1.

OCAMPO V. TIRONA, G.R. NO. 147382, 6 APRIL 2005

Facts:
Leonora Tirona was a lessee of the land that Leonardo Ocampo owned (who had bought the property from Rosauro
Breton who had inherited the land). But, the former invoked her right of first refusal and, in relation thereto,
temporarily stopped paying her monthly rentals when the subject land was declared under area for priority
development. Ocampo then demanded Tirona to pay his rentals in arrears, but the latter refused to pay.
This led Ocampo to file a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona in the MTC. Tirona asserted
that Ocampo did not own the subject land as it was owned by a certain Doa Lourdes Rodriguez Yaneza and that
he was entitled to exercise his right of first refusal pursuant in case of the sale of the land, under PD Nos. 1517, 1893,
and 1968.
MTC in favor of Ocampo stating that Tirona does not have any reason to suspend payment of rents until after the
decrees she invoked is implemented in her favor. The MTC ruled that Tironas occupation of the land was illegal.
On appeal to the RTC, Lourdes Breton-Mendiola filed to intervene and claimed to be the real owner of the subject
property. Pertinently, Tirona claimed for the first time before RTC that she had been paying her rentals to Lourdes
Breton-Mendiola, who had allegedly inherited the said land. In light of the deeds of conveyance and waiver executed
by Mendiolas brother, Rosauro Breton, Tirona could not legally acquire the said land. Mendiola is Tironas lessor,
and is the only person who can file an ejectment suit against Tirona. The RTC ruled in favor of Ocampo stating that
there was no reason to disturb the findings of the MTC.
CA, however, set aside these decisions ruling that until the estate of Alipio Breton has been partitioned, then Ocampo
cannot rightfully claim that what he bought is part of the property occupied by Tirona. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether Ocampo had a right to file an ejectment suit against Tirona
Held:
YES. All the elements for an unlawful detainer suit are present in the instant case. The lease was proved to exist by:
1. Ocampo informed Tirona through a letter that he had bought the property where Tironas house stands.
2. Tironas continued occupancy of the land signifies Tironas acceptance of Ocampos conditions for the
lease.
3. In asserting her right to possess the land, Tirona admitted that Ocampo is her lessor. In a letter, Tirona was
referred to as the hereinmentioned tenant of yours.
In Mirasol v. Magsuci, et al., we ruled that the sale of a leased property places the vendee into the shoes of the
original lessor to whom the lessee bound himself to pay. The vendee acquires the right to evict the lessee from the
premises and to recover the unpaid rentals after the vendee had notified the lessee that he had bought the leased
property and that the rentals on it should be paid to him, and the lessee refused to comply with the demand.
The following facts also support the conclusion that there was violation of the lease agreement:
1. Tirona, through Callejo Law Office, sent a letter stating that Tirona will temporarily stop rental payments until
the NHA has processed the pertinent papers regarding the amount due to Ocampo in view of PD1517.
2. Tirona has not paid her rent from April to August 1995
3. On August 7, 1995 Ocampo demanded payment from Tirona
It was an error for the appellate court to rule on the issue of ownership at this point because in ejectment cases, the
issue is possession de facto and not possession de jure which should be settled in the proper court and proper
action. When the appellate court ruled that the case of unlawful detainer had to wait for the results of the partition
proceedings, it effectively put ownership as the main issue in the case. The issue of ownership opens a virtual

Pandoras Box for Tirona and her supposed intervenor, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.
As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona
need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action
for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims
on the property.
Doctrine: The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his
possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest
which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who
claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to
litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of
one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action
and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a
complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.
Petition granted.