TRANSPORTATION LAW

SY 2015-2016
I.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Governing Laws
1. New Civil Code Primary law
2. Warsaw Convention for international transportation by air
3. Code of Commerce governs suppletorily; it governs
maritime transaction
4. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act for transportation by sea;
governs suppletorily
5. Salvage Law
6. Public Service Act
7. Article XII Sec 11 on operation of public convenience of the
1987 Philippine Constitution
Domestic/inter-island/coastwise
Applicable to Land, Water, and Air transportation
1. Civil Code - primary
2. Code of Commerce (Arts. 349, 379, 573-734, 580, 806845) suppletory
International/foreign/overseas (Foreign country to Philippines)
-

Applicable to Water/maritime and Air transportation

The law of the country of destination generally applies.
1. Civil Code primary
2. Code of Commerce suppletory
3. Others - suppletory
a. Water/maritime: Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)
b. Air: Warsaw Convention
B. Concept of Public Utility & public service
Sec. 13 (b) of the Public Service Act provides that: The
term 'public service' includes every person that now or
hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the
Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited
clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and
done for general business purposes, any common carrier,
railroad, street railway, traction railway, sub-way motor
vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both with or without
fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or
carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or
steamship line, pontines, ferries, and water craft, engaged in

the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard,

marine railway, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant,
ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas electric
light, heat and power, water supply and power, petroleum,
sewerage system, wire or wireless communications system,
wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public
services: Provided, however, That a person engaged in
agriculture, not otherwise a public service, who owns a motor
vehicle and uses it personally and/or enters into a special
contract whereby said motor vehicle is offered for hire or
compensation to a third party or third engaged in agriculture,
not itself or themselves a public service, for operation by the
latter for a limited time and for a specific purpose directly
connected with the cultivation of his or their farm, the
transportation, processing, and marketing of agricultural
products of such third party or third parties shall not be
considered as operating a public service for the purposes of
this Act.
Public utilities are privately owned and operated business
whose services are essential to the general public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------JG Summit Holdings vs Court of Appeals
GR No. 124293 September 24, 2003
FACTS: National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and
Kawasaki Heavy Industries entered into a Joint Venture Agreement in a
shipyard business named PHILSECO, with a shareholding of 60-40
respectively. NIDCs interest was later transferred to the National
Government.
Pursuant to President Aquinos Proclamation No.5, which established the
Committee on Privatization (COP) and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), and
allowed for the disposition of the governments non-performing assets, the
latter allowed Kawasaki Heavy Industries to choose a company to which it
has stockholdings, to top the winning bid of JG Summit Holdings over
PHILSECO. JG Summit protested alleging that such act would effectively
increase Kawasakis interest in PHILSECOa shipyard is a public utility--and
thus violative of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents act is valid.
HELD: No. A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided
by law, the following provision of the Article XII of the Constitution applies:

Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for

the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive
in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in
public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors
in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to
their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing
officers of such corporation or association shall be citizens of the
Philippines.
Notably, paragraph 1.4 of the JVA accorded the parties the right of first
refusal under the same terms. This phrase implies that when either party
exercises the right of first refusal under paragraph 1.4, they can only do so
to the extent allowed them by paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of the JVA or under
the proportion of 60%-40% of the shares of stock. Thus, should the NIDC
opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only exercise
its right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of stock would not
exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock of SNS or PHILSECO. The NIDC, on
the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares. As a
government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned
corporation, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond
60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign
capitalization.
National Development Company vs Court of Appeals
164 SCRA 593
Facts:
In accordance with a memorandum entered into between
defendants National Development Company (NDC) and Maritime Company
of the Philippines (MCP) on September 13, 1962, defendant NDC as the first
preferred mortgagee of three ocean-going vessels including one the name
Doa Nati appointed defendant MCP as its agent to manage and operate
said vessels in its behalf.The E. Phillipp Corporation of the New York loaded
on board the vessel Doa Nati at San Francisco, California, a total of
1,200 bales of American raw cotton consigned to Manila Banking
Corporation, Manila and the Peoples Bank and Trust Company acting for
and in behalf of the Pan Asiatic Commercial Company, Inc., who represents
Riverside Mills Corporation.The vessel figured in a collision at Ise Bay, Japan
with a japanese vessel as a result of which 550 bales of aforesaid cargo
were lost and/or destroyed The damage and lost cargo was worth
P344,977.86 which amount, the plaintiff Development Insurance and

Surety Corporation as insurer, paid to the Riverside Mills Corporation as

holder of the negotiable bills of lading duly endorsed.The insurer filed
before the CFI of Manila an action for the recovery of said amount from
NDC and MCP.
Issue:
Whether or not the law of country or port of destination shall apply.
Held:
In Easter Shipping Lines, Inc., v. IAC, 150 SCRA 469 (1987), we
held under similar circumstances that the law of the country to which the
goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in
case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. Thus, the rule was
specifically laid down that for cargoes transported from Japan to the
Philippines, the liability of the carrier is governed primarily by the Civil
Code and in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and
obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce
and by especial laws (Article 1766, Civil Code). Hence, the carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the provisions of
the Civil Code. The goods in question were being transported from San
Francisco, California and Tokyo, Japan to the Philippines and that they were
lost or damaged due to a collision which was found to have been caused by
negligence or fault of both captains of the colliding vessels.Under the
above ruling, it is evident that laws of the Philippines will apply, and it is
immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise
Bay, Japan. It appears, however, that collision falls among matters not
specifically regulated by the Civil Code, so that no reversible error can be
found in respondent courts application to the case at bar of Articles
826 to 839, Book Three of the Code of Commerce, which deal exclusively
with collision of vessels. Article 826 of the Code of Commerce provides that
where collision is imputable to the personnel of a vessel, the owner of the
vessel at fault shall indemnify the losses and damages incurred after an
expert appraisal. But more in point to the instant case in is Article 827 of
the same Code, which provides that if the collision is imputable to both
vessels, each one shall suffer its own damages and both shall be solidarily
responsible for the losses and damages suffered by their cargoes.There is,
therefore, no room for NDCs interpretation that the Code of Commerce
should apply only to domestic trade and not to foreign trade.MCP next
contends that it cannot be liable solidarily with NDC because it is merely
the manager and operator of the vessel Doa Nati, nor a ship agent. As
the general managing agent, according, to MCP, it can only be liable if it
acted in excess of its authority. The Memorandum Agreement of September
13, 1962 shows that NDC appointed MCP as agent, a term broad enough to
include the concept of ship agent in Maritime Law. In fact, MCP was even
conferred all the powers of the owner of the vessel, including the power to
contract in the name of the NDC. Consequently, under the circumstances,
MCP cannot escape liability. It is well-settled that both the owner and agent

of the offending vessel are liable for the damage done where both are
impleaded.
Tatad Vs Garcia Jr. 243
SCRA 436
Facts:
EDSA LRT Consortium, a foreign corporation, was awarded with the
construction of Light Rail Transit III (LRT III) as the only bidder who has
qualified with the requirements provided by the PBAC. The said foreign
corporation will construct the LRT III in a Built-Lease-Transfer agreement
that such public utility will be leased by the government through the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and then it
would be subsequently sold by the corporation to the government. An
objection was raised by the petitioner stating that the awarding of the bid
to the said corporation is against the Constitution. It was provided in the
Constitution that only Filipinos are entitled to operate a public utility such
as the LRT III.
Issue:
Whether or not the awarding of the bid to EDSA LRT Consortium is
against the Constitution.
Held:
The Court held that there is a distinction in the operation of a
public utility and ownership in the facilities and equipment to serve the
public. The EDSA LRT Consortium fall under the latter because the said
corporation will not operate the public utility. The said corporation will only
own the facilities and equipment such as the train carts, the railings and
the booths. In addition, such ownership will then be subsequently
transferred to the government under Built-Lease-Transfer agreement.
With that said, the operation of the public utility will fall to the Filipinos
through its government. Therefore, the awarding of the bid to EDSA LRT
Consortium is not against the provisions of the Constitution.

C. Constitutional Limitations on Operation of public Utilities

(Art XII 1987 Constitution)
Sec. 11 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that: No
franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws
of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization
be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither

shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition
that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any
public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in
its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such
corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines.
The corporation must be a domestic corporation and that 60% of the
capital must be owned by Filipino citizens.
Sec. 18 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that: The State
may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and
operate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation,
transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the Government.
Q: What are the bases/reasons for regulation of public utilities?
A: Basis: Police Power
Justification: Common good
D. Concept of Franchise: Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity vs Certificate of Public Convenience
-

Franchise is a grant or privilege from the sovereign power.

Certificate of Public Convenience An authorization issued by
the appropriate government agency for the operation of public
services for which no franchise, either municipal or legislative, is
required by law, e.g., common carriers.
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity An
authorization issued by the appropriate government agency for the
operation of public service for which a prior franchise is required by
law; e.g. telephone and other services.

Q: Is a legislative franchise necessary before a public utility can be

allowed to secure a certificate of public convenience?
A: General Rule: NO.
Exception: If a pertinent law requires such legislative franchise.
Factors:
1. Public interest
2. Public convenience
3. Public necessity

Q: What conditions must concur in the grant of certificate of public

convenience and necessity?
A: REQUREMENTS FOR GRANTING CPC OR CPCN
1. Applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines or a corporation
or entity 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens;
2. Applicant must prove public necessity;
3. Applicant must prove that the operation of the public service
proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the
public interest on a proper and suitable manner;
4. Applicant must have sufficient financial capability to undertake
the proposed services and meeting the responsibilities incident
to its operation.
In Tatad v Garcia, the SC held that the controlling factor is the
citizenship of the person operating a common carrier.
Guiding Principles:
1. Prior or Old Operator Rule the first licensee will be
protected in his investment and will not be subjected to
ruinous competition.
*No certificate of public convenience and necessity will be
issued to other operator as long as the prior operator still
in operation and can satisfy the public and that it still has
the capacity to do so.
2. Protection Investment Rule protects from unfair
competition
3. Prior Applicant Rule protects the first applicant.
Principle: all things being equal
*Public interest is the first and paramount consideration.

II. GENERAL CONCEPTS

A. Contract of Transportation in General
Transportation is a contract whereby a person, natural or juridical,
obligates to transport persons, goods, or both, from one place to
another, by land, air, or water, for a price or commission.
*Importance: For liability purposes

B. Perfection
1. Contract to carry (Consensual)
agreement to carry the passenger at some future date
consensual contract and perfected by mere consent
e.g. Aircraft - perfected even without issuance of ticket as long
as there was already meeting of minds with respect to the
subject matter and consideration
2. Contract of Carriage (Real)
not until the facilities of the carrier are actually used can the
carrier be said to have assumed the obligation of the carrier
perfected by actual use
e.g. Aircraft - perfected if it was established that the passenger
had checked in at the departure counter, passed through
customs and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus and
proceeded to the ramp of the aircraft and baggage already
loaded to the aircraft.
Public Utility Bus or Jeepneys or Street Cars once it stops it is in
effect making a continuous offer to riders; perfected when passenger is
already attempting to board the vehicle
Trains perfected when a person:
a. purchased a ticket/ possess sufficient fare with which to pay
for his passage
b. presented himself at the proper place and in a proper
manner to be transported
c. has a bona fide intention to use facilities of the carrier

British Airways vs Court of Appeals

218 SCRA 699
FACTS: On April 6, 1989, Mahtani decided to visit his relative in Bombay, India.
In anticipation of his visit, he obtained the services of a certain Mr. Gemar to
prepare his travel plan. Since british Airways had no ticket flights from Manila
to Bombay, Maktani had to take a connecting flight to Bombay on board British
Airways. Prior to his departure, Maktani checked in the PAL counter in Manila
his two pieces of luggage containing his clothing and personal effects,
confident that upon reaching Hong Kong, the same would be transferred to the
BA flight bound for Bombay, Unfortunately, when Maktani arrived in Bombay,
he discovered that his luggage was missing and that upon inquiry from the BA

representatives, he was told that the same might have been diverted to
London. After plaintiff waiting for his luggage for one week, BA finally advised
him to file a claim accomplishing the property
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant BA is liable for compulsory damages and
attorneys fee, as well as the dismissal of its third party complaint against PAL
HELD: The contract of transportation was exclusively between Maktani and
BA. The latter merely endorsing the Manila to Hong Kong log of the formers
journey to PAL, as its subcontractor or agent. Conditions of contacts was one of
continuous air transportation from Manila to Bombay. The Court of Appeals
should have been cognizant of the well-settled rule that an agent is also
responsible for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable
for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act.
Since the instant petition was based on breach of contract of carriage, Maktani
can only sue BA and not PAL, since the latter was not a party in the contract.

III. Common Carrier

1. Statutory Definition (Art 1732, NCC)
Article 1732 of the New Civil Code provides that: Common carriers
are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public.
-

one that holds itself out as ready to engage in the transportation of

goods for hire as a public employment and not as a casual
occupation.
Implications being a common carrier:
a. extraordinary diligence must be exercised
b. in case of damage, presumption of negligence on the part of the
common carrier
It is the activity of the carrier that is controlling.
The fact that there is no license at the time of the incident happen is of
no moment for liability purposes
2. Distinguished from private carrier
Common Carrier

Private Carrier

As
to
availability:
As
to
required
diligence:
As
to
regulation:
Stipulation
limiting
liability:

Exempting
circumstanc
e:
Presumptio
n
of
Negligence:
Governing
law:

holds himself out

for
all
people
indiscriminately
Extraordinary
diligence
is
required
Subject to state
regulation
Parties may not
agree on limiting
the
carriers
liability
except
when provided by
law
Prove
extraordinary
diligence
and
Article 1734 NCC
There
is
a
presumption
of
fault or negligence
Law on common
carriers

Contracts with particular

individuals or groups
only
Ordinary
diligence
is
required
Not subject to state
regulation
Parties may limit the
carriers
liability,
provided
it
is
not
contrary to law, morals
or good customs
Caso
fortuito,
1174 NCC

Article

No presumption of fault
or negligence
Law on obligations and
contracts

3. Distinguished from towage, arrastre, stevedoring

Towage

Arrastre

Stevedoring

One
vessel
is
hired
to
bring
another vessel to
another
place;
refers to a service
rendered
to
a
vessel by towing
for
the
mere
purpose
of
expediting
her
voyage
without
reference to any
circumstances of

The functions of an
arrastre operator has
nothing to do with
the
trade
and
business
of
navigation, nor to
the use or operation
of vessels. He is no
different from that of
a
depositary
or
warehouseman.

The function
of stevedores
involves the
loading
and
unloading of
coastwise
vessels calling
at the port.

danger.
The SC held that the following services are not considered a common
carrier:
1) Purely arrastre services -comparable to that as warehouseman
and depositor
2) Purely stevedoring services; and
3) Purely towage services.
In Crisostomo v CA, the SC held that the respondent being a travel
agency is not a common carrier because the services offered is not one
that carries passenger from one place to another.
4. Tests to determine common carrier
a. He must engaged in the business of carrying goods for others
as a public employment and must hold himself out as ready to
engage in the transportation of goods for person generally as a
business and not as a casual occupation;
b. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his
business is confined;
c. He must undertake to carry by the method by which his
business is conducted and over his established roads;
d. The transportation must be for hire
True Test of Common Carrier Is the carriage of passengers or
goods, provided it has space, for all who opt to avail themselves of its
transportation service for a fee
5. Parties to a contract of carriage
1. CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS
Common carrier & Passenger (carried gratuitously or not)
Passenger one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue
of contract, express or implied, with the carrier as to the
payment of fare or that which is accepted as an equivalent
thereof.

2. CARRIAGE OF GOODS
Parties: shipper & carrier

Shipper the person who delivers the goods to the carrier for
transportation; pays the consideration or on whose behalf
payment is made
Consignee person to whom the goods are to be delivered.
May be the shipper himself or a third person who is not actually
a party to the contract.

________________________________________________________________________
De Guzman vs Court of Appeals
168 SCRA 612
Facts:
Herein respondent Ernesto Cendana was engaged in buying up
used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. Normally, after collection
respondent would bring such material to Manila for resale. He utilized (2)
two six-wheelers trucks which he owned for the purpose. Upon returning to
Pangasinan, he would load his vehicle with cargo belonging to different
merchants to different establishments in Pangasisnan which respondents
charged a freight fee for.
Sometime in November 1970, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman,
a merchant and dealer of General Milk Company Inc. in Pangasinan
contracted with respondent for hauling 750 cartons of milk. Unfortunately,
only 150 cartons made it, as the other 600 cartons were intercepted by
hijackers along Marcos Highway. Hence, petitioners commenced an action
against private respondent.
In his defense, respondent argued that he cannot be held liable
due to force majuere, and that he is not a common carrier and hence is not
required to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent can be held liable for loss of the
cartons of milk due to force majeure.
2. Whether or not respondent is a common carrier.
Held:
1.

The court ruled the affirmative. The circumstances do not fall

under the exemption from liability as enumerated in Article 1734
of the Civil Code. The general rule is established by the article that
common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods which they carry, unless the same is due
to any of the following causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural
disasters;
b. Act of the public enemy, whether international or civil;

c.
d.
e.
2.

Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

Character of the goods or defects in the packing;
Order or act of competent public authority.

The court ruled the affirmative. Article 1732 of the New Civil Code
avoids any distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both and one who
does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. It also avoids a
distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
services on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such
services on an occasional, episodic, and unscheduled basis.

First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs Court of Appeals

300 SCRA 661
Facts:
Herein petitioner applied for a mayors permit to operate its
pipeline concession. Before such permit was issued, the City treasurer
required petitioner to pay local tax. In order not to hamper its operations,
petitioner paid the tax under protest.
Then the petitioner filed a letter protest addressed to the treasurer
claiming exemption from payment of the tax because according to the
Local Government Code of 1991, transportation contractors are not
included in the enumeration of contractors which are liable to pay taxes.
The city treasurer denied the protest. The petitioner filed a case before the
trial court for tax refund, however it was subsequently dismissed. Hence,
this petition.

In the case at bar, the court categorically ruled that the

transporting of oil through pipelines is still considered to be an activity of a
common carrier. The petitioner is a common carrier because it is engaged
in the business of transporting passengers or goods; like petroleum. It
undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently. The fact that the petitioner
has limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of common
carrier. Under the petroleum act of the Philippines, the petitioner is
considered a common carrier even if it is a pipeline concessionaire.
And even as regards the petroleum operation, it is of public utility.
Specifically, the Bureau of Internal Revenue considers petitioners as
common carrier not subject to withholding tax.

FGU Insurance Corporation vs GPP Sarmiento Truckinh

GR No, 141910 August 6, 2002
Facts:
GPS is an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries,
Inc. One day, it was to deliver certain goods of Concepcion Industries, Inc.
aboard one of its trucks. On its way, the truck collided with an unidentified
truck, resulting in damage to the cargoes. FGU, insurer of the shipment
paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc. the amount of the damage and filed a
suit against GPS. GPS filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prove that it
was a common carrier.
Issue: Whether or not GPS falls under the category of a common carrier.
Held:

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is a common carrier as contemplated
to be exempted under the law.
Held:
The court rules the affirmative. The court enunciated the (4) tests
in determining whether the carrier is that of a common carrier:
a. must be engaged int eh business of carrying goods for other
as a public employment and must hold itself out as ready to
engage in the transportation of goods generally as a business
and not a casual occupation
b. it must undertake to carry goods of the kind which its business
is confined;
c. it must undertake the method by which his business is
conducted and over its established roads;
d. the transportation must be for hire.

Note that GPS is an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion

Industries, Inc. offering its service to no other individual or entity. A
common carrier is one which offers its services whether to the public in
general or to a limited clientele in particular but never on an exclusive
basis. Therefore, GPS does not fit the category of a common carrier
although it is not freed from its liability based on culpa contractual.

Everett Stearnship Vs CA
297 SCRA 496

Facts:

Hernandez Trading Co., respondent herein, imported 3 crates of

bus spare parts from its supplier, Maruman Trading Company, Ltd., a
foreign corporation based in Japan. The crates were shipped from Japan to
Manila on board "ADELFAEVERETTE," a vessel owned by the principal of the
petitioner herein, Everett Orient Lines. The said crates were covered by Bill
of Lading No. NGO53MN. The vessel arrived in Manila and it was discovered
that the one crate was missing. This was confirmed and admitted by
petitioner in its letter of January 13, 1992 addressed to private respondent,
which thereafter made a formal claim upon petitioner for the value of the
lost cargo amounting to One Million Five Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Five
Hundred (Y1,552,500.00) Yen, the amount shown in an Invoice No. MTM941, dated November 14, 1991. However, petitioner offered to pay only
One Hundred Thousand (Y100,000.00) Yen, the maximum amount
stipulated under Clause 18 of the covering bill of lading which limits the
liability of petitioner. Respondent rejected the offer and filed a case to
collect payment for the loss against the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the actual value and not
the maximum value recoverable under the bill of lading.

Held:
A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of the common carrier
for the loss, damages of cargo to a certain sum, unless the shipper declares
or a higher value is sanctioned by law, particularly Articles 1749 and 1780
of the Civil Code. The stipulations in the bill of lading are reasonable and
just. In the bill of lading, the carrier made it clear that its liability would only
be up to Y100,000.00 (Yen). However, the shipper, Maruman Trading, had
the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher
than the limited liability of the carrier. Considering that the shipper did not
declare a higher valuation, it had itself to blame for not complying with the
stipulations. The trial courts decision that private respondent could not
have fairly agreed to the limited liability clause in the bill of lading because
the said condition were printed in small letters does not make the bill of
lading invalid.

Spouses Cruz vs Sun Holidays Inc.

GR No. 186312, June 29, 2010
Facts:
Spouses Dante and Leonora Cruz (petitioners) lodged a Complaint on
January 25, 2001 against Sun Holidays, Inc. (respondent) with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City for damages arising from the death of their
son Ruelito C. Cruz (Ruelito) who perished with his wife on September 11,
2000 on board the boat M/B Coco Beach III that capsized en route to
Batangas from Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro where the couple had
stayed at Coco Beach Island Resort (Resort) owned and operated by
respondent.
On September 11, 2000, as it was still windy, Matute and 25 other
Resort guests including petitioners son and his wife trekked to the other
side of the Coco Beach mountain that was sheltered from the wind where
they boarded M/B Coco Beach III, which was to ferry them to Batangas.
Shortly after the boat sailed, it started to rain. As it moved farther away
from Puerto Galera and into the open seas, the rain and wind got stronger,
causing the boat to tilt from side to side and the captain to step forward to
the front, leaving the wheel to one of the crew members.
The waves got more unwieldy. After getting hit by two big waves which
came one after the other, M/B Coco Beach III capsized putting all
passengers underwater. The passengers, who had put on their life jackets,
struggled to get out of the boat. Upon seeing the captain, Matute and the
other passengers who reached the surface asked him what they could do to
save the people who were still trapped under the boat. The captain replied
"Iligtas niyo na lang ang sarili niyo" (Just save yourselves).
Help came after about 45 minutes when two boats owned by Asia Divers in
Sabang, Puerto Galera passed by the capsized M/B Coco Beach III. Boarded
on those two boats were 22 persons, consisting of 18 passengers and four
crew members, who were brought to Pisa Island. Eight passengers,
including petitioners son and his wife, died during the incident.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is a common carrier.
Held: The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:
Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting

passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,

offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who
does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a
sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular
or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic
or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a
carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business
only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article
1733 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.
Indeed, respondent is a common carrier. Its ferry services are so
intertwined with its main business as to be properly considered ancillary
thereto. The constancy of respondents ferry services in its resort
operations is underscored by its having its own Coco Beach boats. And the
tour packages it offers, which include the ferry services, may be availed of
by anyone who can afford to pay the same. These services are thus
available to the public.
That respondent does not charge a separate fee or fare for its ferry
services is of no moment. It would be imprudent to suppose that it provides
said services at a loss. The Court is aware of the practice of beach resort
operators offering tour packages to factor the transportation fee in arriving
at the tour package price. That guests who opt not to avail of respondents
ferry services pay the same amount is likewise inconsequential. These
guests may only be deemed to have overpaid.

Purpose of this rule: easy identification of the owner to be sued for

liability.
Recourse: Registered owner may bring the case to the court to sue
the buyer or operator of the vehicle at fault.
Exception: in case of stolen vehicle registered owner is not liable.
In the case of Duavit v CA, the SC held that the registered owner is not
liable if the vehicle was taken from his garage without his
knowledge or consent. To hold the registered owner liable would be
absurd as it would be holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle
for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle.
Kabit System is an arrangement whereby a person who has been
granted a certificate of public convenience allows other persons
who own motor vehicles to operate them under his license,
sometimes for a fee or percentage of the earnings.
Kabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy
and therefore void and inexistent under Article 1409 of the New
Civil Code.
If the registered owner and the buyer entered into this transaction they
are In pari delicto thus, in case something happen the court will not aid
them. The court will leave them as they were.
This arrangement is a circumvention of the requirement for license.

Erezo Vs Jepte
102 Phil 103
D.

Registered Owner Rule and Kabit System (relate to

concept of Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
and Certiificate of Public Convenience)

General Rule: Registered owner rule is applicable in this jurisdiction.

Registered owner rule - states that the person who is the registered
owner of a vehicle is liable for any damages caused by the
negligent operation of the vehicle although the same was already
sold or conveyed to another person at the time of the accident.
The registered owner is liable to the injured party subject to his
right of recourse against the transferee or the buyer.

Facts:
Defendant-appellant is the registered owner of a six by six truck
bearing. On August, 9, 1949, while the same was being driven by Rodolfo
Espino y Garcia, it collided with a taxicab at the intersection of San Andres
and Dakota Streets, Manila. As the truck went off the street, it hit Ernesto
Erezo and another, and the former suffered injuries, as a result of which he
died.
The driver was prosecuted for homicide through reckless negligence. The
accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to
pay the heirs of Ernesto Erezo the sum of P3,000. As the amount of the

judgment could not be enforced against him, plaintiff brought this action
against the registered owner of the truck, the defendant-appellant.

essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties, but to permit
the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public

The defendant does not deny at the time of the fatal accident the cargo
truck driven by Rodolfo Espino y Garcia was registered in his name. He,
however, claims that the vehicle belonged to the Port Brokerage, of which
he was the broker at the time of the accident. He explained, and his
explanation was corroborated by Policarpio Franco, the manager of the
corporation, that the trucks of the corporation were registered in his name
as a convenient arrangement so as to enable the corporation to pay the
registration fee with his backpay as a pre-war government employee.
Franco, however, admitted that the arrangement was not known to the
Motor Vehicle Office.

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if
any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicles on the public highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a
definite individual, the registered owner. A registered owner who has
already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party
complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for the

The trial court held that as the defendant-appellant represented himself to

be the owner of the truck and the Motor Vehicle Office, relying on his
representation, registered the vehicles in his name, the Government and all
persons affected by the representation had the right to rely on his
declaration of ownership and registration. It, therefore, held that the
defendant-appellant is liable because he cannot be permitted to repudiate
his own declaration.
Issue: WoN Jepte should be liable to Erezo for the injuries occasioned to
the latter because of the negligence of the driver even if he was no longer
the owner of the vehicle at the time of the damage (because he had
previously sold it to another)
Held:
YES. The registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is
primarily responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiffappellee, but he (defendant-appellant) has a right to be indemnified by the
real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as
damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff-appellant
The Revised Motor Vehicle Law provides that no vehicle may be used or
operated upon any public highway unless the same is properly registered.
Not only are vehicles to be registered and that no motor vehicles are to be
used or operated without being properly registered for the current year, but
that dealers in motor vehicles shall furnish the Motor Vehicles Office a
report showing the name and address of each purchaser of motor vehicle
during the previous month and the manufacturer's serial number and
motor number.
Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by
which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases,
because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any

damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle.

Lim vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Private respondent herein purchased an Isuzu passenger jeepney
from Gomercino Vallarta, a holder of a certificate of public convenience for
the operation of a public utility vehicle. He continued to operate the public
transport business without transferring the registration of the vehicle to his
name. Thus, the original owner remained to be the registered owner and
operator of the vehicle. Unfortunately, the vehicle got involved in a road
mishap which caused it severe damage. The ten-wheeler-truck which
caused the accident was owned by petitioner Lim and was driven by copetitioner Gunnaban. Gunnaban admitted responsibility for the accident, so
that petitioner Lim shouldered the costs of hospitalization of those
wounded, compensation for the heirs of the deceased passenger and the
restoration of the other vehicle involved. He also negotiated for the repair
of the private respondent's jeepney but the latter refused and demanded
for its replacement. Hence, private respondent filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners. Meanwhile, the jeepney was left by the
roadside to corrode and decay. The trial court decided in favor of private
respondent and awarded him his claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, petitioner filed this petition.
Issue: WoN the new owner of a passenger jeepney who continued to
operate the same under the so-called kabit system and in the course
thereof met an accident has the legal personality to bring the action for
damages against the erring vehicle.
Held: YES. According to the Court, the thrust of the law in enjoining the
kabit system is not much as to penalize the parties but to identify the
person upon whom responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with
the end view of protecting the riding public. In the present case, it is once
apparent that the evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit system
does not exist. First, neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is

being held liable for damages. Second, the case arose from the negligence
of another vehicle in using the public road to whom no representation, or
misrepresentation, as regards the ownership and operation of the
passenger jeepney was made and to whom no such representation, or
misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus it cannot be said that private
respondent Gonzales and the registered owner of the jeepney were in
estoppel for leading the public to believe that the jeepney belonged to the
registered owner. Third, the riding public was not bothered nor
inconvenienced at the very least by the illegal arrangement. On the
contrary, it was private respondent himself who had been wronged and
was seeking compensation for the damage done to him. Certainly, it would
be the height of inequity to deny him his right. Hence, the private
respondent has the right to proceed against petitioners for the damage
caused on his passenger jeepney as well as on his business
KABIT SYSTEM
The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been
granted a certificate of public convenience allows other persons who own
motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for a fee or
percentage of the earnings. Although the parties to such an agreement are
not outrightly penalized by law, the kabit system is invariably recognized
as being contrary to public policy and therefore void and inexistent under
Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. In the early case of Dizon v. Octavio the Court
explained that one of the primary factors considered in the granting of a
certificate of public convenience for the business of public transportation is
the financial capacity of the holder of the license, so that liabilities arising
from accidents may be duly compensated. The kabit system renders
illusory such purpose and, worse, may still be availed of by the grantee to
escape civil liability caused by a negligent use of a vehicle owned by
another and operated under his license. If a registered owner is allowed to
escape liability by proving who the supposed owner of the vehicle is, it
would be easy for him to transfer the subject vehicle to another who
possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage
done. Thus, for the safety of passengers and the public who may have
been wronged and deceived through the baneful kabit system, the
registered owner of the vehicle is not allowed to prove that another person
has become the owner so that he may be thereby relieved of responsibility.
Subsequent cases affirm such basic doctrine. It would seem then that the
thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so much as to penalize
the parties but to identify the person upon whom responsibility may be
fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding
public. The policy therefore loses its force if the public at large is not
deceived, much less involved.

Lita Enterprises vs IAC

129 SCRA 347
Facts:
Spouses Nicasio Ocampo and Francisca Garcia (private
respondents) purchased in installment from the Delta Motor Sales
Corporation five (5) Toyota Corona Standard cars to be used as taxi. Since
they had no franchise to operate taxicabs, they contracted with petitioner
Lita Enterprise, Inc., through its representative Manuel Concordia, for the
use of the latters certificate of public convenience for a consideration of
P1, 000.00and a monthly rental of P200.00/taxicab unit. For the agreement
to take effect, the cars were registered in the name of Lita Enterprises, Inc.
The possession, however, remains with spouses Ocampo and Garcia who
operated and maintained the same under Acme Taxi, petitioners trade
name. A year later, one of the taxicabs, driven by their employee, Emeterio
Martin, collided with a motorcycle. Unfortunately the driver of the
motorcycle ,Florante Galvez died from the injuries it sustained. Criminal
case was filed against Emeterio Martin, while a civil case was filed by the
heir of the victim against Lita Enterprises. In the decision of the lower court
Lita Enterprises was held liable for damages for the amount ofP25, 000.00
and P7, 000.00 for attorneys fees. A writ of execution for the decision
followed, 2 of the cars of the respondents spouses were levied and were
sold to a public auction. On March 1973, respondent Ocampo decided to
register his taxicabs in his own name. The manager of petitioner refused to
give him the registration papers. Thus, making spouses file a complaint
against petitioner. In the decision, Lita Enterprise was ordered to return the
three certificate of registration not levied in the prior case. Petitioner now
prays that private respondent be held liable to pay the amount they have
given to the heir of Galvez.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can recover from private respondent, knowing
they are in an arrangement known as kabit system.
Held:
Kabit system is defined as, when a person who has been granted a
certificate of convenience allows another person who owns a motor vehicle
to operate under such franchise for a fee. This system is not penalized as a
criminal offense but is recognized as one that is against public policy;
therefore it is void and inexistent. It is fundamental that the court will not
aid either of the party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them
both where it finds them. Upon this premise, it was flagrant error on the
part of both trial and appellate courts to have accorded the parties relief
from their predicament. Specifically Article1412 states that: If the act in

which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a

criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed: when the fault, is
on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has
given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the others
undertaking. The principle of in pari delicto is evident in this case. the
proposition is universal that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an
illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or
to recover the property agreed to sold or delivered, or damages for its
property agreed to be sold or delivered, or damages for its violation. The
parties in this case are in paridelicto, therefore no affirmative relief can be
granted to them

Teja Marketing Inc. vs IAC

148 SCRA 347
Facts:
Pedro Nale bought from Teja Marketing a motorcycle with complete
accessories and a sidecar. A chattel mortgage was constituted as a security
for the payment of the balance of the purchase price. The records of the
Land Transportation Commission show that the motorcycle sold to the
defendant was first mortgaged to the Teja Marketing by Angel Jaucian
though the Teja Marketing and Angel Jaucian are one and the same,
because it was made to appear that way only as the defendant had no
franchise of his own and he attached the unit to the plaintiffs MCH Line.
The agreement also of the parties here was for the plaintiff to undertake
the yearly registration of the motorcycle with the Land Transportation
Commission. The plaintiff, however failed to register the motorcycle on that
year on the ground that the defendant failed to comply with some
requirements such as the payment of the insurance premiums and the
bringing of the motorcycle to the LTC forstenciling, the plaintiff said that the
defendant was hiding the motorcycle fromhim. Lastly, the plaintiff also
explained that though the ownership of themotorcycle was already
transferred to the defendant, the vehicle was stillmortgaged with the
consent of the defendant to the Rural Bank of Camaliganfor the reason that
all motorcycle purchased from the plaintiff on credit wasrediscounted with
the bank. Teja Marketing made demands for the payment of the motorcycle
butjust the same Nale failed to comply, thus forcing Teja Marketing to
consult alawyer and file an action for damage before the City Court of Naga
in theamount of P546.21 for attorneys fees and P100.00 for expenses of
litigation.Teja Marketing also claimed that as of 20 February 1978, the total
account ofNale was already P2, 731, 05 as shown in a statement of
account; includesnot only the balance of P1, 700.00 but an additional 12%
interest per annumon the said balance from 26 January 1976 to 27
February 1978; a 2% servicecharge; and P546.21 representing attorneys
fees. On his part, Nale did notdispute the sale and the outstanding balance
of P1,700.00 still payable toTeja Marketing; but contends that because of

this failure of Teja Marketing tocomply with his obligation to register the
motorcycle, Nale suffered damageswhen he failed to claim any insurance
indemnity which would amount to no less than P15,000.00 for the more
than 2 times that the motorcycle figured inaccidents aside from the loss of
the daily income of P15.00 as boundary feebeginning October 1976 when
the motorcycle was impounded by the LTC fornot being registered. The City
Court rendered judgment in favor of TejaMarketing, dismissing the
counterclaim, and ordered Nale to pay TejaMarketing On appeal to the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, thedecision was affirmed in toto.
Nale filed a petition for review with theIntermediate Appellate Court. On 18
July 1983, the appellate court set asidethe decision under review on the
basis of doctrine of "pari delicto," andaccordingly, dismissed the complaint
of Teja Marketing, as well as thecounterclaim of Nale; without
pronouncements as to costs. Hence, thepetition for review was filed by Teja
Marketing and/or Angel Jaucian.
Issue:
Whether the defendant can recover damages against the plaintiff?
Held:
Unquestionably,
the
parties
herein
operated
under
an
arrangement,commonly known as the "kabit system" whereby a person
who has beengranted a certificate of public convenience allows another
person who ownsmotor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee.
A certificate ofpublic convenience is a special privilege conferred by the
government. Abuseof this privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be
countenanced. The "kabit system" has been identified as one of the root
causes of theprevalence of graft and corruption in the government
transportation offices.Although not out rightly penalized as a criminal
offense, the kabit system isinvariably recognized as being contrary to
public policy and, therefore, voidand in existent under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code. It is a fundamentalprinciple that the court will not aid either
party to enforce an illegal contract,but will leave both where it finds then.
Upon this premise it would be error toaccord the parties relief from their
predicament.

Santos vs Sibog
104 SCRA 520
Santos v. Sibug
Facts:
Petitioner Adolfo Santos was the owner of a passenger jeep, but hehad no
certificate of public conveyance for the operation of the vehicle as apublic

passenger jeep. Santos then transferred his jeep to the name of Vidadso
that it could be operated under the latters certificate of
publicconvenience. In other words, Santos became what is known as
kabitoperator. Vidad executed a re-transfer document presumably to be
registeredit and when it was decided that the passenger jeep of Santos was
to bewithdrawn from kabit arrangement. On the accident date, Abraham
Sibug was bumped by the saidpassenger jeep.
Issue:
Whether the Vidad is liable being the registered owner of the jeepney?
Held:
As the jeep in question was registered in the name of Vidad,
thegovernment or any person affected by the representation that said
vehicle isregistered under the name of the particular person had the right
to rely on hisdeclaration of his ownership and registration. And the
registered owner or anyother person for that matter cannot be permitted to
repudiate said declarationwith the objective of proving that the said
registered vehicle is owned byanother person and not by the registered
owner. Santos, as the kabit, should not be allowed to defeat the levy in
hisvehicle and to avoid his responsibility as a kabit owner for he had led
thepublic to believe that the vehicle belongs to Vidad. This is one way of
curbingthe pernicious kabit system that facilitates the commissions of
fraud againstthe traveling public.

III.

CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE OF GOODS

A. Obligation of the Carrier to Observe Vigilance of Goods
6. Duty to exercise extraordinary diligence (Art 1733, NCC,
Article 363, 364, 365, CC)
Article 1733 Common carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of
each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in Articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set
forth in Articles 1755 and 1756.

Reason: The nature of the business is imbued with public interest and
public policy; because of the exigencies of the business. The public has
no choice but to trust on the skills of the employees of the common
carrier. The goods and the life of the passenger are placed in the hands
of the common carrier.
Article 363 CC: Outside of the cases mentioned in the second
paragraph of Article 361, the carrier shall be obliged to deliver the
goods shipped in the same condition in which, according to the bill of
lading, they were found at the time they were received, without any
damage or impairment, and failing to do so, to pay the value which
those not delivered may have at the point and at the time at which
their delivery should have been made. If those not delivered form part
of the goods transported, the consignee may refuse to receive the
latter, when he proves that he cannot make use of them independently
of the others.
Article 364 CC: If the effect of the damage referred to in Article 361
is merely a diminution in the value of the gods, the obligation of the
carrier shall be reduced to the payment of the amount which, in the
judgment of experts, constitutes such difference in value.
Article 365 CC: If, in consequence of the damage, the goods are
rendered useless for sale and consumption for the purposes for which
they are properly destined, the consignee shall not be bound to receive
them, and he may have them in the hands of the carrier, demanding of
the latter their value at the current price on that day. If among the
damaged goods there should be some pieces in good condition and
without any defect, the foregoing provision shall be applicable with
respect to those damaged and the consignee shall receive those which
are sound, this segregation to be made by distinct and separate pieces
and without dividing a single object, unless the consignee proves that
impossibility of conveniently making use of them in this form. The
same rule shall be applied to merchandise in bales or packages,
separating those parcels which appear sound.

Sarkies Tours Philippines Inc vs Court of Appeals

280 SCRA 58
Facts:
Fatima Fortades was a passenger of one of the buses of petitioner
Sarkies Tours bound for Legazpi City. She had onboard luggages which
contained important documents and personal belongings. Her belongings

were kept in the baggage compartment of the bus, but during a stopover at
Daet, it was discovered that only one bag remained in the open
compartment. The others, including Fatima's things, were missing and
might have dropped along the way. Despite the suggestion of the
passengers to retrace its route in order to recover their luggage, the driver
nevertheless neglected them and continued driving. Consequently,
respondents filed a case to recover the value of the remaining lost items,
as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation. They claimed that the loss was due to petitioner's failure to
observe extraordinary diligence in the care of Fatima's luggage and that
petitioner dealt with them in bad faith from the start. Petitioner, on the
other hand, disowned any liability for the loss on the ground that Fatima
allegedly did not declare any excess baggage upon boarding its bus.
Issue:
Whether or not Sarkies is liable for damages for lost propery of its
passengers.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that Sarkies is liable for the loss. The
cause of the loss was petitioner's negligence in not ensuring that the doors
of the baggage compartment of its bus were securely fastened. As a result
of this lack of care, almost the entire luggage was lost, to the prejudice of
the paying passengers. Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. This liability
lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession
of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the person who has a
right to receive them. The awarding of actual damages to respondents is
just because their efforts in recovering the lost items must be well
compensated. Moral and exemplary damages must also be awarded in the
presence of bad faith and negligence on the part of the common carrier.

Westwind Shipping Corporation vs UCPB General Insurance

710 SCRA 544
7. Presumption of Negligence (Art 1735, NCC)
8. Duration of Liability (Art 1736, 1737 & 1738, NCC)
9. Defense of common carriers (Art 1734, 1739, 1740,
1742 & 1743)
a. Fortuitous event (Art 1739, NCC)
b. Public Enemy ( Art. 1739, NCC)
c. Improper Packing (Art 1742, NCC)
d. Order of Public Authority (Art 1473, NCC)

De Guzman vs Court of Appeals, supra

Bascos vs Court of Appeals 221 SCRA 318
Servando vs Philippines Stream Navigator 117 SCRA
832

Edgar Cokaliong Shipping Lines vs UCPB General

Insurance 404 SCRA 706

Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. vs IAC 150 SCRA 463

Ganzon vs Court of Appeals 161 SCRA 646

10. Contributory negligence of the sipper (Art 1471, NCC)
11. Stipulation limiting liability of the carrier (Art 1744,
1748, 1749 & 1750, NCC)
a. Requisites (Art 1744, 1751 NCC)
b. Invalid stipulations (Art 1745, NCC)
c. Effect of Delay (Art 1747, NCC)
d. Effect of presumption despite negligence despite
stipulation (1752)

Calvo vs UCPB General Insurance Co. 379 SCRA 510

Belgian Overseas Chartering vs Philippine First

Insurance 383 SCRA 23
B. Other Obligations
1. Duty to Accept Goods
a. Grounds for valid refusal to accept goods

Fisher vs Yango Stearnship Company 31 PHL 1

2. Duty to Deliver Goods
a. Time of Delivery (Art 358)
b. Consequences of Delay ( Art 1470, 1747 NCC, Art
370-374 NCC)
c. Place of Delivery ( Art 430, CC)
d. To whom delivery shall be made ( Art 368 & 369,
CC)

Macam vs Court of Appeals 313 SCRA 77

Samar Mining Co vs Nordeutscher Lloyd 132 SCRA

529

Saludo Jr. vs Court of Appeals 207 SCRA 498

C. Rights of Shipper, Consignee
1. Rights of Abandonment (Art 371, CC)

Magellan Marketing vs CA GR No. 95529 August 22,

1991
IV. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS
A.