Gifted Child Quarterly

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Do Contributors to Intellect Explain the Moral Judgment Abilities of Gifted Youth?

W. Pitt Derryberry and Brian Barger
Gifted Child Quarterly 2008; 52; 340
DOI: 10.1177/0016986208321806
The online version of this article can be found at:
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Do Contributors to Intellect Explain

the Moral Judgment Abilities of
Gifted Youth?

Gifted Child Quarterly

Volume 52 Number 4
Fall 2008 340-352
2008 National Association for
Gifted Children
10.1177/0016986208321806
http://gcq.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com

W. Pitt Derryberry
Western Kentucky University

Brian Barger
Elise Middle School
Abstract: To assess reaction time and attributional complexity as factors contributing to the relatively high moral
judgment of gifted youth, a sample of 30 gifted youth and 30 college students responded to a computerized measure
of moral judgment development, which also indexed reaction time. Additionally, participants completed a measurement of attributional complexity and reported American College Test (ACT) scores. Statistically significant differences favored the gifted in moral judgment development, reaction time, and attributional complexity. Regression
analysis revealed that attributional complexity explained a significant amount of variance, whereas ACT scores and
reaction times accounted for minimal variance. Although reaction time did not predict moral judgment developmental difference, discussion is offered to suggest how gifted youth, such as those in this study, might benefit from using
their reaction time when considering moral situations.

Putting the Research to Use: The results of this study support the view that complex information processing
and reaction time abilities of gifted youth are transferred to their moral judgment development. In sum, in comparison with a control group of college students, the gifted youth considered in this study appeared to process
reasons for moral decisions in a more in-depth manner and were able to do so in a more efficient manner.
Currently, it is unknown why and how this occurs, whether obstacles exist that could block this process, and
whether practices exist that could help to facilitate these areas. Applications of these findings should therefore
expound on these issues so that the utility of research on gifted moral judgment ability is increased. Applied
research should also focus on transferring this understanding to general populations in the hopes of affecting
the understanding of moral judgment development overall.

Keywords:

middle school; age/developmental stage; high school; college or adult

ccording to the National Association for Gifted

Children (http://www.nagc.org/index.aspx? id=574),
there are a handful of foundational definitions that
may be categorized from conservative (related to
demonstrated high IQ) to liberal (a broadened conception that includes multiple criteria that might not
be measured through an IQ test; para. 3). Research on
youth who would be considered gifted according to
the conservative definition1 has produced data supporting differences across a variety of abilities from
the average child. In addition to documenting more

advanced intellectual and creative abilities, for

example, research on gifted youth as defined by conservative considerations has demonstrated higher
scores on certain cognitive developmental measures
Authors Note: Please address correspondence to W. Pitt
Derryberry, Department of Psychology, Western Kentucky
University, 1906 College Heights Blvd. # 21030, Bowling Green,
KY 42101-1030; e-mail: pitt.derryberry@wku.edu.
Note: This article was accepted under the editorship of Paula
Olszewski-Kubilius.

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(Steiner & Carr, 2003). It is not surprising, then, that

moral judgment developmental research has shown
similar differences favoring gifted populations
because moral judgment development is facilitated
by cognitive development (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987;
Gibbs, 1995; Walker, 1980).
According to the neo-Kohlbergian approach of
Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma (1999), moral
judgment development at the lowest level is at the
personal interest schema where judgments are onedimensional and focused on self-serving interests. At
the next level, moral judgments are made according to
the maintaining norms schema in which moral judgments are based on norms, rules, and laws. Finally,
moral judgment development peaks at the postconventional schema. Here, moral judgments are defined by
identified universal moral principles of justice and fairness as a result of objective reflection, deliberative
inquiry, reasoning, and problem solving. Gifted youth,
conservatively defined, have consistently shown
strengths in their moral judgment development relative
to their peers (Chovan & Freeman, 1993; Foulkes,
2000; Howard-Hamilton, 1994; Narvaez, 1993; Tirri &
Pehkonen, 2002). There is some support that the moral
judgment development of such populations of gifted
youth can even exceed those who are more advanced
in age and education (Derryberry, Wilson, Snyder,
Norman, & Barger, 2005). Specifically, Derryberry
et al. (2005) found that high-ability gifted youth were
transitioning from the maintaining norms schema to
the postconventional schema, whereas college students
were transitioning from the personal interest to the
maintaining norms schema.
Although high-ability (the conservatively defined
gifted youth) populations were more advanced on
moral judgment developmental assessments, we are
uncertain how these advances translate to instances of
moral decision making and behavior. Indeed, this is a
limitation of research that focuses on moral reasoning
and judgment (Blasi, 1980; Kurtines & Greif, 1974).
For example, research illustrates that moral exemplarity often has less to do with moral reasoning and more
to do with constructs pertaining to self-understanding
(Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995; Monroe
& Epperson, 1994). To be sure, the advancement of
moral developmental theory has accounted for this.
Specifically, Rest et al. (1999) acknowledge that moral
judgment is but one of at least four components that
are fundamental to moral development and behavior,
and the neo-Kohlbergian approach of Rest et al. (1999)
readily acknowledges that moral judgment development does not represent moral development in totality.

Even though moral judgment development is not

synonymous with moral development and behavior
and definitions of moral development continue to
become more diversified, evidence exists that moral
judgment and reasoning are linked to moral action and
behavior (Thoma, Rest, & Davison, 1991). Recently,
Derryberry and Thoma (2005a, 2005b) provided
empirical illustration of how moral judgment development contributes to important moral behavioral outcomes, including honesty, altruism, and taking a stand
for civil liberties. Additionally, support remains strong
that the consideration of moral judgment development
is an important aspect and direction for moral developmental research (Walker, 2002). In particular, Tirri and
Pehkonen (2002) provided instances illustrating how
the neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral judgment
development in a high-ability gifted youth sample can
relate to logical and elegant (p. 127) reasoning on a
scientific argumentation task.
Further investigation into the moral judgment
development of high-ability youth is important to
enable better understanding of both moral judgment
development and high-ability gifted youth. Although
research suggests that advances in moral judgment
development are the product of advanced intellect
(Sanders, Lubinski, & Benbow, 1995), definitive
explanations of why high-ability youth are so
advanced relative to their peers as well as others in
terms of their moral judgment ability have not been
provided. Sanders et al. (1995) explored how scores
on the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a popular objective
measurement of moral judgment development (see
Rest et al., 1999), related to groups of cognitive and
noncognitive variables. Sanders et al. (1995) used
American College Test (ACT) or Scholastic Aptitude
Test (SAT) scores, grade point average (GPA), and
Ravens Progressive Matrix scores to define their cognitive group of variables. Scores on the Family
Environment Scale, Adjective Checklist, Study of
Values Scale, and a demographics questionnaire represented noncognitive variables. Once cognitive variables were entered in a regression model, Sanders
et al. (1995) found that the DIT did not account for a
statistically significant portion of noncognitive group
variance. Thus, Sanders et al. (1995) argued that DIT
scores were reducible to, or synonymous with, intellect. Given these findings, it might be tempting to presume that moral judgment developmental advances
seen among gifted youth are the product of their
advanced intellectual and creative capacities. There
has been little support for the arguments of Sanders
et al. (1995), prior and subsequent to their study. In

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general, research addressing the relationship between

moral judgment development and intellect supports
that intellect is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral judgment development. As Rest (1979)
originally noted in developing the DIT, moral judgment development is a cognitive intellectual process.
Citing correlations between DIT scores and various
intellectual assessments that ranged from .25 to .50 as
support and other DIT validity criteria (see Rest,
1979; Rest et al., 1999), Rest maintained that DIT
scores and its indexed construct involve intellectual
ability, although additional sources of information are
needed to facilitate advanced moral judgment development. Subsequent research has, therefore, focused
on demonstrating the role of intellect in advanced
moral judgment development. For example, Thoma,
Narvaez, Rest, and Derryberry (1999) illustrated that
relationships remained among moral judgment developmental indices and relevant criteria, even after
aspects of intellectual ability were controlled. They
further distinguished the uniqueness of moral judgment as a measurable construct in a structural equation model that verified the independent existence and
contributions of constructs of moral judgment and
verbal intellectual ability on a criterion of social political ideology (Thoma, Derryberry, Narvaez, & Rest,
2000). Derryberry, Thoma, Narvaez, and Rest (2000)
replicated the findings of Thoma et al. (2000) and further noted that these trends continued during moral
judgment developmental phases of consolidation and
transition. Derryberry, Jones, Grieve, and Barger
(2007) relied on structural equation modeling to document the relationship among moral judgment development as defined by the DIT and indices of
crystallized and fluid intellect. In addition to supporting the existence of three unique psychological latent
constructs, Derryberry et al. (2007) found a large
amount of unexplained variance remaining in paths
from the crystallized and fluid latent constructs to the
moral judgment latent construct. Research involving
the moral judgment development of gifted youth also
supports these findings. Narvaez (1993) noted that
high ability is a necessary but not a sufficient ingredient for the advanced moral judgment ability seen in
gifted populations. Similarly, Tirri and Pehkonen
(2002) observed that there are qualitative differences
in the moral reasoning of gifted adolescents. High
intellectual ability does not predict mature moral judgment (p. 127).
Given the disparate findings of Sanders et al. (1995)
and others (e.g., Rest, 1979; Thoma et al., 1999, 2000;
Derryberry et al., 2000, 2007), researchers of the

moral judgment development of gifted youth are presented with a perplexing problem. Though advanced
moral judgment is documented in the sparse research
that has examined the gifted according to conservative definitions in this area (Chovan & Freeman,
1993; Derryberry et al., 2005; Foulkes, 2000;
Howard-Hamilton, 1994; Narvaez, 1993; Tirri &
Pehknonen, 2002), definitive explanations about why
they are advanced relative to their peers in this
domain have not been provided. Research considering the relationship among indices of moral judgment
development and intellectual ability in general does
not instill the confidence needed to presume that the
advanced intellectual capacities of conservatively
defined gifted youth are sufficient to account for their
moral judgment development. Thus, the question, If
moral judgment development is not reducible to or
synonymous with intellect, then why is it that those of
advanced intellect (defined as gifted according to
conservative definitions) are regularly outperforming
others where this construct is concerned?
Numerous conditions and rationales that go beyond
intellectual ability and aptitude have been offered for
advanced moral judgment development of high-ability
learners (see Rest, Deemer, Barnett, Spickemier, &
Volker, 1986). Factors such as academic orientations,
motivations, interests, and social conditions of gifted
youth are identified as instrumental contributors to
moral judgment development. However, as already
noted, moral judgment development is a cognitive
intellectual process (Rest, 1979). It should be
expected, then, that factors serving intellectual ability
also serve moral judgment development. Hence,
efforts to address the role of intellectual ability in
moral judgment development are still needed. Rather
than attempting to reduce indices of moral judgment
development to indices of intellectual ability, a more
appropriate approach is one that seeks to account for
the shared variance or commonality of these two constructs. In other words, it seems that the aforementioned question cannot be fully answered until the
following question is answered: What is it that intellectual ability and moral judgment development have
in common?

Noted Contributors to Intellect and

Their Potential Contributions to Moral
Judgment Development
A great deal of research has been devoted to identifying and understanding those processes that serve
and foster general intellectual ability or g. Two

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important areas identified as pertaining to intelligence include reaction or response time (RT; Deary,
2000; Jensen, 2005) and complex information processing (CIP; Lohman, 2000; Sternberg, 1982). RT
refers to mental speed or the speed at which humans
process information and is indexed through various
indices of mental chronometry (see Jensen, 2005)
that record how quickly people respond to choices,
items, or other tasks. CIP refers to various mental
tasks that require comprehension, judgment, and
reasoning (Lohman, 2000, p. 288), such as inductive
reasoning, deductive reasoning, and problem solving
(Sternberg, 1982).
Contributions of RT. The study of RT dates back to
Galton, who hypothesized that mental speed is a
major aspect of general intelligence (Jensen, 2005,
p. 26). As Jensen notes, RT can be a highly precise,
reliable, and sensitive measure of individual differences (p. 26). Jensen reports correlations between
RT and intelligence quotients (IQ) ranging from .10
to .50, and that a curvilinear relationship exists with
smaller correlations between IQ and simple and difficult RT tasks and higher correlations with IQ-moderate RT tasks. Studies involving gifted youth and/or
other high-ability learners confirm that RT is
involved in their intellectual functioning (Beh,
Roberts, & Prichard-Levy, 1994; Cohn, Carlson, &
Jensen, 1985; Lajoie & Shore, 1986; Yun, Shi, Tang,
& Liu, 2004). These studies support the conclusion
that RT is an important contributor to IQ (Beh et al.,
1994; Lajoie & Shore, 1986) and also provide evidence that high-ability gifted youth respond to various mental tasks and assignments more quickly than
their peers (Cohn et al., 1985; Yun et al., 2004).
Although the contribution of RT to intelligence
may seem nebulous, Jensen (2005) explained its
importance in noting that faster RT allows more
operations to be performed on the input per unit of
time, thereby increasing the chances of reaching a
successful response before the point of overload and
breakdown due to loss of information (p. 45). In
addressing differences among those who are at moral
judgment phases of consolidation and those who are
at moral judgment phases of transition, Derryberry
and Thoma (2005b) reported that consolidated phases
can facilitate the decision to act honestly when an
attractive alternative for behaving dishonestly exists
in conjunction with minimal time for figuring out the
proper course of action. According to Derryberry and
Thoma (2005b), this indicates the importance of
being able to react or respond to information quickly

along with the utility of the moral judgment schema

for individuals in consolidated phases. Because of
these conditions, consolidated individualsregardless
of their developmental moral judgment schema
were able to respond more quickly in determining the
proper course of action.
Other moral judgment developmental research has
also addressed the role of RT. Thoma, Narvaez,
Endicott, and Derryberry (2002) noted that consolidated and transitional phases of moral judgment development affect how quickly one considers schemarelevant and irrelevant information. Those who were
noted to be in consolidated phases of moral judgment
development were observed to take more time in
responding to items on the DIT overall than those that
were transitional between moral judgment schemata.
At the same time, though, when Thoma et al. (2002)
accounted for an individuals modal moral judgment
schema, they found that consolidated individuals
responded to DIT items that reflected their modal
schema more quickly than did transitional individuals.
Thus, Thoma et al. found support that individuals more
quickly react to schema-related moral judgment information at certain phases of development.
Contributions of CIP. CIP has been recognized as
an important contributor in a variety of considerations of intellectual functioning. According to
Lohman (2000), the importance of this aspect of
information processing as a fundamental contributor
to intellect dates to the work of Binet and Simon
(1916). CIP appears to be acknowledged by Piaget
(1963) in his description of intellectual development
as following a progressing sequence of thought from
simple to complex. According to this conception, CIP
tasks such as inductive and deductive reasoning and
problem solving are prerequisites for the organization
and adaptation of formal operational thought. CIP is
also recognized in other accounts relevant to intellectual functioning. For example, Craik and Lockharts
(1972) levels of processing theory describe the intellectual contribution of CIP with its contention that
information that is mentally addressed more deeply
through analysis, connection, and other forms of
elaboration is most likely to be retained and deemed
relevant. In addressing CIP tasks including reasoning
and problem solving, Sternberg (1982) declared their
intellectual contributions in stating that There seems
to be little doubt that reasoning and problem solving
play important roles in conceptions of intelligence,
almost without regard to the derivation of these conceptions: These roles are important as subsets of

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intelligent behavior (p. 226). Indeed, it is plausible

that the ability and desire to engage in CIP ultimately
distinguishes the intellectual capacities of highability gifted youth and nourishes their talents and
creative capacities.
In distinguishing CIP from simple forms of information processing (see Deary, 2000), Lohman (2000)
summarized Snow, Kyllonen, and Marshalek (1984)
in noting four chief criteria including
a) an increase in the number of component processes
involved in task performance; b) an increase in the
involvement of one or more particular components
(such as inference); c) an increase in demands on
working memory or attentional resources; and d) an
increase in demands on adaptive functions, including
executive or metacognitive controls. (p. 301)

In examining these criteria, the involvement of CIP

is apparent in making a moral judgmentparticularly
moral judgments from the postconventional schema.
According to Rest et al. (1999), moral judgment
development reflects a process where thinking about
moral situations is originally very simplistic at the
personal interest and maintaining norms schemata but
ultimately requires the kind of tasks involved in CIP
at the postconventional schema. Whereas moral judgments according to the first two schemata simply
require retrieval of self- or other-based absolutes,
moral judgments from the postconventional schema
require that the impending judgment has been reasoned on with enough depth so that all aspects and all
parties pertaining to the situation are objectively
reviewed. Essentially, making a postconventional
moral judgment requires the individual to engage in
moral musical chairs . . . (and) . . . reversible role
taking (Kohlberg, 1987, p. 35) and various other
deliberations. Given the numerous considerations
involved and processes (i.e., inductive reasoning,
problem solving, etc.) operating in this kind of task,
all four of the criteria for CIP undoubtedly occur
when a postconventional moral judgment is made.
A recent study of gifted youth found that other
indices likely involving CIP predict their moral judgment development. Specifically, Derryberry et al.
(2005) noted the importance of attributional complexity, which refers to the depth of thinking one uses
in regard to the explication of the behavior of others
(Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder,
1986). According to Follet and Hess (2002), attributional complexity is a useful referent of cognitive
complexity because it refers to the degree to which
one considers, for example, multiple determinants and

causal explanations for behavior (p. 313). Given this

characterization, it is warranted to presume that attributional complexity involves CIP. In a stepwise hierarchical linear regression model, Derryberry et al.
(2005) found that most important in the prediction of
the moral judgment development of the gifted was an
aspect of attributional complexity that describes a
persons preference for complex over simple explanations in explaining the behavior of self and others.
According to Derryberry et al., their findings on the
importance of attributionally complex thinking elucidate the possibility that it is the manner in which
intellect is used that is important for the advancement
of moral judgment development.

Purpose of the Current Study

The reasons for the early advances in moral judgment development that are observed in high-ability or
conservatively defined gifted youth populations are
not well understood. In considering RT and CIP, it
makes sense that groups like high-ability gifted youth
that are likely proficient in both might effectively use
these abilities in other areas such as moral judgment
development. This is especially likely because moral
judgment development is regarded as a cognitive
intellectual process (Rest, 1979) and is related to, but
not reducible to, intelligence. Hence, the need for a
study addressing the contributions of RT and constructs involving CIP to the moral judgment development of high-ability gifted youth is warranted.
Although it makes sense that attributionally complex
thinking about the behavior of others would be beneficial in facilitating moral judgment development, it is
unlikely that attributional complexity is the sole reason for the early advancement of moral thought structures among high-ability gifted youth. As Derryberry
et al. (2005) acknowledged, this contribution only
accounted for 4% of the variance in moral thought
development and, therefore, other relevant predictors
need to be considered in understanding the moral
judgment development of high-ability gifted youth.
Given its noted contributions to intellectual
functioning, in general, and gifted populations,
RTparticularly where moral information is concernedmight also contribute to moral judgment
development. Furthermore, because moral judgment
development has been shown to relate to RT (Thoma
et al., 2002), it may be that the speed at which one can
react to a situation becomes an important facet in
ensuring that attributionally complex thinking is

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capitalized on and not lost because of overload and

breakdown (see Jensen, 2005) in working memory.
For example, if a person is able to react to moral situations quickly while also processing the situation in
an attributionally complex manner, then it seems that
the likelihood is increased that he or she will be able
to effectively consider a variety of possible alternatives
regarding a potential course of action. The end result
would therefore be more opportunities for disequilibrium about the morality of the situation, and the potential for moral judgment growth would be heightened.
The purpose of this study, then, is to compare the
moral judgment development and intellectual ability
of a group of high-ability or conservatively defined
gifted youth with a group of college students. Similar
to Derryberry et al. (2005), this study will also address
whether there are differences in attributional complexity between the two groups, because attributional
complexity appears to involve CIP. Additionally, this
study will address whether differences exist between
the two groups in their moral information RT.
Comparisons of high-ability gifted youth with those
who may be less advanced in terms of intellectual
ability yet more advanced in age and socioacademic
experiences (Derryberry et al., 2005, p. 11) are
advantageous because such comparisons consider
those who are more likely to be similar in terms of
their moral judgment development as well as other
areas related to moral judgment development.
Furthermore, such comparisons are of utility because
any advances that might be observed in the highability gifted youth sample would enable a clearer
understanding and confirmation of the degree to
which they are advanced. After these comparisons
have been conducted, this study will merge both samples and conduct linear regression to determine
whether advances in RT and attributional complexity
increase the likelihood of advanced moral judgment
once intellectual ability has been entered.

Method
Participants
Participants for this study included 30 gifted youth
and 30 college students. Gifted youth participants
were enrolled in a summer program for gifted youth
conducted at a regional university in the Southeast.
This program serves students in Grades 7 through 10
who have earned a minimum score of 18 on the ACT
math subtest and 25 on the ACT English subtest or
a minimum score of 500 on SAT math and verbal

subtests. The gifted sample included 19 females, 10

males, and 1 participant who did not provide information regarding gender. Among those that volunteered information regarding ethnicity, 22 classified
themselves as White, 2 as Asian, 1 as Black, 1 as
Hispanic, and 3 as Other. Participants ranged in age
from 12 to 16 years. The college student sample
attended a large regional university in the Southeast.
These participants were recruited from psychology
classes via the psychology departments study board
and they received extra credit in their courses for participating in the study. Students were eligible to participate in the study regardless of ACT score, GPA,
age, class year, intellectual ability, or traditional versus nontraditional college student status. This
approach is favorable to restricting the participation
of those possessing certain demographic characteristics because it increases the likelihood that the sample obtained is representative of the undergraduate
population it represents. Nineteen college-level participants were females and 11 were males. A total of
18 were freshmen, 7 were sophomores, 2 were
juniors, and 3 were seniors. In terms of ethnicity, 11
classified themselves as White, 1 as Asian, and 1 as
Black. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 27 years.

Instruments
Moral judgment. The DIT-2 (Rest, Thoma,
Narvaez, & Bebeau, 1997) was used to assess moral
judgment development. On the DIT-2, respondents
read five different short scenarios in which a character faces a moral dilemma, provide an action choice
indicating what the character should do, then rate 12
items reflecting the postconventional, maintaining
norms, or personal interest moral judgment schemata
in terms of their importance in the participants decision. To ensure individuals are not haphazardly rating
each item, the DIT-2 also includes several meaningless items as well as items that pertain to antiestablishment attitudes among the 12 associated with each
dilemma. After rating each of the 12 items, respondents rank the four items that were most important to
them in making their decisions. To ascertain developmental differences between groups, participants N2
scores, which assess the degree to which the participant emphasizes postconventional items over other
items in making moral judgments (Rest et al., 1997),
are calculated. N2 scores range from 0 to 95. High N2
scores are indicative of those that not only emphasize
items pertaining to the postconventional schema in
their rating and rankings but also minimize the

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345

importance of items pertaining to the maintaining

norms and personal interest schemata.
DIT-2 Type scores are also used in the current
study. Inclusion of the Type score enables more precision in documenting moral judgment development
than the N2 score. Type scores are categorical indices
that refer to positioning at a particular moral judgment schema and indicate moral judgment developmental phase criteria. If a person primarily references
DIT items pertaining to one moral judgment schema
relative to others, he or she is considered in a consolidated phase of moral judgment development. If a
person does not strongly emphasize DIT items
belonging to a particular moral judgment schema relative to other schemata, he or she is considered in a
transitional phase of moral judgment development.
Type scores range from 1 to 7. Type 1 reflects a
person consolidated at the personal interest schema.
At Type 2, the personal interest schema remains
modal though the individual is beginning to transition
towards the maintaining norms schema. Type 3 also
designates a transitional phase, although a modal shift
has occurred favoring the maintaining norms schema.
Type 4 indicates consolidation at the maintaining
norms schema. Type 5 reveals that transition away
from the maintaining norms schema though this
schema remains modal. Type 6 is a transitional phase
where a modal shift from the maintaining norms to the
postconventional schema has occurred. Type 7 indicates consolidation at the postconventional schema.
Internal consistency of the DIT-2 in the current
study was assessed using Cronbachs alpha computed
at the item level for each schema (e.g., consideration
of the consistency across DIT rating items specific to
particular moral judgment schema), as Crowson,
DeBacker, Derryberry, and Thoma (2005) recommended. Internal consistency is acceptable ( = .716
for the postconventional schema, .733 for the maintaining norms schema, and .757 for the personal
interest schema). Analysis of DIT-2 scores only
includes those with acceptable levels of reliability
(see Rest et al., 1999).
Reaction time (RT). RT indices were measured by
presenting the DIT-2 via Inquisit 1.33 software
(Inquisit 1.33, 2003). Response times for all items
are reported in milliseconds. Response time indices
used in this study include the average RT on all
action and rating choice items (AVErt), action choice
items (ACrt), postconventional items (PCrt), maintaining norms or conventional level items (MNrt),
personal interest or preconventional items (PIrt),

meaningless items (MGLSrt), and antiestablishment

items (AErt).
In evaluating the internal consistency for these
indices, reported RT for each item comprising each
index were compared. Internal consistency is low for
the ACrt ( = .367), the 5 RTs comprising MGLSrt
( = .148), and the 4 RTs comprising AErt ( =.373);
good for the 65 RTs comprising AVErt ( = .886), for
the 14 RTs comprising PCrt ( = .801), and for the 20
RTs comprising PIrt ( = .846); and acceptable for
the 17 RTs for MNrt ( = .736). Although Cronbachs
alpha indices were found for ACrt, MGLSrt, and
AErt, it is important to note that few items comprise
these items making it difficult to achieve high levels
of internal consistency. Although these indices will be
noted in the study, any trends observed will be treated
with caution.
Attributional complexity. The Attributional
Complexity Scale (ACS; Fletcher et al., 1986) was
used in making inferences about an individuals CIP.
The ACS is a 28-item 7-point scale designed to assess
participants complexity of thought in explaining
human behavior. The ACS has been successfully
employed in previous studies as an inference of
aspects pertaining to complex thought (Derryberry
et al., 2005; Follett & Hess, 2002). Examples of ACS
items include I dont usually bother to analyze or
explain peoples behavior, I think a lot about the
influence I have on other peoples behavior, and I
have found that the causes for peoples behavior are
usually complex rather than simple. The ACS yields
a composite ACS score (ACScomp) that ranges from
0 to 84. The ACS can be indexed into seven different subscales; however, low internal consistency was
found for some of these subscales. Thus, only
ACScomp scores are considered in the current study
where = .862.
Intellectual ability. The ACT achievement test is
typically used to assess the level of competence a
student should have for successful completion of college-level work. As such, it is considered to be an
assessment of achievement than of intellect. At the
same time, its scores are inferential of intellectual
ability, and various comparisons of moral judgment
and intellectual ability have referenced these scores
in deducing information regarding general intellectual ability (Derryberry et al., 2000; Rest, 1979;
Sanders et al., 1995; Thoma et al., 2000). Hence, ACT
scores are considered an inferential reflection of intellectual ability in the current study so that differences

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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Gifted Youth

College Students

M
ACT
DIT N2
ACScomp
AVErt
ACrt
PCrt
MNrt
PIrt
MGLSrt
AErt

SD

22.12
39.07
39.31
6590.05
8666.29
16035.53
6203.79
6237.31
8106.27
6625.97

2.75
12.87
19.68
1858.26
6483.41
7007.27
1763.91
1861.27
4576.02
2539.36

SD

21.63
24.52
23.83
7421.87
7014.84
14640.38
7131.09
7254.44
8068.33
8411.68

3.16
10.16
15.85
1950.64
4469.44
9993.06
1708.34
1938.22
3948.98
2690.34

Note: ACT = American College Test; DIT N2 = Defining Issues Testversion 2; ACScomp = Attributional Complexity Scale comprehensive scores; AVErt = average reaction time; ACrt = average reaction time across action choices; PCrt = average reaction time across postconventional items; MNrt = average reaction time across maintaining norms items; PIrt = average reaction time across personal interest
items; MGLSrt = average reaction time across meaningless items; AErt = average reaction time across antiestablishment items; M = mean;
SD = standard deviation.

between groups can effectively be considered. ACT

scores were obtained through university records via
permission from participants. In the current study,
only ACT composite scores were considered because
11 gifted youth participants had not taken the ACT
(they had taken the SAT). SAT composite scores were
converted into ACT composite equivalent scores
according to concordance tables published through
College Board (see Dorans, 1999). Four gifted youth
participants who had not completed either test were
not considered in analyses involving ACT scores.

Procedures
For both groups, data were collected in a session
ranging from 45 min to 1 hr. Informed consent or
assent was obtained from both groups at the start of
the session. Parental consent was granted and verified
prior to the session for the gifted group. Those in the
college student group were offered course extra credit
for their participation. All materials were coded with
a participant number for confidentiality.

Results
Descriptive statistics for dependent variables can be
found in Table 1. Table 2 documents moral judgment
development in terms of modal schema and moral
judgment phase as reflected in the frequency of DIT
Type scores in each sample. The majority of the
gifted youth samples were in consolidated phases of

Table 2
DIT Type Score Frequency Table
Gifted Youth Sample
Personal interest
Type 1
Type 2
Maintaining norms
Type 3
Type 4
Type 5
Postconventional
Type 6
Type 7

College Student Sample

2
2
4
6
3
4
9

Personal interest
Type 1
Type 2
Maintaining norms
Type 3
Type 4
Type 5
Postconventional
Type 6
Type 7

1
8
8
5
5
3
0

Note: Types 1 and 2 = personal interest schema is mode; Types 3

to 5 = maintaining norms schema is mode; Types 6 to 7 = postconventional schema is mode. Types 1, 4, and 7 are consolidated
phases; Types 2, 3, 5, and 6 are transitional phases.

moral judgment development, whereas the majority

of the college student samples were in transitional
phases of moral judgment development. Furthermore,
Table 2 documents that the moral judgment development of most of the gifted youth sample was modal at
either the maintaining norms or postconventional
schema, whereas the moral judgment development of
the majority of the college youth sample was modal
at the maintaining norms schema.
Analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted
on DIT N2, ACScomp, ACT, and AVErt scores.
Statistically significant differences between groups
were reported for N2: F(1, 58) = 23.629, p < .001,

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347

2 = .29, d = 1.07, and ACScomp scores: F(1, 58) =

11.101, p < .002, 2 = .163, d = .80. No statistically
significant differences between groups for ACT composite scores were seen. A multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) was conducted to assess differences between groups on the ACrt, PCrt, MNrt, PIrt,
MGLSrt, and AErt RT indices. Four multivariate tests
yielded statistical significance for RT-dependent variables, F(6, 53) = 2.839, p < .018, 2 = .24. Univariate
tests of statistical significance between groups were
significant on three of these indices: MNrt, F(1, 58) =
4.278, p < .05, 2 = .07, d = .52; PIrt, F(1, 58) = 4.298,
p < .05, 2 = .07, d = .52; and AErt, F(1, 58) = 6.990,
p < .05, 2 = .11, d = .65.
Linear regression analysis was used to assess how
the considered variables predicted moral judgment
developmental variance overall (Table 3). With N2
scores as dependent variable, three blocks were
entered in which the contributions of ACT scores,
ACS comprehensive scores, and the average of the
RT indices were noted. As Table 4 illustrates, only the
second block, ACS scores, was noted to contribute to
a significant portion of N2 variance. ACT scores
(Block 1) and RT averages (Block 3) were shown to
account for a minimal portion of N2 variance. This
lack of contribution from the RT averages is not the
product of shared variance with ACT and ACS scores.
As the correlation matrix illustrated in Table 3 verifies, RT averages were negligibly related to these two
variables.

Table 3
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses for
Variables Predicting DIT N2 Scores
Variable
Block 1
ACT
Block 2
ACT
ACScomp
Block 3
ACT
ACScomp
AVErt

SE B

Significance

.939

.638

.198

1.472

.147

.192
.405

.572
.090

.041
.541

.337
4.484

.738
.000

.167
.409
.001

.575
.091
.001

.035
.547
.087

.290
4.504
.745

.773
.000
.459

Note: ACT = American College Test, ACScomp = ACS

Composite Score, AVErt = average reaction time on DIT items.
R2 = .039 for Block 1 (p < .147); R2 = .268 for Block 2 (p <
.000); R2 = .007 for Block 3 (p < .459).

Table 4
Correlation Matrix
N2
N2
ACT
ACScomp
AVErt

1.00
.152
.552**
.051

ACT

ACScomp

AVErt

1.00
.291*
.040

1.00
.088

1.00

Note: N2 = Defining Issues Test (DIT) N2 scores; ACT = American

College Test; ACScomp = ACS Composite Score; AVErt = average
reaction time on DIT items.
*Correlation is significant at the .05 level.
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level.

Discussion
Given the strong effect size (2 = .29, d = 1.07)
observed for reported DIT N2 scores, there is support
that the moral judgment development of the gifted
youth sample is distinctly different from the college
student sample. As higher N2 scores are indicative of
an increased emphasis of the importance of DIT
items pertaining to the postconventional schema in
conjunction with a decreased emphasis of items pertaining to earlier schemata, the N2 scores reported for
both groups suggest a key moral judgment developmental distinction in that the postconventional
schema was more likely to be prioritized in making
moral decisions by the gifted participants than it was
for the college sample. This is further supported in
Table 2 which provides a breakdown of the participants
in each sample in terms of DIT Type scores. These findings confirm previous studies of advanced moral judgment development of high-ability or conservatively

defined gifted youth (Chovan & Freeman, 1993;

Derryberry et al., 2005; Foulkes, 2000; HowardHamilton, 1994; Narvaez, 1993; Tirri & Pehkonen,
2002). An interesting aspect of these findings is that
these moral judgment differences exist even though
ACT score differences were not significant, refuting
those who contend that moral judgment development
and intellect are reducible to each other (Sanders
et al., 1995) and affirming assertions that such constructs are independent (Derryberry et al., 2000,
2007; Narvaez, 1993; Tirri & Pehkonen, 2002;
Thoma et al., 1999; Thoma et al., 2000).
Certain aspects relating to intellect can be involved
in facilitating the moral judgment development of
high-ability gifted youth, however. For example,
Derryberry et al. (2005) suggested that processes that
underlie and support intellectual ability could still
play a role, contributing to our contention that such

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processes could include RT and constructs related to

CIP. Findings for ACScomp scores and the RT
indices provide initial support for this hypothesis.
Specifically, evidence that the gifted youth may be
more advanced in terms of CIP was provided through
the strong effect favoring the gifted youth sample on
ACScomp scores. Furthermore, the gifted youth
tended to process moral information more quickly as
evidenced by strong effect sizes on the RT indices
and the moderate univariate effects observed. Taken
together, these findings suggest that the gifted youth
preferred to process certain kinds of information in a
more complex manner than the college students.
Furthermore, they have the ability to do so more
quickly than the college students.
This does not mean that the gifted youth processed
all information with more complexity, nor does it
indicate that they processed all information quickly.
As noted in Table 3, the gifted youth reacted significantly more quickly to items pertaining to the personal interest and maintaining norms schemata,
whereas no statistical differences were seen between
groups in reacting to postconventional items. In other
words, they were quick to discount the relative
importance of moral information that was not congruent with the postconventional moral judgment
schema and spent increased time focusing on moral
information that paralleled this schema.
The findings concerning RT are supportive of previous research on RT during moral judgment development (i.e., Thoma et al., 2002), although there are
some new findings. For example, findings concerning
the PCrt index parallel previous study. In particular,
Thoma et al. (2002) illustrated that those in consolidated phases process moral information more slowly
than do those in transitional phases. As noted in Table
2, the number of consolidated individuals in the
gifted sample was almost twice that of those in the
college sample, with the majority of these individuals
being consolidated at the postconventional schema.
With this in mind, in conjunction with the dearth of
participants modal at the postconventional schema
from the college sample, it is not surprising to find
that there were no statistically significant RT differences between gifted and college participants on
items pertaining to the postconventional schema.
Where the findings pertaining to the PIrt and MNrt
RT indices are concerned, similar trends have not
been reported in previous research. Specifically,
Thoma et al. (2002) noted that those that are in consolidated phases of moral judgment development
process information pertaining to their modal moral

judgment schema more quickly than do those that are

transitioning to or away from the same schema. It is
important to note, though, that Thoma et al. (2002)
only found evidence for this trend when comparing
consolidated and transitional individuals that are
modal at the same schema. Hence, though the
research of Thoma et al. (2002) found that differences
in processing can exist between those of consolidated
and transitional phases at the same schema, they did
not find evidence that advancements in moral judgment development result in more efficient information processing for moral judgment schema prior to
the modal moral judgment schema. In the current
study, on the other hand, this is precisely what
occurred as significant differences were seen favoring
the gifted youth on items pertaining to both the personal interest and maintaining norms moral judgment
schema. As these trends therefore support, what separates the gifted youth from the college students in this
study appears to be the speed in which they were able
to determine the merit of all schema-related items.
At the same time gifted participants illustrated a
tendency to regulate their RT. In addition to no statistically significant differences on items pertaining to
the postconventional schema, no statistically significant differences existed on AVErt, ACrt, and
MGLSrt. These findings therefore suggest that when
gifted youth are faced with an action choice or an
item containing semantically attractive yet meaningless information, they allow themselves increased
time for information processing. Even though
reported alphas for both indices are low, the lack of
statistically significant differences on AVErt supports
the hypothesis that the gifted youth regulate their RT
while taking the DIT. As the differences on the PIrt,
MNrt, and AErt indices between groups attest, once a
decision was made, the gifted group was able to more
quickly eliminate the reasons that did not pertain to
the reasons underlying their action choices. This
quick elimination may have consequently led to an
increased willingness to allow themselves additional
time for thinking about the items pertaining to the
postconventional schema. As such, there is support
that advances in RT do not affect all factors that are a
part of making a moral judgment.
Although significant differences were seen
between the gifted youth and college student samples
in terms of RT and CIP as inferred by ACScomp
scores, such analyses do not allow the determination
as to whether these abilities predict moral judgment
development. As such, it was necessary to conduct
the linear regression analysis. In accounting for moral

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349

judgment developmental variance as noted in N2

scores, only complex processing as seen in ACScomp
scores contributed a significant amount of variance.
Because ACT scores did not significantly contribute
to N2 score variance, it becomes even more difficult
to assert that the measurement of moral judgment
development is reducible to intellectual ability. At the
same time, though, the significant contribution of
ACScomp scores supports those who have addressed
the relationship of depth of thinking and moral judgment development (Rest et al., 1986). The results further support assertions that certain processes that
enable the manifestation of intellectual ability can
also contribute to moral judgment development
(Derryberry et al., 2005). This support only applies to
attributional complexity; the same cannot be said for
RT because AVErt was negligible in accounting for
N2 score variance.

Limitations
First, ACS scores refer to complex information
processing as it pertains to the behavior of others and
it is unknown how high scores translate to complex
information processing in general. Similarly, RT
indices to DIT items are not necessarily indicative of
RT overall. Hence, additional study is needed involving other indices of CIP and RT among gifted and
other populations to ensure confidence in the findings
of this study.
Another limitation of the study is that the sample
of gifted youth comprised of high-ability youth
defined as gifted according to conservative definitions that conceptualize giftedness according to intellectual ability or other indices of high ability rather
than liberal definitions that incorporate a variety of
broad-based criteria in defining giftedness. This study
is also limited in its ability to make inferences about
the moral development and behavior of gifted youth
beyond the neo-Kohlbergian consideration of moral
judgment development because moral judgment ability is not synonymous with moral development and
behavior overall (Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart &
Fegley, 1995; Monroe & Epperson, 1994; Rest et al.,
1999). Therefore, it should not be presumed that the
advances seen in the gifted youth sample equate to
advances in moral development overall nor should it
be presumed that the gifted youth in this study are
moral exemplars in terms of their behavior. As a
result of these latter two limitations, there is a need to
consider not just the moral judgment development but
also the moral development and behavior overall of

the gifted. Such considerations should continue to

involve those who are defined as gifted according to
conservative definitions, butgiven the composition
of moral development overall along with that which
comprises giftednesssamples should also include
those that possess other aspects of giftedness such as
those acknowledged by liberal definitions.
Limitations aside, however, we believe that this
study has made some important strides in explaining
the moral judgment development of the gifted in
terms of depth and speed of processing. Specifically,
it is apparent that differences noted in this study in
terms of complexity of processing as inferred by
Attributional Complexity Scale scores is an important
reason for the advanced moral judgment development
that has been regularly seen in high-ability or conservatively defined gifted youth populations. Thus, just
as complexity of thinking may be an important contributor to their intellectual abilities, it is also contributing to their moral judgment ability. RT may be
an important reason for the intellect of high-ability
learners like conservatively defined gifted youth (Beh
et al., 1994; Cohn et al., 1985; Lajoie & Shore, 1986;
Yun et al., 2004), but it is not recognized in this study
as a reason for or contributor to their advanced
growth. However, though RT does not predict
advanced moral judgment development, this study
supports that it is an intellectual process that highability gifted youth use to their benefit once they
make a judgment about the action that should be
taken. In particular, RT strengths appear to make
identifying the reasons for making a moral judgment
an easier and more productive task for the gifted individual. Specifically, it seems that RT may enable the
gifted to more effectively discriminate items. In other
words, because they are proficient in processing
information in a complex manner and because they
are also adept in reacting to information quickly, they
are able to quickly consider DIT items in identifying
the reasons that pertain to their decision about their
action choice recommendations. This possibility is
further supported by the fact that gifted N2 scores are
so strongly distinct from the college students N2
scores. To be sure, those who have high N2 scores
concurrently rate and rank postconventional DIT
items highly and minimize the importance of other
schema-related DIT items. Thus, the difference in N2
scores provides additional evidence that the gifted are
able to effectively distinguish among reasons that
pertain to their moral judgments.
This study represents but a small step in making
sense of the moral judgment development of the

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gifted. Additional research in this direction is certainly warranted. Though complex processing and RT
appear to be promising lines of research in understanding the moral judgment development of the
gifted, future steps are necessary. For example,
though complex information processing and RT are
apparently transferred to the moral functioning of the
gifted, it is unknown as to why and how this occurs
and whether or not obstacles exist that would block
this process. Furthermore, it would be interesting to
understand if there are practices that can help to facilitate these areas and their transfer to moral thinking.
As such, future research must tackle issues such as
this so that the utility of research of gifted moral
functioning can be recognized. Once such understanding is garnered, applied research should focus
on how to transfer such understanding to general populations in the hopes of affecting the moral judgment
development of all, not just the few.

Note
1. The term high ability will be used synonymously with gifted
according to the conservative definition throughout this article.

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W. Pitt Derryberry, PhD, is an educational psychologist and
associate professor of psychology at Western Kentucky
University. His research interests include the moral psychology
of adolescents and young adults, moral education, and intellectual abilities and differences.
Brian Barger received his MA in experimental psychology from
Western Kentucky University. His research interests include cultural influences on the development of moral affect, temperament,
and developmental disabilities.

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