Offensive PKOs Undermine Impartiality

1.
Offensive PKOs Bad
1.
1.
Militarism/Colonialism
Offensive peacekeeping embraces militarism and colonialism
East African, April 26, 2014,

intervention missions
Partiality
dilemma: The new model of UN
Since then, the UN has swung like a pendulum in both theory and praxis from
its traditional non-combative and "neutral" peacekeeping model to a new
militaristic approach that has seen its forces embroiled in combat in African
theatres of war. This follows a new tendency by major global powers at the helm
of the United Nations Security Council to pursue a more militaristic approach,
which is turning UN missions into "combative peacekeeping." This has fuelled
scepticism about the neutrality of UN missions and the behind-the-scenes role of
former European colonial powers in these missions.
2.
1.
Dont Solve Violence
Offensive peacekeeping cant resolve the structural causes of

violence
East African, April 26, 2014,

intervention missions
Partiality
dilemma: The new model of UN
But the new UN interventionism has its fierce critics. Jean-Marie Guehenno, the
United Nations peacekeeping chief from 2000 to 2008, has cautioned against the
thinking that a combative mission will resolve conflicts in Africa, particularly
Congo's quagmire. Offensive peacekeeping cannot be relied upon to resolve the
structural causes of the conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan or eastern DRC, which
often have regional dimensions and linkages in neighbouring countries. These
pundits want the UN to pursue a solution that will involve willing heads of
state from the region. They say that it is "not a SWAT team that's going to
clean up a bad neighbourhood That requires politics."
2.
An offensive force could encourage the involvement of more

groups
News Record, July 30, 2013, United Nations Authorizes Offensive Operations in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, http://www.newsrecord.co/united-nationsauthorizes-offensive-operations-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/
Pieter Vanholder, the DRC country director for the Life and Peace
Institute, believes that attempting to accomplish these goals may result in
unintended consequences. Speaking to Al-Jazeera, Vanholder explained,
The brigade may be seen as a kind of occupation force. As a consequence
it could become a push factor for some to join armed groups, adding to
local resistance.
3.
1.
Undermine Impartiality
Offensive peacekeeping kills the UNs role as a mediator
Africa Policy Brief, April 1, 2014, Partiality dilemma: The new model of UN
intervention missions, http://www.africapi.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/Combative-Peace-UN-Interventionism-CSP-brief-No-1-April2014.pdf DOA: 12-7-14
Also worrying experts is that the new militarism is radically changing the way
the UN has been perceived in conflict situations. "The bigger danger is that
when the UN becomes a combatant on the ground it loses what has been its unique
role of having been a potential mediator of being the impartial outsider," said
Mr Laurenti. Others feel that the shift to a combative style can compromise the
image of the UN peacekeeping forces as neutral actors in conflicts. "It may
compromise the neutrality and impartiality which we find essential to the
organisation's peacekeeping. Its presence should be perceived by all parties as
that of an honest broker, and not a potential party to the conflict," said Gert
Rosenthal, the envoy of Guatemala, a non-permanent member of the UN Security
Council.
2.
Lack of impartiality has undermined peacekeeping in the

Sudan
The impartiality dilemma Beyond Congo, UN interventionism is facing an
"impartiality" dilemma. The role of the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has
caused friction with the leaders in Juba, who are trying to quell an insurgency
led by the former vice-president Riek Machar.
Following the outbreak of
violence in December 2013, the UN Security Council approved with unprecedented
speed a request by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to boost the strength of the
UNMISS to 12,500 troops and 1,323 police, up from 7,000 troops and 900 police.
The perception of the lack of impartiality of the UN force by Juba has created
acrimony. In January, South Sudan president Salva Kiir accused the UN
peacekeeping mission of acting like a "parallel government" in his country.
It
did not help matters that in March, UN trucks that were supposedly carrying food
were found to be carrying weapons and blankets that Juba suspected to be
destined for the rebels.
3.
Offensive peacekeeping operations undermine UN credibility

needed to resolve future crises
Austin Bay, 12-13-13, Sun Journal (Lewiston, Maine), December 13, 2013
Austin Bay: U.N. trying peacekeeping with fangs
But as for the U.N. ordering its well-equipped military units to destroy
specific combatant factions? Critics of offensive mandates authorizing the
"neutralization" of specific factions contend, with good reason, that, when this
occurs, the Security Council has overtly chosen sides. When its peacekeepers
enter a sovereign country with the mandate to attack a rebel faction, the U.N.
loses more than credibility as a mediator. Come the next dirty war, the critics
argue, peacekeeping forces will be met as invaders.
4.
1.
Impartiality Impact
Lack of impartiality prevents peacekeeping solvency
Dr. Jeni Whalan, 2014, Partial Peace: The Politics of Taking Sides in UN
Peacekeeping, Paper prepared for International Studies Association Annual Convention, Toronto, 26-29,
https://www.academia.edu/6474185/Partial_Peace_The_Politics_of_Taking_Sides_in_UN_Peacekeeping DOA: 12-6-14 Lecturer
in International Security and Development BA (UNSW), M.Phil (Oxon), D.Phil (Oxon)
Similarly, Shashi Tharoor recognized that UN peacekeeping could not go back to basics if it was
to respond to the new security threats it faced, but nevertheless declared impartiality to be the
oxygen of peacekeeping: the only way peacekeeping can work is by being trusted by both sides,
being clear and transparent in their dealings, and keeping the lines of communication open. The
moment they lose this trust, the moment they are seen by one side as the enemy, they become
part of the problem they were sent to solve.
2.
Impartiality critical to consent and sustaining peacekeeping
At the local level, similar diversity among the purposes of impartiality exists, as do tensions among
them. First, traditional impartiality has served to make peacekeeping acceptable to relatively strong
host states, sufficient that they would consent to the deployment of peacekeepers. Ensuring the
consent of the host state in one operation also had implications for the viability of future
peacekeeping; as Alan James noted, considerations of precedent were crucial: if a peacekeeping
force gets permission to enter a state to engage in impartial and non-violent activity and then moves
in the direction of partiality and violence, other prospective hosts are going to be extremely cautious
about issuing invitations.71
3.
Impartiality critical to mediation
in
International Security and Development BA (UNSW), M.Phil (Oxon), D.Phil (Oxon)
The final purpose of impartiality identified at the local level is the procedural
legitimation expected to come from a peacekeeping operation that can mediate
between warring factions as an honest broker, fairly and without bias to any side. For
example, the Force Commander of the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC), General John Sanderson, credits this type of impartiality with
the missions ability to win confidence among senior members of the various
Cambodian factions, which provided UNTAC with a new means of influence to
influence their actions.76 This impartiality purpose is most often seen in conflicts among parties who
are relatively evenly matched, where there is not a strong international interest in the
victory of one side over another, and once the conflict has reached some form of
stalemate.77 Effective mediation can, in turn, be expected to produce better outcomes,
such as a negotiated ceasefire with which armed groups comply, which means this
approach may also have a substantive legitimation function.
5.
1.
Undermines Humanitarianism
UN taking on a combat role undermines humanitarianism
2.
Criticism of UN interventionism has also come from the humanitarian aid agencies
who fear that a combative UN force risks blurring the line between aid workers
providing care and soldiers. "You can have a helicopter one day used to deliver
the Force Intervention Brigade troops to attack a village and next day to
deliver aid to that same village," said Michiel Hofman, a senior humanitarian
specialist with Medicins sans Frontieres in Brussels. The UN bureaucracy can
only take lightly the critics of interventionism at its own peril. In war
situations, perception is everything. Interventionism hugely impacts the
perception of the UN peacekeeping operations not just in Africa but globally.
3.
Offensive missions could turn aid workers into targets
Sudarsan Raghavan, November 2, 2013, Washington Post, Raghavan has been The
Post's Kabul bureau chief since 2014. He was previously based in Nairobi and
Baghdad for the Post, In Volatile Congo, A New UN Force with Teeth,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-volatile-congo-a-new-un-forcewith-teeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html DOA: 12-514
But the force is also an unparalleled gamble for the United Nations that challenges the basic principles of
peacekeeping. It has orders to react offensively to enforce peace, essentially transforming peacekeepers into
combatants. And it is openly supporting Congolese government forces, a move away from the principle of neutrality
that has guided other U.N. missions. That could affect the United Nations ability to negotiate peace deals with the
militias and risks deepening conflicts. Humanitarian agencies are worried that Congos brutal militias could see the
entire U.N. mission, which also includes aid workers, monitors and civilian experts, as non-neutral potential targets.
6.
1.
Nationalism
UN militarism in Africa triggers nationalism
Although Africa is unlikely to resist external players in situations like the
CAR, growing perceptions of increased UN militarism on the continent are likely
to stir residual nationalism against external intervention. In recent decades,
the continent, through the AU, has grown increasingly assertive of its
independence vis-a-vis former colonial powers and the West.
7.
1.
Inconsistent With Peacekeeping Values

Offensive PKOs inconsistent with the core principles of
peacekeeping
Courtney Brooks, March 28, 2013, Explainer: UN Move to Give Peacekeepers First
Ever Combat Mandate, http://www.rferl.org/content/un-peacekeepers-combatresolution/24941095.html DOA: 12-5-14
Even though peacekeeping is nowhere to be found in the Charter of the United Nations, the UN has
performed almost 70 peacekeeping operations to date. Thought of as existing between Chapter VI and
VII, or Chapter VI ., peacekeeping was envisioned as a method to stave off wars and conflict in the
hopes of pacific settlement of disputes in order to maintain international peace and security. All
peacekeeping operations (PKOs) operate under three principles: (1) State parties consent to the PKO, (2)
Peacekeepers are impartial observers, and (3) Use of force is prohibited except in self-defense and or if
permitted under the mandate provided by the Security Council. UN Peacekeeping operations are only
approved by the Security Council and may sometimes work in tandem with PKOs authorized by
Regional Organizations.
8.
1.
Undermines Support for Peacekeeping
It is difficult to get commitments to peacekeeping involving

offensive PKOs
in
Substantively, robust peacekeepers operating under new impartiality are intended to deliver on
the expectations and promises implicit in peacekeeping: that they will protect populations, keep the
peace, and deter conflict. But the procedural legitimacy of new impartiality is more contested.
First, it has been less acceptable to loose coalition of the UNs most significant troop contributing
countries. UN peacekeepers today are supplied overwhelmingly by developing countries; in recent
years, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India have collectively contributed the lions share.55 These troop
contributing countries have broadly resisted calls to accept the greater risks involved in using force
in peacekeeping operations, and have regularly invoked the principle of impartiality to question
such practice of taking sides.
in
Third, the traditional notion of impartiality is attractive to those countries that contribute the vast
majority of UN peacekeepers, because it minimizes the risk to their security; becoming a belligerent
party also means that peacekeepers become targets for retaliation.65 Since the Security Councils
peacekeeping decisions rely entirely for their implementation on the willingness of UN member
states to contribute forces to a mission, it must also take into account the perceptions of troop
contributing countries regarding the acceptability and appropriateness of the peacekeeping
enterprise. For their part, member states derive a number of benefits from their contribution of
troops to UN peacekeeping, but remain highly sensitive to the character of these operations:
Naturally, all contributing countries want to avoid casualties and hence exhibit greater reluctance to
contribute troops to missions that are thought overly dangerous. Contributing states thus typically
assess the degree of host government consent for a mission and might be deterred from participating
in operations where this is questionable... National publics are also frequently intolerant of
casualties sustained on peacekeeping operations. This poses a particular challenge to the emerging
concept of robust peacekeeping.66
2.
Offensive PKOs reduce support for peacekeeping
News Record, July 30, 2013, United Nations Authorizes Offensive Operations in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, http://www.newsrecord.co/united-nationsauthorizes-offensive-operations-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/
Furthermore, most countries that supply troops for peacekeeping missions

do so with the expectation of limiting casualties. Placing peacekeepers in
a
fighting role may make supplying troops less attractive for U.N. member
states
9.
1.
2.
Snowball
One offensive intervention sets a precedent for another
Brett D. Schaefer, is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in

the Margaret Thatch, April 10, 2013, Center for Freedom, a division of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation and editor of ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations
and the Search for Alternatives (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), U.S.
Should Oppose a Return to U.N. Peace Enforcement,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-toun- peace-enforcement DOA: 12-6-14

The UNSC has authorized missions in the gray area between traditional missions
and peace enforcement, including the MONUSCO operation before creation of the
intervention brigade, but Resolutions 2098 and 2100 go further toward peace
enforcement than the U.N. has ventured since the 1990s. The U.N. is aware of the
significance of this shift and has taken pains to disguise it. Resolution 2098
explicitly establishes the intervention brigade on an exceptional basis and
without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of
peacekeeping. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations told
journalists that MINUSMA is not an enforcement mission. Yet the very act of
creating the intervention brigade establishes a precedent for future action, and
asserting that MINUSMA is not an enforcement operation cannot overcome the facts
that there is no peace to keep and that peacekeepers are mandated to impose
authority on behalf of the Malian government where it is either weak or absent.
10.
1.
Alternatives
Parallel mission alternative
Since the mid-1990s, states willing to deploy military forces with coercive mandates to conflict
zones have overwhelmingly done so through parallel missions, often with UNa uthorization but not
under UN command nor operating within the UNs own conception of peacekeepers. It is notable
that the southern African states who contributed forces to MONUSCOs intervention brigade sought
initially to deploy as a parallel mission of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
2.
UN authorized intervention forces are superior
Brett D. Schaefer, is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the

Margaret Thatch, April 10, 2013, Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage
Foundation and editor of ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and the
Search for Alternatives (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), U.S. Should
Oppose a Return to U.N. Peace Enforcement,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us- should-oppose-return-to-unpeace-enforcement DOA: 12-6-14
With Srebrenica and Rwanda in mind, the U.N. since 1999 has instructed its
peacekeepers to protect civilians from the imminent threat of violence. These
debacles also led to a reexamination of U.N. peace enforcement culminating in
the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi report),
which acknowledged the need for robust peacekeeping operations at times but also
unequivocally stated: [T]he United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement
action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing
States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII
of the Charter. This report has guided peacekeeping policy for over a decade.
Even as U.N. peacekeeping has been assigned broader responsibilities and
expanded to historic highs in personnel and expense in the 2000s,[2] the U.N.
has observed the principle that it should not engage in peace enforcement
operations. Indeed, the U.N. reiterated the conclusions of the Brahimi report in
the 2009 A New Partnership Agenda Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping:
The single most important finding of the Brahimi report was that UN peacekeeping
can only succeed as part of a wider political strategy to end a conflict and
with the will of the parties to implement that strategy. Peacekeeping is not
always the right answer. In situations of high political tension, or in contexts
where regional or national support is lacking, prevention, mediation,
peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development activities may be more
effective. In active conflict, multinational coalitions of forces or regional
actors operating under UN Security Council mandates may be more suitable.
Successful crisis management rests on choosing the right tools and bringing them
together in ways that maximize their respective strengths.
3.
Alternative in the Congo
Brett D. Schaefer, is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the

Margaret Thatch, April 10, 2013, Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage
Foundation and editor of ConUNdrum: The Limits of the United Nations and the
Search for Alternatives (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), U.S. Should
Oppose a Return to U.N. Peace Enforcement,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us- should-oppose-return-to-unpeace-enforcement DOA: 12-6-14
Neither the DRC nor Mali is ripe for U.N. peacekeeping. The positive environment
from a decade ago has been squandered by DRC President Joseph Kabila with
ample help from spoilers inside and outside the country.[7] There is little prospect
for peace in Mali until a new government is elected that incorporates adequate
representation from long-ostracized groups.[8] While elections are scheduled for
July, significant challenges persist that could derail them.
The Obama Administration has a responsibility not to support the most convenient
options but rather to support efforts that are most likely to result in international
peace and security. Instead of peace enforcement through U.N. operations, the
U.S. should explore and advocate alternatives that address these situations and
support a U.N. mission only when the basic principles of peacekeeping are in place.
Specifically, the U.S. should shift gears and demand that the MONUSCO
intervention brigade be independently commanded in a manner similar to the
French force in Mali or the African Union force in Somalia. International efforts
should concentrate on addressing lack of governance in the DRC, and MONUSCO
should be downsized and focused on less ambitious goals of protecting and
providing security for humanitarian efforts until conditions are again ripe for a more
traditional U.N. peacekeeping operation. In Mali, the U.S. should delay standing up
MINUSMA until conditions improve while supporting the current French and African
interventions.
Although the Administration makes decisions in the Security Council, those
decisions have financial implications. The U.N. charges the U.S. 28.38 percent of
the U.N. peacekeeping budget, including the $1.4 billion annual budget for
MONUSCO (now with an additional $140 million for the intervention brigade).[9]
MINUSMA is projected to cost $800 million annually which is not currently factored
into fiscal year 2014 budget proposals.[10] Congress should challenge the
Administration over whether the U.N. should be entrusted with these situations and
ask which alternatives were explored.
11.
1.
Bad to Support Congo Government
Government is corrupt and its forces are accused of mass

rapes
There are also concerns that the U.N. force is propping up a corrupt government
and aiding an undisciplined military that has a history of human-rights abuses,
including mass rapes. Many Congolese remain skeptical of the new brigades
potential to eradicate the militias. Others have lofty expectations that could
bring disappointment and further antagonism toward the U.N. mission.
12.
A2: Offensive PKOs Necessary to Stop Rebel Groups

1.
Defeat of M23 hasnt deterred other groups
Dr Robert Besseling, January 1, 2014, Besseling is a Senior Political Adviser to

the IHS Country Risk and Forecasting Sub-Saharan Africa team, Janes
Intelligence Review, Elusive riches - Continued threats to the DRC's minerals
trade
The defeat of the M23 has not succeeded in motivating many members of other
rebel groups and community-based Ma-Ma self-defence militias that operate
within the region to surrender and disarm. On 3 December, UN under-secretarygeneral for peacekeeping operations Herv Ladsous said that the FIB would engage
these other armed groups. The FIB is most likely to be deployed against
collaborators of the M23, including some Ma Ma groups in North and South Kivu,
and other groups that operate in areas now effectively under FARDC control, such
as the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain (APCLS), based in
the town of Masisi, North Kivu, and the Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la
Paix/Forces Populaires Congolaises (UPCP/FPC) in Lubero, also in North Kivu.
According to the UN Group of Experts, both of these groups are involved in the
mining of columbite-tantalum and gold.
13.
1.
A2: Necessary to Defeat Rebels
Cant defeat all of the rebel groups in the Congo
U.N. officials say a political solution is still the best path forward, but in a
phone interview last week, Amani Kabasha, the rebels political spokesman, said
his group had lost trust in the U.N. mission because it was supporting Congolese
forces. Even if they kill all of the M23, another group will rise in our
place, he warned. The intervention brigade is expected to go after more than 40
other militias who are committing atrocities, stealing Congos mineral wealth
and preventing the government from functioning a task that seems virtually
impossible. There is also the problem of perception. The Enough Project, a
human-rights group, said in a report last week that the brigade risks being
seen, or being used, as a pawn of Kinshasa, the capital. Both Kobler and Cruz
said the brigade would not work with any Congolese army units that have
committed human-rights abuses. They also said the brigade would work at times on
its own.
14.
1.
Militarized Approaches Fail
Militarized peacekeeping fails
James Sloan, June 3, 2014 is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Glasgow, School of
Law, and a former adviser to a UN peace mission. His book The Militarisation of
Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century was published in 2011 by Hart Publishing,
Oxford, UN Peacekeeping in Darfur: A Quagmare That We Cannot Accept,
http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/03/un-peacekeeping-in-darfur-a-quagmire-that-we-cannotaccept/
As the author of a 2011 book lamenting the change in direction in UN

peacekeeping since the turn of the century and warning that such operations
would almost certainly fail, I was not surprised to read the articles. Deeply
disturbed, of course, but not surprised. UNAMID is an example of a
militarized peacekeeping operationalso known as Chapter VII
peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping, or muscular peacekeepinga type of
operation that has routinely been authorized by the Security Council since the
late 1990s. The operations represent an attempt by the Security Council to
prevent the recurrence of a Rwanda-type situation, where mass atrocities
occurred in the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation, by moving away
from the traditional policy that force may only be used by peacekeepers in selfdefense (or, sometimes, in defense of the mandate of the force), in favour of a
policy authorizing the use of offensive force to protect civilians and others. As I
argued in 2011, this type of operation is unlikely to be successful.
Why Isnt It Working?
The argument put forward in my book is, in a nutshell, that UN peacekeeping
operations are ill-suited to operations requiring the use of offensive force: they
lack the personnel, the equipment, and the effective leadership required.
Moreover, the tradition that peacekeeping operations may only operate with the
consent and cooperation of the government of the host state means that it is
extremely difficult for a militarized peacekeeping force to be even-handed in its
resort to force: if it were to use force against the host stateeven if the
government of the host state was acting contrary to the interests of its civilian
populationit would lose that governments good will and its continued
operation in the state would be extremely difficult.
It is generally agreed that the handful of peacekeeping operations in the 20th

century that were vested with enforcement powers were disastrous; they were
unable to achieve their mandated tasks and brought the Organization into
disrepute. Examples here include ONUC (a peacekeeping operation in the
Congo in the early 1960s) and two ill-fated operations in the 1990s:
UNPROFOR, a peacekeeping operation charged with protecting civilians in
safe areas in the former Yugoslavia (including, tragically, the safe area of
Srebrenica where some 8,000 thousand men and boys were murdered while
peacekeepers were pushed to one side), and UNOSOM II, a peacekeeping
operation charged with using force to prevent the resumption of violence in
Somalia (which withdrew in ignominy following the deaths of 18 US soldiers
and over 25 UN peacekeepers).
Of course, the UN did not use force in its peacekeeping operation in Rwanda
despite it being advocated by its ground commander, Canadian General Romeo
Dallaire, in the months before the genocide broke out. Permission to use force
was denied by the UN Secretariat on the basis that it was not provided for in the
operations Security Council mandate. The stain left on the reputation of the
UN by the Rwandan genocide was deep. With a view to ensuring that nothing
in the nature of the Rwandan genocide occurred under the noses of UN
peacekeepers, the idea that peacekeeping operations should routinely be
mandated to use offensive force in certain circumstances gained favour
despite the problems with earlier militarized peacekeeping operations. In 2000,
the influential Brahimi Report on peacekeeping was published. On the question
of the use of force by peacekeeping operations, it argued along the following
lines: 1) the UN must never again stand by while civilians are killed, as had
been the case with the Rwandan genocide; 2) peacekeepers must be made
robust and charged with taking sidesthey must never again be mere
appeasers; and 3) only once a sufficient number of well-trained and wellequipped peacekeepers have been contributed by states should the Security
Council establish and deploy an operation.
The first element of the argument is laudable: the UN must certainly not stand
idly by in the face of mass atrocities. However, matters fall apart when one gets
to the second and third elements. Simply adding a line or two to the mandates
of peacekeeping operations, requiring peacekeepers to take on the unimaginably
difficult task of preventing genocide or civilian harm is wildly unrealistic. The
nature of UN peacekeeping does not lend itself to the use of force:

peacekeeping forces must be donated by states (and may be withdrawn by them
at any time), peacekeeping forces tend to have little in the way of sophisticated
equipment (that, again, in many cases, must be donated), and the command
structure of peacekeeping forces is frequently problematic. For example, an
order from a commander from State A may be ignored by a subordinate from
State Bif that subordinate is able to have the order overruled by a government
official from State B. A version of this scenario is outlined in the Foreign
Policy investigation of UNAMID.
The third element of the argument that emerged from the Brahimi Report, i.e.,
that the Security Council should wait until peacekeeping forces are sufficiently
well-configured to be successful before establishing them or placing them in
situ, is also problematic. It presumes a Security Council that is sufficiently
circumspect to put political considerations to one side, as well as UN member
states that are willing to contribute sufficient financial resources and personnel
to the endeavordespite the risk of the loss of life. It ignores the reality that
many states may consider the contribution of personnel to operations where the
forces will be in harms way to be politically damaging (the US contributes no
personnel to UNAMID) and may even be begrudging when it comes to
donating equipment. Moreover, it ignores the possibility that some members of
the Security Council might consider it to be preferable to put in place an
operation that is ill-suited to the task, rather than risk waiting until the time is
right, lest they be seen to be doing nothing in the face of mass atrocity. Former
Secretary-General Kofi Anan described the establishment of a militarized
peacekeeping operation with a robust mandate, but little chance of fulfilling it,
as creating an alibi for the Security Council. Presumably, the idea is that if the
UN is criticized for allowing another mass atrocity to occur, the Security
Council can point to the fact that it did act: it established a militarized
peacekeeping operation to prevent such an atrocity. In this regard, the title of
the third article in the Foreign Policy investigation may be recalled: A Mission
That Was Set Up to Fail.
Even if we lived in a world where the leaders deciding what direction the
Security Council would take were circumspect and uninfluenced by politics,
and member statesincluding, of course, the Security Councils permanent
memberswere willing to donate sufficient funding, equipment, and troops to
ensure the success of such operations, I am not convinced that assigning

peacekeepers forceful tasks is a good idea. Imagine a mayor of a city with
serious crime problems and an inadequate police force deciding that the way to
protect the citizenry was to arm traffic wardens or ambulance attendants. While
these newly robust city employees might very well prevent a number of crimes,
it would not be long before they were no longer seen by the criminal population
as unthreateninginstead, becoming the targets of the criminals. Militarized
peacekeepers are in something of a no-win situation: where they use force,
they become the target of various forces; where they do not use force (because
they are vastly outnumbered and to do so would be the equivalent of
committing suicide), there is a substantial risk that the local populationwhich,
for better or worse, has come to think of the peacekeeping force as their
protectorwill see them as failures or cowards. Recall the title of the first
article in the Foreign Policy investigation: They Just Stood Watching.
15.
1.
Solvency Answers
No secondary support for offensive PKOs, failure collapses

them
David Bosco, April 1, 2013, Foreign Policy, When Peacekeepers Go to War,

http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/01/when-peacekeepers-go-to-war/ DOA 12-6-14
Part of the problem with offensive U.N. operations is that the training and
resources of the forces doing the fighting often doesnt match the mandate. Its
one thing for the Security Council to authorize offensive operations from New
York; its quite another thing for peacekeeping commanders to manage them
successfully on the ground. During the U.N.s Bosnia operation in the 1990s,
that gap between the Councils proclamations and the actual work of peacekeepers
grew to tragic proportions. If peacekeepers get bogged down while on the offense
or, worse, commit abuses of their own political will for the operation will
likely melt away. The countries contributing the troops for the enforcement
brigade may think twice. Its doubtful that either the United States or cashstrapped European states will send their own forces to bolster peacekeepers in
need of assistance.
2. Right to Protect (R2P) Bad
1.
1.
Right to Protect Bad Link
Offensive peacekeeping operation exist to protect civilians
Midwest Model United Nations, 2013, http://mmun.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/ga4-a.pdf DOA: 12-6-14
The UN for the first time has authorized peacekeepers to conduct

targeted offensive operations within the mandate of the UN
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUSCO). Security Council Resolution 2098 established a
Force Intervention Brigade to assist the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) in neutralizing armed groups that have been accused of
sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment of child soldiers,
violence against civilians, and other human rights abuses.6 These
offensive operations are meant to provide protection of civilians
until the DRC has created a Rapid Reaction Force that is able to take
over duties from the Force Intervention Brigade. There are many
critics that view the UNs offensive operations as peace
enforcement and that the UN may not be seen as an impartial party to
the conflict in the DRC.
2.
Offensive PKOs based on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
Midwest Model United Nations, 2013, http://mmun.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/ga4-a.pdf DOA: 12-6-14
The new mandate for offensive operations in MONUSCO has been part of
a recent trend in strengthening peacekeepings ability to protect
civilians. Protection of civilians is viewed as a key factor in the
success of any peacekeeping mission. This recent trend stems from the
20045 World Summit Outcomes endorsement of the Responsibility to
Protect. The international community made a commitment to protect
their own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity. In places where civilians are subject to
such atrocities, the international community agreed that the UN
should act to protect civilians.
2.
Groves 8
Right to Protect Undermines American Leadership

1.
An unconditional R2P obligation destroys US sovereignty,

draining the military
2.
R2p kill us sovereignty, causes overstretch
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/the-us-should-reject-the-unresponsibility-to-protect-doctrine
Steven Groves works to protect and preserve American sovereignty, selfgovernance and independence as leader of The Heritage Foundation's Freedom
Project. Groves, who is the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in
Heritages Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, also advocates American
leadership on issues involving international political and religious freedom,
human rights and democratic institutions. He has testified before Congress on
international law, human rights, the United Nations and controversial treaties
such as the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women. In 2013, Groves was awarded the Dr. W. Glenn
and Rita Campbell Award for his work. The award is given annually to the
Heritage employee who delivered an outstanding contribution to the analysis and
promotion of a free society. Before joining Heritage in 2007, Groves was senior
counsel to then-Sen. Norm Coleman (R-Minn.) on the U.S. Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations. He played a lead role in the subcommittee's
investigation of the U.N. "oil-for-food" scandal, the most extensive
congressional probe ever conducted of the United Nations. Groves previously was
an associate at Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, specializing in commercial
litigation. Before that he served as assistant attorney general for the State of
Florida, where he litigated civil rights cases, constitutional law issues and
criminal appeals, among other matters, in state and federal court. Groves is a
frequent guest commentator on domestic and international television and radio.
He has appeared on ABC, BBC, CNBC, CNN and CNN International, Fox News Channel,
National Public Radio, Voice of America, NHK, Al Jazeera, Alhurra and the
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. His commentary and opinion pieces have been
published by journals such as National Review, The Weekly Standard and Human
Events, as well as by The Washington Times and other major newspapers across
America. Groves holds a law degree from Ohio Northern University's College of
Law and a bachelor of arts degree in history from Florida State University.
If wholly accepted as official U.S. policy, the R2P doctrine would greatly
expand U.S. obligations to prevent acts of genocide around the world. More
important, adoption of R2P would effectively cede U.S. national
sovereignty and decision-making power over key components of national
security and foreign policy and subject them to the whims of the international
community. The U.S. government, as a party to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention), is currently
obligated to prevent acts of genocide that occur within U.S. territory.[29] The
Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), the
legislation implementing the Genocide Convention, was signed into law by
President Ronald Reagan in 1988.[30] The Proxmire Act defined the crime of
genocide as an act committed "with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or
in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group." The new
law even criminalized the act of inciting another person to commit an act of
genocide.[31] Importantly, U.S. enforcement of these criminal offenses was

limited to acts committed in the United States.[32] However, adoption of the
R2P norm would obligate the United States to prevent all acts of genocide,
ethnic cleansing, and war crimes even if they occur outside of the U.S. Such
an obligation would impose unique responsibilities. As the world's preeminent
military force, the United States would have to bear a disproportionate

share of the R2P international commitment. In the event that acts of genocide
and ethnic cleansing occur, the vast majority of nations in the international
community could reasonably plead military inferiority on each such occasion,
leaving the United States to bear the brunt of any intervention. Most members of
the international community could also plead poverty, again leaving the United
States to fund the intervention. Even if the intervention is funded through the
United Nations system, the United States would still pay an unequal share of the
cost.[33]
3.
The doctrinal dominance of r2p wrecks Americas global

leadership BOTH structurally AND perceptually. Foreign
policy must shift back to SELF-INTEREST
Kaplan 8/1/13
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-tragedy-us-foreign-policy-8810
Robert D. Kaplan is a foreign correspondent for The Atlantic, a senior fellow at
the Center for a New American Security in Washington and a member of the
Pentagons Defense Policy Board. His most recent book is Monsoon: The Indian
Ocean and the Future of American Power (Random House, 2010).
The 1990s were full of calls for humanitarian intervention: in Rwanda,

which tragically went unheeded; and in Bosnia and Kosovo where interventions,
while belated, were by and large successful. Free from the realpolitik
necessities of the Cold War, humanitarians have in the past two decades tried
to reduce foreign policy to an aspect of genocide prevention. Indeed, the
Nazi Holocaust is only one lifetime removed from our owna nanosecond in human
historyand so postCold War foreign policy now rightly exists in the shadow of
it. The codified upshot has been R2P: the Responsibility to Protect, the
mantra of humanitarians. But American foreign policy cannot merely be
defined by R2P and Never Again! Statesmen can only rarely be concerned with
humanitarian interventions and protecting human rights to the exclusion of other
considerations. The United States, like any nationbut especially because it is
a great powersimply has interests that do not always cohere with its
values. That is tragic, but it is a tragedy that has to be embraced and
accepted. What are those overriding interests? The United States, as the
dominant power in the Western Hemisphere, must always prevent any other power
from becoming equally dominant in the Eastern Hemisphere. Moreover, as a
liberal maritime power, the United States must seek to protect the sea lines of
communication that enable world trade. It must also seek to protect both
treaty and de facto allies, and especially their access to hydrocarbons.
These are all interests that, while not necessarily contradictory to human
rights, simply do not operate in the same category. Because the United States
is a liberal power, its interestseven when they are not directly concerned
with human rightsare generally moral. But they are only secondarily moral.
For seeking to adjust the balance of power in ones favor has been throughout
history an amoral enterprise pursued by both liberal and illiberal powers.
Nevertheless, when a liberal power like the United States pursues such a
goal in the
service of preventing war among major states , it is acting morally in the

highest sense . A telling example of this tensionone that gets to the heart of
why Never Again! and R2P cannot always be the operative words in statesmanship
was recently provided by
the foreign-affairs expert Leslie H. Gelb. Gelb noted that after Saddam Hussein
had gassed close to seven thousand Kurds to death in northern Iraq in 1988, even
a truly ethical secretary of state, George Shultz, committed a moral
outrage. For Shultz basically ignored the incident and continued supporting
Saddam in his war against Iran, because weakening Irannot protecting the
citizens of Iraqwas the primary American interest at the time. So was Shultz
acting immorally? Not completely, I believe. Shultz was operating under a
different morality than the one normally applied by humanitarians. His was a
public morality; not a private one. He and the rest of the Reagan administration
had a responsibility to the hundreds of millions of Americans under their
charge. And while these millions were fellow countrymen, they were more
crucially voters and citizens, essentially strangers who did not know Shultz or
Reagan personally, but who had entrusted the two men with their interests. And
the American publics interest clearly dictated that of the two states, Iran and
Iraq, Iran at the time constituted the greater threat. In protecting the public
interest of even a liberal power, a statesman cannot always be nice; or
humane. I am talking here of a morality of public outcomes, rather than one of
private intentions. By supporting Iraq, the Reagan administration succeeded in
preventing Iran in the last years of the Cold War from becoming a regional
hegemon. That was an outcome convenient to U.S. interests, even if the morality
of the affair was ambiguous, given that Iraqs regime was at the time the more
brutal of the two. In seeking good outcomes, policymakers are usually guided by
constraints: a realistic awareness of what, for instance, the United States
should and should not do, given its finite resources. After all, the United
States had hundreds of thousands of troops tied down in Europe and Northeast
Asia during the Cold War, and thus had to contain Iran through the use of a
proxy, Saddams Iraq. That was not entirely cynical: it was an intelligent use
of limited assets in the context of a worldwide geopolitical struggle. The
problem with a foreign policy driven foremost by Never Again! is that it
ignores limits and the availability of resources. World War II had the
secondary, moral effect of saving what was left of European Jewry. Its primary
goal and effect was to restore the European and Asian balance of power in a
manner tolerable to the United Statessomething that the Nazis and the Japanese
fascists had overturned. Of course, the Soviet Union wrested control of Eastern
Europe for nearly half a century following the war. But again, limited resources
necessitated an American alliance with the mass-murderer Stalin against the
mass-murderer Hitler. It is because of such awful choices and attendant
compromisesin which morality intertwines with amoralitythat humanitarians will
frequently be disappointed with the foreign policy of even the most heroic
administrations. World War II certainly involved many hideous compromises and
even mistakes on President Franklin D. Roosevelts part. He got into the war in
Europe very late, he did not bomb the rail tracks leading to the concentration
camps, he might have been more aggressive with the Soviets on the question of
Eastern Europe. But as someone representing the interests of the millions of
strangers who had and had not voted for him, his aim was to defeat Nazi Germany
and Imperial Japan in a manner that cost the fewest American soldiers lives,
and utilized the least amount of national resources. Saving the remnants of
European Jewry was a moral consequence of his actions, but his methods contained
tactical concessions that had fundamental amoral elements. Abraham Lincoln, for
his part, brought mass suffering upon southern civilians in the last phase of
the Civil War in order to decisively defeat the South. The total war waged by
generals William Tecumseh Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant was evidence of that.
Simply put, there are actions of state that are the right things to do, even if
they cannot be defined in terms of conventional morality. Amoral goals,
properly applied, do have moral effects. Indeed, in more recent times,
President Richard Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, rushed arms
to Israel following a surprise attack by Arab armies in the fall of 1973. The
two men essentially told the American defense establishment that supporting
Israel in its hour of need was the right thing to do, because it was necessary
to send an unambiguous message of resolve to the Soviets and their Arab allies
at a critical stage in the Cold War. Had they justified the arms transfers
purely in terms of helping embattled post-Holocaust Jewryrather than in terms
of power politics as they didit would have made for a much weaker argument in
Washington, where officials rightly had American interests at heart more than
Israeli ones. George McGovern was possibly a more ethical man than either Nixon
or Kissinger. But had he been elected president in 1972, would he have acted so
wisely and so decisively during the 1973 Middle East war? The fact is,
individual perfection, as Machiavelli knew, is not necessarily synonymous with
public virtue. Then there is the case of Deng Xiaoping. Deng approved the brutal
suppression of students at Beijings Tiananmen Square in 1989. For that he is
not respected among humanitarians in the West. But the consolidation of
Communist Party control that followed the clampdown allowed for Dengs
methodical, market-oriented reforms to continue for a generation in China.
Perhaps never before in recorded economic history have so many people seen such
a dramatic rise in living standards, with an attendant rise in personal (if not
political) freedoms in so short a time frame. Thus, Deng might be considered
both a brutal Communist and the greatest man of the twentieth century. The
morality of his life is complex. The Bosnia and Kosovo interventions of 1995 and
1999 are frequently held out as evidence that the United States is most
effective when it acts according to its humanitarian valuesnever mind its
amoral interests. But those who make that argument neglect to mention that the
two successful interventions were eased by the fact that America operated in the
Balkans with the balance-of-power strongly in its favor. Russia in the 1990s was
weak and chaotic under Boris Yeltsins incompetent rule, and thus temporarily
less able to challenge the United States in a region where historically the
czars and commissars had exerted considerable sway. However, Russia, even in the
1990s, still exerted considerable sway in the Caucasus, and thus a Western
response to halt ethnic cleansing there during the same decade was not even
considered. More broadly, the 1990s allowed for ground interventions in the
Balkans because the international climate was relatively benign: China was only
just beginning its naval expansion (endangering our Pacific allies) and
September 11 still lay in the future. Truly, beyond many a moral response lies a
question of power that cannot be explained wholly in terms of morality. Thus ,
to raise morality as a sole arbiter is ultimately not to be serious about

foreign policy. R2P must play as
large a role as realistically possible in the affairs of state. But it cannot
ultimately dominate . Syria is the current and best example of this. U.S.
power is capable of many things, yet putting a complex and war-torn Islamic
societys
house in order is not one of them. In this respect, our tragic experience in
Iraq is indeed relevant. Quick fixes like a no-fly zone and arming the rebels
may topple Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but that might only make President
Barack Obama culpable in midwifing to power a Sunni-Jihadist regime, even as
ethnic cleansing of al-Assads Alawites commences. At least at this late
juncture, without significant numbers of Western boots on the ground for a
significant periodsomething for which there is little public supportthe
likelihood of a better, more stable regime emerging in Damascus is highly
questionable. Frankly, there are just no easy answers here, especially as the
pro-Western regime in Jordan is threatened by continued Syrian violence. R2P

applied in 2011 in Syria might actually have yielded a better strategic result:
it will remain an unknowable. Because moralists in these matters are always
driven by righteous passion, whenever you disagree with them, you are by
definition immoral and deserve no quarter; whereas realists, precisely because
they are used to conflict, are less likely to overreact to it. Realists know
that passion and wise policy rarely flow together. (The late diplomat
Richard Holbrooke was a stunning exception to this rule.) Realists adhere to the
belief of the mid-twentieth-century University of Chicago political scientist,
Hans Morgenthau, who wrote that one must work with the base forces of
human nature, not against them . Thus, realists accept the human material
at hand in any given place, however imperfect that material may be. To wit, you
cant go around
toppling regimes just because you dont like them. Realism, adds Morgenthau,
appeals to historical precedent rather than to abstract principles [of justice]
and aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute
good. No group of people internalized such tragic realizations better than
Republican presidents during the Cold War. Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon,
Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush all practiced amorality, realism, restraint
and humility in foreign affairs (if not all the time). It is their sensibility
that should guide us now. Eisenhower represented a pragmatic compromise within
the Republican Party between isolationists and rabid anti-Communists. All of
these men supported repressive, undemocratic regimes in the third world in
support of a favorable balance of power against the Soviet Union. Nixon accepted
the altogether brutal regimes in the Soviet Union and Red China as legitimate,
even as he balanced one against the other. Reagan spoke the Wilsonian language
of moral rearmament, even as he awarded the key levers of bureaucratic power to
realists like Caspar Weinberger, George Shultz and Frank Carlucci, whose effect
regarding policy was to temper Reagans rhetoric. The elder Bush did not break
relations with China after the Tiananmen uprising; nor did he immediately pledge
support for Lithuania, after that brave little country declared its independence
for fear of antagonizing the Soviet military. It was caution and restraint on
Bushs part that helped bring the Cold War to a largely peaceful and,
therefore, moralconclusion. In some of these policies, the difference between
amorality and morality was, to paraphrase Joseph Conrad in Lord Jim, no more
than the thickness of a sheet of paper. And that is precisely the point:
foreign policy at its best is subtle, innovative, contradictory, and truly
bold only on occasion, aware as its most disciplined practitioners are of
the limits of American power. That is heartrending, simply because calls to
alleviate suffering will in too many instances go unanswered. For the essence of
tragedy is not the triumph of evil over good, so much as the triumph of one good
over another that causes suffering.
Operational Flexibility vs. Precautionary Principles. Even if surrendering
control of America's armed forces to the will of the world community were
acceptable, the U.S. military could not operate effectively under the
R2P doctrine.
Once committed to a military operation with all of its attendant risks, U.S.
armed forces must be allowed the operational freedom to create the conditions to
succeed. However, the R2P doctrine espouses a "proportional means"
limitation to the rules of engagement that would likely hinder the success of
a military intervention. Specifically, the ICISS report suggests that the
"scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be
the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question."[51] In
other words, any intervening armed force may act only to end genocidal acts and
ethnic cleansing -- and go no further. However, a combat environment is
rarely so predictable. Some situations would require the total destruction of
the forces perpetrating the genocide or the overthrow of the government
providing command and control. Yet the ICISS report states that "[t]he effect on
the political system of the country targeted should be limited...to what is
strictly necessary to accomplish the purpose of the intervention."[52] Several
instances of genocide and ethnic cleansing in recent history have occurred with
the complicity and active involvement of a national government and its armed
forces. It is unrealistic to mandate that a military intervention limit its
effect on the political system and its leadership while stopping genocidal
crimes. It is likewise nave to believe that government forces that are
complicit in genocidal acts would cease and desist from committing atrocities
after a military intervention has ended and the intervening troops are
withdrawn. In addition, the R2P doctrine demands that "all the rules of
international humanitarian law should be strictly observed" in the event
of a military intervention.[53] There is, however, widespread debate over
certain crucial aspects of that law. For example, there are major differences
of opinion regarding the classification, treatment, confinement, and trial of
certain classes of enemy combatants. The use of certain weapons, such as
cluster bombs and land mines, is also disputed. The R2P's requirement
of
strict observance of the law of armed conflict is therefore unachievable
because there is broad disagreement on what "strict observance" would
entail.
4.
Holmes 11
Adoption of r2p crushes US hegemony without improving

security
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/04/whose-responsibility-toprotect
Kim R. Holmes, a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, oversaw the
think tanks defense and foreign policy team for more than two decades. Holmes
was Heritages vice president for foreign and defense policy studies and
director of the Davis Institute for International Studies from 1991 through 2012
except for his service, during most of the first term of President George W.
Bush, as assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs.
Holmes priority is writing a book, due in fall 2013, in which he hopes to lay
out a compelling vision for Americas future by uniting Heritages domestic and
foreign policy ideas. Few people bring greater clarity and historical wisdom to
thorny issues than Kim Holmes, Heritage President Edwin J. Feulner said in
announcing the new role on Dec. 5, 2012. Holmes previously directed Heritage's
team of foreign and defense policy experts in four centers on the front lines of
international affairs: the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Studies, the Asian Studies Center, the Center for International Trade and
Economics and the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. Davis also includes the
Washington Roundtable for the Asia-Pacific Press (WRAPP). Holmes joined Heritage
in 1985 and rose to vice president in 1991. He was a founding editor of the
annual Index of Economic Freedom, which has become a signature Heritage
publication. He led the think tanks efforts to convince the United States to
withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He launched Heritages widely
respected homeland security program after September 11, as well as its program
on international trade, and expanded the missile defense program to what it is
today. Holmes left Heritage in late 2001 to serve as an assistant secretary of
state. After rejoining the think tank in 2005, he authored the book Liberty's
Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st Century. Recognized around the
globe as one of Washingtons foremost foreign and defense policy experts, Holmes
is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, where he formerly served on the
Washington Advisory Committee. Previous appointments include the Defense Policy
Board, which is the U.S. defense secretarys primary resource for expert outside
advice; the Board of Directors of the Center for International Private
Enterprise; and public member of the U.S. delegation to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe. While at the State Department, Holmes was
responsible for developing policy and coordinating U.S. engagement at the United
Nations and 46 other international organizations. Important goals achieved at
that time included the U.N. mandates enabling Iraq to make the transition to
democracy; the Security Council's first binding nonproliferation resolution; the
U.N.'s first mandate requiring the Office of Internal Oversight Services to
release reports to member states; an international outcry over Libya's assuming
chairmanship of the Commission on Human Rights, which culminated in that body's
refashioning; and establishment of the U.N. Democracy Caucus and U.N. Democracy
Fund. Holmes earned his doctoral and masters degrees in history from Georgetown
University. He received a bachelors degree in history from the University of
Central Florida in Orlando. He was a research fellow at the Institute for
European History in Germany and adjunct professor of European security and
history at Georgetown University
What are these objectives?
First, to undermine the idea that force should be used only to protect national
security. Advocates argue that protecting civilians is the only just
cause for using force. Defending our allies from attack or even launching
military interventions overseas to take out terrorist bases would, under this
definition, be illegitimate. The second objective is to elevate the
Security Council as the only body that can legitimately authorize the use of
force by any nation, including the U.S. This has obvious implications for
the U.S. Constitution, which recognizes the war-making powers only of the
President and the Congress. Our nation has the bulk of the worlds military
forces. This doctrine would constrain us from using force for our own
protection (except for very obvious invasions). Worse, it leaves our forces
on the hook to intervene overseas at the behest of the Security Council,
at our expense. It relegates our military to the status of U.N.-mandated world
police force.
This makes no sense in terms of U.S. national security or in terms of the
U.N. Charter. Article 51 of the Charter affirms that nations can use military
force for self-defense. The Charter also says that when force is used for other
purposes, it must do so to counter international threats and restore
international peace. And it says nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. In other words, internal abuses
by states are no excuse to intervene. Advocates of the responsibility to protect
may find this provision inconvenient, heartless or even illegitimate. But
thats what the Charter says. As envisioned by many of its supporters, this
doctrine violates the U.N. Charter. The Security Council has pecked away at
national sovereignty for years, justifying arms embargoes, no-fly zones and
sanctions. But it has recently become far more willing to ignore this Charter
restriction in response to perceived threats to civilian security. Before
dismissing the slippery slope argument that the Security Council will someday
claim exclusive jurisdiction over the use of force, remember how far we have
drifted away from the original purposes of the U.N. Charter. Responsibility
to protect is pure sophistry, riddled with contradictions. In reality, it
is a cynical attempt to assert external decision-making powers over the

use of U.S. military force. By trying to change the rules, advocates hope to
delegitimize Americas traditional use of force to defend itself and its
allies and to put that decision in the hands of an international body
that includes Franc, Russia and China . Its easy to see why Russia
e the U.N. to control U.S. decisions to use military
China would want
force. Its not at all clear why a U.S. president would want that.
3.
Groves 8
1.
R2P Bad: Sovereignty
Accepting r2p destroys US sovereignty
While genocide, war crimes, and other atrocities will always be incompatible
with American values, the McCain and Clinton statements raise the issue of
whether preventing genocide and ethnic cleansing would necessarily constitute a
vital U.S. national interest. In some situations, acts of large-scale ethnic
cleansing in some remote nation may indeed affect U.S. national interests.
However, the real question is whether or not the United States should
obligate itself through an international compact to use its military

forces as the rest of the world sees fit in cases of genocide and ethnic
cleansing. Accepting such an obligation would arguably empower other
nations to judge whether U.S. national interests or national values are at
stake. That begs the question of who will decide whether the United States must
commit its limited resources -- including its military forces -- to prevent
atrocities occurring in a foreign land. The R2P doctrine is designed to take
decision making on these crucial issues out of the hands of the United
States and place it in the hands of the international community, operating
through the United Nations. If the United States consented to such a doctrine,
it would effectively surrender its authority to exercise an essential ,

sovereign power. First Principles and National Sovereignty The United
States must not surrender its independence and sovereignty cavalierly. The
Founding
Fathers and subsequent generations of Americans paid a high price to achieve
America's sovereignty and secure the unalienable rights of U.S. citizens. The
government formed by the Founders to safeguard American independence and protect
individual rights derives its powers from the consent of the governed, not from
any other nation or group of nations.[42] Having achieved its independence by
fighting a costly war, America's Founders approached permanent alliances and
foreign entanglements with a fair degree of skepticism. President George
Washington, in his 1796 farewell address, favored extending America's commercial
relations with other nations but warned against extensive political connections.
[43] Washington well understood that legitimate governments are formed only
through gaining the consent of the people. He therefore placed a
high value on the independence that the United States had achieved and was
rightfully dubious about involvement in European intrigues. Integral to
national sovereignty is the right to make authoritative decisions on

foreign policy and national resources, particularly the use of the nation's
military forces. Many of the reasons why America fought the War of
Independence against Great Britain revolved around Britain's taxation of the

American people without their consent and its practice of "declaring themselves
invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever."[44] Once
America gained control of its revenue, natural resources, and industry and had
formed a government separate and apart from any other, the Founders would not
have compromised or delegated its prerogatives to any other nation or group of
nations. Washington rightly warned his countrymen to "steer clear" of such
foreign influence and instead to rely on "temporary alliances for extraordinary
emergencies."[45] The R2P doctrine strikes at the heart of
the Founders'
notion of national sovereignty. The Founders would have deplored the idea
that the United States would cede control -- any control -- of its armed
forces to the caprice
of the world community without the consent of the American people. Washington
stated that the decision to go to war is a key element of national sovereignty
that should be exercised at the discretion of the American government: Our
detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different
course. If we remain one people under an efficient government, the period is not
far off...when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice,
shall counsel.[46] The U.S. interest, guided by justice and exercised with the
consent of the American people, must remain the standard for making decisions of
war and peace. The interest of the international community, which is guided by
its own collective notion of justice and without the consent of the American
people, should not serve as America's barometer, especially when placing the
lives of U.S. military men and women in jeopardy.[47] The United States cannot
rely on world opinion, as expressed through an emerging international norm such
as R2P, to set the proper criteria for the use of U.S. military force. The
commitment to use force must be made exclusively by the U.S. government acting
as an independent, sovereign nation based on its own criteria for military
intervention.[48] In sum, the R2P doctrine does not harmonize with the
first principles of the United States. Adopting a doctrine that binds the
United States to scores of other nations and dictates how it must act to prevent
atrocities is the very sort of foreign entanglement against which Washington
warned us. The United States would betray the Founding Fathers' achievement of
independence and sovereignty if it wholly acceded to the R2P doctrine.
Groves 8
2.
Actively rejecting r2p crucial to maintain sovereignty
Protecting American Sovereignty
Given the recognition of the responsibility to protect doctrine in the 2005
World Summit Outcome Document, as well as the continuing efforts by certain
actors in the international community to promote and operationalize R2P, the
United States should clarify its position on its national sovereignty and the
criteria for the use of its armed forces.
To that end, the United States should:
Maintain its current official position, as set forth in Ambassador Bolton's
letter regarding the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, that the R2P doctrine
does not create a binding legal obligation on the United States to intervene in
another nation for any purpose.
Affirm that the United States need not seek authorization from the U.N.
Security Council, the U.N. General Assembly, the international community, or any
other international organization to use its military forces to prevent acts of
genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other atrocities occurring in another country.
Base its decisions to intervene in the affairs of other nations -- including
punitive economic, diplomatic, political, and military measures -- on U.S.
national interests, not on criteria set forth by the R2P doctrine or any other
international "test."
Scrutinize ongoing efforts by certain actors within the international
community to operationalize and otherwise promote the R2P doctrine in the United
States, the United Nations, the international NGO community, and other
international forums.
Reject the notion thatthe R2P doctrine is an established international norm.
Conclusion
The United States should take no comfort from the fact that, as a party to the
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, it has committed itself only to being
"prepared to take collective action" to end atrocities or that the ICISS report
represents the obligation to prevent atrocities as a mere "responsibility." R2P
advocates are attempting to achieve worldwide consensus that the international
community has an obligation to intervene, with military force if necessary, in
another country to prevent acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other
atrocities. R2P proponents may not be satisfied with anything less than a
multilateral treaty -- a United Nations Convention on the Responsibility to
Protect -- that creates binding legal obligations on its signatories.
The United States should therefore continue to treat the responsibility to
protect doctrine with grave skepticism. The independence won by the Founders and
defended by subsequent generations of Americans should not be squandered, but
rather should be safeguarded from furtive encroachments by the international
community.
Only by maintaining a monopoly on the deployment of diplomatic pressure,
economic sanctions, political coercion, and military forces will the United
States preserve its national sovereignty. Acceding to a set of criteria such as
those set forth by the R2P doctrine would be a dangerous and unnecessary step
toward bolstering the authority of the United Nations and the international
community and would compromise the consent of the American people.
4.
1.
Gay 7/23/13
A2: R2P Expands Sovereignty
Defense of r2p misdefine sovereignty the redefinition still

erodes it
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-deceptive-appeal-theresponsibility-protect-8764
John Allen Gay is an assistant managing editor at The National Interest. His
book (co-authored with Geoffrey Kemp) War with Iran: Political, Military, and
Economic Consequences was released by Rowman and Littlefield in early 2013, The
National Interest, July 23, The Deceptive Appeal of the Responsibility to
Protect, DOA: 12-7-14
The third pillar is where the rub is. The notion that the international
community has an obligation to become involved in a country under certain
circumstances, regardless of what its government says, appears to erode
national sovereignty. Albright and Williamson charge that this is a
misperceptionin fact, they say, R2P is designed to reinforce, not undermine,
national sovereignty. It places primary emphasis on the duty of states to
protect their own people and its complementary focus on helping governments
improve their capacities to fulfill their commitments. In other words, R2P
expands the concept of sovereigntysovereignty includes not only rights, but
also responsibilities, responsibilities which states should help each other
fulfill. Sovereignty here is so sacrosanct that states failing to exercise it
fully lose their title to itOnly when a government fails or refuses to live up
to the responsibility of sovereignty does it run the risk of outside
intervention. Yet this is a curious way to construe sovereignty.
Sovereignty becomes not merely an empirical fact about states that is
prudently respected, but a right entrusted from on high; given that the right
passes to the international community when abused, it would seem this
sovereignty sees the world as a federation. International institutionstreated
in the report as the final authorities on third-pillar actionsgraciously
devolve their responsibilities to local viceroys and governors-general, whom it
may relieve of their duties if their failures are severe enough. Its not really
sovereignty, thenits mere administrative convenience.
5.
Gay 7/23/13
A2: R2P Doesnt kill Sovereignty - its Preventive

1.
Even if its prevention, the doctrine still kills sovereignty
Albright and Williamson might reply that all these worries repeat the error
of assuming that R2P is mainly about its third pillar, when in fact R2P is at
its core an instrument of prevention. It does not mandate military action by
the United States or others. The idea is to generate preventive diplomacy,
increased development aid, sanctions, and other tools to avoid the military
options that might be necessary when prevention fails and atrocities commence.
The second pillar, for them, bears the most weight. et the way Albright and
Williamson envision this pillar working is also a threat to sovereignty . They
imply this in the Politico op-ed they released to plug the report, as they note
that Syria today presents us with a stark reminder of the high human costs of
equivocation.
As Assad began to turn state organs into his own tool of repression, R2Ps
preventive underpinnings were rightfully called into question... Indeed.
No preventive action could have kept Assad from turning the states
institutions into tools of repression while also respecting Syrian
sovereignty, because Assads rule was already repressive. As in most
autocracies, the government could not become less repressive without endangering
its continued hold on power. Assad was thus likely to regard the second-pillar
efforts that would have been necessary to stabilize prewar Syria as a threat,
and to refuse them. (Indeed, other autocracies, such as Russia and Egypt, have
similarly refused such help.) So should these second-pillar measures be
conducted over a governments objections? If not, theyll often be
insufficient; if so, sovereignty is further eroded. Yet Albright and
Williamson pass over this problem in silence.
6.
Menon 6/12/13
1.
A2: Safeguards Protect Sovereignty

R2P safeguards AUGMENT erosion of sovereignty
http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/06/12/its-fatally-flawed/
Rajan Menon is Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science, City
College of New York/City University of New York, and a senior fellow at the
Atlantic Council.
R2Ps originators anticipated that any prescription perceived as proposing lax
criteria for the use of force would be dead on arrival, so the ICISS report and
follow-on publications of its ilk have bowed before the shrine of
sovereignty. They affirm that the obligation to protect people rests in the
first instance with the governments that have jurisdiction over them, but they
add that when a state cannot or will not protect human rights, the
responsibility shifts to the international community, which means, ideally, the
UN girded with Security Council authorization, or in a pinch regional
organizations if they promise subsequently to seek UNSCR approval. R2P
proponents take pains to explain that the concept is not a pretext for military
intervention. Force, Gareth Evans tirelessly reiterates, should be used only
during human rights emergencies and only following the failure of diplomacy,
mediation, naming and shaming, and sanctions. Even then, he stresses,
feasibility, risks, proportionality and the prospects for success must be
weighed. (There is more than a dollop of just war theory in R2P; Augustine and
Aquinas would be proud.) R2Ps expositors also recommend various preventive
measures: early-warning mechanisms, pre-crisis mediation, peacekeeping,
economic assistance and post-conflict reconstruction.2 Yet the reassurances
that force would be a rare, last-ditch response have not placated critics,
for several reasons. R2Ps pre-intervention prescriptions merely repeat
existing remedies and add nothing to diplomacys toolkit. Whats new is the
casuistry of reframing and diminishing sovereignty in order to

legitimize altruistic armed intervention in defense of the abstract rights
that most political communities agree upon in theory. Given R2Ps emphasis on
feasibility and the chances for success, weak states are its most likely
proving
grounds; powerful ones need not fear, no matter the magnitude of their
misdeeds. Because idealism and power are inextricably intertwined, with the
latter frequently corrupting the former, R2P provides powerful states one script
for playing the Good Samaritan when intervention promotes their interests, and
another for eschewing or opposing aid when it doesnt.
7.
1.
Chirstensen 3/2/12
A2: N/U Sovereignty is Down Now

is unique sovereignty is strong HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION is the ONLY cause
http://notesonliberty.com/2012/03/02/bizarre-love-triangle-towards-a-newinternationalism/
Brandon Christensen (follow him on Twitter) received his B.A. in cultural
anthropology from UCLA in 2013, where he also minored in Middle Eastern and
African studies. His writings have been featured in the Freeman and at
RealClearHistory. He was born in the middle of Utah, raised in a small Northern
California town, and spent two years attending a community college in Santa Cruz
before moving to Los Angeles. He is interested in pre-colonial polities,
property rights, ethnicity, and international trade.
Perhaps, but I strongly disagree with Dr. Larisons observations here. Not
with the notion that weaker states have selfish interests too, but rather with
the argument that state sovereignty has been eroding precipitously over the
past twenty years. To the isolationist, free trade and international governance
(including military alliances) are necessarily bad things for a state and its
sovereignty, because these concepts are perceived to be taking away from the
ability of a state to make decisions in its own interests. Yet the major
powers and, to a lesser extent, the regional powers of the world are largely
able
to do what they want in terms of formulating domestic and foreign policies.
Just think of the recent attempt by Brazil and Turkey to get Iran to play nice
with its nuclear technology. With the exception of the United States in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the weak states of the world and their predation by major
powers seems only to be occurring along peripheries of the major powers
territories, specifically in the region of the world traditionally under Russian
influence. And even these predatory practices of the Russian state are largely
aimed at defending Moscows peripheries from the incursions into region by the
American state. So I would look at the situation of weak states outside the
peripheries of great powers not as a steady erosion of state sovereignty, but as
the last stage of colonization by Europeans a century ago. The weakness in these
states was inherent from the beginning, as they were largely constructed to
extract resources for shipment to European industry and to ensure that recently
conquered non-Western rivals, whether monarchies, confederations, city-states,
or empires, remained conquered once and for all. In order for a state to have
sovereignty, it needs to be recognized by its own people as legitimate, and not
by major powers (though it certainly helps!), and the structure of weak states,
at least outside the peripheries of major powers, is illegitimate in the eyes of
most the people living within these states. Dr. Larison continues: If there is
one thing more misguided than organizing foreign policy around humanitarian
and democratist meddling in the affairs of other nations, it has to be the
revival of the liberal nationalist conceit that there should be an independent
nation-state for every group that wants one. Hardly. The Wilsonian notions
of humanitarian intervention and democratic nation-building

are easily
the most misguided
ideals being espoused throughout Washington today, and the fact that some of
the idealists over at Foreign Policy have latched onto liberal nationalism as a
way to promote their misguided policies should not deter us from the fact that
the United States has not pursued nor promoted liberal nationalism in its
foreign policy since Wilsons disastrous meddling in Europe over (nearly) a
century ago. Let us be clear: the NATO excursions into the Balkans had nothing
to do with promoting liberal nationalism, and everything to do with humanitarian
intervention, democratic state-building, and geostrategic maneuvering. The
military excursions into Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, and God knows
where else over the past twenty years have nothing to do with the concept of
liberal nationalism and everything to do with humanitarian intervention,
democratic state-building, and/or geostrategic maneuvering. Liberal
nationalism, as it is promoted by the idealists, is extremely new on the
scene in D.C. and is probably just one of the many, many fads that swing
through the capital and are used to apply humanitarian intervention and
democratic state-building to foreign policy proposals.
8.
1.
Sovereignty Impact
Global adoption of R2P causes great power wars denial of

sovereignty.
Trombly 11
Dan Trombly, GWU IR Grad Student, 8-27-2011 The upending of sovereignty
http://slouchingcolumbia.wordpress.com/2011/08/27/the -upending-of-sovereignty/
The second dangerous element is that on the international scale, the potential for creating
serious enmity among the great powers. The importance of consensus belies the reality of
how consensus is formed, not by automatic recognition but by a careful negotiation of
interests and calculation of threats. Yet the more we choose, falsely, to view R2P as simply a
norm which automatically initiates a series of actions to enforce itself, the more tension we
are likely to provoke when this imagined process hits against the friction of world politics
. While
as they actually
are I have predicted that military limitations by US allies in power projection and the
increasing ability of countries to deny the US ability to unilaterally project power itself will make the
implementation of R2P unlikely beyond Africa or certain parts of the Middle East, even the attempts to apply
it in the backyard of China or Russia could seriously destabilize the international system. For the US to
seek to implement a norm which in theory only a UNSC veto prevents from being
employed against China in that countrys backyard would be a serious escalation of
tensions
in utter
denial of the
.
type
of asovereign,
qualified
space
is denial
seeking
to
create in and
its own
neighborhood
is not
plot by great
powers. But
it isChina
a radical
of the
historic purpose of sovereignty, which was
R2Pnot to protect societies from foreign states, but to protect society
from itself. But rather than empowering a global society, it will empower the great powers of the
international system, along with those societies whose appeals suit their perceived
interests. It is built on a fundamentally untenable illusion of consensus among great powers
which will not endure a crisis in a more strategically meaningful area of the world. Should
activists succeed in convincing great powers that societies of affected states can legitimize the actions of
intervening states, and jus ad bello trump the need for the impossible-to-enforce consensus, the results
will seriously challenge the basis of amicable great power relations in the first place.
9.
1.
Gay 7/23/13
R2P Increase War Moral Hazard (Syria/Iran)

R2P incentivizes war deal-making it rules out compromise.
Specifically drives Assad and militias
The R2P concept of sovereignty can also give bad actors like Assad
perverse incentives . A case in point is threats to bring those behind

atrocities before international courtsthreats made in Albright and Williamsons
report. Assad is
hardly more likely to seek peace and step down if he thinks that might see
him brought before the International Criminal Court and thrown in prison
for decades. Such a risk is all the more reason to hang on desperately
and to keep inflicting horrors on his people. Second-pillar actions, too,
could make him more troublesome. If the international community insists that
states
accept outside efforts to change their politics, autocracies will have
incentives to resist the international community; those within autocratic
regimes who benefit from their positions have incentives to spoil the deal.
And the resistance can be quite destructive, endangering international
stability and even causing atrocities. Irans support for terrorist groups
and
sectarian militias
dynamic .
throughout the Middle East may be driven
in part by this
10. R2P Increases War Moral Hazard

Beaumont 5/4/13
1.
Moral hazard blocks negotiated solutions
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/04/un-syria-duty-to-intervene
Peter Beaumont writes on foreign affairs for the Guardian and Observer. He has
reported extensively from conflict zones including Africa, the Balkans and the
Middle East, and has reported widely on human rights issues and the impact of
conflict on civilians. The winner of the George Orwell Prize for his reports
from Iraq he is the author of The Secret Life of War: Journeys Through Modern
Conflict
Jennifer Walsh, professor of international relations at Oxford University who
has studied the development of R2P, agrees with Evans's analysis. But she also
identifies a "moral hazard" inherent in R2P that it can create a
perception
in conflicts that a rebel force may be only a regime-sponsored atrocity
away from international interveners coming to its aid. The incentive for
rebels to find a negotiated solution is thus reduced.
Menon 6/12/13
2.
Serbia proves moral hazard
Atlantic Council.
Those who start wars are often confident that they know how they will end. They
are just as often proved wrong. Idealistic humanitarian interveners, a subspecies of such hubristic planners, congratulate themselves on their highmindedness, which leads most of them to assume that if no self-interested
motives attach to their intentions, then no self-interested consequences can
emerge from them. Of course this is absurd. One result of NATOs (eventual)
decision to strike Bosnian Serb forces in 1995, very popular among the
soon-to-be-hatched R2P brood, was to alter the political balance within the
Kosovar Albanian opposition. The Dayton deal skirted Kosovo, confirming most
Kosovars belief that the world couldnt care less about their plight. The new
context helped the KLA but, as already noted, shaped the ferocity of its
tactics. In response, Serb forces mounted a major counterinsurgency campaign.
Indeed, the multiplication of Western calls to do something had the
perverse effect of inducing Slobodan Milosevic to ramp up the killings and
expulsions. Once NATO started bombing, Milosevic moved even faster and more
ruthlessly to quash the KLA, but NATO still limited itself to airpower and
restricted pilots to safe altitudes. The result? In less than three months after
NATO began bombing, Serbian troops killed some 10,000 people in Kosovo and
drove another 1.4 million from their homes. The shallowness of the alliances
commitment to humanitarian principles was revealed when it chose to conduct a
campaign that would produce minimal, ideally zero, casualties for its own
soldiers, no matter the horrendous consequences for the people it had intervened
to protect. NATOs defenders say that it did not do the killing and expelling,
that Milosevic was responsible and that he would have done what he did anyway.
Yes, the Serbian leadership unquestionably bears responsibility; yes, atrocities
occurred before NATO acted; but there can be no doubt that the scale and
duration of Serbian atrocities owed much to NATOs intervention. The selfexculpatory claim that what happened would have happened is unpersuasive. It is
also worth noting in passing what the Kosovar victory enableda set of concerns
almost universally ignored in Western accounts of the war. NATO defended the
intervention as a response to killings and ethnic cleansing, but after the
war Albanians killed many Serb civilians and forced thousands of Serbs
and Roma from their homes even as NATO troops (organized as KFOR) were
moving in to secure Kosovo. The KLA maintained detention centers in Albania

where several hundreds of Serbs and other minorities, plus Albanians suspected
of complicity with the Serb authorities, were held. Some were tortured, others
killedin some cases after their organs were removed for sale by Albanian
criminal networks.6
High-ranking KLA officials participated in some of these activities. Before the
war, in those parts of Kosovo not controlled by Serb forces, criminal clans,
again involving KLA leaders, seized industries, natural resources and property,
foreshadowing the massive corruption and criminality that mark Kosovo today.
None of this ever excited much passion in Brussels or Washington; nor were
European governments welcoming toward refugees fleeing Kosovo. Their focus was
on Serb atrocities. The KLA, which had gained in stature partly because the
United States and Europe embraced it as a war partner and as the legitimate
representative of Kosovar resistance, got a pass. In humanitarian
interventions Manichean world of artificial passion plays, there are no shades
of gray. Unintended consequences are either ignored or blamed on others.
Stefan Bauschard
Offensive PKOs release
100
1001
Stefan Bauschard
101
1011
11. Moral Hazard: Secessionism

Janik 13
1.
R2P sparks global secessionism through moral hazard
Janik, Ralph R. A., The Responsibility to Protect as an Impetus for Secessionist

Movements: On the Necessity to Re-Think Territorial Integrity (December 6,
2013). Matthias Kettemann (ed), Grenzen im Vlkerrecht (Jan Sramek Verlag,
2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364478
Ralph Janik is research assistant of Prof. August Reinisch and lecturer at the
University of Vienna. After completing his studies in law and political science
at the University of Vienna and the Universidad Alcala de Henares (Madrid) , he
has worked inter alia as a research assistant in the project International Law
through the National Prism: The Impact of Judicial Dialogue at the University
of Vienna, Section for International Law and International Relations , as well
as at the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam, where he also obtained his
postgraduate LL.M. degree in international law
The historical and political roots of such secessionist struggles will be
briefly outlined in the next section, which is followed by a short overview on
the legal framework regarding secessionist claims. After having discussed the
extent to which law has a say in this subject matter and the possibility of
secession as a remedial , ultima ratio right under extraordinary
circumstances, the following part will then proceed to demonstrate that
secession is increasingly gaining factual and legal importance in light of
the increasing tendency to deal with intra-state conflicts on the

international plane instead of treating these as essentially domestic matters.
The last step in this development has been the emergence of the concept of the
Reponsibility to Protect which essentially enshrines the duty of states

to protect their respective populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity and also de lege ferenda obligations upon
the international community to act once a state is unable or unwilling to
protect its population from such acts or even carrying out these serious human
rights violations itself. As will be shown however, this concept does not only
have positive effects but may also constitute an incentive for secessionist
movements to actively provoke the government they are fighting to react
in a manner that might force the international community to step up with at
least some kind of international support on their behalf. Here, one needs to
bear in mind that such support might decisively shift the balance of power
towards the otherwise clearly disadvantaged secessionist group. This incentive
is further fostered by the fact that massive state retaliation may also provide
the basis for the
above-mentioned right to remedial secession , thereby also influencing the
international community in its subsequent assessment of the pressing issue of
recognition. Assuming that such a nexus of the Responsibility to Protect and the
right to remedial secession indeed exists, the international community could
thus often unknowingly and unintentionally become the midwife of new

states. That would call for a fundamental re-conceptualization either of the
attitude towards secessionism or that towards intervention on humanitarian

grounds; this point will be addressed in the last part, which will be followed
by a conclusion.
12.
Janik 13
1.
Secession: A2: Alternative Causality
R2P is the CRUCIAL determinant of global secessionism
Janik, Ralph R. A., The Responsibility to Protect as an Impetus for Secessionist

Movements: On the Necessity to Re-Think Territorial Integrity (December 6,
2013). Matthias Kettemann (ed), Grenzen im Vlkerrecht (Jan Sramek Verlag,
2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364478
Ralph Janik is research assistant of Prof. August Reinisch and lecturer at the
University of Vienna. After completing his studies in law and political science
at the University of Vienna and the Universidad Alcala de Henares (Madrid) , he
has worked inter alia as a research assistant in the project International Law
through the National Prism: The Impact of Judicial Dialogue at the University
of Vienna, Section for International Law and International Relations , as well
as at the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam, where he also obtained his
postgraduate LL.M. degree in international law
It is all too likely that, due to the change in attitude towards
intervention in civil wars, often fought over secessionist demands, as
well as regarding recognition of thereby possibly emerging states, such
conflicts are here to
stay and may well increase in the future. This would particularly but
not exclusively affect countries composed by many ( easily ) separable
groups living in more or less distinct territories without sharing any
sense of
community or even solidarity. The possibility of a doubled moral hazard
caused by the interplay of remedial secession and the prospect of outside
intervention is thus of crucial significance for the future of the
international legal order.
Yet, this effect in general and regarding
secession in particular has largely

remained ignored both by practitioners and theorists. Rather, scholars
usually seem reluctant to voice fundamental criticism in connection with
the advances in connection with the use of force on humanitarian grounds,
especially upon authorization by the Security Council, in fear of being seen as
advocates of oppressive regimes. At the same time, states seem to avoid or
simply not consider the possibility of this very issue in their shortterm
pursuance of strategic goals, while they are keen on avoiding the creation of
any precedence at all costs and regardless of the facts. In the case of Kosovo
for instance, the intervening countries simply emphasized that the conflict was
not an issue of an attempt to secession but a humanitarian catastrophe that had
made the use of force necessary to stop and prevent a regime from gross human
rights abuses. 107 Nanda, Self-Determination, 279. 108
13.
Larison 11
1.
Secession Spills Over
Secession linked globally spills over
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-wages-of-kosovo-and-southsudan/
Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He
has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News,
Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and is a
columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of
Chicago, and resides in Dallas.
This is always very easy for others with nothing at stake to say. Sudans
break-up doesnt threaten the rest of Africa until it provides the

precedent in other countries for similar independence movements. Kosovo was
supposed to be exceptional, too, until recognition of its independence
more or less directly led to the effective partition of Georgia. When the
U.S. and other states recognized Kosovo, few believed that it could have an
effect on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but it did. How many countries will suffer
from greater instability because self-determination prevailed in Sudan? Once
major powers start re-drawing borders to satisfy the demands of selfdetermination or other concerns, there is no obvious place to stop .
Kosovos example isnt supposed to have any effect on the situation in
Karabakh, either, but why
are the people in Karabakh and Armenia bound by this Western assumption?
Supporters of the secession of South Sudan have to take into account the
possibility that the success of the southern Sudanese in achieving
independence will encourage other separatist and automomist movements in
Africa and elsewhere. In many ways, African nation-states are among the most
arbitrary, artificial creations in the entire world, but that doesnt mean that
splitting them up into equally artificial, less viable statelets will make
things any better. Kosovos separation from Serbia and eventual independence
empowered a gang of criminals.
2.
Byman and Pollock 12
Secession creates a domino effect
Byman, Daniel, and Kenneth Pollack. "The Syrian Spillover." Foreign Policy
(2012).
Kenneth Michael Pollack, PhD, is a noted former CIA intelligence analyst and
expert on Middle East politics and military affairs.
Dr. Daniel L. Byman is a professor at Georgetown University's Walsh School of
Foreign Service in the Security Studies Program and Department of Government
Secessionism: As the Balkan countries demonstrated in the 1990s, seemingly
triumphant secessionist bids can set off a domino efect . Slovenia's
declaration of independence inspired Croatia, which prompted Bosnia to do
the same, which encouraged Macedonia, and then Kosovo. Strife and conflict
followed all of these declarations. Sometimes it is the desire of one subgroup
within a state to break away that triggers the civil war in the first place. In
other cases, different groups vie for control of the state, but as the
fighting drags on, one or more groups may decide that their only recourse is
to secede. At times, a minority comfortable under the old regime may fear
discrimination from a new government. The South Ossetians, for example,
accepted Russian rule but rebelled when Georgia broke off from the Soviet Union,
as they feared they would face discrimination in the new Georgian state. After
Russia helped South Ossetia defeat the Georgian forces that tried to re-conquer
the area in 1991-1992, the next domino fell when ethnic Abkhaz also rebelled and
created their own independent area in 1991-1992. The frozen conflict that
resulted from this civil war finally burst into an international shooting war
between Georgia and Russia in August 2008.
14.
1.
Holmes 1/7/14
R2P Fails: A2 Good
Self-interest and UN charter structurally precludes effective

R2P
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/1/the-weakness-of-theresponsibility-to-protect-as-an-international-norm
history at Georgetown University.
Over the last 60 years, additional international conventions and United Nations
resolutions have also established norms and standards of international

humanitarian law. These include the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its
subsequent Protocols. Although not sidestepping the respect for national
sovereignty still embedded in the U.N. Charter (and thus the right of the
Security Council to decide ultimately questions of international peace), these
conventions and resolutions did quite consciously stretch the boundaries of old
definitions of sovereignty. They not only diminished the legitimacy of national
sovereignty but also broadened the scope of action that international bodies
could take in defense of human rights and to protect against genocide and mass
murder. It was always a balancing act, but there was inherent tension between
the rights of national sovereigntywhich the U.N. General Assembly and Security
Council jealously protected and the rights of individuals to protectionwhich
were championed in such bodies as the Human Rights Council, the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the human rights treaty bodies.
The resolutions on R2P ratified by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005 tried to
overcome these tensions, but it still recognized the ultimate authority of
the Security Council. Each state had a responsibility to protect its
population, the resolution said, but collective action was to be taken through
the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on
a case-by-case basis. In other words, only the Security Council could decide
whether an intervention of the international community should be undertaken,
which implied not only the rights of the veto of the Permanent Five (P-5)
members (including the United States), but also that the universal humanitarian
legal principles supposedly established by the R2P resolution were still
subordinate to the principles of national sovereignty--to rights of the P-5
members in particular.
Why does this matter? Because it points to the fact that R2P is a mere
aspiration,
as opposed to a real principle of international norms or
even law. R2P sometimes not only runs against the practices of Realpolitik
(where national
sovereignty still reigns supreme), but more importantly, it is at odds with a
fundamental principle of the United Nations itselfnamely, the ultimate
legal deference to national sovereignty
as decided by the national members

of the Security Council. The Council may approve of the concept with respect to
Libya but does
not do so in Syria because certain members of the P-5 (namely Russia) object. In
that difference is the ultimate weakness of R2P as a principle . The
opposition of Russia to a Syria intervention, for example, reveals that no
matter what Moscow may think about R2P as a principle, it will not adhere to it
if it violates its
national interests. Frankly, as a matter of principle, the United States as a P5 member more or less does the same thing. Regardless of what the General
Assembly may say, it is the actions of the Security Council that count in
international peace and stability. If there is no consensus among the P-5 on
how R2P should be followed, or subsequent observance of any agreement on it in
practice, then it will never survive as a viable legal or normative
principle of international order.
2.
Holmes 1/7/14
R2p fails humanitarian intervention without the pretext

solves better
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/1/the-weakness-of-theresponsibility-to-protect-as-an-international-norm

Finally, there is the question of how R2P affects the United States. Since the
U.S. has a veto on the U.N. Security Council, it will never be forced to send an
armed force in defense of the R2P principle against its will. But that is not
the real concern. Rather, it is that, over time, the norm will be established
that the only proper use of American military force is for the kinds of
humanitarian operations implied by the R2P principle. Woodward and Morrison
imply such a norm when they say R2P is arguably the most radical adjustment to
sovereignty since the Peace of Westphalia was signed in 1648. The authors see
this as a positive development, rather than as a concern for the use of force.
They envision it as a revolutionary advance, a victory for democracy because it
pledges to support sovereign rule only when it protects the populace it

governs. Undermining national sovereignty as a principle is a double-edged
sword for the United States. As any U.S. diplomat with U.N. experience will tell
you, many nations around the world are all too happy to downplay national
sovereignty if it means criticizing the internal practices of the United States
or Israel. And yet they jealously defend that sovereignty when it comes to their
own acts. More fundamentally, however, the purposes of U.S. armed forces are
still, first and foremost, to defend the sovereignty, security and freedom of
the American people. They are not primarily mercenary forces to be deployed at
the behest of a U.N. body, no matter how well intended that mission may be.
Therefore, significantly altering U.S. military missions or planning to
accommodate the R2P doctrine would be misguided. After all is said and
done, R2P is not really a principle but an
, and a rather weak
one
at that. Its defenders often say, The fact aspiration
that we cannot protect people
everywhere is no reason for doing nothing when we can. In other words, they
argue that intervening in the face of mass murder is an option that cannot be
relinquished. That is true. But we dont need R2P to have that option.
Whether the U.N. Security Council authorizes such an intervention will
always be a practical judgment, at the discretion of sovereign members of
the UNSC, and depending on all sorts of circumstances. And it is these
exceptions that
illuminate the weakness of R2P as a principle. The problem with R2P is

that its reality never lives up to its high-sounding principles. If it
wanted to, the Security Council could have intervened to stop genocide in
Rwanda and elsewhere. The reason it didnt are the same ones that will
likely keep it from doing so elsewhere in the future. Ultimately R2P is
riddled with too many contradictions and practical problems to make it a
serious doctrine for implementation by U.S. strategy. It mainly comes down
to an argument of moral suasion to intervene against mass murder and
genocide, which one can make without resorting to tortured arguments
about supposed international principles or even the proper purposes of
warfare, and
certainly
without damaging
Holmes 11
3.
the vital notion of national sovereignty.
Scattershot application means fail
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/04/whose-responsibility-toprotect
The 1990s genocides in Srebrenica and Rwanda sparked U.N. debate on how to
prevent such massacres. This led to a 2001 U.N.-commissioned study, The
Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty. That report laid out the doctrines main
ideas: All nations have a responsibility to protect their citizens from largescale loss of life or ethnic cleansing, and if a nation failed to do this, the
international community working through the U.N. had a responsibility to
protect the aggrieved population. The U.N. General Assembly enshrined this idea
in the 2005 Millennium Summit Outcome Document. The U.S. accepted, but
stipulated that the document did not obligate nations to intervene. The
Security Council subsequently reaffirmed the responsibility lines on several
occasions, most recently in this years first Libyan resolution. It referenced
the authorities responsibility to protect its population. There are many
problems with this idea. First is the hypocrisy of protecting one
population while ignoring others. Why intervene with force to stop a
potential massacre in Libya and ignore real genocide in Sudans Darfur region?
Why were some of the same people who advocate a responsibility to protect in
Libya so fiercely opposed to intervening in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein killed
about 300,000 civilians? Given its scattershot application, responsibility
to protect fails as a principle .
Stefan Bauschard
110
1101
Stefan Bauschard
1.
Mahoney 10/22/13
15.
R2P Bad: Bias
111
1111
Prefer our evidence r2p good cards tainted by promilitary

bias
http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/liam-mahony/myth-of-militarymight-in-r2p-choices
Liam Mahony has been working in the field of civilian protection and human
rights since the 1980s. Author of Proactive Presence: Field Strategies for
Civilian Protection, he has done extensive fieldwork in many countries, and is a
pioneer in the theory and practice of international protection. A former
lecturer in Human Rights at Princeton University, he co-founded Fieldview
Solutions and through it has led analysis and training for hundreds of UN and
NGO protection staff deployed in conflict zones.
In the debat over Responsibility-to- , assumptions, cultural myths and

languagee conspire toProtect
promote unwise military action. The effectiveness of
military responses to conflict has become unconsciously and widely assumed. Are
military responses so popular because objective scientific study has proven
their efficacy? Or does this debate mostly reflect the daily teaching in many
cultures throughout the world, that the bigger stick always wins? The
promotion of violent force as the problem-solving option of last resort

pervades popular culture from Hollywood to school history curricula. And
it pervades this debate .
R2P proponents insist that their doctrine prefers non-military approaches. But
the language of the debate suggests otherwise: robust by definition means strong
and healthy, but in the international communitys debate over approaches to
conflict it is usually a synonym for military and violent. The double-edged
phrase last resort implies both that the military option has great risks but
also that if all other means fail, this is the one that will work. Gareth Evans
piece in this debate, for instance, refers to the military option as something
to be considered when no lesser measure is available. With thousands of lives
at stake, why would we settle for lesser measures? Such language, so
frequently used even by those who are honestly committed to civilian protection,
inevitably supports calls for military action, even if it is unwise. The
implicit message is that the only really serious action is military

action. Everything else is weak and half-hearted. This language also
invites world powers like the US to clothe their military aspirations in
humanitarian rhetoric, regardless of whether their intent or final impact
helps civilians on the ground. Syria, with its consistent support to Hezbollah,
has been considered an enemy by the US for decades. Can we seriously be
considering that the US is all of a sudden engaging now out of concern for
Syrians civilians? The US is already engaged militarily supporting one side in
this war, and the civilian death toll has only increased as a result. If
anything, the debate regarding how best to protect civilians in Syria is much
too late the balance of consequences for civilians should have been assessed
before the first military or political support was offered to the rebels, back
in 2011. I have had the opportunity to spend some time in the Democratic
Republic of Congo in recent years, assessing strategies for the protection of
civilians, in a situation where the international community and the UN have put
all their eggs in the military basket. Many Congolese themselves are also
Stefan Bauschard
111
1111
desperately hoping for military salvation. Yet after a decade of blue berets and
billions of dollars spent, civilians remain totally vulnerable to privations
from armed groups as well as from the (UN-supported) Congolese military. This
year the UN was faced with broad-based pressure to do something more. Despite
there being no objective assessment of the real protective impact on the
Congolese people of the current militarized approach, the only new strategy
they could come up with was to strengthen the military approach and approve a UN
force with an explicit offensive mandate: more military, more robustly
offensive. Interestingly, a recent study looking at a different type of
conflict resistance movements against repressive regimes suggests that in
the last hundred years, unarmed resistance movements were more successful
at achieving their objectives than armed ones. (Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J.
Stephan. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent
Conflict.) With adequate research, the hypothesis of a correlation in
international interventions between military force and protective impact
might be shown to be valid, or it might not. But in the meantime it is
largely a myth , a heuristic simplification that gives us a too-readilyavailable and simple answer to complex situations. It is also a myth that
gives many people
hope, because we deeply wish that there were a quick solution to the human
suffering we are witnessing in the conflicts that prompt these debates.
Decision-makers truly concerned with protecting civilians need to recognize
this unconscious assumption that privileges the military option . Rather
than
reacting to knee-jerk pressures to do something, or to do more, policy decisions
should be based on a careful context-based analysis of each particular case, and
an extremely cautious assessment of reasonable expectations of consequences.
This kind of assessment is necessary before military action, before economic
sanctions, or any other pressure. Those in power who order atrocities - whether
President Assad or an armed group leader in the Congo - are most often
interested in sustaining or increasing their own power. Such power is political,
economic, and military and it depends on their relationships with others. A
strategy to protect civilians must examine the real interests of these people,
identifying all the political, economic and military relationships they have
that present opportunities for leverage. From that analysis, a nuanced and more
complex strategy would combine the range of tools of leverage available. These
in turn would be tailored to maximize their combined impact, and the strategy
would assess the projected balance of consequences with an emphasis on
minimizing negative impacts on civilians. Those in power who order violence
against civilians are usually linked to a range of powerful economic interests,
and may be even more sensitive to economic pressures than to military ones. (In
fact, external military threats can sometimes serve to strengthen domestic
support for a targeted group consider how Hezbollah has benefitted from
Israeli attacks on Lebanon.) Economic sanctions are not a panacea, either, and
may well in some cases hurt civilians far more than can be justified by their
impact. Further, just as military decisions tend to be based on geo-politics
divorced from the interests of civilians, decisions about economic measures tend
to be skewed in the interests of economic power brokers for whom sacrificing
profits for humanitarian gain is unacceptable. It should not be surprising that
we cannot control the arms trade, for instance, when huge multinational
interests in the US and Europe make so much money from it; or that we have
difficulty fully implementing other kinds of smart sanctions even when they
have UN Security Council backing. The fact that sanctions so seldom effectively
target the wealthy, but instead too often inflict greater suffering on the poor,
is no accident. The point here is not that economic measures are better or worse
than military ones, but rather that there is no self-evident hierarchy among
them. If wise decisions are to be made, the costs and benefits of

different measures must be carefully assessed, based on past experiences
and on the real dynamics of each current context. But this is not what is
happening.
Instead, the debate
is dominated by myths, bias and rhetoric . The crucial
assessment of the expected balance of consequences has become a phrase for s
oundbite s, rather than an analytical prerequisite to action . As long as the

military option is perceived as
more potentially effective than it is in reality, and economic and political
pressures considered less effective than they might be, unwise decisions result.
That is the f undamental nature of bias.
16.
1.
De Waal 12
R2P = Genocide (Sudan/Syria)
R2p derails effective genocide prevention abandoning it is

key to Syria and Sudan
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/opinion/how-to-end-mass-atrocities.html?_r=0
Alex de Waal is executive director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher
School, Tufts University., How to End Mass Atrocities, New York Times, March 10,
DOA: 12-7-14
High from last years interventions in Libya and Ivory Coast, Evans wrote
triumphantly in Foreign Policy last December that those missions brought an end
to most of the confused debates about humanitarian intervention. The vision he,
Power and fellow idealists share is to send the cavalry over the hill not only
to stop any massacres but also to herald justice and democracy. If only it were
that simple. In the face of evil, the idealists tend to turn righteous and
forget to ask important questions about what they want to achieve and
how. The result is a misrepresentation of history and a misunderstanding of
the measures that can most efectively halt atrocities today. One major
problem is that the idealists tend to misconstrue or overlook the
fundamental motivations of perpetrators. They typically see the killers as
insatiable. This is understandable because they are driven by the memory of the
Holocaust and the
Rwandan genocide. But the Nazis and Hutus were exceptional for making the
extermination of a people essential to their politics. Most mass killers have
other goals. In many cases, the perpetrators simply stop killing when they have
reached their goals, become exhausted, fallen out among themselves or been
defeated. Take the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70. Despite a blockade of the
secessionist province of Biafra and the genocidal rhetoric of some Nigerian
leaders, the killing ended when the Biafran rebels finally fell to Nigerian
forces. Having achieved their military aim, the Nigerians then began a process
of reconciliation and reconstruction under the banner no victor, no
vanquished. In Guatemala, the perpetrators of the 1980-83 massacres of Mayan
communities suspected of supporting Communist insurgents called an end to the
atrocities after defeating the rebels. In Indonesia, the generals stopped
killing the Communists in 1966 once the group no longer posed a threat. The
soldiers of President Milton Obote massacred tens of thousands of people in
Ugandas Luwero Triangle in 1983-4 until they were defeated on the
battlefield. Likewise, the killings in East Pakistan ended with Indias invasion
in 1971 and the Khmer Rouges atrocities in Cambodia with Vietnams intervention
in 1978-79. In other words, even once they are under way, mass atrocities do
not lead inexorably to bottomless massacres. The killers usually have
political goals: They are determined to kill until they have achieved their
objectives, not until theres no one else left standing. Their use of violence
can be excessive, but more important, it is often instrumental. This creates
an opportunity for negotiating
an end to mass atrocities, through peace talks

and with financial and diplomatic incentives and pressure. In recent history
such deal- making has brought to an end, albeit often an imperfect one,
massacres in Burundi, East Timor, Kenya, Macedonia and South Sudan. Yet
the idealists insist on pursuing a more ambitious agenda: nothing short of
democracy and justice,
imposed by military intervention. And this can undermine simply getting the
killing to
stop. For perpetrators, the prospect of foreign intervention and

prosecution rules out the possibility for compromise. For rebels, it creates
a perverse incentive to escalate ethnic violence so as to provoke an
international military response. The idealists blind spot about nonideal
endings also means they cannot decide what do to when the killings do subside.
In September 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that a genocide had
occurred, and
might be continuing, in Darfur. But by then the level of violence had already
begun to drop, and it continued to diminish over the next few years. U.S. policy
stayed stuck on trying to stop massacres that were no longer happening. In 2009,
Scott Gration, the U.S. special envoy to Sudan, was saying there were remnants
of genocide. But in 2010, Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations, was still insisting there was an ongoing genocide. Unable to commit
itself to either aggressive regime change or a program of reconstruction and
reconciliation, the U.S. government hasnt made any progress on either approach.
And its indecision has delayed finding a workable political solution for Darfur.
Western policy makers interested in stopping mass crimes should not overlook
tools that can work. Where violence is used as an instrument for political
gain, it is negotiable. Some perpetrators can be moderated through
diplomacy. Others will stop killing if they defeat a rebellion or realize they
cannot. The main aim should be to stop genocidal killing . Holding elections
and prosecuting
the perpetrators of crimes, however laudable those goals, arent the priority.
Today, with civilians in Sudans Nuba Mountains threatened by mass hunger and
violence, U.S. campaigners are calling for humanitarian intervention. They
should remember to keep the political solution firmly in focus. The root of the
crisis is a war between evenly matched adversaries who must recognize that they
need to live with the other. The peace talks that stalled last July should
be revived. This would require Khartoum to lift the ban against the Sudan
Peoples Liberation Movement in the northern sector and begin an inclusive
constitutional reform process. The rebels and their South Sudanese backers, for
their part, would have to repudiate the goal of regime change. Politics are
also all-important in Syria. The crisis has evolved from a civilian uprising
to a fully fledged civil war, with each side fearing annihilation if it loses.
The regime of Bashar al-Assad needs a soft landing, and so the model for
solving this crisis is the kind of patient mediation
effort that was
deployed in Yemen, not aggressive intervention as in Libya. Responding to

mass atrocities, whether ongoing or imminent, is difficult enough, but the
idealism of Evans
and Power makes it that much more so. They have composed a story, based on
ethics rather than evidence, that incorrectly assumes all perpetrators of mass
political violence are insatiable killers and that dictates who should respond
(Western nations), how (with military intervention) and why (for justice and
democracy). It is a morality tale that undermines the best ways to deal with
the worst crimes.
17.
Brooks 1/14/13
1.
R2p Bad: Drone Strikes
R2P legitimacy key to escalating globe drone strikes
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52290-hate-obamas-dronewar.html?itemid=id#26087
Rosa Brooks is a law professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, a
columnist and contributing editor for Foreign Policy and a Bernard L. Schwartz
senior fellow at the New America Foundation. From April 2009 to July 2011, she
served as Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele
Flournoy, and in May 2010 she also became [1] Special Coordinator for Rule of
Law and Humanitarian Policy, running a new Pentagon office dedicated to those
issues. Brooks wrote a weekly column for the Los Angeles Times from 2005 to
2009, and is an expert on national security, international law and human rights
issues. At the Pentagon her portfolio included both rule of law and human rights
issues and global engagement, strategic communication, and she received the
Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service for her work.
This notion of a " responsibility to protect" was embraced by the
international community -- including the United States -- with surprising
rapidity. In every
way, it represents a radical assault on traditional legal concepts of
sovereignty. The "responsibility to protect" doctrine -- often now referred to
as R2P -- suggests that when a state fails to protect its own population, it can
no longer claim any right to be free of external intervention (including, in
extreme cases, military intervention) if intervention is needed to secure the
safety of a threatened population. And by implication, that intervention need
not necessarily be authorized by the U.N. Security Council. If the Security
Council "fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking
situations crying out for action...concerned states may not rule out other means
to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation," observed the 2001 ICISS
report. The logic is clear enough: If failure to protect its population
delegitimizes a state's legal claim to sovereignty, then the failure of
collective security structures (such as the UNSC) to take appropriate corrective
action would similarly delegitimize those collective institutions. Put a little
differently, the Responsibility to Protect logically implies that both "the
international community" and individual states have a right and a duty to
intervene -- militarily, if necessary -- when another state is "unwilling or
unable" to protect its own population. If the language justifying drone
strikes in sovereign states appears to directly parallel the language of

the Responsibility to Protect, it's no accident. Although the R2P doctrine
was developed in response to genocide and other mass atrocities, the language
of R2P was easily turned to other purposes . That's not entirely
inappropriate, either: R2P's underlying logic is equally applicable to
terrorism, which is itself
a form of human rights abuse (and one that can have devastating consequences for
civilian populations). As I have argued elsewhere, you "might even say that
the R2P coin ought logically to be seen as having two sides . On one side
lies a state's duty to take action inside its own territory to protect itsown
population from violence
and atrocities. On the other side lies a state's duty to take action inside its
own territory to protect other states' populations from violence. Either way, a
state that fails in these duties faces the prospect that other states will
intervene in its internal' affairs without its consent." In a sense, then, it
was the human rights community's critique of sovereignty that helped

pave the way for drone strikes.
18.
1.
R2P = Imperialism
R2p is a fig leaf for imperialism
Global Policy Forum 14

http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention.html
Global Policy Forum is an independent policy watchdog that monitors the work of
the United Nations and scrutinizes global policymaking. We promote
accountability and citizen participation in decisions on peace and security,
social justice and international law.
What is to be done in a crisis like the genocide in Rwanda, when the
international community seeks to stop the killing? Can nations, acting through
the UN Security Council, fulfill a "responsibility to protect" innocent
civilians? Or is such a doctrine just a Trojan horse for great power abuse? When
nations send their military forces into other nations' territory, it is
rarely (if ever) for "humanitarian" purposes. They are typically pursuing
their narrow national interest - grabbing territory, gaining geo-strategic
advantage, or seizing control of precious natural resources. Leaders hope to
win public support by describing such actions in terms of high moral purposes bringing peace, justice, democracy and civilization to the affected area. In
the era of colonialism, European governments all cynically insisted that
they acted to promote such higher commitments - the "white man's burden,"
"la mission civilisatrice," and so on and so forth. The appeal to higher
moral purposes continues to infect the political discourse of the great

powers.
Today's " humanitarian intervention" is only the latest in this long tradition
of political obfuscation . In 2003, the US-UK invasion and occupation of Iraq
was labeled "humanitarian intervention" by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair
19.
1.
R2P = imperialism: Africa
Indeterminacy of R2p allows repeated interventions against

Africa
Branch 11/6/12
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52035-theresponsibility-to-protect-what-is-the-basis-for-the-emerging-norm-ofr2p.html?itemid=id#26087
Assistant Professor of Political Science, San Diego
State University, 2008Research Associate, Makerere Institute of Social Re
search, 2011EDUCATION
Ph.D. (Political Science) Columbia University, 2007
A.B. (Social Studies) Harvard University, 1998
Africa has a long history of being 'protected' by the West. And today, with
the precipitous rise of the so-called Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it
appears that intervention in the name of protecting Africa has returned to
the centre of Western concern or
regained its utility. Three-quarters of the crises in which R2P has been invoked
or applied have been in Africa and the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General
on R2P announced that the responsibility to protect really came from Africa and
the African experience" Africa also provided the military testing ground
for R2P and following foreign military intervention in Libya in 2011, according
to Ramesh Thakur, R2P is closer to being solidified as an actionable norm".
R2Ps privileged application in Africa bears comparison to the continent's
experience with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Critics have argued that
the Court targets Africa because it can operate there in an accountability-free
zone, able to intervene in ongoing conflicts, take sides in civil wars, scuttle
amnesties and peace processes, or align itself with US military forces all
without being held responsible for the consequences of its actions. But at least
with the ICC, there is a concrete institution prosecutors and judges who make
statements and decisions that can be critiqued on legal, political, or moral
grounds. With R2P, however, even this modicum of publicity and formalisation is
absent. And this makes its expanding use in Africa all the more dangerous.
The first problem is that no-one seems sure of what R2P even is. Its
proponents have celebrated it as a norm, a doctrine, a concept, an idea, a
principle, a framework, or a lens, while its critics have dismissed or condemned
it as an excuse, an ideology, a fad, or an empty slogan. Illustrating this
uncertainty is the fact that, while most agree that R2P enjoys no legal status
of its own, others seem to give it an almost super-legal status. Take the
statement by Susan Rice, current US Ambassador to the UN, for example, who in
2007 invoked R2P to justify a threatened US ground and air attack against Sudan
without Security Council approval. Rice cited R2P to dismiss the possible legal
problems of invading a sovereign state, asserting: Still others insist that,
without the consent of the UN or a relevant regional body, we would be breaking
international law. Perhaps, but the Security Council last year codified a new
international norm prescribing the responsibility to protect. It commits UN
members to decisive action, including enforcement, when peaceful measures fail
to halt genocide or crimes against humanity. Not surprisingly, there is
also
no consensus on what actions R2P actually legitimates, nor by whom or when.
The problem is compounded by the multiplicity of statements on R2P, from the
2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)

report to the United Nations 2004 A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, to the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, to the SecretaryGenerals 2009 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. The original
statement of R2P in the ICISS report explains: State sovereignty implies
responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people
lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a
result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state
in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of nonintervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. Of course,
the statement poses more questions than it answers. What is the threshold at
which responsibility is legitimately taken up by the international community?
Who makes that decision? And who is the international community? The precise
sequence of actions necessary to fulfil R2P is also left undefined. According to
ICISS, R2P comprises three specific responsibilities: the responsibility to
prevent, by addressing both the root causes and direct causes of crises; the
responsibility to react to situations of compelling human need by employing
appropriate measures, up to military intervention; and the responsibility to
rebuild, which will help address the causes of the harm the intervention was
designed to halt or avert. Given the increasingly expansive formulations of
R2P, according to which R2P action is to help prevent, react, and rebuild
countries, work with, pressure, and coerce states, and address root causes and
prevent the recurrence of conflict, there seems to be little that is not
included among the instruments that may be legitimately used in the name of R2P.
This could span from development aid to diplomatic pressure, from direct
budgetary assistance to invasion and occupation, from traditional reconciliation
to international criminal prosecution. Even one of R2Ps most vocal academic
supporters, Alex Bellamy, admits that, it is seldom if ever clear what R2P
requires in a given situation. The result is a situation in which some analysts
can condemn the AU-UN intervention in Darfur as a dismal failure of R2P while
others can laud it as a success; some blame R2P as an excuse used to prevent
effective intervention there while others credit it with enabling international
involvement. The same ambiguity characterises discussions of the R2P in Kenya
during the post-election violence in 2008. Some would agree with Kofi Annan that
Kenya is a successful example of R2P at work but others deny that R2P played a
role in the unfolding of international involvement, explaining that the
situation was only labelled a R2P situation retrospectively. This
fundamental indeterminacy of R2P was made even clearer, as was its

danger, in the Libya intervention. The doctrines first full-scale deployment
led to the bombing of civilian infrastructure, the deposing and killing of
Muammar Gaddafi, the installing of a rebel government, and the arming of
civilians all in the name of protection. The last was justified by a senior
French diplomatic source as: an operational decision taken at the time to help
civilians who were in imminent danger. A group of civilians were about to be
massacred so we took the decision to provide self-defensive weapons to protect
those civilian populations under threatIt was entirely justifiable legally,
resolution 1970 and 1973 were followed to the letter." R2P is not only dangerous
because it is flexible enough to be used to justify overthrowing governments and
arming civilians, but also because it allows those using it to refuse
accountability. States can engage in political and military intervention without
having to justify those
interventions on political or military grounds, only on protection grounds. And
they can refuse responsibility for the consequences of their actions all is
fair when civilian protection is at stake. R2P can be used to justify military
intervention or non-intervention, invasion or withdrawal. Thus, it is precisely
R2Ps indeterminacy that makes it so popular today. This may suggest something
about the Wests current approach to Africa: occasional violent engagement in
Stefan Bauschard
120
1201
the name of protection when a state has been declared to have failed in its own
protection role, complemented by military assistance to client states in the
name of promoting their capacity to protect. This is combined with disengagement
when convenient in the name of allowing states to fulfil the protection mandate
themselves, all with no objective standards and no accountability. Mahmood
Mamdani has argued that one consequence of R2P is to institute a divided
international system that distinguishes African states , whose legitimacy and

sovereignty are to be judged by the international community, from Western
states, whose sovereignty is beyond question and that judge and intervene
in Africa. R2P institutes a divided international system in
another way as well: one within Africa that distinguishes those African states
that are favoured by the West and tend to be labelled human rights protectors,
responsible, and thus deserving support, from those that are out of favour with
the West and are labelled human rights violators, failed or criminal, and
meriting international coercion. This is not to say that every Western ally will
be termed a human rights protector and every adversary a human rights violator.
But, by grounding the judgment as to state legitimacy in the flexible,
informal language of R2P, giving that judgment to those who have the power to
claim to speak in the name of the international community, and stripping away
the need for the state or interveners to be accountable to African citizenries,
this division remains an ever-present and dangerous possibility.
Herman 11/9/13
20.
R2P =Imperialism Kills International Law
1.
R2P is a pretext for interventionism crushes collective

security and ilaw
http://www.voltairenet.org/article180927.html
Edward S. Herman is professor emeritus of finance at the Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania and has written extensively on economics, political
economy, and the media. Among his books are Corporate Control, Corporate Power
(Cambridge University Press, 1981), The Real Terror Network (South End Press,
1982), and, with Noam Chomsky, The Political Economy of Human Rights (South End
Press, 1979), and Manufacturing Consent (Pantheon, 2002).
Both the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Humanitarian Intervention
(HI) came into existence in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, which
ended any obstruction that that contesting Great Power had placed on the
ongoing power projection of the United States. In Western ideology, of
course, the United States was containing the Soviets in the post-World War II
years, but that was ideology. In reality the Soviet Union was always far less
powerful than the United States, had weaker and less reliable allies, and was
essentially on the defensive from 1945 till its demise in 1991. The United
States was aggressively on the march outward from 1945, with the steady spread
of military bases across the globe, numerous interventions, large and small, on
all continents, engaged in building the first truly global empire. The Soviet
Union was an obstruction to U.S. expansion, with sufficient military power to
constitute a modest containing force, but it also served U.S. propaganda as an
alleged expansionist threat. With the death of the Soviet Union new threats were
needed to justify the continuing and even accelerating U.S. projection of power,
and they were forthcoming, from narco-terrorism to Al Qaeda to Saddams weapons
of mass destruction to the terrorist threat that encompassed the entire planet
earth and its outer space. There was also a global security menace alleged,
based on internal ethnic struggles and human rights violations, that supposedly
threatened wider conflicts, as well as presenting the global community (and its
policeman) with a moral dilemma and demand for intervention in the interests of
humanity and justice. As noted, this morality surge occurred at a moment in
history when the Soviet constraint was ended and the United States and its close
allies were celebrating their triumph, when the socialist option had lost
vitality, and when the West was thus freer to intervene. This required overriding the several hundred year old Westphalian core principle of international
relations that national sovereignty should be respected which if adhered to
would protect smaller and weaker countries from Great Power cross-border
attacks. This rule was embodied in the UN Charter, and could be said to be the
fundamental feature of that document, described by international law scholar
Michael Mandel as the worlds constitution. Over-riding this rule and
Charter fundamental would clear the ground for R2P and HI, but it would also
clear the ground for classic and straightforward aggression in pursuit of
geopolitical interests, for which R2P and HI might supply a useful cover.
It is obvious that only the Great Powers can cross borders in the alleged
interest of R2P and HI, a point that is recognized and taken as an entirely
acceptable premise in every case in which they have been applied in recent
years. The Great Powers are the only ones with the knowledge and material
resources to do this benevolent global social work. As NATO public relations
official Jamie Shea explained in May 1999, when the question came up as to
whether NATO personnel might be indicted for war crimes during NATOs bombing
war against Serbia, which seemed to follow from the letter of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) charter: NATO countries
organized the ICTY and International Court of Justice, and NATO countries
fund these tribunals and support on a daily basis their activities. We are the
upholders, not the violators, of international law. This last is a contestable
assertion, but Sheas other points are clearly valid. It is enlightening that
when a group of independent lawyers submitted an extensive dossier in 1999
showing probable NATO violations of ICTY rules, after a long delay and following
open pressure from NATO authorities, the anti-NATO claims were disallowed by the
ICTY prosecutor on the ground that with only 496 documented killings of Serbs by
NATO bombs there is simply no evidence of a crime base for indicting NATO,
although the original May 1999 indictment of Milosevic involved a crime base of
only 344 deaths. It is of similar interest that International Criminal Court
(ICC) prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo declined to prosecute NATO officials for
their attack on Iraq in 2003, despite over 249 requests for ICC action, on the
ground that here also the situation did not appear to meet the required
threshold of the Statute. These two cases illustrate the fact that the
structures and laws that underlie the application of R2P (and HI) exempt
the Great Power enforcers from the laws and rules that they enforce on
the lesser powers. It also exempts their friends and clients. This means
that in the real world there is nobody responsible for protecting Iraqis or
Afghanis from the United States or Palestinians from Israel. When U.S. Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright acknowledged on national TV in 1996 that 500,000
Iraqi children may have died as a result of UN (but really U.S.) -imposed
sanctions on Iraq, declaring that U.S. officials felt these deaths were worth
it, there was no domestic or global reaction demanding the end of these
sanctions and the application of R2P or HI on behalf of the victimized Iraqi
population. Similarly there was no call for any R2P intervention on behalf of
the Iraqis when the United States and Britain invaded Iraq in March 2003, with
direct and induced civil war killings of perhaps a million more Iraqis. When the
Canadian-sponsored International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect
considered the Iraq war in relation to R2P, its authors concluded that abuses by
Saddam Hussein within Iraq were not of a scope in 2003 to justify an invasion,
but the coalition never even raised the question of whether the Iraqi people
didnt need protection from the invaders responsible for the death of vast
numbers. They worked from the imperial premise that the Great Power enforcers,
even when aggressing in violation of the UN Charter and killing hundreds of
thousands, are exempt from R2P as well as the rule of law. This works from the
top of the global power structure on down; Bush, Cheney, Obama, John Kerry,
Susan Rice, Samantha Power at the top, then on the way down we have Merkel,
Cameron, and Hollande, then further down Ban Ki-Moon and Luis Moreno-Ocampo, and
with their power base to be found in the corporate leadership and media. Ban KiMoon and his predecessor Kofi Annan have been open servants of the Great NATO
Powers, to whom they owe their status and authority. Kofi Annan was an
enthusiastic supporter of the NATO attack on Yugoslavia, a believer in the
enforcement responsibility of the NATO powers, and keen on the
institutionalization of R2P; and Ban Ki-Moon works in the same mode. This same
global power structure also means that ad hoc Tribunals will be formed and used
against villains of choice, as well as international courts. Thus when the
United States and its allies wanted to dismantle Yugoslavia and weaken Serbia,
they were able to use the Security Council in 1993 to establish a tribunal, the
ICTY, precisely for this service, which the ICTY carried out effectively. When
they wanted to help their client Paul Kagame consolidate his dictatorship in
Rwanda, they created a similar tribunal for this service, the ICTR. If these
powers want to attack and bring about regime change in Libya, they can get the
ICC to accuse Gaddaffi of war crimes speedily and without independent

investigation of any charges, and based mainly on anticipations of civilian
killings. But as noted, the ICC couldnt find any basis for action against the
invaders of Iraq whose killings of civilians were large-scale and realized, not
merely anticipated. There was, in fact, a major World Tribunal on Iraq organized
to hear charges against the United States and its allies for their actions in
Iraq, but it was privately organized and had a critical anti-war bent, so that
although it held hearings in many countries and heard many prestigious
witnesses, this tribunal was given negligible attention in the media. (Its final
sessions and report in June 2005 were unmentioned in the major U.S, and British
media.) R2P fits snugly into this picture of service to an escalating
imperial violence, with the United States and its enormous militaryindustrial complex engaged in a Global War on Terror and multiple wars,
and its NATO arm steadily enlarging and embarked on out of area service,
despite the ending of its supposed role of containing the Soviet Union. It
conveniently premises that the threats that the world needs to address come from
within countries, not from cross-border aggression in the traditional mode that
the makers of the UN Charter considered of first importance. They are wrong:
William Blum lists 35 cases where the United States overthrew governments
between 1945 and 2001 (thus not even counting the war-making of George W. Bush
and Barak Obama; Blum, Freeing the World to Death [Common Courage, 2005], chaps.
11 and 15) In the real world, while R2P has a wonderful aura of
benevolence, it will be put in play only at the instigation of the Great

NATO Powers and it will therefore never be used in the interest of unworthy
victims, defined as victims of the Great Powers or their clients (see
Manufacturing Consent, chap 2, Worthy and Unworthy Victims). For example, it
was never invoked to constrain Indonesian violence in its invasion and
occupation of East Timor from 1975 onward, although this invasion-occupation
accounted for an estimated 200,000 deaths on a population base of 800,000, thus
exceeding the proportionate deaths under Pol Pot. In this case the United States
gave the invasion a green light, gave further arms to the invaders, and
protected them from any UN response. This is a case where the UN Charter was
being violated and East Timorese desperately needed protection, but as the
United States supported the invader no international response transpired. It is
enlightening and amusing to see that Gareth Evans has been perhaps the leading
spokesperson in support of R2P.as an instrument of justice. Evans is a former
Foreign Minister of Australia, author of a book on R2P, past president of the
International Crisis Group, a co-founder of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, and a participant in several reports and
debates on R2P. Evans was the Foreign Minister of Australia during the years of
Indonesias genocidal occupation of East Timor, and in that role Evans honored
and feted Indonesian leaders and worked with them in sharing the stolen oil
rights of East Timor. (See John Pilger, East Timor: a lesson in why the poorest
threaten the powerful, April 5, 2012, pilger.com.) So Evans was really a
collaborator in a major genocide. Can you imagine the medias response to a nonNATO human rights campaign that used as spokesperson a Chinese official who had
maintained friendly relations with Pol Pot during his most deadly years? It is
enlightening to see how Gareth Evans deals with the criteria for enforcing R2P.
In answering questions on this subject at a UN General Assembly session on R2P,
Evans appealed to common sense: R2P defines itself, and the crimes, including
ethnic cleansing, are all inherently conscience-shocking, and by their very
nature of a scale that demands a responseIt is really impossible to be precise
about numbers here. Evans notes that sometimes modest numbers will suffice: We
remember starkly the horror of Srebrenica [with only 8,000 deaths]. Was Racak
with its 45 victims in Kosovo in 99 sufficient to trigger the response that was
triggered by the international community? It was sufficient to trigger a

response for the simple reason that it helped advance NATOs ongoing program of
dismantlement of Yugoslavia. But Evans dodges answering his own question. You
may be sure that Evans does not ask or attempt to explain why there was no
triggering of a response to East Timor with its 200,000 or Iraqs 500,000 plus a
million. The politicization of choices here is total, but Evans has apparently
internalized the imperial perspective so completely that this huge double
standard never reaches his consciousness. But the most interesting fact is that
a man with such a record and such blatant bias can be accepted as an authority
and his biased perspective is treated with respect. It is interesting, also, to
see how Evans never mentions Israel and Neither Palestine, where ethnic
cleansing has been in active process for decades, works openly and is deeply
resented by vast numbers across the globe. do other members of the power pyramid
suggest Israel-Palestine as an area where consciences are shocked and the nature
and scale of abuse demands a response from the international community. In
order to obtain her U.N. Ambassadorship, Samantha Power thought it was necessary
to go before a group of pro-Israel U.S. citizens and assure them, with tears
flowing, that she regretted any past suggestions that AIPAC was powerful and
that its influence had to be over-ridden for developing a U.S.-interest policy
toward Israel and Palestine. She pledged a devotion to Israels national
security. The world will wait a long time for Power and her bosses to support
R2Ps application to ethnic cleansing in Palestine In sum, the international
power
structure in the post-Soviet world has worsened global inequality and
at
the same time increased Great Power interventionism and literal aggression .
The increased militarism may have contributed to the growing inequality, but it
is also designed and serves to facilitate pacification at home as well as
abroad. In this context, R2P and HI are understandable developments,
providing a moral cover for actions that would repel many people and
constitute a violation of international law if viewed in a cold light. R2P
puts aggression in a
benevolent light and thus serves as its useful instrument.
cynical fraud and a
constitution ( UN Charter)-buster
In short, it is a
21.
R2P Hypocritical
R2P is necessarily a hypocritical fction only used against weak

states
Menon 6/12/13
Atlantic Council.
The world has not obliged
Practical interests shape
States and its democratic
comes to R2P, they, just
revolutionary liberals. Raison dtat is resilient:

what states do, not abstract ideals. The United
allies are not exceptions to this rule. When it
as China and Russia have, will block punitive
measures against friendly governments. Imagine that the so-called Arab
Spring makes a delayed appearance in Saudi Arabia. Would the Saudis ever
face a Security Council resolution with R2P in it? Would the United States,
Britain or France back an R2P resolution occasioned by Israels use of force in
the West Bank or Gaza? No and no. Those who doubt this might ponder recent
events in Bahrain, where a Sunni-run state lords over its Shia majority. The
Obama Administration deemed Qaddafis violence against the Libyan opposition
R2P- worthy but has been unmoved by the Bahraini regimes repression of
unarmed protestors. Nor is Washingtons stance likely to change so long as the
U.S.
Fifth Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia played a decisive role in
mobilizing Arab support for UNSCR 1973, which authorized the intervention
against Qaddafi; but it sent troops into Bahrain to crush the Shia rebellion
three days before NATOs intervention in Libya. Qatar, too, mustered Arab League
support for the move against Qaddafi and provided combat aircraft to supplement
NATOs Libya intervention, but its troops joined the Saudi gendarmes march into
Manama. What mattered for the Gulf monarchies was preventing the rise of a
Shia-dominated state in Bahrain aligned with Iran. Self-determination and
liberty could waitindefinitely. Egyptian security forces killed 840 unarmed
civilians and injured some 6,000 during the uprising against Mubarak; no major
government invoked R2P.Had Mubarak survived and unleashed his army in full,
would he have shared Qaddafis R2P-tinged fate? Not likely. Strong horses dont
attract R2P attention; only weak or vulnerable ones do. Powerful democracies
have long been willing to countenance the killing and expulsions of

people and to arm governments that commit such acts. Consider some
examples. Turkeys war against the PKK has killed thousands of civilians
since 1984 and displaced another 386,000. In 198889, Saddam Hussein gassed and
deported thousands of Kurds, killing as many as 100,000 of them, and
systematically razed their towns and villages. But Washington turned a blind eye
because the Iraqi dictator was then providing a useful service by fighting
Khomeinis Iran. Consider, too, that between Indonesias annexation of
East Timor in 1975 and the 1999 UN-sanctioned, Australian-led intervention,
18,600
East Timorese civilians were killed, and another 102,800 died from war-related
hunger and disease, with the vast majority of the fatalities occurring before
1999. Australia was rightly complimented for leading the multilateral force that
helped bring stability, and eventually independence, to East Timor. But the
Australian government, its own documents have since revealed, knew that
Indonesia was preparing to conquer East Timor in 1975, may have provided tacit
approval, and certainly was willing to arm Suhartos government in the years
preceding the annexation.Not only was Australia the only major Western democracy
to officially recognize the annexation; Gareth Evans, then its Foreign Minister,
signed a deal in 1989 with his Indonesian counterpart, Ali Alatas, giving
Australian energy companies access to the seabed off East Timor. As for the
United States, it armed the Indonesian army for years, even though between
500,000 and one million people perished following the 1965 coup that brought
Suharto to power. It is now clear that Indonesias conquest of East Timor
occurred with the Ford Administrations foreknowledgeand acquiescence. American
arms sales to Indonesia rose substantially after its occupation of East Timor.
Britains dealings with Suharto followed a similar pattern.
22. R2P = White Supremacy

Barake 9/9/13
1.
R2p is a cover for global white supremacy
http://www.fairobserver.com/article/humanitarian-intervention-us-imperialism
Ajamu Baraka was the Founding Executive Director of the US Human Rights Network
(USHRN) from July 2004 until June 2011. The USHRN became the first domestic
human rights formation in the United States explicitly committed to the
application of international human rights standards to the US. Under Baraka, the
Network grew exponentially from a core membership base of 60 organizations to
more than 300 US-based member organizations and 1,500 individual members who
work on the full spectrum of human rights issues in the United States. Baraka
has also served on the boards of various national and international human rights
organizations, including Amnesty International (USA) and the National Center for
Human Rights Education. He is currently on the boards of the Center for
Constitutional Rights; Africa Action; Latin American Caribbean Community Center;
Diaspora Afrique; and the Mississippi Workers Center for Human Rights. Baraka
has taught political science at various universities, including Clark Atlanta
University and Spelman College. He has been a guest lecturer at academic
institutions throughout the US, and has authored several articles on
international human rights.
How is it that the administration can announce to the world its intentions to
circumvent, and by doing so, subvert international prohibitions on war? By
wrapping itself in the false fag of humanitarian concerns f or the suffering
masses in Syria.
President Barack Obama, the corporate and financial elites most effective
propaganda weapon since Ronald Reagan, explains to the world that it is only the
plight of people in Syria that drives the US decision to attack the country. No
one asks the president to explain to the innocent human beings who are walking
around today alive, but who will be the dead and maimed collateral damage of
this pending attack, why their sacrifice is for the greater good of humanity.
This justification for the latest breech of international law is yet another
example of the sham that is humanitarian intervention. If mass killings
of its own people constitutes a crime against humanity and mass in Syria
means over a thousand people killed, surely the killing of over a thousand in
Egypt must also constitute a serious crime against humanity. But that kind of
rational calculation could only occur if there were one ethical standard for all
states and an equal value placed on human life. Two Moral Standards The reality,
however, is that there are two mutually exclusive moral standards: one for
the vast majority of nations, and another for those comprising the dying
but dangerous collection of European colonial capitalist nations. It is the
naked pursuit of US geo-political interests like the gas off the coast of Syria,
oil, and the desire to isolate Iran that drive policy and not some concern for
the people in Syria. That is the context that shapes and informs US foreign
policies globally. In the current context of relative US decline, international
law related to non-economic functions and relationships the Geneva accords and
the law of war, human rights and the Charter of the United Nations are now
constraints on the ability of the US to pursue its interests. And with no
domestic checks on executive power with the capitulation and collaboration of
Congress (despite this feint toward democratic accountability represented in
seeking congressional approval from Congress before attacking Syria), a
corporate media that serves as cheerleaders for the administration, and peace
and anti-imperialist movements that are marginal and in political disarray, US

criminality is completely out of control with the result that the United States
has become the quintessential Rogue State. Why has it been so easy for the
State to obfuscate its interests and to create a bipartisan coalition united
in its support for the essentials of US foreign policies, even while there may
be disagreements on some of the tactical issues? This can be partially explained
by the innovative discourses produced by Western propagandists during the
last two decades, the most innovative being the concept of
humanitarian intervention and

protect.
its dubious corollary, the right to
Humanitarian intervention and the right to protect evoke
the unacknowledged white supremacist assumption that the

international community read as the
governments of the capitalist/colonialist West has a duty and a right to
arrest, bomb, invade, prosecute, sanction, murder and violate
international law anywhere on the planet to save people based on its own
determinations and values. That is precisely why the question of what entitles
the US to inflict punishments on the Syrian government is not even raised as
part of a public discussion. That question and its answer are obvious to the
victims of Western colonial and imperialist brutality: The US and its
European allies have that right because they have always had the right
over the last 500 years to universalize and impose their assumptions, world
views and values. Normalization of White Supremacist Domination The

normalization of white supremacist domination and its prerogatives are so
completely inculcated in US and Western consciousness that not only is the
question as to what right the US and the West have to attack Syria outside the
framework of
consideration, but alternative ways of viewing the world are beyond
cognitive comprehension . This is the cultural and ideological foundation of

American exceptionalism and the intellectual framework and assumptions
that informed Western-based human rights organizations and their
theoreticians in the construction of the notion of humanitarian
intervention. De-contextualized from the reality of globalized Euro-American
domination, the idea that there is a
collective responsibility on the part of states to protect people from gross and
systemic human rights violations associated with war crimes, genocide, crimes
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, could be viewed as a progressive
development for international relations and global morality even if that
protection if offered selectively. But in the hands of an arrogant minority that
still dominates the international system and sees its civilizational project as
representing the apex of human development, the right to protect has become
a convenient cover for rationalizing and justifying continued EuroAmerican global hegemony through the use of armed interventions
refashion local realities in line with Western geopolitical interests.
to
23.
Thrall 2/22/12
1.
R2P = Syria Intervention
R2P crucial to selling Syrian intervention
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/responsibility-protect-6559
A. Trevor Thrall is an associate professor of government and politics at George
Mason University and director of the Biodefense Program. He is the coeditor of
American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11
and coeditor of the forthcoming book Why Did the United States Invade Iraq?
Intervention in Syria is either a dangerous idea, an opportunity to further the
cause of democracy promotion or nothing less than the moral duty of the
international community. The Obama administration continues to act cagey
about the prospects of a successful intervention and the potential for
geopolitical fallout from Russia, China and Iran. But given European pressure
and the recent Libyan precedent, it seems more than possible that the United
States will come to embrace some sort of military intervention in Syria
as the love child of regime-changing neoconservatives and genocidepreventing idealists . The real question then will be: Can Obama sell a
Syrian intervention
to the public? And if so, how? The likeliest pitch
for
Obama to use is some form of the
responsibility-to-protect (R2P) ethic . Articulated after the international

communitys tepid response to the Bosnian meltdown, R2P has become the
liberal interventionists best friend, offering a justification for
violating national sovereignty and taking foreign governments to task for
failing to
protect their people from violence. Obama used this line with Libya, arguing
that: To brush aside America's responsibility as a leader andmore profoundly
our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would
have been a betrayal of who we are. . . . Some nations may be able to turn a
blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is
different. And as president, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and
mass graves before taking action. And indeed, the loudest voices so far urging
intervention in Syria belong to the R2P crowd
(Washington Post editorial

here, for example), thanks in part to confidence engendered by what they viewed
as success in Libya. But
the question remains: Will the public buy this argument? Certainly, such
responsible rhetoric resonatesat least on the surfacewith the public. Though
precise poll data are scanty, a couple of polls from the Pew Research Center
illustrate that the public generally agrees that the United States has a
responsibility to prevent genocide.
Stefan Bauschard
130
1301
Stefan Bauschard
131
1311
24.
1.
Ditching R2P Solves
R2P is the worst path in Syria moderate internationalism

solves
Chimini 9/11/13
http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/bschimni/r2p-and-syriaimperialism-with-human-face
B.S. Chimini is Professor of International Law at the School of International
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Second, states have become wiser after the intervention in Libya. States that
did not oppose the invocation of R2P in Libya are now unwilling to support it
because the UNSC resolution 1973 was misinterpreted and used by NATO powers to
bring about regime change. Third, there is the valid concern that military
action will lead to an escalation of violence in Syria and the region,
leading to a greater humanitarian crisis. Millions more will be displaced
outside and inside Syria. Thousands more will lose their lives. It is believed
that even the departure of Assad will bring little relief to the people of
Syria. This has been the experience of the Libyan people, who have in the postGaddafi era been subjected to unceasing violence by armed militias holding sway
in large parts of the country. Fourth, it is felt that military action will
undermine the Geneva 2 process, which holds out the best possibility of
bringing to an end the conflict in Syria. It could mean a long period of
political uncertainty in which the Syrian people will be unable to take control
of their political destiny. Fifth, it is pointed out that the support for
democratic forces in Syria comes from many Arab regimes that are anything but
democratic. It strengthens the suspicion that what drives support for military
action is a geopolitical agenda. Sixth, there is the genuine fear that arms
supplied to rebels may end up with extremist groups who are a part of the rebel
forces. And seventh, it is believed that there are no innocent parties in this
conflict. Both the government and the rebel forces are contributing to the
escalating violence and violating international humanitarian laws. Even in
global civil society, there is resistance to the idea that the choice
before the international community is between supporting military action
or a brutal regime. This resistance emanates from a certain reading of
history. It is believed that the false choice is a function of the
geopolitics of imperialism with deep roots in colonialism. The roots of
violence in post-colonial states goes back to the construction of the colonial

state that saw the economy, bureaucracy, police and the army positioned to serve
the state rather than the people. The structures of colonial state were never
fully dismantled in the post-colonial era. However, where the post-colonial
states are democracies, social and human rights movements are able to prevent
gross violations of human rights (or, when it takes place, to use the legal
system to bring the perpetrators to justice). But in cases where the postcolonial state transfigured into an authoritarian state, as in the case of
Syria, this is not possible. These authoritarian states have often received
support from hegemonic powers pursuing geopolitical ambitions. But when such
regimes become a liability, the same states manipulate the politics of the postcolonial state by relying on the genuine grievances of the people to oppose the
incumbent regime. The outcome often is increased violence by the state against
its own people. It is against this backdrop that the lifting of the embargo by
the EU to supply arms to rebels, and earlier to allow the use of oil revenues to
fund the insurgency, together with the possibility of President Obama ordering
military action, are to be viewed. It is felt that despite denials, forces of

imperialism are using the acute distress of the Syrian people to pursue the
agenda of regime change. What we need today is not military intervention
but prudent internationalism. It is an internationalism that refrains from
undermining the normative consensus in the international community on
when military action is permissible. Prudent internationalism also
acknowledges
that democracy and democratic practices cannot be exported to societies and that
military action can undermine the future of democracy by sharpening sectarian
and social divides. Prudent internationalism also takes cognizance of the
past outcomes of military action, especially the continuing violence in
societies that have been the subject of military action (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan
and Libya). Prudent internationalism also does not accept the view that nonsupport of military action is support for the brutal Assad regime. Prudent
internationalism sees a third way , that of diplomatic and political action

to resolve
the conflict. It requires that states and civil society forces opposed to
military action ensure that the Geneva 2 process gets under way. Indeed,
there is a moral obligation on all those opposed to military action not to
remain passive spectators to the unfolding tragedy in Syria. In this respect, it
is particularly important that key developing countries such as Brazil, India,
China and South Africa act immediately to garner support for the diplomatic
process. The decision on convening the Geneva 2 process cannot be left to a few
states, in particular the US. Egypt has shown how the same hegemonic power that
speaks of the need to institute a democratic regime in Syria is a mute witness
to its destruction in Egypt. Meanwhile, as efforts are being made to start the
Geneva 2 process, the Syrian people must be offered increased humanitarian
assistance to relieve their sufferings.
25.
1.
Hashemi 2/20/14
Syria Crisis Impact: Middle East War
Continued Syrian crisis destabilizes Middle East, respawns al

Qaeda
Nader Hashemi is director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the Josef
Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. His latest
book is The Syria Dilemma. The views expressed are his own.
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/20/why-u-s-should-care-aboutsyria-crisis/
The moral case for why Syria matters is easy to make. The killing fields of
Syria are now reminiscent of those in Bosnia. Over the past three years, we have
witnessed state-sanctioned war crimes and crimes against humanity replete with
chemical weapons, barrel bombs, the targeting of children, mass rape, a refugee
crisis and according to a new report industrial-scale torture and killings.
Indeed, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has described Syria as a
disgraceful humanitarian calamity with suffering and displacement unparalleled
in recent history. But a new dimension to this conflict has emerged: Syria is
now a global security problem. The Syrian conflict is destabilizing the

Middle East . Lebanon has been convulsed, Iraq has been shaken and
Jordans fourth largest city today is a Syrian refugee camp. To a lesser
extent, Turkey has
also been adversely affected some 600,000 refugees are said to be currently
living on the Turkish-Syrian border, and Turkeys role in the conflict has
become a major bone of contention in domestic Turkish politics. Meanwhile, the
conflict has heightened sectarian tensions across the Arab-Islamic world,
fueled in part by the regional maneuverings of Saudi Arabia and Iran and
their respective allies. Both are fighting to expand their regional influence,
and Syria today is the key battleground for the contest. Finally, al Qaeda has
re- emerged from the ashes of the Syrian conflict. Al Qaeda now controls
territory that stretches more than 400 miles across the heart of the Middle
East, CNN analyst Peter Bergen recently observed. This deeply troubling
development has obvious implications for global security, especially for
Europe and the United States.
Karam 1/8/14
2.
Al Qaeda makes conflict spread regionally
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-news/20140108-jihadist-gains-in-syria-iraqraise-stakes-in-mideast.ece
Zeina Karam,
The Associated Press
Al-Qaeda is positioning itself as a vanguard defending Sunni Muslims

against persecution by Shiite-dominated governments in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.
As a result, a Syrian rebellion against President Bashar Assad is
evolving into something bigger and more ambiguous: a fight increasingly led
by Sunni jihadists determined to create an Islamic state. Battling these
extremists
is a coalition that includes Syrian moderates who are horrified that their cause
has been discredited, with parts of the nation falling under strict religious
law. For moderates in the Middle East, the renewed assertiveness of the
extremists is increasingly taking on the aspect of a regional calamity.

The war in Syria has poured gasoline on a raging fire in Iraq, and
conflicts in
both countries are feeding upon one another and complicating an already
complex struggle, said Fawaz Gergez, director of the Middle East Center at the
London School of Economics. Now the reverberations of the Syria war are
being felt on Arab streets, particularly Iraq and Lebanon, and are
aggravating Sunni-Shiite tensions across the Arab Middle East. Why now?
Experts see al- Qaeda characteristically taking advantage of social,
religious and
ideological divisions of the kind that have been exposed by the Sunni-Shiite
battle in Syria.
Kaplan 8/27/13
3.
Longer conflict causes Mideast explosion
http://www.globaldashboard.org/2013/08/27/seven-scenarios-for-the-future-ofsyria/
Seth Kaplan is a Professorial Lecturer in the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. He teaches, writes,
and consults on issues related to fragile states, governance, and development.
He is the author of Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development
(Praeger Security International, 2008) and Betrayed: Politics, Power, and
Prosperity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). A Wharton MBA and Palmer scholar, Seth
has worked for several large multinationals and founded four companies. He
speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese and Japanese.
6) Regional conflict. The likelihood of this also increases the longer the
war goes on. Lebanon and Iraq have already suffered from spillover : bombs
have gone off in South Beirut and Tripoli in the past week and Sunni
extremists
have been strengthened in Iraq in recent months. It is not out of the realm of
possibility that these trends will continue and a broad Sunni-Shiite
conflict will engulf the whole Levant.
This is the worst result, and
would have even greater consequences for the region. Over 50 million
people would be directly affected.
26.
1.
Menon 6/12/13
Right to Protect Causes War Escalation
R2P interventionism is uniquely destabilizing BECAUSE its

ineffective
Atlantic Council.
Yet the reassurances that force would be a rare, last-ditch response have not
placated critics, for several reasons. R2Ps pre-intervention prescriptions
merely repeat existing remedies and add nothing to diplomacys toolkit.
in order to
Whats is the casuistry of reframing and diminishing
new
legitimize
altruistic armed intervention insovereignty
defense of the abstract rights
that most political communities agree upon in theory. Given R2Ps emphasis on
feasibility and the chances for success, weak states are its most likely
proving grounds; powerful ones need not fear, no matter the magnitude of their
misdeeds. Because idealism and power are inextricably intertwined, with the
latter frequently corrupting the former, R2P provides powerful states one
script for playing the Good Samaritan when intervention promotes their
interests, and another for eschewing or opposing aid when it doesnt. R2Ps
defenders see this indictment as reflecting hyperbole or misunderstanding, or as
the artifice of dictators who declaim about sovereignty and legality but in
truth seek to avoid accountability. Yes, dictators have every reason to avoid
accountability, but it doesnt really matter which side is right. What matters
is that in a world of diverse polities and cultures, such objections and
anxieties have sufficient appeal to prevent the doctrine from acquiring the
universal pragmatic applicability its supporters seek. Many states have
signed
on to R2P, but it does not follow that they will stand behind its
sovereignty-eroding features when it is proposed as a plan for military action.
2.
Brooks 1/14/13
Disrupting sovereignty destroying the basis for collective

security
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52290-hate-obamas-dronewar.html?itemid=id#26087
Rosa Brooks is a law professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, a
columnist and contributing editor for Foreign Policy and a Bernard L. Schwartz
senior fellow at the New America Foundation. From April 2009 to July 2011, she
served as Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele
Flournoy, and in May 2010 she also became [1] Special Coordinator for Rule of
Law and Humanitarian Policy, running a new Pentagon office dedicated to those
issues. Brooks wrote a weekly column for the Los Angeles Times from 2005 to
2009, and is an expert on national security, international law and human rights
issues. At the Pentagon her portfolio included both rule of law and human rights
issues and global engagement, strategic communication, and she received the
Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service for her work.
Second, arguments premised on the Responsibility to Protect are
transparent: Evidence that a state is unwilling or unable to protect its
population from egregious harm can be examined by all, and R2P-based
interventions are publicly proclaimed, making it possible to hold interveners

accountable for errors or abuses. Nonetheless, the parallels between R2P and
the understanding of sovereignty that undergirds U.S. drone policy are
troubling. I'm no fan of the traditional legal conception of sovereignty, which
has been used to mask many abuses. But in a world with no meaningful
international governance structures, sovereignty -- even a weak and

hypocritical conception of sovereignty -- is one of the few bulwarks against
unilateral overreaching by great powers. Our fragile international order
rests less on "law" than on implicit bargains between states , and insofar as
U.S. drone policy further undermines traditional norms relating to
sovereignty and the use of force, it risks undermining those tenuous bargains.
It risks sending the message -- to friends and foes alike -- that we will no
longer even offer much pretence of respecting sovereignty. As a result, it
risks undermining the fragile order we so desperately need.
Gay 7/23/13
3.
Sovereignty erosion = international wars
Why is R2Ps gutting of national sovereignty a problem?

Respect for
sovereignty is generally a stabilizing force in the international
community. It narrows the scope of acceptable disagreement between states
there are fewer things to fight about. This can lead, in turn, to fewer
international armed
conflictsand fewer of their attendant atrocities. R2Ps disregard for
sovereignty might empower the international community to, from time to time,
actually stop a genocide by intervention. Yet all too often, no international
community
exists. Interventions can become proxy conflicts (this would happen in a
Syria intervention, and was a danger in the Balkans). And these proxy
conflicts can readily yield atrocities of their own, perhaps far worse
than those the intervention was launched to prevent.
4.
Johnstone 1/25/13
WW III
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52236-responsibility-toprotect-is-a-power-play.html?itemid=id#26087
Johnstone gained a BA in Russian Area Studies and a Ph.D. in French Literature
from the University of Minnesota.[1] She was active in the movement against the
Vietnam War, organizing the first international contacts between American
citizens and Vietnamese representatives. Most of Johnstone's adult life has been
spent in France, Germany, and Italy. Johnstone was European editor of the U.S.
weekly In These Times from 1979 to 1990. She was press officer of the Green
group in the European Parliament from 1990 to 1996. Johnstone also regularly
contributes to the online magazine CounterPunch.[further explanation needed].
Opposing genocide has become a cottage industry in the United States. An
example is a program called "World Without Genocide" at William Mitchell College

of Law in St. Paul. The recent commentary by its executive director, Ellen
Kennedy ("Never again, its been said of genocide. Do we finally grasp it?"
Jan. 19), employs all the usual clichs of that well-meaning but misguided
campaign. Misguided, and, above all, misguiding. The antigenocide movement is
directing people of good intention away from the essential cause of our
time -- to reverse the drift toward worldwide war . The Bible of this
campaign is Samantha Power's book, "A Problem from Hell." Power's thesis is
that the United States is too slow to intervene to "stop genocide." It is a
suggestion the U.S.
government embraces, to the point of taking on Power as a White House adviser.
The reason is clear. Since the Holocaust has become the most omnipresent
historical reference in Western societies, the concept of "genocide" is
widely accepted as the greatest evil to afflict the planet. It is felt to be
worse than war. Therein lies its immense value to the U.S. military-industrial
complex , and to a foreign-policy elite seeking an acceptable pretext for
military intervention. The obsession with "genocide" as the primary
humanitarian issue in the world
today relativizes war. It reverses the final judgment of the Nuremberg Trials
that: "War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to
the belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of
aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme
international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains
within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." Instead, war is
transformed into a chivalrous action to rescue whole populations from

"genocide." At
the same time, national sovereignty , erected as the barrier to prevent
strong nations from invading weaker ones -- that is, to prevent aggression
and "the
scourge of war" -- is derided as nothing but a protection for evil rulers
("dictators") whose only ambition is to "massacre their own people." This
ideological construct is the basis for the Western-sponsored doctrine, forced
on a more or less reluctant United Nations, of " R2P, " the ambiguous shorthand
for both the "right" and the "responsibility" to protect people from their own
governments. In practice, this can give the dominant powers carte blanche
to intervene militarily in weaker countries in order to support whatever armed
rebellions they favor. Once this doctrine seems to be accepted, it can even
serve as an incitement to opposition groups to provoke government

repression in order to call for "protection." Kennedy blames "genocide" on the
legal barrier set up to try to prevent aggressive war: national sovereignty. For
more than 350 years," she writes, "the concept of 'national sovereignty' held
primacy over the idea of 'individual sovereignty' ... The result has been an
'over and over again' phenomenon of genocide since the Holocaust, with millions
of innocent lives lost in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Congo, Guatemala, Argentina,
East Timor ..." Yet Hitler initiated World War II precisely in violation
of the national sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and Poland -- partly, he
claimed, to stop alleged human-rights violations against ethnic Germans who
lived there. It was to invalidate this pretext, and "save succeeding generations
from
the scourge of war," that the United Nations was founded on the basis of respect
for national sovereignty. Of course, there is no chance that the United States
will abandon itsnational sovereignty. Rather, other countries are called
upon to abandon their national sovereignty to the United States. Kennedy's
list includes events that do not remotely fit the term "genocide" and leaves out
others that do -- all according to the official U.S. narrative of contemporary
conflicts. But the significant fact is that the worst of these slaughters -Cambodia, Rwanda and the Holocaust itself -- occurred during warsand as a
result of wars. The systematic killing of European Jews took place during
World War II. In Rwanda, the horrific slaughter was a response to an invasion by
Tutsi forces from neighboring Uganda. The Cambodian slaughter was not the fault
of "national sovereignty" but the direct result of the U.S. violation of
Cambodia's national sovereignty. Years of secret U.S. bombing of the Cambodian
countryside, followed by a U.S.-engineered overthrow of the Cambodian
government, opened the way for takeover of that country by embittered Khmer
Rouge fighters who took out their resentment against the devastation of rural
areas on the hapless urban population, considered accomplices of their enemies.
Some of the bloodiest events do not make Kennedy's genocide list. Missing is the
killing of more than half a million members of the Indonesian Communist Party in
1965 and 1966. But the dictator responsible, Suharto, was "a friend of the
United States," and the victims were communists. A principal danger of the R2P
doctrine is that it encourages rebel factions to provoke repression, or to
claim persecution, solely to bring in foreign forces on their behalf. It is
certain that opposition militants exaggerated Moammar Gadhafi's threat to
Benghazi to provoke the 2011 French-led NATO war against Libya. The war in Mali
is a direct result of the brutal overthrow of Gadhafi, who was a major force for
African stability. The sole purpose of R2P is to create a public opinion
willing to accept U.S. and NATO intervention in other countries. It is not
meant to allow the Russians or the Chinese, say, to intervene to protect
housemaids in Saudi Arabia from being beheaded -- much less to allow Cuban
forces to shut down Guantanamo and end U.S. violations of human rights (on Cuban
territory). Intervention means war; war causes massacres and more
The sense of
being threatened by U.S. power incites other countries to build up their
military defenses and to repress opposition militants who might serve as
for outside intervention. Today, the greatest threat to the peoples of
wars .
own
excuses
the
world is not "evil dictators," but the militarization of international relations
which, unless
reversed, is leading toward the unimaginable catastrophe of World War III.
Menon 6/12/13
5.
R2P incentivizes escalation to provoke an intervention
Atlantic Council.
The point here is not to condemn particular states for their selective moral
outrages or for putting interests before ethics. This is what states of all
stripes tend to do. Its not that they never act in defense of principles or
altruistically; its that they dont do so when important interests point
another way, or when the costs and hazards of defending them are deemed
prohibitive. R2P boosters and revolutionary liberals will reply that the
inability to defend basic values everywhere does not mean they cant be defended
when possible. Examples of supposedly successful action (Bosnia, Kosovo, East
Timor and Libya) are trotted out, perhaps supplemented by Emersons quip about
consistencys allure for little minds. But given the realities of power, what
this riposte concedes is that if a weak and ally-bereft state kills its
citizens, it risks falling into the R2P file and facing armed intervention. If
not, then notwhich brings us to the problem of moral hazard inherent in

R2P. The prospect of an external humanitarian intervention, as noted earlier,
led the KLA to adopt tactics that bordered on terrorism , and Serbia in
turn to adopt tactics that resembled migratory genocide . In Libya, once the
UNsanctioned machinery of intervention began to move,
anti-Qaddafi insurgents
had no reason to compromise and Qaddafi had no motivation to hold back.
R2P presents a theoretical continuum of measures with armed intervention at one
end, but engaged antagonists know that the various intermediate steps can easily
and rapidly be skipped, the continuum collapsed, and the concept applied
expansively. That encourages opposition forces to magnify violence to
attract and suborn outside help, and it encourages embattled regimes to
accelerate efforts at repression before external intervention can be
agreed upon and implemented. In short, the prospect
of R2P interventions
can easily make bad situations worse. onsider Syria in this light. The
Assad government has certainly slaughtered enough of its own citizens to attract
R2P attention. But no major power has proposed armed intervention or even arming
the insurgents in a dramatic or open way. Why? Because, unlike Qaddafi, Assad
has
the equipment to make the establishment of a no-fly zone, let alone use of
ground troops, a very hazardous venture. Syria also has reliable supporters and
arms suppliers in Russia and Iran, and Beijing has joined Moscow in scuttling
successive Security Council resolutions aimed at the Assad regime. Russia and
China had not forgotten that in Libya what began as an R2P intervention to
protect civilians turned quickly into one aimed at regime change. Its
impossible to prove, being a counterfactual, but had an R2P intervention
in Syria ever seemed possible to the combatants, it might well have made
the carnage worse by quickening the tempo of killing.
27.
1.
Right to Protect Triggers Nuclear Proliferation

Strengthened R2P norm causes prolif.
Bolfrass 9/12/11
Alexander K. Bollfrass is a visiting scholar at the Stimson Center 9-12-2011
Explaining Libya to Iran
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9970/explaining-libya-to-iran
Eight years after Moammar Gadhafi gave up his mail-order nuclear weapons program and chemical
munitions in exchange for dtente with the West, he has been chased from power by a ragtag rebel army
backed by Western airpower. Chances are that Gadhafi regrets his decision to forgo his WMD programs. If
he had been armed with nuclear or chemical weapons, NATO might not have intervened when he threatened
to massacre his own people. While Gadhafi's fall is good news, the end of the eccentric colonel's dictatorship
now heightens the challenge of getting the Irans and North Koreas of the world to give up their nuclear
ambitions in exchange for better relations with the West. Before the bombs started falling on Tripoli, the
intellectual and legal momentum behind such an intervention had been building for years. Through the work
of academics and humanitarian advocates, the idea known as the "responsibility to protect," or R2P, has
emerged as an increasingly mainstream norm among Western policymakers. R2P emphasizes the
responsibility of states to protect their populations and permits international intervention if a government is
unable or unwilling to prevent mass atrocities against its people. In March, the international community did
not dither when Gadhafi appeared to be preparing a massacre in Benghazi. R2P was used to justify the first
U.N.-sanctioned humanitarian intervention in a sovereign country against the wishes of its government. The
architects of the intervention were some of the very same countries that had convinced Gadhafi to give up his
weapons of mass destruction eight years earlier: France, Britain and the United States. Parallel to the
humanitarian community's development of the R2P doctrine, another community of

foreign policy thinkers, those worried about the spread of nuclear weapons, had worked to
promote an idea with very different implications for sovereignty. They reached the
conclusion that fear of outside intervention was among the many factors driving
governments to build weapons of mass destruction. For this reason, they argued, it was necessary
to assuage that fear with the offer of a security guarantee once the government could prove it had abandoned
its WMD ambitions. In Libya, this security-assurance principle successfully brought the archpariah of the
1980s back into the international fold in 2003. The contradictory doctrinal developments in
humanitarian and security circles are not abstract intellectual exercises; they have practical
implications. In light of the Islamic Republic's crushing of the Green Movement in 2009, it takes little
imagination to see a Libya-like situation emerge in Iran. Iranian leaders weighing the pros and cons of
coming clean over their country's nuclear program might look closely at what happened to Gadhafi after he
surrendered his weapons program. They might also consider Saddam Hussein and his nonexistent weapons of mass
destruction, while contrasting both these dictators with Kim Jong Il and his unpunished nuclear roguery and human
rights violations. They might come to the conclusion that nuclear weapons are useful. In fact,
we need not speculate about such a scenario, for this is essentially what Iranian Supreme
The Iranians are not the only

ones learning this lesson, one that sets the stage for a future in which nuclear weapons are
prized as a counterweight to the threat of international intervention represented by R2P and
its inherent challenge to state sovereignty. Instead of greater openness and West-friendly
behavior, the response of the rogue states would be deeper retrenchment under the cover of
asymmetric WMD capabilities.
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said at the start of the Libyan campaign.
Stefan Bauschard
2.
140
1401
Proliferation snowballs and puts everyone on hair trigger

every small crisis will go nuclear.
Soloski 9
Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
serves on the U.S. congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass

Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, 9 (Henry, Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd,
Policy Review June & July,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)
such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed

during the Cold War. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of
At a minimum,
the two superpowers strong alliance systems the U.S.-led free world and the Russian-Chinese led
Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance tension
and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is
capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively
weak alliance system ( nato) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the uk). nato is
increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in
Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or
nuclear- weapon-armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear
powers by making them strategic partners (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies (France and the uk),
non-nato allies (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation
actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear
weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear nato allies),
the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties
with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as
being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure
3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system,
with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system
that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today
that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an
increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we
think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt
or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war
Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics

could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear
states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of
these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation
trendscould
with theeasily
others create
noted above
one
the and
perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear
competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could
be called upon to break out
or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of
potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the
military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than
Certainly each nuclear states military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to
before.
weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that
can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be
even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long- range, precision guidance
munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options . Certainly, in such a world,
in the
East eor. Relatively
South West
Asia,developments
etc. could easily
relations between statesofcokey
uldfigures
become
farMiddle
less stabl
small
e.g.,prompt
Russian nuclear weapons
support for sympathetic near-abroad
provinces;
Pakistani-inspired
terrorist
strikes
in
India,
such
as
deployments with strategic consequences (arms races, strategicthose
miscues, and even
experienced recently in Mumbai;
newwar).
Indian flanking activities in Iran near
nuclear
Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts
As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to
violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.23 In short, we may soon see a
future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.
28.
Right to Protect Destroys US-Brazil Relations
1.
Unchecked humanitarian intervention tanks US Brazilian

relations overwhelms alt cause
Spektor 12
http://www.americasquarterly.org/humanitarian-interventionism-brazilian-style
Matias Spektor is assistant professor of international relations at Fundao
Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
While Washington saw the Libya episode as a successful model for future
humanitarian interventions, Braslia s aw it as a dangerous
.
precedent
Brazils foreign policy elite believed the resolution was too broad,
giving NATO free rein over the terms and conditions of the intervention. For
Brazilian leadership, the thin rules governing the use of force on the
to international s tability.
part of the major powers represent a great
threat
The idea stems from a belief that intrusive norms of humanitarian
intervention will corrode the principles of sovereignty and national
autonomy and threaten international stabilityrepresenting potentially
even a greater risk
than the
rise of new powers, radical Islam and even nuclear terror.
2.
Brazil wants LIMITED and RESTRAINED r2p syncing

with the Brazilian position boosts relations and Brazilian soft
power
Spektor 12
http://www.americasquarterly.org/humanitarian-interventionism-brazilian-style
Matias Spektor is assistant professor of international relations at Fundao
Getulio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Brazilian officials were sensitive to the criticism. By November 2011, they

began to circulate a concept paper at the UN entitled Responsibility While
Protecting, or RWP. The paper argued that without limits on what the powerful
may do, the emerging ideology of humanitarian intervention could easily become a
tool for foreign manipulation. It then went on to suggest that the international
community ought to codify standards and procedures to govern humanitarian
intervention in the future. In practice, RWP proposed the introduction of
criteriasuch as last resort, proportionality, and balance of consequences
before the Security Council authorized the use of force. The paper called for
the creation of a system for monitoring and reviewing the intervention as it
evolves. The RWP concept was not open- ended and it stopped short of specifying
how to roll out the criteria it proposed. Braslia conceived it less as a
finished doctrine and more as a broad message to the international community: if
humanitarian interventions in the future are loosely regulated and big power
coalitions intervene as they please, then R2P will divide the international
community between north and south, rich and poor, strong and weak. There was
nothing new here. Brazils core message that interventions need to be carefully
regulated can in fact be found in the 2005 R2P initiative. The fact that the
Brazilian government dusted off its old proposal and presented it to the public
demonstrated its willingness to engage constructively in the global debate over

the rules that govern the use of force in the next decades. The reception of
Brazils RWP in the U.S. and parts of Europe was negative at first. With the
partial exception of Germany, Europe quickly dismissed the initiative as an
attempt to block action and let tyrannical leaders hide behind the legal shield
of sovereignty. So far, Brazil has done a poor job of explaining what RWP
entails and answering suspicions that it is an attempt to paralyze global action
against mass atrocities instead of what it claims it is: a tool to ensure
interventions cause less damage than they set out to prevent. China, Russia and
India did not show much sympathy for RWP either. They were unhappy to see Brazil
go further than they were ready to go in criticizing the Assad regime in Syria,
and in their eyes RWP only confirms Brazils unpredictability when it comes to
defending the primacy of sovereignty. This is, of course, problematic for
Brazil. Without the military or financial resources to be a major player in the
business of intervention and peacekeeping operations, its ability to speak up
in global councils rests on the tacit support
of others. If it wants its

new ideas to stick, then Brazil first needs to convince and influence powerful
countries. RWP has yet to achieve this. Equally complicated is the reception of
RWP at home. Brazils commitment to sovereignty is deeply rooted in and around
the state apparatus, and talk of humanitarian intervention is bound to clash
with embedded understandings of how the world works. It is among networks of
activists and private foundations, however, that RWP seems to have found its
closest friends. Anecdotal evidence suggests that networks of human rights NGOs
active in Brazil and in and around the UN system welcomed the initiative and are
keen to learn more about it. Among these activists, there is a sense that if
R2P is ever going to become a key organizing principle of global order
that is embraced by all, then part of the bargain will have to involve some
form of criteria for intervention. On this view, weaker nations around the
globe will only grant legitimacy to humanitarian intervention if the use of

force on behalf of strangers is strictly regulated to ensure that the interests
of the people come before those of powerful nations. Stepping Up or Stepping Out
of Line? Future disagreement between the U.S. and Brazil over
humanitarian intervention
is not inevitable. Brazilian leaders have been

sensitive to the accusation that they just want to be recognized as a major
power without paying
any of the costs. Instead, Braslia believes it has gone out of its way to
demonstrate its burden-sharing credentials. To further the debate, though,
Brazilian leaders will need to remain involved in the shaping of humanitarian
intervention norms and avoid alienating the United States. As part of this
process, Brazil is aiming to demonstrate that it is entitled to a permanent seat
on the UN Security Council, based not only on its willingness to deploy military
missions abroad to enforce peace and stability, but on the argument that it can
bring to international and multilateral debates and decisions a new, modern
perspective on security that is more in tune with the demands of a changing
world. Along these lines, Braslia believes that it can add legitimacy to global
order because it seeks to preserve humanitarian intervention while defending the
weak from the selective geostrategic predations of the most powerful. This is a
message that strikes a chord with large swaths of people around the globe. What
is the implication for the United States? Since Brazil is more interested in
adapting existing conceptions of intervention than in offering alternative ones,
the U.S. would be wise to invest in greater dialogue and practical
cooperation on the ground. A good example is the work currently conducted by
the two countries in Haiti or in bilateral military cooperation in partner
countries throughout Africa. Along these lines, Washington should not
discard
RWP too quickly. If notions of civilian protection are going to become

fixtures in the emerging normative landscape, then they will have to be
embraced by major rising powers, first among them the members of the BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Among those countries Brazil
has been the one most willing to engage on this topic. Rather than see RWP as
an attempt to block progress toward better and more efficient humanitarian
interventions, the U.S. should take it as an attempt to return to the
initial spirit of R2P in the mid-2000s. At inception, the principle did not
focus on the use of military force
as the sole or primary instrument to

cease violations of rights. Instead, it gave equal attention to building
state
capacity to address structural causes of violence, such as poverty. Brazil wants
to emphasize that side of humanitarian intervention because it will not and
cannot take active part in it through military force. But it is keen to make
contributions in the fields where it has the ability to deliver, such as poverty
alleviation, sustainable agriculture, public service reform, and international
aid and cooperation. These may not be integral to current understandings of
humanitarian intervention, but are likely to become so if R2P is to become a
dominant norm in twenty-first century international society. The best response
by the U.S. would be to take Brazils proposals seriously and engage
Braslia in further specifying how the concept would work in practice.
Dialogue
with Brazil is a low-cost initiative
to try bridging the gap between the

Western industrial countries and the major developing states that now
threatens the future survival of a global shared responsibility to protect.
3.
Stuenkl 11/28/11
Constrained r2p boosts Brazilian prestige as global

middleman
Oliver Stuenkel is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the

Getlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in So Paulo, where he coordinates the So Paulo
branch of the School of History and Social Science (CPDOC) and the executive
program in International Relations. He is also a non-resident Fellow at the
Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin and a member of the Carnegie
Rising Democracies Network. His research focuses on rising powers; specifically
on Brazils, Indias and China's foreign policy and on their impact on global
governance. He is the author of the forthcoming IBSA: The rise of the Global
South? (2014, Routledge Global Institutions) and BRICS and the Future of Global
Order (2014, Lexington).
In this context, Brazils President Dilma Rousseff has offered an
interesting concept that may bring the two sides together. During her
opening speech at the UN General Assembly earlier this year, Rousseff argued
that better mechanisms were needed to assure that in an intervention
unwanted damage would be kept at a minimum, calling it the responsibility
while protecting (responsabilidade ao proteger). Since then, Brazil has been

low-key about the idea, and it has attempted to integrate the concept into last
months
IBSA declaration. Brazilian Presidents Rousseff argument during her speech that
while there was been a lot of talk () of the right to protect, there is little
said about the responsibility while protecting may seem insignificant, but in
essence means that if carried out in a responsible manner, Brazil could, in
principle, support intervention in the UN Security Council in the future
and India and South Africa are not fundamentally opposed to this idea. In an op-
ed in todays Folha de So Paulo, Matias Spektor, professor at Fundao Getulio

Vargas who coordinates the Center for International Relations, argues that the
concept has the potential to turn into one of the Rousseff
administrations important
to the international e . If accepted by
contributions
debat
the P5, the Brazilian initiative would impose
constraints on
interventions that could help reluctant actors such as China and Russia
support them, mitigating worries that interventions cause more damage than
necessary or support a hidden agenda. In order to successfully launch the
concept, Spektor argues, Brazil needs to promote it on many levels such as
the G20 and during
the BRICS summit, which takes place in India next year. Whatever happens, the
case shows Brazil is eager to turn into an international agenda-setter :

It is not only willing to participate in international negotiations, but it also
increasingly seeks to frame the debate and decide which issues should be
discussed in the first place.
3. Con Positive Peace Kritik
1.
*** Links ***
2.
1.
Link War
Understanding war as a discrete event obscures the structural

roots of violence
Cuomo 96 (Chris J. Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, and Director of

the Institute for Women's Studies at the University of Georgia, War Is Not Just
an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence, Published in
Hypatia 11.4 nb, pp. 31-48)
Philosophical attention to war has typically appeare d in the form of justifications for entering into war,
and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate,
hounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from norma
l life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful
times . Not surprisingly, most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely
as an event an occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are
typically marked by formal, institutional declarations. As happenings, wars and military activities can be
seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex, intentions, and directly enacted by individual and
collective decision-makers and agents of states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to
feminists
including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other oppressed
groups; how military violence shapes gendered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral
imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other oppressive and
violent institutions and hegemoniescannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events. These issues
are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions .
Risk of w ar rh eto ric pri v ileg es se curit y ov er pea cema king , tu rn ing t h e c a se
Waever 4 (Ole, Ph.D. in Political Science and Professor of International Relations at COPRI, Peace and
Security, Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, pg 62-63, http://books.google.com/books?
id=L2GKw5JcmYQC&pg=PA53&lpg=PA53&dq=%E2%80%9CPeace+and+Security%E2%80%9D,+%22Contemp
orary+Security+Analysis+and+Copenhagen+Peace+Research%22&source=bl&ots=7g5DLhB5ZY&sig=ujOh2GZXFvCSlxUWfsvrgOZyWWs&
hl=en&ei=OMZXSo2ZN5GiswOqoanaBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3, 2004, AD: 7-10-9)
President B ush
2001:341). The
senio r decla re d in 1 9 8 9 , O nce a ga in, it is a t i me f o r pea ce
(quoted by Rasmussen
f a mo us New Wo rld O rder speec h a t t he end o f t he Gul f Wa r (March 6, 1991) was phrased
mostly in terms of peace- enduring peace must be our mission. Nato enlargement is so hard for Russia and others to oppose
because it is presented apolitically as the mere expansion of the democratic peace community (Williams 2001). The war on terror
after 11 September
2001 has surprisingly few references to either peace or security - o pera t io n Enduring F re edo m - but
President George W. Bushs a ddre ss o n 7 O ct o ber 2 0 01 ended w it h P ea ce a nd f re edom w ill
prev a il, a nd
t he ( in)f a mo us a xi s o f ev il w a s presente d (29 January, 2002) in t er ms o f a t hreat t o pea
ce . Peace has become the overarching concept of the two examined in this chapter. Security in turn, is gradually
swallowed up into a
g ener a lized co ncer n a bo ut ris k . So ciet y s re f lect io ns o n it self a re increa sing ly in t
er ms o f risk (risk society). More and more dangers are the product of our own actions, and fewer and
fewer attributabl e to forces completely external to ourselves- thus threats become risks (Luhmann 1990).
This goes for forms of
production and their effects on the environment, and it goes for internal affairs, where it is hard to see the
war on terrorism as a pure reaction to something coming to the West from elsewhere. Western actions in
relation to Middle East peace processes, religion, migration and global economic policy are part of what might produce future terrorism.
The short-term reaction to the 11 September attacks on the USA in 2001 might be re-assertion of single-
minded aspirations for absolute security with little concern for liberty and and for boomerang effects on
future security (Bigo 2002), but in general debates, the risk way of thinking about international affairs is making itself increasingly
felt. We have seen during the last twenty years a spread of the originally specifically international concept
of
sec urit y in it s sec ur it iza t io n f unct io n t o mo re a nd mo re s pher es o f do me st ic life , a
nd no w so ciety takes its revenge by transforming the concept of security along lines of risk thinking
(Waever 2002). Politically, the concepts of peace and security are cha nging places in these years. Security studies
and peace research werer shaped
in important ways by the particular Cold War context, though not the way it is often implied in fast politicians statements about the postCold War irrelevance of peace research. Peace research and security studies I(or rather strategic studies) meant, resp ectibley to oppose
or to accept the official Western policy problematique. Today, it is the othe way round. P ea ce re sea rc h mig ht be da t
ed because peace is so apologetic to be intellectually uninteresting, while security is potentially the name
of a radical, subversive agenda.
3.
1.
Link War
They dehistoricize war making complex solutions to the

structural roots impossible
Gur-Z eev 1 (Ilan, Head of the Department of Education at the University of

Haifa, Summer, http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/peace23.html)
Pacifist writers as diverse as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Barbara Deming have emphasized the fact that pacifism entails a critique
of pervasive, systematic human violence. Despite its reductionist tendencies, there is much to learn from the ways in which pacifists
conceive of war as a presence, as well as the pacifist refusal to let go of the ideal of peace. Characterizing pacifism as motivated by the desire
to avoid specific events disregards the extent to which pacifism aims to criticize the preconditions underlying events of war. Following
several initial moves in feminist philosophy, Peach rejects just war abstraction--of the realities, or "horrors," of war; dimensional evil,
killable Others; and I the ethical responses needed to address the morality of war, such as a privileging of justice mil rights over love and
caring. Following Elsluain, she believes that feminist just-war principles should be more particularized, contextualized, and individualized.
But the abstraction of the particularities of war depends on an abstraction of war itself. The distance of such abstraction is created in part by
willingness to think of war without considering the presence of war in "peaceful" times. Wars becomes conceptual entities
objects for considerationrather than diverse, historically loaded exemplifications of the contexts in
which they occur. In order to notice the particular and individual realities of war, attention must be given
to the particular, individual, and contextualized causes and eff ects of pervasive militarism, as well as the
patterns and connections among them
2.
A crisis-driven approach to war focused on timeframe and risk

assessment obscures the omnipresence of militarism at the root
of violence

Hypatia 11.4 nb, pp. 31-48) CH
Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into
the very fabric of life in twenty -first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses.
For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based
ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance
to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as giv ens in
most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of
declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war . It is particularly easy for those whose lives are
shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain
this
false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict,
creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercis es in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is
then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened,
and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities.
Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and
complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant
military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly
all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of
the state.
Stefan Bauschard
150
1501
Stefan Bauschard
151
1511
4.
1.
Link War
Their reduction of war to the entities and particularities of the

aff abstracts war, preventing contextualized responses to
structural violence

But the abstraction of the particularities of war depends on an abstraction of
war itself. The distance of such abstraction is created in part by willingness
to think of war without considering the presence of war in "peaceful" times.
Wars becomes conceptual entitiesobjects for considerationrather than diverse,
historically loaded exemplifications of the contexts in which they occur. In
order to notice the particular and individual realities of war, attention must
be given to the particular, individual, and contextualized causes and effects of
pervasive militarism, as well as the patterns and connections among them. Like
other feminists, Peach criticizes the dualisms and dichotomies that underlie war
and the other evils of patriarchy, including dichotomies between male and
female, combatant and non-combatant, soldier and citizen, ally and enemy and
state and individual which have dominated just-war thinking. Rather than relying
on traditional dichotomies, a feminist application of just-war criteria should
emphasize the effects of going to war on the lives of particular individuals who
would be involved, whether soldier or civilian, enemy or ally, male or female.
(Peach 1994. 166)
5.
Hegemon
y causes
negative
peace
6.
Link Hegemony
Tavares 8 (Rodrigo l, June, Understanding regional peace and security: a framework for analysis., Vol. 14
Issue 2, p107-127, 21p, Contemporary Politics)
The first instrument, armed violence, can be seen as a mechanism of state policy to shape
the international system. In a paradoxical perspective, realist scholars and conservative policy
makers tend to consider war as a rational tool to carve international order and stability
(Waltz
1959; see also Howard 1970). The second instrument, balance of power, is an instrument (or
a set of instruments) that states use to band together and pool their capabilities whenever one
state or group of states appears to become a threat as it gathers a disproportionate amount
of power. Although balance of power could be interpreted as a concept or a strategic
doctrine,
here t he e mpha si s is o n t he mec ha nis ms u sed by po litic a l a g ent s t o ba la nce ea ch o t her s
ca pa bilit ies .
In conjugation with this, hegemony is the dominance of one state over other states,
with or without the threat of force, to the extent that , for instance, the dominant party
can dictate the terms of relationship to its advantage. In the same line, alliances are
military collective defence arrangements of states formed as a response to a common
threat and as a way of maximizing security and minimizing the eventuality of an external
attack. Modern military alliances are the subject of a significant body of literature
(Osgood 1968, Walt 1987, 1997).
1.
Negative peace trades-off with a focus on the structural roots

of violence
Von Heinegg 4 (Wolff Heintschel, * Prof. Dr. iur., Europa-Universitat Frankfurt

(Oder); Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, U.S. Naval War
College, Newport, R.I., SummerThe Rule of Law in conflict and Post-Conflict
Situations: Factors in war to peace transitions, Harvard Society for Law &
Public Policy)
Before dealing with the different forms of terminating (and of suspending) an international armed conflict, it needs to be stressed that the
end of a war merely means a return to peace insofar as the situation thus created is characterized by the
absence of military operations, including occupation. This situation, often referred to as "negative peace,"
of course does not mean a return to normal or amicable relations between the former belligerents, often
referred to as "positive peace." n17 The latter condition, while not apt for an abstract and comprehensive definition, n18 may be
achieved through the exchange of diplomats and by the reestablishment of economic and cultural relations. There is, however, another aspect
of this issue that is of importance in that context. A situation of "positive peace," which is, inter alia, based upon the
principle of sovereign equality of States, regularly presupposes the reestablishment of the full sovereignty
of all belligerents. While the termination of an international armed conflict implies that any further use of
armed force not justified by the right of self -defense will be contrary to the fundamental prohibition of
the use of force, n19 the existence of negative peace does not necessarily imply t he return of the vanquished
state to full sovereignty. While there may be an exchange of diplomats as well as other forms of establishing diplo matic
relations, the situation may not be characterized as a return to, or the establishment of, positive peace s o
long as the State concerned has not regained its full sovereignty . This was the case with Germany until its reunification
because all questions relating to "Germany as a whole" had been made subject to the so called "Allied reservations," which meant that neither
the Federal Republic of Germany nor the German Democratic Republic were allowed to autonomously decide on that core question of
their respective sovereignty. Moreover, Berlin remained under an [*848] occupational regime. n21 Only with the end of the Allied rights
concerning Germany as a whole, including Berlin, did Germany and the Allies return to a situation of positive peace proper
7.
***Impacts***
Stefan Bauschard
154
1541
Stefan Bauschard
8.
1.
155
1551
Impact No Solvency War
Militarism is the root cause The Pro doesn t solve

Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or
address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in
occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to
feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national
identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman enti ties and communities during
peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence
in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among
the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as
nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military
solutions for social problems.
2.
Their solutions backfire, turning the case
Felice 98 (William F., Professor of International Relations and Human Rights at Eckerd College, Militarism
and Human Rights, International Affairs, Vol. 74 No. 1, Blackwell Publishing,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2624664, A.D.: 7/10/09) JH
The attitudes that sustain large and deadly military machines did not fall with the Berlin Wall . The logic is
mesmerizing. The world is a dangerous place divided into sovereign nation-states, each seeking to improve its position in an anarchic
international system. There are few opportunities for cooperation. Each state maintains the right to be free from the
scrutiny and intervention of other states in its internal affairs. Each nation is surrounded by danger and mu st protect
itself to survive, which gives rise to a preoccupation with power, particularly military power. Internalizing this acute sense
of danger makes it easier to accept high taxation to pay for the militarization at the expense of social
development. Yet such militarization in the name of security and peace often backfires and creates
conditions of insecurity and conflict. Further, such expenditures consistently undermine the ability of
nations to fulfil other international human rights, in particular economic and social rights. Security defined solely as the heavily
armed defence of ones borders. How does a nation provide a basic right to physical security without compromising other human rights?
What types of military and other expenses should be budgeted to attain physical security?
9.
1.
Impact No Solvency Poverty
Structural violence outweighs the aff and a failure to address

human security makes their harms inevitable They treat the
effect, not the cause
Gilman 0 (Robert, President of Context Institute, Structural Violence, The Foundation of Peace IC #4,
http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC04/Gilman1.htm, 2000, AD: 7-9-9)
How legitimate is it to ascribe these deaths to the structural violence of human institutions, and not just
to the variability of nature? Perhaps the best in-depth study of structural violence comes from the Institute for
Food and Development Policy (1885 Mission St, San Francisco, CA 94103). What they find throughout the
Third World is that the problems of poverty and hunger often date back hundreds of years to some
conquest - by colonial forces or otherwise. The victors became the ruling class and the landholders,
pushing the vast majority either on to poor ground or into being landless laborers . Taxes, rentals, and
the
legal system were all structured to make sure that the poor stayed poor . The same patterns continue
today. Additional support is provided by the evidence in the above figure, which speaks for itself. Also,
according to Sivard, 97% of the people in the Third World live under repressive governments, with almost half
of all Third World countries run by military dominated governments. Finally, as a point of comparison, Ehrlich
and Ehrlich (Population, Environment, and Resources, 1972, p72) estimate between 10 and 20 million deaths
per year due to starvation and malnutrition. If their estimates are correct, our estimates may even be too low.
Some comparisons will help to put these figures in perspective. The total number of deaths from all causes in
1965 was
62 million, so these estimates indicate that 23% of all deaths were due to structural violence. By 1979
the fraction had dropped to 15%. While it is heartening to see this improvement, the number of deaths is
staggeringly large, dwarfing any other form of violence other than nuclear war. For example, the level
of structural violence is 60 times greater than the average number of battle related deaths pe r year
since
1965 (Sivard 1982). It is 1.5 times as great as the yearly average number of civilian and battle field deaths
during the 6 years of World War II. Every 4 days, it is the equivalent of another Hiroshima . Perhaps the
most
hopeful aspect of this whole tragic situation is that essentially everyone in the present system has become a
loser. The plight of the starving is obvious, but the exploiters don't have much to show for their efforts either not compared to the quality of life they could have in a society without the tensions generated by this
exploitation. Especially at a national level, what the rich countries need now is not so much more material
wealth, but the opportunity to live in a world at peace . The rich and the poor, with the help of modern
technology and weaponry, have become each others' prisoners . Today's industrialized societies did not
invent this structural violence, but it could not continue without our permission. This suggests that to the list
of human tendencies that are obstacles to peace we need to add the ease with which we acquiesce in
injustice the way we all too easily look in the other direction and disclaim "response ability." In terms of the suffering
it supports, it is by far our most serious flaw .
2.
Militarism is the root cause
Felice 98 (William F., Professor of International Relations and Human Rights at Eckerd College, Militarism and
Human Rights, International Affairs, Vol. 74 No. 1, Blackwell Publishing,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2624664, A.D.: 7/10/09) JH
This human rights agenda can also only be implemented within a framework of peace. Militarism has neither created a world of peace and
stability, nor protected the human right to physical security. Overemphasis on military superiority undermines the
ability to build regimes of trust and harmony . The arsenals of the war system are symptoms of deep conflict. Arms control
and disarmament and the demobilization of armed forces are prerequisites to providing the institutional framework within which nations
may pursue implementation of the corpus of international human rights law. International security and stability are dependent on domestic
security and stability. The roots of conflict within domestic soc ieties are often the result of economic, social
and environmental pressures which cause poverty and unemployment and pit one community, class, sex or ethnic group
against another. Human rights as the core of domestic and foreign public policy can provide a route for the achievement of peace and
stability.
P re o cc upa t io ns w it h ba la nce o f pow er a nd milita ry pro w ess ca n o nly co ntinue t o pro

duce a w o rld of
insecurity and war. Policies based on outmoded notions of realpolitik exacerbate insecurities. The irony is
t ha t hu ma n r ig hts po licies p ro v ide t he clea re st ro a d to achiev e t he re a list o bje ct
iv es o f sec urit y a nd stability. Long-term interests in international stability should compel governments to explore human
security and positive peace. It is commonly accepted that totalitarianism and human rights are incompatible. The negative impact of
militarism on basic human rights must also be understood. A
militarized society exists in contradiction to basic human

rights and negates the opportunities for human freedom.
10.
1.
Impact War
Their conception of peace prescribes military solutions as

violence control
Sandy & Perkins 1 (Leo R and Ray, Co-Founder of Peace Studies at Plymouth State College and teacher of
philosophy at Plymouth State College, The Nature of Peace and its implication for peace education, online
journal of peace and conflict resolution 4.2,
http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/ENGSEMJ/v08/undervisningsmateriale/IL%20&%20HR/Topic
%202%20%20Reading.pdf, 2001, AD:7-10-9)
Peace as the mere absence o f w a r is w ha t Woo l ma n ( 1 9 8 5) re f er s t o a s neg a t iv e pea ce
. This definition is based on Johan Galtungs ideas of peace. For Galtung, negative peace is defined as a state
requiring a set of social structures that provide security and protection from acts of direct physical
violence committed by individuals, groups or nations. The emphasis is ...on control of violence. The main
strategy is dissociation, whereby conflicting parties are separated...In general, policies based on the idea of
negative peace do not deal with the causes of violence, only its manifestations. Therefore, these policies are
thought to be insufficient to assure lasting conditions of peace. Indeed, by suppressing the release of
tensions resulting from social conflict, negative peace efforts may actually lead to future violence of
greater magnitude . (Woolman, 1985, p.8) The recent wars in the former Yugoslavia are testimony to this .
The massive military machine previously provided by the U.S.S.R. put a lid on ethnic hostilities yet did
nothing to resolve them thus allowing them to fester and erupt later.
Defining war as an event implies that war can be justifies, guaranteeing militarized solutions
to problems
the Institute for Women's Studies at the Univerity of Georgia, War Is Not Just
Just-war theory is a prominent example of a philosophical approach that real-rim-the-assumption that
wars are isolated from everyday life and ethics. Such theory, as developed by St. Augustine, Thomas
Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius, and as articulated in contemporary dialogues by many philosophers,
including Michael Walzer (1977), Thomas Nagel (1974), and Sheldon Cohen (1989), take the primary
question concerning the ethics of warfare to be about when to enter into

military conflicts against other states. They therefore take as a given the
notion that war is an isolated, definable event with clear boundaries. These
boundaries are significant because they distinguish the circumstances in which
standard moral rules and constraints, such as rules against murder and
unprovoked violence, no longer apply. Just-war theory assumes that war is a
separate sphere of human activity having its own ethical constraints and
criteria and in doing so it begs the question of whether or not war is a special
kind of event, or part of a pervasive presence in nearly all contemporary life.
Because the application of just-war principles is a matter of proper decisionmaking on the part of agents of the state, before wars occur, and before
military strikes are made, they assume that military initiatives are distinct
events. In fact, declarations of war are generally overdetermined escalations of
preexisting conditions. Just-war criteria cannot help evaluate military and
related institutions, including their peacetime practices and how these relate
to wartime activities, so they cannot address the ways in which armed conflicts
between and among states emerge from omnipresent, often violent, state
militarism. The remarkable resemblances in some sectors between states of peace
and states of war remain completely untouched by theories that are only able to
discuss the ethics of starting and ending direct military conflicts between and
among states
11.
1.
Impact War
Understanding war as an event necessitates militarism which

forecloses vital interrogation to determine true peace
Richmond 7 (Oliver P., lecturer in the Department of International Relations,

University of St. Andrews, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Critical
Research Agendas for Peace: The Missing Link in the Study of International
Relations, http://www.questiaschool.com/read/5023019836?title=Critical
%20Research%20Agendas
%20for%20Peace%3a%20The%20Missing%20Link%20in%20the%20Study%20of%20International
%20Relations, AD: 7/10/09)
As a consequence what has emerged has been an orthodox assumption that first the management of war
must be achieved before the institutions of peace can operate, at a global, regional, state, and local level.
Peace has, in Western political thought in particular, been enshrined first in the belief that only a limited
peace is possible, even despite more utopian leanings, and recently that peace can now be built according
to a certain epistemology. Militarization, force, or coercion have normally been the key mechanisms for its
attainment, and it has been imbued with a hegemonic understanding of universal norms, now
increasingly instilled through institutions of governance. It is generally assumed by most theorists, most
policymakers,
and practitioners, that peace has an ontological stability enabling it to be understood, defined, and thus
created. Indeed, the implication of the void of debate about peace indicates that it is generally thought
that peace as a concept is so ontologically solid that no debate is required. There is clearly a resistance
to examining the concept of peace as a subjective ontology, as well as a subjective political and
ideological framework. Indeed, this might be said to be indicative of "orientalism," in i mpeding a
discussion of a positive peace or of alternative concepts and contexts of peace. (18) Indeed, Said's
humanism indicates the
dangers of assuming that peace is universal, a Platonic ideal form, or extremely limited. An emerging critical
conceptualization of peace rests upon a genealogy that illustrates its contested discourses and multiple
concepts. This allows for an understanding of the many actors, contexts, and dynamics of peace , and
enables a reprioritization of what, for whom, and why, peace is valued. Peace from this perspective is a rich,
varied, and fluid tapestry, which can be contextualized, rather than a sterile, extremely limited, and
probably unobtainable product of a secular or nonsecular imagination. It represents a discursive framework
in which the many problems that are replicated by the linear and rational project of a universal peace
(effectively camouflaged by a lack of attention within IR) can be properly interrogated in order to prevent
the discursive replication of violence. (19) This allows for an understanding of how the multiple and
competing versions of peace may even give rise to conflict, and also how this might be overcome. One area
of consensus from within this more radical literature appears to be that peace is discussed, interpreted, and
referred to in a way that nearly always disguises the fact that it is essentially contested. This is often an act
of hegemony thinly
disguised as benevolence, assertiveness, or wisdom. Indeed, many assertions about peace depend upon
actors who know peace then creating it for those that do not , either through their acts or through the implicit
peace discourses that are employed to describe conflict and war in opposition to peace. Where there should be
research agendas there are often silences. Even contemporary approaches in conflict analysis and peace
studies rarely stop to imagine the kind of peace the y may actually create. IR has reproduced a science of
peace based upon political, social, economic, cultural, and legal governance frameworks, by which conflict in
the world is judged. This has led to the liberal peace framework, which masks a hegemonic collusion over
the discourses of, and creation of, peace. (20) A critical interrogation of peace indicates it should be qualified
as a specific type among many.
12.
1.
Impact Structural Violence Outweighs
Structural violence outweighs nuclear war
Gilman 83 (Robert, President of Context Institute, Founding Editor of IN CONTEXT, A Quarterly of
Humane Sustainable Culture, Can we find genuine peace in a world with inequitable distribution
of wealth
among nations?, The Foundations of Peace, p. 8, AD: 7-11-09)MT
How legitimate is it to ascribe these deaths to the structural violence of human institutions, and not just to the
variability of nature? Perhaps the best in-depth study of structural violence comes from the Institute for Food
and Development Policy (1885 Mission St, San Francisco, CA 94103). What they find throughout the Third
World is that the problems of poverty and hunger often date back hundreds of years to some conquest
- by colonial forces or otherwise. The victors became the ruling class and the landholders, pushing the vast
majority either on to poor ground or into being landless laborers. Taxes, rentals, and the legal system were all
structured to make sure that the poor stayed poor. The same patterns continue today.
Some comparisons will help to put these figures in perspective. The total number of deaths from all causes in
1965 was 62 million, so these estimates indicate that 23% of all deaths were due to structural violence. By
1979 the fraction had dropped to 15%. While it is heartening to see this improvement, the number of deaths
is staggeringly large, dwarfing any other form of violence other than nuclear war. For example, the level of
structural violence is 60 times greater than the average number of battle related deaths per year since
1965 (Sivard 1982). It is 1.5 times as great as the yearly average number of civilian and battle field deaths during
the 6 years of World War II. Every 4 days, it is the equivalent of another Hiroshima.
2.
Structural violence kills more people than have died in all acts
of direct violence
Pilisuk 1 (Marc, GLOBALISM AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE Peace, Conflict, and

Violence:
Peace Psychology for the 21st Century. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, PrenticeHall.) CH
Limited material resources are not the only plight of poor people. Poverty inflicts psychological scars as well;
it is an experience of scarcity amidst affluence. For many reasons, such as those discussed by Opotow (this
volume), poverty produces the scorn of others and the internalized scorn of oneself. Ind igence is not just
about money, roads, or TVs, but also about the power to determine how local resources will be used to
give meaning to lives. The power of global corporations in local communities forces people to depend on
benefits from afar. Projected images of the good life help reduce different cultural values to the one global
value of money. Meanwhile, money becomes concentrated in fewer hands. The world is dividing into a small
group of haves and a growing group of paupers. This division of wealth inflicts a level of structural
violence that kills many more persons than have died by all direct acts of violence and by war.
3.
Structural violence outweighs NW
Evangelista 5 (Matthew, Professor of International and comparative politics,

Harvard University, Peace studies: Critical Concepts in Political Science,
2005, http://books.google.com/books?id=9IAfLDzySd4C&pg=PA41&lpg=PA41&dq=
%22structural+ violence%22+%22nuclear+war
%22&source=bl&ots=m9wAXnUQqH&sig=4MnhVGRGJJ_Z8aS5SSmTp
tgRqYM&hl=en&ei=YBJZSoSeKYuqswOQ9fjWBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6,
AD: 7/11/9) TR
But equally important is to recall that it is hardly possible to arrive at any general judgment, independent of time
and space, as to which type of violence is more important. In space, today, it may certainly be argued that
research in the Americas should focus on structural violence, between nations as well as between
individuals, and that peace research in Europe should have a similar focus on personal violence. Latent
personal violence in Europe may erupt into nuclear war, but the manifest structural violence in the
Americas (and not only there) already causes an annual toll of nuclear magnitudes . In saying this, we are of
course not neglecting the
structural components of the European situation, (such as the big power dominance and the traditional
exploitation of Eastern Europe by Western Europe) nor are we forgetful of the high level of personal violence
in the Americas even though it does not take the form of international warfare (but sometimes the form of
interventionist aggression).
Stefan Bauschard
160
1601
Stefan Bauschard
13.
1.
161
1611
Impact Structural Violence Outweighs
Structural violence outweighs direct violence on magnitude

and probability
Pilisuk 97 (Marc, Fall, The hidden structure of violence, Fall97, Vol. 20 Issue
2, p25, 7phttp://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=8&hid=7&sid=9058ddcf-12214296-8d1b98c9d5856a77%40sessionmgr7&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=97120169
14)
Poverty, inequality, social marginality, and domination of resources all produce unneeded suffering and death.
These structures are not acts of nature but products of social arrangements created by people in ways not easily
noticed. There are relationships among cultural, structural, and direct violence. Culture, the normative beliefs
and practices of a society, can be a source of violence by allowing a dehumanization of certain persons or
groups. Cultural violence leads to structural violence when it is incorporated into formal legal and economic
exchanges. While individual acts of direct violence have many causes, their occurrence is frequently
predicated upon a larger and often hidden structure that induces violence (Galtung 1996). The three types
of violence differ temporally. Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ebbs and
flows; cultural violence remains more invariant, given the slow transformation of basic culture. In most cases,
there is a flow from cultural violence to institutionalized structural violence, and finally to eruptions of direct
violent acts. Direct violence is used by both underdogs and top dogs but serves quite different purposes for
the two groups. Underdogs use violence as a way to get out of a "structural iron cage " of powerlessness
and poverty or to get back at the society that put them there . Top dogs, on the other hand, use violence as a
way
to keep or gain power (Galtung 1996). Structural violence is harder to identify than direct violence. One
can recognize acts of rape or murder as violent and we abhor them. Examples of structural violence,
however, look normal on the surface. Therefore, more often than not, structural violence is left
unchanged and the cycle of violence continues.
2.
Structural violence outweighs because its systemic
Parson 7 (Kenneth, Peace Review, April-June, Structural Violence and Power,

Peace Review; Apr-Jun2007, Vol. 19 Issue 2, p173-181,
9phttp://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=6&hid=7&sid=9058ddcf-1221-4296-8d1b98c9d5856a77%40sessionmgr7&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=25359940
) CH
Despit e a lo ng ce ntury o f v io lence rapid proliferation of the instruments of mass violence, the
increasingly complex organization and accelerated deployment of the forces of violence, and the
widespread mediazation of violence over the last three decades aloneour theoretical
understanding
and articulation of violence itself has progressed much more slowly. Johan Galtung is one particular theorist
who takes seriously the project of clarifying how our discourses of violence perpetuate or provide
alternatives to
relations of violence. Given his longstanding attention to structural violence and the extensive thinking he has done on the relations between
violence and power within the context of militarization, poverty, and political repression, his notions of peace and violence are not without substantial content
and relevance to theorists of conflict and war
3.
Structural Violence has a greater impact than Direct Violence
Maley 85 (William, The University of New South Wales at Duntroon, Peace, Needs
and Utopia, Political Studies, XXXIIl, 578-591,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=6&hid=7&sid=fbf7951e-fa9b-4ac2-ba3b2c07e8326bd2%40sessionmgr2) CH
However, Galtung's major theoretical innovation was to posit a distinction between direct violence, where
there is an actor committing the violence, and structural violence, where there is no such actor, On
occasion he refers to this latter condition as 'social injustice', and he uses interchangeably the labels
'social injustice' and 'positive peace' to describe the absence of structural violence, -' However, he stressed
that both the absence of direct violence and the absence of structural violence are significant goals, and
that 'it is probably disservice to man to try, in any abstract way, to say that one is more important than
the
other'.
14.
1.
Impact Sexism
Militarism allows for the justification of violence against

women

To give one very clear example of the ways in which just-war evaluations of wars as events fail to address
feminist questions about militarism, consider the widespread influence of foreign military bases on gendered
national identities and interactions. In Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International
Politics (1990), Cynthia Enloe illustrates how, while decision- making and economic power are held
primarily by men, international relations and politics are inevitably played out on women's bodies in
myriad ways, propagating racist, nationalist, and colonialist conceptions of femininity. One chapter,
"Base Women," is devoted to a discussion of the ways in which local and global sexual politics shape and
are shaped through the constant presence of thousa nds of military bases worldwide in the symbol of the
soldier, the introduction of foreign conceptions of mascul inity and femininity, the repro duction of family
structures on military bases, and through systems of prostitution that universally coexist alongside
military bases Enloe writes, "military politics, which occupy such a large part of international politics
today, require military bases. Bases are artificial societies created out of unequal relations between men
and women of different races and classes" and, one might add, different nations (Enloe 1990, 2). The
constant, global presence of these bases is an example of the mundane givenness and subtle omnipresence
of military violence. Most bases have managed to slip into the daily lives of the nearby community. A
military base, even one controlled by soldiers of another country, can become politically invisible if its
ways of doing business and seeing the world insinuate themselves into a community's schools, consumer
tastes, housing patterns, children's games, adults' friendships, jobs and gossip. . . . Most have draped
themselves with the camouflage of normalcy. . . . Rumors of a base closing can send shivers of economic alarm
through a civilian community that has come to depend on base jobs and soldiers' spending. (Enloe 1990, 66)
Just-war
theoryeven feminist just-war theorycannot bring to light the ways ill which the politics of military
bases are related to the waging of war, how militarism constructs masculinity and femininity, or how
international politics are shaped by the microcosmic impacts of military bases. It therefore cannot address
some of the most pressing ways in which militarism and war involve and affect women.
15.
1.
Impact Environment
Militarism justifies continual environmental destruction
Cuomo 96 (Chris J. Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, and Director of the Institute for
Women's Studies at the University of Georgia, War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of
Everyday Violence, Published in Hypatia 11.4 nb, pp. 31-48)
If environmental destruction is a necessary aspect of war and the peacetime practices of military
institutions, an analysis of war which includes its embeddedness in peacetime militarism is necessary to
address the environmental effects of war. Such a perspective must pay adequate attention to what is required to prepare for
war in a technological age, and how women and other Others are affected by the realities of contemporary military institutions and
practices Emphasizing the ways in which war is a presence, a constant undertone, wh ite noise in the
background of social existence, moving sometimes closer to the foreground of collective consciousness in
the form of direct combat yet remaining mostly as an unconsidered given, allows for several promising
analyses . To conclude, I will summarize four distinct benefits of feminist philosophical attention to the constancy of military presence in
most everyday contemporary life.
2.
Militarism Destroys the Environment

In Scorched Earth: The Military's Assault on the Environment, William Thomas, a U.S. Navy veteran,
illustrates the extent to which the peacetime practices of military institutions damage natural
environments and communities. Thomas argues that even "peace" entails a dramatic and widespread war
on nature, or as Joni Seager puts it, "The environmental costs of militarized peace bear suspicious
resemblance to the costs of war" (Thomas 1995, xi). All told, including peacetime activities as well as the
immense destruction caused by combat, military institutions probably presen t the most dramatic threat
to ecological well-being on the planet. The military is the largest generator of hazardous waste in the
United States, creating nearly a ton of toxic pollution every minute, and military analyst Jillian Skeel claims
that, "Global military activity may be the largest worldwide polluter and consumer of precious resources"
(quoted in Thomas 1995, 5). A conventionally powered aircraft carrier consumes 150,000 gallons of fuel a day.
In less than an hour's flight, a single jet launched from its flight deck consumes as much fuel as a North
American motorist burns in two years. One F-16 jet engine requires nearly four and a half tons of scarce
titanium, nickel, chromium, cobalt, and energy-intensive aluminum (Thomas 1995, 5), and nine percent of all
the iron and steel used by humans is consumed by the global military (Thomas 1995, 16). The United States
Department of Defense generates 500,000 tons of toxins annually , more than the world's top five chemical
companies combined. The military is the biggest single source of environmental pollution in the United
States. Of 338 citations issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency in 1989, three-quarters
went to military installations (Thomas 1995, 17).
16.
1.
Impact Environment
Military practices destroy the environment both during war

and peace time

There are many conceptual and practical connections between military practices in which humans aim to
kill and harm each other for some declared "greater good," and nonmilitar y practices in which we
displace, destroy, or seriously modify nonhuman communities, species, and ecosystems in the name of
human interests. An early illustration of these connections was made by Rachel Carson in the first few pages
of The Silent Spring (1962), in which she described insecticides as the inadvertent offspring of World War II
chemical weapons research. We can now also trace ways in which insecticides were put of the Western-defined
global corporatization of agriculture that helped kill off the small family farm and made the worldwide system
of food production dependent on the likes of Dow Chemical and Monsanto. Military practices are no
different from other human practices that damage and irreparably modify nature. They are often a result
of c ost- benefit analyses that pretend to weigh all likely outcomes yet do not consider nonhuman entities
except in terms of their use value for humans and they nearly always create unforeseeable effects for
humans and nonhumans. In addition, everyday military peacetime practices are actually more destructive
than most other human activities, they are directly enacted by state power, and, because they function as
unquestioned "givens," they enjoy a unique near-immunity to enactments of moral reproach. It is worth
noting the extent to which everyday military activities remain largely unscrutinized by environmentalists,
especially American environmentalists, largely because fear allows us to he fooled into thinking that
"national security" is an adequate excuse for "ecological military mayhem" (Thomas 1995, 16).
17.
1.
Impact Genocide
The ideology of militarism guarantees genocide and unlimited

violence

The feminization, commodification, and devaluation of nature helps create a reality in which its destruct ion
in warfare is easily justified. In imagining an ethic that addresses these realities, feminists cannot neglect the
extent to which military ecocide is connected, conceptually and practically, to transnational capitalism
and other forms of human oppression and exploitation. Virtually all of the world's thirty-five nuclear bomb test sites, as
well as most radioactive dumps and uranium mines, occupy Native lands (Thomas 1995, 6). Six nuiltinationals control one-quarter of all
United States defense contracts (Thomas 1995, 10), and two million dollars per minute is spent on the global military (Thomas 1995, 7).
One could go on for volumes about the elleci of chemical and nuclear testing, military-industrial development and waste, and the disruption
of wildlife, habitats, communities, and lifestyles that are inescapably linked to military practices. There are many conceptual
and practical connections between military practices in which humans aim to kill and harm each other
for some declared "greater good," and nonmilitary practices in which we displace, destroy, or seriously
modify nonhuman communities, species, and ecosystems in the name of human interests. An early illustration
of these connections was made by Rachel Carson in the first few pages of The Silent Spring (1962), in which she described insecticides as
the inadvertent offspring of World War II chemical weapons research. We can now also trace ways in which insecticides were put of the
Western-defined global corporatization of agriculture that helped k ill olf the small family farm and made the worldwide system of food
production dependent on the likes of Dow Chemical and Monsanto. Military practices are no different from other human
practices that damage and irreparably modify nature. They are often a result of cost-benefit analyses
that pretend to weigh all likely outcomes yet do not consider nonhuman entities except in terms of their
use value for humans and they nearly always create unforeseeable effects for humans and nonhumans . In
addition, everyday military peacetime practices are actually more destructive than most other human
activities, they are directly enacted by state power, and, because they function as unquestioned "givens,"
they enjoy a unique near-immunity to enactments of moral reproach. It is worth noting the extent to which everyday
military activities remain largely unscrutinized by environmentalists, especially American environmentalists, largely because fear allows us
to he fooled into thinking that "national security" is an adequate excuse for "ecological military mayhem" (Thomas 1995, 16). If
environmental destruction is a necessary aspect of war and the peacetime practices of military
institutions, an analysis of war which includes its embeddedness in peacetime militarism is neces sary to
address the environmental effects of war. Such a perspective must pay adequate attention to what is required to prepare for war
in a technological age, and how women and other Others are affected by the realities of contemporary military institutions and practices.
18.
1.
Impact Morality OWs Extinction
We have a moral obligation to help others in the face of

structural violence even if that leads to extinction.
Watson 77 (Richard, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, World Hunger and

Moral Obligation, p. 118-119)
These arguments are morally spurious. That food sufficient for well-nourished survival is the equal right of
every human individual or nation is a specification of the higher principle that everyone has equal right to the
necessities of life. The moral stress of the principle of equity is primarily on equal sharing, and only
secondarily on what is being shared. The higher moral principle is of human equity per se. Consequently, the
moral action
is to distribute all food equally, whatever the consequences. This is the hard line apparently drawn by such
moralists as Immanuel Kant and Noam Chomskybut then, morality is hard. The conclusion may be
unreasonable (impractical and irrational in conventional terms), but it is obviously moral. Nor should anyone
purport surprise; it has always been understood that the claims of moralityif taken seriouslysupersede
those of conflicting reason. One may even have to sacrifice ones life or ones nation to be moral in situations
where practical behavior would preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a
(perhaps dead) patriot even when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent.
Similarly, if one is to be moral, one distributes available food in equal shares (even if everyone then dies). That
an action is necessary to save ones life is no excuse for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to
be a patriot or moral. No principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to save ones life or
nation. There is a strict analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake of being moral, and
adhering to Christian principles for the sake of being Christian. The moral world contains pits and lions, but
one looks always to the highest light. The ultimate test always harks to the highest principlerecant or die
and it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going gets rough . I have put aside many questions of
detail such as the mechanical problems of distributing food because detail does not alter the stark
conclusion. If
every human life is equal in value, then the equal distribution of the necessities of life is an extremely high, if
not the highest, moral duty. It is at least high enough to override the excuse that by doing it one would lose
ones
life. But many people cannot accept the view that one must distribute equally even in f the nation collapses or
all people die. If everyone dies, then there will be no realm of morality. Practically speaking, sheer survival
comes first. One can adhere to the principle of equity only if one exists. So it is rational to suppose that the
principle of survival is morally higher than the principle of equity. And though one might not be able to
argue for unequal distribution of food to save a nationfor nations can come and goone might well argue
that
unequal distribution is necessary for the survival of the human species. That is, some large groupsay one-third
of present world populationshould be at least well-nourished for human survival. However, from an
individual standpoint, the human specieslike the nationis of no moral relevance. From a naturalistic
standpoint, survival does come first; from a moralistic standpointas indicated abovesurvival may have to be
sacrificed. In the milieu of morality, it is immaterial whether or not the human species survives as a result of
individual behavior.
19.
***Alternative***
20. Alternative Discourse

1.
Discourse is key to positive peace
Gay 98 (William, University of North Carolina, Charlotte, December, The

Practice of Linguistic nonviolence, Peace Review, 10402659, Dec98, Vol. 10,
Issue 4, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=7&hid=7&sid=fbf 7951e-fa9b4ac2-ba3b-2c07e8326bd2%40sessionmgr2&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d %3d#db=ap
h&A N=1426690)
Many times the first step in reducing linguistic violence is to simply refrain from the use of offensive and
oppressive terms. However, just because linguistic violence is not being used, a genuinely pacific discourse is not necessarily
present. Nonviolent discourse, like the condition of peace, can be negative or positive. "Negative peace"
refers to the temporary absence of actual war or the lull between wars, while "positive peace" refers to
the negation of war and the presence of justice. The pacific discourse that is analogous to negative peace
can
actually perpetuate injustice. Broadcasters in local and national news may altogether avoid using terms like "dyke" or "fag" or
even "homosexual," but they and their audiences can remain homophobic even when the language of lesbian and gay pride is used . A
government may cease referring to a particular nation as "a rogue state," but public and private attitudes
may continue to foster prejudice toward this nation and its inhabitants. When prejudices remain
unspoken, at least in public thrums, their detection and eradication are made even more difficult . Of course,
we need to find ways to restrain hate speech in order to at least stop linguistic attacks in the public arena. Likewise, we need to find ways to
restrain armed conflicts and hostile name calling directed against an adversary of the state. However, even if avoidance of linguistic
violence is necessary, it is not sufficient. Those who bite their tongues to comply with the demands of
political correctness are often ready to lash out vitriolic epithets when these constraints are removed.
T hus, the practice of linguistic nonviolence is more like negative peace when the absence of hurtful or
harmful terminology merely marks a lull in reliance on linguistic violence or a shift of its use from the
public to the private sphere. The merely public or merely formal repression of language and behavior
that expresses these attitudes builds up pressure that can erupt in subsequent outbursts of linguistic
violence and
physical violence.
2.
Linguistic violence causes structural violence Resistance

solves
Gay 98 (William, University of North Carolina, Charlotte, December, The

Practice of Linguistic nonviolence, Peace Review, 10402659, Dec98, Vol. 10,
Issue 4, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=7&hid=7&sid=fbf 7951e-fa9b4ac2-ba3b-2c07e8326bd2%40sessionmgr2&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d %3d#db=ap
h&A N=1426690) CH
The first step is breaking our silence co ncerning the many forms of violence. We need to recognize that
often silence is violence; frequently, unless we break l he silence, we are being complicitous to the violence of
the situation. However, in breaking the silence, our aim should be to avoid counter-violence, in its
physical forms and in its verbal forms. Efforts to advance peace and justice should occupy the space
between silence and violence. Linguistic violence can be overcome , but the care and vigilance of the positive
practice
of physical and linguistic nonviolence is needed if the gains are to be substantive, rather than merely formal,
and if the goals of nonviolence are to be equally operative in the means whereby we overcome linguistic
violence and social injustice.
21. Alternative Reject

1.
Moving away from crisis-driven politics solves

Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables
consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more
nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war
is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following:
how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive
presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which
threats of state - sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism,
nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities , cities, and nations are
currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the
relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American
obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a
more powerful police state, one
cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like
the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns.
2.
Rejecting negative peace opens the space for positive peace
Salomon and Nevo 2 (Gavriel and Baruch, educational psychologists, University of

Haifa, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Peace Education: The Concept, Principles,
and Practices around the World, 2002,
http://www.questiaschool.com/read/109637749?title=Peace%20Education%3a%20%20The%
20Concept%2c%20Principles%2c%20and%20Practices%20around%20the%20World, AD:
7/9/9) TR
It is obvious that peace education is not a single entity. A variety of distinctions can be offered. For one, peace
has more than one meaning, and so does its absence violence. Galtung (1973) distinguished between
positive and negative peace, with the former denoting collaboration, integration, and cooperation, and
the latter denoting the absence of physical and direct violence between groups. He also coined the
construct of "structural violence," denoting societal built-in inequalities and injustices. A second, possible
distinction pertains to the sociopolitical context in which peace education takes place: regions of intractable
conflict (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998), regions of racial or ethnic tension with no overt actions of hostility (e.g.,
Leman, chap. 14, this volume), or regions of tranquility and cooperation. A third distinction can be made
between
desired changes: changes on the local, microlevel, for example, learning to settle conflicts and to cooperate on
an interpersonal level, versus desired changes on a more global, macrolevel, for example, changing perceptions,
stereotypes, and prejudices pertaining to whole collectives. Although in both cases individuals are the targets
for change, the change itself pertains to two different levels: more positive ways of handling other
individuals versus handling other collectives. Still another possible distinction is between the political,
economic, and social status of peace education participants: racial or ethnic majority versus minority, conqueror
versus conquered, and perpetrator versus victim. Clearly, peace education for the weak and dominated is not the
same as for the strong and dominating (for important distinctions, see chapter 3 by Bar-Tal, this volume).
Whereas these and other distinctions are of great importance, I think that the sociopolitical context in which
peace education takes place supersedes the rest. It is the context that determines to an important extent (a) the
challenges faced by peace education, (b) its goals, and (c) its ways of treating the different subgroups of
participants. Thus, for example, a rough examination of peace education programs around the world
suggests that whereas regions of relative tranquility emphasize education for cooperation and harmony
(positive peace), promoting the idea of a general culture of peace, regions of conflict and tension
emphasize education for violence prevention (negative peace), greater equality, and practical coexistence
with real adversaries, enemies, and minorities. Whereas the former are likely to promote individual skills in
handling
local, interpersonal conflicts, the latter are more likely to address perceptions of and tolerance toward collectives.
Stefan Bauschard
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Stefan Bauschard
1.
22. Alternative Reject
171
1711
The ontopolitical act of rejection calls into question the

negative peace worldview, prompting alternatives
Burke 2 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of

New South Wales, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Aporias of Security,
http://www.questia.com/read/5002461817?title=Aporias%20of%20Security, AD:
7/10/9)
However, I believe that, more than ever, we do need to ask what it is to be secure. Surely we no longer know
what security is--in that Platonic sense. Surely more than ten years after the end of the Gold War, after the
Clinton Doctrine and the destruction of the Twin Towers, after humanitarian and policy disasters in Indochina,
Africa, East Timor, the Middle East, and Central America, and after a growing body of humanist and
critical scholarship has questioned security's unity, discursive structure, and political implications,
security no longer possesses a credible wholeness. (1) This article begins from the premise that security's
claims to universality and wholeness founder on a destructive series of aporias, which derive firstly from the
growing sense that security no longer has a stable referent object, nor names a common set of needs,
means, or ways of being, and secondly, from the moral relativism that lies at the center of dominant
(realist)
discourses of security that pretend to universality but insist that "our" security always rests on the
insecurity and suffering of another. While this article argues strongly that security has no essential ontological
integrity, it also argues that if the power and sweep of security are to be understood and challenged, its
claims to universality must be taken seriously. They underpin and animate sweeping forms of power,
subjectivity, force, and economic circulation and cannot be dismissed out of hand. Nor, in the hands of
some humanist writers--who have sought to think human and gender security in radical counterpoint to realist
images of national and international security--are such claims always pernicious. They have a valuable moral
and political force that undermines, perhaps unwittingly, the logocentric presuppositions of the realist discourses
they question. Yet a common assumption that security can be ontologically completed and se cured does
present a hurdle for
the kind of "ontopolitical" critique that we really need. (2) The answer is not to seek to close out these
aporias; they call to us and their existence presents an important political opening. Rather than seek to resecure
security, to make it conform to a new humanist ideal--however laudable--we need to challenge security as a
claim to truth, to set its "meaning" aside. Instead, we should focus on security as a pervasive and complex
system of political, social, and economic power, which reaches from the most private spaces of being to the
vast flows and conflicts of geopolitics and global economic circulation. It is to see security as an interlocking
system of knowledges, representations, practices, and institutional forms that imagine, direct, and act upon
bodies, spaces, and flows in certain ways-to see security not as an essential value but as a political technology.
This is to move from essence to genealogy: a genealogy that aims, in William Connolly's words, to "open us
up to the play of possibility in the present ... [to] incite critical responses to unnecessary violences and
injuries surreptitiously imposed upon life by the insistence that prevailing forms are natural, rational,
universal or necessary." (3)
Stefan Bauschard
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Stefan Bauschard
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23. Alternative Small Actions

1.
Small acts of resistance are key to positive peace
Duncan 2 (Grace, Student of Peace and Conflict, School of Political Science and
International Studies, UQ, Winter, Peace, Action and Consequences,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=9&hid=7&sid=fbf7951e-fa9b-4ac2-ba3b2c07e8326bd2%40sessionmgr2)
So the causes of this violence are personal as well as societal . Aaron has problemshis unemployment and
his family but his reaction to those problems is far from inevitable. It can be argued that Aarons unhappiness
has led to this violence as much as anything else. Any action that would reduce his unhappiness, a simple
act of genuine kindness or compassion, would thus address this problem and contribute to positive peace.
Such an act would be barely visible to the world at large, yet its contribution would be more durable
because it goes closer to the source of the conflict. Clearly Aaron would not completely change his behaviour
because one person was nice to him, but such an action can feed into the psychological web of human society
and have ripple like effects. In this way, the action would be broad in its consequences and far less ambiguous
than those mentioned above. While its results would be difficult to see, they should not be ignored. Clearly, this
theory is a crude simplification of a complex situation, perhaps an oversimplification. It must be
acknowledged that not all levels of action are appropriate or possible in all circumstances, nor are they
available to all
peo ple. While s ma l ler a ct ions ca n be un dert a ke n by a lmo st a ny o ne, big g er a ct s are re
ser v ed f o r t ho se
with political power or influence. The ethical stance generated by this theory is not that an individual
sho uld shu n big g er a ct s (if they are available to them), because of their ambiguity and short shelf-life,
in
f a v o ur of s ma ller inte rper s o na l a ct io ns. It is that smaller acts have ethical priority because of
the relative purity and durability of their consequences, and should not be compromised in pursuit of big
actions. They should not be forgotten or judged less important simply because they are subtle and
unspectacular and do not occur in the more glamorous public or international spheres. People have
different ideas about how best to pursue peace and these, at times, seem irreconcilable. This paper has
explained, through the device of the continuum of action for peace, what I see as the connections and
relationships between various types of acts that have this aim. It has dealt with the fact that actions undertaken
with purely altruistic motives can sometimes have ambiguous results, particularly if they are big actions, and
especially if they lose sight of these connections and of the ultimate aim of positive peace. The hypothetical
example used is intended only as a thought- experiment. It would be the task of further study to show how such
ideas are manifested in the real world.
24. Alternative Solves Politicians/Elites

1.
Gradualism is the only way to solve preparing for conflicts

brings them into existence, dragging the world into a nuclear
holocaust politicians cannot solve, the alternative must occur
alone
Groten and Jansen 81 (Hubert and Juergen, Doctorate in International Studies and
Peace Lobbyist, Interpreters and Lobbies for Positive Peace, Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 18, No. 2, Special Issue on Theories of Peace 175-181, Sage
Publications, http://www.jstor.org/stable/424209, A.D.: 7/9/09)
With regard to peace research as we know it, we may conclude that nothing can be done. This does not seem to worry peace researchers
unduly. As shown above, they have been allowed to settle down as a scholarly community, tolerated by the powers that be and by the
public. In addition, the impact that critical peace research can make is largely reduced by political pressure
that faces the peace researchers with the alternative of either refraining from publishing any radical conclusions from their
research or of seeing public acceptance and public funds withdrawn. This dampens any enthusiasm, especially as there is no positive
feedback to cheer one up. This is because the rulers tolerate peace research, and the masses, the people who should
be interested in i t, know nothing about it. Not raising their voices too high to avoid disturbing the peace is
what peace re - searchers seem to have resigned themselves to. All this is happening at a point of history when
the world is poised on the brink of a holocaust; when the behaviour of man, under the influence of what Osgood calls
'psycho-logic',8 must be qualified as par- anoid; when the spiralling arms race has been allowed to take on a
frightening reality of its own. This is happening when one of the leading German scholars and scientists, Carl F. von
Weizsacker, who among other things has a well-earned reputation as a peace researcher, is setting energetically about the task of
propagating the need for nuclear shelters for the people.9 He, too, seems to have resigned himself this time to yet another
war taking its natural course - it cannot be helped, it is all so human. After that war is over, we must sit
down and seriously think about preventing war. Now there is nothing we can do but construct shelters. Von Weizsacker
surely knows that the speeding up of civilian defence adds momentum to the spiralling con - flict as it makes
war a working proposition again in the minds of many. How can this suicidal folly be stopped? Our answer
is gradualism. It makes sug - gestions that do not strain the social and political system or the individual
too much. Its basic assumption, that symbolic unilateral steps can prepare the way to qual- itative disarmament, ought to be taken up
again. New thinking, though, has to be added to gradualist theory where the addressees are concerned. So far the proponents of gradualism
have been addressing themselves mainly to politicians. But most of the politicians in responsible positions have many
conflicting interests to take care of and conflicting pressures to respond to. What is more important, they are
not so personally involved since they are the ones who are least affected by the effects of structural violence,
and they are well-cushioned against the absence of positive peace. However, there is a small band of politicians who would be prepared to
take up the cause of positive peace provided they are given encouragement and continuous support by their voters. There is no
support for a positive peace policy from the dominant strata of society because they are not aware of the
necessity of such a policy.
25. A2: Positive Peace Vagueness

1.
We must move forward toward positive peace attempts to

define the goal are only constructions of a flawed mindset
'Peace is not merely the absence of war, collective violence or threats to use violence; the idea of peace must be rendered
using terms like 'justice', 'freedom', 'development', and 'solidarity'.'5 Expanding the concept of peace in this way does not make it any more
workable than does reducing it to a normative formula such as: peace is meeting man's basic needs or providing the minimum for
subsistence.6 The difficulties that arise when one tries to define peace are aptly summarized in the following words: 'All the
attempts at pro- ducing a comprehensive definition of what positive peace is must be seen in the light of
the quest for an all-embracing political system which as a minimum guarantees the survival of mankind
and as its
maximum creates a social order in which the welfare and happiness of man are achieved.'7 Is it at all possible
to find a useful and practicable definition of positive peace? As it embraces both the road and the goal, both the method or
process and the aim, it would have to incorporate an analysis of present - day society and, at the same time, would
have to trace the picture of a new, just society. Perhaps we are asking the wrong questions. What we ought to be
concerned
with cannot be a comprehensive definition but, rather, an analysis of the existing situation that would pro vide us
with the tools to start changing society. Another idea becomes essential here. This is democratization which, like positive
peace, is
both the goal, i. e., a democratic society free from structural violence, and the road leading to it, i.e., a procedure that takes in the masses and
is supported by them. The goal can be named but it need not be defined. What matters is the process, the road
leading to it, the key to it, positive peace being the guideline . The idea then is not to use up one's energy trying to present
people with a picture of what may be in store for them but to prepare the way, advancing by small steps, taking first things
first. Of course providing a clear analysis of the existing situation is more than many peace researchers ever do; but this is not sufficient in
itself. It is, however, equally insufficient to point to a utopia . Doing first things first also implies that critical peace
research cannot be 'neutral' or 'objective' in the sense that it appeals to all and sundry in bland scientific terms. It has to take sides.
It has to prepare action. This means first of all realizing that there is nobody eagerly waiting for recipes or in- structions from peace
research. Critical peace researchers have to under- stand that their aims are not the aims of the people
dominating society. What critical peace research has to offer can only be put into practice with the help of those
people who are most seriously affected by the absence of positive peace. Only they can initiate and implement
any policy that com- bats structural violence. It is not to the rulers of society that positive peace appeals; it
is to the dispossessed and oppressed that the value and the chances of positive peace must be proved. However, they are
not aware of the terms' structural violence' and 'positive peace' that have so far been re - served to
academic circles, as jargon, and to a few privileged people, as esoteric knowledge
Stefan Bauschard
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Stefan Bauschard
26.
1.
176
1761
A2: Aff Alone Doesnt Solve
A movement towards positive peace is a prerequisite to solving

all harms even a small transition solves the most intense
impacts of structural violence
Barash 0 (David P., Professor of Psychology at the University of Washington,

Approaches to peace: a leader in peace studies, Oxford University Press, 2000,
http://www.questiaschool.com/read/111756263?title=Approaches%20to%20Peace%3a%20%
20A%20Reader%20in%20Peace%20Studies, AD: 7-10-9)
It is important to be against war. But it is not enough. We also need to be in favor of somethingsomething positive and affirming: namely, peace. Peace studies is unique not only because it is
multidisciplinary and forthrightly proclaims its adherence to values, but also because it identifies positive
visions of peace as being greater than the absence of war. The positive peace toward which peace studies
strives may be, if anything,even more challenging than the prevention of war. It is a variation on what has been
called the dog-car problem. Imagine a dog that has spent yars barking and running after cars. Then, one day, it
catches one. What does it do with it? What would devotees of peace do with the world if they had the
opportunity? This is not a useless exercise, as before any future can be established, it must first be imagined.
And moreover, unlike our hypothetical car-chasing dog, the establishment of positive peace is not an all-ornothing phenomenon. The movement toward positive peace is likely to be halting and fragmentary, with
substantial success along certain dimensions, likely failures along others. On balance, the project is
formidable, nothing less than a fundamental effort to rethink the relationship of human beings to each
other and to their shared planet .
If war and its causes are difficult to define- and this is assuredly the case- the positive peace is even more
elusive. (It can even be dangerous, since disagreements over what constitutes a desirable peace can lead to
war.) Earlier, we briefly considered just war doctrine. The conditions for a just peace are no less strenuous or
important. The relevant issues include- but are not limited to- aspirations for human rights, economic
fairness and opportunity, democratization, and what, specifically, is desire, or how much emphasis to place
on each goal. The pursuit of positive peace nonetheless leads to certain agreed principles, one of which is
a minimization of violence, not only the over violence of war, but also what has been called structural
violence a condition that is typically built into many social and cultural institutions. A slave-holding
society may be at peace in that it is not literally at war, but it is also rife with structural violence .
Structural violence has the effect of denying people important rights such as economic opportunity,
s ocial and political equality, a sense of fulfillment and self-worth, and access to a healthy natural
environment .
When people starve to death, or even go hungry, a kind of violence is taking place . Similarly, when
human beings suffer from diseases that are preventable when, they are denied a decent education, housing,
an
opportunity to play, to grow, to work, to raise a family, to express themselves freely, to organize
peacefully, or to participate in their own governance, a kind of violence is occurring, even if bullets or
clubs are not being used. Society visits violence on human rights and dignity when it forcibly stunts the
optimum development of each human being, whether because of race, religion, sex, sexual preference, age,
ideology, and so on. In short, structural violence is another way of identifying oppression, and positive
peace would be a situation in which structural violence and oppression are minimized. In addition, social
injustice is important not only in its contribution to structural violence, but also as a major contributor
to war, often in unexpected ways. For many citizens of the United States and Europe, as well as privileged
people worldwide, current lifestyles are fundamentally acceptable. Hence, peace for them has come to meant
the continuation of things as they are, with the additional hope that overt violence will be prevented. For
others- perhaps the majority of our planet- change of one sort or another is desired. And for a small
minority, peace is something to fight for! A Central American peasant was quoted in the New York Times
saying I am for peace, but not peace with hunger.
A2: Af Alone Doesnt Solve

2.
Positive peace is a process Were the necessary first step
Bilgin 5 (Pinar, Assistant Professor, Ph.D, International Politics and Security,

University of Wales, Regional Security in the middle East: A Critical
Perspective, 2005, http://www.questia.com/read/108556832?title=Regional
%20Security%20in%20the%20Mid dle%20East%3a%20%20A%20Critical%20Perspective, AD:
7/10/9)
As an analytical move, broadening security entails questioning the military-focused security agendas of Cold War
Security Studies and calling for opening up the agenda to include other non -military threats. In making this
move, students of critical approaches to security have followed in the footsteps of Peace Researchers who, from the 1960s onwards, had
gradually widened their conceptions of peace and violence. Distinguishing between 'negative' and 'positive' peace, John Galtung argued
that peace defined as here by the absence of armed conflict is 'negative peace'. 'Positive peace', maintained Galtung, means
the absence of not only direct physical violence but also indirect (and sometimes unintentional) 'structural violence' - that is,
those socio-economic institutions and relations that oppress human beings by preventing them from
realising their potential. Galtung (1969, 1996) also emphasised that to attain 'positive peace', it is not enough to
seek to eliminate violence; existing institutions and relations should be geared towards the enhancement of
dialogue, cooperation and solidarity among peoples coupled with a respect for the environment. It is also worth noting here that
for Galtung (1996:265) peace is not a static concept; it is rather a process (as with security and emancipation for students
of critical approaches to security; see Booth 1991b; Wyn Jones 1999). Building upon Peace Researchers' broadening of the concepts of
violence and peace that took human beings as the referent, students of critical approaches to security broadened security
to include - in Ken Booth's words - 'all those physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying
out what they

would freely choose to do' (Booth 1991b: 319; Booth 1999b: 40). Such constraints may include human rights
abuses, water shortage, illiteracy, lack of access to health care and birth control, militarisation of society,
environmental degradation and economic deprivation as well as armed conflic t at the state- and sub-state level.
Accordingly, the purpose behind broadening security, from a critical perspective, is to become aware of threats
to security faced by referents in all walks of life and approach them within a comprehensive and dynamic framework cognisant of the
interrelationships in between. Understood as such, broadening security does not simply mean putting more issues on
governments' security agendas, but opening up security to provide a richer picture that includes all issues
that engender insecurity. In other words, although the broadening of governmental security agendas is an offshoot of broadening
security, it is not its main purpose. After all, the US Central Intelligence Agency also broadened its agenda in the 1990s (Johnson 1993),
but sought to address them through its traditional practices.
27. A2: Positive Peace = Violence/Revolt

1.
Positive peace precludes the possibility of violence or

revolution
Peace research is called upon to break this doubly vicious circle. It can do this if it takes its central concept, peace, more
seriously. Only then will it take itself seriously. And only then will it accept its responsibilities to the
people. To do this, it has to come down from its academic pulpit . It is here that the concept of 'positive peace' comes
in.3
'Positive peace' is central to a peace research that claims to be a critical social science. When peace research started some twenty years ago
there were the 'armers', who aimed at controlling military conflicts by calling for arms, and new arms at that; and there vere the 'disarmers'.
This distinction was not sufficient. Only when Johan Galtung broke down the narrow concept of violence as personal, direct violence by
introducing the concept of 'structural violence' could peace research develop into a critical social science. Those social scientists that have
opted for critical peace research believe that structural violence is present wherever man is deprived of his
potentiality by the working of the very structure of society itself . So this kind of violence is produced by
the structure of society and it, in turn, supports this structure. According to this concept, any social injustice is
structural violence. Direct, personal violence is but one aspect of this violence. Starting from this concept, Dieter Senghaas
developed his concept of 'organized peacelessness'. Critical peace research is more radically critical of society and
considers a 'peace' policy that advocates deterrence as not only too limited but also as preserving the social
status quo characterized by structural violence. This does not mean, however, that critical peace research, on a
continuum of possible policies, is placed firmly at the end advocating revolution. On the contrary, it rules out revolution as
this implies the use of direct violence. So on this continuum peace research stops short of revolution; it equally rejects the
policy of deterrence as a means not capable of bringing about positive peace. This does not mean, however, that it
does not take into account short and medium-term approaches as well. It has to in order to reach its addressees. At this point a somewhat
closer inspection
of the category central to peace research, positive peace, is called for. Positive peace can only be achieved in the absence
of structural violence and the violent structures that go with it. Positive peace is social justice.
28. A2: Positive Peace = Authoritarianism

1.
Positive peace resists authoritarianism
Potter 4 (Nancy Nyquist, PhD in Rhetoric from the University of Minnesota,

Putting Peace into practice, pg. 14-15, http://books.google.com/books?
id=uQ4Ab7drluQC&pg=PA5&lpg=PA5&dq=%22negative+peace%22+%22 positive+peace%22+
%22inseparable%22&source=bl&ots=JyUFsQfWT3&sig=LtO877TxxXq2bEOC_aGIbd7_
kU0&hl=en&ei=WRRZSpChF4XcsgOZ5OCZCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4, A.D.:
7/11/09)
The language of positive peace is quite compatible with the democratic spirit and is diametrically opposed
to authoritarian traditions. Since the language of positive peace resists monologue and encourages
dialogue, it fosters an approach to public policy debate that is receptive rather than aggressive and
meditative rather than calculative. The language of positive peace is not passive in the sense of avoiding
engagement; it is pacific in the sense of seeking to actively build lasting peace and justice. In this sense, while
the language and practice of positive peace facilitates the continuation of politics rather than its
abandonment, it also elevates diplomacy to an aim for cooperation and consensus rather than competition
and compromise. The language
of positive peace provides a way of perceiving and communicating that frees us to the diversity and open
- endedness of life rather than the sameness and finality of death that results when diplomacy fails and war
ensues. The language of positive peace, by providing an alternative to the language of war and the language
of negative peace, can introduce into public policy discourse shared social values that express the goals
of a fully politicized and enfranchised humanity.
Positive Peace Good Solves Root Cause

(1/2)
2.
Positive peace resolves the underlying causes of conflicts and

violence- facilitates the development of relationships which
restore and preserve community values and needs. We should
be encouraging the government to pass policies of peace and
justice
Sandy and Perkins 1 (Leo R and Ray, Co-Founder of Peace Studies at Plymouth State College and teacher of
philosophy at Plymouth State College, The Nature of Peace and its implication for peace education, online
journal of peace and conflict resolution 4.2,
http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/ENGSEMJ/v08/undervisningsmateriale/IL%20&%20HR/Topic
%202%20%20Reading.pdf, 2001, AD:7-10-9)
Positive peace, in contrast, is a pa t t er n of coo pera t io n a nd inte g ra t io n bet w ee n ma j o r
hu ma n g ro ups ....[It] is about people interacting in cooperative ways; it is about social organizations of
diverse peoples who willingly choose to cooperate for the benefit of all humankind; it calls for a system in
which there are no winners and losers--all are winners; it is a state so highly valued that institutions are
built around it to
pro t ec t a nd pro mo t e it (OKane, 1991-92). It also involves the search for positive conditions which can
resolve the underlying causes of conflict that produce violence (Woolman, 1985, p.8). The strategies used
for this purpose are called associative, and t hey a re cha ra ct er ized by a hig h lev el of social
interaction [which] enables more rapid resolution of conflict by providing maximum contacts through
which solutions
ma y a rise (Woolman, 1985, p.8). Woolman also describes the sort of social reorganization that would provide
the best opportunity for real peace. Essentially, he espouses Galtungs idea of smallness and
decentralization of power and authority. Thus, small scale social organization offers a better
environment for
encouragement of local autonomy, participation, and high levels of inter -group interaction. Big
countries, corporations, and institutions are generally regarded as negative structures because they are
prone to depersonalization, excessive centralization of decision-making, and patterns of center-periphery
exploitation. Gene Sharp (1980) in his Social Power and Political Freedom adroitly elaborates these points.
The condition of smallness does much to reduce feelings of anonymity and powerlessness. It also
facilitates the development of relationships which can restore and preser ve community values and
spiritual needs
w hich sho uld t a ke prec ede nce o v er t he ma t er ia lis m t ha t is so ce ntr a l t o Weste rn cult ure.
(Woolman,
1985, p.12). Consistent with these approaches, Reardon (1988) places global justice as the central concept
of positiv e pea ce a nd a sser t s t h a t j ust ice, in t he sense o f t he f ull enj o y ment o f t he
ent ire ra ng e o f hu ma n rights by all people, is what constitutes positive peace (p.26). In a similar vain,
Trostles (1992) comprehensive definition of peace clearly places it within a positive context: [Peace is] a state of well-being that is
characterized by trust, compassion, and justice. In this state, we can be encouraged to explore as well as celebrate our diversity, and search
for the good in each other without the concern for personal pain and sacrifice. ... It provides us a chance to look at ourselves and others as
part of the human family, part of one world. The
role of the individual peacemaker from this perspective would involve people who, . . . work toward promoting a world in which nonviolent
interaction a nd so cia l e qua lity a re t he no r m. . . . Indiv idua l s o f co nscience sho ul d w o rk t o cr
ea t e a t rickle
up t heo ry . . . . by st a rt ing at t he g ra ssro o t s lev el t o enco ura g e co rpo ra t e lea ders,
po litica l f ig ures, a nd government officials to establish policies promoting peace and justice . This
includes not only participating in government by voting, etc., but also standing against a government that
does not operate in the best interest of global harmony. (Trostle, 1992) A pea ce ma ki ng g o v er n
ment w o uld re quir e a sy st e m o f no n military national service (to). . . include the Peace Corps and exchange student or exchange citizen programs.
. .as well as the duty of largely developed nations to share technology and surpluses of an y kind with those
co unt ries in nee d a nd les s de v elo ped (Trostle, 1992). Offering another broad positive view of
peace is MacLeod (1992) who defines it as, an awareness that all humans should have the right to a full and
satisfying life. For an individual this means developing his own and his loved ones potential growth, and for
reaching out to his neighbors to help assure that they have the same chance. For communities, this means
developing fair regulations for living together, and encouraging programs that will enhance fellowship among
its many diverse elements. For nations, this means encouraging its citizens to strive for enhancement of a
benign attitude toward all elements of their own society and toward all other nations. Towards an adequate
definition It is difficult
no t t o see in t hese po sit iv e a ppro a ches t o t he def init io n o f pea ce ra dica l i mplica
t io ns f o r a reorganization of our society and, indeed, our entire world . There is no denying that a
positive conception of peace along the lines suggested by Galtung, Sharp, Reardon, et al. would involve
fundamental changes on the level of the individual psyche and the nation-state as well. At both levels
genuine peace requires the advent of a new self-lessness, a willingness to see our fellow humans as our
brothers and sisters, and--as the traditional religions have always counciled-- to love them as we love
ourselves. But besides this
Stefan Bauschard
180
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subjective component of each individuals altruistic love, there must be justice which depends on the right sort
of social organization. This is Reardons point. It is also implied by Trostles state of well-being ... of global
harmony ... part of one world. The suggestion here is that, at the very least, a state of (genuine) peace is
something beyond what can be achieved by the traditional system of sovereign nation-states. The problem,
of course, is that this system lacks a system of workable law, each state being the ultimate arbiter of
whether it will wield force in its pursuit of national interest or not . Without workable world law its hard to
see how there can be justice, and so, peace, in its true sense. The world federalists have expressed this point
succinct ly but po w er f ully : There ca n be no w o rld pea ce w it ho ut inte rna t io na l j ust ice; no
inte rna t io na l
justice without world law; and no effective world law without institutions to make, interpret and enforce
it . 3 And the world federalists may be right when they make this requirement of enforceable world law a sine qua non for the
abolition of the age-old institution of war itself. Certainly Albert Einstein thought so when he declared that Peace is not merely the
absence of war but
the presence of justice, of law, of order--in short, of government (Einstein, 1968). In conclusion, we believe that a proper definition of
peace must include positive characteristics over and above the mere absence of belligerence. Rather, it must include those positive factors
that foster cooperation among human groups with ostensibly different cultural patterns so that social justice can be done and human
potential can freely develop within democratic political structures. And this--promoting social justice/freedom by democratic means--will
almost certainly require more selfless concern at all levels: at the personal level, more brotherly love; and at the international level, less
narrow national self-interest-- a goal which we believe will require a diminution of the current system of nation states and the gradual
emergence of
a world community self-governed by world law. In this way, a truly peaceful world will be a world where war has been made impossible-or, at least much less likely--by a new community where people not only see themselves in their hearts as part of one human family, but
where, in (political-legal-moral) reality, they really are part of such a family. Lessons for peace education Finally, what do these insights
about the definition of peace mean for peace makers, and peace educators generally, in the 21st Century? We think they mean first that
peace makers must stress that the long range goal of peace education should be the elimination of war as a
method of resolving disputes. Reardon (1988) anticipated this when she said that peace education must
confront the need to abolish the institution of war (p.24). To date there has not been a widespread perceived need to do
so. Establishing the need is a challenge that lies ahead. But, secondly and at least equally important, our reflections about the nature of peace
also suggests that the abolition of war will require more than the mere cessation of hostilities among peoples--not that that would be bad if
we could get it. The problem is, as we saw earlier, that we probably ca nt g et it w it ho ut a ra dica l r ec onst ruct io n
o f interpersonal and international relations along the lines suggested by our earlier examination. And
paramount among these relations are the ideas of social justice and world law. The importance of these ideas in
successfully pursuing the quest of abolishing war is, we think, an equally important implication for the
future of peace education. Of course, the quest for peace and the abolition of war will be a long one
requiring us to dig
deeper into t he v er y depths o f t he hu ma n a n d inst it utio n a l psy ches w hich lea d civ ili ze
d peo ples t o re so rt to force and, ho pef ully , t o f ind a nd bu ild t he elu siv e pea ce . This
quest re q uires t ha t w e t ea ch f o r pea ce and not just about peace.
29.
30. Positive Peace Good Solves Militarism

1.
Pursuit of positive peace minimizes structural violence, an

inherent condition of in justice that is a major contributor to
oppression and war
Barash 00 (David P., Professor of Psychology, University of Washington,

Approaches to Peace: A Reader in Peace Studies, 2000,
http://www.questia.com/read/111756263?title=Approaches%20to%20Peace%3a%20%20A%20
Reader%20in%20Peace%20Studies, AD: 7/9/9)
The pursuit of positive peace nonetheless leads to certain agreed principles, one of which is a minimization of
violence, not only the ov er t vio lence o f wa r, but a lso w ha t ha s been ca lled st ruct ura l v io
lence , a condition that is typically built into many social and cultural institutions. A slave-holding
society may be at peace in that it is not literally at war, but it is also rife with structural violence. Structural
violence has the effects of denying people important rights such as economic opportunity, social and
political equality, a sense of fulfillment and self-worth, and access to a healthy natural environment.
When people starve to death, or even go hungry, a kind of violence is taking place. Similarly, when human
beings suffer from diseases that are preventable, when they are denied a decent education, housing, an
opportunity to play, to grow, to work, to raise a family, to express themselves freely, to organize peacefully, or
to participate in their own governance,
a kind of violence is occurring, even if bullets or clubs are not being used. Society visits violence on human
rights and dignity when it forcibly stunts the optimum development of each human being, whether because of
race, religion, sex, sexual preference, age, ideology, and so on. In short, structural violence is another way
of identifying oppression, and positive peace would be a situation in which structural violence and
oppression are minimized. In addition, social injustice is important not only in its contribution to structural
violence, but also as a major contributor to war, often in unexpected ways. For many citizens of the United
States and Europe, as well as privileged people worldwide, current lifestyles are fundamentally acceptable.
Hence, peace for them has come to mean the continuation of things as they are, with the additional hope that
overt violence will be prevented. For others perhaps the majority of our planet change of one sort or
another is desired. And for a small minority, peace is something to fight for! A Central American peasant was
quoted in the New York Times as saying I am for peace, but not peace with hunger. There is a long
tradition suggesting that injustice is a primary cause of war. The French philosopher Denis Diderot, for
example, was convinced that a world of justice and plenty would mean a world free of tyranny and war. Hence,
th
in his 18 - century treatise, the Encyclopedia, Diderot sought to establish peace by disseminating all the
worlds technical information, from bee-keeping to iron forging. And, of course, similar efforts continue today,
although few advocates of economic and social development claim that the problem of violence can be solved
simply by spreading knowledge or even by keeping everyones belly full.
4. Imperialism Bad
1.
1.
Racism
Imperialism is grounded in racism and strips countries of their

culture
Narobi 86.[James, Professor of NHU, Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of

Language in African
th
Literature. July 6 , 2013 London:Heinemann Kenya, New Hampshire

http://www.swaraj.org/ngugi.htm ]
For these patriotic defenders of the fighting cultures of African people, imperialism is not a slogan. It is real; it is
palpable in content and form and in its methods and effects. Imperialism is the rule of consolidated finance capital
and since 1884 this monopolistic parasitic capital has affected and continues to aff ect the lives even of the
peasants in the remotest corners of our countries. If you are in doubt, just count how many African countries
have now been mortgaged to IMF the new International Ministry of Finance as Julius Nyerere once called it. Who
pays for the mortgage? Every single producer of real wealth (use-value) in the country so mortgaged, which means
every single worker and peasant. Imperialism is total: it has economic, political, military, cultural and
psychological consequences for the people of the world today. It could even lead to holocaust. The freedom for
western finance capital and for the vast transnational monopolies under its umbrella to continue stealing from
the countries and people of Latin America , Africa, Asia and Polynesia is today protected by conventional and
nuclear weapons. Imperialism, led by the USA, presents the struggling peoples of the earth and all those calling
for peace, democracy .and socialism with the ultimatum: accept theft or death. The oppressed and the exploited
of the earth maintain their defiance: liberty from theft. But the biggest weapon wielded and actually daily
unleashed by imperialism against that collective defiance is the cultural bomb. The effect of a cultural bomb is
to
a nnihila t e a peo ple s belief i n t heir names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of
struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one
wasteland of non-achievement and it makes them want to distance thems elves from that wasteland. It makes
them want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves ; for instance, with other peoples
languages rather than their own. It makes them identify with that which is decadent and reactionary, all those
forces which would stop their own springs of life. It even plants serious doubts about the moral rightness of
struggle. Possibilities of triumph or victory are seen as remote, ridiculous dreams. The intended results are
despair, despondency and a collective death-wish. Amidst this wasteland which it has created, imperialism
presents itself as the cure and demands that the dependant sing hymns of praise with the constant refrain: Theft is
holy. Indeed, this refrain sums up the new creed of the neo-colonial bourgeoisie in many independent African states.
The classes fighting against imperialism even in its neo-colonial stage and form, have to confront this threat with
the higher and more
creative culture of resolute struggle. These classes have to wield ev en more firmly the weapons of the struggle
contained in their cultures. They have to speak the united language of struggle contained in each of their
languages. They must discover their various tongues to sing the song: A people united can never be
defeatedColonialism dehumanizes individuals of all races
Hardt and Negri 2k
[Michael and Antonio, Political Philosopher and Literary Theorist at Duke University, Political
Philosopher, Empire, page 129]
The work of numerous authors, such as Jean-Paul Sartre and
Franz Fanon, who have recognized that colonial representations and colonial sovereignty are
dialectical in form has proven useful in several respects. First of all, the dialectical
The
construction demonstrates that there is nothing essential about the identities in struggle.
White and the Black, the European and the Oriental, the
colonizer and the colonized are all representations that
function only in relation to each other and (despite
appearances) have noreal necessary basis in nature, biology,
or rationality. Colonialism is an abstract machine that
produces alterity and identity. And yet in the colonial
situation these differences and identities are made to
function as if they were absolute, essential, and natural.
The rst result of the dialectical reading is thus the
denaturalization of racial and cultural difference. This does not
mean that once recognized as articial constructions, colonial identities evaporate into thin air;
they are real illusions and continue to function as if they were essential. This recognition is not
a politics in itself, but merely the sign that an anti colonial politics is possible. In the second
the dialectical interpretation makes clear that

colonialism and colonialist representations are grounded in a
violent struggle that must be continually renewed. The European
place,
Selfneeds violence and needs to confront its Other to feel and maintain its power, to remake itself
continually. The generalized state of war that continuously subtends colonial representations is not
accidental or even unwantedviolence is the necessary foundation of colonialism itself. Third,
posing colonialism as a negative dialectic of recognition makes clear the potential for subversion
inherent in the situation. For a thinker like Fanon, the reference to Hegel suggests that the Master
can only achieve a hollow form of recognition; it is the Slave, through life-and-death struggle, who
has the potential to move forward toward full consciousness. The dialectic ought to imply movement,
but this dialectic of European sovereign identity has fallen back into stasis. The failed dialectic
suggests the possibility
of a proper dialectic that through negativity will move history forward.
2.
1.
Ethics
Imperialism destroys ethics by valuing security risks over

collateral damage
McNally 6 (David, Professor of political science at York University The new

imperialists Ideologies of Empire Ch 5 Pg 92) JL
Yet, even on Ignatieff s narrow definition, in which human rights are about
stopping unmerited cruelty and suffering, the crucial question is how we are to
do so. What if some means to this ostensible end say, a military invasion
can reasonably be expected to produce tens of thousands of civilian casualties
and an almost certain breakdown in social order? Ignatieff s doctrine of human
rights provides absolutely no ethico-philosophical criteria in that regard.
Instead, he offers a pragmatic judgement and a highly dubious one that only
U.S. military power can be expected to advance human rights in the zones
where barbarians rule. But note: this is an utterly ad hoc addition to his
theory. In no respect can it be said to flow from any of his reflections on
human rights per se. Moreover, others proceeding from the same principle of
limiting cruelty and suffering have arrived at entirely opposite

conclusions with respect to imperial war. Ignatieff s myriad
proclamations for human rights thus lack any demonstrable tie to his
support of empire and imperial war. This is convenient, of course, since
the chasm between moralizing rhetoric and imperial advocacy allows
Ignatieff to pump out empty platitudes as if these contained real ethical
guidance. Concrete moral choices, involving historical study and
calibrations of real human risk, never enter the equation. So, Ignatieff
can drone on about the world being a better place without Saddam, never
so much as acknowledging the cost of this result: some 25,000 Iraqis killed
as a
result of armed conflict since the start of the U.S. invasion, and probably
more than 100,000 dead as a result of all the consequences of the U.S. war.24
Nowhere does he offer any kind of calculus for determining if these tens
of thousands of deaths are ethically justified. Instead, banalities about
being rid of Saddam are offered up without even countenancing the scale of human
suffering that Ignatieff s preferred course of action war and occupation
has entailed. But then, Ignatieff shows little regard for ordinary people in the
zones of military conflict. His concern is for the security of the West and of
the U.S.A. in particular. Ruminating about Americas new vulnerability in the
world, for instance, he writes, When American naval planners looked south from
the Suez Canal, they had only bad options. All the potential refuelling stops
Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Yemen are dangerous places for American
warships. As the attack on the U.S.S. Cole made clear, none of the governments
in these strategically vital refuelling stops can actually guarantee the safety
of their imperial visitors.25
3.
1.
Indigenous Rights
Imperialism deteriorates the culture of indigenous people
Galeota 2004 [Julia, The Humanist, Article Cultural Imperialism: An American Tradition
http://www.thehumanist.org/humanist/articles/essay3mayjune04.pdf]
In his 1976 work Communication and Cultural Domination, Herbert Chiller defines cultural imperialism as:
the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system, and how its
dominating
stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to,
or even to promote, the values and structures of the dominant center of the system. Thus, cultural imperialism
involves much more than simple consumer goods; it involves the disseminatio n of ostensibly American
principles, such as freedom and democracy. Though this process might sound appealing on the surface, it masks
a frightening truth: many cultures around the world are gradually disappearing due to the overwhelming
influence of corporate and cultural America. The motivations behind American cultural imperialism parallel
the justifications for U.S. imperialism throughout history: the desire for access to foreign markets and the belief
in the superiority of American culture. Though the Un it ed Sta t es do es bo a st t he wo rld s la rg est, mo st
po w er f ul economy, no business is completely satisfied with controlling only the American market; American
corporations
w a nt to co ntro l t he o t her 95 perc ent o f t he wo rld s co nsu mer s a s w ell. However, one must
question whether this
projected society is truly beneficial for all involved. Is it worth sacrificing countless indigenous cultures for the
unlikely promise of a world without conflict? Around the world, t he a nsw er is a n o v erwhel ming No !
Disre g a rdi ng the fact that a world of homogenized culture would not necessarily guarantee a world without
conflict, the complex fabric of diverse cultures around the world is a fundamental and indispensable basis of
humanity. Throughout the course of human existence, millions have died to preserve their indigenous culture. It
is a fundamental right of humanity to be allowed to preserve the mental, physical, intellectual, and creative
aspects
o f o ne s so ciet y . A single global culture would be nothing more than a shallow, artificial culture of
materialism
reliant on technology. Thankfully, it would be nearly impossible to create one bland culture in a world of over six
billion people. And nor should we want to. Contrary to Rothkopf s (and George W. Bushs) belief that, Good and
evil, better and worse coexist in this world, there are no such absolutes in this world. The United States should not be
able
to relentlessly force other nations to accept its definition of what is good and just or even modern. Fortunately,
many victims of American cultural imperialism arent blind to the subversion of their cultures.
4.
1.
Terrorism
Imperialism encourages fundamentalism which leads to

terrorist organizations.
Gagnon 12
[Jean, Honorary Research Fellow, Centre for Greater China Studies, Journal of South Asian
Development, The Taliban Did Not Create the Taliban, Imperialism Did, vol. 7 no. 1] Sir Karl
Poppers (2002) method of historicism has been neglected in the analysis of the radicalization of
Afghanistans society in the form of the Taliban. Poppers historicism is the idea that the past may
allow the forecasting of the future by understanding the state of the present in one specific line
by analyzing periods of
imperialismthose eras of social injustice, violence and
oppressionit is seen that such imperialism led to radical
fundamentalism, as many had no choice but to lash out. The
push to strenuous religious identity, heavily laden with
violent tactics, was the natural response of peoples trying
to maintain their identities and collective destiny from
imperial domination. Furthermore, as evidence continues to
show, most often those individuals that are first to
radicalize are the poorest of the poor, the dispossessed, or
those who have experienced violent injustices. Using Poppers method,
it is possible to explain how imperialism breeds radicalism
(using Afghanistan as an example) and as such provide some general
of historical inquiry. It is argued herein that
recommendations to swing the pendulum in reverse so as to minimize radical behavior. This article
has implications for international relations, foreign policies and aid.
2.
Nuclear technology is easily accessible to terrorist groups,

enabling them to inflict maximum damage.
O'Neill 97 from the Institute for Science and International Security

[Kevn, Editor at the Institute for Science and International Security, The Nuclear Terrorist
Threat http://www.isisonline.org/publications/terrorism/threat.pdf]
The proliferation of nuclear weapons or radiological

dispersal devices to terrorist groups is perhaps one of the
most frightening threats to U.S. security. Nuclear materials,
technologies and know-how are more widely available today
than ever before. Small quantities of both fissile materials
and highly radioactive materials, sufficient to manufacture a
radiological dispersal device, are actively traded on the
black market. A nuclear detonation by a terrorist group would
likely result in an unprecedented number of casualties. In
contrast, a radiological dispersal attack would probably be
less violent, but could significantly contaminate an urban
center, causing economic and social disruption. Both types of
attacks would have significant psychological impacts on the
entire population.

Offensive PKOs Undermine Impartiality

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1.

Offensive PKOs Bad

Offensive peacekeeping embraces militarism and colonialism

East African, April 26, 2014,

dilemma: The new model of UN

Dont Solve Violence

Offensive peacekeeping cant resolve the structural causes of

East African, April 26, 2014,

dilemma: The new model of UN

An offensive force could encourage the involvement of more

Offensive peacekeeping kills the UNs role as a mediator

Lack of impartiality has undermined peacekeeping in the

Offensive peacekeeping operations undermine UN credibility

Lack of impartiality prevents peacekeeping solvency

Impartiality critical to consent and sustaining peacekeeping

Impartiality critical to mediation

UN taking on a combat role undermines humanitarianism

Offensive missions could turn aid workers into targets

UN militarism in Africa triggers nationalism

Inconsistent With Peacekeeping Values

Undermines Support for Peacekeeping

It is difficult to get commitments to peacekeeping involving

Offensive PKOs reduce support for peacekeeping

Furthermore, most countries that supply troops for peacekeeping missions

One offensive intervention sets a precedent for another

Brett D. Schaefer, is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/us-should-oppose-return-toun- peace-enforcement DOA: 12-6-14

Parallel mission alternative

UN authorized intervention forces are superior

Brett D. Schaefer, is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the

Alternative in the Congo

Brett D. Schaefer, is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the

Bad to Support Congo Government

Government is corrupt and its forces are accused of mass

A2: Offensive PKOs Necessary to Stop Rebel Groups

Defeat of M23 hasnt deterred other groups

Dr Robert Besseling, January 1, 2014, Besseling is a Senior Political Adviser to

A2: Necessary to Defeat Rebels

Cant defeat all of the rebel groups in the Congo

Militarized Approaches Fail

Militarized peacekeeping fails

As the author of a 2011 book lamenting the change in direction in UN

It is generally agreed that the handful of peacekeeping operations in the 20th

nature of UN peacekeeping does not lend itself to the use of force:

ensure the success of such operations, I am not convinced that assigning

No secondary support for offensive PKOs, failure collapses

David Bosco, April 1, 2013, Foreign Policy, When Peacekeepers Go to War,

2. Right to Protect (R2P) Bad

Right to Protect Bad Link

Offensive peacekeeping operation exist to protect civilians

Midwest Model United Nations, 2013, http://mmun.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/ga4-a.pdf DOA: 12-6-14

The UN for the first time has authorized peacekeepers to conduct

Offensive PKOs based on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Midwest Model United Nations, 2013, http://mmun.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/ga4-a.pdf DOA: 12-6-14

Right to Protect Undermines American Leadership

An unconditional R2P obligation destroys US sovereignty,

R2p kill us sovereignty, causes overstretch

genocide.[31] Importantly, U.S. enforcement of these criminal offenses was

military force, the United States would have to bear a disproportionate

The doctrinal dominance of r2p wrecks Americas global

The 1990s were full of calls for humanitarian intervention: in Rwanda,

service of preventing war among major states , it is acting morally in the

to raise morality as a sole arbiter is ultimately not to be serious about