Emmanuel
Ebora
Santos
Uy,
at
the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor
Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN
dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged
marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No.
99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.

Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the

Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x.
xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on
October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case
No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed
decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this
court
hereby
finds
accused
Victoria
Soriano
Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of
prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of
prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil
aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accuseds bigamous
marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their
property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same
court in that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001. [3]

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to
Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain
Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to
both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and
(3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far
back as 1978.

On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its

Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when
she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her
marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the
court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still
existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of
sufficient evidence, petitioners contentions that her marriages were celebrated
without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far
back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision
dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo
null and voidab initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said
decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the
reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA,
citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,[4] denied reconsideration and ruled that [t]he
subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said
marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy.[5]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE
OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR
THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF
THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO

ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL

AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S.
JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF
BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF
VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO
VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED
AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE
AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.

The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be
discussed jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution
evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the
pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to
Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal,
she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy,
initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC
denied her motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her
arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[6] the Court categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a casethe
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of
a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x

xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at
bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action
for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a
second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x[7]
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,[8] where it was held
thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering
that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners
marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case
for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the
first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage
was annulled.[9]

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioners
conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered
a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second

marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void,
the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not
yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed
valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of
petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference. [10] As held in Tenebro, [s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically
void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.[11]
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable
by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive
penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that [c]rimes punishable by other afflictive
penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years, while Article 91 states that [t]he
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x .
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as
1978; hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who
raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or
accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing
to establish the same, it remains self-serving. [12] Thus, for petitioners defense of
prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early
as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly
failed
to
present
sufficient
evidence
to
support
her
allegation. Petitioners testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she
(petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally
unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed
that:

x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who
allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It
must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother,
the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.[13]

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14] the prescriptive period for the

crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents], as opposed
to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. [15] Since
petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription began to run
as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous
penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without
first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound
discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into
which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in
the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.[16]

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner
is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for
bigamy isprision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which
ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years
imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration
of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances

proven in this case, the prescribed penalty ofprision mayor should be imposed in
its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial
court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioners
marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment [17] to be void ab
initio on account of the latters psychological incapacity, by reason of which,
petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce
the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its
Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed,
but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and
One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.