LTD (2015) Cases

Days 10 and 11
GENEROSO MENDOZA vs.
CA, DANIEL GOLE CRUZ and DOLORES MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-36637 July 14, 1978
SANTOS, J.:
NATURE: Petition for review by certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the CA
dated February 27, 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 46581-R, which upheld the registration in the
names of Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, purchasers of the landholdings subject
matter of an application for registration, notwithstanding that they were not parties in
the original registration proceedings.
FACTS:
May 15, 1964, Generoso Mendoza filed with the CFI of Bulacan an application for the
registration of two parcels of land, with a residential house thereon, situated in the
Poblacion of Sta. Maria Bulacan.
A notice was issued on December 3, 1964
The date of initial hearing was set on June 18, 1965.
Said notice was duly published, posted and served but nobody appeared nor filed an
answer or opposition within the period allowed for that purpose.
Consequently, the registration court entered on July 6, 1965, an order of general
default and allowed the applicant to present his evidence ex-parte.
Evidence presented proved:
1. That Generoso and his wife, Diega de Leon, were the owners of the parcels of
land subject of the application but the same were sold by them, during the
pendency of the case, to the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza,
subject to the vendors' usufructuary rights.
2. The deed of sale was presented (carbon copy)
On the basis of such evidence, the registration court on July 21, 1965, ordered the
registration of the 2 parcels of land in the names of the vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and
Dolores Mendoza, subject to the usufructuary rights of the vendors, Generoso Mendoza
and Diega de Leon.
On the same day, a copy of said decision was received by Generoso Mendoza.
On November 5, 1965. Generoso Mendoza filed a motion for the issuance of the
decree.
On May 16, 1967, Decree No. 114454 was issued confirming the title to the land of
vendees Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, and ordering the registration of the
same in their names, subject to the usufructuary rights of the vendors.
Consequently, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3787 was issued to spouses Daniel Gole
Cruz and Dolores Mendoza.

On April 16, 1968, Generoso Mendoza filed an urgent petition for reconsideration
praying that the decision (order for registration in the names of private respondents)
and the decree issued on May 16, 1967 be set aside and that Original Certificate of
Title No. 03787 be cancelled, on the ground that the vendees/ the registered owners
had failed to pay the purchase price of the lands.
The registration court considered said urgent petition for reconsideration as a
petition for review of the decree and set aside its decision, its order for the issuance of
the decree, and the decree of registration, on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction
to order the registration of the lands in the names of the vendees, who were not parties
to the application for registration.
Moreover, said court ordered the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 03787 and directed the
registration of the lands in the names of spouses, Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon,
subject to the rights of vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, stated in the
deed of sale.
On September 17, 1968, spouses Cruz and Mendoza moved to reconsider the order=
MR denied on October 17, 1968.
On December 19, 1968, spouses Cruz appealed from the order;Mendoza filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal =the registration court dismissed the appeal.
The spouses Cruz and Mendoza then filed with the CAa special civil action for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 43250-R.
The CArendered decision, on February 27, 1973, setting aside the order of the land
registration court. It also denied applicant Mendoza's petition for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the registration of the lots in the names of the vendees is valid.
HELD: YES

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Petitioner
1. Insisted that he could not be deemed to have
caused the registration of the land in the names
of private respondents as he never testified in
court having sold the same to said Private
respondents
He claimed that he never testified in court as
having sold the property to the herein private
respondents.

SC
The records of the case belie petitioner's claim that he did not testify relative to the deed of sale.
The transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearing on the application for registration held on July 6, 1965 all too clearly
show that petitioner and his wife testified before the deputed commissioner, Mr. Ricardo Cruz, that they sold the property
sought to be registered to the private respondents.
Q: was there any transaction that took place?
A. Yes sir, we have sold these two parcels of land to Daniel Gole Cruz and his wife Dolores Mendoza.
Q: if you know the carbon copy of the deed of sale?
A. Yes sir that is the carbon copy of the deed of sale I have just mentioned.
Q. Do you know who are now in possession of these properties.
A. We, I, my husband and Daniel Gole Cruz and and his wife, Dolores Mendoza are in actual possession of the same.

2. That the registration court could not legally

order the registration of the land in the names
of the vendees-respondents, who were neither
the applicants nor the oppositors in the
registration case below

Q. Why are Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza co-possessing with you these two parcels of land?
A. Because on October 15, 1964, we sold this property to them with one of the conditions that until my husband and myself or
anyone of us die, we will live with them.
Furthermore, applicant-petitioner even presented the private respondent Daniel Gole Cruz to confirm the aforesaid sale of the
subject property.
Generoso Mendoza was the original applicant in this case. At the hearing, he himself produced evidence that on October
15,1964 he and his wife sold the Land in favor of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza for the amount of
P6,000.00 payable in installments.
Petitioner himself caused the registration of the land in the names of private respondents.
Petitioner overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject
matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed by an
instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the
decree of title
The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the "buyer" or the person to whom
the property has been conveyed" for the applicant.
Neither does it require that the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the case. He
may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings.
The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with
a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the
case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with.
The Deed of Sale was duly presented to the registration court for consideration.
Firstly, it was the petitioner himself, who presented the deed of sale to the court and testified before the same that
he did sell the land to the private respondents. This was done by him despite the fact that he could easily have the
land registered in his name as an order of general default had been issued and the hearing on the application for
registration had been conducted EX-PARTE.
Secondly, as if to fully convince the court of the fact of sale, petitioner presented his wife, Diega de Leon, and private
respondent, Daniel Gole Cruz, to confirm the said sale of the land and the stipulated usufructuary rights.
Finally, the petitioner even filed the motion for the issuance of the decree of confirmation of title after having

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received the decision of the court ordering the registration of the title to the land in the names of vendeesrespondents, subject to the stipulated usufructuary rights thereby signifying his full assent to the same.
It is true that no written motion was filed seeking the consideration of the deed of sale in relation with the application for
registration. But the law does not require that the motion accompanying the presentation of the instrument be in
writing. And the above- enumerated acts of the applicant-petitioner and the circumstances surrounding the same accept
of no interpretation than that the applicant-petitioner did in fact move the court to order the registration of the title to
the land in the names of vendees- respondents, subject only to the stipulated usufructuary rights of the petitioner and his
wife. There was, therefore, sufficient compliance with the first requirement of the law.
Anent the second requirement of prior notice to the parties.
A order of general default had been issued prior to the presentation of the deed of sale by the applicant-petitioner,
since nobody filed an opposition to the application for registration. Thus, the only person who should have been
entitled to a notice from the court was the applicant-petitioner himself, as the only party with a legal standing in the
proceedings. In view thereof, no legal objection to the court's jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the
names of vendees-respondents may be interposed on the ground of non-compliance with the requirement of prior
notice to the parties.
Since there was sufficient compliance with the aforestated requirements of the law, respondent Court of Appeals did
not, therefore, err in holding that the lower court had jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the names of
vendees-respondents.
3. That respondent Court of Appeals erred in
Without merit. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides as follows
holding that he was not the victim of fraud SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim
perpetrated
by
the
vendees,
private and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. ... Such decree shall not be opened by
respondents, herein, who allegedly failed to pay reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
the purchase price of the landholdings.
judgments or decree: subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of
the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. ... (Emphasis supplied.)
only ground upon which a decree of registration may be set aside is fraud in obtaining the decree of confirmation and
registration
In the instant case, applicant-petitioner cannot complain of fraud in obtaining the decree of registration for as heretofore
stated, it was solely upon his testimony and proof that the lots were ordered registered in the names of the vendeesrespondents and it was also upon his motion that the decree of registration was issued by the lower court.
What the applicant-petitioner actually invokes in this case is not fraud in obtaining the decree of registration but the alleged
failure of the vendees-respondents to pay the purchase price of the landholdings. But as correctly held by respondent Court
of Appeals:
Breach of contract is not a ground for a petition for a review. And the registration court has no jurisdiction to decide the
contentious issue of whether or not the deed of sale, should be rescinded for the alleged failure of the vendees to pay the
purchase price. The issue on the breach of contract has to be letigated in the ordinary court.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. CA and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by NATURE: Petition to set aside the CAs Decision promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN (ABISTADO)
Resolution promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997
No. 23719.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

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FACTS:
On December 8, 1986, Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of
registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential
general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due
Decree (PD) No. 1529. (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the
process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would
Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
be legally infirm.
However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence,
However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in
substituted as applicants by his heirs.
open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
The land registration court on June 13, 1989, dismissed the petition for want
Private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which set aside the
of jurisdiction.
decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of
Teodoro Abistado.
Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution
notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the
dated November 19, 1991.
Philippines.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated the case to SC.
It was only published in the Official Gazette
The Court has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant
This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an
application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision
error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper
the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and
of general circulation.
not for certiorari under Rule 65.[9]
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982,
stating that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a ISSUE: WHETHER NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING IN AN
two-fold purpose; the first, the provision refers to publication in the Official ORIGINAL LAND REGISTRATION CASE MANDATORY.
Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, refers to publication not
only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, HELD: YES.
and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable.
As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably
necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to
assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case.
CA
Petitioner
Private respondent
That the publication for registration of Title in LRC Case Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD Contend that failure to comply with the requirement of
need not be published in a newspaper of general
1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be published
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere
circulation.
both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
procedural defect.
That other requirement of: publication in the Official
general circulation.
That publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer
Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the According to petitioner, publication in the Official
jurisdiction.
site and other conspicuous places, were complied with
Gazette is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the
and these are sufficient to notify any party who is
trial court, and xxx in xxx a newspaper of general
minded to make any objection of the application for
circulation to comply with the notice requirement
registration.
of due process.
SC
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing
xxx
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

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1. By publication. -Xxx that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the
land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may concern.' Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date
and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. Xxx publication in a newspaper
of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
Land registration is a proceeding in rem.
Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property.
An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.
This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an
application which they had no knowledge of.
The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given
notice and opportunity to oppose.
Reason: due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice
in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO v. HON. JUDGE ANDRES B.
PLAN (CFI ISABELA) and VICENCIO CAYABA
G.R. No. L-55152 August 19, 1986
FERNAN, J.:

Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Five Thousand (5,000) square meters ; and,
[c] a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of
Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (6,250) square meters.

NATURE: Petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order
challenging the two [2] orders issued by respondent judge in Land Registration
Case No. Branch 11-N-204 of the CFI Isabela, the order dated July 2, 1980,
dismissing the opposition filed by petitioners on the ground of res judicata, and
the order dated September 19, 1980, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS:
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio Valisno
purchased from the Blancos the ff:
[a] a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of

Petitioners declared the parcels of land in their name for taxation purposes and exercised
exclusive possession thereof in the concept of owners by installing as caretaker one Fermin
Lozano, who had his house built thereon.
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the
land in question by virtue of a deed of sale, ousted Fermin Lozano from possession of the
land. He subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land.
Deed of Sale: executed in his and one Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on June 30, 1967 by
the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Veran
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then CFI Isabela a complaint against
private respondent for recovery of possession of said parcels of land. Civil Case No. Branch
II-895, resolved in favor of petitioners who were declared owners thereof.

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On appeal, however, by private respondent to the then CA, the appellate

court reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the complaint of
petitioners.
Finding that the land occupied by the Cayaba has not been successfully
Identified with that described in the complaint, the instant action should
have been dismissed outright, in view of the provision of Article 434 of the
New Civil Code which reads.

Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be Identified, and the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of
the defendant's claim'.

It is undisputed that the Cayaba is the present occupant of the land, and
possesses it with a just title and he need not show or prove why he is
possessing the same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil Code].
The evidence of the appellant in the matter of Identifying the property in
question because it is a vicinity plan showing the position of the land in
relation not only to the properties adjoining the same but also with known
boundaries and landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the appellees'
evidence, particularly the description in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is
unreliable, since the area and boundaries of the property are mere
estimations, reached thru pure guess-work.

A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by petitioners before the SC was
denied due course.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, Cabaya filed before the CFI of Isabela an application
for registration in his name of the title of the lands in question, basing his entitlement on
deed of sale as well as the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R.
On April 26, 1980, Valisno filed an opposition to the application.
Cabaya, however, moved for the dismissal of said opposition on the ground that the same is
barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R.
Despite the opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court issued the
first of the assailed orders dismissing the petitioner's opposition on the ground of res
judicata.
MR denied
Hence, the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE OPPOSITION TO THE APPLICATION FILED BY PETITIONER IS BARRED BY RES
JUDICATA.
HELD: YES.

Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their briefs.
On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to amend application filed by Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr., thru counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. II-N-204, praying that he be
included as co-applicant to the land sought to be registered.

Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows the
application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient.

The opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. XXX such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners
complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorize.
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar.

For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it
must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
IN THE CASE AT BAR:
A. The decision in CA-G. R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
B. 1. There is, between the registration case under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.

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The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two
cases.
B.2. With respect to the subject matter, the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's
names.
C. The complaint in the 1st action is for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an
accion reinvidicatoria. The 2nd case is for registration of title. The two cases have identity of causes of action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis
of ownership and the same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership.
In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion
is directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same.
It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction, while the second case is being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration
court. It is enough that the court which decided the first case on the merits had validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. That both courts should
have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res judicata.

On petitioners complaint that by dismissing their opposition, respondent court had denied them their day in court. It is well to remind petitioners that they had their day in court
in Civil Case No. Branch II-895 as well as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, where their claim over the land in question was fully aired and ventilated.

The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent Cayaba [in behalf of the co-ownership] with respect to the land under consideration had been put to rest in CA-G.R. No.
60142-R. Said decision having attained finality, the same remains the law of the case between the parties.

Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing petitioners' opposition, such dismissal must be affirmed.