CASE NUMBER 5-8

G.R. No. 203335

February 11, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL
and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
Facts:
1.
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic
Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
2.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the cybercrime law that regard
certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as
provisions that would enable the government to track down and penalize violators.
3.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354,
361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.
4.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional
rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably
put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful
attacks on the system
5.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on
February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining
order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent
government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void.

Ruling:
The Court declared the following provisions of RA 10175 (Cybercrime Act) as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, either wholly or contextually:
1. Sec. 4(c)(3) (Unsolicited Commercial Communications)
2. Sec. 12 (Real time collection of traffic data)

3, Sec. 19 (Restricting or blocking access to computer data)

4. Sec. 4(c)(4) (online libel- only where it penalises those who simply receive the
post or react to it) but NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL as far as the original author is
concerned.
5. Sec. 5 (aiding or abetting in the commission of a cybercrime/attempt to commit a
cybercrime) only in relation to secs. 4(c)(2) (child pornography), 4(c)(3) (unsolicited
commercial communications) and 4(c)(4) (libel);
6. Sec. 7 (liability under other laws) only in relation to secs. 4(c)(4) (libel) and 4(c)
(2) (child pornography).
All other provisions
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

not

so

declared

by

the

Court

are

considered

NOT

G.R. No. 153675

April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by

the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
Facts:

Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the Hongkong Court with three (3)
counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent, conspiracy to
defraud, was penalized by a common law of Hongkong. A warrant of arrest was
issued and if convicted, he may face jail terms.

On September 23, 1999, He was arrested and detained.

On November 22, 1999, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC
of Manila a petition for his extradition.

Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which Judge Felixberto Olalia granted.

Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a petition to vacate such order, but it

was denied by the same judge.

Issue:
Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail.
Ruling:
The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person (Sec. 2 Art II 1987 Constitution) have the
obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.

The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of
the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the

promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption
lies in favor of human liberty.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail,
aright to due process under the Constitution.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hongkong
Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback
in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY

G.R. No. 190582

represented herein by its Chair,

DANTON REMOTO,
Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C. J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus -

BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

April 8, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------------x

facts:
1.
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006.

2.
The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the
organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad
again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC but it was dismissed on
moral groun
3.
Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First
Resolution, stating that the party-list system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations.
4.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion
5.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the
petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that
the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA
7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field
personnel.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization
Ruling:
1.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the
COMELEC. It also directed the COMELEC to grant petitioners application for partylist accreditation.
2.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
3.
Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with
this policy of neutrality.
4.
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for
the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
5.
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.The principle of non-discrimination
requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all
persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
6.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

G.R. No. L-2855

July 30, 1949

BORIS MEJOFF, petitioner,

vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Facts:
This was an original action in the Supreme Court for habeas corpus.
The petitioner was a Russian national who was brought into the country as a secret
operative of the Japanese forces.
Upon liberation,he was arrested as a Japanese spy by the U.S. Army.
Thereafter, the people's court ordered his release. But the Board of Commissioners
of Immigration declared that he had entered the country illegally and ordered
deportation.
While the arrangements for his departure are being made and for the best interest
of the country, petitioner Mejoff was detained at the Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa.
Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the
Government has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the
country.
Issue:

Whether or not prolonged detention of the petitioner is warranted by law and the Constitution.
Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and commanded the respondents to
release the former from custody subject to terms and conditions.
The petitioners unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the
Constitution, if the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by
no means actual, present, or uncontrollable.
The possibility that he might join or aid disloyal elements if turned out at large does
not justify prolonged detention, the remedy in that case being to impose conditions
in the order of release and exact bail in a reasonable amount with sufficient
sureties.
Hence, a foreign national, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been
formally made or judicial order issued, may not be indefinitely be kept in detention.
He has the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to
human beings, as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, of which the Philippines is
a member.

CASE NUMBER 9-12

G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, et al., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, et al., respondents
Facts:
In 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency through a people power
revolution, forced into exile and in his stead, Corazon Aquino was declared President.
Now, Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die
but President Aquino, considering the consequences of Marcos return at a time when the
stability of the government is threatened and the economy is just beginning to rise, has stood
firmly in her decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Marcoses have the right to return to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
3. Assuming the President has the power to bar the return of the Marcoses, did the
President acted with grave abuse of discretion?
Held:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court emphasized that the right to travel is totally distinct to return to
ones country and although the former is the only one specifically guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights, it was still held that the right to return, as provided for under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, may be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under the Constitution, is part of the law of the land(Sec 2 of Art II of the 1987
Constitution).
2. Yes. It was held that the President, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution,
has the obligation to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national
interest. The instant case, the Supreme Court held, calls for the exercise of the residual
power of the President as protector of the peace. Such power to bar the Marcoses from
returning has even been recognized by members of the Legislature.
It was further noted by the Supreme Court that such paramount duty provides for a
broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether a request to return
must be granted or not.

3. No. It was held that there exist factual bases for the Presidents decision. The documented
history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate
and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.

G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T.
BAYLON, RAMON
MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO
ARANETA, PLACIDO
AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C.
PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH
98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Facts:
The Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) went on strike after the SSS
failed to act on the union' s demands, which included implementation of the provisions of the old
SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues and payment of
accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay, among others.
The SSS then filed with the RTC a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the SSSEA, praying that the court enjoin the strike and the strikers
be ordered to return to work, that the defendants be ordered to pay damages SSS suffered and
that the strike be declared illegal.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the SSS have the right to strike.
Held:
They do not have such right. Although there is no question that the Constitution
recognizes the right of government (including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters) employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also
includes the right to strike. But it was pointed out by the SC that a reading of the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission would show that in recognizing the right of government
employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions
or associations only, without including the right to strike.

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
Facts:
Commonwealth Act no. 548 authorized Director of Public Works, with the approval

of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to promulgate rules and

regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and
street. Pursuant to such, the Director of Public Works, promulgated rules and
regulations which provided for the closure of certain streets to traffic of
animal-drawn vehicles at certain times of the day for a period of one year.
Such was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional because it
constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.
2. Whether or not CA no. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate

business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion.
Held:

1. No. CA no. 548 does not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works
and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein
conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations
now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to
carry out the legislative policy which is to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets and to close them temporarily to any or all classes
of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.
2. No. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds
of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity
of the state. To this fundamental aim of the Government the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing, without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy.

G.R. No. 117472. June 25, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.

Facts:
Complainant Rodessa Echegaray is a 10-year old and a fifth grader had accused her
father, Leo Echegaray of having raped her for about five times. Such acts allegedly happened
whenever the victims mother is out of their house and accused was most of the time, high on
drugs. Initially, Rodessa kept to herself as accused threatened to kill her mother when the victim
would divulge the act. But when the act happened for the fifth time, Rodessa decided to tell her
grandmother who in turn told Rodessas mother.
The RTC convicted accused for the crime of rape, aggravated by the fact that the accused
is the father/stepfather of Rodessa and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death.
Issue:
Whether or not the sentence of death should be upheld.
Held:
Yes. The SC found no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old
Rodessa which the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted by the defense.
Further, sec 11 of RA 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty Law, Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code was amended, provides for that the death penalty shall be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the ff. circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
Whereas, even though accused declares that he is neither a father nor a stepfather nor
grandfather of Rodessa, he was a confirmed lover of Rodessas mother and he therefore falls
squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under the term "common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.

CASE NUMBER 13-16

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO RAMOS
G.R. No. 129439
September 25, 1998
Facts:
During the month of April 1995, the mother of complainant Elizabeth T.
Ramos and her youngest sister slept inside the lone bedroom of their house
while she, her brother and two other sisters slept outside of this room in an
adjoining area. Sleeping together with them at that time was complainant's
father, appellant Feliciano M. Ramos.
Complainant woke up when appellant carried her brother and two
sisters and transferred them for where they were sleeping to another area of
the house.
Appellant was able to rape the minor complainant through the use of
force and intimidation in its execution.
From this night on, appellant would repeat his dastardly acts against
his daughter a number of times and this would not have discovered had
complainant not suffered an abortion of the fetus she was carrying in her
womb.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed is qualified rape.
Ruling:
No. The concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship
with the offender as a qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the
information or in the complaint against appellant, he cannot be convicted of
qualified rape because he was not properly informed that he is being
accused of qualified rape. The Constitution guarantees the right of every
person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO GALIT

G.R. No. L-51770
March 20, 1985
Facts:
In the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow,
was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo,
Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different
parts of her body by a blunt instrument.
More than two weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked
up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion)
living in Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the murder.
Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation
in the commission of the crime.
The Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal imposed death sentence upon
the accused Francisco Galit.
Before the mandatory review by the Court, the accused also assailed
the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession he previously made on the
grounds that it was extracted through torture, force and intimidation, and
without the benefit of counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not the extra-judicial confession is inadmissible.
Ruling:
Yes. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. The investigating
officers mauled him and tortured him physically by covering his face with a
rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. He admitted
what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the
confession they prepared. These constitute gross violations of his rights.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS, et.al vs. SECRETARY OF

AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
Facts:
Republic Act. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8,
1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27
to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners.
On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as
well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by
Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation.
Subsequently, R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 was enacted.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause in
the passage of the RA 6657.
Ruling:
No. Complainants submitted no evidence to the Court that the
requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Equal protection simply
means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both
as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have
not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different
treatment.

LAO H. ICHONG vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
Facts:
The Legislature passed Republic Act No. 1180 or An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business. The purpose of the said law was to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines from having a stranglehold upon the peoples
economic life. Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were
exempted from this Act.
Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare
RA 1180 unconstitutional on the ground that it denies alien residents right to
the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their right to liberty
and property without due process.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 1180 deprives the aliens of the equal protection of
the laws.
Ruling:
No. The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the
aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive
and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully
justify the legislative classification adopted.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among
residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a
basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

CASE NUMBER 17-20

G.R. No. L-45987

May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Accused cayat is found guilty by the trial court for violation of Act No. 1639 which penalizes nonChristians from receiving, acquiring, and having in his possession and under his control or custody,
intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such
tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.

The accused challenges the constitutionality of the act on the following grounds (1) That
it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; (2) That it is violative of the due
process clause of the Constitution: and. (3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the
state.
ISSUE:
Whether the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is violated
RULING:
No. The classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes
so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their
equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no
other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race."
On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them
rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now
enjoyed by their Christian brothers.

G.R. No. L-55109 April 8, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
EDUARDO AUSTRIA y MONTAO, JAIME DE LA TORRE y PAHILUNA and PABLO AUSTRIA y
CAMELLOSO,accused appellants.
FACTS:
Appellants were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide, the appellants entered a plea of
not guilty. After trial, the court found them guilty of the crime charged. The decision of the court
heavily relied on circumstantial evidence. During the pendency of the appeal, Pablo Austria and
Jaime de la Torre died of undetermined cause and hypertension, respectively, hence the resolution
of the instant appeal should be based on the evidence against the surviving appellant, Eduardo
Austria.
ISSUE:
Whether conviction can be had based on circumstantial evidence
RULING:
Yes. To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence under Sec. 5, Rule 133, there must.
be (a) more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
However, as regards appellant Eduardo Austria, the only evidence against him is that he was seen
at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 9, 1975 along the road going to Hda Austria. This
evidence even if tied up with the testimony of Iluminada Azuelo that Austria harbored ill-feelings
against the deceased because he was dismissed from the hacienda by the deceased. This does not
establish or support an inference, much less a conclusion, that he participated in the commission of
the offense charged. The conviction of appellant Eduardo Austria on an inference based on another
inference cannot be maintained.
It is axiomatic that conviction should be made on the basis of a strong, clear and compelling
evidence. To overcome the presumption of innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed,
which unfortunately was not met in this case.

G.R. No. L-21325 October 29, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLEO DRAMAYO, PATERNO ECUBIN, PRIOLO BILLONA, FRANCISCO BILLONA,
MODESTO RONQUILLA, CRESCENCIO SAVANDAL and SEVERO SAVANDAL, defendants;
PABLEO DRAMAYO and PATERNO ECUBIN, defendants-appellant.

FACTS
Appellants were charged with the crime of murder. After trial, the court found only appellants
Dramayo and Ecubin guilty of the crime. The others were acquitted and were utilized as state
witnesses, which testimony were used by the court to arrive at its decision. Upon appeal the
counsel for the accused avers that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to
warrant the conviction of the accused, there still being a reasonable doubt to be implied from the
fact that while conspiracy was alleged, only two of the seven accused were held culpable.
ISSUE
Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to warrant the conviction of
the appellants
RULING
No. It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to establish
the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi interposed hardly meriting any
further discussion. It cannot be denied though that the credible and competent evidence of record
resulted in moral certainty being entertained not only by the trial judge but by us as to the culpability
of appellants.
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two
appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than
amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more
than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution.
It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases
where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of
conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense
guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability.

G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990

EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, VIOLETA SEVILLA, QUERUBIN
BILLONES, ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA
LICUP, SOLIDAD ABURDO, ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA
RESTORAN, VERIDIAN FLORA, ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO,
ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES,
BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO GAROFIL, ERIBERTO
MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO, ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDO GARBO, VIRGINIA
LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA. RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO,
ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO
SESPENE, ROSA MARTIN and JAIME BONGAT,petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA, respondents.

FACTS:
The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were
conducted in Tondo, Manila were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target
house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the
policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The
residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their
houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were
ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents
complained that their homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their
valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation.
The residents also reported incidents of mauling, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who
were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
information. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies and that the aerial
target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the
communities were the said drives were conducted.
ISSUE:
Whether the saturation drive consisted of human rights violations
HELD:
The case is remanded to the RTC. The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought
through a taxpayers' suit, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and
legitimate ones. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police
actions to one on one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific
individuals are easily procured.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level conference should
bring together the heads of the Department of Justice, Department of National Defense and the

operating heads of affected agencies and institutions to devise procedures for the prevention of
abuses.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can
order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure, no
permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a
hard look by administration officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are
also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably
committed and could be committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily restrain the
alleged banging on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas
for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences even if these are humble shanties of
squatters, and the other alleged acts which are shocking to the conscience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon,
and Pasay City where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations and where
specific erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted.

CASE NUMBER 21-24

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

FACTS:
One hundred and seventy women, without their consent and without any
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on
board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt
to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is
shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was
deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to
cloak their secret and stealthy acts.
ISSUE:
WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.
RULING:
No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse
of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There
is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing
public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any
person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of
the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as
every other citizen.

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu

GR 95770, 29 December 1995

FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and
consolidated raising the same issue whether school children who are members or a
religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled from school (both
public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in
the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine
national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?

RULING:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not
justified. Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the
amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to
his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones belief. The first is absolute as long
as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and
present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right
to prevent.

Estrada v. Escritor
A.M.No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:
Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253 in Las Pinas City. The
complainant Estrada requested for an investigation of respondent for living with a
man not her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child
within this live-in arrangement. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness' in accordance with her religion which allows
members of the Jehovahs witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to
enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral
and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where
divorce is allowed.

ISSUE:
WON respondent is protected by her religious freedom.
RULING:
NO. Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral
conduct. Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out
a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. The
Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms
including religious freedommay be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as
preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than
the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that
its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom.
In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council

G.R. No. 178552
October 5, 2010
FACT:
This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, An Act
to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism, aka Human Security Act
of 2007.Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected
communist fronts by the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the
transcendental importance doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been
subjected to close security surveillance by state security forces, their members
followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with dark windshields, and their
offices monitored by men with military build. They likewise claim they have been
branded as enemies of the State.

ISSUE:
1. WON petitioners have locus standi.
2. WON transcendental importance doctrine can be applied.

RULING:
1. NO. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Petitioners have not
presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of
them faces any charge under RA 9372.
2. NO. Petitioners conveniently state that the issues they raise are of
transcendental importance, which must be settled early and are of farreaching implications, without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372
under which they have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of
human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants
with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of
sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement. To rule
otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every
worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.

WIGBERTO E. TAADA v. EDGARDO ANGARA

272 SCRA 18
MAY 2, 1997
Facts :
A petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement was filed by the petitioners. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein
respondents acting in their capacities as Senators by signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products.
Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector, reduce cost and uncertainty associated
with exporting and more investment in the country as the predicted benefits reflected in the
agreement.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair
Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power and that the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue :
Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.
Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws.
Pacta sunt servanda dictates that international agreements must be performed in good faith. A
treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority.
As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of
judicial inquiry and review.

Antonia Loanco De Jesus v Cesar Syquia

58 Phil 866

FACTS:
Antonia Loanco de Jesus and Cesar Syquia met in a barber shop where de Jesus worked as
cashier.
They had a relationship and Antonia got pregnant with a baby boy.
When he went to Japan and China, he was writing letters to Antonia reminding her to keep
herself in good condition so that their junior would be strong.
When she gave birth, Syquia took her and the child to live in a house in Manila where they lived
as a family for a year.
She became pregnant again but Syquia left her to marry another woman.
During the christening of the child which Syquia arranged, he decided to give the child the name
of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.
ISSUE:
WON Antonia is entitled to damages for breach of promise to marry and kids to paternal support
HELD:
Promise to marry not satisfactorily proved so the trial court was right in refusing to grant De
Jesus' prayer.
Also, action for breach of promise to marry has no standing for civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such action.
Antonia de Jesus only entitled to the support of the first child because of Cesar's prior
recognition. No support for the second child because no proof of paternity or recognition
presented.

Isagani Cruz vs Sec. Of DENR

G.R. No. 135385
December 6, 2000

FACTS:
Isagani Cruz assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the
ground that the law amount to an unlawfuldeprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well asminerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrineembodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains
whichmay include natural resources.
Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections
3(a) and 3(b) ofsaid law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The SC deliberated upon the matter and after the deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote.
They deliberated again and the same result transpired.
Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law wassustained.
Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehowagainst the regalian doctrine.

G.R. NO. 159618

Feruary 1, 2011
BAYAN MUNA vs. ALBERTO ROMULO
FACTS:
In 2000, the Republic of the Philippines (RP), through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo,
signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval
by the signatory states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA
Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of
the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.
Petitioner, claiming to represent the marginalized sectors, imputes grave abuse of discretion to
respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as
unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
Respondents question petitioners standing to maintain a suit and counter that the Agreement,
being in the nature of an executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its
efficacy.
ISSUE:
Whether the agreement is valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of
all the members of the Senate
HELD:
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence.
The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been
confirmed by long practice.

Zenaida Medina, et al. v Dra. Venancia Makabali

G.R. no. L-36953
Reyes, J.B.L.

Facts: Petitioner gave birth to a boy with the assistance of herein respondent doctor.
Petitioner however left the child with the respondent since birth and since then
respondent has raised the boy as her own son. Now comes the petitioner asking the
court to award her the custody of the child.

Issue: Whether or not the custody of the child should be awarded to the petitioner
as the biological mother.

Ruling: The paramount interest to consider in deciding the issue is the welfare of the
child. Considering that petitioner has virtually abandoned the child for five years,
cohabits with a man not his legal husband, it is to the best interest of the child to
remain with herein respondent.

Marissa Mossesgeld vs Cout of Appeals, et al.

G.R. no. 111455
Pardo, J.

Facts: Petitioner gave birth to a boy whose presumed father is a married man. In
accomplishing the registration of birth, the parents wrote the last name of the
father. The Civil Registrar refused the registration contending that under the Family
Code, illegitimate children should take up their mothers last name. The father now
filed a petition for mandamus to compel the local Civil Registrar to register the birth
certificate.

Issue: Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the Civil Registar to register the
said document

Ruling: Mandamus cannot lie to compel the performance of an act that is prohibited
by law. The Family Code lawfully mandates that illegitimate children must take up
the last name of the mother. Hence, mandamus will not lie to compel the Civil
Registrar to register the certificate of live birth using the fathers surname, even
with the consent of the latter.

People of the Philippines v. Cesar Cervantes

G.R. no. 90257
Cruz, J.

Facts: Marivic Ortega together with her family rents a room in accuseds house. One
night, after a drinking session, Marivic was awakened to the fact that Cervantes was
groping her breast, he then stripped himself, placed himself on top of the eleven
year old child and raped her, after which he threatened to kill her. Marivic kept quiet
until Cervantes attempted to rape her again a second time. Rape charges were filed
against herein accused and appeals the conviction

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape

Ruling: Minor inconsistencies in the testimony do not impair the essential veracity of
the victims statements. Whether the accused boxed her or merely threatened her
is immaterial in this case as force and intimidation does not have to be established
when rape is committed against a girl under 12 years of age.

People of the Philippines vs Vicente Ty, et al.

G.R. no. 121519

Kapunan, j.

Facts: Complainant brought her sick seven-month old daughter to Sir John Medical
and Maternity Clinic operated by herein accused appellants. For lack of money,
complainant was not able to pay the bills. She then left the child to the nursery of
the said institution after which a period ensued when nothing was heard from the
mother nor the father. Two years passed and still no contact which prompted the
hospital staff to arrogate the care of the child to one Lilibeth Neri. After five years,
complainant suddenly came back asking for the child hence this case.

Issue: Whether or not accused committed kidnapping and failure to return a minor.

Ruling: Accused-appellants must be acquitted for failure to conclusively show and

establish the filiation of complainant with that of the alleged daughter.
Notwithstanding that fact, the kidnapping must be dismissed for there was no
deliberate intent to commit such act. The facts of tehc ase show that the acts by the
accused were all motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to help the child
and a high regard for her welfare and well-being.

OSMALIK BUSTAMANTE, ET. AL vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATION

COMMISSION
G.R. No. 111651, November 28, 1996
En Banc, Padilla, J.
FACTS:
The Supreme Court First Division rendered a decision awarding backwages to
in favor of petitioners from the time of their illegal dismissal on 25 June 1990 up to
the date of their reinstatement. Private respondent now moves to reconsider the
decision on grounds that computation of backwages should not start from cessation
of work up to actual reinstatement, and that salary earned elsewhere (during the
period of illegal dismissal) should be deducted from the award of such backwages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents contention is correct.
RULING:
No. Presidential Decree No. 442 (the Labor Code of the Philippines) which was
signed into law on 1 May 1974 and which took effect on 1 November 1974. Its
posture on the award of backwages, as amended, was expressed as follows:
"ART. 279. Security of tenure. - In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and to his back wages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
reinstatement. (Underscoring supplied)."
Under the abovequoted provision, it became mandatory to award backwages to
illegally dismissed regular employees. The law specifically declared that the award
of backwages was to be computed from the time compensation was withheld from
the employee up to the time of his reinstatement. This notwithstanding, the rule
generally applied by the Court after the promulgation of the Mercury Drug case,
and during the effectivity of P.D. No. 442 was still the Mercury Drug rule. A survey
of cases from 1974 until 1989, when the amendatory law to P.D. No. 442, namely,
R.A. No. 6715 took effect, supports this conclusion.

APEX MINING COMPANY, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATION COMMISSION

and SINCLITICA CANDIDO
G.R. No. 94951, April 22, 1991
First Division, Gancayco, J.
FACTS:
Private respondent was employed by petitioner to perform laundry services at
its staff house. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However,
eventually she was paid on a monthly basis. Sometime in 1987, while she was
attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally
slipped and hit her back on a stone, as a result she was not able to continue with
her work.
Private respondent was offered the amount of Five Thousand Pesos to
persuade her to quit her job, but she refused and preferred to return to work.
Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and subsequently dismissed her.
Private Respondent claims that she should be treated as a regular employee rather
than a domestic servant or house helper and therefore entitled to reinstatement or
payment of separation pay.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent is an employee of petitioner or domestic helper.
RULING:
Private respondent should be considered an employee. Under Rule XIII,
Section I(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, the terms house helper or domestic
servant shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in
and about the employers home and which services are usually necessary or
desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to
the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers family.
In the case at bar, the definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp
or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who attends
to the needs of the companys guest and other persons availing of said facilities. By
the same token, it cannot be considered to extend to then driver, houseboy, or
gardener exclusively working in the company, the staffhouses and its premises.
They may not be considered as within the meaning of a househelper or domestic
servant. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the
business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS. HON. LEONARDO

QUISUMBING
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
First Division, Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
International School, Inc. (Private Respondent) is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and
other temporary residents. The School adopts a classification of teachers wherein
they are either (1) Foreign-hires or (2) Local-hires. The case stems from the
complaint that Foreign-hires receive a salary 25% more than the local-hires.
Respondent based its contention on valid classification. Accordingly, two
factors came into play namely, (a) the dislocation factor and (b) limited tenure. It
was averred by the respondent school that the compensation scheme is simply the
schools adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms
of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the School was correct in paying foreign-hires more.
RULING:
No. Equal pay for equal work. Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar condition, should be paid
similar salaries. This rule applies to the school, its international character
notwithstanding.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge the burden of proof that
foreign-hires perform 25% more effectively or efficiently than the local-hires. Both
groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar
working conditions.
The constitution enjoins the state to protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare. The state, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but
are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining
agreements included, must yield to the common good. In the case at bar, there is
no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and localhires.

South-West African Cases ICJ Report 1996

Facts:
After WWII, the Union of South Africa, alleging that the Mandate it had been
given by the League of Nations to administer South West Africa had lapsed, sought the
recognition of the United Nations to the integration of the Territory in the Union. The
UN General Assembly asked the Court to advise on the international status of South
West Africa (now Namibia). The Court was asked to determine the meaning of the
sacred trust of civilization accepted by South Africa under the Mandate.
Issues:
Whether or not South West Africa should be absorbed by South Africa under
the Mandate?
Ruling:
No. South West Africa is a territory under the Mandate and South Africa is not
competent to modify the international status of South West Africa. McNair, in a
separate opinion, set out how the Court finds and applies general principles of law.
Article 38(I)(c) allows the Court to apply the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations. This is done by regarding any features or terminology which are
reminiscent of the rules and institutions of private law as an indication of policy and
principles rather than as directly importing these rules and institutions; applying this
to the case at bar, the Court was tasked with interpreting "sacred trust of civilization
historical basis of the legal enforcement of the English trust was that it was binding
upon the conscience of the trustee and thus should be enforceable in law.
There are three general principles which are common to all these institutions:
1. the control of the trustee over the property is limited in one way or
another; he is not in the position of the normal complete owner, who can
do what he likes with his own, as he is precluded from administering the
property for his own personal benefit;
2. the trustee is under some kind of legal obligation, based on confidence
and conscience, to carry out the trust or mission confided to him for the
benefit of some other person or for some public purposes; and
3. any attempt by one of these persons to absorb the property entrusted to
him into his own patrimony would be illegal and would be prevented by
the law;

As a result, it would be in violation of the trust to absorb South West Africa into South
Africa.

Rodriguez v. Attorney General of Canada

3 S.C.R. 519, 1993
Facts:
Sue Rodriguez was a 42 year-old mother who was diagnosed with Amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis in 1992 and by 1993 it was found that she would not live more than a
year, and so she began a crusade to strike down section 241(b) of the Criminal Code,
which made assisted suicide illegal, to the extent that it would be illegal for a
terminally ill person to commit "physician-assisted" suicide. She applied to the
Supreme Court of British Columbia to have section 241(b) of Criminal Code struck
down as it violated sections 7 (the right to "life, liberty, and security of the person), 12
(protection against "cruel and unusual punishment"), and 15(1) (equality) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition of assisted suicide a violation of Sec. 7, 12 and
15 (1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
Held:
No. Justice Sopinka, writing for the majority, found that there was no violation
of section 7 and that though it is true that the prohibition had sufficient connection
with the justice system by its impact on an individual's autonomy and right to life by
causing physical and psychological pain the provision however, did not violate any
principles of fundamental justice. He further examined that the long history of the
prohibition of suicide and concludes that it reflects part of the fundamental values of
society and so could not be in violation of fundamental justice.
In addition, he also rejected the claim that the provision violated the section 12
right against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment as a mere prohibition did
not fall within the meaning of treatment.
Lastly, he considered the section 15 equality challenge and noted that the issue
is best not resolved under this right, but in assuming that it did violate section 15 he
found that it was clearly saved under section 1.