Digest Activity

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 199082
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairperson Sixto S.

Brillantes, Jr., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, represented by Secretary
Leila M. De Lima, JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, SENATOR AQUILINO M. PIMENTEL III,
and DOJ-COMELEC FACT FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
July 23, 2013
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON.
LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as
Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJCOMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACTFINDING TEAM, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution are the separate motions for reconsideration filed by
movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA)1 in G.R. No. 199118 and Jose
Miguel T. Arroyo (Mike Arroyo )2 in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the
Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012
Decision3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against
respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of
Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint
DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee)
and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.
G.R. No. 199085

BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON.
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as COMELEC
Chairperson; RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO V. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S.
LIM AND AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, in their capacity as COMELEC
COMMISSIONERS; CLARO A. ARELLANO, GEORGE C. DEE,
JACINTO G. ANG, ROMEO B. FORTES AND MICHAEL D. VILLARET,
in their capacity as CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS,
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON THE 2004 AND 2007 ELECTION
FRAUD, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 199118
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
For a better perspective, we briefly state the relevant factual and

procedural antecedents as found by the Court in the assailed decision, to
wit:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No.
001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team (referred to as Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee
was mandated to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on the
basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the
Fact-Finding Team. The Fact-Finding Team, on the other hand, was
created for the purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial
evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be
conducted by the Joint Committee. Pursuant to Section 7 4 of the Joint
Order, on August 23, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated its Rules of
Procedure.
In its Initial Report5 dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team
concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial
elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and
Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated.6 The Fact-Finding Team
recommended, among others, that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.

(Abalos) be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage
for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South
Cotabato; that GMA and Abalos be subjected to another preliminary
investigation for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao;7 and,
that Mike Arroyo be subjected to further investigation. 8 The case was
docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-2011.
On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a Joint

Resolution which was later indorsed to the Comelec.20 On November 18,
2011, the Comelec en banc issued a Resolution21 approving and adopting
the Joint Resolution subject to modifications. The Comelec resolved,
among others, that an information for electoral sabotage be filed against
GMA and Abalos, while the charges against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Pimentel filed a

ComplaintAffidavit9 for Electoral Sabotage against petitioners and twelve
others, and several John Does and Jane Does. The case was docketed
as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011.
On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelecs Law

Department filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasay City, an
Information against petitioner GMA, Governor Andal Ampatuan, Sr., and
Atty. Lintang H. Bedol, for violation of Section 42(b)(3) of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9369, amending Section 27 (b) of RA 6646, docketed as
Criminal Case No. RPSY-11-04432-CR.22 The case was raffled to Branch
112 and the corresponding Warrant of Arrest was issued which was
served on GMA on the same day.23
On October 24, 2011, the Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against
petitioners in DOJ-Comelec Case Nos. 001-2011 and 002-2011. 10 On
November 3, 2011, petitioners, through counsel, appeared before the
Joint Committee11 and respondents therein were ordered to submit their
Counter-Affidavits by November 14, 2011.12
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing
the creation of the Joint Panel.13 The petitions were eventually
consolidated.
On November 14, 2011, Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings14 before the Joint Committee, in view of the pendency of his
petition before the Court. On the same day, GMA filed before the Joint
Committee an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam15 to require Senator
Pimentel to furnish her with documents referred to in his complaintaffidavit and for the production of election documents as basis for the
charge of electoral sabotage. GMA prayed that she be allowed to file her
counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt of the requested
documents.16 Petitioner Abalos, for his part, filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam),17 in view of the pendency of
his petition brought before the Court.
In an Order18 dated November 15, 2011, the Joint Committee denied the
aforesaid motions of petitioners. GMA, subsequently, filed a motion for
reconsideration.19
On November 18, 2011, GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus
Motion Ad Cautelam24 with leave to allow the Joint Committee to resolve
the motion for reconsideration filed by GMA, to defer issuance of a
warrant of arrest and a hold departure order, and to proceed to judicial
determination of probable cause. She, likewise, filed with the Comelec a
Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam25 praying that its Resolution be vacated for
being null and void. The RTC, nonetheless, issued a Warrant for her
arrest which was duly served. GMA was later arraigned and she entered
a plea of "not guilty." She was, for some time, on hospital arrest but was
able to obtain temporary liberty when her motion for bail was granted. At
present, she is again on hospital arrest by virtue of a warrant issued in
another criminal case.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions and supplemental
petitions are DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution No. 9266 dated August 2,
2011, Joint Order No. 001-2011 dated August 15, 2011, and the FactFinding Teams Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared
VALID. However, the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary
Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007
National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the proceedings

having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the
conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.
Let the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
112, where the criminal cases for electoral sabotage against petitioners
GMA and Abalos are pending, proceed with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.26
Hence, these motions for reconsideration.
Issues
Mike Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the independence of the
Comelec as basis in nullifying the subject joint DOJ-Comelec resolutions.
Echoing Justice Arturo Brion in his Dissenting and Concurring
Opinion,27 Mike Arroyo insists that the creation of the Joint Panel
undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec. 28
Mike Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ should conduct preliminary
investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise
concurrent jurisdiction.29 Finally, as has been repeatedly pointed out in his
earlier pleadings before the Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the
proceedings involving the electoral sabotage case were rushed because
of pressures from the executive branch of the government. 30
For her part, GMA claims that in availing of the procedural remedies
available, she merely exercised her earnest efforts to defend herself and
should not have been deemed by the Court as acts which purportedly
tend to demonstrate that she either waived or forfeited her right to submit
her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence.31 Citing several cases
decided by the Court, she likewise faults the Court in not upholding her
right to ask for additional time within which to submit her counter-affidavit
and countervailing evidence.32 GMA highlights that the subject Comelec
Resolution creating the Joint Panel is different from the previous Comelec
resolutions requesting the DOJ Secretary to assign prosecutors to assist
the Comelec, as the latter emphasize the role of the DOJ as deputized
agency in the conduct of preliminary investigation. She maintains that it is
the Comelec and not the Joint Committee that has the primary, if not
exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary investigation of election

cases.33
In their Consolidated Comment,34 respondents defend the creation of the
Joint Committee and argue that it does not undermine the independence
of the Comelec as a constitutional body because it is still the Comelec
that ultimately determines probable cause.35 As to the conduct of the
preliminary investigation, respondents maintain that no rights were
violated as GMA was afforded the opportunity to defend herself, submit
her counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence. 36 They, thus,
consider GMAs claim of availing of the remedial measures as "delaying
tactics" employed to thwart the investigation of charges against her by
the Joint Committee.37
The Courts Ruling
Clearly from the above discussion, movants raise issues that have been
thoroughly explained by the Court in the assailed decision. The issues
were all addressed and the explanation was exhaustive, thus, we find no
reason to disturb the Courts conclusions.
At any rate, if only to address the motions of the movants herein and to
put an end to the questions attached to the creation of the Joint Panel
and, consequently, to the performance of their assigned tasks, we hereby
reiterate our findings and conclusions made in the assailed decision.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of
whether the Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate and
prosecute cases of violations of election laws. In Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v.
Commission on Elections,38 the constitutionality of Section 4339 of RA
936940 had already been raised by petitioners therein and addressed by
the Court. While recognizing the Comelecs exclusive power to
investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or
the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the
1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a
legislative enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA
9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other
prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise
concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election
offenses.
Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a discrepancy between

Comelec Resolution No. 346741 dated January 12, 2001 and Joint Order
No. 001-2011, dated August 15, 2011, creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. However, GMA seemed
to miss the date when these two resolutions were promulgated by the
Comelec. It is noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No. 3467 was issued
when Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code was still effective, while
Joint Order No. 001-2011 as well as Comelec Resolution Nos. 8733 42 and
905743 mentioned in the assailed decision but missed out by GMA in her
motion, were issued during the effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369, giving
the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government the
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses.
This amendment paved the way for the discrepancy. In Comelec
Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec maintained the continuing deputation
of prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department was tasked to
supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the task force
pursuant to the mandate of the Omnibus Election Code. However, with
the amendment, the Comelec likewise changed the tenor of the later
resolutions to reflect the new mandate of the Comelec and other
prosecuting arms of the government now exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. Thus, the Comelec Law Department and the Office of the
Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the
investigatory and prosecutory functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force.
Considering, therefore, that the later resolutions, including Joint Order
No. 001-2011, were issued pursuant to Section 43 of RA 9369 amending
Section 265 of BP 881 which was declared "constitutional" in Banat, there
is no reason for us to declare otherwise. To maintain the previous role of
other prosecuting arms of the government as mere deputies despite the
amendment would mean challenging Section 43 of RA 9369 anew which
has already been settled in Banat.
as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately

acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same
complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent
assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will
not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that
first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others.
To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the

concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law. As
we explained in our September 18, 2012 Decision:
Finally, we focus on the validity of the preliminary investigation conducted

by the Joint Committee.
x x x The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to

deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the
petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power
between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where
one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such
The procedure in conducting the preliminary investigation is governed by

Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. Under both Rules,46 the respondent shall
submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting
documents relied upon for his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt
of the subpoena, with the complaint and supporting affidavits and
xxxx
None of these problems would likely arise in the present case. The
Comelec and the DOJ themselves agreed that they would exercise their
concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was
conducted on the basis of two complaints the initial report of the FactFinding Team and the complaint of Senator Pimentel both complaints
were filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints were
filed with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only one
investigative body. Thus, we find no reason to disallow the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is
especially true in this case given the magnitude of the crimes allegedly
committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation also serves
to maximize the resources and manpower of both the Comelec and the
DOJ for the prompt disposition of the cases.44
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the
DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order
whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause
for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance
with the Comelec Rules of Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that
we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication
of the Comelecs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
documents.47Also in both Rules, respondent is given the right to examine

evidence, but such right of examination is limited only to the documents
or evidence submitted by complainants which she may not have been
furnished and to copy them at her expense.48
As to the alleged denial of GMAs right to examine documents, we
maintain that no right was violated in view of the limitation of such right as
set forth above. We reiterate our explanation in the assailed decision, to
wit:
While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain election
documents which served as bases in the allegations of significant
findings specific to the protested municipalities involved, there were no
annexes or attachments to the complaint filed. As stated in the Joint
Committees Order dated November 15, 2011 denying GMAs Omnibus
Motion Ad Cautelam, Senator Pimentel was ordered to furnish petitioners
with all the supporting evidence. However, Senator Pimentel manifested
that he was adopting all the affidavits attached to the Fact-Finding Teams
Initial Report. Therefore, when GMA was furnished with the documents
attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the right to
examine as guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Those were the only documents submitted
by the complainants to the Committee. If there are other documents that
were referred to in Senator Pimentels complaint but were not submitted
to the Joint Committee, the latter considered those documents
unnecessary at that point (without foreclosing the relevance of other
evidence that may later be presented during the trial) as the evidence
submitted before it were considered adequate to find probable cause
against her. x x x49
counter-affidavits when the interest of justice demands that respondent

be given reasonable time or sufficient opportunity to engage the services
of counsel; examine voluminous records submitted in support of the
complaint or undertake research on novel, complicated or technical
questions or issues of law and facts of the case.51
In this case, GMA claimed that she could not submit her counteraffidavit
within the prescribed period because she needed to examine documents
mentioned in Senator Pimentels complaint-affidavit. It appeared,
however, that said documents were not submitted to the Joint Committee
and the only supporting documents available were those attached to the
Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team. Admittedly, GMA was furnished
those documents. Thus, at the time she asked for the extension of time
within which to file her counter-affidavit, she very well knew that the
documents she was asking were not in the record of the case. Obviously,
she was not furnished those documents because they were not
submitted to the Joint Committee. Logically, she has no right to examine
said documents. We cannot, therefore, fault the Joint Committee in
consequently denying her motion for extension to file counter-affidavit as
there was no compelling justification for the non-observance of the period
she was earlier required to follow.
And as we held in the assailed decision:
There might have been overzealousness on the part of the Joint
Committee in terminating the investigation, endorsing the Joint
Resolution to the Comelec for approval, and in filing the information in
court.
1wphi1
Neither was GMAs right violated when her motion for extension of time
within which to submit her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence
was consequently denied. The Rules use the term "shall" in requiring the
respondent to submit counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence
within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena. It is settled that the use
of the word "shall" which is a word of command, underscores the
mandatory character of the rule.50 As in any other rule, though, liberality in
the application may be allowed provided that the party is able to present
a compelling justification for the non-observance of the mandatory rules.
In the 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, investigating prosecutors
allow or grant motions or requests for extension of time to submit
However, speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or

quasijudicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious
performance of functions. The orderly administration of justice remains
the paramount consideration with particular regard to the peculiar
circumstances of each case. To be sure, petitioners were given the
opportunity to present countervailing evidence. Instead of complying with
the Joint Committees directive, several motions were filed but were
denied by the Joint Committee. Consequently, petitioners right to submit
counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence was forfeited. Taking into
account the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases and
following the procedures set forth in the Rules on Criminal Procedure and
the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the Joint Committee finally reached its
conclusion and referred the case to the Comelec. The latter, in turn,
performed its task and filed the information in court. Indeed, petitioners
were given the opportunity to be heard. They even actively participated in
the proceedings and in fact filed several motions before the Joint
Committee. Consistent with the constitutional mandate of speedy
disposition of cases, unnecessary delays should be avoided. 52
Finally, in our assailed decision, we already took judicial notice that not
only did GMA enter a plea of "not guilty," she also filed a Motion for Bail
and after due hearing, it was granted. Apparently, she benefited from the
RTC Order giving her temporary liberty. In filing the motion before the
RTC and actively participating therein, she has chosen to seek judicial
remedy before the RTC where the electoral sabotage case is pending
instead of the executive remedy of going back to the Joint Committee for
the submission of her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence.
Besides, as thoroughly discussed in the assailed decision, the irregularity
or even the absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information filed against her.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions for Reconsideration
are DENIED for lack of merit.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 185740
July 23, 2013
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE,

represented by GOVERNOR JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
BEATRIZ O. GONZALES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Provincial Government of Camarines Norte's (petitioner)
petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated June 25,
2008 and the Resolution3 dated December 2, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97425, reinstating respondent Beatriz
O. Gonzales as the Province of Camarines Nortes provincial
administrator, or to an equivalent position.
Factual Antecedents
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province
of Camarines Norte by then Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991.
Her appointment was on a permanent capacity. On March 8, 1999,
Governor Jess B. Pimentel sent Gonzales a memorandum directing her
to explain in writing why no administrative charges should be filed against
her for gross insubordination/gross discourtesy in the course of official
duties, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service;
this was later on captioned as Administrative Case No. 001. After
Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee
found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to
Governor Pimentel that she be held administratively liable.4 On
September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc
Investigation Committees recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.5
Proceedings before the Civil Service Commission
Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentels decision to the Civil Service

Commission (CSC). The CSC issued Resolution No. 001418 6 modifying
Governor Pimentels decision, finding Gonzales guilty of insubordination
and suspending her for six months. This decision was appealed by
Governor Pimentel, which the CSC denied in its Resolution No. 001952. 7
Gonzales then filed a motion for execution and clarification of Resolution
No. 001418, in which she claimed that she had already served her sixmonth suspension and asked to be reinstated. The CSC issued
Resolution No. 002245,8 which directed Gonzales reinstatement.
Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on
October 12, 2000, but terminated her services the next day for lack of
confidence. He then wrote a letter9 to the CSC reporting his compliance
with its order, and Gonzales subsequent dismissal as a confidential
employee. In his letter, Governor Pimentel cited Resolution No.
0001158,10 where the CSC ruled that the provincial administrator position
is highly confidential and is coterminous in nature.
The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008, 11 which again
directed Gonzales reinstatement as provincial administrator. It clarified
that while the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. RA
7160) made the provincial administrator position coterminous and highly
confidential in nature, this conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials
who were already issued permanent appointments as administrators prior
to the new laws effectivity. According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired
a vested right to her permanent appointment as provincial administrator
and is entitled to continue holding this office despite its subsequent
classification as a coterminous position. The conversion of the provincial
administrator position from a career to a non-career service should not
jeopardize Gonzales security of tenure guaranteed to her by the
Constitution. As a permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be removed
for cause, after due notice and hearing. Loss of trust and confidence is
not among the grounds for a permanent appointees dismissal or
discipline under existing laws.
In a letter12 dated February 17, 2005, Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging
that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines Nortes incumbent
governor, refused to reinstate her. The CSC responded with Resolution
No. 061988,13 which ordered Gonzales reinstatement to the provincial
administrator position, or to an equivalent position.Thus, the petitioner,
through Governor Typoco, filed a petition for review before the CA,
seeking to nullify the CSCs Resolution No. 030008 and Resolution No.
061988.
The Appellate Courts Ruling
The CA supported the CSCs ruling that reinstated Gonzales as provincial
administrator or to an equivalent position.14
Citing Aquino v. Civil Service Commission,15 the CA emphasized that an
appointee acquires a legal right to his position once he assumes a
position in the civil service under a completed appointment. This legal
right is protected both by statute and the Constitution, and he cannot be
removed from office without cause and previous notice and hearing.
Appointees cannot be removed at the mere will of those vested with the
power of removal, or without any cause.
The CA then enumerated the list of valid causes for a public officers
removal under Section 46,16 Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Revised
Administrative Code (Administrative Code), and noted that lack of
confidence was not in the list. Thus, the CA concluded that Gonzales
dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence violated her security of
tenure, and that she has the right to be reinstated with payment of
backwages.
The CA further held that Gonzales dismissal was illegal because it was
done without due process. The proceedings under Administrative Case
No. 001 cannot be the basis for complying with the requirements of due
process because they are separate and distinct from the proceedings in
the present controversy. Thus, Gonzales was illegally terminated when
she was dismissed for lack of confidence, without any hearing, the day
after she was reinstated.
In its present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner argues that
the provincial administrator position has been converted into a highly
confidential, coterminous position by RA 7160. Hence, Gonzales no
longer enjoyed security of tenure to the position she held prior to RA
7160s enactment.
In her Comment19 and Memorandum,20 Gonzales maintained that the
provincial administrator remained a career service position. Section 721 of
Presidential Decree No. 807, which was one of the bases of the Court in
Laurel V v. Civil Service Commission22 to declare the provincial
administrator as a career service position, is a verbatim copy of Section
7,23 Chapter 2 of the Administrative Code. This classification, established
by law and jurisprudence, cannot be altered by the mere implementing
rules and regulations of RA 7160. And assuming arguendo that the
provincial administrator position has indeed become a primarily
confidential position, this reclassification should not apply retroactively to
Gonzales appointment on a permanent capacity prior to RA 7160s
effectivity.
Issues
The parties arguments, properly joined, present to us the following
issues:
1) Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial
administrator position from a career service to a primarily
confidential, non-career service position; and
2) Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as
provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte.
The Courts Ruling
Lastly, the CA noted that Resolution No. 002245, which modified

Governor Pimentels decision, has long been final and executory. The
petitioner did not file any petition for reconsideration against Resolution
No. 002245, and hence, it is no longer alterable.
The petitioner sought a reconsideration17 of the CAs Decision, which the
CA denied in a Resolution18 dated December 2, 2008.
The Present Petition
We find the petition meritorious.

Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator position as a
primarily confidential, non-career position
We support the CSCs conclusion that the provincial administrator
position has been classified into a primarily confidential, non-career
position when Congress, through RA 7160, made substantial changes to
it. First, prior to RA 7160, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the old Local
Government Code (LGC), did not include a provincial administrator
position among the listing of mandatory provincial officials,24 but

empowered the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to create such other offices
as might then be necessary to carry out the purposes of the provincial
government.25 RA 7160 made the position mandatory for every
province.26 Thus, the creation of the provincial administrator position
under the old LGC used to be a prerogative of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
Second, in introducing the mandatory provincial administrator position,
RA 7160 also amended the qualifications for the provincial administrator
position. While Section 48027 of RA 7160 retained the requirement of civil
service eligibility for a provincial administrator, together with the
educational requirements, it shortened the six-year work experience
requirement to five years.28 It also mandated the additional requirements
of residence in the local government concerned, and imposed a good
moral character requirement.
Third, RA 7160 made the provincial administrator position coterminous
with its appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-career service
position that is primarily confidential.
Before RA 7160 took effect, Laurel classified the provincial administrator
position as an open career position which required qualification in an
appropriate examination prior to appointment. Laurel placed the
provincial administrator position under the second major level of positions
in the career service under Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 807.
This provision reads:
Section 7. Classes of Positions in the Career Service.
(a) Classes of positions in the career service appointment to which
requires examinations shall be grouped into three major levels as follows:
governors direction for the province with what the provincial

administrator would implement. In contrast with the general direction
provided by the provincial governor under the Manual of Position
Descriptions cited in Laurel, Section 480(b) of RA 7160 now mandates
constant interaction between the provincial administrator and the
provincial governor, to wit:
(b) The administrator shall take charge of the office of the administrator
and shall:
(1) Develop plans and strategies and upon approval thereof by
the governor or mayor, as the case may be, implement the same
particularly those which have to do with the management and
administration-related programs and projects which the governor
or mayor is empowered to implement and which the sanggunian
is empowered to provide for under this Code;
(2) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the
administrator shall:
(i) Assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of the local
government unit, under the supervision, direction, and control of the
governor or mayor, and for this purpose, he may convene the chiefs of
offices and other officials of the local government unit;
xxxx
(4) Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor and mayor,
as the case may be, on all other matters relative to the management and
administration of the local government unit. [emphases and italics ours]
2. The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific

positions which involve professional, technical, or scientific work in a nonsupervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of
college work up to Division Chief level.
As the CSC correctly noted in Resolution No. 0001158,29 the

administrator position demands a close intimate relationship with the
office of the governor (its appointing authority) to effectively develop,
implement and administer the different programs of the province. The
administrators functions are to recommend to the Sanggunian and to
advise the governor on all matters regarding the management and
administration of the province, thus requiring that its occupant enjoy the
governors full trust and confidence.
Section 480 of RA 7160 made the provincial administrators functions

closely related to the prevailing provincial administration by identifying the
incumbent with the provincial governor to ensure the alignment of the
To emphasize the close relations that the provincial administrators

functions have with the office of the governor, RA 7160 even made the
provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing
xxxx
authority.30 This provision, along with the interrelations between the

provincial administrator and governor under Section 480, renders clear
the intent of Congress to make the provincial administrator position
primarily confidential under the non-career service category of the civil
service.
Congress reclassification of the provincial administrator position in RA
7160 is a valid exercise of legislative power that does not violate
Gonzales security of tenure
Having established that Congress has changed the nature of the
provincial administrator position to a primarily confidential employee, the
next question to address would be its impact on Gonzales security of
tenure. According to the petitioner, Gonzales lost her security of tenure
when the provincial administrator position became a primarily confidential
position. Gonzales, on the other hand, retorted that the conversion of the
position should not be retroactively applied to her, as she is a permanent
appointee. Both the CA and the CSC ruled in favor of the latter, and gave
premium to Gonzales original permanent appointment under the old
LGC. They posit that Gonzales acquired a vested legal right over her
position from the moment she assumed her duties as provincial
administrator. Thus, she cannot be removed from office except for cause
and after due hearing; otherwise such removal would amount to a
violation of her security of tenure.
The arguments presented by the parties and ruled upon by the CA reflect
a conceptual entanglement between the nature of the position and an
employees right to hold a position. These two concepts are different. The
nature of a position may change by law according to the dictates of
Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that
enjoys constitutional and statutory guarantee, but may itself change
according to the nature of the position.
Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial
changes in the provincial administrator position and to reclassify it as a
primarily confidential, non-career service position. Flowing from the
legislative power to create public offices is the power to abolish and
modify them to meet the demands of society;31 Congress can change the
qualifications for and shorten the term of existing statutory offices. When
done in good faith, these acts would not violate a public officers security
of tenure, even if they result in his removal from office or the shortening
of his term.32 Modifications in public office, such as changes in
qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in good faith so long
as they are aimed at the office and not at the incumbent. 33
In Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon,34 for instance, Congress

enacted a law modifying the offices in the Board of Dental Examiners.
The new law, RA 546, raised the qualifications for the board members,
and provided for a different appointment process. Dr. Alfonso C. Salcedo
and Dr. Pascual Ignacio, who were incumbent board members at the time
RA 546 took effect, filed a special civil action for quo warranto against
their replacements, arguing that their term of office under the old law had
not yet expired, and neither had they abandoned or been removed from
office for cause. We dismissed their petition, and held that Congress may,
by law, terminate the term of a public office at any time and even while it
is occupied by the incumbent. Thus, whether Dr. Salcedo and Dr. Ignacio
were removed for cause or had abandoned their office is immaterial.
More recently, in Dimayuga v. Benedicto II,35 we upheld the removal of
Chona M. Dimayuga, a permanent appointee to the Executive Director II
position, which was not part of the career executive service at the time of
her appointment. During her incumbency, the CSC, by authority granted
under Presidential Decree No. 1, classified the Executive Director II
position to be within the career executive service. Since Dimayuga was
not a career executive service officer, her initially permanent appointment
to the position became temporary; thus, she could be removed from
office at any time.
In the current case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not abolish the
provincial administrator position but significantly modified many of its
aspects. It is now a primarily confidential position under the non-career
service tranche of the civil service. This change could not have been
aimed at prejudicing Gonzales, as she was not the only provincial
administrator incumbent at the time RA 7160 was enacted. Rather, this
change was part of the reform measures that RA 7160 introduced to
further empower local governments and decentralize the delivery of
public service. Section 3(b) of RA 7160 provides as one of its operative
principles that:
(b) There shall be established in every local government unit an
accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and
operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service
requirements of its communities.
Thus, Gonzales permanent appointment as provincial administrator prior
to the enactment of RA 7160 is immaterial to her removal as provincial
administrator. For purposes of determining whether Gonzales termination
violated her right to security of tenure, the nature of the position she
occupied at the time of her removal should be considered, and not
merely the nature of her appointment at the time she entered government
service.
the event that the Court determines that the position is actually
confidential in nature:
In echoing the CSC and the CAs conclusion, the dissenting opinion
posits the view that security of tenure protects the permanent
appointment of a public officer, despite subsequent changes in the nature
of his position.
The Court is aware that this decision has repercussions on the tenure of
other corporate secretaries in various GOCCs. The officers likely
assumed their positions on permanent career status, expecting protection
for their tenure and appointments, but are now re-classified as primarily
confidential appointees. Such concern is unfounded, however, since the
statutes themselves do not classify the position of corporate secretary as
permanent and career in nature. Moreover, there is no absolute
guarantee that it will not be classified as confidential when a dispute
arises. As earlier stated, the Court, by legal tradition, has the power to
make a final determination as to which positions in government are
primarily confidential or otherwise. In the light of the instant controversy,
the Court's view is that the greater public interest is served if the position
of a corporate secretary is classified as primarily confidential in nature. 38
Citing Gabriel v. Domingo,36 the dissenting opinion quotes our categorical

declaration that "a permanent employee remains a permanent employee
unless he is validly terminated," and from there attempts to draw an
analogy between Gabriel and the case at hand.
The very first sentence of Gabriel spells out its vast difference from the
present case. The sole and main issue in Gabriel is whether backwages
and other monetary benefits could be awarded to an illegally dismissed
government employee, who was later ordered reinstated. From this
sentence alone can be discerned that the issues involved related to the
consequences of illegal dismissal rather than to the dismissal itself.
Nowhere in Gabrielwas there any mention of a change in the nature of
the position held by the public officer involved.
Further, key factual differences make Gabriel inapplicable to the present
case, even if only by analogy: first, the public officer in Gabriel received a
Memorandum stating that he would be appointed as Transportation
District Supervisor III under their office reorganization. Second, the Court
in Gabriel clearly pointed out that the reason for his eventual appointment
as a casual employee, which led to his termination from service, was due
to a pending protest he filed before the CSC indicating that there was
no ground for him to not receive the appointment earlier promised. In
contrast, the issue of Gonzales is whether the appointing authoritys lack
of trust and confidence in the appointee was sufficient cause for the
termination of employment of a primarily confidential employee. And third,
there was a change in the position held by the public officer in Gabriel.
He was a permanent employee who was extended a different
appointment, which was casual in nature, because of a protest that he
earlier filed. In contrast, the current case involves a public officer who
held the same position whose nature changed because of the passage of
RA 7160.
The dissent also quotes the penultimate paragraph of Civil Service
Commission v. Javier37 to support its contention that permanent
appointees could expect protection for their tenure and appointments in
The quoted portion, however, even bolsters our theory. Read together
with its succeeding paragraph, the quoted portion in Civil Service
Commission v. Javier39 actually stands for the proposition that other
corporate secretaries in government-owned and controlled corporations
cannot expect protection for their tenure and appointments upon the
reclassification of their position to a primarily confidential position. There,
the Court emphasized that these officers cannot rely on the statutes
providing for their permanent appointments, if and when the Court
determines these to be primarily confidential. In the succeeding
paragraph after the portion quoted by the dissent, we even pointed out
that there is no vested right to public office, nor is public service a
property right. Thus:
Moreover, it is a basic tenet in the country's constitutional system that
"public office is a public trust," and that there is no vested right in public
office, nor an absolute right to hold office. No proprietary title attaches to
a public office, as public service is not a property right. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office. The
rule is that offices in government, except those created by the
constitution, may be abolished, altered, or created anytime by statute.
And any issues on the classification for a position in government may be
brought to and determined by the courts.40 (emphases and italics ours)
Executive Order No. 503 does not grant Gonzales security of tenure in
the provincial administrator position on a permanent capacity
In extending security of tenure to Gonzales permanent appointment as

provincial administrator, the dissenting opinion cites as authority
Executive Order No. (EO) 503 which provided certain safeguards against
the termination of government employees affected by the implementation
of RA 7160. According to the dissenting opinion, EO 503 is an obvious
indication of the executive departments intent to protect and uphold both
the national government and the local government employees security of
tenure. It cites Section 2(a), paragraph 8 (providing for the tenure of an
administrator) to prove its point:
8. Incumbents of positions, namely administrator, legal officer, and
information officer declared by the Code as coterminous, who hold
permanent appointments, shall continue to enjoy their permanent status
until they vacate their positions.
At first glance, EO 503 does seem to extend the provincial administrators
security of tenure in their permanent appointments even beyond the
effectivity of RA 7160. EO 503, however, does not apply to employees of
the local government affected by RA 7160s enactment. The title of EO
503 clearly provides for its scope of application, to wit:
Executive Order No. 503. Providing for the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Transfer of Personnel and Assets, Liabilities and
Records of National Government Agencies whose Functions are to be
Devolved to the Local Government Units and for other Related Purposes.
[underscore, italics and emphases ours]
A reading of EO 503s whereas clauses confirms that it applies only to
national government employees whose functions are to be devolved to
local governments:
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Code, transfers
the responsibility for the delivery of basic services and facilities from the
national government agencies (NGAs) concerned to the local
government units (LGUs);
WHEREAS, the Code stipulated that the transfer of basic services and
facilities shall be accompanied by the transfer of the national personnel
concerned and assets to ensure continuity in the delivery of such
services and facilities;
WHEREAS, responsive rules and regulations are needed to affect the

required transfer of national personnel concerned and assets to the
LGUs. [underscores, italics and emphases ours]
Thus, paragraph 8, section 2(a) of EO 503 cannot apply to Gonzales, a
provincial administrator. As explained earlier, the existence of the
provincial administrator position was a prerogative of the Sanggunian
Panlalawigan, and was not even a mandatory public office under the old
LGC. It is clearly not a national government position whose functions are
to be devolved to the local governments.
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, argues that EO 503 does not
apply to national government employees only. According to the dissent,
the phrase "and for related purposes" in EO 503s title could encompass
personnel not necessarily employed by national government agencies
but by local government units such as the administrator, the legal officer
and the information officer, as enumerated in Section 2(a), paragraph 8
thereof. This provision, according to the dissent, fills the crucial gap left
by RA 7160 which did not provide whether the term of an incumbent
provincial administrator would automatically become coterminous with
that of the appointing authority upon RA 7160s effectivity.
This kind of construction effectively adds to EO 503s object matters that
it did not explicitly provide for. The phrase "and for other related
purposes" can only add to EO 503 matters related to the devolution of
personnel, basic services and facilities to local government units. The
impact of the change in a local government positions nature is clearly
different from the implementation of devolution and its ancillary effects:
the former involves a change in a local government positions functions
and concept of tenure, while the latter involves (among other things) the
transfer of national government employees to local government units.
This difference is highlighted by the fact that EO 503, as reflected by its
whereas clauses, was issued to implement Section 17 of RA 7160. In
contrast, the change in the nature of the provincial administrator position
may be gleaned from Section 480 of RA 7160. Hence, by no stretch of
reasonable construction can the phrase "and for other related purposes"
in EO 503s title be understood to encompass the consequences of the
change in the local government positions nature.
Furthermore, construing that the administrator position in Section 2(a),
paragraph 8 pertains to city, municipal and/or provincial administrators
would result in a legal infirmity. EO 503 was issued pursuant to the
Presidents ordinance powers to provide for rules that are general or
permanent in character for the purpose of implementing the Presidents
constitutional or statutory powers.41 Exercising her constitutional duty to

ensure that all laws are faithfully executed, then President Corazon
Aquino issued EO 503 to ensure the executives compliance with
paragraph (i), Section 17 of RA 7160, which requires local government
units to absorb the personnel of national agencies whose functions shall
be devolved to them.42 This is reflected in EO 503s title and whereas
clauses, and its limited application as discussed earlier.
Thus, the dissenting opinions interpretation would result in the judicial
recognition of an act of the Executive usurping a legislative power. The
grant of permanent status to incumbent provincial administrators, despite
the clear language and intent of RA 7160 to make the position
coterminous, is an act outside the Presidents legitimate powers. The
power to create, abolish and modify public offices is lodged with
Congress.43 The President cannot, through an Executive Order, grant
permanent status to incumbents, when Congress by law has declared
that the positions they occupy are now confidential. Such act would
amount to the Presidents amendment of an act of Congress an act that
the Constitution prohibits. Allowing this kind of interpretation violates the
separation of powers, a constitutionally enshrined principle that the Court
has the duty to uphold.44
The dissent counters this argument by pointing out that Section 2(a),
paragraph 8 of EO 503 enjoys the legal presumption of validity. Unless
the law or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of
its validity stands. The EOs validity, however, is not in question in the
present case. What is at issue is a proper interpretation of its application
giving due respect to the principle of separation of powers, and the
dissenting opinions interpretation does violence to this principle.
Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily confidential
employee
To be sure, both career and non-career service employees have a right to
security of tenure. All permanent officers and employees in the civil
service, regardless of whether they belong to the career or non-career
service category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed
from office except for cause provided by law and after procedural due
process.45 The concept of security of tenure, however, labors under a
variation for primarily confidential employees due to the basic concept of
a "primarily confidential" position. Serving at the confidence of the
appointing authority, the primarily confidential employees term of office
expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When
this happens, the confidential employee is not "removed" or "dismissed"
1wphi1
from office; his term merely "expires"46 and the loss of trust and
confidence is the "just cause" provided by law that results in the
termination of employment. In the present case where the trust and
confidence has been irretrievably eroded, we cannot fault Governor
Pimentels exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no longer
entrust his confidence in Gonzales.
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or
employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as
provided by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a
right to public office despite a change in the nature of the office held. In
other words, the CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled that
the petitioner violated Gonzales right to security of tenure when she was
removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but the situation
had since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as
ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the law
prevailing at the time of the termination of her service; i.e., she was then
already occupying a position that was primarily confidential and had to be
dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the
appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales termination for lack of confidence
was lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator
of Camarines Norte or to any other comparable position. This conclusion,
however, is without prejudice to Gonzales entitlement to retirement
benefits, leave credits, and future employment in government service.
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition,
and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated June 25, 2008 and
the Resolution dated December 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. SP No. 97425.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 206844-45
July 23, 2013
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE

PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented
herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G.
DATOL, Jr.,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 206982
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), represented by its President
and Incumbent Representative in the House of Representatives,
ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same
party-list organization, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) that are now praying for essentially
the same reliefs from this Court.
One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the
organizations incumbent representative in the House of Representatives.
This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Arquiza Group. The
other group is led by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the organizations erstwhile
third nominee. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Datol
Group.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 is the Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari
(With Prayer for the Forthwith Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante Order
[SQAO])1 filed in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS by Francisco G. Datol,
Jr. For brevity, we shall refer to this petition as the Datol Groups petition.
G.R. No. 206982 is the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction)2 filed on behalf of SENIOR CITIZENS by Rep. Arquiza. We
shall refer to this as the Arquiza Groups petition.
The above petitions were filed pursuant to Rule 643 in relation to Rule
654 of the Rules of Court, both assailing the Omnibus Resolution5 dated
May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in
SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). Said Resolution
disqualified SENIOR CITIZENS from participating in the May 13, 2013
elections and ordered the cancellation of its registration and accreditation
as a party-list organization.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR
CITIZENS as a party-list organization in a Resolution6 issued on even
date in SPP No. 06-026 (PL).
SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However,
the organization failed to get the required two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast.7 Thereafter, SENIOR CITIZENS was granted leave to
intervene in the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections.8 In accordance
with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional
seats under the party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one
seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organizations first nominee,
served as a member of the House of Representatives.
Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May
10, 2010 elections.
On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an
agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, the relevant terms of which we
quote:
IRREVOCABLE COVENANT
We agree that official candidates of the SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST

and in the following order shall be:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT

We, in representation of our respective personal capacity, hereby
covenant and agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
PARTIES AND PERSONS
1. ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, of legal age,
married, Filipino, and residing at 1881 C.M. Recto
Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila, and representing the Senior
Citizens Party-list in my capacity as President with our
General Headquarters at Room 404 West Trade Center,
132 West Avenue, hereinafter referred to as the FIRST
PARTY;
2. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, of legal age, married, Filipino,
and residing at 35 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
hereinafter referred to as the SECOND PARTY;
3. FRANCISCO G. DATOL, JR., of legal age, married,
Filipino, and residing at North Olympus Blk., 3, Lot 15 Ph4
Grieg St., Novaliches, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to
as the THIRD PARTY;
4. REMEDIOS D. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married,
Filipino, and residing at 1881 C.M. Recto Avenue,
Sampaloc, Manila, hereinafter referred to as the FOURTH
PARTY;
5. LINDA GADDI DAVID, of legal age, married, Filipino,
and residing at 150 Don Francisco, St. Francis Vil., San
Fernando, Pampanga City (sic) hereinafter referred to as
the FIFTH PARTY;
xxxx
ARTICLE III
THE LIST OF CANDIDATES
Name
CTC No.
Issued at
Issued on
1. Godofredo V. Arquiza
S.C.I.D.#2615256
Manila
04-02-04
2. David L. Kho
16836192
Quezon City 03-15-09
3. Francisco G. Datol,
Jr.
27633197
4. Remedios D. Arquiza
S.C.I.D.#50696
5. Linda Gaddi David
CCI2009 12306699 Pampanga
01-04-10
ARTICLE IV
SHARING OF POWER
The Nominees agreed and pledged on their legal and personal honor and
interest as well as the legal privileges and rights of the respective partylist offices, under the following circumstances and events:
ELECTION RESULTS
Where only ONE (1) candidate qualifies and is proclaimed, then No. 1
shall assume the Office of Party-list Representative in CONGRESS from
July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2012 and shall relinquish his seat in Congress
by the proper and legal acts and No. 2 shall assume said seat from July
1, 2012 to June 30, 2013;
In the event TWO (2) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then, No. 1
shall serve for three (3) years, and No. 2 and No. 3 will each serve for
one-and-a-half years.
In the event THREE (3) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then No.
1 shall serve for three years; No. 2 will serve for two (2) years and
afterwards shall relinquish the second seat to No. 4 nominee, who will
then serve for one (1) year; No. 3 will occupy the third seat for two (2)
years and afterwards shall relinquish said seat on the third year to
Nominee 5, who will serve for the remaining one (1) year.
In Fine:
If only one (1) seat is won

No. 1 nominee = 2 years
No. 2 nominee = 1 year
If two (2) seats are won
If three (3) seats are won:
(Signed)

Linda Gaddi David

CTC#CCI2009 12306699 Iss.
at
San Fernando, Pampanga on
01-04-109
All beginning July 1, 2010

SHARING OF RIGHTS
BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES
That serving incumbent Congress Representative in the event one or
more is elected and qualified shall observe proper sharing of certain
benefits by virtue of his position as such, to include among others,
appointment of persons in his office, projects which may redound to the
benefits and privileges that may be possible under the law.
The above mentioned parties shall oversee the implementation of this
COVENANT.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands this
MAY 05 2010 in QUEZON CITY.
(Signed)
(Signed)
Godofredo V. Arquiza
S.C.I.D. #2615256 Iss. at
Manila
on 04-02-04
David L. Kho
CTC#16836192 Iss. at
Quezon City on 03-15-09
(Signed)
(Signed)
Francisco G. Datol, Jr.

CTC#16836192 Iss. at
Remedios D. Arquiza
S.C.I.D.#50696 Iss. at
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS
ranked second among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two
seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its
first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second
nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long
after. According to the Datol Groups petition, the members of SENIOR
CITIZENS held a national convention on November 27, 2010 in order to
address "the unfulfilled commitment of Rep. Arquiza to his
constituents."10 Further, a new set of officers and members of the Board
of Trustees of the organization were allegedly elected during the said
convention. SENIOR CITIZENS third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr.,
was supposedly elected as the organizations Chairman. Thereafter, on
November 30, 2010, in an opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled
from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were allied with
Rep. Arquiza.11
Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged
in a bitter rivalry as both groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed
leadership of the organization.
The Resignation of Rep. Kho
On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. in a letter12 dated December 8, 2011 that
the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his
resignation, which was to take effect on December 31, 2011. The fourth
nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume the vacant position in
view of the previous expulsion from the organization of the third nominee,
Francisco G. Datol, Jr.
The letter of Rep. Arquiza was also accompanied by a petition13 dated

December 14, 2011 in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS. The petition
prayed that the "confirmation and approval of the replacement of
Congressman David L. Kho, in the person of the fourth nominee,
Remedios D. Arquiza, due to the expulsion of the third nominee,
Francisco G. Datol, Jr., be issued immediately in order to pave the way of
her assumption into the office."14 Before the COMELEC, the petition was
docketed as E.M. No. 12-040.
Attached to the petition was the resignation letter15 of Rep. Kho, which
was addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The
letter stated thus:
THE HONORABLE SPEAKER
House of Representatives
Congress
Quezon City
Sir:
I am hereby tendering my irrevocable resignation as Representative of
the Senior Citizens Party-list in the House of Representatives, effective
December 31, 2011 in the event that only two (2) seats are won by our
party-list group; and will resign on June 30, 2012 in case three seats are
won.
As a consequence thereof, the Coalition of Associations of Senior
Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. shall nominate my successor pursuant to
law and Rules on the matter.
Please accept my esteem and respect.
Truly yours,
(Signed)
Rep. David L. Kho
Party-list Congressman
Copy furnished:
The Board of Trustees
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.16
According to the Datol Group, Rep. Kho submitted to them a letter dated
December 31, 2011, notifying them of his resignation in this wise:
December 31, 2011
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF
SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILS., INC.
Rm. 405, 4th Floor, WTC Building
132 West Avenue, Quezon City
Gentlemen/Ladies:
It is with deepest regret that I inform this esteemed organization of my
decision to resign as the party-list nominee for the House of
Representatives this 15th Congress for personal reason already
conveyed to you.
Thank you for the opportunity to serve the Senior Citizens of our dear
country.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
DAVID L. KHO17
In the interim, during the pendency of E.M. No. 12-040, COMELEC
Resolution No. 936618 was promulgated on February 21, 2012.
Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof provided that:
SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a result of term
sharing agreement among nominees of winning party-list
groups/organizations shall not be allowed.
On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS that
were allied with Rep. Arquiza issued Board Resolution No. 003-2012,
which pertinently stated thus:
BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 003-2012
Series of 2012
A RESOLUTION RECALLING THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOARD IN
RESOLUTION NO. 11-0012 OF THE RESIGNATION OF
CONGRESSMAN DAVID L. KHO AND ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE

REPRESENTING THE SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST IN THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE HIS TERM
AND IMPOSING CERTAIN CONDITIONS ON HIM TO BE PERFORMED
WITH THE COALITION;
WHEREAS, the second nominee, Congressman David L. Kho, tendered
his resignation as representative of the Senior Citizens Party-list effective
December 31, 2011, x x x;
WHEREAS, the said resignation was accepted by the Board of Trustees
in a resolution signed unanimously, in view of the nature of his
resignation, and in view of his determination to resign and return to
private life, x x x;
WHEREAS, after much deliberation and consultation, the said nominee
changed his mind and requested the Board of Trustees to reconsider the
acceptance, for he also reconsidered his resignation, and requested to
continue his term;
WHEREAS, in consideration of all factors affecting the party-list and in
view of the forthcoming elections, the Board opted to reconsider the
acceptance, recall the same, and allow Cong. David L. Kho to continue
his term;
was withdrawing its petition, but the same was opposed by the Datol
Group and was not acted upon by the COMELEC.22
On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution 23 in E.M.
No. 12-040, dismissing the petition of the SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza
Group). The pertinent portions of the Resolution stated, thus:
First, resignation of Kho,
pursuant to the party nominees
term-sharing agreement, cannot
be recognized and be given effect
so as to create a vacancy in the
list and change the order of the
nominees.
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941, the withdrawal in writing of the
nominee of his nomination is one of the three (3) exemptions to the rule
that "no change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC."
While we can consider the resignation of Rep. Kho as akin to the
withdrawal of his own nomination, we are constrained however NOT to
recognize such resignation but only in so far as to change the order of
petitioners nominees as submitted to the Commission.
xxxx
WHEREAS, the Coalition, in recalling the acceptance of the Board, is

however imposing certain conditions on Cong. Kho to be performed;
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED
to recall the acceptance of the resignation of Congressman David L. Kho
in view of his request and change of mind, hence allow him to continue
his term subject to conditions stated above.19
Thereafter, on April 18, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc conducted a
hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS petition in E.M. No. 12-040. At the
hearing, the counsel for SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group) admitted
that Rep. Khos tender of resignation was made pursuant to the
agreement entered into by the organizations nominees.20However, said
counsel also stated that the Board of Trustees of the organization
reconsidered the acceptance of Rep. Khos resignation and the latter
was, instead, to complete his term.21 Also, from the transcript of the
hearing, it appears that the Arquiza Group previously manifested that it
Considering that it is an admitted fact that the resignation of Rep. Kho

was made by virtue of a prior agreement of the parties, we resolve and
hereby rule that we cannot recognize such arrangement and accordingly
we cannot approve the movement in the order of nominees for being
contrary to public policy. The term of office of public officials cannot be
made subject to any agreement of private parties. Public office is not a
commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject of any
private agreement. Public office is vested with public interest that should
not be reined by individual interest.
In fact, to formalize the policy of disallowing term sharing agreements
among party list nominees, the Commission recently promulgated
Resolution No. 9366, which provides:
"SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a result of
term sharing agreement among nominees of winning party-list
groups/organizations shall not be allowed."
Considering all these, we find the term sharing agreement by the

nominees of the Senior Citizens Party-List null and void. Any action
committed by the parties in pursuit of such term-sharing arrangement
including the resignation of Congressman David Khocannot be
recognized and be given effect. Thus, in so far as this Commission is
concerned, no vacancy was created by the resignation of Rep. Kho and
there can be no change in the list and order of nominees of the petitioner
party-list.
WHEREFORE, there being no vacancy in the list of nominees of the

petitioner organization, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The list and order of nominees of petitioner hereby remains the
same as it was submitted to us there being no legally recognizable
ground to cause any changes thereat.24 (Citation omitted.)
Second, the expulsion of Datol

even if proven true has no effect
in the list and in the order of
nominees, thus Remedios Arquiza
(the fourth nominee) cannot be
elevated as the third nominee.
The Review of SENIOR CITIZENS Registration
xxxx
It must be noted that the list and order of nominees, after submission to
this Commission, is meant to be permanent. The legislature in crafting
Republic Act No. 7941 clearly deprived the party-list organization of the
right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the
list is submitted to the COMELEC, except for three (3) enumerated
instances such as when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee
withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes
incapacitated.
xxxx
Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-list were true,
the list and order of nominees of the Senior Citizens party-list remains
the same in so far as we are concerned as it does not fall under one of
the three grounds mentioned above. Neither does it have an automatic
effect on the organizations representative in the House of
Representatives, for once a party-list nominee is "elected" into office and
becomes a member of the House, he is treated similarly and equally with
the regular district representatives. As such, they can only be expelled or
suspended upon the concurrence of the two-thirds of all its Members and
never by mere expulsion of a party-list organization.
xxxx
The Datol Group filed A Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration25 of the
above resolution, but the same remained unresolved.
Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective
Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-list System of
Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name of
SENIOR CITIZENS.26The Manifestation of the Datol Group was docketed
as SPP
No. 12-157 (PLM), while that of the Arquiza Group was docketed as SPP
No. 12-191 (PLM).
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, 27 which,
inter alia, set for summary evidentiary hearings by the COMELEC En
Banc the review of the registration of existing party-list organizations,
which have filed their Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Partylist System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
The two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS appeared before the COMELEC
En Banc on August 24, 2012 and they both submitted their respective
evidence, which established their continuing compliance with the
requirements of accreditation as a party-list organization.28
On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution29 in
SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-191 (PLM). By a vote of 4-3, the
COMELEC En Banc ordered the cancellation of the registration of
SENIOR CITIZENS. The resolution explained that:
It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission promulgated
its resolution in a petition that involved SENIOR CITIZENS titled "In Re:
Petition for Confirmation of Replacement of Resigned PartyList Nominee"
and docketed as EM No. 12-040. In the process of resolving the issues of
said case, this Commission found that SENIOR CITIZENS nominees
specifically nominees David L. Kho and Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have
entered into a term-sharing agreement. x x x.
Nominee David Khos term as party-list congressman is three (3) years

which starts on June 30, 2010 and to end on June 30, 2013 as directed
no less than by the Constitution of the Philippines. Section 7, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution states:
"Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected
for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."
But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by SENIOR
CITIZENS, David Khos term starts on June 30, 2010 and ends on
December 31, 2011, the date of effectivity of Khos resignation. By virtue
of the term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of the House
of Representatives is cut short to one year and six months which is
merely half of the three-year term. This is totally opposed to the
prescription of the Constitution on the term of a Member of the House of
Representatives. Hence, when confronted with this issue on term sharing
done by SENIOR CITIZENS, this Commission made a categorical
pronouncement that such term-sharing agreement must be rejected.
xxxx
From the foregoing, SENIOR CITIZENS failed to comply with Section 7,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of Comelec
Resolution No. 9366. This failure is a ground for cancellation of
registration under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 which states:
"Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC
may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
xxxx
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to CANCEL the registration of Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines (SENIOR CITIZENS)

under the Party-List System of Representation.
The rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS challenged the above resolution
before this Court by filing their respective petitions for certiorari. The
petition filed by the Datol Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204421, while
the petition of the Arquiza Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204425.
On December 11, 2012, the Court initially granted status quo ante orders
on said petitions, directing the COMELEC to include the name of
SENIOR CITIZENS in the printing of official ballots for the May 13, 2013
party-list elections. Eventually, both petitions were consolidated with the
petition in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 203766.
On April 2, 2013, the Court promulgated its Decision in Atong Paglaum,
which ordered the remand to the COMELEC of the petitions that have
been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of the
petitioners in the printing of ballots. Following the parameters set forth in
the Courts Decision, the COMELEC was to determine whether said
petitioners, which included the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, were
qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the
May 13, 2013 elections. For this purpose, the Court stated that the
COMELEC may conduct summary evidentiary hearings.
Thereafter, on May 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the
assailed Omnibus Resolution in SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-191
(PLM), ruling in this wise:
Guided by these six new parameters [enunciated by the Court in Atong
Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections], as well as the provisions of
the Constitution, Republic Act No. 7941 ("R.A. No. 7941") or the PartyList System Act, and other pertinent election laws, and after a careful and
exhaustive reevaluation of the documents submitted by the petitioners
per their compliance with Resolution No. 9513 ("Res. No. 9513"), the
Commission En Banc RESOLVES as follows:
I. SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) SENIOR CITIZENS
To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and to CANCEL the
registration and accreditation, of petitioner Senior Citizens, for violating
laws, rules, and regulations relating to elections pursuant to Section 6 (5)
of R.A. No. 7941.
The Commission En Banc finds no cogent reason to reverse its earlier

finding in the Resolution for SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM)
promulgated on 04 December 2012, in relation to the Resolution for E.M.
No. 12-040 promulgated on 27 June 2012. The sole ground for which the
petitioner Senior Citizens was disqualified was because of the termsharing agreement between its nominees, which the Commission En
Banc found to be contrary to public policy. It will be noted that this ground
is independent of the six parameters in Atong Paglaum, and there is
nothing in the doctrine enunciated in that case which will absolve the
petitioner Senior Citizen of what, to the Commission En Banc, is a clear
bastardization of the term of office fixed by Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution as implemented by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7941, which
expressly provides that Members of the House of Representatives,
including party-list representatives, shall be elected for a term of three
years. A term, in the legal sense, is a fixed and definite period of time
during which an officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, a
fixed interval after which the several incumbents succeed one another.
Thus, service of the term is for the entire period; it cannot be broken
down to accommodate those who are not entitled to hold the office.
That the term-sharing agreement was made in 2010, while the
expression of the policy prohibiting it was promulgated only in 2012 via
Section 7, Rule 4 of Resolution No. 9366 ("Res. No. 9366"), is of no
moment. As it was in 2010 as it is now, as it was in 1987 when the
Constitution was ratified and as it was in 1995 when R.A. No. 7941 was
enacted into law, the agreement was and is contrary to public policy
because it subjects a Constitutionally-ordained fixed term to hold public
elective office to contractual bargaining and negotiation, and treats the
same as though it were nothing more than a contractual clause, an object
in the ordinary course of the commerce of men. To accept this defense
will not only open the floodgates to unscrupulous individuals, but more
importantly it will render inutile Section 16 of R.A. No. 7941 which
prescribes the procedure to be taken to fill a vacancy in the available
seats for a party-list group or organization. For this mistake, the petitioner
Senior Citizens cannot hide behind the veil of corporate fiction because
the corporate veil can be pierced if necessary to achieve the ends of
justice or equity, such as when it is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, or protect fraud. It further cannot invoke the prohibition in
the enactment of ex post facto laws under Section 22, Article III of the
Constitution because the guarantee only the retrospectivity of penal laws
and definitely, Reso. No. 9366 is not penal in character.
From the foregoing, the cancellation of the registration and accreditation
of the petitioner Senior Citizens is therefore in order, and consequently,
the two Manifestations of Intent to Participate filed with the Commission

should be denied.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Commission En Banc RESOLVES:
A. To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and CANCEL the
registration and accreditation, of the following parties, groups, or
organizations:
(1) SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) & SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.;
xxxx
Accordingly, the foregoing shall be REMOVED from the registry of partylist groups and organizations of the Commission, and shall NOT BE
ALLOWED to PARTICIPATE as a candidate for the Party-List System of
Representation for the 13 May 2013 Elections and subsequent elections
thereafter.30 (Citations omitted.)
On May 13, 2013, the elections proceeded. Despite the earlier
declaration of its disqualification, SENIOR CITIZENS still obtained
677,642 votes.
Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS registration and its
disqualification to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections, the Datol
Group and the Arquiza Group filed the instant petitions.
On May 15, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Very2 Urgent Motion to
Reiterate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo
Ante Order,31 alleging that the COMELEC had ordered the stoppage of
the counting of votes of the disqualified party-list groups. The Datol
Group urged the Court to issue a TRO and/or a status quo ante order
during the pendency of its petition.
Meanwhile, on May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Resolution,32 which considered as final and executory its May 10, 2013
Resolution that cancelled the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. On even
date, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers (NBOC), promulgated NBOC Resolution No. 0006-
13,33 proclaiming fourteen (14) party-list organizations as initial winners in

the party-list elections of May 13, 2013.
The Arquiza Group filed on May 27, 2013 a Supplement to the "Very
Urgent Petition for Certiorari,"34 also reiterating its application for a
TROand a writ of preliminary injunction.
On May 28, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued NBOC Resolution No.
0008-13,35 which partially proclaimed the winning party-list organizations
that filled up a total of fifty-three (53) out of the available fifty-eight (58)
seats for party-list organizations.
On May 29, 2013, the Chief Justice issued a TRO,36 which ordered the
COMELEC to submit a Comment on the instant petitions and to cease
and desist from further proclaiming the winners from among the party-list
candidates in the May 13, 2013 elections.
On June 3, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Most Urgent Motion for
Issuance of an Order Directing Respondent to Proclaim Petitioner
Pendente Lite.37
In a Resolution38 dated June 5, 2013, the Court issued an order, which
directed the COMELEC to refrain from implementing the assailed
Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and
SPP No. 12-191 (PLM), insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS was concerned
and to observe the status quo ante before the issuance of the assailed
COMELEC resolution. The Court likewise ordered the COMELEC to
reserve the seat(s) intended for SENIOR CITIZENS, in accordance with
the number of votes it garnered in the May 13, 2013 Elections. The Court,
however, directed the COMELEC to hold in abeyance the proclamation
insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS is concerned until the instant petitions are
decided. The Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing
Respondent to Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite filed by the Datol Group
was denied for lack of merit.
On June 7, 2013, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Comment39 on the instant petitions. In a
Resolution40 dated June 10, 2013, the Court required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. On June 19, 2013, the Arquiza
Group filed its Reply41 to the Comment of the COMELEC. Subsequently,
the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their separate
memoranda.42 On the other hand, the OSG manifested43 that it was
adopting its Comment as its memorandum in the instant case.
THE ISSUES
The Datol Groups memorandum raised the following issues for our
consideration:
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
4.1
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ADDED ANOTHER GROUND (VIOLATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY) FOR CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION OF A
PARTYLIST GROUP AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 6, REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7941.
4.2
JURISDICTION WHEN IT CANCELLED PETITIONERS CERTIFICATE
OF REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.
4.3
JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED
PUBLIC POLICY ON TERM SHARING.
4.4
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE AUTOMATIC REVIEW BY
THE EN BANC OF THE REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION GRANTED
BY ITS DIVISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION THAT THE EN BANC CAN ONLY REVIEW DECISIONS OF
THE DIVISION UPON FILING OF A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.44 (Citation omitted.)
Upon the other hand, the memorandum of the Arquiza Group brought
forward the following arguments:
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:

a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
4.1. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY

10, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law and having been
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 10, 2013
was issued pursuant to the directive of the Supreme
Court in Atong Paglaum. Therefore, the SUBSIDIARY
ISSUES arising therefrom are:
a. Are there guidelines prescribed in Atong
Paglaum to be followed by respondent Comelec
in determining which partylist groups are qualified
to participate in party-list elections?
b. If there are these guidelines to be followed,
were these adhered to by respondent Comelec?
(2) Is the ground -- the Term-Sharing Agreement between
Senior Citizens nominees -- a legal ground to cancel
Senior Citizens Certificate of Registration?
4.2. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
b. Has the Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 20, 2013,
in fact, become final and executory?
4.3. Whether or not NATIONAL BOARD of CANVASSERS
(NBOC) RESOLUTION No. 0006-13 of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid
for being contrary to law and having been issued without or in
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction?
b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which was made

as the basis thereof correct?
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs.
Comelec been followed?
4.4. Whether or not NBOC RESOLUTION No. 0008-13 of MAY
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are identical with those of Issue
No. 4.3, namely:
b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which was made
as the basis thereof correct?
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs.
Comelec been followed?
4.5. What is the cardinal rule in interpreting laws/rules on
qualifications and disqualifications of the candidates after the
election where they have received the winning number of votes?
4.6. May the COMELEC En Banc Resolutions of May 10 and 24,
2013 and NBOC Resolutions of May 24 and 28, 2013 be annulled
and set aside?45
THE COURTS RULING
After reviewing the parties pleadings, as well as the various resolutions
attached thereto, we find merit in the petitioners contentions.
1wphi1
SENIOR CITIZENS Right to Due Process
First, we shall dispose of the procedural issue. In their petitions, the two
rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS are actually one in asserting that the
organizations disqualification and cancellation of its registration and
accreditation were effected in violation of its right to due process.
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or

association organized for religious purposes;
The Arquiza Group argues that no notice and hearing were given to
SENIOR CITIZENS for the cancellation of its registration on account of
the term-sharing agreement of its nominees. The Arquiza Group
maintains that SENIOR CITIZENS was summoned only to a single
hearing date in the afternoon of August 24, 2012 and the COMELECs
review therein focused on the groups programs, accomplishments, and
other related matters. The Arquiza Group asserts that SENIOR CITIZENS
was not advised, before or during the hearing, that the issue of the termsharing agreement would constitute a basis for the review of its
registration and accreditation.
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
Likewise, the Datol Group faults the COMELEC for cancelling the
registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS without giving the
latter the opportunity to show that it complied with the parameters laid
down in Atong Paglaum. The Arquiza Group confirms that after the
promulgation of Atong Paglaum, the COMELEC conducted summary
hearings in executive sessions, without informing SENIOR CITIZENS.
The Arquiza Group says that it filed a "Very Urgent Motion To Set Case
For Hearing Or To Be Included In The Hearing Set On Thursday, May 9,
2013," but its counsel found that SENIOR CITIZENS was not included in
the hearings wherein other party-list groups were heard by the
COMELEC. The Arquiza Group subsequently filed on May 10, 2013 a
"2nd Very Urgent Motion To Set Case For Public Hearing," but the same
was also not acted upon. The Arquiza Group alleges that it only found out
after the elections that the assailed May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution
was issued and the Arquiza Group was not actually served a copy
thereof.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 794146 provides for the procedure relative
to the review of the registration of party-list organizations, to wit:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC
may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign

political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are
indispensable before the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation
of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. In
connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v.
Commission on Elections47 the concept of due process as applied to the
COMELEC. We emphasized therein that:
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as
an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the
seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty
is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in
administrative proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a
party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of
due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of
its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these
serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of
due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay
requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the
inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decisionmaker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These
standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case
and are the material and substantial components of decision-making.
Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented
which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented
or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decisionmaker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial
evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the
decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and
decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the
constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly
the facts and the law upon which it is based. As a component of the rule
of fairness that underlies due process, this is the "duty to give reason" to
enable the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has
been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny
and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by
the decision-maker. (Emphases ours, citations omitted.)
In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS
was made pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a
summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24, 2012 in SPP No.
12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the
Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to
adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the requirements
for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation was
committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing
agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010
would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organizations
qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it
were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this
issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to
adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement
and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position.
In its Comment48 to the petitions, the COMELEC countered that
petitioners were actually given the opportunity to present their side on the
issue of the term-sharing agreement during the hearing on April 18,
2012.49 Said hearing was allegedly conducted to determine petitioners
continuing compliance for accreditation as a party-list organization.
The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April 18, 2012
hearing, the rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence
of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of COMELEC,
however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the
petition of the Arquiza Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition
asked for the confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho, who had
tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More
specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the focus thereof
was on the petition filed by the Arquiza group and its subsequent
manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its petition.
Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish
the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned
them about the complications brought about by their term-sharing
agreement. However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding
the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and the
issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for
disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman
Brillantess remonstration was not sufficient as to constitute a fair warning
that the term-sharing agreement would be considered as a ground for the
cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS registration and accreditation.
Furthermore, after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, which remanded,
among other cases, the disqualification cases involving SENIOR
CITIZENS, said organization should have still been afforded the
opportunity to be heard on the matter of the term-sharing agreement,
either through a hearing or through written memoranda. This was the
proper recourse considering that the COMELEC was about to arrive at a
final determination as to the qualification of SENIOR CITIZENS. Instead,
the COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No.
12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without conducting any further
proceedings thereon after its receipt of our Decision in Atong Paglaum.
The Prohibition on Term-sharing
The second issue both raised by the petitioners herein constitute the
threshold legal issue of the instant cases: whether the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Omnibus Resolution, disqualifying
and cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS
solely on account of its purported violation of the prohibition against termsharing.
The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing
was provided for under Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No.
9366, which was promulgated only on February 21, 2012. Hence, the
resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to the case of
SENIOR CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect.
When the term-sharing agreement was executed in 2010, the same was
not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the
Irrevocable Covenant between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for
the 2010 elections should not have been a ground for the cancellation of
the organizations registration and accreditation because the nominees
never actually implemented the agreement.
In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no termsharing actually transpired between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS.
It explained that whatever prior arrangements were made by the
nominees on the term-sharing agreement, the same did not materialize
given that the resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board of
Trustees and the members of SENIOR CITIZENS.
Still, granting for the sake of argument that the term-sharing agreement
was actually implemented, the Arquiza Group points out that SENIOR
CITIZENS still cannot be held to have violated Section 7 of Resolution
No. 9366. The term-sharing agreement was entered into in 2010 or two
years prior to the promulgation of said resolution on February 21, 2012.
Likewise, assuming that the resolution can be applied retroactively, the
Arquiza Group contends that the same cannot affect SENIOR CITIZENS
at it already earned a vested right in 2010 as party-list organization.
Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided." As held in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Reyes,50 "the general rule is that statutes are
prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not create
new or take away vested rights, do not fall under the general rule against
the retroactive operation of statutes." We also reiterated in Lintag and
Arrastia v. National Power Corporation51 that:
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative
rules and regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative intent
to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication
because the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that
have already become vested. This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex
prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward). (Citations
omitted.)
True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it shall have
retroactive effect. Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to the
argument of the Arquiza Group that SENIOR CITIZENS already earned a
vested right to its registration as a party-list organization.
Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections52 teaches that "a public office is
not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a Public office
is a public trust. No one has a vested right to any public office, much less
a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office." Under Section
2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is entrusted with the
function to "register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must
present their platform or program of government." In fulfilling this function,
the COMELEC is duty-bound to review the grant of registration to parties,
organizations, or coalitions already registered in order to ensure the
latters continuous adherence to the requirements prescribed by law and
the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their qualifications and
eligibility to participate in party-list elections.
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application
of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 on the ground of the impairment of
SENIOR CITIZENS vested right.
Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly
provided for its retroactive application, the Court finds that the COMELEC
En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of
SENIOR CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En
Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR
CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was manifested by the
Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the
COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group
manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for confirmation and
approval of Rep. Khos replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated
June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused
to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of
Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created
despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was
also no indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to
implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing
agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group
insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all
intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his
term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with

COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in
E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented
by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list
organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the
COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of
SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out
their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule,
or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR
CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have
no legal leg to stand on.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack of
a legal ground to disqualify the SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a finding of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with no choice but
to strike down the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in
SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds no need to discuss the
other issues raised by the petitioners. In particular, the dispute between
the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, not being an issue raised here,
should be threshed out in separate proceedings before the proper
tribunal having jurisdiction thereon.
Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the
disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its
registration and accreditation, said organization is entitled to be
proclaimed as one of the winning party-list organizations in the recently
concluded May 13, 2013 elections.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules that:
(1) The Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer
for the Forthwith Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante
Order [SQAO]) in G.R. Nos. 206844-45 and the Very Urgent
Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) in G.R. No.
206982 are GRANTED;
(2) The Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the

Commission on Elections En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and
SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.
is concerned; and
(3) The Commission on Elections En Bane is ORDERED to
PROCLAIM the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list organizations
during the May 13, 20 13 elections with the number of seats it
may be entitled to based on the total number of votes it garnered
during the said elections.
No costs.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189028
July 16, 2013
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO,

NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE BIENVENIDO LUMBERA,
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (PAINTING) BENEDICTO
CABRERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (SCULPTURE)
NAPOLEON ABUEVA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS
(PAINTING AND SCULPTURE) ARTURO LUZ, NATIONAL ARTIST
FOR PRODUCTION DESIGN SALVADOR BERNAL, UNIVERSITY
PROFESSOR EMERITUS GEMINO ABAD, DEAN MARVIC M.V.F.
LEONEN (UP COLLEGE OF LAW), DEAN DANILO SILVESTRE (UP
COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE), DEAN ROLAND TOLENTINO (UP
COLLEGE OF MASS COMMUNICATION), PROF. JOSE DALISAY, DR.
ANTON JUAN, DR. ALEXANDER CORTEZ, DR. JOSE NEIL GARCIA,
DR. PEDRO JUN CRUZ REYES, PROF. JOSE CLAUDIO GUERRERO,
PROF. MICHAEL M. COROZA, PROF. GERARD LICO, PROF. VERNE
DE LA PENA, PROF. MARIAN ABUAN, PROF. THEODORE O. TE, DR.
CRISTINA PANTOJA-HIDALGO, PROF. JOSE WENDELL CAPILI,
PROF. SIR ANRIAL TIATCO, PROF. NICOLO DEL CASTILLO, PROF.
HORACIO DUMANLIG, PROF. DANTON REMOTO, PROF.
PRISCELINA PATAJOLEGASTO, PROF. BELEN CALINGACION,
PROF. AMIEL Y. LEONARDIA, PROF. VIM NADERA, PROF. MARILYN
CANTA, PROF. CECILIA DELA PAZ, ROF. CHARLSON ONG, PROF.
CLOD MARLON YAMBAO, PROF. KENNETH JAMANDRE, PROF.
JETHRO JOAQUIN, ATTY. F.D. NICOLAS B. PICHAY, ATTY. ROSE
BEATRIX ANGELES, MR. FERNANDO JOSEF, MS. SUSAN S. LARA,
MR. ALFRED YUSON, MS. JING PANGANIBANMENDOZA, MR.
ROMULO BAQUIRAN, JR., MR. CARLJOE JAVIER, MS. REBECCA T.
ANONUEVO, MR. JP ANTHONY D. CUNADA, MS. LEAH NAVARRO,
MR. MARK MEILLY, MR. VERGEL O. SANTOS, MR. GIL OLEA
MENDOZA, MR. EDGAR C. SAMAR, MS. CHRISTINE BELLEN, MR.
ANGELO R. LACUESTA, MS. ANNA MARIA KATIGBAKLACUESTA,
MR. LEX LEDESMA, MS. KELLY PERIQUET, MS. CARLA PACIS, MR.
J. ALBERT GAMBOA, MR. CESAR EVANGELISTA BUENDIA, MR.
PAOLO ALCAZAREN, MR. ALWYN C. JAVIER, MR. RAYMOND
MAGNO GARLITOS, MS. GANG BADOY, MR. LESLIE BOCOBO, MS.
FRANCES BRETANA, MS. JUDITH TORRES, MS. JANNETTE
PINZON, MS. JUNE POTICAR-DALISAY, MS. CAMILLE DE LA ROSA,

MR. JAMES LADIORAY, MR. RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., and
CONCERNED ARTISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (CAP), Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE CULTURAL
CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
CULTURE AND THE ARTS, MS. CECILE GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, MR.
CARLO MAGNO JOSE CAPARAS,1 MR. JOSE MORENO, MR.
FRANCISCO MANOSA, AND ALL PERSONS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE,
ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, DIRECTION, CONTROL
AND SUPERVISION IN RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE
ORDER OF THE NATIONAL ARTIST AND THE RELEASE OF FUNDS
IN RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE HONORS AND
PRIVILEGES OF THE ORDER OF NATIONAL ARTISTS ON
RESPONDENTS GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, CAPARAS, MORENO AND
MANOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Art has traditionally been viewed as the expression of everything that is
true, good and beautiful. As such, it is perceived to evoke and produce a
spirit of harmony. Art is also considered as a civilizing force, a catalyst of
nation-building. The notion of art and artists as privileged expressions of
national culture helped shape the grand narratives of the nation and
shared symbols of the people. The artist does not simply express his/her
own individual inspiration but articulates the deeper aspirations of history
and the soul of the people.2 The law recognizes this role and views art as
something that "reflects and shapes values, beliefs, aspirations, thereby
defining a peoples national identity."3 If unduly politicized, however, art
and artists could stir controversy and may even cause discord, as what
happened in this case.
The Antecedents
History of the Order of National Artists
On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 10014 and, upon recommendation of the Board of
Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), created the
category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to

Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters. In the
same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was declared as the first National
Artist.
On May 15, 1973, Proclamation No. 11445 was issued. It amended
Proclamation No. 1001 "by creating a National Artists Awards Committee"
that would "administer the conferment of the category of National Artist"
upon deserving Filipino artists. The Committee, composed of members of
the Board of Trustees of the CCP, was tasked to "draft the rules to guide
its deliberations in the choice of National Artists, to the end that those
who have created a body of work in the arts and letters capable of
withstanding the test of time will be so recognized."
The authority of the National Artists Awards Committee to administer the
conferment of the National Artist Award was again reiterated in
Presidential Decree No. 2086 issued on June 7, 1973.
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law
Creating the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed
into law. It established the National Commission for Culture and the Arts
(NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate over the development,
promotion and preservation of the Filipino national culture and arts and
the Filipino cultural heritage. The NCCA was tasked with the following:
Sec. 8. The Commission. A National Commission for Culture and Arts is
hereby created to formulate policies for the development of culture and
arts; implement these policies in coordination with affiliated cultural
agencies; coordinate the implementation of programs of these affiliated
agencies; administer the National Endowment Fund for Culture and Arts
(NEFCA); encourage artistic creation within a climate of artistic freedom;
develop and promote the Filipino national culture and arts; and preserve
Filipino cultural heritage. The Commission shall be an independent
agency. It shall render an annual report of its activities and achievements
to the President and to Congress.
Among the specific mandates of the NCCA under Republic Act No. 7356
is to "extend recognition of artistic achievement through awards, grants
and services to artists and cultural groups which contribute significantly to
the Filipinos cultural legacy."7 In connection with this mandate, the NCCA
is vested with the power to "advise the President on matters pertaining to
culture and the arts, including the creation of a special decoration or
award, for persons who have significantly contributed to the development

and promotion of Philippine culture and arts."8
As both the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated
by law to promote, develop and protect the Philippine national culture and
the arts, and authorized to give awards to deserving Filipino artists, the
two bodies decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists
Award.9 Thereafter, they reviewed the guidelines for the nomination,
selection and administration of the National Artists Award. Pursuant to
their respective powers to draft and promulgate rules, regulations and
measures to guide them in their deliberations in the choice of National
Artists, the CCP and NCCA adopted the following revised guidelines in
September 200710:
4. ADMINISTRATION OF THE AWARD
4.1. The National Commission for Culture and the Arts
(NCCA) shall plan, organize and implement the Order of
National Artists in coordination with the Cultural Center of
the Philippines (CCP).
4.2. It shall enlist the support and cooperation of private
sector experts from the various fields of art to ensure that
the awards are implemented in a successful and impartial
manner.
4.3. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall
commission art experts to form a Special Research Group
who shall verify information submitted on nominees and
provide essential data.
They shall be selected for their specialization and
familiarity with the works and accomplishments of
nominated artists.
4.4. The Special Research Group shall be composed of
ten (10) to twenty (20) members who have expertise in
one or more fields or disciplines.
4.5. The National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be
created before or during the nomination period. It is
tasked to screen nominees and recommend to the NCCA
and CCP Boards the candidates for the Order of National
Artists. It shall be composed of highly regarded peers,

scholars, (including cultural philosophers and historians),
academicians, researchers, art critics, and other
knowledgeable individuals. A wider age-range of experts
who would have first-hand knowledge of achievements of
nominees shall be considered.
4.6. The selection of the members of the National Artist
Award Council of Experts shall be based on the following
criteria:
(a) should have achieved authority, credibility and
track record in his field(s) of expertise;
(b) should have extensive knowledge in his
field(s) and his views on Philippine art and culture
must be national in perspective;
(c) should be a recognized authority in the study
or research of Philippine art and culture;
4.8. Any member of the Council of Experts who is

nominated or related to a nominee up to the fourth degree
of consanguinity or affinity shall inhibit himself/herself
from the deliberation process. Likewise, any member may
decline to participate in the deliberation for any reason or
may be removed for just cause upon recommendation to
the NCCA Board by at least two thirds (2/3) of the
members; in which case, the National Artist Award
Secretariat shall again select the replacements for those
who decline or resigned until the first deliberation panel is
completed.
4.9. The list of nominated members of the National Artist
Award Council of Experts shall be reviewed by the
National Artist Award Secretariat as needed, for purposes
of adding new members or replacements.
4.10. The members of the National Artist Award Council of
Experts shall serve for a fixed term of three (3) years.
5. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION
(d) must be willing to devote sufficient time and

effort to the work of the Council;
The Order of National Artists shall be given to:
(e) must be willing to sign a non-disclosure

statement in order to safeguard the confidentiality
of the deliberations;
5.1 Living artists who are Filipino citizens at the time of

nomination, as well as those who died after the
establishment of the award in 1972 but were Filipino
citizens at the time of their death.
(f) must not have been convicted with finality of

any crime by a court of justice or dismissed for
cause by any organization, whether public or
private.
5.2 Artists who through the content and form of their

works have contributed in building a Filipino sense of
nationhood.
4.7. The National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be

composed of a maximum of seven (7) members each of
the seven (7) areas/disciplines. The living National Artists
will automatically become members in addition to the
forty-nine (49) selected members. These members will
constitute the first deliberation panel and will be invited to
evaluate the nominations and materials submitted by the
Special Research Group.
5.3. Artists who have pioneered in a mode of creative

expression or style, thus, earning distinction and making
an impact on succeeding generations of artists.
5.4. Artists who have created a substantial and significant
body of works and/or consistently displayed excellence in
the practice of their art form thus enriching artistic
expression or style.
5.5 Artists who enjoy broad acceptance through:
5.5.1. prestigious national and/or international

recognition, such as the Gawad CCP Para sa
Sining, CCP Thirteen Artists Award and NCCA
Alab ng Haraya
5.5.2. critical acclaim and/or reviews of their
works
6.2.7. Architecture, Design and Allied Arts architecture

design, interior design, industrial arts design, landscape
architecture and fashion design.
6.3. Nominations for the Order of National Artists may be
submitted by government and non-government cultural
organizations and educational institutions, as well as
private foundations and councils.
5.5.3. respect and esteem from peers.

6. NOMINATION PROCEDURE
6.1. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall announce
the opening of nominations through media releases and
letters to qualified organizations.
6.2. Candidates may be nominated under one or more of
the following categories:
6.2.1. Dance choreography, direction and/or
performance.
6.2.2. Music composition, direction, and/or
performance.
6.2.3. Theater direction, performance and/or production
design.
6.2.4. Visual Arts painting, sculpture, printmaking,
photography, installation art, mixed media works,
illustration, comics/komiks, graphic arts, performance art
and/or imaging.
6.2.5. Literature poetry, fiction (short story, novel and
play); non-fiction (essay, journalism, literary criticism and
historical literature).
6.2.6. Film and Broadcast Arts direction, writing,
production design, cinematography, editing, camera work,
and/or performance.
6.4. Members of the Special Research Group, as well as

agencies attached to the NCCA and CCP shall not submit
nominations.
6.5. NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and
NCCA and CCP officers and staff are automatically
disqualified from being nominated.
6.6. Nominations shall be accepted only when these are
submitted in writing and with proper supporting
documentation, as follows:
6.6.1. A cover letter signed by the head or
designated representative of the nominating
organization.
The cover letter shall be accompanied by a Board
Resolution approving the nominee concerned with
the said resolution signed by the organization
President and duly certified by the Board
Secretary.
6.6.2. A duly accomplished nomination form;
6.6.3. A detailed curriculum vitae of the nominee;
6.6.4. A list of the nominees significant works
categorized according to the criteria;
6.6.5. The latest photograph (color or black and
white) of the nominee, either 5" x 7" or 8" x 11";
6.6.6. Pertinent information materials on the

nominees significant works (on CDs, VCDs and
DVDs);
7.3. The National Artist Award Secretariat will meet to

review the list of nominees for oversights. Consequently,
deserving nominees shall be added to the list.
6.6.7. Copies of published reviews;
7.4. The first deliberation panel (Council of Experts) shall

be intra-disciplinary. The panelists shall be grouped
according to their respective fields of expertise or
disciplines to shortlist the nominees in their disciplines or
categories for presentation to the second deliberation
panel.
6.6.8. Any other document that may be required.

6.7. Nominations received beyond the announced
deadline for the submission of nominations shall not be
considered.
6.8. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall announce
the opening of nominations through media releases.
6.9. All inquiries and nominations shall be submitted to
The NATIONAL ARTIST AWARD SECRETARIAT
Office of the Artistic Director Cultural Center of the Philippines Roxas
Boulevard, 1300 Pasay City or The NATIONAL ARTIST AWARD
SECRETARIAT Office of the Deputy Executive Director National
Commission for Culture and the Arts 633 General Luna Street,
Intramuros, Manila
7. SCREENING AND SELECTION PROCESS
7.1. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall pre-screen
the nominees based on technical guideline items 5.1, 6.2,
6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. The pre-screening shall not be
based on the accomplishments and merits of the
nominee.
7.2. The Special Research Group shall accomplish its
task within six (6) months. The main objective is to verify
the validity of the data, and evaluate the quality, true
value and significance of works according to the criteria. It
shall come up with the updated and comprehensive
profiles of nominees reflecting their most outstanding
achievements.
7.5. The second deliberation panel shall be composed of

a different set of experts from the first deliberation panel
three (3) experts each of the seven (7) areas/discipline
and may include members from varying backgrounds
such as critics and academicians. The achievements of
each shortlisted nominee shall be presented by one
designated member of Council of Experts. Then panel
deliberates and ranks the shortlisted nominees according
to the order of precedence following the set criteria of the
Order of National Artists. In extreme cases, the Second
Deliberation may add new names to the lists.
7.6. The second deliberation panel may recommend not
to give award in any category if no nominee is found
deserving. The number of awardees shall also depend on
the availability of funds. All decisions and
recommendations shall be in writing.
7.7. The recommendations from the Second Deliberation
Panel of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall
then be presented to the joint boards of NCCA and CCP
for final selection. The presentors shall prepare their
presentation in writing together with an audio-visual
presentation or powerpoint presentation. Written
interpellations/opinions will be accepted from selected
critics. The review shall be based on the ranking done by
the Second Deliberation. The voting shall be across
disciplines. The National Artists will be given the option
whether to vote on all categories or on his/her particular
discipline.
7.8. Proxy votes will not be allowed in the Selection

Process. Designation of permanent representatives of
agencies should be made at the outset to make them
regular Board members of NCCA and thus, may be
allowed to cast votes.
7.9. The list of awardees shall be submitted to the
President of the Republic of the Philippines for
confirmation, proclamation and conferral.
8. PRESENTATION OF THE AWARDS
8.1. The Order of National Artists shall not be conferred
more frequently than every three (3) years.
8.2. The Order of National Artists shall be conferred by
the President of the Philippines on June 11 or any
appropriate date in fitting ceremonies to be organized by
the National Artist Secretariat.
8.3. The medallion of the Order of National Artists and
citation shall be given to the honoree during the
conferment ceremony. The cash award of P100,000.00 in
cheque shall be given immediately after the ceremony or
at another time and place as requested by the honoree.
8.4. A posthumous conferral consisting of the medallion
and citation shall be given to the family or legal heir/s of
the honoree. The cash award of P75,000.00 in cheque
shall be given to the honorees legal heir/s or a
representative designated by the family immediately after
the ceremony or at another time and place as requested
by the family. (Emphases supplied.)
In 1996, the NCCA and the CCP created a National Artist Award
Secretariat composed of the NCCA Executive Director as Chairperson,
the CCP President as Vice-Chairperson, and the NCCA Deputy
Executive Director, the CCP Vice-President/Artistic Director, the NCCA
National Artist Award Officer and the CCP National Artist Award Officer as
members. They also centralized with the NCCA all financial resources
and management for the administration of the National Artists Award.
They added another layer to the selection process to involve and allow
the participation of more members of the arts and culture sector of the
Philippines in the selection of who may be proclaimed a National Artist.
On September 19, 2003, Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, entitled
Establishing the Honors Code of the Philippines to Create an Order of
Precedence of Honors Conferred and for Other Purposes, was issued.
The National Artists Award was renamed the Order of National Artists and
raised to the level of a Cultural Order, fourth in precedence among the
orders and decorations that comprise the Honors of the Philippines.
Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, recognizes the vital role of the NCCA
and the CCP in identifying Filipinos who have made distinct contributions
to arts and letters and states that the National Artist recognition is
conferred "upon the recommendation of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines and the National Commission for Culture and the
Arts."12 Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, further created a Committee on
Honors to "assist the President in evaluating nominations for recipients of
Honors,"13 including the Order of National Artists, and presidential
awards. The Committee on Honors has been allowed to "authorize
relevant department or government agencies to maintain Honors and/or
Awards Committees to process nominations for Honors and/or
Presidential Awards."14In this connection, Section 2.4(A) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations15 of Executive Order No. 236, s.
2003, states:
2.4: Awards Committees
There shall be two types of awards committees: the Committee on
Honors and the various awards committees in the various units of the
government service.
A. The Committee on Honors
The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards Committee. It is
composed of the following:
The Executive Secretary, Chairman
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman
Head, Presidential Management Staff, member
Presidential Assistant for Historical Affairs, member
Chief of Presidential Protocol, member

Chief of Protocol, DFA, member
All nominations from the various awards committees must be submitted
to the Committee on Honors via the Chancellery of Philippine Orders and
State Decorations. The Chancellery shall process nominations for the
consideration of the Committee on Honors. The Committee on Honors
shall screen and recommend these nominations to the President.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel purportedly composed

of an entirely new set of Council of Experts met and shortlisted 13 out of
the 32 names in the preliminary shortlist.20 On May 6, 2009, the final
deliberation was conducted by the 30-member Final Deliberation Panel
comprised of the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the living National Artists.21 From the 13 names in the
second shortlist, a final list of four names was agreed upon. 22 The final
list, according to rank, follows:
Name
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening

committee to ensure that nominations received from the various awards
committees meet two tests: that there has not been an abuse of
discretion in making the nomination, and that the nominee is in good
standing. Should a nomination meet these criteria, a recommendation to
the President for conferment shall be made.
The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the
Committee on Honors in the highest consideration when making the final
decision on the conferment of awards. (Emphasis supplied.)
Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, entitled Amending Section 5(IV) of
Executive Order No. 236 Entitled "Establishing the Honors Code of the
Philippines to Create an Order of Precedence of Honors Conferred and
for Other Purposes" was subsequently issued on June 8, 2005. It
amended the wording of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, on the Order
of National Artists and clarified that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise
the President on the conferment of the Order of National Artists."
Controversy Surrounding the 2009
Order of National Artists
Petitioners alleged that on January 30, 2007, a joint meeting of the NCCA
Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees was held to
discuss, among others, the evaluation of the 2009 Order of National
Artists and the convening of the National Artist Award Secretariat. The
nomination period was set for September 2007 to December 31, 2007,
which was later extended to February 28, 2008. The pre-screening of
nominations was held from January to March 2008.16
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met.17 A total of 87
nominees18 were considered during the deliberation and a preliminary
shortlist19 of 32 names was compiled.
Art Field/Category
Number of
Votes
Manuel Conde (+)
Film and Broadcast Arts

(Film)
26
Ramon Santos
Music
19
Lazaro Francisco (+) Literature
15
Federico AguilarAlcuaz
15
Visual Arts
On May 6, 2009, a letter, signed jointly by the Chairperson of the NCCA,

Undersecretary Vilma Labrador, and the President and Artistic Director of
the CCP, Mr. Nestor Jardin, was sent to the President.23 The letter stated,
thus:
May 6, 2009
Her Excellency GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
Malacaan Palace, Manila
Subject: 2009 Order of National Artist Awardees
Dear President Arroyo:
We are respectfully submitting a recommendation of the NCCA Board of
Trustees and CCP Board of Trustees for the Proclamation of the following
as 2009 Order of National Artists:
1. Mr. MANUEL CONDE+ (Posthumous) Film and
Broadcast Arts
2. Dr. RAMON SANTOS Music

3. Mr. LAZARO FRANCISCO+ (Posthumous) Literature
4. Mr. FEDERICO AGUILAR-ALCUAZ Visual Arts
The above persons were identified by experts in the various fields of arts
and culture, including living National Artists. An intensive selection
process was observed following established practice. In the past, awards
were presented by the President at a Ceremony held at the Malacaan
Palace followed by a program called "Parangal" at the Cultural Center of
the Philippines. We also propose to continue with past practice of
celebrating the life and works of the four (4) Order of National Artists
through an exhibit that will open and a commemorative publication that
will be released on the day of the proclamation.
We respectfully suggest, subject to Her Excellencys availability, that the
Proclamation be on June 11, 2009, if possible at the Malacaan Palace.
Thank you for your kind attention.
Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd.)
VILMA L. LABRADOR
Chairman
National Commission for Culture and the Arts
(Sgd.)
NESTOR O. JARDIN
President and Artistic Director
Cultural Center of the Philippines24
According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the
Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the
Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various
sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private
respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas,
Francisco Maosa and Jose Moreno. The Committee on Honors
purportedly processed these nominations and invited resource persons to
validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.25
The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to then

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo recommending the conferment of the
Order of National Artists on the four recommendees of the NCCA and the
CCP Boards, as well as on private respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. Acting on this recommendation,
Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was
issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation
Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico
AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Maosa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was
subsequently announced to the public by then Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009.26
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will
be conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the standard for
entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this petition for
prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for restraining order)
praying that the Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and
that the conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno be enjoined and
declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.27
In a Resolution28 dated August 25, 2009, the Court issued a status quo
order29 enjoining "public respondents" "from conferring the rank and title
of the Order of National Artists on private respondents; from releasing the
cash awards that accompany such conferment and recognition; and from
holding the acknowledgment ceremonies for recognition of the private
respondents as National Artists."
What is the nature and scope of the power of the President to confer the
Order of the National Artists and how should it be exercised? This is the
essential issue presented in this case. It will determine whether the
proclamation of respondents as National Artists is valid. Preliminary
procedural issues on the standing of the petitioners and the propriety of
the remedies taken,30 however, call for resolution as a prerequisite to the
discussion of the main question.
Contention of the Parties
A perusal of the pleadings submitted by the petitioners reveals that they
are an aggrupation of at least three groups, the National Artists, cultural
workers and academics, and the Concerned Artists of the Philippines
(CAP). The National Artists assert an "actual as well as legal interest in

maintaining the reputation of the Order of National Artists."31 In particular,
they invoke their right to due process not to have the honor they have
been conferred with diminished by the irregular and questionable
conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Maosa and Moreno. For petitioners, this would adversely affect their
right to live a meaningful life as it detracts not only from their right to
enjoy their honor as a fruit of their lifelong labor but also from the respect
of their peers.32
The cultural workers, academics and CAP claim to be Filipinos who are
deeply concerned with the preservation of the countrys rich cultural and
artistic heritage. As taxpayers, they are concerned about the use of public
monies for illegal appointments or spurious acts of discretion.33
All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo
gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous
screening and selection process for the Order of National Artists and in
substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
According to petitioners, the Presidents discretion to name National
Artists is not absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the
matter cannot be exercised in the absence of or against the
recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP. In adding the names of
respondents Caparas, Guidote-Alvarez, Maosa and Moreno while
dropping Dr. Santos from the list of conferees, the Presidents own
choices constituted the majority of the awardees in utter disregard of the
choices of the NCCA and the CCP and the arts and culture community
which were arrived at after a long and rigorous process of screening and
deliberation. Moreover, the name of Dr. Santos as National Artist for
Music was deleted from the final list submitted by the NCCA and the CCP
Boards without clearly indicating the basis thereof. For petitioners, the
Presidents discretion to name National Artists cannot be exercised to
defeat the recommendations made by the CCP and NCCA Boards after a
long and rigorous screening process and with the benefit of expertise and
experience. The addition of four names to the final list submitted by the
Boards of the CCP and the NCCA and the deletion of one name from the
said list constituted a substitution of judgment by the President and a
unilateral reconsideration without clear justification of the decision of the
First, Second and Final Deliberation Panels composed of experts.34
Petitioners further argue that the choice of respondent GuidoteAlvarez
was illegal and unethical because, as the then Executive Director of the
NCCA and presidential adviser on culture and arts, she was disqualified
from even being nominated.35 Moreover, such action on the part of the
former President constituted grave abuse of discretion as it gave

preferential treatment to respondent Guidote-Alvarez by naming the latter
a National Artist despite her not having been nominated and, thus, not
subjected to the screening process provided by the rules for selection to
the Order of National Artists. Her inclusion in the list by the President
represented a clear and manifest favor given by the President in that she
was exempted from the process that all other artists have to undergo.
According to petitioners, it may be said that the President used a different
procedure to qualify respondent Guidote-Alvarez. This was clearly grave
abuse of discretion for being manifest and undue bias violative of the
equal protection clause.36
Respondent Caparas refutes the contention of the petitioning National
Artists and insists that there could be no prejudice to the latter. They
remain to be National Artists and continue to receive the emoluments,
benefits and other privileges pertaining to them by virtue of that honor.
On the other hand, all the other petitioners failed to show any material
and personal injury or harm caused to them by the conferment of the
Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Maosa and Moreno. The rule on standing may not be relaxed in favor of
the petitioners as no question of constitutionality has been raised and no
issue of transcendental importance is involved.37
Respondent Caparas further argues that the remedies of prohibition and
injunction are improper as the act sought to be enjoined the declaration
of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno as
National Artists had already been consummated. In particular,
respondent Caparas was already proclaimed National Artist through
Proclamation No. 1827 issued on July 6, 2009.38
On the merits, respondent Caparas contends that no grave abuse of
discretion attended his proclamation as National Artist. The former
President considered the respective recommendations of the NCCA and
the CCP Boards and of the Committee on Honors in eventually declaring
him (Caparas) as National Artist. The function of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards is simply to advise the President. The award of the Order of
National Artists is the exclusive prerogative of the President who is not
bound in any way by the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards. The implementing rules and regulations or guidelines of the
NCCA cannot restrict or limit the exclusive power of the President to
select the recipients of the Order of National Artists.39
For her part, in a letter40 dated March 11, 2010, respondent GuidoteAlvarez manifested that she was waiving her right to file her comment on
the petition and submitted herself to the Courts discretion and wisdom.
Respondent Maosa manifested that his creations speak for themselves
as his contribution to Filipino cultural heritage and his worthiness to
receive the award. Nonetheless, he expressed his conviction that the
Order of National Artists is not a right but a privilege that he would
willingly relinquish should he be found not worthy of it. 41
Respondent Moreno did not file any pleading despite being given several
opportunities to do so. Hence, the Court dispensed with his pleadings. 42
In a Resolution dated July 12, 2011, this Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to file their respective
memoranda.43 Respondent Caparas filed his memorandum on
September 8, 2011,44 the CCP filed its memorandum on September 19,
2011,45 respondent Maosa on September 20, 2011,46 and the Office of
the Solicitor General filed a manifestation stating that it is adopting its
comment as its memorandum on September 21, 2011.47 Respondent
Moreno failed to file a Memorandum, hence, the Court resolved to
dispense with the same.48 Petitioners filed their Memorandum on May 14,
2012.49
On the other hand, the original position of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) was similar to that of respondent Caparas.50 In a
subsequent manifestation,51 however, the OSG stated that the current
Board of Commissioners of the NCCA agree with the petitioners that the
President cannot honor as a National Artist one who was not
recommended by the joint Boards of the NCCA and the CCP. The
implementing rules and regulations of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003,
recognized the binding character of the recommendation of the NCCA
and the CCP Boards and limited the authority of the Committee on
Honors to the determination that (1) there has been no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NCCA and the CCP Boards in making the
nomination, and (2) the nominee is in good standing. Where a nomination
meets the said two criteria, a recommendation to the President to confer
the award shall be made.52
The OSG further argued that, while the President exercises control over
the NCCA and the CCP, the President has the duty to faithfully execute
the laws, including the NCCA-CCP guidelines for selection of National
Artists and the implementing rules of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003.
Moreover, the laws recognize the expertise of the NCCA and the CCP in
the arts and tasked them to screen and select the artists to be conferred
the Order of National Artists. Their mandate is clear and exclusive as no
other agency possesses such expertise.53
The OSG also assailed the former Presidents choice of respondent
Guidote-Alvarez for being contrary to Republic Act No. 7356.54 Section 11
of the said law provides:
Sec. 11. Membership Restrictions. During his/her term as member of
the Commission, a Commissioner shall not be eligible for any grant, or
such other financial aid from the Commission as an individual: Provided,
however, That he/she may compete for grants and awards on the same
level as other artists one (1) year after his/her term shall have expired.
The omission of the word "award" in the first portion of the above
provision appears to be unintentional as shown by the proviso which
states that a member may compete for grants and awards only one year
after his or her term shall have expired. As such, respondent GuidoteAlvarez is restricted and disqualified from being conferred the 2009 Order
of National Artists.55
The Courts Ruling
Standing of the Petitioners
Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper
party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication.56 The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.57
The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an
official act must have a direct and personal interest. They must show not
only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that they
sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in
some indefinite way. They must show that they have been or are about to
be denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled or that
they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of
the statute or act complained of.58
In this case, we find that the petitioning National Artists will be denied
some right or privilege to which they are entitled as members of the
Order of National Artists as a result of the conferment of the award on
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. In
particular, they will be denied the privilege of exclusive membership in the
Order of National Artists.
In accordance with Section 2(a)59 of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003,
the Order of National Artists is "an exclusive association of honored
individuals." To ensure the exclusivity of the membership in the Order, a
rigid nomination and screening process has been established with
different sets of renowned artists and respected art critics invited to sit as
the Council of Experts for the First and Second Deliberation Panels.
Moreover, all living National Artists are given a voice on who should be
included in their exclusive club as they automatically become members of
the Final Deliberation Panel that will vote on who should be included in
the final list to be submitted to the President for conferment of the Order
of National Artists. To allow the untrammeled discretion and authority of
the President to confer the Order of National Artists without regard to the
stringent screening and rigorous selection process established by the
NCCA and the CCP will diminish, if not negate, the exclusive nature of
the said Order. It will unduly subject the selection and conferment of the
Order of National Artists to politics rather than to principles and
procedures. It will subvert the transparent and rigorous process and allow
entry to the exclusive Order of National Artists through a secret backdoor
of lobbying, back channeling and political accommodation.
Among the other petitioners, Prof. Gemino Abad presents a unique valid
personal and substantial interest. Like respondents Caparas, Maosa
and Moreno, he was among the 87 nominees for the 2009 Order of
National Artists. Like respondent Moreno, he made it to the preliminary
shortlist. As he did not make it to the second shortlist, he was not
considered by the Final Deliberation Panel, more so by the former
President.
It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was
disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA
at that time while respondents Maosa and Caparas did not make it to
the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the
second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated differently and
considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous
screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of
National Artists. The Committee on Honors and the former President
effectively treated respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and
Moreno as a preferred class. The special treatment accorded to

respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno fails to
pass rational scrutiny.60 No real and substantial distinction between
respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify
deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and
placing respondents in an exceptional position. The undue classification
was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the
law and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry
the law into effect. While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the
Order of National Artists,61 he is entitled to be given an equal opportunity
to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of
petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial
enough to confer him standing in this case.
As regards the other concerned artists and academics as well as the
CAP, their claim of deep concern for the preservation of the countrys rich
cultural and artistic heritage, while laudable, falls short of the injury in fact
requirement of standing. Their assertion constitutes a generalized
grievance shared in a substantially equal measure by all or a large class
of citizens.62 Nor can they take refuge in their status as taxpayers as the
case does not involve any illegal appropriation or taxation. A taxpayers
suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing
power of the Congress.63
Nonetheless, as a reading of the petition shows that it has advanced an
issue which deserves the attention of this Court in view of its
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedent, it behooves the Court to
relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue presented before
it.64 Moreover, this issue is of paramount interest,65 which further justifies a
liberal stance on standing.
Propriety of the Remedies
The present action is a petition for prohibition, certiorari, injunction,
restraining order and all other legal, just and equitable reliefs.
It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are
preventive and, as such, cannot be availed of to restrain an act that is
already fait accompli.66 Where the act sought to be prohibited or enjoined
has already been accomplished or consummated, prohibition or
injunction becomes moot.67
Nevertheless, even if the principal issue is already moot, this Court may
still resolve its merits for the future guidance of both bench and bar.
Courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
"capable of repetition, yet evading review."68
It is an opportune time for the Court to assert its role as republican
schoolmaster,69 a teacher in a vital national seminar.70 There are times
when the controversy is of such character that, to prevent its recurrence
and to assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass
on the merits of a case.71 This is one such case. More than being a
teaching moment, this is not the first time that the Order of National
Artists was conferred in the manner that is being assailed in this case. 72 If
not addressed here and now, there is great probability that the central
question involved in this case will haunt us again in the future. Every
President may invoke absolute presidential prerogative and thrust upon
us National Artists after his or her own heart, in total disregard of the
advise of the CCP and the NCCA and the voice of the community of
artists, resulting to repeated episodes of indignation and uproar from the
artists and the public.
Furthermore, if not corrected, such an act would give rise to mischief and
dangerous precedent whereby those in the corridors of power could
avoid judicial intervention and review by merely speedily and stealthily
completing the commission of an illegality.73
In any event, the present petition is also for certiorari and there is no
procedural bar for the Court to pass upon the question of whether the
proclamations of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and
Moreno as National Artists were attended by grave abuse of presidential
discretion.
Limits of the Presidents Discretion
The respective powers of the CCP Board of Trustees and of the NCCA
Board of Commissioners with respect to the conferment of the Order of
National Artists are clear. They jointly administer the said award and,
upon their recommendation or advice, the President confers the Order of
National Artists.
To "recommend" and to "advise" are synonymous. To "recommend" is "to
advise or counsel."74 To "advise" is "to give an opinion or counsel, or
recommend a plan or course of action; also to give notice. To encourage,
inform or acquaint."75 "Advise" imports that it is discretionary or optional
with the person addressed whether he will act on such advice or

not.76 This has been clearly explained in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma77:
The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice,
exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character,
not binding upon the party to whom it is made." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the
President may or may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the
NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and
the CCP is subject to the Presidents discretion.
Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the matter is not totally
unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless.
Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it
pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation,
"discretion is not unconfined and vagrant" but "canalized within banks
that keep it from overflowing."78
The Presidents power must be exercised in accordance with existing
laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful
execution of the laws by the President:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National
Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully
execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed
as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of
power.79 It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal
principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey
and execute them.80 This is precisely why the law provides that
"administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." 81
In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards
in connection with the conferment of the Order of National Artists by
executive issuances were institutionalized by two laws, namely,
Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No.
7356. In particular, Proclamation No. 1144 dated May 15, 1973
constituted the CCP Board as the National Artists Awards Committee and
tasked it to "administer the conferment of the category of National Artist"
upon deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to "draft the rules to
guide its deliberations in the choice of National Artists":
(a) To encourage the continuing and balanced development of a

pluralistic culture by the people themselves, it shall:
Proclamation No. 1001 dated April 27, 1972, creating the Award and
Decoration of National Artist, is hereby amended by creating a National
Artists Awards Committee, hereinafter to administer the conferment of the
category of National Artist upon those deserving thereof. The Committee,
which shall be composed of members of the Board of Trustees of the
Cultural Center of the Philippines, shall organize itself immediately and
shall draft the rules to guide its deliberations in the choice of National
Artists, to the end that those who have created a body of work in the arts
and in letters capable of withstanding the test of time will be so
recognized. (Emphases supplied.)
(4) extend recognition of artistic achievement through awards,

grants and services to artists and cultural groups which contribute
significantly to the Filipinos cultural legacy;
The authority of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists Awards

Committee was reiterated in Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7,
1973.
The function of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists Awards
Committee has been recognized under Republic Act No. 7356:
Sec. 18. The National Cultural Agencies. The [NCCA] shall coordinate
with the national cultural agencies including but not limited to the Cultural
Center of the Philippines, the Institute of Philippine Languages, the
National Historical Institute, the National Library, the National Museum,
the Records Management and Archives Office. However, they shall
continue operating under their respective charters or as provided by law
where provisions therein are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act. They shall serve as the national repository and/or showcase, as the
case may be, of the best of Philippine culture and arts. For this purpose,
these agencies shall submit periodic reports, including recommendations
to the [NCCA]. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the NCCA has been given the following mandate in
connection with the conferment of cultural or arts awards:
Sec. 12. Mandate. The Commission is hereby mandated to formulate
and implement policies and plans in accordance with the principles stated
in Title 1 of this Act.
xxxx
xxxx
Sec. 13. Powers and Functions. To carry out its mandate, the
Commission shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(j) advise the President on matters pertaining to culture and the
arts, including the creation of a special decoration or award, for
persons who have significantly contributed to the development
and promotion of Philippine culture and arts;
(k) promulgate rules, regulations and undertake any and all
measures as may be necessary to implement this Act.
(Emphases supplied.)
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the
conferment of the National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided
to work together and jointly administer the National Artist Award. They
reviewed the guidelines for the nomination, selection and administration
of the National Artist Award, created a National Artist Award Secretariat,
centralized all financial resources and management for the administration
of the National Artist Award, and added another layer to the selection
process so that more members of the arts and culture sector of the
Philippines may be involved and participate in the selection of National
Artists.
We have held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law
has the force and effect of law.82 Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies
regarding the Order of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of
Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates
have the force and effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding upon
executive and administrative agencies,83 including the President
himself/herself as chief executor of laws. In this connection, Section
2.5(A) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations84 of Executive Order

No. 236, s. 2003 provides:
2.5: General Guidelines for Awards Committees
A. National Orders of Cultural and Scientific Merit
The existing modalities of the NCCA for selecting recipients for the Order
of National Artists, and the Gawad sa Manlilikha ng Bayan, and of the
NAST for selecting recipients of the Order of National Scientists, shall
remain in force. (Emphases supplied.)
Section 2.4(A) of the same implementing rules further states:
2.4: Awards Committees
There shall be two types of awards committees: the Committee on
Honors and the various awards committees in the various units of the
government service.
A. The Committee on Honors
The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards Committee. It is
composed of the following:
The Executive Secretary, Chairman
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman
Head, Presidential Management Staff, member
Presidential Assistant for Historical Affairs, member
Chief of Presidential Protocol, member
Chief of Protocol, DFA, member
All nominations from the various awards committees must be submitted
to the Committee on Honors via the Chancellery of Philippine Orders and
State Decorations. The Chancellery shall process nominations for the
consideration of the Committee on Honors. The Committee on Honors
shall screen and recommend these nominations to the President.
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening

committee to ensure that nominations received from the various awards
committees meet two tests: that there has not been an abuse of
discretion in making the nomination, and that the nominee is in good
standing. Should a nomination meet these criteria, a recommendation to
the President for conferment shall be made.
The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the
Committee on Honors in the highest consideration when making the final
decision on the conferment of awards. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to the above provision of the implementing rules of Executive
Order No. 236, s. 2003, the authority of the Committee on Honors is
limited to determining whether the nominations submitted by a particular
awards committee, in this case, the joint NCCA and CCP Boards, have
been tainted by abuse of discretion, and whether the nominees are in
good standing. Should the nominations meet these two criteria, the
Committee on Honors shall make a recommendation to the President for
conferment of the Order of National Artists.
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and
as a consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws,
the discretion of the President in the matter of the Order of National
Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her by the NCCA and
the CCP Boards. This means that the President could not have
considered conferment of the Order of National Artists on any person not
considered and recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is
the proper import of the provision of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005,
that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the President on the
conferment of the Order of National Artists." Applying this to the instant
case, the former President could not have properly considered
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno, as their
names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection and meticulous screening
process be rendered futile, the respective mandates of the NCCA and the
CCP Board of Trustees under relevant laws to administer the conferment
of Order of National Artists, draft the rules and regulations to guide its
deliberations, formulate and implement policies and plans, and undertake
any and all necessary measures in that regard will also become
meaningless.
Furthermore, with respect to respondent Guidote-Alvarez who was the
Executive Director of the NCCA at that time, the Guidelines expressly
provides:
6.5 NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA and
CCP officers and staff are automatically disqualified from being
nominated.85
Respondent Guidote-Alvarez could not have even been nominated,
hence, she was not qualified to be considered and conferred the Order of
National Artists at that time. The Presidents discretion on the matter does
not extend to removing a legal impediment or overriding a legal
restriction.
From the foregoing, the advice or recommendation of the NCCA and the
CCP Boards as to the conferment of the Order of National Artists on
Conde, Dr. Santos, Francisco and Alcuaz was not binding on the former
President but only discretionary or optional for her whether or not to act
on such advice or recommendation. Also, by virtue of the power of
control, the President had the authority to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside such recommendation or advice. It was well within the Presidents
power and discretion to proclaim all, or some or even none of the
recommendees of the CCP and the NCCA Boards, without having to
justify his or her action. Thus, the exclusion of Santos did not constitute
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the former President.
The conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents GuidoteAlvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno was an entirely different matter.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.86
There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution87 when the former President gave preferential treatment to
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. The
former Presidents constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and
observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to
the selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National
Artists proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the
conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the rules,
guidelines and processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act
that unduly favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and
Moreno. The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said
respondents was therefore made with grave abuse of discretion and
should be set aside.
1wphi1
While the Court invalidates today the proclamation of respondents

Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno as National Artists, such
action should not be taken as a pronouncement on whether they are
worthy to be conferred that honor. Only the President, upon the advise of
the NCCA and the CCP Boards, may determine that. The Court simply
declares that, as the former President committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009,
the said proclamations are invalid. However, nothing in this Decision
should be read as a disqualification on the part of respondents GuidoteAlvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno to be considered for the honor of
National Artist in the future, subject to compliance with the laws, rules
and regulations governing said award.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in PART. Proclamation
Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming respondents Cecile
Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Maosa, and
Jose Moreno, respectively, as National Artists are declared INVALID and
SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 195649
April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO,
LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65
of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the
COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for
applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the
Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being
questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. 3 However, as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United
States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. 4 On the
same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition was issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which
states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and
perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United
States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the
best of my knowledge and belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others,
the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey
the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del

Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. 9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto
a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." 10To further bolster
his claim of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his
Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December
2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record
shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25
June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the
Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration
dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco"
appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM
listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel
records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010
elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer,
submitting the following documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia
Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of
Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of
Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and
continuously residing in his familys ancestral house in
Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion,
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that
Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado
went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the
Philippines in 2009;
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
12
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an

Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in
default and to present evidence ex-parte.
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local

Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr.
Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from
January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15
April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan
certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan
since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC
First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Baluas contention
that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the
finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his
contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that
Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the

Local Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division
disagreed with Arnados claim that he is a Filipino citizen. 18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with
the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnados act of consistently using his
US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009
effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnados continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that
Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he
only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office.
We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnados
unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As
noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an
official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending
to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested
himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges
reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification
and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is
hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnados proclamation as the winning
candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby
ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En
Banc on the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the
Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the
following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by

the evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit
of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied
with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of
his American citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his
Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear
allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of
the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used his
Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Baluas petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado
was filed out of time, and the First Divisions treatment of the
petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the peoples choice as indicated by his
winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the
COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a
petition for quo warranto, which should have been filed within ten
days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for
mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of
votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the
COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an
Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling
argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the
order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is
not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the
highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for
Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all
motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a

decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer,
Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be
prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that
under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even
after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is
questioned."
As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section
6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for
disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been
rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer,
would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the
dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the
order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to
take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division
of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was
filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28
April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of
the First Division and granted Arnados Motion for Reconsideration, on
the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the
respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never
became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that
the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status
as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such.
More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-
renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Divisions reliance

in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. DefensorSantiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a
naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is
maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who
acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original
citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to
those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is
not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener
pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly
help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport
after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with
the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US
passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was
only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the
issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it
about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondents
submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used
the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April
16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4,
2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to
his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his
use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent
used whatever is within his control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto
Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds
provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which
Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of
citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a
person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed
that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands
until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the
instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should
be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American
passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of

expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
retention of citizenship."26
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring

Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US
passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the
2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly
abandoned his allegiance to the United States. The latters continued use
of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen
despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs
contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine
citizenship. Respondents submission with the twin requirements was
obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for
running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010
Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the
office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time
he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he
is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent
obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latters
failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law,
his having received the highest number of votes does not validate his
election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was
filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved
against him after election, his having obtained the highest number of
votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does not
violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life
to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the
Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the
law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part
of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen
despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to
reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to
run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to
affirm the First Divisions disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks
the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government
Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling
that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is
disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which
will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the
result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a
disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier
made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use
of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones
qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local
Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when

respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division
Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that
he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado,
considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for
him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the
COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or
disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En
Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of

such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this
provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification
even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered. 29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact
that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not
shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set
forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the
right to elevate the matter before this Court.
Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original
petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the
COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by
the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court
has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the
disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain
finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
provides:
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case,
the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings
for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6
of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of
1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public
office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign
citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin
requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible
to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice:
first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again
on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of
Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise
possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his
American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus
completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a
Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the
laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is
open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen
performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to
travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on
30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate
of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship,

and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US
passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport,
Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in
effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is
an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by
the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can
simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It
requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship
and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court
declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. DefensorSantiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner
on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently
does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts
enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and
loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates
the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is
also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days
after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of
Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that
he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign
passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier
status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place
the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using
his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign
citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship
is acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is
distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not
required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of
foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand,
are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to
qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009,
Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino
and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, 40 he
was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a
period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which
date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American
citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x. 41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one.

It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of
renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that
"Arnados act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated
his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to
comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive
acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public
office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens
from running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to
allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who
subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public
office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the
explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine
passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain
his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the
Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and
later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did
not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use
of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he
took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US citizen before the
immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he
was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already
used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with
the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado
used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he
would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnados subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not
correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to
filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same
way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not
undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that
comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its
citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance
to ones flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by
choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign
citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office
demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing
his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he
took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his
situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but
even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v.
Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a
second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest.
This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to
the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who
loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus,
Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner,
Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing
candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281.
Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was
ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the
municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by
Act No. 2045 having intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a
statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the four year
interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of

victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The
Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not
entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x
with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a
comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from
that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In
the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find
that some other person than the candidate declared to have received a
plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater number
of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of
canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or
illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of
the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the
deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails
entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word,
because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found
that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was
the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other
case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received
a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined
to the personal character and circumstances of a single
individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other
case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier
statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the
word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any
other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since
the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification
case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest
number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to
determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge
exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally
elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held
in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was
whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of
municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the
second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those
proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and
all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no
effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to
the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and
additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without
costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not
even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the
Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects
thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility
of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible
candidate to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the
one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is
thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another
eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the
winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a
wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have been
a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or
any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been
passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the
opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly
qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility
does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily
affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his
favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements
for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law
requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain
disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as
elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even
becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for
and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the
qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and
rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election
laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should
be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not
excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case,
that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to
serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to
this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.51(Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v.
COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Sayaang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x
becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements." 53
We have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the election may
be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to
be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidates
certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to
certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule
of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory
after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in
Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to
fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket
and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with
dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our
elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way
around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at
providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed
choice about a candidates eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is
Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local
government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is
Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC.
Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution
of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a
Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To
state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications
if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs
may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass
election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly

valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy
to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit
himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a
disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice
through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To
allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is
electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end,
it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
1wphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the
election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the
qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos
v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will
of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in
favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total
expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the
qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate
as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their
victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications
set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when
the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidates
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be
deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated
the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible
ones.
The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a
prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very
existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible.
Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a
disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in
the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has
assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based
on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
There was no chance for Arnados proclamation to be suspended under
this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking
his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long
after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves

his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as
provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as
a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As
earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen
when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen
disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position." The prohibition
serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the
enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate
of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have
produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible
to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he
was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory
character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's
disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a
candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not
have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession
under the Local Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the
Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.

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Republic of the Philippines

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairperson Sixto S.

July 23, 2013

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 199085

For a better perspective, we briefly state the relevant factual and

recommended, among others, that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.

On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a Joint

Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Pimentel filed a

On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelecs Law

In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the proceedings

exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary investigation of election

Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a discrepancy between

as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately

To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the

Finally, we focus on the validity of the preliminary investigation conducted

x x x The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to

The procedure in conducting the preliminary investigation is governed by

documents.47Also in both Rules, respondent is given the right to examine

counter-affidavits when the interest of justice demands that respondent

However, speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or

Republic of the Philippines

July 23, 2013

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE,

Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentels decision to the Civil Service

Lastly, the CA noted that Resolution No. 002245, which modified

We find the petition meritorious.

position among the listing of mandatory provincial officials,24 but

governors direction for the province with what the provincial

2. The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific

As the CSC correctly noted in Resolution No. 0001158,29 the

Section 480 of RA 7160 made the provincial administrators functions

To emphasize the close relations that the provincial administrators

authority.30 This provision, along with the interrelations between the

In Salcedo and Ignacio v. Carpio and Carreon,34 for instance, Congress

Citing Gabriel v. Domingo,36 the dissenting opinion quotes our categorical

In extending security of tenure to Gonzales permanent appointment as

WHEREAS, responsive rules and regulations are needed to affect the

constitutional or statutory powers.41 Exercising her constitutional duty to

Republic of the Philippines

July 23, 2013

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE

We agree that official candidates of the SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT

Quezon City 03-15-09

Quezon City 02-10-10

Quezon City 01-02-07

5. Linda Gaddi David

CCI2009 12306699 Pampanga

If only one (1) seat is won

If three (3) seats are won:

No. 1 nominee = 3 years

Linda Gaddi David

All beginning July 1, 2010

Francisco G. Datol, Jr.

The letter of Rep. Arquiza was also accompanied by a petition13 dated

CONGRESSMAN DAVID L. KHO AND ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE

WHEREAS, the Coalition, in recalling the acceptance of the Board, is

Considering that it is an admitted fact that the resignation of Rep. Kho

Considering all these, we find the term sharing agreement by the

WHEREFORE, there being no vacancy in the list of nominees of the

Second, the expulsion of Datol

The Review of SENIOR CITIZENS Registration

Nominee David Khos term as party-list congressman is three (3) years