EX POST FACTO LAWS

BAYOT V SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who
was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa
thru falsification of Public documents before
the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started
from his alleged involvement as a government
auditor of the commission on audit assigned to
the Ministry of education and culture, with
some other employees from the said ministry.
The bureau of treasury and the teachers camp
in Baguio City for the preparation and
encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the
nom-existent obligations of the teachers camp
resulting in damage to the government of
several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on
july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal
mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on
January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan
promulgated a decision convicting the accused
together with his other co-accused in all but
one of the thirty two cases filed against them.
On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was
passed amending RA 3019.

Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of

the constitutional guarantee against an ex post
facto law.

Held: The court finds no merit in the

petitioners contention that RA 3019 as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which
includes the crime of estafa through falsification
of Public Documents as among crimes
subjecting the public officer charged therewith
with suspension from public office pending
action in court, is a penal provision which
violates the constitutional prohibition against
the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to
the RPC suspension from employment and
public office during trial shall not be considered
as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not
a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if
acquitted the official who is suspended shall be

entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and

benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension. And does not violate the
constitutional provision against ex post facto
law.
The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be
suspended because he is currently occupying a
position diffren tfrom that under which he is
charged is untenable. The amendatory
provision clearly states that any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under RA
3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the
government or public funds or property or
whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation shall be suspended from office.
The use of the word office applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding
and not only the particular office under which
he was charged.
PEOPLE V FERRER
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac
trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the
Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of
attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of
subversion
against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being
an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances
of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to
afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for
being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting,
instigating people to unite and overthrow the
Philippine Government. Attended by
Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed
Men, Craft,
and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.)
The Congress usurped the powers of the judge
2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing
the guilt of the CPP without any forms of
safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a
presumption of organizational guilt by being
members of the CPP regardless of
voluntariness.

The Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 was approved

20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the
CPP and similar associations penalizing
membership therein, and for other purposes. It
defined
the Communist Party being although a political
party is in fact an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government, not only by force
and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a
clear and present danger to the security of the
Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation
with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP
is
punishable. Section 5 states that due
investigation by a designated prosecutor by the
Secretary
of Justice be made prior to filing of information
in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for
furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for
2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by
prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the
renunciation of membership to the CCP through
writing under oath. Section 9 declares the
constitutionality of the statute and its valid
exercise
under freedom if thought, assembly and
association.
Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of
attainder/ ex post facto law. For penalizing
membership of CPP
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of
expression.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the AntiSubversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It
punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is
the substitution of judicial determination to a
legislative determination of guilt. In order for a
statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the
following requisites must be present: 1.) The
statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute
is applied retroactively and reach past
conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an
ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares
the CPP as an organized conspiracy for

the overthrow of the Government for purposes

of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act
applies not only to the CPP but also to other
organizations having the same purpose and
their
successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct
not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be
UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership
was acquired with the intent to further the
goals of the organization by overt acts. This is
thE element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE
that is punishable. This is the required proof of
a members direct participation. Why is
membership punished. Membership renders aid
and
encouragement to the organization.
Membership makes himself party to its
unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in
nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after
approval of the act. The members of the
subversive organizations before the passing of
this Act
is given an opportunity to escape liability by
renouncing membership in accordance with
Section
8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis
mutandis or that the necessary changes having
been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Government should not be the basis of guilt.
This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of
the
Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL
justifies the limitation to the exercise of
Freedom of Expression and Association in this
matter. Before the enactment of the statute
and
statements in the preamble, careful
investigations by the Congress were done. The
court
further stresses that whatever interest in
freedom of speech and association is excluded

in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are

weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY
and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in
the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to
proving circumstances/ evidences of
subversion, the following elements must also be
established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it
must be proven that the organization purpose
is to overthrow the present Government of the
Philippines and establish a domination of a
FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and
knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its
subversive purpose. Membership is willfully
and knowingly done by overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the
crimes of the accused under the Act. The
Supreme
Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL
COURT

NON-IMPROSONMENT FOR DEBT

Lozano v. MARTINEZ
Facts:
Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law)
was approved on 3 April 1979. The petitions
arose from cases involving prosecution of
offenses under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs.
RTC Judge Antonio M.Martinez [Manila, Branch
XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs.
RTC Executive Judge Glicerio L.Cruz [Lemery
Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio
and Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano
[Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654,
Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano
[Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25,
Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr.
[Makati, Branch 139] in GR 75122-49, Amable
and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch
154 of Pasig in GR 75812- 13, Luis M. Hojas vs.
RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro,
Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and
People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila,
Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789].
Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad,
Aguiluz, Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably
to quash the informationson the ground that
the acts charged did not constitute an offense,
thestatute being unconstitutional. Themotions
were denied by the trial courts, except in one
case, which is the subject of GR 75789 (People
vs.Nitafan), wherein the trial court declared
thelaw unconstitutional and dismissed the case.
The partiesadversely affected have come to the
Supreme Court for relief.
Issue:
Whether BP 22 is contrary to the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
Held:
The constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that
evolved graduallyduring the early part of the
nineteenth century in the various states of the
American Union as a result of thepeople's
revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice,
sanctioned by common law, which permitted
creditorsto cause the incarceration of debtors

who could not pay their debts. At common law,

money judgments arisingfrom actions for the
recovery of a debt or for damages from breach
of a contract could be enforced against
theperson or body of the debtor by writ of
capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ,
a debtor could be seized and imprisoned at the
instance of the creditor until he makes the
satisfaction awarded. As aconsequence of the
popular ground swell against such a barbarous
practice, provisions forbiddingimprisonment for
debt came to be generally enshrined in the
constitutions of various states of the Union.
Thishumanitarian provision was transported to
our shores by the Americans at the turn of the
century andembodied in Philippine organic
laws. Later, the Philippine fundamental law
outlawed not only imprisonmentfor debt, but
also the infamous practice, native to our shore,
of throwing people in jail for non-payment of
thecedula or poll tax. It may be constitutionally
impermissible to penalize a person for nonpayment of a debt ex
contractu. Organic provisions relieving from
imprisonment for debt were intended to
prevent commitment ofdebtors to prison for
liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The
inhibition was never meant to includedamages
arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that
damages recoverable therein do not arise from
anycontract entered into between the parties
but are imposed upon the defendant for the
wrong he has done andare considered as
punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed
by the courts in criminal proceedings as
punishments for crime. Herein, the thrust of the
law (BP 22) is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, themaking of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. The law punishes
the act not as an offense againstproperty, but
an offense against public order. It is not the
non-payment of an obligation which the
lawpunishes, nor is it intended or designed to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Although the
effect of the law maybe to coerce payment of
an obligation, it is intended to banish a practice
(i.e. the issuance of worthlesschecks)
considered harmful to public welfare

Sura vs. Martin

Facts:
In Civil Case 5580 of the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Negros Occidental, through
JudgeEduardoD. Enriquez, judgment was
rendered on 20 June 1961, amended on 15
July1961, ordering the Vicente MartinSr. to
recognize Vicente Martin Jr. as his natural son;
toprovideVicente Martin Jr. support in the
monthly rateof P100 from 10 December 1959
until thelatter reaches the age of majority, and
to pay the attorney's fees inthe amount of
P1,000 plus the costs. From the judgment,
Vicente Martin Sr. appealed to the Court of
Appeals,and the latter Court, in CA-GR 30388-R,
affirmed said decision on 30 January 1964. On 9
May 1964, the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros
Occidental, through Judge Jose R. Querubin
issued the order, orderingthe Clerk of Court to
issue writ of execution, same being forwarded
to theProvincial Sheriff of NegrosOriental.
Pursuant to said order, a writ of execution was
issuedon 9 May 1964 by the Clerk of Court, and
theProvincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental served
the sameupon the defendant in Tanjay, Negros
Oriental butreturned the writ unsatisfied.
Thesecond paragraph of the Sheriff's return of
service, dated 21 September1964, stated that
"the judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing
in the dwelling house and in the company of
his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this province.
Debtor has no leviable property; he is even
supported by hismother. Hereto attached is the
certificate of insolvency issued by the
MunicipalTreasurer of Tanjay NegrosOriental,
where debtor legally resides." On 6 October
1964, Nilda Sura's counsel (in behalf of here
minorchild Vicente Martin Jr.) prayed that
Vicente Martin Sr., for failure to satisfy the writ
of execution, beadjudged guilty of contempt of
court. On 28 November 1964, the Court issued
the order granting VicenteMartin Sr. to fulfill
the decisionof the court within the period of 30
days or he shall be held in contempt.Vicente

Martin Sr. havingfailed to satisfy said order, the

Court on 9 January 1965 issued the order
orderingthe arrest of Martin Sr. On 26 January
1964, Martin Sr.'s counsel filed a notice of
appeal, and at thesame timeprayed for the
fixing of a bond for the temporary release of the
defendant. On 1February 1965, the Courtissued
the order directing the confinement of Martin
Sr. to theprovincial jail, adn fixed bail at P7,000
ifMartin Sr. desired to appeal the case. Martin
Sr. appealed.
Issue:
Whether the imprisonment of Martin Sr. for
failure to satisfy the decision requiring him to
supporthisnatural son at the monthly rate of
P100, due to insolvency, violative of the
constitutional right againstimprisonment for
debt
Held:
The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of
Vicente Martin, Sr., for contempt of court
forfailure tosatisfy the judgment were illegal, in
view of the following considerations: (1) The
judgmentordering MartinSr. to pay past and
future support at P100 per month was a
finaldisposition of the case and was declaratory
ofthe obligation of Martin Sr.. The writ
ofexecution issued on the judgment with
respect to past support in theamount of about
P6,000 Required "the sheriff or other proper
officer" to whom it was directed to satisfy the
amount out of all property, real and personal,
of the judgment debtor in the manner specified
inRule 39,Section 15, of the Rules of Court. The
writ of execution was, therefore, a direct order
to the sheriff or otherproper officer to whom it
was directed, and not an order to the judgment
debtor. In view thereof, the judgmentdebtor
could not, in the very nature of things,
havecommitted disobedience to the writ. (2)
The sheriff's returnshows that the judgment
debtorwas insolvent. Hence the Orders of
January 9 and February 1, 1965, in
effect,authorized his imprisonment for debt in
violation of the Constitution. (3) The
disobedience to a judgmentconsidered as
indirect contempt does not refer to a judgment
which is a finaldisposition of the case andwhich

is declaratory of the rights of the parties, but to

a special judgment, ajudgment "which requires
theperformance of any other act than the
payment of money, or thesale or delivery of real
or personal property."According to Moran,
generally, any order orjudgment of a court
finally disposing of an action should beenforced
by ordinary executionproceedings, except
special judgments which should be executed by
contemptproceedings. The Court reversed the
orders of the lower court.

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
CUANCA V SALAZAR
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus
brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his
cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the
Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia
Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced
payment has already been given to Estelita by
the employment agency, for her to work as a
maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to
another residence, which was disallowed by the
employment agency. Further she was detained
and her liberty was restrained. The employment
agency wanted that the advance payment,
which was applied to her transportation
expense from the province should be paid by
Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency

has the right to restrain and detain a maid
without returning the advance payment it gave?

Held: An employment agency, regardless of the

amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to
curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that
no physical force has been exerted to keep her
in the house of the respondent does not make
less real the deprivation of her personal
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer
from one place to another, freedom to choose
ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to
external moral compulsion, to founded or
groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor
to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any
other psychological element that may curtail
the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered

exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such

psychological spell is to place a person at the
mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the
protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,AMPARO,HABEAS

DATA AND KALIKASAN

VINGSON V CABCABAN
MANGILA V PANGILINAN
Anita Mangila was charged with seven
criminalcomplaints with syndicated estafa in
violation of
Migrant #or$ers Act of 1""5. %he complaints
arose from therecr&iting and promising of
employment 'yMangila and the others to the
privatecomplainants as overseas contract
wor$ers in%oronto, Canada, and from the
collection of visaprocessing fees, mem'ership
fees and on(lineapplication witho&t a&thority
from P)*A.+ollowing the preliminary
Pangilinan of M%CC inP&erto Princesa, a
warrant of arrest was iss&edagainst Mangila
and her cohorts witho&t 'ail. 0yvirt&e of the
arrest warrant, Mangila wasarrested in Manila
-.Mangila filed a petition
for ha'eas corp&s 'eforethe CA to o'tain her
release. 2he arg&ed that/&dge Pangilinan had
no a&thority to cond&ctthe P- was
not yet completed whenthe arrest warrant was
therewas no finding of pro'a'le
ca&se prior to theiss&ance of arrest
warrant.%he CA denied Mangila4s petition.
ISSUE:

remedy to o'tain the release of Mangilafrom

detention.
HELD:
habeas corpus
is a special proceeding governed'y R&le 176 of
the R&les of Co&rt, as amended.-n
Ex Parte Billings
, it was held that
habeascorpus
is that of a civil proceeding in character.-t see$s
the enforcement of civil rights. Resortingto the

writ is not to in8&ire into the criminal act

of which the complaint is made, '&t into the
right of li'erty, notwithstanding the act and
theimmediate p&rpose to 'e served is relief
fromillegal restraint. %he r&le applies even
wheninstit&ted to arrest a criminal prosec&tion
andsec&re freedom. #hen a prisoner petitions
for awrit of
habeas corpus
, he there'y commences as&it and prosec&tes a
case in that co&rt.%he in8&iry in a
habeas corpus
proceeding isaddressed to the 8&estion of
whether theproceedings and the assailed order
are, for anyreason, n&ll and void. %he writ is
not ordinarilygranted where the law provides
for other remedies in the reg&lar co&rse, and in
thea'sence of e9ceptional
circ&mstances.Moreover,
habeas corpus
sho&ld not 'e grantedin advance of trial. %he
orderly co&rse of trialm&st 'e p&rs&ed and the
&s&al remediese9ha&sted 'efore resorting to
the writ wheree9ceptional circ&mstances are
e9tant. -n another case, it was held that
habeas corpus
cannot 'eiss&ed as a writ of error or as a means
of reviewing errors of law and irreg&larities
notinvolving the 8&estions of :&risdiction
occ&rringd&ring the co&rse of the trial, s&':ect
to thecaveat that constit&tional safeg&ards of
h&manlife and li'erty m&st 'e preserved, and
notdestroyed. -t has also 'een held that
whererestraint is &nder legal process, mere
errors andirreg&larities, which do not render
theproceedings void, are not gro&nds for relief
'y
habeas corpus
'eca&se in s&ch cases, therestraint is not
-t was clear that &nder 2ection
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
, the resol&tion of the investigating :&dge was
not final '&t was still s&':ect to thereview 'y the
p&'lic prosec&tor who had thepower to order
the release of the detainee if nopro'a'le ca&se
sho&ld 'e&ltimately fo&ndagainst her. -n the

conte9t of the r&le, Mangilahad no need to

see$ the iss&ance of the writ of
habeas
corpus
to sec&re her release fromdetention. ;er proper
reco&rse was to 'ring thes&pposed
irreg&larities attending the cond&ct of the
preliminary investigation and the iss&ance
of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of
theCity Prosec&tor, who had 'een meanwhile
giventhe most direct access to the entire
records of the case, incl&ding the warrant of
arrest,following /&dge Pangilinan4s transmittal
of themto the City Prosec&tor for appropriate
action. %hewrit of
habeas corpus
co&ld not 'e &sed asas&'stit&te for another
availa'le remedy

ARIGO V SWIFT
PONENTE: Villarama
TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity
from suit

2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship

ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles
east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured
in the incident, and there have been no reports
of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding,
salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the
USS Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu,
and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have legal
standing.
2. Whether or not US respondents may be
held liable for damages caused by USS
Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity
from suit under VFA applies in this case.

FACTS:

HELD:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class

mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the
Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for
the said vessel to enter and exit the territorial
waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the
port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.
On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan
for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after
a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

First issue: YES.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian

departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is a right of appearance
in a court of justice on a given question.
Specifically, it is a partys personal and
substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the act being challenged, and calls
for more than just a generalized grievance.
However, the rule on standing is a procedural
matter which this Court has relaxed for non-

traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,

taxpayers and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the subject
matter of the controversy is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., we recognized the public right of
citizens to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. We declared that the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology need not be
written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like
other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational
implications.1wphi1 Such right carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit
filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this
Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens
have legal standing to sue for the enforcement
of environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future
generations.
Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their

official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act
or omission resulting in the unfortunate
grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP
was committed while they were performing
official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials
will require remedial actions and appropriation
of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself. The
principle of State immunity therefore bars the

exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the

persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case,
when its warship entered a restricted area in
violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage
to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter
within the ambit of Article 31 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). He explained that while historically,
warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in
cases where they fail to comply with the rules
and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latters internal waters and
the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out

by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy
sovereign immunity subject to the following
exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with
the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws
and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea and
disregards any request for compliance
therewith which is made to it, the coastal State
may require it to leave the territorial sea
immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for
damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial
purposes
The flag State shall bear international
responsibility for any loss or damage to the
coastal State resulting from the non-compliance
by a warship or other government ship

operated for non-commercial purposes with the

laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea
or with the provisions of this Convention or
other rules of international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other
government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes
With such exceptions as are contained
in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31,
nothing in this Convention affects the
immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A
foreign warships unauthorized entry into our
internal waters with resulting damage to
marine resources is one situation in which the
above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party
to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to
date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of
long-standing policy the US considers itself
bound by customary international rules on the
traditional uses of the oceans as codified in
UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that the
US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on
its disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep
seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the
oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind, pointing out that such has nothing
to do with its the US acceptance of customary
international rules on navigation.
The Court also fully concurred with Justice
Carpios view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will
disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and
territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
international responsibility under Art. 31 in
connection with the USS Guardian grounding
which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our longtime ally and trading partner, which has been
actively supporting the countrys efforts to
preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk
from its obligation to compensate the damage
caused by its warship while transiting our
internal waters. Much less can we comprehend
a Government exercising leadership in
international affairs, unwilling to comply with
the UNCLOS directive for all nations to
cooperate in the global task to protect and
preserve the marine environment as provided
in Article 197 of UNCLOS
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional
basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as
appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or
through competent international organizations,
in formulating and elaborating international
rules, standards and recommended practices
and procedures consistent with this
Convention, for the protection and preservation
of the marine environment, taking into account
characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to
the present controversy is beyond dispute.
Although the said treaty upholds the immunity
of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal
States while navigating the latters territorial
sea, the flag States shall be required to leave
the territorial sea immediately if they flout the
laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and
they will be liable for damages caused by their
warships or any other government vessel
operated for non-commercial purposes under
Article 31.
Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under

the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions such as the
present petition for issuance of a writ of

Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from

Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal
case against a person charged with a violation
of an environmental law is to be filed
separately.
The Court considered a view that a
ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US
personnel who may be found responsible for
the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be
premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also found unnecessary at
this point to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same
vein, we cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental
laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages,
including the collection of administrative fines
under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or
that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an
environmental law.
AMPATUAN V MACARAIG
FACTS: Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the
COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the
corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets,
Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the
Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded
the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1
Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was
commanded to the MPD District Director for
proper
disposition.
Likewise,
inquest
proceedings were conducted by the Manila
Prosecutors Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent
Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation
Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable
cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave
Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that
said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary
hearing.

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City

Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the
case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further
investigation and that the latter be released
from custody unless he is being held for other
charges/legal grounds.
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation
of the Manila Citys Prosecution Office,
petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan,
filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22
April 2008.
On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus commanding therein
respondents to produce the body of PO1
Ampatuan and directing said respondents to
show cause why they are withholding or
restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.
Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents
averred that the filing of the administrative case
against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the
PNP and this Court has no authority to order
the release of the subject police officer. The
petitioner countered that the letter resignation
of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the
administrative case moot and academic.
Respondent however stressed that the
resignation has not been acted by the
appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that
the administrative case was filed while PO1
Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP.
The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION
OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE
WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE,
ILLEGAL.
HELD: The objective of the writ is to determine
whether the confinement or detention is valid
or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.
What is to be inquired into is the legality of a
person's detention as of, at the earliest, the

filing of the application for the writ of habeas

corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances
mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed
under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No.
6975 (also known as the Department of Interior
and Local Government Act of 1990), as
amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known
as the Philippine National Police Reform and
Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides
that members of the police force are subject to
the administrative disciplinary machinery of the
PNP.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed
under restrictive custody, such constitutes a
valid argument for his continued detention. This
Court has held that a restrictive custody and
monitoring of movements or whereabouts of
police officers under investigation by their
superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restraint of liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint
which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It
is neither actual nor effective restraint that
would call for the grant of the remedy prayed
for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to
assure the PNP authorities that the police
officers concerned are always accounted for.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the
burden of showing that she is entitled to the
issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her
husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to
show on its face that the latter is unlawfully
deprived of his liberty guaranteed and
enshrined in the Constitution.

LANSANG V GARCIA

Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at

about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the
Philippines was holding a public meeting at
Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of
its candidates in the general elections
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand
grenades were thrown at the platform where
said candidates and other persons were. Eight
persons were killed and many more injured.
Proclamation 889 was issued by the President
suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus
stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion
and insurrection in order to forcibly seize
political power. Petitions for writ of habeas
corpus were filed by persons (13) who have
been arrested without a warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the
proclamation was that it is to be applied to
persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally,
Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment,
inserting the word actually staging. Proc. 889B was also issued lifting the suspension of
privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and
26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the
suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in
Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the
suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18
provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose
privilege was suspended. Petitioners
maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not
declare the existence of actual "invasion
insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger
thereof, however it became moot and academic
since it was amended. Petitioners further
contend that public safety did not require the
issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there
is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time
of the suspension of the privilege, the
Government was functioning normally, as were
the courts; (c) that no untoward incident,
confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has

actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d)

that the President's alleged apprehension,
because of said plan, is non-existent and
unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces
in the Philippines are too small and weak to
jeopardize public safety to such extent as to
require the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court
having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it
may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the
existence of the factual bases for the
proclamations. Now the Court resolves after
conclusive decision reached by majority.

part thereof under martial law. He had, already,

called out the armed forces, proved inadequate.
Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of
the privilege is the least harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no
ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors,
20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that
there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing
incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970.
CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and
control nine major labor organizations; has
exploited the (11) major student or youth
organizations; about thirty (30) mass
organizations actively advancing the CPP.
KULAYAN V TAN

Issues:

LOZADA V MACAPAGAL ARROYO

(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide

whether the exigency has arisen requiring
suspension (of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his
decision is final and conclusive upon the courts
and upon all other persons.

CARAM V SEGUI

(2) Whether or Not public safety require the

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.

Held: The President has authority however it is

subject to judicial review. Two conditions must
concur for the valid exercise of the authority to
suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must
be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or
"imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public
safety" must require the suspension of the
privilege. President has three (3) courses of
action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any

GAMBOA V CHAN
Facts:Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued
Admin No. 275 creating Zearosa Commissionwhich was
formed to investigate the existence of private army
groups in the country in view of eliminating and
dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon
conclusion of its investigation, theCommission submitted
a confidential report to the office of the
President.Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras,
Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the
PhilippineNational Police Ilocos Norte conducted
surveillance operation against her and her aides
and classifiedher as PAG coddler. Purportedly
without the benefit of data verification, PNP
forwarded in the Reports
enumeration of individual maintaining PAGs.
Gamboas association with PAG was published and
released in the different forms of media,
publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her
right to privacy was violated, Gamboa filed apetition
before the RTC for the issuance of writ of habeas data to
destroy the unverified reports fromthe PNP data base
and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless

reports against her. The RTC ruled thatthe

inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her
right to privacy. However, the RTC dismissed
Gamboas petition for writ of habeas data
saying that Gamboa failed to establish the
source of the
information.ISSUES:1.
Whether or not the forwarding or information or
intelligence report by the PNP to the
Commission was an unlawful act that violated
petitioners right to privacy
2.
Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data
was proper
HELD:Forwarding of information or intelligence
report gathered by the PNP to the Commission
is
NOT an intrusion of petitioners right to privacy
It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a
legitimate aim which is to investigate theexistence of
PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them
permanently. Pursuant to the stateinterest of dismantling
PAGs, as well as the powers and functions accorded to
the Commission and thePNP, the latter collected
information on individuals suspected of maintaining
PAGs, monitored them andcounteracted their
activities. One of those individuals is herein
petitioner Gamboa.This court holds that
Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that
the data contained in thereport listing her as a PAG
coddler came from the PNP contrary to the ruling of the
trial court, however,the forwarding of information by the
PNP to the Commission was not unlawful act that
violated orthreatened her right to privacy in life,
liberty or security. The PNP was rationally
expected to forwardand share intelligence
regarding PAGs with the body specifically
created for the purpose of investigatingthe
existence of these notorious group. Moreover, the
Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize
the police force in the fulfillment of the formers
mandate, and thus had the power to request as
sistancefrom the latter.
Petition for writ of habeas data is NOT PROPER

PAJE V CASINO

SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

that they must be enacted instead by the

Congress of the Philippines.

GARCIA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed,
in addition to any other duties, taxes and
charges imposed by law on all articles imported
into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad
valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed
across the board on all imported articles,
including crude oil and other oil products
imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443
increased the additional duty to 9%. In the
same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the
previous 5% duty except that crude oil and
other oil products continued to be taxed at
9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from
Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of
Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution

provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the
Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission
to Congress to authorize the President subject
to such limitations and restrictions as
[Congress] may impose to fix within specific
limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or
imposts . . . . In this case, it is the Tariff and
Customs Code which authorized the President
ot issue the said EOs.

GUERRERO V CA
CONDE V RIVERA

He contends that since the Constitution vests

the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress,
the President may not assume such power by
issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478
which are in the nature of revenue-generating
measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are
constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of
course, within the province of the Legislative
rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be
characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to be exercised by the President,

Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal

midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to
respond to no less the five information for
various crimes and misdemeanors, has
appeared with her witnesses and counsel at
hearings no less than on eight different
occasions only to see the cause postponed, has
twice been required to come to the Supreme
Court for protection, and now, after the
passage of more than one year from the time
when the first information was filed, seems as
far away from a definite resolution of her
troubles as she was when originally charged.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been

denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.

Held: Philippine organic and statutory law

expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all
other accused persons, has a right to a speedy
trial in order that if innocent she may go free,
and she has been deprived of that right in
defiance of law. We lay down the legal
proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of
the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus
to compel a dismissal of the information, or if
he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus
to obtain his freedom.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Galman v Sandiganbayan

and ordering a re-trial before an impartial

tribunal.

144 SCRA 392 (1986)

Facts: An investigating committee was created
to determine the facts on the case involving the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that
majority and minority reports showed that they
are unconvinced on the participation of Galman
as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded
him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the
military reports. Majority reports
recommended the 26 military respondents as
indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino
and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not
give due consideration.

The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally

preparing a resolution charging the 26 military
accused as principal to the crime against Aquino
but was recalled upon the intervention of
President Marcos who insist on the innocence
of the accused. Marcos however recommended
the filing of murder charge and to implement
the acquittal as planned so that double
jeopardy may be invoked later on.

The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of

justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross
violation of constitutional rights of the
petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in
allowing the prosecution to present vital
documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying
the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan

Issue: Whether or not there was due process in

the acquittal of the accused from the charges
against them.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the

prosecution was deprived of due process and
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their
case which grossly violates the due process
clause. There could be no double jeopardy since
legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58
Phil. 851). The lower court that rendered the
judgment of acquittal was not competent as it
was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated
the right of the prosecution to due process. In
effect the first jeopardy was never terminated,
and the remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy.

The court further contends that the previous

trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian
President ordered the Sandiganbayan and
Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial
which was undertaken with due pressure to the
judiciary. The courts decision of acquittal is one
void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in
observing due process during the trial therefore
the judgment was also deemed void and double

jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial

was one vitiated with lack of due process on the
account of collusion between the lower court
and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a predetermined verdict of the accused.

The denial on the motion for reconsideration of

the petitioners by the court was set aside and
rendered the decision of acquittal of the
accused null and void. An order for a re-trial
was granted.

that, an ocular inspection of the body of the

accused is permissible.
BELTRAN V SAMSON
Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of
Falsification, refused to write a sample of his
handwriting as ordered by the respondent
Judge. The petitioner in this case contended
that such order would be a violation of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination
because such examination would give the
prosecution evidence against him, which the
latter should have gotten in the first place. He
also argued that such an act will make him
furnish evidence against himself.

VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS

Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the

crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the
petitioner to subject herself into physical
examination to test whether or not she was
pregnant to prove the determine the crime of
adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner
refused to such physical examination
interposing the defense that such examination
was a violation of her constitutional rights
against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination

was a violation of the petitioners constitutional
rights against self-incrimination.

Held: No. It is not a violation of her

constitutional rights. The rule that the
constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition
against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The corollary to the proposition is

Issue: Whether or not the writing from the

fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the
purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting
and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes
evidence against himself within the scope and
meaning of the constitutional provision under
examination.

Held: The court ordered the respondents and

those under their orders desist and abstain
absolutely and forever from compelling the
petitioner to take down dictation in his
handwriting for the purpose of submitting the
latter for comparison. Writing is something
more than moving the body, or the hands, or
the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical
act, because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention; and in the case at
bar writing means that the petitioner herein is
to furnish a means to determine whether or not
he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is
more serious, we believe the present case is
similar to that of producing documents or
chattels in one's possession. We say that, for
the purposes of the constitutional privilege,
there is a similarity between one who is
compelled to produce a document, and one

who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his

handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is
required to furnish evidence against himself. It
cannot be contended in the present case that if
permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the
crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal
treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for
the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his
handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible
to obtain specimen or specimens without
resorting to the means complained herein, that
is no reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true
that in some cases criminals may succeed in
evading the hand of justice, but such cases are
accidental and do not constitute the raison d'
etre of the privilege. This constitutional
privilege exists for the protection of innocent
persons.

PEOPLE V GALIT
The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim
oil the occasion of a robbery. He had
beendetained and interrogated almost
continuously for five days, to no avail. He
consistentlymaintained his innocence. There
was no evidence to link him to the crime.
Obviously,something drastic had to be done. A
confession was absolutely necessary. So the
investigatingofficers began to maul him and to
torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted
on hisinnocence. His will had to be broken. A
confession must be obtained. So they continued
tomaltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face
with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet
bowlfull of human waste. The prisoner could
not take any more. His body could no longer
endurethe pain inflicted on him and the
indignities he had to suffer. His will had been
broken. Headmitted what the investigating
officers wanted him to admit and he signed the
confessionthey prepared. Later, against his will,
he posed for pictures as directed by his
investigators,purporting it to be a reenactment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silentand to
counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him.
RULING:
Such a long question followed by a
monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the
requirements of the law that the accused be
informed of his rights under the Constitution
and our laws. Insteadthere should be several
short and clear questions and every right
explained in simple words in adialect or
language known to the person under
investigation. Accused is from Samar and
thereis no showing that he understands
Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest,
accused wasnot permitted to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact,
his sisters andother relatives did not know that
he had been brought to the NBI for
investigation and it wasonly about two weeks
after he had executed the
salaysay
that his relatives were allowed to visithim. His
statement does not even contain any waiver of
right to counsel and yet during theinvestigation
he was not assisted by one. At the supposed
reenactment, again accused was notassisted by
counsel of his choice. These constitute gross
violations of his rights.

CHAVEZ V CA
Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified
theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car
together with accessories). An information was
filed against the accused together with other
accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain
and abuse of confidence without theconsent of
owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused
plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal
grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be
thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused
opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the
accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary
witness not an state witness. Counsel of

accused answer that it will only incriminate his

client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal.

involving a violation of another constitutional

right, in this wise:

Petitioner was convicted.

A courts jurisdiction at the beginning of trial

may be lost in the course of the proceedings
due to failure to complete the court as the
Sixth Amendment requires by providing
Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain
Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this
constitutional guaranty, and whose life or
liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the
Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the
court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The
judgment of conviction pronounced by a court
without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned
thereunder may obtain release of habeas
corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of

Chavez against self incrimination had been
violated to warrant writ of HC?
HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to
incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot
be said now that he has waived his right. He did
not volunteer to take the stand and in his own
defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;
Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case
heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky
defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own
admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his
original claim remains valid. For the privilege,
we say again, is a rampart that gives protection
even to the guilty
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is
traditionally considered as an exceptional
remedy to release a person whose liberty is
illegally restrained such as when the accuseds
constitutional rights are disregarded. Such
defect results in the absence or loss of
jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial
and the consequent conviction of the accused
whose fundamental right was violated. That
void judgment of conviction may be challenged
by collateral attack, which precisely is the
function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue
even if another remedy which is less effective
may be availed of by the defendant. Thus,
failure by the accused to perfect his appeal
before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a
recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted
upon a judgment already final. For, as
explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of
habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must
be liberally given effect so as to protect well a
person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety
of the writ was given the nod in that case,

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the

remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose
case presents a clear picture of disregard of a
constitutional right is absolutely proper.
Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless
otherwise expressly provided by law, to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.

PEOPLE V SUAREZ
FACTS: On or about the 8th day of December,
1987 in the Municipality of Pasig, Estrelita
Guzman was robbed and was killed in her own
house.
Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his
wife, Marivic Suarez, also the victims adopted
daughter, could get at once any property that
Marivic might inherit from Estrellita upon the
latter's death. In exchange for the job, Suarez
would allow the other accused to steal what
they wanted from the house, in addition to
giving them P100,000.00 after one month from

the killing of Estrellita.

Two of the accused, Reyes and Lara, gave their
sworn statement detailing what transpired from
the planning until the execution of the crime.
Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the
accused and on the circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution, the trial court
found Suarez, Reyes and Lara guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
While Suarez and Reyes have already accepted
the trial court's verdict, Lara now questions the
lower court's decision by challenging the
admissibility of their extrajudicial declarations.
He claims that their extrajudicial confessions
were obtained through force and intimidation
and without the benefit of an effective counsel.

ISSUES: WON accused Laras extrajudicial

confessions were freely and voluntary given and
without the benefit of an effective counsel.
HELD: After a thorough review of the records of
the case, we agree with the lower court's
factual finding and conclusion that the
extrajudicial confessions of accused Reyes and
appellant Lara were freely and voluntarily given
and that their retraction and claims of violence
and coercion were merely belated contrivances
and efforts at exculpation. Their claim that they
were forced to sign their respective statements
was sufficiently refuted by the witnesses for the
prosecution who were present on the day and
time the duo gave and signed their sworn
statements.
We find no merit in herein appellant's
contention that Atty. Saunar was not Reyes'
own choice as counsel for the interrogation.

While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases

where a person under custodial investigation
cannot afford the services of a lawyer is
naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
accused really has the final choice as he may
reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused
where he never raised any objection against the
former's appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of his statement
before the swearing officer. 37
Here, while the lawyers of the accused were
provided by the NBI, the accused never signified
their desire to have a lawyer of their own
choice. Thus, we also disagree with appellant's
claim that the lawyer who assisted him in his
waiver came in only after he had executed his
waiver. His own statements show that he
waived his rights in the presence and with the
advice of Atty. Rodolfo Dahiroc.
PEOPLE V MALMSTED
Facts:
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding
officer of the first regional command (NARCOM)
stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to
set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose
of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports
that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs. And an information also was received
about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused
was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were
members of the NARCOM and that they would
conduct an inspection. During the inspection
CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist.

Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a

gun, the officer asked for accuseds passport
and other identification papers. When accused
failed to comply, the officer required him to
bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his
waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag
and when accused opened the same bag the
officer noticed four suspicious looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained
hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused was invited
outside the bus for questioning. But before he
alighted from the bus accused stopped to get
two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag.
It was only after the officers had opened the
bags that the accused finally presented his
passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy
each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained
also hashish.

and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the

search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing
provision of law, which allows a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as
such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed,
and that the object sought in connection with
the offense are in the placed sought to be
searched.
When NARCOM received the
information that a Caucasian travelling from
Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a
prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a
search warrant.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under
Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful a peace
officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in the presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporary confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another
Accused was searched and arrested
while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime
was actually being committed by the accused

MORALES V ENRILE
GAMBOA V CRUZ
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy
without a warrant. During a line-up of 5
detainees including petitioner, he was identified
by a complainant to be a companion in a
robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner
filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the
conduct of the line-up, without notice and in
the absence of his counsel violated his
constitutional rights to counsel and to due
process. The court denied said motion. Hearing
was set, hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to
counsel and due process violated.

Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the

custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet
entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not
been held yet to answer for a criminal offense.
The moment there is a move or even an urge of
said investigators to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information which
may appear innocent or innocuous at the time,
from said suspect, he should then and there be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right,
but the waiver shall be made in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not,
in any way, deprived of this substantive and
constitutional right, as he was duly represented
by a counsel. He was accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present
evidence to substantiate his defense; only that
he chose not to, and instead opted to file a
Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had
rested its case. What due process abhors is the
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
PEOPLE V BARROS
PEOPLE V COMPIL
PEOPLE V SALAS
Facts: At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of
March 6, 1992, a 60 year old woman, identified
as Virginia Talens was found lying dead in a
canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga;
she was last seen alive at about 3:00 o'clock
early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando
Pangan and Richard Pangan who were with her
going home coming from the wake of one
Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and Richard
Pangan testified that accused was with them in
going home at about 3:00 o'clock in the
morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando and Richard
Pangan reached first their house and left the

two on the way and that was the last time

Virginia was seen alive; just a few minutes after
reaching his house and while inside his house,
Orlando Pangan heard a shout; another woman,
one Serafia Gutierrez, testified that she likewise
was awakened by a shout at about 3:00 in the
morning; Dr. Aguda who autopsied the victim
found hematoma on the head and chest, an
abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the
neck which stabwound, the doctor claims, was
the cause of death of the victim; Police
Investigator Gonzales who immediately
responded upon report, recovered at the scene
a pin, the victim's wristwatch, earring, a ring
and P135.00 money; he likewise found on
March 9, 1992 when he continued his
investigation bloodstain on the front door of
the house of the accused which bloodstain
when submitted for examination was found to
be of human blood; one Resultay was with
Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of
March 5, 1992 in going to the wake, who claims
that Virginia had money on a purse as while
they were on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng
she saw Virginia got money from her purse a
P500.00 bill but as she had no change she
instead took P8.00 from her other pocket; one
Ramil Talens, a son of the victim corroborated
the claim of Resultay that Virginia had with her
at that time money worth P2,000.00 as in the
morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her mother
for safekeeping the sum of P1,500.00 which he
claims his mother placed in her purse and
claims further that at the wake, he asked and
was given P50.00 by his mother as he also
participated in the gambling thereat, however,
the purse of Virginia containing about P2,000.00
was no longer to be found when she was found
dead; Orlando Pangan saw the accused
gambled in the wake; Virginia likewise gambled
at the wake; accused had been working for
three days before March 6 at Sta. Ana,

Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but the

following day, he did not anymore report for
work at Sta. Ana, Pampanga, was no longer to
be found and was last seen at about 3:00
morning together with Virginia Talens on their
way home coming from the wake; the parents
of [the] accused were informed by Investigator
Gonzales that their son was the suspect and
adviced them to surrender him, but since March
6, 1992 when accused left Mexico, Pampanga,
he returned only on September 19, 1992 at
Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico, Pampanga
where he was ultimately apprehended by the
Mexico Police on September 22, 1992 after
chancing on a radio message by the police of
Arayat to their Provincial commander that a
vehicular incident occurred at Arayat,
Pampanga where one Elmer Salas was the
victim and was hospitalized at the district
hospital at Arayat, Pampanga where he used
the name of Rommel Salas and not Elmer Salas.
The trial court rendered convicting Salas for
Robbery with Homicide

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient
to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide.
(2) Whether or Not the appellants crime
homicide or robbery with homicide.

Held: There was no eyewitness or direct

evidence; either to the robbery or to the
homicide and none of the things allegedly
stolen were ever recovered. However, direct
evidence is not the only matrix from which the
trial court may draw its findings and conclusion
of culpability. Resort to circumstantial evidence

is essential when to insist on direct testimony

would result in setting felons free.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to
support a conviction, all the circumstances must
be consistent with each other, consistent with
the theory that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other possible, rational
hypothesis excepting that of guilt. All the
circumstances established must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing solely to the
accused, to the exclusion of all other persons,
as the author of the crime. The facts and
circumstances consistent with the guilt of the
accused and inconsistent with his innocence
can constitute evidence which, in weight and
probative value, may be deemed to surpass
even direct evidence in its effect on the court.
The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at
around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant
hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San
Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since
childhood, on that very date. Appellant was
nowhere when his co-worker and barrio mate,
Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant's house to
fetch him for work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m.
of March 6, 1992. Appellant also abandoned his
job as a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on
March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving
behind an unfinished painting project. He was
not seen again from said date. Police
investigators found human bloodstains on the
front door of appellant's house, on his clothing,
and on his yellow slippers after the victim was
killed. Despite efforts of the police to find
appellant as the principal suspect, a fact known
to appellant's family and neighbors, appellant
did not present himself to the authorities.

Appellant was apprehended only a full six

months after the date of the crime, following
his confinement in a hospital in Arayat,
Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a
Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When hospitalized,
appellant used the alias Rommel Salas, instead
of his true name Elmer Salas. These
circumstances denote flight, which when
unexplained, has always been considered by the
courts as indicative of guilt.
Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake
they attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying
a winning streak when her son, Ramil Talens,
came to fetch her but which he failed to do
because his mother was winning, and she
refused to leave. The purse of Talens containing
cash was gone when her corpse was found in
the canal with a stab wound and bruises. What
was left was a safety pin which victim used to
fasten the missing purse to her clothes.
Denial is an inherently weak defense which
must be buttressed by strong evidence of nonculpability to merit credibility. Denial is negative
and self-serving and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight over the testimonies of
credible witnesses who positively testified that
appellant was at the locus criminis and was the
last person seen with the victim alive.
The absence of evidence showing any improper
motive on the part of the principal witness for
the prosecution to falsely testify against the
appellant strongly tends to buttress the
conclusion that no such improper motive exists
and that the testimony of said witnesses
deserve full faith and credit.
The essence of voluntary surrender is
spontaneity and the intent of the accused to
give himself up and submit himself

unconditionally to the authorities either

because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants
to save the State the trouble of having to effect
his arrest. Spontaneity and intent to give one's
self up are absent where the accused went into
hiding for six months after the incident and had
to resort to an alias when he was involved in an
accident being investigated by the police
authorities.
Robbery with Homicide is a special complex
crime against property. Homicide is incidental
to the robbery which is the main purpose of the
criminal. In charging Robbery with Homicide,
the onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking
of personal property with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; (b) the property
belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on
the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in
the generic sense, was committed." Although
there was no witness as to the actual robbing of
the victim, there is testimony that the victim
had more or less P2,000.00; and wore gold
earrings valued at P750.00. These were never
recovered.
While there is indeed no direct proof that
Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was
killed, we may conclude from four
circumstances that the robbery occasioned her
killing: (1) Both appellant and victim gambled at
the wake. (2) The appellant knew that victim
was winning. (3) The victim was last seen alive
with appellant. (4) The victim's purse containing
her money and earrings were missing from her
body when found.
The decision of the regional trial court is
affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.

PEOPLE V OBSANIA
Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery
with Rape before the Municipal Court of
Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty.
His counsel moved for the dismissal of the
charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the
info. Said motion was granted. From this order
of dismissal the prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal

places the accused in Double Jeopardy.

Held: In order that the accused may invoke

double jeopardy, the following requisites must
have obtained in the original prosecution, a)
valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, d)
defendant was acquitted or convicted or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was
ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's
motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double
jeopardy as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies
to wit when the case is dismissed with the
express consent of the defendant, the dismissal
will not be a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense because his action in having the
case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right/privilege for the reason that
he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding
to the trial on the merits and rendering a
judgment of conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed
provisionally not only with the express consent

of the accused but even upon the urging of his

counsel there can be no double jeopardy under
Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is
revived by the fiscal.
PEOPLE V FERRER
The Government is appealing from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
dismissing the case against the Defendant
Cornelio Ferrer for acts of lasciviousness, on a
motion to quash filed by him.
Cornelio Ferrer was charged with acts of
lasciviousness in the Justice of the Peace Court
of Asia, Negros Occidental on the basis of a
written complaint, later amended filed by the
offended party, Perla Engcoy. After the
corresponding preliminary investigation, the
Justice of the Peace Court finding probable
cause that the offense charged has been
committed and that the Defendant is probably
guilty, elevated the case to the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, where the case
was tried on February 15, 1955. After the
prosecution had rested its case, the hearing was
adjourned to March 1, 1955. In the meantime,
on February 24 of the same year, the accused
filed a motion to quash on the ground that the
jurisdiction of the trial court to try the case had
not been established for the reason that the
evidence for the prosecution merely tended to
prove that the acts of lasciviousness were
committed in the house of the offended party,
without showing where that house is situated.
The prosecution filed a written opposition to
the motion to quash, and the defense filed a
reply to said opposition, after which the trial
court by order of March 23, 1955, granted the
motion to quash and dismissed the case with
costs de oficio.
We have examined the record of the case,
particularly, the testimony of the offended
party and that of the Chief of Police and we are
fully convinced that the prosecution had
established the jurisdiction of the trial court,
that is to say, that the offense charged was
committed in the town of Asia, Province of

Negros Occidental. In the first place, the

complaint and amended complaint both under
oath, filed by the offended party in the Justice
of the Peace Court allege that the acts of
lasciviousness were committed against her in
her house in the poblacion of the Municipality
of Asia, Province of Negros Occidental. In the
second place, testifying as a witness at the trial,
she gave as her residence the town of Asia,
Negros Occidental. Then she testified that the
acts of lasciviousness were committed on her
person in her house. (pp. 6, 7, 11, t.s.n.) As the
Solicitor General says, in the absence of proof
that she had more than one house, it is
presumed that the crime was committed in her
house in Asia, Negros Occidental, within the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Then we have the
testimony of Celestino Regala, Chief of Police of
Asia, wherein he declared that he received the
complaint filed by Perla Engcoy against Cornelio
Ferrer; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat he made
the corresponding investigation, specially since
the accused was one of his policemen, charged
with having committed acts of lasciviousness
against the offended party, Perla, in her own
house, and he asserted that the distance of said
house from the Municipal building of Asia is
around 200 yards. (pp. 72-83, t s. n.) With all
this evidence, we cannot understand how the
trial court could say that the prosecution had
not established its jurisdiction to try the case.
Unfortunately, however, we believe that the
Government however meritorious its case
cannot appeal the order of dismissal without
violating the right of the Defendant not to be
placed in double jeopardy. The accused herein
has not filed a brief on appeal raising this
question of double jeopardy. Nevertheless, Rule
118, Section 2 the Rule of Court
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The
People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the
Defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy, and we have to give force and effect
to said rule. Here, the Defendant had already
been arraigned and he entered his plea, and the
trial had begun, and the prosecution had rested
its case. We hold that the appeal of the

Government from the order of dismissal would

place the accused in double jeopardy.
We find the present case to be one of
miscarriage of justice because the accused was
practically acquitted with out considering the
merits of the case, all due, unfortunately, to the
error of the trial court. However, this Tribunal
finds itself helpless to correct the error and
must respect and enforce the right of the
accused granted by law and guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Without anticipating or advancing any opinion
as to the innocence or guilt of the accused,
since he is a municipal policeman, it is
suggested that he be subjected to an
administrative investigation. Let copies of this
decision be furnished the office of the President
and the Municipal Council of Asia, Negros
Occidental.
In view of the foregoing, the appeal filed on
behalf of the Government is hereby dismissed
with costs de oficio.

ESMANA V POGOY
Facts: Petitioners Esmea and Alba were
charged with grave coercion in the Court of
Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas
Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth
P5000 from the bank to be given to them
because the priest lost in a game of chance.
During arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not
Guilty. No trial came in after the arraignment
due to the priests request to move it on
another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy
issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979
but the fiscal informed the court that it received
a telegram stating that the complainant was
sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy
trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case
because the trial was already dragging the
accused and that the priests telegram did not
have a medical certificate attached to it in order

for the court to recognize the complainants

reason to be valid in order to reschedule again
another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a
motion to revive the case and attached the
medical certificate of the priest proving the fact
that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On
Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave

coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due
to complainants failure to appear at the trial,
would place the accused in double jeopardy

Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the

accused in double jeopardy for the very reason
that the case has been dismissed already
without the consent of the accused which
would have an effect of an acquittal on the case
filed. The dismissal was due to complainants
incapability to present its evidence due to non
appearance of the witnesses and complainant
himself which would bar further prosecution of
the defendant for the same offense. For double
jeopardy to exist these three requisites should
be present, that one, there is a valid complaint
or information filed second, that it is done
before a court of competent jurisdiction and
third, that the accused has been arraigned and
has pleaded to the complaint or information. In
the case at bar, all three conditions were
present, as the case filed was grave coercion,
filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to
where the coercion took place and last the
accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or the information. When these three
conditions are present then the acquittal,
conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or
termination of the case without his express

consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to

another prosecution for the offense charged. In
the case, it was evidently shown that the
accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and
asked for the trial of the case and not its
termination which would mean that
respondents had no expressed consent to the
dismissal of the case which would make the
case filed res judicata and has been dismissed
by the competent court in order to protect the
respondents as well for their right to speedy
trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the
respondents which would be a bar to further
prosecution.
PEOPLE V CITY COURT OF SILAY
Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974,
accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and
Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the
Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane
cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar
canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight
report cards), Apparently, it was proven and
shown that there was padding of the weight of
the sugar canes and that the information on the
tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be
heavier than its actual weight. The three
accused then were charged with Falsification
by private individuals and use of falsified
document. After the prosecution had
presented, the respondent moved to dismiss
the charge against them on the ground that the
evidences presented were not sufficient to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Acting on the motion, respondent court issued
its order dismissing the case on the ground that
the acts committed by the accused do not
constituted the crime of falsification as strictly
enumerated in the revised penal code defining
the crime of falsification which was charged
earlier and that their case be dismissed. People

asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not

tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed
because according to them, it was done with
the consent of the accused therefore waiving
there defense of double jeopardy. The accused
on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the
dismissal was due to lack of merits of the
prosecution which would have the same effect
as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution
from prosecuting the accused for it will be
unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due
to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the
plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by

the court would place the accused Sensio,
Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy

Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the

accused in double jeopardy for the very reason
that the case has been dismissed earlier due to
lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of
falsification was dismissed on a motion of the
accused however this was a motion filed after
the prosecution had rested its case, calling for
the evidence beyond reasonable ground which
the prosecution had not been able to do which
would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will
bar the prosecution of another case. As it was
stated on the requirements of a valid defense of
double jeopardy it says: That there should be a
valid complaint, second would be that such
complaint be filed before a competent court
and to which the accused has pleaded and that
defendant was previously acquitted, convicted
or dismissed or otherwise terminated without
express consent of the accused in which were
all present in the case at bar. There was indeed
a valid, legitimate complaint and concern
against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico

which was filed at a competent court with

jurisdiction on the said case. It was also
mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty
and during the time of trial, it was proven that
the case used against the accused were not
sufficient to prove them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case
which translates to acquittal. It explained
further that there are two instances when we
can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is
that the ground for the dismissal of the case
was due to insufficiency of evidence and
second, when the proceedings have been
reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of
the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites
given, it was the first on that is very much
applicable to our case at bar where there was
dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of
evidence which will bar the approval of the
petition in the case at bar for it will constitute
double jeopardy on the part of the accused
which the law despises.
SALCEDO V MENDOZA
DE LA TORRE V CA
ALBERTO V CA

CITIZENSHIP
LABO V COMELEC
FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for
recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayorelect who, through his marriage with an
Australian national, was naturalized and took an
oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said
marriage was found to be bigamous and
therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that
his naturalization made him only a dual national
and did not divest him of his Philippine
citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested
of his Philippine citizenship.
HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63
clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be
lost through naturalization in a foreign country;
express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath
of allegiance to a foreign country, all of which
are applicable to the petitioner.

FRIVALDO V COMELEC
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the
province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due
time. The League of Municipalities filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded
the special and affirmative defenses that he was
naturalized as American citizen only to protect
himself against President Marcos during the
Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:

No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code

provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines,
this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He
claims that by actively participating in the local
elections, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States
of America. The Court stated that that the
alleged forfeiture was between him and the US.
If he really wanted to drop his American
citizenship, he could do so in accordance with
CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD
725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.

MERCADO V MANZANO
Facts:Petitioners filed for respondents
disqualification for election alleging that
respondent is a dual citizen, and under the
Local Government Code, dual citizens cannot
run for public office.
Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was
born in the U.S which follows the principle of
jus soli, hence, considered an American citizen
as well.
COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he
was considered natural-born because of the
vrtue that he is a son of both Filipino citizens
but petitioners assail this.
Issue: Is respondent Manzano a dual citizen
and cannot run for public office?
Ruling: The Court first defined dual citizenship
and compared it to dual allegiance.

Dual citizenship arises when a person whose

parents are citizens of a state that follows jus
saguinis and was born in a state that follows jus
soli, hence, resulting to a concurrent application
of different two laws or more.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his

loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in
connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.

On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation

whre a person simultaneously owes loyalty to
two or more states.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine

citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
[(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or
Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of
the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was
elected as the Representative of the 2nd District
of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won
over petitioner Bengson who was then running
for reelection.

In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen,

his act of filing a certificate of candidacy
tantamount to his election of Phil. citizenship
meaning he forswears allegiance to the other
country and thereby terminating their status as
dual.
The Court stressed that participating in the
election is an express renunciation of American
citizenship.

BANGZON V HRET
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at
issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that no person shall be a Member
of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted
in the US Marine Corps and without the consent
of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath
of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63
[(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
rendering service to or accepting commission
in the armed forces of a foreign country.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo

Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become
a member of the HOR since he is not a naturalborn citizen as required under Article VI, section
6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the
petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz
the duly elected Representative in the said
election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship
may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes

by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will
be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed
Forces of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place
where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall
contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of
allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.

MACALINTAL V COMELEC

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer,

questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the
validity of the said act on the following grounds,
among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino
already considered an immigrant
abroad can be allowed to participate in
absentee voting provided he executes
an affidavit stating his intent to return
to the Philippines is void because it
dispenses of the requirement that a
voter must be a resident of the
Philippines for at least one year and in
the place where he intends to vote for
at least 6 months immediately
preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
proclaim winning candidates insofar as
it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the
Constitution for it is Congress which is
empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments
are correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the
absentee voters are required to
physically reside in the Philippines
within the period required for nonabsentee voters. Further, as understood
in election laws, domicile and resident
are interchangeably used. Hence, one is
a resident of his domicile (insofar as
election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the
intention to return to. Thus, an
immigrant who executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is considered a resident of
the Philippines for purposes of being

qualified as a voter (absentee voter to

be exact). If the immigrant does not
execute the affidavit then he is not
qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be
harmonized. It could not be the
intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation
of the winners in the vice-presidential
and presidential race. To interpret it
that way would mean that Congress
allowed COMELEC to usurp its power.
The canvassing and proclamation of the
presidential and vice presidential
elections is still lodged in Congress and
was in no way transferred to the
COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

NICOLAS-LEWIS V COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA
9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of
suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec,
however, did not allow petitioners to vote in
the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners
faield to comply with the requirement of 1-year
residency prior the elections as provided for
under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners may participate in
the election sans the compliance of the 1 year
residency.
Ruling:
The Court held that those who retained or
reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225 may
exercise their right to vote under the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189.
Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides
for the exception to the residency requirement
in Section 1 of the same article. The voting
mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth

to provide a system wherein Filipinos of dual

citizenship and are, at the same time, not
residing in the Philippines are empowered to
vote.
The Court held that present day duals may now
exercise their right of suffrage provided they
meet the requirements under Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189

CALILUNG V DATUMANONG
FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be
issued to stop respondent from implementing
RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner
avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it
violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by
recognizing and allowing dual allegiance.
RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of policy and is not self-executing
provision.
What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship
to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship, by reason of
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. In
its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.
VALLES V COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition and prays that a writ
of prohibition be issued to stop respondent
from implementing Republic Act No. 9225,
entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As
Amended, and for Other Purposes" which he
avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional
as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law."
R.A. 9225:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any
provision
of
law
to
the
contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
ISSUES:
(1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2)
Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon
the issue of dual allegiance?
RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of a policy and it is not a selfexecuting provision. What Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does
not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to
the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No.
9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of
confronting the issue of whether or not there is

dual allegiance to the concerned foreign

country. What happens to the other citizenship
was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
On the other hand, Congress was given a
mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department,
including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining
to dual allegiance.
PETITION is DISMISSED For lack of merit.

JAPZON V COMELEC
Facts:
Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and
private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were
candidates for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May
2007.
Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before
the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or
cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon
averred in his Petition that Ty was a former
natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9
October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur,
Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses
Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas
Sumiguin (a Filipino).
Ty eventually migrated to the United States of
America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty
had been residing in the USA for the last 25
years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy
on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented
therein that he was a resident of Barangay6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a
permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign
country.
While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition
of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually
resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one
year immediately preceding the date of election

as required under Section 39 of Republic Act

No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991
Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine
citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the
USA, the most recent of which was on 31
October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.
Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, he continued to
comport himself as an American citizen as
proven by his travel records. He had also failed
to renounce his foreign citizenship as required
by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as
the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
of 2003, or related laws.
Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the
COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from
running for public office and the cancellation of
the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino
who went to the USA to work and subsequently
became a naturalized American citizen. Ty
claimed, however, that prior to filing his
Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor
of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already
performed the following acts: (1) with the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting
dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty
filed with the Philippine Consulate General in
Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for
the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship;
(2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles,
California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine
passport indicating in his application that his
residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini
St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar. Ty's application was approved
and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a
Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty
personally secured and signed his Community
Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of
General Macarthur, in which he stated that his
address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17

July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in

Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured
another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating
therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7)
finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly
notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his American citizenship, and he had
been a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one
year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections.
Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's
Petition
in
SPA
No.
07-568.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and
was declared Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May
2007.[7]
The COMELEC First Division found that Ty
complied with the requirements of Sections 3
and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired
his Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public
office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that
no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to
another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof.
Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of
Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of
the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and
executed
a Renunciation
of
Foreign
Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance
with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a
candidate for or occupying public office nor is in
active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officer in the armed forces in the
country of which he was naturalized citizen
Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in
stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he
was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least
one year before the elections on 14 May 2007.
It reasoned that: Although Ty has lost

his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was

naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and
subsequent acts thereof proved that he has
been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least
one (1) year before the elections held on 14
May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of
candidacy.
The petition was denied and COMELEC was in
favor of the defendant failing to obtain a
favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon
proceeded to file the instant Petition
for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had
committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of
discretion for dismissing the petition.
Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside
the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28
September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division
and en banc, respectively; to issue a new
resolution denying due course to or canceling
Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare
Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar.
Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition.
According to Ty, the COMELEC already found
sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a
resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the
14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot
evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence
without violating the well-entrenched rule that
findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on
the Court.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to
meet the one-year residency requirement set
by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty
candidate in the 14 May 2007 local
elections.The Court finds no merit in the
Petition at bar.
. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a
notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already

effectively renounced his American citizenship,

keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.

The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed

orders of the COMELEC and the Court of
Appeals and annulled the election of the
respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's
immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted
an
abandonment
of
his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Being a green card holder, which was proof that
he was a permanent resident or immigrant of
the United States, and in the absence of any
waiver of his status as such before he ran for
election on January 18, 1988, respondent was
held to be disqualified under 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas
Pambansa
Blg.
881).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defedant has complied with
the residency requirement for elective
positions.
RULING:
Yes, the defendant solely complied the
residency requirements for elective position.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225
governs the manner in which a natural-born
Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine
citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and
liabilities under such circumstances. A close
scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does
not at all touch on the matter of residence of
the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its
provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no
residency requirement for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it
mention any effect of such reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship on the
current residence of the concerned naturalborn Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225
treats citizenship independently of residence.

This is only logical and consistent with the

general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship.
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to
stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full
one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local
elections so that he could be considered a
resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has
previously ruled that absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected, does not constitute loss
of residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even
with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually
present in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at
least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14
May 2007 local elections. Even if length of
actual stay in a place is not necessarily
determinative of the fact of residence therein, it
does strongly support and is only consistent
with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to
establish residence/domicile in the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this
Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May
2006 only to comply with the one-year
residency requirement, so Ty could run as a
mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007
elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court
did not find anything wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an
elective post, for as long as he is able to prove
with reasonable certainty that he has effected a
change of residence for election law purposes
for the period required by law. As this Court
already found in the present case, Ty has
proven by substantial evidence that he had
established
residence/domicile in
the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior
to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he
ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor
and in which he garnered the most number of
votes.

To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification,

Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving
effect to the apparent will of the people would
ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions
that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed
to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to
be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant
Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.