Association of Small Landowners v DAR Secretary

Facts:
These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform
Program. The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the provision of RA 6657
The compensation shall be paid on one of the following modes, at the option
of the landowner: (1) Cash payment,
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP
preferred

shares,

physical

assets

or

other

qualified

investments

in

accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds

regarding the modes of payment of just compensation is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the
owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money,
which is the only medium of payment allowed. RA 6657 allows the payment of just
compensation by means of LBP Bonds, Shares of Stocks in government-owned or controlled
corporations, and tax credits.
Issue: Whether or not payment of just compensation other than money is allowed
Held:
It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is
money and no other. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of
eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps
local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. Agrarian Reform
program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the
vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of
billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially
appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact

not even fully available at this time. It is assumed that the framers of the Constitution were aware
of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government.
It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed,
they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but
a less conventional if more practical method.

National Housing Authority v Allarde

Facts:
Private respondent Rufino Mateo had lived in the disputed lots since his birth in 1928. In
1959, he started farming and working on a six-hectare portion of said lots, after the death of his
father who had cultivated a thirteen-hectare portion of the same lots. On September 1, 1983, the
National Housing Authority notified the respondent spouses of the scheduled development of
the Tala Estate including the lots in question, warning them that it would not be responsible
for any damage which may be caused to the crops planted on the said lots. In 1989, private
respondent Rufino Mateo filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the award
to them of subject disputed lots under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). In
January 1992, petitioner caused the bulldozing of the ricefields of private respondents, damaging
the dikes and irrigations thereon, in the process. On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses,
relying on their claim that subject lots are agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP ,
brought before the respondent Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from bulldozing further and making
constructions on the lots under controversy. Petitioner contended that the said lots which were
previously reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for housing and resettlement purposes are not
covered by the CARP as they are not agricultural lands within the definition and contemplation
of Section 3 (c) of R. A. No. 6657.
(c) Agricultural Land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.

The RTC issued the writ.

Issue:Whether or not the disputed land is covered by CARP

Held:
Lands reserved for, or converted to, non-agricultural uses by government agencies
other than the Department of Agrarian Reform, prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No.
6657 (1988) are not considered and treated as agricultural lands and therefore, outside the
ambit of said law. Thus, since as early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate was reserved, inter alia
under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the National Housing
Authority, the same has been categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural activity
contemplated by Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore, outside the coverage of the
CARL.
Isidro v CA
Facts:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject parcel of land. In 1985,
Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner
Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land. The occupancy of a portion of said
land was subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand.
Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond.
In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the land,
but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent
effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The trial court dismissed the case because it ruled that it is an
agrarian dispute, hence not cognizable by civil courts. Private respondent appealed to the RTC
which affirmed in toto the decision of MTC. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the trial
court was reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute and hence not cognizable by civil courts

Held:
No. A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an
agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is
agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee or tenant. The law
provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural
is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a
tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such
arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship. Tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their
written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more
important.
Suplico v CA
Facts:
Isabel Tupas leased her landholding for the amount of P10, 000.00 to petitioner Enrique
P. Suplico, her brother-in-law, under a contract that was set to expire on 31 May 1982. Some
time in 1979, respondent Armada started tilling an area of 32,945 square meter of the farmland
under an agreement with Enrique Suplico. Armada undertook to till the land while Suplico agreed to
provide the farm implements and work animals.

Petitioner was to receive from the respondent 62

cavans from the palay harvest per crop yield by way of rental for the use not only of the land but
also of the work animals and a hand tractor. Private respondent resided with his family in a
farmhouse on the land. When, years later, petitioner threatened to eject respondent from the
property, the respondent initiated an action for damages and injunction against petitioner in the
Court of Agrarian Relations.
The complaint averred that respondent was the tenant-farmer of around 2.5 hectares of the
property of Isabel Tupas having been instituted as such tenant in 1979 by her administrator,
herein petitioner Enrique Suplico, to whom he religiously paid the fixed rental of 62 cavans of
palay per crop yield.

Suplico interposed the special defense that Armada was not a tenant-farmer but a seasonal hired farm
laborer with a fixed compensation, and that his services could be terminated anytime before or, at the
worst case, upon the expiration of their contract in May 1982. Suplico added that Armada unlawfully
appropriated for himself the whole produce of the first yield for the crop year 1982-83 .
Isabel Tupas, represented by her attorney-in- fact Lolita T. Suplico (sister of Isabel and the wife of
Enrique P. Suplico) alleged that she had no contractual relationship with Armada nor did she impliedly
tolerate his continued possession of the land. She prayed that Armada be ejected from her landholding. [
Isabel Tupas donated the whole property to her sister, Lolita T. Suplico, and her nephews, Enrique
Suplico, Jr., and David Suplico

On 18 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision declaring private respondent a bona
fide agricultural lessee. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is a tenant of the subject land
Held:
Tenancy did exist between the parties. Firstly, private respondent was in actual
possession of the land, and he there resided, with his family, in a farmhouse just like what a farm
tenant normally would. Secondly, private respondent and his wife were personally doing the
farm work of plowing, planting, weeding and harvesting the area. The occasional and temporary
hiring of persons outside of the immediate household, so long as the tenant himself had control
in the farmwork, was not essentially opposed to the status of tenancy. Thirdly, the management
of the farm was left entirely to private respondent who defrayed the cultivation expenses.
Fourthly, private respondent shared the harvest of the land, depositing or delivering to petitioner
Enrique Suplico the agreed 62 cavans of palay per crop yield.

Bejasa v CA
Facts:

On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her

attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the disputed land. On October 26, 1984,
Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaimes
wife with a term of one year. On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of
P15, 000.00 in consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyawnabunga" agreement, with a term of
one year. After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victorias demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas
continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in the form of
rent or a shared harvest. On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery
of damages against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan, amd the trial court ruled in favour
of the Bejasas. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the owner and the Bejasas
Held:
The elements of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. Candelaria and
the Bejasas, between them, there is no tenancy relationship but a lease. Candelaria as
landowner never gave her consent. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil
law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did.

Almuete v Andres

Facts:
The subject property was awarded by the then National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) to petitioner Rodrigo Almuete. He and his family farmed the subject
property peacefully and exclusively for some twenty-two years. On August 17, 1979, an
Agrarian Reform Technologist filed a field investigation and inspection report stating that the
whereabouts of Rodrigo Almuete, was unknown and that he had waived all his rights as a
NARRA settler due to his poor health beyond his control and financial hardship. The
technologist also stated therein that the actual occupant of the land is Marcelo Andres since April
1967 to date. Thereafter, a homestead patent was issued in favour of Andres. Marcelo Andres
gained control, and took possession, of approximately half of the subject property. Consequently,
Rodrigo Almuete and his daughter, Ana Almuete, filed an action for reconveyance and recovery
of possession against Marcelo Andres with the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela which
rendered a decision in favour of Almuete. On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared the decision
of the trial court NULL and VOID because the case is an agrarian dispute, hence it falls within
the jurisdiction of DARAB.
Issue:
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case. Who has a better right or the
owner.
Held:
The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The following elements are indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship:(1) The
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;(2) The subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land;(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;(4)
The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;(5) There is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and(6) The harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. The Court of Appeals gravely erred when it
granted the petition for certiorari and held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action between petitioners and respondent since there is no tenancy relationship
between them. The action filed by petitioners was cognizable by the regular courts.

Monzanto v Zerna
Facts:
Spouses Jesus and Teresita Zerna were charged with qualified theft for stealing the
coconut harvests from the plantation of petitioner Monzanto. The spouses were the overseer
of the land owned by the petitioner. After trial on the merits, the RTC acquitted them of the
charge. The total proceeds of the copra sale alleged in the Information were P6, 262.50.
However, the awarded amount was only P5, 162.50 which was deposited by private respondents
with the barangay secretary on March 2, 1995, after deducting P340 for harvesting cost and P760
for labor cost. Thus, petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration praying that the
remaining sum of P1, 100 be returned to her. In its September 4, 1996 Order, the trial court
granted the Motion and ordered private respondents to return the amount of P1, 100.10. On
appeal, CA ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order private respondents to pay
petitioner the amount of P1, 100 because the dispute involved an agricultural tenancy
relationship; the matter fell within the jurisdiction of DARAB.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of the civil liability in this case is agrarian in nature
Held:
An agrarian dispute existed between the parties. First, the subject of the dispute between
them was the taking of coconuts from the property owned by petitioner. Second, private
respondents were the overseers of the property at the time of the taking of the coconuts. A
tenurial arrangement exists among herein parties as regards the harvesting of the agricultural
products, as shown by the several remittances made by private respondents to petitioner. These
are substantiated by receipts. In any event, their being overseers does not foreclose their being
also tenants.

Alita v CA
Facts:
Private respondents' predecessors-in-interest acquired the subject parcel of lands through
homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private respondents
herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate,
relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316. On June 18, 1981, private respondents
instituted a complaint for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions
and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to lands obtained through
homestead law. The RTC dismissed the complaint but on motion for reconsideration it
declared that P.D. 27 is not applicable to homestead lands. On appeal to the CA, the decision
of the RTC was sustained.
Issue:
Whether or not lands acquired through homestead law are covered by CARP
Held:
Petitioners is correct in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping
social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the
Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the
enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Philippine
Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the
tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. Provided, that the original homestead
grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.

Daez v CA
Facts:
Eudosia Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa,
Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents MacarioSoriente, Rogelio
Macatulad, ApolonioMediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said
land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 as
amended by Letter of Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed under duress by
the respondents, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers, Eudosia Daez
applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as
well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. The application of the
petitioner was denied. Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having
been finally denied her, EudosiaDaez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland,
this time under R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Regional Director allowed Daez to retain the subject
land but the DAR Secretary reversed that decision. She appealed to the Office of the President
which ruled in her favour. Respondents appealed to the CA which reversed the decision of the
Office of the President.
Issue:
Whether or not the denial of application for exemption under PD 27 would bar an application for
retention under RA 6657
Held:
The requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and
those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowners right of retention are
different. Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for
retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does
not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment

to the application filed by EudosiaDaez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland,
even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final
and executory.

Paris v Alfeche
Facts:
Petitioner is the registered owner of two parcels of land situated at Paitan, Quezon,
Bukidnon. The said parcels are fully tenanted by private respondents herein who are recipients of
Emancipation Patents in their names pursuant to Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27.
Petitioner alleged that she owns one of the subject property as original homestead grantee who
still owned the same when Republic Act No. 6657 was approved, thus she is entitled to retain the
area to the exclusion of her tenants. The Adjudicator a quo rendered a decision in favour of the
petitioner but that decision was reversed by DARAB. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court
rejected the claim of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act are automatically
exempted from the operation of land reform
Held:
Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the
original homesteads, only for "as long as they continue to cultivate" them. That parcels of
land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt them from the operation of
land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage.

Republic v CA

Facts:
Private respondent is the owner of the five parcels of land in issue which have a
combined area of approximately 112.0577 hectares situated at Barangay Punta, Municipality of
Jala-Jala, Rizal. The tax declarations classified the properties as agricultural. On June 16, 1994,
petitioner DAR issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory
acquisition pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II of R.A. 6657. On July 21, 1994, private respondent
filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the land from agrarian
reform. Private respondent alleged that the property should be exempted since it is within the
residential and forest conservation zones of the town zoning ordinance of Jala-Jala. On October
19, 1995, the DAR Secretary issued an Order denying the application for exemption of private
respondent. On appeal to the CA, the decision of DAR was reversed. Petitioner DAR maintains
that the subject properties have already been classified as agricultural based on the tax
declarations.
Issue:
Whether or not the land classification on tax declarations are conclusive
Held:
There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in a tax
declaration is conclusive and final, nor would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax
declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land. In fact, DAR
Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be
submitted when applying for exemption from CARP.

Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v Secretary of DAR

Facts:

Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc.

and petitioner-in-intervention Archies Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna are engaged in the
aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16
(d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in
Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional. they contend that R.A. 6657, by including in
its coverage, the raising of fish and aquaculture operations including fishponds and prawn ponds,
treating them as in the same class or classification as agriculture or farming violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution and is, therefore void. During the debates of the
Constitutional Commission, it shows that the intent of the constitutional framers is to exclude
industrial lands, to which category lands devoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farms
belong.
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v CA
Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner of two
parcels of land with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are
watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community. Petitioner alleged
that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem.
Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court
seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim,
however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents. After the filing of the ejectment
cases, respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform for the compulsory acquisition
of the SRRDC property under the CARP. The landholding of SRRDC was placed under
compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of the property
contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in
terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were
not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled against the petitioner. On appeal the
CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.
Issue:

Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire
property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657
Held:
Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. We
cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be
protected for watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of
water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but
cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now.

Issue:
Whether or not fishponds and prawn ponds are included in the coverage of CARL
Held:
On February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7881 was approved by Congress amending
some provisions of RA 6657. The provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and
prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question
concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and academic with
the passage of R.A. No. 7881.