Professional Documents
Culture Documents
against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio for
FACTS:
These are three consolidated administrative complaints brought against Judge Omelio of
RTC Davao City.
ONLY the third case, Cruzabra v. Omelio is relevant:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Rule 129, Section 1 prior SC decisions fall under official acts of judicial
departments of the Phillippines
Decisions of courts form part of the legal system and failure of any court to apply
them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance
with law, and shall be a ground for administrative action against an inferior court
magistrate (citing Petran Development Inc v. CA).
The Supreme Court had already ruled against reconstitution of titles in Heirs of
Don Constancio Guzman Inc. v. Hon. Judge Emmanuel Carpio.
Judge Omelio was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for failing to take judicial
notice of this prior decision of a superior court (as well as reversing a prior
inhibition and taking cognizance of the motion for indirect contempt).
Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act
as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
CC No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, CC No. 0130.
I. CC NO. 0130
PCGG-conducted ETPI SHs meeting, a PCGG-controlled BOD was elected. The ETPI
SHs convened a special SHs meeting wherein another set of BOD was elected.
Africa filed a petition seeking to nullify the Orders of the PCGG. Sandiganbayan
favored Africas motion and ordered an annual SHs meeting where only the registered
owners [or their proxies] may vote their corresponding shares.
In an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of
CC No. 0130, among others, with CC No. 0009, with the latter as the main case and
ISSUE: WON Judge Omelio was guiltly of gross ignorance of the law. (YES)
SC: Guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Should have taken judicial notice of prior decision.
Republic of the Philippines, through the PCGG, filed a complaint (CC No. 0009)
In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V.
Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken at the
petitioners instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking on the
respondents by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before
(i) to cause the holding of a special SHs meeting of ETPI for the sole
purpose of increasing ETPIs authorized capital stock and
o
(ii) to vote therein the sequestered Class A shares of stock.
Africa petitioned.
Court referred the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence to
1.
having been duly served on all the parties concerned, they must accordingly
be deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine the witness when
determine whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the sequestered
shares in question are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation
to entitle the PCGG to vote them in a SHs meeting.
II. CC NO. 0009
The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead
deposition was not included as part of its offered exhibits.
Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for
Judicial Notice (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative prayer that
the case be re-opened for the introduction of additional evidence.
Sandiganbayan promulgated (2000 resolution) denying the petitioners 2nd motion: On
the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the
ordinary formal offer of exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample
opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by law. Definitely, it is not
under Art (sic) 129 on judicial notice.
rd
Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two years that it sought to rectify
its ineptitude by filing a motion to reopen its case as to enable it to introduce
and offer Banes deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative for the
court to take judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition.
it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the deposition is inadmissible.
THE PETITION
3.
to its allegation that the respondents interest in ETPI and related firms
properly belongs to the government.
The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioners formal offer of
made its Formal Offer of Evidence on Dec 14, 1999. Significantly, the Bane
from the time the case was filed and the voluminous records that the present
case has generated.
2.
evidence was obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed
deposition of Bane as part of its evidence in CC No. 0009 for the reason that
Evidence Day 02
It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane
deposition) that it would be used as evidence in CC No. 0009. Notices
Petitioner asserts that CC No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken,
introduced and admitted in evidence) is but a child of the parent case, CC No. 0009;
under this relationship, evidence offered and admitted in any of the children cases
should be considered as evidence in the parent case.
Sandiganbayan should not have denied its admission on flimsy grounds, considering
that:
Respondents:
o
3rd motion - mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by the petitioner,
likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution.
o
3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third MR of the 1998
resolution.
o
respondents assert that they have not waived their right to crossexamine the deponent;
o
the allegations in the Bane deposition cannot be a proper subject of
judicial notice under Rule 129.
o
Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence because the petitioner failed
to comply with the requisites for admission under Sec 47, Rule 130.
Petitioner:
o
it filed the 3rd motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayans 2000
resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane deposition should
be done through the ordinary formal offer of evidence.
o
it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a formal offer of
evidence.
o
mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is
sufficient for the admission of the Bane deposition considering
that the deponent is not an ordinary witness who can be easily
summoned by our courts in light of his foreign residence, his citizenship,
and his advanced age. Rule 24 (now Rule 23), and not Sec 47, Rule 130,
should apply to the present case, as explicitly stated in the notice of the
deposition-taking.
ISSUES/RULING
WON THE CONSOLIDATION OF CC NO. 0009 AND CC NO. 0130 DISPENSED
WITH THE USUAL REQUISITES OF ADMISSIBILITY. NO.
Pahina 2 ng 33
Petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence without
observing the provisions of Sec 47, Rule 130. The petitioner claims that in light of the
prior consolidation of CC No. 0009 and CC No. 0130, among others, the former case
or proceeding that Sec 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer exists.
Consolidation is used generically and even synonymously with joint hearing or trial of
several causes.
There is nothing that would even suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a
merger of causes of action, parties and evidence. At most , there was a consolidation of
trial but not actual consolidation.
Considering the fact that in the present case the party respondents to CC No. 0009
are not parties to CC 0130, the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended
an actual consolidation.
To impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation results
the taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent impairment of their
Depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open
court of a party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral
However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in Sec 4,
Rule 23, the deposition may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand.
Sec 47, Rule 130 lays down the following requisites for the admission of a testimony or
deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;
The petitioner asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine
the deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite individual
notices previously sent to them.
Petitioners reliance on the prior notice on the respondents, as adequate opportunity for
cross-examination, cannot override the non-party status of the respondents in CC No.
0130 the effect of consolidation being merely for trial. As non-parties, they cannot
be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot be bound by
the several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another
evidence.
Evidence Day 02
the former testimony or deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must
first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the party must establish the basis for the
admission of the Bane deposition in the realm of admissible evidence.
The deposition may not be allowed in this case because petitioner failed to impute,
much less establish, the identity of interest or privity between the then
opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents.
right of cross-examination.
After failing to take Banes deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstances
of this case, the least that the petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of
the Bane deposition and proceed with the deposition immediately upon securing a
favorable ruling thereon
Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action. It must be stressed that not
only were the respondents non-parties to CC No. 0130, they likewise have no interest in
Africas certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI stockholder.
Considering that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a vital cog in the petitioners case
against the respondents, the Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to take the
deposition in an incident case (instead of the main case) at a time when it became
the technical right of the petitioner to do so.
The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been
previously introduced and admitted in CC No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan
should have taken judicial notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act
on without proof because these facts are already known to them. It is the assumption
by a court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The
principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence
on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.
The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law
maxim, manifesta (or notoria) non indigent probatione. The taking of judicial
notice means that the court will dispense with the traditional form of presentation of
Pahina 3 ng 33
evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it would
not be disputed.
The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129. Rule 129 either requires the
court to take judicial notice of the official acts of the x x x judicial departments of
the Philippines, or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice of matters ought
to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have
been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. This rule though
from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where
sufficient basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of
the latter case.
The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of
judicial notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial
notice seriously pursued.
Petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical
perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in any of the children cases CC 0130
The Judge in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing
about the facts of the case, except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence.
Thus, when the case is up for trial, the judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it
is incumbent upon the litigants to the action to establish by evidence the facts upon
which they rely.
admits of exceptions.
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part
of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case
pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection
number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the
original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the
archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties,
Evidence Day 02
upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that
as evidence in the parent case CC 0009 - or of the whole family of cases. To the
petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of judicial
notice.
We strongly disagree.
o
The supporting cases the petitioner cited are inapplicable either because
these cases involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule,
which proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of
the records of other cases.
o
The petitioners proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly
procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has
generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying
complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioners argument, we would
be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the
admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found
competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed
lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a partylitigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies
NSVHAI, represented by its President Marita Cortez, filed a petition for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with a prayer for issuance of TRO with the
RTC, arguing that the resolution would disrupt the residents' safety, health and well-being,
that it would destroy the roads and drainage system on said streets (as these were not
designed to withstand heavy traffic), and that there are other ways to ease traffic flow
anyway, such as strict enforcement of traffic rules and regulations, and the presence of
traffic enforcers on all traffic choke points. In its Amended Petition, NSVHAI also claimed
that respondent had no jurisdiction over the opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets as
such can only be ordered through an ordinance.
BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a
cause of action, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and lack of court jurisdiction
over the subject matter, alleging that the subject streets are of the public domain and are
thus owned by the local government. It was granted, prompting petitioner to appeal the case
before the Supreme Court.
Issue
w/n the CA erred in dismissing the case by making findings of fact not supported by
evidence of record
Held
NO, the CA did not err in dismissing the case of the petitioners
Ratio
Burden of Proof
Pahina 4 ng 33
Evidence Day 02
Being the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was on the petitioner to
show ownership over the subject roads. It is a basic rule in civil cases that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence, relying on the
strength of their own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
In this case, NSVHAI did not submit an iota of proof to support its acts of ownership over
Rosemallow and Aster streets (closing the roads, collecting fees from delivery vans passing
through, etc). On the other hand, the local government units power to close and open roads
within its jurisdiction is clear under Section 211 of the Local Government Code. However,
since Rosemallow and Aster Streets have already been donated by the Sun Valley
Subdivision to the City Government of Paranaque, they have since then taken the nature of
public roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the
private rights or claims of herein Appellant. Section 21 of the LGC thus does not apply in
this case.
Judicial Notice
Moreover, NSVHAI wants the court to take judicial knowledge that criminal activities like
robbery and kidnapping are becoming daily fares in Philippine society. However, Rule 129
provides that:
Rule 129
2.
The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial knowledge are not found in the
rule quoted above and do not support its petition for injunctive relief in any way.
As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of the law,
and it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead
of going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government Code, the petition must be
denied.
1 Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an
ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling
within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance
must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when
necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.
3.
4.
5.
On November 14, 1995, Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the
vessel MV Jinlian I 60,000 plastic bags of soda ash dense (each bag weighing 50
kilograms) from China to Manila. The shipment, with an invoice value of
US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.
under Marine Risk Note No. RN-0001-21430, and covered by a Bill of Lading
issued by Tianjin Navigation Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as
the consignee and Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.
On November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila,
the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc., a duly registered domestic
corporation engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring services, unloaded the
60,000 bags of soda ash dense from the vessel and brought them to the open
storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping, pending
clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee. When the
unloading of the bags was completed on November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found
to be in bad order condition.
On November 29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the
trucks of MEC Customs Brokerage for transport and delivery to the consignee. On
December 28, 1995, after all the bags were unloaded in the warehouses of the
consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad order condition due to spillage, caking,
and hardening of the contents.
On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/ damaged
cargoes to the consignee in the amount of P643,600.25.
On November 20, 1996, respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, filed before RTC
of Manila for damages against petitioner, the shipper Inchcape Shipping Services,
and the cargo broker MEC Customs Brokerage.
Pahina 5 ng 33
6.
RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner liable for the damage/loss sustained by
the shipment but absolving the other defendants. The RTC found that the
proximate cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioners stevedores
who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel. The RTC emphasized
that despite the admonitions of Marine Cargo Surveyors Edgar Liceralde and
Redentor Antonio not to use steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags,
petitioners stevedores continued to use such tools, which pierced the bags and
caused the spillage.The RTC, thus, ruled that petitioner, as employer, is liable for
the acts and omissions of its stevedores under Articles 2176 and 2180 paragraph
(4) of the Civil Code. The CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE (TOPICAL): WON the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract
between petitioner and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioners
liability.
HOLDING: Judicial notice does not apply.
1.
2.
3.
Petitioner claims that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000.00,
pursuant to its Management Contract for cargo handling services with the PPA.
Petitioner contends that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the said
contract since it is an official act of an executive department subject to judicial
cognizance.
Respondent contends that this is outside the operation of judicial notice. And even
if it is not, petitioners liability cannot be limited by it since it is a contract of
adhesion.
The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not
among the matters which the courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be
considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was created
by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, is a government-owned and
controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country.
Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered
into a Management Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be
applied.
Evidence Day 02
Doctrine: Geographical divisions are subject to mandatory judicial notice. A new
barrio being previously part of another barrio is a geographical division which is
a matter subject of mandatory judicial notice.
FACTS:
B.E. San Diego filed an accion publiciana (recovery of possession, who has a better right to
possession) against Jovita Matias over a parcel of land located in Malabon. In her Answer,
Matias said that the property she is occupying is different from the property that B.E. San
Diego seeks to recover.
She claimed that the property she is now occupying is located in Barrio Catmon while the
property B.E. San Diego is seeking to recover is located in Barrio Tinajeros as shown in the
transfer certificate of title (TCT) it presented.
RTC took judicial notice of the fact that Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio
Tinajeros, and declared B.E. San Diego as the rightful owner of the subject property. CA
however reversed the RTC and said that the discrepancy in the location is significant, and
RTC should have required an expert witness from concerned government agency to resolve
the said discrepancy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of an expert witness is necessary to explain the discrepancy in
the location of the subject property
HELD:
No. Expert witness testimony is not necessary.
RATIO:
The RTC has authority to declare that the discrepancy arose from the fact that Barrio
Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros. This is a matter subject of mandatory
judicial notice. Geographical division is among matters that courts should take judicial
notice of as provided for in Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Given that Barrio Tinajeros is adjacent to Barrio Catmon, it is likely that, indeed, the two
barrios previously formed one geographical unit.
Sufficient evidence also exists to support this conclusion. The TCT of B.E. San Diego
identifies the property as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13 in Barrio Tinajeros. B.E. San Diegos tax
declaration identifies it too as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13 but located in Barrio Catmon. It is
clear though that both title and the tax declaration share the same boundaries to identify
the property. The trial court judge can very well ascertain the facts to resolve the
discrepancy and dispense with the need for the testimony of an expert witness.
BARUT V. PEOPLE, G. R. NO. 167454, SEPTEMBER 24, 2014.
EMERITU C. BARUT v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2014, J. Bersamin)
FACTS
Pahina 6 ng 33
1.
2.
3.
4.
Barut (a guard of Philippine National Construction Corporation) was tried for and
found guilty of homicide by the RTC of Muntinlupa City
Background:
SPO4 Vicente Ucag was on board a passenger jeepney (driven by his brother)
on the SLEX, coming from Laguna and going back to Metro Manila. His wife
and 16-yr old son Vincent were riding an owner-type jeep driven by Rico
Villas on the same route.
When the jeep driven by Villas exited at the Sucat interchange ahead of
Ucags jeepney, PNCC guards Ancheta and Barut stopped Villas. They
informed him that his vehicle had no headlights, asked for his license, and
issued him a traffic violation report (TVR) ticket.
The jeepney carrying Ucag then stopped where Villas jeep had parked. Ucag
and co-passenger Fabiano alighted and approached Ancheta and Barut to
inquire what the matter was. Ucag then requested the return of Villas
license upon being apprised, but Ancheta refused.
Vicente Ucag (son), upon seeing the exchange of gunshots, rushed towards
Ucag (his father). Before he could reach his father, Barut fired at Vincent in
the chest.
Vicente was rushed to the Paranaque Medical Center. He died during the
emergency surgery.
Baruts contentions:
Such inconsistency gave rise to the doubt as to who really shot and killed the
victim
CA:
Villas and Fabiano clearly and consistently testified that Barut was the
person who shot Vincent, and Baruts bare denial of firing at Vincent did not
prevail over their positive and categorical identification of him as the
perpetrator
the RTC could not take the declaration of Villas into consideration because
Villas extrajudicial sworn statement containing the declaration had not been
offered and admitted as evidence by either side. Only evidence that was
formally offered and made part of the records could be considered. In any
5.
Evidence Day 02
event, the supposed contradiction between the extrajudicial sworn statement
and the court testimony should be resolved in favor of the latter.
Barut seeks review of his conviction by petition for review on certiorari
2.
Findings of fact by the RTC are accorded great respect especially when affirmed by the
CA
RTC judge has personal and direct observation of the witnesses manner and
decorum during intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused
CAs negative treatment of the declaration contained in Villas extra-judicial sworn
statement was in accord with rules and jurisprudence
Sec. 34, Rule 132 (Rules of Court): the RTC, as the trial court, could consider
only the evidence that had been formally offered; the offering party must
specify the purpose for which the evidence was being offered
o
Purpose: to ensure the right of the adverse party to due process of
law (to timely object to the evidence as well as to properly counter
the impact of evidence not formally offered)
o
Candido v. CA: xxx a formal offer is necessary since judges are
required to base their findings of fact and judgment only upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial xxx
The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be
considered is relaxed upon the concurrence of two requisites:
(a) The evidence was duly identified by testimony duly recorded
(b) The evidence was incorporated in the records of the case
Petitioner Dra. dela Llana was on front passenger seat while Juan dela Llana was
driving along North Ave.
Dump truck carrying sand and gravel rammed into their rear. They were bumped by
driver Joel Primero, employed by Rebecca Biong.
Pahina 7 ng 33
Dra. dela Llana started feeling pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder
deteriorating her health after a month. It was soon found out she had an injury caused
by compression of nerve running to her left arm and hand.
o
Underwent surgery but it incapacitated her from practice of her profession.
Petitioner demanded compensation from Respondent Biong. But respondent refused
payment. Petitioner filed for damages in RTC.
Petitioner presented her Medical Certificate for suffering whiplash injury as evidence.
Respondent presented Testimonial evidence of herself, Joel and licensed drivermechanic Alberto Marcelo.
RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner holding the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana's
whiplash injury to be Joel's reckless driving.
CA reversed RTC ruling saying Petitioner failed to establish reasonable connection bet.
vehicular accident and whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence citing Nutrimix
Feeds Corp v CA.
o
Arguments:
o
Petitioner
Evidence Day 02
2) Medical certificate cannot be considered because it was
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 190793, JULY 19, 2012.
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (from UST Law
Review)
Public knowledge of facts pertaining to employment of violence and unlawful means to
achieve ones goals is within the determination of the COMELEC, and such fact is sufficient
to deny a party registration and accreditation.
Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) fled its Petition for Registration with the respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a
regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the
2010 National and Local Elections. It was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio
F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes), and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo
(Acedillo).
Pahina 8 ng 33
Taking cognizance of the Oakwood incident, the COMELEC denied the Petition, claiming
that MAGDALOs purpose was to employ violence and unlawful means to achieve their
goals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals
through violent or unlawful means
HELD:
MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied
the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere
speculation and conjectures. This argument cannot be given any merit. Under the Rules of
Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of public knowledge, or are capable
of unquestionable demonstration. Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
the Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit
and give probative value to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and
to take notice of judicially cognizable facts.
That the Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it
a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance thereof
without requiring the introduction and recent jurisprudence. The COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful
means to achieve its goals. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution,
parties, organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means shall be Denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section
61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal
through Violence shall be entitled to accreditation.
In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with Violence. As
publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to
express their dissatisfaction with the administration of Former President Arroyo and to
divulge the alleged corruption in the military and The supposed sale of arms to enemies of
the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top officials
of the AFP and the PNP To resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel
occupied by civilians, March in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant
Explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the
grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the government constituted clear
acts of violence. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it
treated the Oakwood standoff as a Manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for
resorting to violence or Threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means
did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The power vested by Article
IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register
Evidence Day 02
political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is
purely administrative in Character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to
assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its
goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in
Nature.
In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfil its organizational
objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the members of
MAGDALO committed crimes, as COMELEC was not required to make that determination
in the first place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO
possessed all the necessary qualifications and none of disqualifications for registration as a
political party. Accreditation as a political party is not a right but only a privilege given to
groups who have Qualified and met the requirements provided by law.
Note worthily, however, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favour of the members
of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be
interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from party registration.
SPS. LATIP V. CHUA, G.R. NO. 177809, OCTOBER 16, 2009.
FACTS:
-
In 2001, she filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against the Sps.
Latip. She attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles of the
building.
A year after the commencement of the lease and with the Sps. Latip already
occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter
demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail
In their Answer, the Sps. Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred that the
lease of the two cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts
showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of 2.5M.
Sps. Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale
lease rights over 2 cubicles in the building. According to them, the immediate
payment of 2.5M would be used to finish the construction of the building giving
them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.
In December 1999, as soon as the 2 cubicles were finished, Sps. Latip occupied
them without waiting for completion of the other 5 stalls.
As to Rosalies claim that her receipt of 2.5M was simply goodwill payment by
Evidence Day 02
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by
mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.
-
Here, RTC specifically ruled that apart from the bare allegation, Rosalie produced
no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of 2.5M simply constituted the
payment of goodwill money.
the prospective leases, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the
CA: reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC
-
found that the alleged defects of the contract of lease did not render the contract
ineffective
On the issue of WON the 2.5M was goodwill payment, the CA took judicial notice
of this common practice in the area of Baclaran (also bolstered by the statement of
the other occupants)
Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 129 declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or
discretionary.
Requisites:
1.
2.
3.
Things of common knowledge of which courts could take judicial notice may be
matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary
LOT 7328
Owned by Dinglasan
(Pototan, Iloilo)
a ya
Jalaud Riverm
RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie
did not adduce evidence in this regard.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
To assert their right over the disputed land, Dinglasan, et al., filed Case 1 against
Jarencio, the tenant, a complaint seeking to declare her the owner of the land and
for damages.
Degayo sought to intervene in Case 1, being the owner of the land, but her motion
was denied. Degayo never questioned this order. Hindi nya siguro alam ang
petition for certiorari (Rule 65) na favorite ni Ta Vicks. However, she was able to
participate in the case as witness for the defense.
Instead, she filed a separate petition, (Cae 2) also for declaration of ownership
with damages. The matters she raised herein are the same as those she raised as
witness in Case 1.
RTC Iloilo Branch 27 ruled in favor of Dinglasan (no accretion happened). Jarencio
failed to perfect the appeal, hence, the case became final and executory.
On the other hand, in Case 2, Branch 22 ruled in favor of Degayo (there was an
accretion).
Dinglasan appealed to the CA; the CA reversed. Ruling of CA:
a. The disputed land was an abandoned riverbed, hence belonged to
Dinglasan.
b. The decision in Case 1 was conclusive to the title of the thing, being an
aspect of the rule on conclusiveness on judgment.
1.
Evidence Day 02
WON the disputed property is an abandoned riverbed and not an accretion. YES
Art. 461 CC - River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by
the new course in proportion to the area lost.
2.
RELEVANT ISSUE:
1.
WON CA erred in taking judicial notice of the RTC decision in Case 1 which was not
presented during the hearing of the present case.
HELD:
1.
NO.
General rule: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge.
Exceptions: (Enunciated in Tiburcio v. PHHC)
1.
2.
When a case has close connection with the matter in the controversy (as
in this case)
When a previous case determines WON the case pending is a moot one
The Court did not elaborate on this but obviously, this case belongs to the first
exception. The matter in controversy in this case is the nature of the disputed
land (WON its an accretion) and such controversy is closely linked, in fact
similar, with the 1st case.
Also, Degayos objection was deemed a mere technicality because Degayo herself
repeatedly referred to the Case 1 in her pleadings in Case 2, as well as in her
appellees brief before the CA and her petition for review in the SC. The existence
of Case 1 was also jointly stipulated by the parties in Case 2.
OTHER ISSUES (In case she asks)
Edelina Ando married Japanese National Yuichiro Kobayashi. In Japan, Yuichiro Kobayashi
was validly granted a divorce. Believing in good faith that the divorce capacitated her to
remarry, Edelina married Masatomi Ando. Edelina applied for the renewal of her Philippine
passport to indicate her surname as Ando but was told at the DFA that the same cannot be
issued to her until she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her
said husband Masatomi is valid until otherwise declared.
Edelina filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief, impleading the DFA as
respondent and praying the court to declare her marriage with Masatomi as valid and to
direct the DFA to issue a passport under the name Edelina Ando y Tungol. RTC issued an
order dismissing the petition for want of cause and action as well as jurisdiction. The RTC
said there is no showing that Edelina complied with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of
the Family Code, that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute
divorce. After Edelina filed an ex parte motion for reconsideration of the order was endorsed
to a family court, which dismissed the petition anew on the ground that petitioner had no
cause of action. An ex parte motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Edelina filed this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.
Pahina 11 ng 33
Evidence Day 02
David and Leticia were married on 12/3/1988 in QC, Philippines. They have 2
children, namely: Jerome and Jena. They migrated to the USA where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They continues to own properties in the
US and Philippines.
PETITIONER: Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it is solely the wife or the husband who can file
a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, the state
cannot collaterally attack the validity of a marriage in a petition for declaratory relief.
Further, Edelina alleged that a marriage shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. She also argued that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial
decree of divorce is required under Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance therewith
is a mere irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license.
Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California, which
was granted. The California court also granted to Leticia the custody of her two
children, as well as all the couples properties in the USA and awarded the
Philippine properties to David.
1. Edelina incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief with respect to her prayer to
compel the DFA to issue her passport. She should have first appealed before the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, according to the Philippine Passport Act.
2. Edelina should have filed a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from
her first husband with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as
valid.
In Garcia v. Recio, the SC ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment. The law
on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be
alleged and proven and like any other fact.
There appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the national
law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that
national law. Any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her
complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien
spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.
NOVERAS V. NOVERAS, G.R. NO. 188289, AUGUST 20, 2014.
David A. Noveras v. Leticia T. Noveras
20 August 2014
J. Perez | 2nd Division
Facts:
1.
Petition for review assailing the Decision of the CA, which affirmed in part the
RTC decision.
2.
3.
At the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
Recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover
their legal and personal status are those of the USA. With respect to
their marriage, the parties marriage had already been dissolved by
virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the
RTC
Pahina 12 ng 33
4.
CA: modified the trial courts Decision by directing the equal division of the
Philippine properties between the spouses.
5.
Issue 1: W/N the Court should recognize the Caifornia Judgment which
awarded the Philippine properties to David. (Said judgment was made part of the
pleadings presented and offered in evidence)
Held: TC erred in recognizing the divorce decree.
The foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132.24 and132. 25, in relation to Rule
39. 48(b). The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.
Under 132.24, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody
thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or
consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
132.25 states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court.
Only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its
authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
The Court relaxed the requirement on certification in Bayot v. CA where it held therein that
"[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a
copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is,
as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office
where the divorce decree was obtained.
Evidence Day 02
The application of the doctrine of processual presumption is entirely a different matter
because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are
still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding
directly to liquidation.
Issue 2: W/N the Philippine properties should be awarded to David.
Held: NO
TC should have proceeded with the case as an action for judicial separation of conjugal
property based on Art. 135 of the Family Code instead of converting it as a liquidation of the
ACP. It should have evaluated the grounds asserted by Leticia.
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to
necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family
Code.
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not
tackled in the trial courts decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition
as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. It is undisputed
that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the
Philippines. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who
worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of
Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third, their divorce
was granted by the California court in June 2005. Having established that Leticia and
David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of
absolute community of property should be granted.
Disposition: CA decision affirmed
LBP V. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, G.R. NO. 172551, JANUARY 15, 2014.
Rule 129: What Need Not Be Proved>Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing
necessary
LBP v Yatco
January 15, 2014 Brion, J.
FACTS:
Pursuant to EO 405, LBP valued the property at PHP1+ M, which Yatco did not
find acceptable.
Yatco elevated the matter to DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD).
PARAD computed the propertys value at PHP16+ M; it used the propertys
current market value (as shown in the tax declaration that Yatco submitted) and
applied the formula MV x 2.
PARAD noted that the LBP did not present any verified or authentic document to
back up its computation; hence, it brushed aside LBPs evaluation.
LBP filed with the RTC of San Pablo City Branch 30, acting as Special Agrarian
Court (RTC-SAC), a petition for judicial determination of just compensation.
RTC-SAC fixed just compensation at PHP200/sqm. It used the valuation set by
RTC Calamba Branches 35 and 36 in 2 civil cases. RTC-SAC did not give weight to
the LBPs evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out that the LBP failed to
prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and likewise failed to
consider the valuation factors provided in Sec 17 of the CARL.
RTC-SAC denied LBPs MR. LBP appealed to the CA, CA dismissed appeal.
Hence, this petition.
Evidence Day 02
1. The RTC-SAC fully disregarded Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 2 and DAR
AO 5-983 and thus acted outside the contemplation of the law. The RTCSAC did not point to any specific evidence or cite the values and amounts it used
in arriving at the PHP200/sqm valuation. It did not even consider the propertys
2 Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost
of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land
shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
3 A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or
CA:LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all three factors are present, relevant, and applicable.
A1. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be: LV
= MV x 2
Pahina 14 ng 33
considered the propertys MV (which, SC found that it did not), this alone will not
Evidence Day 02
Considering that both parties failed to adduce satisfactory evidence of the propertys value at
the time of taking, SC deemed it premature to make a final determination of the matter in
controversy.
suffice as basis, unless justified under Item II.A.3 of DAR AO 5-98 (see note 2).
LBP V. HONEYCOMB FARMS, INC., G.R. NO. 166259, NOVEMBER 12, 2012.
market value based on the current tax declaration that Yatco insists the RTC-SAC
considered in addition to Branch 36s valuation. Assuming that the RTC-SAC
Then too, it did not indicate the formula that it used in arriving at its valuation or
which led it to believe that Branch 36s valuation was applicable to this case.
Lastly, the RTC-SAC did not conduct an independent assessment and computation
FACTS:
To be exact, the RTC-SAC merely relied on Branch 36s valuation as it found the
LBPs evidence on the matter of just compensation inadequate. While the SC
agreed that the evidence presented by the LBP was inadequate and did not also
consider the legally prescribed factors and formula, the RTC-SAC still legally
erred in solely relying on Yatcos evidence which the Court found to be irrelevant
and off-tangent to the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.
2. The valuation fixed by Branches 35 and 36 was inapplicable to the
property. By simply looking at the expropriating body and the law governing the
expropriations made, SC was convinced the valuation fixed by Branch 36 is
inapplicable to the present case. [Property in the present case was expropriated
pursuant to its agrarian reform program; in contrast, the land subject of the civil
cases was expropriated by NAPOCOR for industrial purposes.]
Furthermore, RTC-SAC adopted Branch 36s valuation without any qualification or
condition. Yet, in disposing of the present case, the just compensation that it fixed for the
property largely differed from the former. (Branch 36 fixed a valuation of PHP20/sqm; while
the RTC-SAC, in the present case, valued the property at PHP200/sqm.) RTC-SAC did not
offer any explanation nor point to any evidence, fact or particular that justified the obvious
discrepancy between these amounts.
Honeycomb Farms Corp. (HFC) voluntarily offered their two parcels of land to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The Landbank of the Philippines (LBP) used the
guidelines embodied in DAR AO No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR AO No. 11, series
of 1994 in fixing the value of these lands. HFC rejected the valuation. The voluntary offer to
sell was referred to the DAR adjudication Board. The Regional Adjudicator fixed the value of
landholdings at P 5,324,529.00. HFC filed a case with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian
Court against the DAR Secretary and LBP, praying to compensate HFC for its landholdings
amounting to P 12,440,000.00. In its amended complaint, HFC increased the valuation to P
20M. LBP, on the other hand, revalued one of the lands to P 1,373,244.78, which was
formerly fixed at P 2,527,749.60; and the other to P 1,513,097.57, which was previously fixed
at P 2,796,800.00. The RTC made its own valuation when the Board of Commissionerspoju
could not agree on the common valuation. The RTC took judicial notice of the fact that a
portion of 10 hectares of that land is a commercial land because it is near the commercial
district of Cataingan, Masbate. The CA decided in favor of HFC. CA held that lower courts
are not bound by the factors enumerated in Sec. 17 of RA 6657 and the guidelines set forth
in the AO. LBP filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court thereafter.
ISSUES:
1
Whether or not the compensation to be paid should be less than the market value
of the property because the taking was not done in LBPs traditional exercise of
the power of eminent domain
Whether or not a hearing is necessary before the RTC can take judicial
The DAR is the administrative agency tasked with the implementation of the
agrarian reform program. The RTC is required to consider the acquisition cost of
the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made
by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true
that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant
to its rule-making power under Sec. 49 of R.A. No. 6657. As the government
Pahina 15 ng 33
The compensation to be paid should not be less than the market value of the
property When the State exercises its inherent power of eminent domain, the
Constitution imposes the corresponding obligation to compensate the landowner
for the expropriated property. This principle is embodied in Sec. 9, Art. III of the
Constitution, which provides: Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. When the State exercises the power of eminent
domain in the implementation of its agrarian reform program, the constitutional
provision which governs is Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution, which provides
that the State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. Notably, this provision also imposes upon the State the
obligation of paying the landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is
for the governments agrarian reform purposes. Specifically, the provision makes
use of the phrase just compensation, the same phrase used in Sec. 9, Art. III of
the Constitution. That the compensation mentioned here pertains to the fair and
full price of the taken property
3. While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of certain facts, it must
exercise this right within the clear boundary provided by Sec 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
Evidence Day 02
acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not
be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge.mThe mere personal knowledge of
the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.
In these lights, we find that a remand of this case to the court of origin is necessary for the
determination of just compensation, in accordance with the formula stated in DAR AOs
which are the applicable issuances on fixing just compensation.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. V. BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP., G.R. NO. 182864,
JANUARY 12, 2015.
Eastern Shipping v. BPI/MS Insurance
12 January 2015
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
Issues:
1.
2.
The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where
the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists;
and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. To
say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the
usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
Ratio:
1.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
The classification of the land is obviously essential to the valuation of the subject property,
which is the very issue in the present case. The parties should thus have been given the
opportunity to present evidence on the nature of the property before the lower court took
judicial notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the subject landholdings. As we said
in Land Bank of the Phils. v. Wycoco:
2.
If the bill of lading has no notation of any defect or damage in the goods, as in this
case, it constitutes prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the goods as
therein described. Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common
carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their destination constitutes a prima
facie case of fault of negligence against the carrier. The fault is attributable to
Eastern Shipping. No adequate explanation was given as to how the damage
happened.
The COGSA as well as the bill of lading provides that the carrier shall be liable for
damage in an amount not exceeding $500/package, unless the nature and
valuation higher than said amount is declared in writing and inserted in the bill of
lading and extra freight is paid. There is no question about the declaration on the
first bill of lading. As to the non-declaration on the second bill of lading, there was
still compliance. The provision does not require that the details must be written on
the very bill of lading itself. Compliance can be attained by incorporating the
invoice, by way of reference, to the bill of lading provided that the former is as in
this case admitted as evidence.
Pahina 16 ng 33
Evidence Day 02
EDC was able to cause the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the
Office of the Provincial Assessor Rizal and transfer the tax declaration over the
subject property in its name.
In the Pre-trial Order, Eastern Shipping admitted the existence and due
execution of the two bills of lading together with the invoice on the second
shipment.
Eastern Shipping: What was admitted and written on the pre-trial order
Respondents filed the Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Tax Declaration
and Reconveyance of Possession with Damages.
Court: Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
Heirs of Juan argued: respondents were aware of and were parties to the contract
to sell entered into by them and EDC. The heirs of Juan claimed that respondents
received their share in the downpayment made by EDC but they were both unpaid
of the balance on the cost of the land.
was only the existence of the invoice but not its contents.
The case for the presentation of defendants evidence was reset for
failure of their respective lawyers to appear for 3 times.
The trial court reset the case to 3 October 2007 and even required the
parties to secure a new lawyer.
The trial court warned the defendants, petitioner here, and the heirs of
Juan that if they fail to do so, their right to present evidence would be
waived.
Finally, on 5 December 2007, the counsel of the heirs of Juan once again
failed to appear so upon motion of respondents counsel, the case was
submitted for resolution.
Facts
Apolonio Ballesteros (Apolonio) and Maria Membrebe (Maria) were husband and
wife. They begot two (2) children.
o
RTC ruled in favor of respondents, that respondents and the heirs of Juan are coowners of the subject property and that EDC was not a buyer in good faith because
it knew that respondents were co-owners of the subject property because Herminia
informed EDC of such fact through a letter dated 9 March 2000. The trial court
ruled that the Deed of Absolute sale is null and void.
Court of Appeals partially granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals agreed with
the trial courts finding that the heirs of Juan, as co-owners, could only alienate or
convey to EDC their one-half portion of the subject property which may be allotted
to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. However, the
appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court that the Deed of Absolute
Sale is null and void.
Issue/Holding/Ratio
Pahina 17 ng 33
Evidence Day 02
WON the heirs of Irenea are entitled to inherit one-half of the subject property from
Apolonia? YES, they are co-owners over one-half of the property. The heirs of Juan did not
validly convey their share to EDC.
Herminia has successfully established her successional rights over the subject
property through her clear testimony and admitted by the opposing counsel:
Q: So, hindi lang kayo ang may-ari ng lupa? Ang ina nya kasama doon sa may-ari
at kalahati lang ang sa inyo?
We also took into consideration the admissions made by the heirs of Juan in their
Answer to the Complaint filed by respondents before the trial court. For ready
reference, we shall reproduce the pertinent portion of the Answer and the
Complaint:
A: Hindi pa naparti.
Q: Kahit hindi pa naparte narerecognize ninyo na ang nanay niya ay isa sa mayari ng lupa kasama ang tatay mo, hindi ba?
ANSWER
A: Opo.
xxxx
A: Opo.
Q: Why did you sell all?
COMPLAINT
Q: Ang tanong saiyo, kalahati ng lupa may karapatan ka, you have a right [to]
only to one of the property?
A: Opo.
A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial,
either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of
the judicial proceeding.23 Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
EDC avers that said judicial admission should not bind it because it was an
innocent purchaser in good faith. The Court of Appeals debunked this contention
and correctly ruled, as follow:
o
ISSUES: W/N the finding that it was the truck that hit the electricity post lacks evidentiary
support.
HELD: NO
Fernandez and SPO2 Galangs testimonies regarding the truck hitting the electricity post
are hearsay and should not be given credence.
A dump truck, a jeepney and a car figured in a vehicular accident along Ortigas
Avenue, Pasig City damaging a 45-foot wooden electricity post, three 75 KVA
transformers, and other electrical line attachments.
Meralco traced the ownership of the truck to Josefa
Meralco demanded from Josefa reimbursement for the replacement cost of the
electricity post and its attachments, but Josefa refused to pay. So Meralco sued
Josefa and Pablo Manoco, the truck driver, for damages before the RTC of Pasig
City.
Evidence for Meralco
o
Testimonies of 6 witnesses:
Evidence Day 02
Meralcos foreman
Meralcos supervising accountant
Fernandez and SPO2 Galang merely testified and conveyed to the court matters
only narrated to them by other people who were not presented in court.
Hearsay evidence has no probative value because it is merely the witness
recitation of what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing. A
witness can testify only to those facts which are derived from his own perception.
BUT: Meralco has sufficiently established the direct causal link between the truck and the
electricity post through Abios testimony.
Abio categorically stated during trial that he saw the truck hit the electricity post.
His first-hand account of the incident during the direct examination was frank and
straightforward.
Josefa failed to impeach the veracity of Abios testimony during the crossexamination.
Abio even reiterated that it was Josefas truck that rammed the electricity post.40
Full faith and credence given to unrebutted, and categorical declaration on the
witness stand, made under solemn oath, that it was the truck that caused damage
to Meralcos property.
PLUS, Even without Abios testimony: Josefa judicially admitted in his motions and
pleading that his truck hit the electricity post. (motion to dismiss dated March 17, 1997)
o
o
Pahina 19 ng 33
OTHER Issues:
Bautista is presumed to be negligent in driving the truck under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur:
o
o
o
o
o
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence on the part of
the defendant or some other person who is charged with negligence where the
thing or transaction speaks for itself.
Res ipsa loquitur is grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human experience
that negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself,
ELEMNETS: (1) the accident is of such character as to warrant an inference that
it would not have happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident
must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of;
and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
The present case satisfies all the elements of res ipsa loquitur.
Josefa did not adduce any evidence in support of his defense during trial.
Josefa failed to show that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Bautista
Evidence Day 02
However, Josefa failed to overcome the presumption of negligence against him
since he waived his right to present evidence during trial.
Meralco failed to point out the specific facts that afforda basis for its
claim for actual damages.58 Actual damages cannot be presumed.
The trial court thus erred in even admitting Exhibit "D" in evidence
whose contents were offered without any other competent evidence to
corroborate them
SPS. MANZANILLA V. WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES CORP., G.R. NO. 177484, JULY 18, 2014.
SPOUSED MANZANILLA V. WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES CORP.
July 18, 2014
Facts:
The spouses Manzanilla are the owners of a 25,000-square meter parcel of land in Batangas,
a portion of which was being leased to Waterfields (represented by its President Aliza Ma).
The Contract of Lease (dated May 24, 1994) provides a 25-year period and renewable upon
the option of the lessee. Theres a provision acknowledging the lessees payment of a rental
deposit amounting to P216,000 which is meant to answer for unpaid rentals, damages,
penalties and unpaid utility charges. Such deposit or any balance thereof shall be refunded
to the lessee immediately upon the termination or expiration of the contract. The parties
executed on June 6, 1994 an Amendment to the Contract of Lease which retained the terms
and conditions of the original contract.
Beginning April 1997, however, Waterfields failed to pay the monthly rental. Hence, Ma sent
the spouses Manzanilla a letter dated July 7, 1997. The letter contains Mas promise to pay
the rentals in arrears by way of check payment and a statement that the deposit stipulated
in the lease contract be used exclusively for the payment of the unpaid utilities and other
incidental expenses. It also stated that the original contract shall be amended according to
the provision of the letter.
Spouses Manzanilla filed before the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment against Waterfields.
Paragraph 5 of the complaint alleges: subsequently, the said Contract of Lease was
amended on 06 June 1994 and on 09 July 1997 x x x.
Pahina 20 ng 33
Evidence Day 02
In its Answer, Waterfields admitted4 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Complaint. It alleged that it
had built substantial improvements over the land; that it just recently suffered business
losses. It claimed that it did not fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals but was just
utilizing the rental deposit in the amount of P216,000.00 (equivalent to one year rentals) as
rental payment in accordance with Section 4 of the original Contract of Lease. Hence, it
argued that the spouses Manzanilla have no cause of action against it.
MTC: Ruled in favor of Manzanilla. It held that Mas letter of July 9, 1997 had amended the
Contract of Lease. In particular, Section 4 of the Contract of Lease which provides that the
rental deposit shall answer for any unpaid rentals, damages, penalties and unpaid utility
charges was superseded by the portion in Mas July 9, 1997 letter which states that the
deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall be used exclusively for the payment of
unpaid utilities, if any, and other incidental expenses only and applied at the
termination of the lease. Hence, the MTC found no merit in Waterfields claim that it did
not fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals as it was applying the rental deposit to its
payment of the same.
RTC: Waterfields, in its Answer admitted paragraph 5 of the Complaint which states that
the Contract of Lease was amended on June 6, 1994 and July 9, 1997.
CA: Spouses Manzanilla have no cause of action against Waterfields. Spouses Manzanilla
terminated the Contract of Lease. Upon such termination, it held that the rental deposit
should have been applied as payment for unpaid utilities and other incidental expenses, if
any, in view of the July 9, 1997 letter. And since the spouses Manzanilla did not allege that
there were unpaid utilities or incidental expenses for the account of Waterfields as of the
termination of the contract, the whole amount of P216,000.00 should have been returned by
the former to the latter when the contract was terminated. Not having done so, the spouses
Manzanilla therefore, became debtors of Waterfields insofar as the said amount is
concerned. And since Waterfields is also a debtor of the spouses Manzanilla with respect to
the unpaid rentals, compensation should take place.
Issues: Whether or not there was a violation of the lease which will justify a complaint for
unlawful detainer. (YES)
Waterfields cannot now contradict its judicial admission 6 that the Contract of Lease was
amended on July 9, 1997; the doctrine of estoppel likewise bars it from falsifying Mas July
9, 1997 letter in this litigation.
Clearly, Waterfields admitted in its Answer the truth of the material allegation that the
Contract of Lease was amended on July 9, 1997. It is well- settled that judicial admissions
cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party [itself] and binds the person who
5 For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, two requisites must concur: (1) there
Held:
must be failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the lease, and (2) there
must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate. The first requisite refers to the
existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the
jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued.
6 Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission,
4 Paragraph 2 of the Answer provides: Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Complaint are admitted.
verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during trial, either by verbal or
written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.
Pahina 21 ng 33
Evidence Day 02
makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake (as in
this case), no amount of rationalization can offset it.
Moreover, [u]nder the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon. A party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the
prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. In the law of evidence, whenever a party
has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing [to be] true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
In view of these, any effort on the part of Waterfields to impugn the July 9, 1997 letter is
futile.
Even without the above-mentioned admission of Waterfields, the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts (which, according to Article 1371 of the Civil Code, shall be considered in
judging the intent of the contracting parties) of the parties reveal their intention to amend
the original Contract of Lease.
The doctrine of unjust enrichment does not apply in this case since any benefit that the
spouses Manzanilla may obtain from the subject premises cannot be said to be without any
valid basis or justification.
DIMAGUILA V. SPS. MONTEIRO, G.R. NO. 201011, JANUARY 27, 2014.
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
Pahina 22 ng 33
Evidence Day 02
Luna and a friend then arrived at the scene and approached her nephews group, uttering
the words: "Gusto nyo itaob ko long lamesang ito." Sensing trouble, Marita rushed to the
house of Ocampo, who was a police officer in the Western Police District, to ask for his help
in preventing a confrontation between the two groups. Together with Marita, he proceeded
to the site of the drinking spree. Ocampo approached De Luna and asked if the latter knew
him. When De Luna replied yes, Ocampo went on to tell the group to put an end to their
drinking session. De Luna and his friends immediately left the scene. However, minutes
later, De Luna went back to the locus. Marita heard De Luna shout towards their direction
the words: "Walang pulis-pulis sa akin!" Ocampo likewise heard De Lunas utterances:
"Walang pulis-pulis sa amin! Anong akala mo sa amin, basta-basta mo na lang pauuwiin."
De Luna then pulled out a knife and tried to stab Ocampo twice but the latter dodged the
knife both times. Thereafter, he drew his pistol and fired two successive shots at De Luna.
Ocampo was leaning backwards when he fired at De Luna. Fatally hit, the latter
Pahina 23 ng 33
Evidence Day 02
need of proof other than the fact of the commission of murder or homicide. Based on recent
jurisprudence, however, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000 for the heirs of De
Luna is in order. With respect to other compensatory damages, competent evidence must be
presented to support the claim for those damages. In this case, the heirs of the victim
claimed that they spent P2,577 for hospital expense and P300 for funeral expenses.
However, when actual damages substantiated by receipts amount to less than P25,000, the
award of P25,000 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount, is
justified. The award for moral damages shall be adjusted from P50,000 to P75,000 to
conform to the prevailing jurisprudence, while the award for attorneys fees must be deleted
as none of the grounds therefor under Article 2208 of the Civil Code is present. Finally, the
Court also imposes interest on all the monetary awards for damages at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
PEOPLE V. RULLEPA Y GUINTO, G.R. NO. 131516, MARCH 5, 2003.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONNIE RULLEPA y
GUINTO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Facts:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Manila in
CA-G.R. CR No. 30957 dated 23 April 2010 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellantPO1 CRISPIN
OCAMPO y SANTOS is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE and is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Mario de Luna the amounts of P75,000 as civil
indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as temperate damages. All monetary
awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of
the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Notes:
Testimony of witnesses:
1.
Cyra May (victim) said that she was raped repeatedly, that accused
inserted his penis in her mouth, vagina, and anus.
2.
3.
Dr. Cristina Preyra (Medico-Legal) that Labia majora are full, convex
and coaptated with congested and abraded labia minora
(On Penalty)
Anent the appropriate penalty, the Court affirmed the penalty imposed by the RTC and the
CA: an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum
for the crime of homicide, there being one ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and no aggravating circumstance.
With regard to the appropriate indemnity and damages, an award for civil indemnity in
favor of the heirs of the victim must be automatically imposed against the accused without
presenting in between, i.e. that the labia minora had abrasions that
may be caused by a penis. She notes however that the victim was in a
virgin state.
4.
Testimony of accused:
Pahina 24 ng 33
1.
that the statements attribute to him are inadmissible since they were
made out of fear for having been elicited by the parents through
bullying.
2.
Accused also draws attention to the statement of victim that he was not
in the house on November 17, alleged that the victim was coached, and
alleged that the victim may have imagined the event.
Evidence Day 02
the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
RTC: conviction and meted out the death penalty because of the victim was
allegedly three years of age, a qualifying circumstance. Because of the death
penalty, the case reached the SC on automatic review. Note that under Art. 335 of
the RPC, the qualifying circumstance that will merit the death penalty is if the
victim was below 7 years of age.
Issue: WON the victim was 3 years of age or below 7 years of age, which would support the
penalty of death.
Held: this was not proven.
The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2.
3.
(b)
(c)
4.
5.
It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6.
The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of
the victim.
However, in People v. Tipay, the court held that the presentation of the birth
certificate may not be necessary in case where the tenderness of the victim
is manifest, in which case the court can take judicial notice.
On the other hand, other cases criticize the doctrine in People v. Tipay on the
ground that Rule 129 (3) precludes judicial notice, because said section
requires a hearing and an examination of facts. In that case, there is no true
judicial notice because there is evidence (the victim's appearance) and there
is an examination thereof (the hearing). Judicial notice is when there is no
need to present evidence.
The court ruled that there was no question as to the admissibility of a persons
appeaance in determining his age. As to the weight, however, what is applicable
are the guidelines in Pruna, in particular, guideline no. 3.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of
the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b)
and (c) above.
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth
or similar authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however,
testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age
sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no
difficulty ascertaining the victims age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt,
therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was
below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here,
reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken
for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object
evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony
of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below
seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant
cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion
perpetua can be imposed upon him.
Pahina 25 ng 33
Note: the 12 years makes the rape statutory, and this was proven. The 7 years is
what would have been a qualifying circumstance. This was not proven however,
because the object evidence (appearance) and testimony of mother was insufficient.
Not much explanation as to why it was insufficient.
b.
c.
Evidence Day 02
they did not present their own copy of the Contract notwithstanding directives from the RTC
to produce the same.
The RTC decided in favour of Monark. MCMP filed an MR while Monark interposed a
Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Reconsideration (MCPR). The RTC issued an order
granting Monarks MCPR, which allowed the inclusion of payments of interests, charges,
and fees, in accordance with the stipulations entered into the parties under Exhibits A to
G (referring to contents of the contract, which was lost but proven through the photocopy).
The CA denied MCMPs appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA should have disallowed the presentation of secondary
evidence to prove existence of the contract, following the Best Evidence Rule
MCMPs argument: Based on the testimony of Peregrino, Monark did not diligently
search for the original copy of the Contract because:
1)
2)
3)
Monark only searched for the original copy of the document for the purposes of the
instant case
HELD: NO, CA was correct in allowing the presentation of secondary evidence to prove
d.
e.
Section 3 of Rule 140 provides that When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:
After 30-day period lapsed, MCMP failed to pay, making only two partial payments of
P100,000 each on 2001. As of April 30, 2002, MCMP owed Monark P1,282,481.83, and
Monark filed a suit for a sum of money with the RTC on June 18, 2002.
MCMP:
(a)
(b)
It had an agreement with Monark it would not be charged for the whole time that
the leased equipment was in its possession but rather only for the actual time the
equipment was used although still on the project site (such stipulation was not in
the contract)
Monark:
(a)
Presented Reynaldo Peregrino (Senior Account Manager) who testified there were
two (2) original copies of the Contract retained by both MCMP and Monark; it lost
its copy despite diligent efforts to recover the copy. Peregrino presented a
photocopy of the Contract which he personally had on file.
MCMP: Objected to the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
Contract because there were no diligent efforts to search for the original copy ALTHOUGH
a)
When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
b)
When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce if after reasonable notice.
XXX
Secs. 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of secondary
evidence to prove the contents of a lost document:
5. When original document is unavailable When the original document has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. If the document is in
the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce
Pahina 26 ng 33
Evidence Day 02
Traveller Kids, Inc.(TKI), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing, importing and distributing shoes, sandals and other footware.
it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the
document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss."
They agreed that TKI would import footwear from CSFL from its China factory.
For the first three years, TKI was able to pay, but in 2004 it started to default on its
payments. The unpaid accounts amounted to $325,451.39, in addition to an
additional $92,000 worth of children's shoes manufactured as per TKI purchase
orders.
After verbal and written demand were made for payment of the accounts to no
avail, CSFL filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money before the Malabon
RTC.
CSFL presented a witness who identified several sales invoices and order slips it
issued as evidence of its transactions with TKI. TKI objected pointing out that the
documents being presented were mere photocopies.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
The CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and RTC gave
credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of
Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail.
Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. Findings of facts and assessment of
credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court.
After the presentation of its last witness, CSFL filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits
seeking the admission of, among others, the sales invoices and order slips earlier
objected to by TKI. TKI still objected on the same grounds. The RTC issued an Order
admitting all exhibits offered by CSFL.
TKI filed an MR raising the same objections and also objecting to the documents
presented to prove CSFL's claim for attorney's fees on the grounds that they were not
raised during the pre-trial.
RTC denied the MR, on the ground that the invoices and order slips were
duplicate originals, as sufficiently established by CSFL's officer and principal witness
Susan Chiu.
Instead of presenting evidence, TKI filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for
TRO and/or writ of Preliminary Injunction reiterating the same arguments. No
injunction order was issued by the CA and so trial continued and TKI was ordered to
present evidence. As TKI refused citing its certiorari proceeding, the RTC considered
TKI waived its right to adduce countervailing evidence and ordered CSFL to submit
its memorandum.
The CA partially granted TKI's petition, ruling that the objected "photocopies"
were inadmissible as evidence, but dismissing the issue as regards to documents
proving attorney's fees. The CA said that that Chius testimony merely established
the existence or due execution of the original invoices. CSFL, however, did not
present the original invoices, only the photocopies, contrary to Section 5, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court set down the requirements
before a party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original
document whenever the original copy has been lost:
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original,
the offeror must prove the following:
(1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and;
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed.
Though MPMC contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the contract
that they entered into, it failed to present a copy of the Contract despite the request of the
trial court for it to produce its copy of the Contract. Normal business practice dictates that
MCMP should have asked for and retained a copy of their agreement. MCMP's failure to
present the same and explain its failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of
secondary evidence in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it
also gives rise to the disputable presumption adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule
131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced."
CAPITAL SHOES FACTORY, LTD. V. TRAVELER KIDS, INC., G.R. NO. 200065, SEPTEMBER
24, 2014.
Capital Shoes v. Traveler Kids
GR No. 200065 / 24 Sep 2014 / J. Mendoza
FACTS
ISSUE / HELD
(1)
No.
RATIO
First issue
According to Sec. 4 (b) Rule 130
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time,
with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
Chiu remained firm and consistent with her statement that the subject invoices
were duplicate originals as they were prepared at the same time.
Contrary to the assertion of TKI, the duplicate originals were produced in court
and compared with their photocopies during the hearing before the trial court. The
TSNs further reveal that after the comparison, the photocopies were the ones
retained in the records.
(2)
(3)
ISSUE:
(1)
Evidence: Petitioners claim that the duplicate/carbon copy of the Deed of Sale in
(2)
favor of Sylianteng violated the best evidence rule R130.3. They also question its
authenticity in general. (SC best evidence rule doesnt apply)
Side issues:
a.
b.
c.
After the admission of CSFLs exhibits as evidence, TKI should have let trial
proceed in due course instead of immediately resorting to certiorari , by presenting
its own testimonial and documentary evidence and in case of an unfavorable
decision, appeal the same in accordance with law
SC: Best evidence rule doesnt apply | Notarization proof of due execution and authenticity
(1)
Best evidence rule only applies when the content of a document is the subject of
inquiry, NOT where the issue was due execution, authenticity, or existence of
Second issue
Evidence Day 02
Petitioners and respondents are both claiming ownership of two parcels of land
(1250sqm and 990sqm) located along Wilson Street, San Juan City.
a. Scunak et al claim that the lands were sold to them by the sole heir
(Ramon Pultaje) who inherited from the original developer
b. Syliantengs claim that the original developer executed deeds of sale in
favor of their mother who later transferred it to them.
RTC ruled in favor of Scunak et al. CA reversed and ruled for Sylianteng.
SC took cognizance of the case despite dealing with questions of fact because of the
conflicting decisions of the lower courts.
(2)
(3)
(2014)
SPS FERNANDO and MA. ELENA SANTOS, Petitioners, vs. LOLITA ALCAZAR,
FACTS:
Evidence Day 02
1.
DOC TR INE
The rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted, unless the adverse party specifically denies them under oath,
applies only to parties to such instrument.
4.
While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere
CA
The effect of the admission is such that "a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff
which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and entitles him to a
FACTS
Lolita Alcazar, proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC) filed a Complaint for sum
of money against the petitioners, Sps Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos, to collect
5.
3.
uncorroborated.
Trial court denied petitioners demurrer for lack of merit.
RTC
Petitioners assert that only a photocopy of the Acknowledgment was presented and
identified by respondent even as the original was not lost, the same having
been made part of the record of the case when respondents evidence was first
presented ex parte.
They argue that the photocopy presented and offered in evidence is inadmissible
and could not be the basis for arriving at a finding of liability on their part,
pursuant to the best evidence rule.
Petitioners point out inconsistencies and erroneous assumptions made by the CA
which formed the basis of its decision, such as Ma. Elenas undue inclusion in the
judgment of liability, when it is evident from the Acknowledgment that it
was executed and signed by Fernando alone.
The trial court essentially held that petitioners admitted that they entered
into transactions with the respondent for the delivery of paint and
liability required no further proof. And with this admission of liability, the
Acknowledgment which was duly authenticated and formally offered in evidence
was sufficient to establish their liability, and no further proof in the form of
receipts and statements of account was required.
Fernandos categorical admission of liability as contained in the Acknowledgment
as well as petitioners admissions in their Answer sufficed. It held further that
respondent was competent to testify on the Acknowledgment as she was a
signatory therein.
Since they failed to oppose the Acknowledgment in the court below as a result of
their having waived their right to present evidence, petitioners cannot now
belatedly question the document.
Moreover, their claim of a lesser liability in the amount of P600,000.00 remained
to be plain unsubstantiated allegations as a result of their failure to refute
respondents evidence and present their own.
PETITIONE RS ARGUME NTS
inadmissible; petitioners receipt of the written demand was not proved; the
CA held that petitioners failed to deny specifically under oath the genuineness and
due execution of the Acknowledgment; consequently,
o
1) its genuineness and due execution are deemed admitted
o
2) there was thus no need to present the original thereof, and
o
3) petitioners liability was sufficiently established.
CA held that in their Answer, petitioners admitted that they owed
6.
Petitioners may no longer raise any issue pertaining to the Acknowledgment, the
genuineness and due execution of which they are considered to have admitted; and
Pahina 29 ng 33
that with the resolution by the CA of the issues revived in the Petition, petitioners
are guilty of forum shopping.
7.
OUR RULI NG
signatory to the Acknowledgment. She may be held liable only to the extent
mere photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not materially affect the
proclaimed that the document resides in the record. This would explain
then why respondent cannot find it in her possession; it is with the court as an
exhibit. Besides, it evidently appears that there is no question raised on the
authenticity and contents of the photocopy that was presented and
identified in court; petitioners merely insist that the photocopy is inadmissible
during the taking of her testimony for the second time, and the presentation of a
outcome of the case.
It was a mere procedural inadvertence that could have been cured and did not
affect petitioners cause in any manner. As conceded by them, the original exists
and was made part of the records of the case when respondents evidence was first
taken.
Though respondent now claims that she had lost the original, the CA
Evidence Day 02
The effect of the admission is such that "a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff
which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part and entitles him to a
The effect of this is that the genuineness and due execution of the
Acknowledgment is deemed admitted.
"There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to
documents the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the
adverse party."
The Court believes that judgment may be had solely on the document, and there is
no need to present receipts and other documents to prove the claimed
indebtedness. The Acknowledgment is "valid and binding between the parties who
executed it, as a document evidencing the loan agreement they had entered into."
The heirs of Spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave claimed that they could
not locate the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797 pertaining to the land they inherited
from their parents, that the entry of the deed of sale with right to repurchase on the original
TCT did not exist, and that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon.
The custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed the deed of sale with right to
repurchase on September 9, 1975; and this had been registered with the Register of Deeds
and duly annotated on the title. She had then become the absolute owner of the property
due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.
It opined that the contents of the deed of sale could be proved by secondary evidence in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its execution or
existence and of the cause of its unavailability being without bad faith when defendant
Prodon swore that she purchased the land and her testimony has been confirmed by the
Notarial Register of Notary Public Eliseo Razon and by the Primary Entry Book of the
Register of Deeds of Manila.
CA reversed. It said: a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary
evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. Xxx The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its discretion may change
this order if necessary."
The CA found circumstances that put doubt on the existence of the alleged deed of sale.
Evidence on record showed that Maximo Alvarez was hospitalized between August 23, 1975
to September 3, 1975 and suffered from paralysis of half of his body and blindness due to
cataract. Maximo Alvarez was again later hospitalized and died on October of 1975 without
having left the hospital.
Evidence Day 02
A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show the loss
or explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the presentation of secondary
evidence. Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he had given the original to her
lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the
original because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his heart ailment. Such
evidence without showing the inability to locate the original from among Atty. Lacanilaos
belongings by himself or by any of his assistants or representatives was inadequate.
Moreover, a duplicate original could have been secured from Notary Public Razon, but no
effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction.
In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the existence of the
deed. Camilon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had twice gone to his residence in
Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first on September 5, 1975, to negotiate the sale of the property
in question, and the second on September 9, 1975, to execute the deed of sale with right to
repurchase.
------------------
ISSUE:
WON the Best Evidence Rule applies in an action for quieting of title based on the
inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase. - NO
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
HELD: NO
SC: The CA and the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case.
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
This action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase. The principal issue was whether or not the deed of sale with right to
repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed.
(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
The Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with right
to repurchase were not the issue . The lower court should have simply addressed and
determined whether or not the "existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue
had been proved by preponderance of evidence.
The presentation of evidence other than the original document, like the testimonies of
Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the Primary
Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without first proving the loss
or unavailability of the original of the deed.
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish and
explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to establish the
genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because the deed, although a collateral
document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title. Her inability
to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its existence and due
execution by other means that could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards
that end, however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the
same strict standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a
precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the
original of the document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence other
than the original writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves:
(a) the existence or due execution of the original;
(b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in
court; and
(c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of
the original can be attributed.
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a
writing are brought before the court, considering that
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(a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of
more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive
instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in
words may mean a great difference in rights;
(b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a
copy by handwriting or typewriting; and
(c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a
writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally. The rule further acts as an insurance against
fraud. Xx Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting from
the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of
writings.
MALIKSI V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 203302, MARCH 12, 2013.
Evidence Day 02
primarily because the originals of the evidence were not presented in court, nor were they
authenticated by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that
petitioner failed to provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court.
Republic filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration which is also denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
WON the Republic observed the best evidence rule? (NO)
HELD:
No. Petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents
themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove
petitioners allegations. Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of
the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which mandates that the
evidence must be the original document itself. The origin of the best evidence rule can be
found and traced to as early as the 18th century in Omychund v. Barker, wherein the Court
of Chancery said, The judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but one
that if the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by
general rule of evidence, the best that the nature of the case will admit. The rule is,
those witnesses. The first ground judges have gone upon in departing from strict rules, is
an absolute strict necessity. Secondly, a presumed necessity. In the case of writings,
subscribed by witnesses, if all are dead, the proof of one of their hands is sufficient to
establish the deed: where an original is lost, a copy may be admitted; if no copy, then a proof
by witnesses who have heard the deed, and yet it is a thing the law abhors to admit the
memory of man for evidence.
In particular, it may not insist that the photocopies of the documents fall under Sec. 7 of
Rule 130 in relation to Secs. 19 and 20 of Rule 132.
1.
The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its
investigations does not make them per se public records. Petitioner presented as
witness its records officer Magno, who testified that these public and private
documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the
course of the Commissions investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. However, witnesses can testify only to those facts which are of their
personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception. Thus, Magno
could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but not as to
the contents of the documents themselves.
2.
3.
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this
reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before the PCGG, while it may be
Evidence Day 02
exercise of its mandate, it was not attested to by the legal custodian to be a correct
copy of the original. This omission falls short of the requirement of Rule 132, Secs.
24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.
considered as a public document since it was taken in the course of the PCGGs
Pahina 33 ng 33