SC Clarifies "Three-Term Limit" Rule, Proclaims Abundo Winner of 2010

Mayoral Elections in Viga, Catanduanes

Posted: F

ABUNDO vs COMELEC

The Supreme Court En Banc has partly granted the petition for certiorari under rule 65 of Abelardo Abundo, Sr.,
Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, setting aside the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division Resolution
dated February 8, 2012, COMELECs En Banc resolution in EAC (EA) No. A-25-2010 dated May 10, 2012, and the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes Branch 43s Decision in Election Case No. 55 dated August 9, 2010,
which declared Abundo ineligible to run in the 2010 Mayoral elections of Viga, Catanduanes under the three-term
limit rule.
Abundo ran for the position of Municipal Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes in the years 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010. He
was proclaimed winner of the 2001 and 2007 elections. In the 2004 election, however, Jose Torres was proclaimed
the winner of the electoral race and Mayor of Viga, performing the functions of the office. Abundo protested Torres
election and was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. He assumed office from May
9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007.
As a result of such reversal, the Court declared Abundo eligible for another term as Mayor to which he was duly
elected in the May 2010 elections and immediately reinstated him to such position. Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O.
Cervantes were also ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes,
respectively and to revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and first Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of
this Decision, which is immediately executory. The Court likewise lifted the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) it
issued on July 3, 2012 to restrain the COMELEC from enforcing the abovementioned resolutions.
As provided for in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of the Local Government Code, the
three-term limit rule constitutes a disqualification to run for an elective local office when an official has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and has fully served those three consecutive terms.
In the Courts 35-page decision, written by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., it unanimously held that Abundo did not
serve three consecutive terms as Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes due to an actual involuntary interruption during the
2004-2007 term. This was because he assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served a little over one
year and one month only. Thus, the two-year period which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be
considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundos case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule,
ruled the Court.
The Court further ruled that the COMELEC erred in applying Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, which held
that service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is
considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule as the doctrine refers to
a situation where the elected official is under preventive suspension and is only temporarily unable to discharge his
functions yet is still entitled to the office as compared to the situation of Abundo where he did not have title to the
office. The Court emphasized that pending the favorable resolution of Abundos election protest, he was relegated to
being an ordinary constituent and private citizen since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was
occupying the mayoralty seat. While awaiting the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising
power or authority over the constituents of Viga and cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he
was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner. It stressed that Abundos case differs from other cases involving the
effects of an election protest because while Abundo was the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right
and opportunity to serve his constitutents.
In his separate opinion, Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote to briefly expound on the Courts ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections which the COMELEC erroneously relied upon in affirming the grant of the quo
warranto petition against Abundo, and to express my own views on how our present Decision should be read in light
of other three-term limit cases that have been decided under a protest case scenario. He stressed that the Court
cannot avoid considering the attendant factual and legal realities, based on the requirements that Borja established,
and has no choice but to adjust its appreciation of these realities, as may be necessary.
Justice Brion agreed that the Aldovino ruling relied upon by COMELEC cannot be used as a basis for the conclusion
that there had been no interruption in the case of Abundo - the eventual winner who is so recognized only after

winning his protest case. Notably in Aldovino, while preventive suspension is an involuntary imposition, what it
affects is merely the authority to discharge the functions of an office that the suspended local official continues to
hold the local elective official continues to possess title to his office while under preventive suspension, so that no
interruption of his term ensues.
After discussing the prevailing jurisprudence cited by the majority (Ong v. Alegre, Lonzanida v. Commission on
Elections, and Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections), Justice Brion pointed out that the differing factual situations
of the cited cases and Abundo that necessarily gave rise to different perspectives in appreciating the same legal
question, immediately suggest that the Courts ruling in the cited cases cannot simply be combined nor wholly be
bodily lifted and applied to Abundo. At the simplest, both Lonzanida and Ong were protestees who faced the same
legal reality of losing the election, although Ong fully served the elected term; for Abundo, the legal reality is his
recognized and declared election victory, In terms of factual reality, Lonzanida and Abundo may be the same since
they only partially served their term, but this similarity is fully negated by their differing legal realities with respect to
the element of election. Ong and Abundo, on the other hand, have differing legal and factual realities; aside from
their differing election results, Ong served the full term, while Abundo only enjoyed abbreviated term.
Based on this analysis, Justice Brion concluded his separate opinion by stressing that Abundo should not be
considered to have been elected for the full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule, despite the legal reality that
he won the election; as in Ong, the factual reality should prevail, and that reality is that he served for less than this full
term. Thus, where less than a full term is served by a winning protestant, no continous and uninterrupted term
should be recognized. This is the view that best serves the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro joined Justice Brions separate opinion.
The Court also summarized the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and involuntary
interruption.
Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections provides that when a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the
official merely assumed the position through succession, his service for the unexpired portion of the term cannot be
treated as one full term.
Montebon v. Commission on Elections supplemented this by saying that if the official runs again for the same
position he held rior to his assumption of the higher office, his succession to said position is by operation of law and is
considered an involuntary severance or interruption.
On the issue of recall elections, Adormeo v. Commission on Elections and Socrates v. Commission on Elections held
that an elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for
what could be his fourth trm, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the officials
servicefor he had become in the interim a private citizen.
Latasa v. Commission on Elections ruled that the abolition of an elective office due to the conversion of a
municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent officials continuity of service.
As mentioned above, Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections states that preventive suspension is not a term
interrupting event as the elective officers continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the
period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of the office during this period.
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections and Dizon v. Commission on Elections continued on to rule that when a
candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he losess
in an election protest and is ousted from office. An interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary is sufficient to break the continuity of service.
Lastly, Ong v. Alegre and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections declared when an official is defeated in an election
protest and decision becomes final only after the official had served the full term for the office, then his loss in the
election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His
full service should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after
the expiration of the term. (GR No. 201716, Abundo v. Commission on Elections, January 8, 2013)
x x x."

Posted by Philippine Laws and Cases - Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr. at 6:17 PM