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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE
MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of
Staff, respectively, respondents.

CORTES, J.:
Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the
Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of
national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people
power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic
under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consilidation of power have not been unchallenged. The
failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7
by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos
spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms
dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even
from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987
Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs.
Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col.
Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people,
both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message
they conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the military establishment that thraetened civilian supremacy
over military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious
military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of
Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained
ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their
own on the areas they effectively control while the separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There
has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to
arms but also to through the use of propaganda have they been successful in dreating chaos and destabilizing the
country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation
attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years
after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while
the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino,

considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on
the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after
causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three
years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to
bar their return to the Philippines.
The Issue
Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and family to the
Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from
returning to the Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public health
a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the
Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety or public health?
b. Assuming that she has made that finding
(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?
(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?
(3) Has there been a hearing?
(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the President's
decision, including the grounds upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners
so that they may controvert the same?
c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the
Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political
question?
d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his
family is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have
respondents established such fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to bar the return of former
President Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the
return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp.
5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired
by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines,
provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided
by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or
the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question
which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos
and his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights
in vacuo without reference to attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of
the determination by the President that such return and residence will endanger national security and
public safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it
involves merely a determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial and
transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its nationals, the question becomes political
and this Honorable Court can not consider it.
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and
reestablish their residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can
decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and
reestablish their residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security
and public safety? this is still a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall

return to the Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this
Honorable Court can not decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the
President of the Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support
thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may
call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for
reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of
Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the
deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign
Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its limits. We,
however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the issues, we
are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel and the
import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113,
2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel
and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right
involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The
Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)]
separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art.
12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by
such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own
country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and
the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats
only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of
the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a
different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily
deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively
exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they
relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue before the Court is
novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence.
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations on the
right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its
resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its resolution.
Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the President has
the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine,

pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the
President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare
and decided to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To
recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has
blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the
President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation
of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive
and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v.
Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power;
and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a
combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy
of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the
commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties
or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art.
VII, Sec. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the
Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se enumerated
powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are
limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated
powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum for
Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours
is legally patterned.**
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem. He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution
ought to settle everything beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think
that constitution makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it
should be a vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The executive power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers,
17871957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the office from
Washington to the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship, he
concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is
President." [At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it remained of course, an agency of
government subject to unvarying demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than
most agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge.
Each President's distinctive temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits,
expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire
government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from the
character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its impact on the constitutional

order, therefore altered from President to President. Above all, the way each President understood it as
his personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the
electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened
or weakened the constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the consideration
of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete
understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935
Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973
Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere
figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was
also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government
and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three
distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President
is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office
unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws
is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive
power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated
in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928),
on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of
stock held by the Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:
...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee"
respectively, are not charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of
anything which is in aid of performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the
moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act
in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in character, and still more clear that
they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes
logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one among which the powers
of government are divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement
for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only what
are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the
more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other. ....
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not
and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and
protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such

does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of
government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any
decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and
adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the
President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More
than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind
that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have
surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government
exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution
reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art.
II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the
deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars
believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither
absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although
couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public
interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of
rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of
the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt,
it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws
that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to
preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the view that
an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The
American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its
existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times
when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties
in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-inchief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be
said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces,
or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been recognized
by memembers of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives
and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine
unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo,
p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his
country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to
travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely
similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a
broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue
constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into
areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.
But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the
President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example,
question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action
may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally
undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before
us because the power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question doctrine.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the
scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When
political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official
concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would
appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which
specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v.
Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers
underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the
separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with
the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension
of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the
authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in
this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the
Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to
determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to
conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do
exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in
deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the
briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser,
wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision..
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a
well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power,
urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier
narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate
and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment has
given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return
of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With these before
her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the
return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against
the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted
her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not
precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived
as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The
preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President,

sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that
responsibility.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought
about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of
whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely
scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in
foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the
excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the
root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of
common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the
gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual
and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., concurring:

"The threats to national security and public order are real the mounting Communist insurgency, a simmering
separatist movement, a restive studentry, widespread labor disputes, militant farmer groups. . . . Each of these
threats is an explosive ingredient in a steaming cauldron which could blow up if not handled properly." 1
These are not my words. They belong to my distinguished colleague in the Court, Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
But they express eloquently the basis of my full concurrence to the exhaustive and well-written ponencia of Mme.
Justice Irene R. Cortes.
Presidential powers and prerogatives are not fixed but fluctuate. They are not derived solely from a particular
constitutional clause or article or from an express statutory grant. Their limits are likely to depend on the imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. History and time-honored
principles of constitutional law have conceded to the Executive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and
imperative national emergency. Many terms are applied to these powers: "residual," "inherent," 44 moral," "implied,"
"aggregate," "emergency." whatever they may be called, the fact is that these powers exist, as they must if the
governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out effectively and efficiently. It is in this context that
the power of the President to allow or disallow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines should be viewed. By
reason of its impact on national peace and order in these admittedly critical times, said question cannot be
withdrawn from the competence of the Executive Branch to decide.
And indeed, the return of the deposed President, his wife and children cannot but pose a clear and present danger
to public order and safety. One needs only to recall the series of destabilizing actions attempted by the so-called
Marcos loyalists as well as the ultra-rightist groups during the EDSA Revolution's aftermath to realize this. The most
publicized of these offensives is the Manila Hotel incident which occurred barely five (5) months after the People's
Power Revolution. Around 10,000 Marcos supporters, backed by 300 loyalist soldiers led by Brigadier General Jose
Zumel and Lt. Col. Reynaldo Cabauatan converged at the Manila Hotel to witness the oath-taking of Arturo Tolentino
as acting president of the Philippines. The public disorder and peril to life and limb of the citizens engendered by this
event subsided only upon the eventual surrender of the loyalist soldiers to the authorities.
Then followed the Channel 7, Sangley, Villamor, Horseshoe Drive and Camp Aguinaldo incidents. Military rebels
waged simultaneous offensives in different parts of Metro Manila and Sangley Point in Cavite. A hundred rebel
soldiers took over Channel 7 and its radio station DZBB. About 74 soldier rebels attacked Villamor Air Base, while
another group struck at Sangley Point in Cavite and held the 15th Air Force Strike wing commander and his deputy
hostage. Troops on board several vehicles attempted to enter Gate I of Camp Aguinaldo even as another batch of
200 soldiers encamped at Horseshoe Village.