Value in Ethics: Lonergan Perspective

Brian Cronin
Value Ethics:
A Lonergan Perspective.
Contents
Preface / [1]
Introduction / [5]
Chapter 1 Why A Value Ethics? / [21]

1 Introduction / [22]
2 Natural Law Ethics [24]
2.1 Historical Sketch / [25]
2.2 Evaluation / [28]
3 Virtue Ethics / [32]
4 An Ethic of Feeling / [40]
5 An Ethic of Reason: Kant / [48]
6 An Ethics of Value and Valuing / [54]
7 The Present Situation / [58]
8 Why a Value Ethics: Stages of Meaning / [64] [vi]
Chapter 2
Method in Value Ethics / [77]
1 Method and Methods / [78]

2 Self-Appropriation of Cognitional Structure / [82]
Value Ethics
2.1 Invariant Set of Interrelated Cognitional Activities / [83]

2.2 Immanent and Operative Norms / [88]
3 Consciousness / [90]
3.1 The Experience of Being Conscious / [91]
3.2 Levels of Consciousness / [96]
3.3 Reflexive Consciousness / [98]
3.4 Misconceptions of Consciousness / [104]
4 Self-Appropriation as Method in Ethics / [107]
4.1 Resources for Intentionality Analysis / [109]
4.2 Content to Activities / [115]
4.3 Activities to Norms / [117]
5 What Kind of Ethics will Emerge? / [117]
Chapter 3
The Question of Value Arises / [123]
2 Context of Question of Value / [127]
2.1 Remote Context / [127]
2.2 Proximate Context / [129]
3 Characteristics of Questions of Value / [131]
3.1 Arises Spontaneously / [131]
3.2 Arises from the Beginning / [132]
3.3 Arises in every Culture / [133]
3.4 Arises at every Stage of History / [133]
3.5 Unavoidable / [134]
4 Intentionality of the Value Question / [136]
5 Ordering of Value Questions / [143]
5.1 A Scale of Values? / [143] [vii]
Contents
5.2 Vital Values / [145]

5.3 Social Values / [146]
5.4 Cultural Values / [148]
5.5 Moral or Personal Values / [148]
5.6 Religious Values / [149]
5.7 Sublation in Scale of Values / [149]
5.8 Terminal and Originating Values / [153]
5.9 Values and Disvalues / [154]
6 Specifying Moral Values / [154]
6.1 Stating the Problem / [155]
6.2 Stating the Solution / [158]
Chapter 4
Deliberative Insight / [171]
2 Learning from Aristotle / [176]
3 Lonergan on Deliberation / [178]
3.1 Deliberative Insights Primary Sources / [179]
3.2 Deliberative Insights Secondary Sources / [183]
4 Knowledge of Reality Especially Human Reality / [185]
5 Deliberative Insight Systematic Presentation / [187]
5.1 Deliberation as Insight / [188]
5.2 Structure of Deliberative Insight / [189]
5.3 Content And Criteria / [190]
5.4 Valuing Things / [191]
5.5 Scale of Values / [193]
5.6 Deliberative Insights in Moral Philosophy / [196]
Value Ethics
5.7 Link between Evidence and Conclusion / [200]

5.8 Sufficiency and Relevance of Evidence / [200]
5.9 Unifies and Organizes / [210]
5.10 Understanding in Three Modes / [202]
6 Conclusion: Is there a Deliberative Insight? / [203] [viii]
Chapter 5
Lonergan on Feelings / [209]
2 Learning from History / [213]
2.1 Aristotle on the Emotions in the Ethical Life / 213]
2.2 Place of Feelings in Ethics The Empiricists / [219]
3 Lonergan on Feelings Historical Sketch / [220]
3.1.1
Up to Insight (1953) / [221]
3.1.2
The Desire to Know / [221]
3.1.3
Interference of the Biases / [225]
3.1.4
The Possibility of Ethics / [228]
3.2
From Insight to Method and Beyond / [232]
3.2.1
Influence of Max Scheler (1874-1928) / [233]
3.2.2
Influence of Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977) / [237]
3.2.3
Feelings in Method A Summary / [239]
4 Broadening our Notion of Feeling / [245]
Chapter 6 Self-Appropriation of Feelings and Values / [255]

2 Intentional and Non-Intentional / [258]
3 Intentional Response to Value / [260]
3.1 First Approximation: Pure Desire to Know / [261]
3.2 Second Approximation: Transcendental Notion of value / [264]
Contents
3.3 Third Approximation: Transcendental Precepts / [267]

3.4 Intentional Response to Value / [271]
3.5 Characteristics of Intentional Response to Value / [272]
4 Intentional Response to Agreeable or Disagreeable / [277]
4.1 Unity of Human Person / [277]
4.2 Animal Sensitivity / [278]
4.3 Human Sensitivity / [282]
4.4 Characteristics of Intentional Responses to Agreeable or Disagreeable / [285]
[ix]
5 Complex Interrelationships / [286]
5.1 Principles of Integration A Summary / [286]
5.2 Spiritual Feelings Sublate Sensitive Feelings / [289]
5.3 The Spiritual Orients Sensitive Feelings / [292]
5.4 The Spiritual Transforms Sensitive Feelings / [294]
5.5 Anger as an Illustration / [296]
5.6 Development and Decline of Feelings / [298]
5.7 Education of Feeling of Moral Responsibility / [299]
6 Hierarchy of Feelings / [303]
7 Unity of Cognitive and Affective Components / [311]
8 How do you Feel about That? / [316]
9 Summary of a Position / [319]
Chapter 7
Deciding Free and Responsible / [325]
2 Identifying Deciding and Choice / [327]
2.1 What Deciding is not / [330]
2.2 What Deciding is / [334]
Value Ethics
2.3 Emergence and Differentiation / [338]

2.4 Levels of Decision-Making / [341]
3 Priority: Values and Decisions / [343]
3.1 Myth of Isolated Reason / [343]
3.2 Myth of Arbitrary Will / [345]
3.3 Some Priorities / [347]
3.4 Good Will / [352]
3.5 Good Decision-Making / [355]
4 Responsible Freedom / [356]
4.1 Towards a Definition of Freedom / [356]
4.2 Limitations to Human Freedom / [361]
4.3 Freedom as Achievement / [367]
4.4 Are we Really Free? / [368] [x]
5 Choice of Evil / [371]
5.1 What is Evil? / [371]
5.2 Stages of Moral Decline / [373]
Chapter 8 Moral Self-Transcendence / [383]

2 Self-Transcendence / [385]
2.1 Immanence to Self-Transcendence / [386]
2.2 Self-Development to Self-Transcendence / [388]
2.3 Development and Conversion / [390]
3 Understanding Moral Development / [391]
3.1 Understanding Development / [392]
3.2 Lonergan on Moral Development / [398]
3.3 Kohlberg on Moral Development / [399]
Contents
3.4 Critique of Kohlberg / [405]

4 Understanding Moral Conversion / [409]
4.1 General Notion of Conversion / [409]
4.2 Moral Conversion / [413]
5 Moral Self-Transcendence / [419]
Chapter 9 Judgments of Value / [427]

1 The Four Components / [429]
1.1 Four Components Summary / [429]
1.2 Unity on the Part of the Subject / [432]
1.3 Structure and Content / 433]
1.4 The Four Causes / [436]
2 Characteristics of Judgments of Value / [438]
3 Various Kinds of Judgments of Value / [443]
4 Criteria Operating in Moral Judgments: Conscience / [447]
4.1 What is Conscience? / [449]
4.2 How does Conscience Work? / [452]
[xi]
4.3 Development and Decline of Conscience / [458]

5 Objectivity of Moral Value Judgments / [459]
5.1 Critical Realist Position / [459]
5.2 Absolute Notion of Objectivity of Moral Values / [460]
5.3 Do we Create Values? / [462]
6 Clarification by Contrast / [463]
Chapter 10
Promoting Moral Value / [471]
1 Foundations / [471]
1.1 Where do Values Come From? / [472]
1.2 Self-Affirmation as a Responsible Subject / [477]
Value Ethics
1.3 Not Open to Basic Revision / [478]

2 Value Ethics in Practice / [481]
2.1 Making True Value Judgments / [481]
2.2 Generalists and Specialists: Foundations and Applications / [483]
2.3 Laws, Virtues, Rights, Values / [486]
3 Teaching Moral Values / [489]
3.1 Pedagogy of Four Components / [489]
3.2 Way up, Way down / [492]
3.3 Teaching Moral Philosophy / [497]
4 What is at Stake? / [499]
4.1 Value of Human Person / [499]
4.2 Formulation of Laws, Virtues, Values / [501]
4.3 Global Ethics / [505]
Epilogue / [513]
Illustrations
Diagram One: Integral Cognitional Structure of Truth and Value / [82]
Diagram Two: Four Components of the Value of Judgment / [428]
Diagram Three: How Conscience Works / [453]
Preface
As students we were urging our professor of ethics to write an article on a
certain topic. His laconic reply was, Why add to the confusion? Confusion abounded
then in ethics in the sixties, and abounds all the more in our contemporary situation at
the beginning of the third millennium. There is confusion among the theorists and
academics about which system to follow, about what method to adopt, about what we
can know concerning good and evil. There is confusion amongst parents and teachers
about how values are to be taught, which values are to be preferred, where do these
values come from anyway. There is confusion on the world stage over our moral
obligation in the face of issues of war and peace, poverty and Aids, terrorism and social
justice, genetics and stem cell research, and the like.
Granted that, as Aristotle noted, you will never get the same precision in ethics
as you expect in mathematics, can we attempt to make some small contribution to
clearing up the confusion, to bring clarity, rather than adding to the confusion?
Penetrating to the root of the matter might help. Much confusion arises from seeking
ethical absolutes in the wrong places. My contention is that ethical absolutes are to be
found, not in formulated laws, not in lists of virtues and vices, not in systems of moral
philosophy, not in authority figures dictating to us, but in the ethical norms immanent
and operative in each one of us and unfolding in an invariant pattern of cognitional and
volitional activities by which we know moral values, we decide for and implement these
values. If we can find the source of moral values, then, surely we will have found a key
to distinguishing true from false values, which might enable us to teach values, and to
make ourselves and others better persons in a healthier society.
This text is designed to promote such ethical self-discovery. We have privileged
access to our own values, to our reception of values from parents and society, to our
own critique of values, our internal-[2]ization of values and our hesitant, partial,
Value Ethics
11
implementation of values in the concrete realities of life. This method does not provide
a simple, magic solution, but sets us on a slow, painstaking process of discovery of what
it is the be a free and responsible human person, motivated by moral obligation and
equipped with an ability to discern good from evil. We can learn to distinguish
authenticity from inauthenticity, genuine autonomy from spurious self-interest, true
operation of informed conscience from conscience as an excuse to do what you like.
Over forty years have passed since I was introduced to ethics by the professor,
reluctant to add to the confusion. I have been teaching philosophy during much of that
time, starting with the courses in the history of philosophy, which are relatively easy to
teach given the abundance of books and articles available, and moving on to the more
difficult challenges of systematic courses in the philosophy of science, epistemology
and metaphysics, where you take a stand and invite the students to do likewise. Finally,
I moved on to the most difficult of all subjects, the teaching of ethics, the knowledge of
good and evil, the making of ourselves as moral persons, the construction of moral
persons in a moral society. I did write a book on issues of cognitional theory and
epistemology which some people seem to have found helpful, as it is now in its third
edition.1 This text will bring the same method and approach to bear on the more
complex matter of value ethics. My original intention was a longer and more detailed
treatment of all foundational issues in ethics. I realized in the course of time that it is
better to concentrate on appropriating the foundational activities and norms, and to leave
the applications and elaborations of that base to wiser and better heads and hearts.
I owe a debt to our students who set the context for teaching and communication
and are always ready with a stream of searching questions, especially if the professor is
unsure of his ground and they sense a weakness. In that way it has been a collaborative
effort, where together we have explored what it is to be an authentic moral person in all
its complexity. I owe a debt of gratitude to Spiritan Missionary Seminary, where this
12
Preface
project was conceived and brought to [3] birth. I have been allowed to enjoy years of
absence to formulate this text, while others took on my work load.
I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Boston College, the Department of Philosophy
and especially the Lonergan Centre, which granted me a Fellowship for two years to
work on this project. I have to thank especially Father Joseph Flanagan, S.J., the
Director of the Centre, for his constant encouragement, as well as to the other members
of the Lonergan group for the stimulation and critique of emerging ideas. I am indebted
to Dr. Michael Shute of Memorial University for reading the manuscript and making
very helpful suggestions. My hope is that the text will promote clarity about foundations
of moral values and help to clear away some little of the confusion endemic to moral
discussion.
When is a book finished? When is it perfect? One can continue for ever
improving and perfecting, but then nothing would ever be published. I offer this text
painfully aware of its inadequacies in scholarship, in detail, and in poverty of
expression, but convinced that there is a view here on appropriating value judgments
from which many might profit.
Brian Cronin, December 2005
Note about the Author: Brian Cronin is an Irish Spiritan Missionary who has
worked in East Africa since 1972. After pastoral work in Nairobi, he was appointed to
teach Philosophy in Tanzania. Since doing doctoral studies in Boston College, he has
been teaching at Spiritan Missionary Seminary, P.O. Box 2682, Arusha, Tanzania.
Notes about Internet Edition: This work now being offered is the first Internet edition
of Fr. Brian Cronins second book, Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective, which comes
as a sequel following the publication of his earlier book, The Foundations of
Philosophy: Lonergans Cognitional Theory and Epistemology, which had been written
to introduce readers to the first half of Fr. Bernard Lonergans Insight: A Study of
Human Understanding. The print edition of this second work first appeared in 2006
and, like the first book, it appeared as a publication of the Consolata Institute of
Philosophy, based in Nairobi, Kenya (PO Box 49789). Hence, it is not too readily
available for purchase in Europe or America although orders for purchase can be placed
with the Newman Bookstore in Washington, D.C. The full postal address is as follows:
Newman Bookstore; St. Paul's College/Hecker Center; 3025 Fourth St. NE;
Value Ethics
13
Washington, D.C.; 20017; U.S.A.; tel. 202-526-1036. On Internet, Fr. Cronins book
can be ordered from the Newman Bookstore at orders@newmanbookstore.com.
In preparing this Internet edition, to synchronize the pagination in tandem with the print
edition for easy reference purposes, numbers within square brackets have been inserted
in the text to indicate where the pages break in the print edition, as in [267]. The Table
of Contents above has been similarly synchronized. The numbers cited within square
brackets indicate the pagination of the first print edition.
In preparing this edition, many thanks are owed to Mr. Anthony Russo who inserted the
pagination within square brackets to synchronize this Internet edition with the print
edition and many thanks are also owed to Mr. Kin Koerber who combined all sections
and chapters into a single document using MS Word.
Please note that if grammatical or typographical errors are noticed, it would be an act of
charity for you, the reader, to inform us of these matters so that appropriate corrections
can be made within the Internet edition. In closing, special thanks are owed to the
author, Fr. Brian Cronin, for permitting and encouraging the publication of this Internet
edition.
1
Brian Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy: Lonergans Cognitional Theory and

Epistemology, (Consolata Institute Press, Nairobi, 1999, 2005).
Introduction
The unavoidable fact is that we are continuously making judgments of value,
that is, knowing values and living our lives on the basis of these values. We distinguish
between good and bad schools, good and bad policies, honest and dishonest politicians,
good and bad actions. We function in society on the basis of these values. Most people
agree in condemning genocide, terrorism, world poverty, political corruption, child
abuse, etc. We have little hesitation lauding the values of democracy, freedom,
accountability, transparency, and condemning the absence of these values in a tyranny
or dictatorship. We are constantly approving and disapproving of aspects of our own
behaviour; we are exhorting our children to be a good boy and do what you are told;
we are chiding our friends for letting us down or losing their temper or thinking too
much of themselves. For the most part we pass these judgments easily, freely, without
any special effort and in many cases our evaluations are correct.
It is evident that sometimes we make mistakes. What we thought was a good
friend can turn out to be a fair weather friend. The politician we voted for turns out to be
self-serving and corrupt. The good school we chose for our daughter turns out to be a
disaster. But the salient point is that we can recognize our mistakes; we can correct our
mistaken judgments; we can readjust our evaluations in the light of further experience
and new data. What is this extraordinary ability we have to know good from evil; to
evaluate people, actions, policies and things, from the point of view of good, better, best
or bad, worse, worst?
Academics and philosophers have great difficulty giving an adequate account of
this ability to affirm judgments of value. The history of axiology, the philosophy of
value, is only about two hundred years old and was mostly confined to the
Phenomenologists and Existentialists. Nietzsche made prolific use of the language of
values [6] but usually in the context of unmasking ideological values, revealing the
Value Ethics
15
hidden motivations and feelings behind supposed evaluations. Relativists assert that all
our evaluations depend on our point of view, our culture, our age or sex, and that there
cannot be absolute, universal, true value judgments. Others are so sceptical about our
knowledge of truth that knowledge of values becomes an impossible dream. Others see
no need for this value language: we have our traditional moral laws and
commandments, we have our lists of virtues and vices; this business of values is leading
us into moral chaos.
My contention is that approaching ethics in terms of values, evaluations and
value judgments, represents significant progress in our understanding of morality.
Finally, we seem to have reached the core of the issue, the source of values; we can now
identify the activities and norms that allow us to make value judgments. We can identify
and isolate this ability that we have to make value judgments. From the ability to
recognize mistakes we can learn what is necessary in order to pass a true judgment of
value and know that it is true. What are the activities that we need to perform in order to
produce a true judgment of value? What are the norms that we need to follow to be sure
that it is an authentic evaluation? These are the two basic questions we are answering in
this text.
In a previous text entitled, Foundations of Philosophy,1 I outlined how we reach
judgments of truth. The text identified the interrelated set of activities which we perform
when we question something, understand what is involved, refine our concepts and
definitions and theories, proceed to ask whether there is evidence to assert their truth,
gather the evidence, line it up with the conclusion and, behold, the conclusion follows:
it can be affirmed and you know it is true. We explored in that text each of the various
activities, how they were self-assembling or unfolding, what criterion was operating,
how you reached a conclusion and whether it was certain, highly probable or merely
probable. We discovered that, yes, you sometimes make mistakes, but you are usually
Introduction
16
able to recognize the mistakes, correct them and proceed to find the correct solution.
What is this extraordinary ability that we have to ask questions, not knowing the
answer, put various ideas and examples together, combining knows and un-[7]knowns,
and end up discovering the answer and recognizing it as the correct answer? We have
this ability to know the truth, at least in some cases; to distinguish history from legend,
chemistry from alchemy, fact from fiction, science from humbug. It is of some
importance to know the truth in medicine, in mechanics, in politics, in philosophy. How
much more important in the field of moral values!
This text is an effort to extend the methods, procedures, style of that previous
text to the field of knowledge of values. We use the word 'values' freely nowadays, in
everyday contexts, in economic affairs, in politics, in education, in cultural studies, in
philosophy and religious studies. But it is difficult to define the notion, to pin it down,
to show where values come from, to distinguish values from disvalues, to elaborate a
justification for true value judgments. This text is about the subject asking questions
about the worth of something; sorting out evidence, examples, arguments, criteria,
definitions, and so on, that are relevant to a solution; putting it all in order; and finally
realizing what is the correct judgment of value. It is about all levels and types of value,
but especially about moral values, the values of the best way to live, the actions that are
right or wrong, the values by which we live our interpersonal lives. It is a text in value
ethics: an attempt to give a coherent and correct account of how we know values, how
we recognize our mistakes in the field of values and how we correct our mistakes.
Obviously, if you are already familiar with the earlier text, the method employed
and the background from which it springs, it will make it easier to understand this
foundation of ethics. Value judgments seem to presuppose correct factual judgments but
go beyond them; making a choice between different courses of action presupposes that
you understand correctly the range of alternatives available. However, a detailed
Value Ethics
17
knowledge of cognitional theory is not an absolute prerequisite for understanding this

text on ethics. It might actually work the other way round. If you become familiar with
the method of self-appropriation used in this text and learn the immanent source of
judgments of value, it should be much easier to return to judgments of truth and
appropriate the activities by which we grasp truth. [8]
Moral and Religious Values
Can you have an ethics of value without God? Is it really hubris for human
beings to aspire to a knowledge of good and evil, without invoking religious values?
Many who espouse religious values do not see the need for a defence of distinct moral
values. Religious groups normally teach moral values as part of their religious way of
life; religions provide powerful motives to live well, to condemn immoral behaviour, to
promote virtue and curb vices. Religions can have a strong influence on the moral
behaviour of people in the society; it can promote progress and prevent decline. Thus,
religious leaders and religious traditions are entitled to calls to discipleship, to follow
the beatitudes, to insist on rules of moral behaviour, to defend moral values. Any
religious tradition will call on its followers to a way of life based on belief in the tenets
of their faith, but will also usually include moral values. Why then write about moral
values as if God did not exist? Let us be content with a very brief answer to a very large
question.
Generally, I consider it true that religious values trump moral values. A religious
perspective is more comprehensive, more ultimate, and more profound, than a moral
perspective. By religious values I mean holiness, unconditional love, self-sacrifice, and
relationship with God, prayer, worship, spiritual life, and the like. Religious themes
such a salvation, grace, heaven and hell, redemption, faith, divinization, ultimate destiny
and meaning, are more comprehensive and important in themselves than moral values.
A religious perspective has its own legitimacy based on revelation, or scripture, or
Introduction
18
tradition, or faith; it appeals to religious authorities, Elders, Bishops, Imams, Rabbis, for
teaching, interpretation and guidance. So why should we not be content with the
teachings of religious groups on moral matters? The Catholic Church has always
claimed to be competent to teach both matters of faith and of morals. Can we rely on
religious authorities to uphold and teach moral values?
There are a number of problems. (1) No religious tradition is free from the
dialectic of authenticity and inauthenticity. There is no guarantee that a pronouncement
of a religious leader is automatically [9] progress rather than decline. Religious groups
are always on the road to renewal and repentance. (2) A faith which is not guided by
intelligence, understanding and reason can easily tend to a fanaticism, or
fundamentalism, or fideism, where there is no check or balance on the religious teaching
authority. A religious tradition which does not value human understanding can presume
to a knowledge for which there is no basis. How often have church leaders pronounced
on matters of social justice or economics or medicine, without bothering to become
proficient in these areas? Moral theology often surreptitiously invokes the methods,
principles, and procedures of a moral philosophy in its dealings with contemporary
problems. But it were better that they become good philosophers and acknowledge
openly these methods, principles and procedures. (3) Distinct spheres of competence
need to be recognized. Is it so long ago that the Bible was understood to be teaching
history, biology and astronomy? Do the Scriptures give you answers to contemporary
moral problems such as stem cell research, genetics, currency manipulations, how to
alleviate world poverty, the definition of marriage? There are numerous dangers
emerging if religious and moral perspectives are confused or compacted together. The
alternative to confusion is clear differentiation and distinction which does not mean
separation. We recognize the distinct sphere of religious beliefs and vales, but at the
Value Ethics
19
same time insist on the integrity, importance and validity of moral philosophy and moral
values.
Our world contains a plurality of religious traditions; each appeals to a different
set of beliefs, a different book, a different code of conduct; each has its way of worship,
its organization, its hierarchy, its authority. Although there is an increasing trend for
religions to dialogue with one another, they remain as different beliefs, different
priorities, different ways of life. In our contemporary secular and global world how are
we to teach, know, promote and agree upon simple moral values? On what do we base
our common values, our talk about rights, the institutions built on such principles, the
recognition that in come cases we are obliged to help suffering humanity and in other
case we are obliged to intervene to protect human rights? On what do we base our
discussions of abortion, stem cell research, war [10] and peace, tax cuts for the rich,
genetics, poverty, climate change, terrorism, detention without trial, trade imbalances,
homosexuality, definition of marriage, and the like? All these have profound moral
implications. They are each specialized areas requiring study, specialized research,
evaluations of possibilities and consequences, and moral evaluation. Many of these
issues are of recent origin or have been affected by technology, modern economies,
advances in medicine and scholarship; for many of them there is no ready-made answer
in the bible or religious tradition. We have to work it out for ourselves. We need an
independent, integral, methodical, critical ethics to forge a global community based on a
common vision of the value of each human person, working in cooperation, towards a
better future for the whole of humanity.
My point is that the field of human values has an integrity of its own. It needs to
be treated at its own level, using its own methods and procedures, reaching its own
conclusions, learning from its own mistakes. We do have the tools and capacities that
we need to know values. We do not need to appeal to the authority of a religious
Introduction
20
tradition to answer moral questions. Although the influence of religious teaching is

often beneficial, we cannot forget that religious leaders and traditions are also either
developing or declining; they too are called to constant renewal. We cannot totally
forget religious wars, crusades, inquisitions, witch-hunts, fanaticism, abuse of authority
and distortions of priorities, to which the religions are prone.
The choice is between differentiation and confusion. This differentiation of the
moral from the religious point of view needs to be made to preserve the integrity of
both. The religious point of view is valid as a faith, as a comprehensive world view
incorporating God, human destiny, salvation, revelation, providence, and the like. But
there is also a legitimacy of the power of reason; there is legitimate human knowing of
values. We can know in terms of experiencing, understanding and judging the truth on
the basis of sufficient reason. We can know by way common sense; we can know the
basic sciences, mathematics and the human sciences. We can know in terms of
methodology and philosophy. Finally, we can know about values, we can attain
knowledge of good and evil, and we can do so on the [11] basis of our own inherent
natural ability to seek, to understand and to know.
Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (1904-1984)
The inspiration for this elaboration of the ethical perspective comes from the
writings of Bernard Lonergan. His thought has profoundly changed me and the whole
structure and method and thrust of this book is a reflection of this. However, my
approach to Lonergan is not to repeat the words of a great thinker in scholarly detail but
to appropriate the method and ideas, make them your own, test them on examples, put
them into practice, and communicate them fruitfully to others. The power of his method
is that you can made it your own and work out the implications from there. This has
been my approach over twenty-five years of teaching and writing.
Value Ethics
21
For those who are not familiar with Lonergan, you will still be able to
understand and appreciate all that is said in this text. I am at pains to explain the method
and presuppositions and ideas as we go along. This text does not require a previous
familiarity with his writings. Obviously it would help. He is worth getting to know
because he helps us to know ourselves, both in the field of knowing fact from fantasy,
and now in the field of knowing values. There are an increasing number of introductions
to his thought being published.2 Perhaps this text will spur you to read more and perhaps
tackle his classic works of Insight 3 and Method in Theology.4
For those who have some familiarity with Lonergan's work, I offer this as a
modest contribution, hoping it will be a source of enlightenment rather than additional
confusion. Most of this text is very elementary, basic, Lonergan stuff. If it has any
originality or value it lies in the putting together of disparate pieces into a coherent
whole. Most of us struggle with the thought of this great thinker. We will eventually
have twenty-five volumes of the Collected Works Edition to cope with. One could get
lost in just trying to keep up with the primary and secondary texts that continue to be
published. But to get lost in texts would be to miss the point; for the point here, as
always, is appropriation; to make it your own, to recognize yourself in his [12] writings,
to take firm possession of you own native ability to know truth and value and to put that
into practice in a life well lived. Elaborating an explicit value ethics has been very
difficult. Whereas for cognitional theory and epistemology you have the richness and
detail of Insight, for ethics you have important principles and definitions, some
sketches, but no elaborate working out. I hope this will be a positive contribution to
fostering a much-needed value ethics.
For those who are proficient in Lonergan studies I offer this, not as a work of
scholarship, but as a work of elaboration, implementation and communication. It is true
that Lonergan never elaborated a systematic ethics in the same way as he explained
Introduction
22
cognitional theory in Insight. Yet he has made valuable contributions to an ethics in

chapter eighteen of Insight on the Possibility of Ethics, in Chapter Two of Method in
Theology on The Human Good and in Topics in Education.5 These contributions date
from different periods in his intellectual development and although crucial and correct,
they are somewhat incomplete and lacking specification. Thus, one of the aims of this
text is to work these central ideas into a coherent framework, to fill out the meaning of
crucial terms, to fill in some gaps, to specify with examples, to make a complete
readable text, a systematic presentation of knowledge of moral values.
I will be quoting from Lonergan at key points and referring to his various
writings. But this is not a dissertation on Lonergan's ethics, relying entirely on his every
word. It is an attempt to use the method of self-appropriation, to put things in order, to
elaborate clearly, to apply a method, to indicate definite conclusions. It will be easier if
you are already familiar with his thought; but on the other hand, this text should be
understandable on its own terms. I am conscientious in explaining the method, situating
it in the context of other methods, applying it step by step, systematically and slowly, to
build up a picture of the whole field. I feel it must be the aim of the Lonergan enterprise
to translate his thought into more digestible form, to encounter students, opponents, the
contemporary situation, to show what a valuable heritage there is for the betterment of
persons and society. [13]
Aims and outline.
Consonant with the previous work then, the starting point of this text on value
ethics is persons as they are. Our approach is inductive in the sense of starting from
actual behaviour, motivation, activities, whether good or bad. We start with the realities
of the moral life, the fact that as human beings we grow physically, psychologically,
intellectually and morally. Few would deny this, but can we identify the movement, the
Value Ethics
23
activities, the criterion of moral progress and, conversely, identify the realities of moral
decline? Most of us are a complicated amalgam of both progress and decline.
This is not a book of rules, neither of commandments, nor of what specific
actions should be done or not done. It is not a list of specific answers to concrete moral
problems or dilemmas. It is in the field of meta-ethics, as it is called, and does not
address specific examples except by way of illustration. We are concerned with the
foundation of ethics, to identify the contrary pushes and pulls of desires and
inclinations. Ethical rules appropriate to each area of human behaviour are desirable and
necessary. We hope to show how such codes should be worked out, rather then detailing
them ourselves. General moral norms can be identified fairly easily but specifying
detailed conclusions in areas like business or medicine may require the participation of
specialists. So we are rather weak on specific answers to concrete cases, but hope to
elaborate a method for finding the answer to all cases, in every situation, for all possible
subjects.
Nor is this a book about theory. Theories give coherent, abstract, conceptual
explanations of how or why things happen. There have been many theories of ethics,
moral philosophies, conceptual explanations of principles, deductions, definitions,
methods, conclusions. Some are highly elaborate, intellectually satisfying, impressive
systems or structures. But theories relate things to one another and so tend to abstract
from the moral subject in his/her concrete, complicated, ambiguous reality. Just as in
epistemology you cannot have a truth that prescinds from knowing subjects, so in ethics
you cannot have an abstract good that prescinds from moral subjects. Theories [14] are
valuable; they represent a stage in the objectification of moral value; but now we need
to return to the subject in all his concreteness as one of the terms of any system of
concepts, definitions or relations of an ethical philosophy.
Introduction
24
This is a book about self-appropriation of ourselves as moral persons. By selfappropriation we mean taking possession of ourselves, becoming explicitly aware of the
activities and norms involved in moral judgments and decisions; being aware of the
factors making for true moral judgments and the factors hindering, and making it more
difficult to reach true moral knowledge. Let me attempt a summary, chapter by chapter,
so that the reader can get an overall view, and also pick and choose what is most
interesting or relevant.
In the first chapter we give an answer to the question of why we approach the
questions of moral philosophy in terms of values. There have been many different ways
of systematizing the data of morality in terms of laws, virtues, feeling, reason, and
others, but a value approach seems to go to the heart of the matter. We give a brief
summary of these various approaches and evaluate them in terms of advantages and
disadvantages. Our purpose is to set off the distinctive approach of value ethics and how
this promises to give a foundation for ethics. We review the present situation as
represented in the various schools in the academy and the practice or lack of it on the
streets. We summarize the historical development in terms of a shift from common
sense to theory, from common sense and theory to interiority. It is time to make ethics
empirical, in the sense of starting with people as they are, learning from our innate
ability to make moral judgments, focusing on exact descriptions and explanations of
how we actually make good evaluations. Those who are familiar with the history of
moral philosophy and the contemporary situation might skip or skim this chapter.
In our second chapter we elaborate a method appropriate to a value ethics. How
is it possible to identify and define mental activities and norms? How can private mental
acts become the data for an inductive method? Some would exclude such an approach
entirely as impossible and unverifiable. I try to show that we are actually doing [15]
such self-appropriation whenever we describe our dreams, our feelings, our processes of
Value Ethics
25
thought, our state of mind, or the state of our conscience. Such elementary efforts can be
systematized, make explicit, and can become the basis of an empirical method that
studies not the data of sense, but the data of consciousness. This method can and has
been used in a cognitional theory and epistemology in the search for truth; now it is
being extended to our knowledge of values and decisions. The moral norms are
immanent and operative in a basic set of activities. The method needed to identify them
is a method of self-appropriation. Obviously, if you are familiar with the method
already, then, this chapter is unnecessary for you; it is written to those who are new to
such an approach and might find it problematic or puzzling.
In the third chapter we start by examining the question of value. We are looking
for the source of values and this would seem to be the question as it arises in concrete
situations. The importance of the question lies in the notion of intentionality: each
question intends an answer and so points towards the answer. The question motivates
the activities towards the conclusion. The question sets the conditions that are only
satisfied if the answer is correct. The levels of consciousness are distinguished by the
question for understanding, the question of truth, and the question of value. All normal
persons, at all times and places raise the question of values, distinguish right from
wrong, good from bad, true values from false values. The value question and the
process of evaluation actually pervade our lives: we are doing it all the time it might
help to recognize this explicitly. The general value question splits into different species,
when we ask about special classes of values and disvalues. This enables us to
distinguish between value, in a general sense referring to all values, and value in a
specifically moral sense. Our main interest is in this specifically moral meaning of
value.
Our fourth chapter considers how we reach an answer to the value question. If it
is knowing, then, it must be some cognitive activity, some kind of act of understanding,
Introduction
26
some kind of justification for the positing of an answer in a judgment of value. We draw
here on a parallel between the activities proper to knowing truth and the active-[16]ties
proper to knowing value. To know a truth we ask a question, assess the sufficiency of
the evidence for the conclusion, grasp this sufficiency in a reflective insight, and posit
the judgment. To know a value we follow a parallel procedure, asking questions about
values, thinking, understanding, assembling evidence and arguments pro and con, grasp
the sufficiency or insufficiency of this evidence in a deliberative insight, and then posit
the appropriate judgment of value. The structure of the judgment of value is similar to
that of the judgment of truth; the content truth or value differentiates the two
judgments. We are uncompromising in asserting that knowledge of values is a cognitive
activity, an act of human understanding, an act of intellect, and whatever role feelings
are to play, they cannot usurp the activities of understanding and knowing value.
What role do feelings play in our knowledge of values? Chapter five devotes
itself to a study of Lonergans writings on this question. It is a difficult and complicated
matter. Lonergans position evolved and his terminology shifted. He did not seem to
have reached a totally adequate position even in Method in Theology. But there is a
benefit from studying his struggle, as he is convinced of the positive contribution
feelings make to evaluations, but is not quite sure how to formulate this. We can benefit
from studying his development, noticing ambiguities and gaps, consistencies and
inconsistencies. As this chapter is largely an interpretation of Lonergan texts, it may not
be very enlightening to those already familiar with the texts and the problematic that
arises from the oft-quoted passages.
Chapter six attempts a systematic presentation on the role of feelings in moral
evaluations. It is consonant with the markers, distinctions and signposts identified by
Lonergan, but goes beyond them in filling in gaps and identifying more concretely the
feelings involved. There are a group of feelings which are indispensable to knowing;
Value Ethics
27
these can be referred to as the desire to know, the transcendental imperatives, the
notions of truth and value. These are deep, permanent, feeling orientations which initiate
the process of knowing, motivate the unfolding of the activities, point the activities in
the right direction and recognize with satisfaction when the answer is found. Far from
usurping cognitive activities, these feelings are a constitutive as-[17]pect of the
dynamism, the intentionality, the criterion and the content of our knowing values. There
are also sensitive feelings which might hinder and might help the process of knowing;
they might be in harmony with the deeper feelings or might not. In the virtuous person
the deeper and better feelings predominate and sensitive feelings have been educated to
fall in line. In the vicious person the deeper and better feelings have been submerged,
co-opted, suppressed, in the search for self-interested satisfaction of sensitive goals.
This single chapter can only outline a basic, consistent position on the role of feelings in
evaluations. Much elaboration and improvement is called for, but a basic coherent
position seems to have been reached.
Chapter seven distinguishes deciding from knowing, from desiring, and from
doing. Discussion of moral cases often conflates knowing value, deciding about values,
and the consequent implementing in action. In concrete experience it is often difficult to
separate them. Normally, good decisions presuppose good judgments of value, though
there are some exceptions. The goodness of decisions in themselves is the goodness of
freely and responsibly deciding for what is good. Such decisions can be deep or
superficial, permanent or temporary, extending to all areas or limited to some,
unflinching or hesitant. It seems better not to assign deciding to a level of cognitional
structure; first, it is not cognitional but volitional; second, all human activities that are
free and responsible flow from decision, including the very activities of experiencing,
understanding and judging. A little excursion into moral decline illustrates the results of
weak deciding for the good.
Introduction
28
Chapter eight describes the twin processes of moral development and moral
conversion, which are included in the process of self-transcendence. These processes
involve the whole person as knowing, as feeling, as deciding, as embodied, as doing, as
being. Kohlberg helps us to identify the stages of moral development. Lonergan helps
us to identify a concomitant process of moral conversion. It is the whole person who
decides, who constitutes himself by his decisions, who thereby constitutes himself as
criterion of moral goodness. It is the good person who knows and implements moral
values. [18]
In Chapter nine we deal with judgments of value, that is, knowledge of moral
values. We identify the judgment as an affirmation or denial that brings knowing to a
term: we take a moral stand, the moral question is answered, and the criterion of moral
conscience assures us that we are right. We apply the principle that genuine objectivity
of moral judgments is the fruit of authentic subjectivity, not a suppression of
subjectivity.
Having identified the activities and norms involved in moral knowing, Chapter
ten can only point to how this foundation can be developed in various directions. Some
guidelines seem necessary to indicate how these general conclusions can become more
concrete rules and guidelines to conduct. It can also be a foundation for a pedagogy at
all levels of moral development. Such a foundation should become an agreed moral
framework for tackling community, social, national and international global problems.
To emphasize that this text is about self-appropriation, we begin each chapter
with personal questions for deliberation. These questions are designed to help the
process of personal identification and appropriation of the activities and norms spoken
about in the text. They present some typical kinds of moral questions, dramas,
dilemmas, that we face in life. They invite you to stop and work things out for yourself.
They might help to point you in the right direction. If the source of moral values is to be
Value Ethics
29
found in a set of personal activities and norms, then, it would seem important to identify
what these mean in your own experience. Without that identification, we would be like
blind men talking about colour. If you do not find the questions and examples helpful,
perhaps you can think of others closer to your own experience and state of life. At the
end of each chapter I give my own suggestions and distinctions relevant to each of the
questions.
To summarize, the aims of this text are:
to promote awareness and sensitivity to the source of moral values in
ourselves; awareness of the activities and norms operating in coming to know values;
awareness of true as op-[19]posed to false values; awareness of the impact of values on
ourselves, our families, our communities, and our societies.
to give a justification and explication of the meaning of the moral dimension in
life, defending it from reductionism, rationalization, relativism and deconstruction.
to heighten awareness of dialectic of free responsible human person, pulled in
opposing directions by desires, appetites, longings, ambition, inclinations; struggling
between the search for real self-transcendence and the cheaper version that views
success, wealth, power, fame, or pleasure as self-fulfilment.
to provide a foundation for ethics: an intelligent, clear, comprehensive method
for deciding moral issues based on the value of the human person in all his/her
unfolding potential.
1
Brian Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy: Lonergans Cognitional Theory and

Epistemology, (Nairobi: Consolata Institute of Philosophy Press, 1999).
2
A classic in this field is: Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., Lonergan (Collegeville: The
Liturgical Press, 1992).
3
Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, (London: Longmans,

1957). 5th ed., ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of
Bernard Lonergan, vol 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).
4
Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972).
Introduction
30
Bernard Lonergan, Topics in Education: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 10

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
1
Why a Value Ethics?
The word 'morality' is the sort of thing that can be systematized in

different ways, and one can discuss at some length the value of the
different ways. Is morality conceived as a means to a summum
bonum, is morality conceived in terms of natural law, or is morality
conceived in terms of values? There are different approaches. They
are all useful in certain respects. I think that one of the most fruitful
ones is the approach through values, and I think that it is through
values that one arrives at something true about morality.1
Questions for Deliberation:
(1) Can you remember an occasion when you had to break a law in order to do good?
(2) Did an unjust law even impinge on you personally?
(3) Can you imagine a family husband, wife and four children living together
without any rules?
(4) "Rules are made for the guidance of wise men and the observance of fools". Please
evaluate this proverb.
(5) How do you teach a soldier to be brave?
(6) Would you want your children to be honest? [22]
(7) Would you be able to give an account of your own personal value priorities? Where
did these priorities come from?
(8) Do human institutions, e.g. a restaurant, a software company, a department of
philosophy in a university, have value priorities built into them?
1 Introduction
How do you go about solving a moral dilemma in which you have become
personally involved? It might be something like, how to deal with a person whom you
thought of as a friend, but you discover that he/she has been seriously unfaithful,
betrayed you or has accused you falsely. Do you fall back on the rules of thumb from
Why a Value Ethics?
32
your religious tradition, such as turn the other cheek, forgive and you will be forgiven,
an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, correct your friend and you will be blessed,
and so forth? Do you invoke principles of justice and reciprocity to show how you have
been unfairly treated and deserve recompense? Do you invoke the ideal of friendship
and wonder how a friend can behave like that? Do you allow your emotions to boil over
and lead you to seek revenge and retribution, perhaps by treating him/her in the same
way? Do you reason out the issue in terms of ends and means, distributive and
rectificatory justice, lawyers, suing, and compensation? Do you seek the advice of
friends, parents, priest, teacher, or counsellor? Do you think in terms of your own value
system, evaluating what harm has been done, assessing what is the best response, and
deciding to resolve the dilemma with the best possible outcome for yourself and your
putative friend?
You will probably find that it is quite difficult to articulate the procedure you
would follow, or have followed in the past. There are many alternative ways of
evaluating the various options in our moral lives. You may be quite confused about how
to deal with such an issue and at a loss as to how to handle it. Our minds are a residue of
various moral systems that have helped to form us in the past and parts of which remain
with us still. We have been bawled at by our parents and teachers to do this or don't do
that or else. We have been exhorted from the pulpit to be virtuous, kind, forgiving,
patient, [23] and just. Our culture and media encourage us to follow our bliss, seek
happiness and success even if it means trampling on your neighbour in the process.
Some say, 'look at the consequences, the end justifies the means.' Others say 'follow the
rules and the rules will keep you. Others cry, 'follow your conscience, and forget about
the rules.' Others will whisper, 'the only rule is to love; after that, do as you will.' Our
culture presents many procedures for solving moral dilemmas and they are quite
Value Ethics
33
different; different systems of judging right and wrong, different methods for working
out that is the right thing to do, different criteria for judging what is moral goodness.
We are confused because our culture is confused. The homogenous culture with
one language, one set of beliefs and values, one stable social and political system, the
same from birth to death, is long a thing of the past. Today culture is pluralist,
incorporating influences from many religions, languages, philosophies, value systems
and social systems. Our moral climate is shaped by the moral systems of the past; the
new procedures and methods of pragmatists, consequentialists, emotivists, rationalists,
relativists, deconstructionists, axiologists, and the like. None of these systems gained
universal acceptance but all have left their mark, each pointing us in different directions.
Our first task, then, is to take our bearings, to assess our present cultural
situation, to ask how we got into this mess in the first place, where did all these
influences come from anyway? Our present situation is a result of history and so we
look at history to learn from genuine achievements and to avoid the mistakes of the past.
This historical review is merely a sketch; it is not scholarship but pedagogy. What can
we learn from the procedures, the ideals, the methods, the innovations of different moral
systems that will help us to get our bearings today, and allow us to take a stand on moral
issues for ourselves in a coherent and critical manner.
Despite all the detailed ups and downs of history there does seem to be a
direction, a movement forward, a progression in thinking about morality. There seems
to be a general movement from law, to virtue, to values. There seems to be a movement
from an ethics of re-[24]straint, to an ethics of internalized values, autonomy, and
conscience. There seems to be a progression from observance of the law, to the self as a
moral subject, learning how to value correctly, how to decide freely and to act
responsibly. That is the brunt of our citation from Lonergan at the beginning of this
chapter; that there are various ways of systematizing moral data; that each has its
Why a Value Ethics?
34
advantages and disadvantages; but that there seems to be a special advantage in the
'value' approach, where we find something 'true' about morality. Such a suggestion
requires us to take our bearings in terms of how these systems are to be related and
evaluated. It is certainly true that there are many systems of morality, as anyone who
has looked through the ethics shelf in his local bookshop or library will attest. But are
these equally valid alternatives or are they mutually exclusive? Are some of them true
and the others false or are there degrees of truth or falsehood in the various systems? Is
there steady progress to be perceived in the later systems emerging from earlier or is
there a decline? Are the systems, contradictory, or contrary, or complementary? What is
so special about value ethics? These are the kinds of questions we seek to answer in this
first chapter in an attempt to orient our study in terms of learning from the past,
assessing the present and pushing towards the future.
Keeping in mind then that we are simply trying to get our bearings from history,
let us do a sketch of natural law philosophy, virtue/vice philosophy, rationalist moral
philosophy, empiricist ethics and how they come together to form the present situation.
Scholars of history should excuse the generalizations and simplifications as we are just
learning from history and not strictly speaking doing history. Each system will be
evaluated tentatively as we grope towards the meaning and implications of a moral
philosophy based on values.
2 Natural Law Ethics
There are two central ideas here, that of 'laws' and that of 'natural'. It is common
enough to think of morality in terms of laws, precepts, rules, commandments. We often
think of morality in terms of do's and don'ts: perform human actions which are deemed
good, avoid human behaviours which are deemed bad. It is a com-[25]mon sense
approach used by parents, teachers, philosophers, religious leaders and politicians, in
many cultures and eras of history. All this requires is a list of human actions to be
Value Ethics
35
avoided and a list of those that are commended. The good person we can recognize as
the one who conforms to the laws; the bad person as the one who breaks the law.
But where do these laws come from? How do we get this knowledge of good and
evil? The justification for a particular list of do's and don'ts can be religious or
philosophical. The natural law tradition claims that we can know these laws by using
our reason. We study the nature and final end of a human person and deduce from this
how he should behave in order to reach his final end. Historically, this natural law
tradition was closely linked with the Biblical tradition and a religious justification for
the particular rules and commandments.
2.1 Historical Sketch
The religious roots of this tradition go back to the Old Testament, to the giving of
the Ten Commandments to Moses on Mount Sinai. Here is a powerful symbol of the
rules carved out on stone tablets and reinforced by the authority of God himself. The list
of Ten Commandments was later elaborated by priests, scribes and teachers into
thousands of detailed prescriptions to cover nearly every aspect of religious, moral and
social life.
Collectively this teaching was referred to as the Torah, the Law. It actually
included religious precepts, moral laws, and regulations for hygiene, civil laws
concerning marriage, property, justice and finance.
It was a powerful system because it was backed by the authority of God himself:
to break these commandments was to disobey God to invoke his rage and punishment.
The system hinged on obedience to the Law which meant fulfilling all that the law
required and avoiding all behaviour that was forbidden. This emphasizes obedience and
requires detailed and clear laws and interpreters of the law. There were times in the
tradition when the law was regarded legalistically, narrowly, literally, slavishly; other
times when it was interpreted according to the spirit, recognizing the purpose of the law
Why a Value Ethics?
36
as primary [26] and interpreting the law as to its intent rather than its literal meaning.
The Jewish, Christian and Islamic religious traditions share these origins in the Old
Testament.
The first step in possibly secularizing this system of morality was taken by
Aristotle. Aristotle distinguished what is right by nature from what is right by
convention (N.E. 1134b20)2. There were a variety of constitutions and systems of law in
the various Greek cities depending on their history and needs. For the Sophists it was no
problem that laws should differ from city to city and by implication behaviour which is
wrong in one place is right in another. Aristotle accepts that conventions and laws vary
according to acceptance and the needs of each city, but he was not prepared to accept
that lawyers were totally free in writing these constitutions. Is there not a higher
criterion to guide the formulation of laws? Is there not a limit to what laws we can
make? Is there not a difference between just and unjust laws? So Aristotle appealed to a
natural right, which has the same validity everywhere and does not depend on
acceptance; these natural laws are immutable (N.E. 1134b24). There is a higher standard
of right and wrong, which does not change. He is formulating the notion that some
things are wrong in themselves and no conventional law can make them right; he is
reacting against the Sophist position of ethical relativism. Aristotle does not elaborate
on this distinction; he is more interested in virtues and vices than in laws.
The Stoics seem to have developed this idea of a natural law understood as
'acting according to reasonable nature'. Reason was the criterion of good or bad and not
emotion. However, they emphasized virtue and the intention of the activity, rather than
specifying actions as good or bad in themselves.
The idea of a natural law that could be formulated by reason was taken over by
the Christian Church of the Middle Ages along with much of Roman civil law and its
own developing Church Law. It was Aquinas who best systematized and articulated the
Value Ethics
37
basis of a natural law philosophy.3 He distinguished Eternal Law, Natural Law and
Human Law. [27]
Eternal law is God as exemplar cause: the laws of nature and human behaviour
existing eternally in the mind of God. God has a plan of how things should behave both
in nature and in human behaviour. These laws are embodied in the nature of things and
in the nature of man. Just as there are laws of nature by which fire behaves as fire, so
also there are natural moral laws by which human persons should know how to behave
as human persons.
Natural law is human participation in this Divine law. Natural moral laws are
embodied in man's nature. By studying human nature we can grasp how human beings
ought to behave. We can discover God's intentions for us by studying the nature of man,
his perfection, his purpose, his final end, and the means to achieve this purpose.
Aquinas considered the nature of man as a substance, man as a living being and man as
rational, in order to elaborate our teleology as human persons.
The primary precept of the moral law is to do good and avoid evil; this is
naturally known; it is known to everybody; you do not have to do any moral reasoning
to discover this; rather all moral reasoning presupposed this basic first principle. Using
this first principle we can study, for instance, the nature of marriage, the purpose of
marriage and deduce further moral principles appropriate to married life. Such
secondary precepts can be deduced also for justice, health, warfare, and so on; thus, you
can build up a code of moral behaviour appropriate for each area of human life. The
individual, using prudence, applies these precepts to the concrete situation to evaluate
what is right and wrong here and now.
Human law - also called positive or conventional or legal - is law for the sake of
order in the community and nation. They are dictates of reason, promulgated by a lawful
authority; they should be for the common good, they should be just rather than unjust.
Why a Value Ethics?
38
The intellectualist tradition of natural law, defining law in general as an

ordinance of reason, has continued as the foundation of Catholic moral teaching. The
Church claims the right to teach morals as well as doctrines and uses natural law
tradition as its philosophical basis. A clear example of natural law thinking can be found
in [28] Humanae Vitae.4 The bare bones of the argument can be stated as follows. The
nature and purpose of marriage and sexual intercourse is (1) to foster the relationship
between husband and wife and (2) to produce and educate children. Hence, of its very
nature every act of sexual intercourse must remain open in principle to the possibility of
conception. Hence, any artificial contraception frustrates the natural purpose of the act;
hence, it is against the natural law and is forbidden.
There is a minority voluntarist tradition which regards law as arbitrary,
emanating from the will rather than from reason, depending on the authority of God or
the State rather than reason. Scotus is usually considered as a medieval proponent of
such a view. Hobbes was, perhaps, its greatest proponent in later times. In the secular
world of today that view of law as arbitrary, an exercise of power, based on the will of
the people, not answerable to rational foundations, seems to prevail. However, there is
increasing interest in a rational basis for natural law inspired by the Nuremburg trials,
the United Nations work for Human Rights, and the International Criminal Court. Is
there a rational basis for saying that some behaviours are wrong in themselves,
regardless of where, when and by whom they are committed; and that they should be
punished?
The natural law tradition has a rich and distinguished history even though we
have reduced it to a few paragraphs. Our interest is not in the historical details but in our
assessment of the efficacy and validity of this approach to which we now turn.
2.2 Evaluation: Advantages
Value Ethics
39
(1) From a pedagogical point of view, the natural law approach would seem to
be the simplest, most direct and clearest way of teaching people how to behave morally.
It is particularly obvious in the education of children, who are not yet capable of
discerning the reasons for not lying or not stealing or not playing with razor blades. The
most expedient approach is simply to command, don't do it; you will understand the
reason when you grow up. So the simplest way to regulate good and bad behaviour is
to set out a list of rules of what to do and what not to do. Most families, most religious
groups, most in-[29]stitutions and communities keep order by having a clear set of
rules, which everybody knows and is expected to observe.
(2) This approach is reasonably effective; it produces immediate, palpable
results with a minimum of effort. If God commands, then, obviously the law is
important and cannot be questioned and obedience is called for. If the commandments
come from God, who are we to question, or to qualify, or to make exceptions? A parent
represents an authority figure for the child and again commands will usually be carried
out from fear of punishment or a desire to please.
(3) Obedience is the one important virtue in this schema. There is no need for a
long process of education, nor personal soul-searching, nor complicated moral
reasoning. You know where you stand; if you keep the law then you are a good person;
if you have broken the law then you are a bad person; there is little room for moral
ambiguity. If there is a clear list of good behaviours, the implication seems to be that
you just follow them and you are a morally good person.
(4) Compliance or non-compliance is easily verified when there is such a clear
set of rules. This allows for punishment and rewards. Hence fear of punishment and
desire for reward can be used as motivations to keep the law. The difficulty with vague
exhortations is that they are open to different interpretations. The advantage of specific
Why a Value Ethics?
40
clear rules is that there is little room for interpretation and it is clear to all whether they
are observed or broken.
(5) Natural law philosophy claims to have a solid rational foundation. It has a
coherent method, a way of proceeding; it can cope with new situations by applying the
basic method; it claims a uniformity that is based on human nature and hence
transcultural. It has a clear notion of right and wrong and preserves Aristotle's basic
intuition that some behaviours are wrong in themselves regardless of conventional law.
In the contemporary climate of relativism, natural law stands out in its claim to
objectivity of moral laws.
Disadvantages.
(1) The main disadvantage of an ethics of law or command would seem to be
that it is largely confined to the externals of behaviour [30] and misses out on essential
elements of intention, motive, responsibility, conscience and personal freedom. External
observance of rules may hide hidden motives, hypocrisy, doing the right thing for the
wrong reason. If external observance is all that is required, it can lead to a very
superficial moral life. External behaviour provides ready, verifiable evidence of
observance so it is tempting to be satisfied with that. But surely moral development
includes development of moral sensitivity, of an autonomous moral conscience, of
moral virtue and taking pleasure in doing good.
(2) Observance of law can never do away with the need for intelligence,
prudence and goodness in the application of general laws to particular situations. Laws
are of their nature general or universal. But the situation in which the law is to be
applied is always particular and concrete and unique. No matter how detailed you make
the laws there is still a gap between the law and the unique situation in which it is
applied. The act of applying the correct law to the appropriate situation in the right order
of priority requires both intelligence and rectitude. Aristotle recognized that knowing
Value Ethics
41
what is the right thing to do required the virtue of prudence, meaning, deliberating well
about matters conducive to the good life in general.(N.E. 1140a30) But he also
recognized the need for equity, which he defined as "a rectification of law in so far as
law is defective on account of its generality."(N.E. 1137b26) So applying laws to
concrete situations requires insight, prudence and equity. Circumstances alter cases and
every rule has its exceptions. Intelligence, goodness and discrimination cannot be
excluded no matter how many or detailed the laws may be.
(3) There are different kinds of laws, commandments of God, Canon Law of the
Church, natural law as a moral philosophy, civil laws, cultural rules, traffic laws, rules
of etiquette, local customs, regulations for hygiene, rules for keeping fit, and so forth.
Discrimination is needed to sort out which law is relevant, which one has priority, and
what has to be jettisoned. There are some rules that are more important than others; how
to balance them in a situation of conflict requires understanding and goodness. Further,
some laws are just and other laws are deemed unjust. Must you obey unjust laws? Who
is to say that a law is unjust? If something is legal does it [31] mean that it is also
moral? Is it a sufficient self-defence to claim that you were obeying the law or you were
following the order of a superior officer?
(4) You often find that moral laws tend to be negative. It seems to be easier to
define what not to do than what to do, to define what is wrong and immoral than to
define what is right and moral. The scope of what is wrong behaviour is perhaps
narrower and easier to specify that the scope of good behaviour. Parents' rules for their
children are usually a list of what not to do; 'Go and find out what Johnny is doing and
tell him to stop'. Many of the Ten Commandments are negatives. Moral laws tend to be
minimalist, defining the minimum necessary to avoid doing wrong. It is easier to list
what is forbidden, than what is required for living a good moral life.
Why a Value Ethics?
42
(5) Continued adherence to the mentality of obedience to laws actually hinders

growth in moral sensitivity and maturity. It is a characteristic of children to work by
such rules from their parents, their culture, their government and their church. But there
comes a time when they are expected to take responsibility for their own decisions and
lives. They have to sort out which of these laws continue to be relevant to adult life.
They realize that different criteria are needed to make good adult decisions. They grow
out of automatic obedience and ask what is the purpose of such laws. Moral maturity
seems to imply some degree of moral autonomy.
(6) Natural law, as a formal moral philosophy, is disputed on a number of
important points today. Does the authority of natural law come from the eternal law in
which it participates or does it stand on its own on the authority of reason? Is human
nature to be understood from a biological perspective or from a rationalist perspective or
from a holistic personalist view? What is this 'nature', which is rejected by empiricists,
existentialists, linguistic analysts, and situationists? Is this deductive method really
fruitful; should there not be more room for inductive method? Where do these
definitions of human nature, the nature of marriage, the common good, etc. come from?
Is it legitimate to move from the 'is' of nature to the 'ought' of moral laws, from fact to
obligation? Are laws to be under-[32]stood as arbitrary decrees of the will of the
powerful or are they dictates of right reason? How do we balance obedience to law and
the autonomy of conscience? Natural law moral philosophers propose different answers
to these basic questions.
The natural law tradition has been a pillar of moral teaching for millennia. It is
clear that there is something solid there in terms of asserting that some things are wrong
in themselves regardless of convention. However, the emphasis on formulated rules,
perhaps, leads to a neglect of motivation, conscience, moral autonomy and the problems
Value Ethics
43
of applying general rules to specific situations. How can we preserve what is good in
natural law philosophy and incorporate activities of personal evaluation?
3 Virtue Ethics
A virtue ethic systematizes the data of moral philosophy around a different
question. Instead of asking for a list of good and bad human actions, virtue ethics asks,
What is a good human person? What are the virtues to be developed and the vices to be
avoided in becoming a good moral human person? Instead of a list of rules about human
behaviour, we elaborate a list of virtues to be acquired and vices to be avoided in
becoming a mature moral person. Virtue ethics then focuses on the definition of the
virtues and vices, the education or discipline necessary to become virtuous, the
difficulties encountered and the end to be achieved. Educators and parents
spontaneously use this approach when they appeal to their charges 'to be brave', 'don't be
selfish', 'control your temper', 'act your age', etc. This tradition also has a respectable
historical pedigree and the dominant figure here is also Aristotle.
For Aristotle ethics is a subordinate part of politics. Politics asks, What is the
best way of organizing the polis in terms of leadership, constitution, good civic order,
the best system of education, and so on? Given that context, ethics asks, What is the
best way of life for the individual person in the city state? What is the best kind of life
for [33] the free citizen? What is his final end? Where is happiness to be found? What
are the virtues that he should strive for? What kind of a person should he strive to
become? Can we define this ideal person, this ideal way of living? He answers these
questions in terms of defining and dividing virtues and vices, but first he has to be clear
about basic terms and relations.
Socrates and Plato had tried to define piety, courage, justice and other virtues
but in most cases they seemed to fail. Probably they failed because they tried to define
Why a Value Ethics?
44
these virtues in isolation, without having set a context or procedure for the effort.
Aristotle does not make the same mistake and so his first task in the Nicomachean
Ethics is to define the scope of ethics, the notion of happiness, the purpose of man, his
final end, the function of man; finally, virtue and vice, and ultimately the particular
virtues and vices individually. The advantage of this procedure is that you set up a
system of terms and how they relate to one another. He is moving from descriptive to
explanatory relations. Happiness is contrasted with pleasure; virtue is set off against the
vices by excess and defect; end is distinct from means; potency is related to act, etc.
Aristotle's approach to ethics is called 'eudaemonist', meaning orientated
towards happiness, determined by the end of seeking for happiness. His ethics is also
called teleological, meaning operating in terms of a final end. Aristotle clearly thinks of
man becoming. His basic metaphysical categories are potency and act. He sees humans
as developing from potentiality to actuality, childhood to adulthood and changing all
through life. We are not born actually virtuous; we are born with a potentiality to
become virtuous or vicious. He realizes that the main categories to be dealt with in this
struggle to become a good human person are happiness and pleasure. Happiness by
definition is the final end of man. It is that which is chosen for its own sake and for the
sake of which everything else is chosen. It is never a means but always an end; it seems
to be both a subtle feeling and a state of mind. It seems to mean a kind of selffulfilment. Jonathan Barnes says, "The notion of eudaimonia is closely tied, in a way in
which the notion of happiness is not, to success: the eudaimon is the man who makes a
success of his life and actions, who realizes his [34] aims and ambitions as a man, who
fulfils himself."5 The happiness that Aristotle is talking about is a total selftranscending self-fulfilment of every aspect of the person; it is not to be confused with
the happiness of modern usage, which is often the same as pleasure.
Value Ethics
45
He defines virtue as "a purposive disposition, lying in a mean, that is relative to

us and determined by a rational principle and by that which a prudent man would use to
determine it." (N.E.1107a1) A virtue is a disposition or a habit; you could call it an
inclination, a spontaneous tendency, an orientation. It is built into the chemistry, the
biology, the emotions, the psychology, the mind of the person. Virtue is a mean
between two extremes: Aristotle hits on this trick of defining the virtues by contrasting
them with two flanking vices, one by excess and one by deficiency. In this way he is
able to work out a table of the virtues flanked by their corresponding two vices. A
simple example is bravery, which is a mean between cowardice and foolhardiness in the
context of fear and danger. The coward is vicious because of deficiency; he has no
control of fear in the face of danger and runs away. The foolhardy person is vicious
because of excess; he overcomes his fear completely so that he does foolish things
regardless of the danger. This helps to set up the system of terms and relations where
the terms define the relations and the relations define the terms. The vices help you to
understand the virtue; and understanding the virtue helps you to understand the vices.
Also the virtues are related to one another in various ways. So we are getting an
explanatory account of the virtues and vices.
So Aristotle builds up a picture of the good man by defining the moral and
intellectual virtues. The moral virtues he defines are temperance, bravery, generosity,
munificence, high-mindedness, ambition, good temper, friendship, humour,
shamefulness and a whole book on justice. Intellectual virtues are those which perfect
the intellect: science, art, wisdom, intelligence, prudence, deliberation, understanding,
judgment and cleverness. Be aware that these are translations of Aristotle's terms and
may not correspond with contemporary usage. [35]
He establishes a very important principle, that the good and wise man is the
criterion and standard of goodness. He looks for this standard not outside in laws or
Why a Value Ethics?
46
books, or traditions or beliefs or analysis of human action but in the person himself. It
is the good man who knows best about goodness. His affectivity and psyche and habits
are in harmony with his principles and so the truly good is identical with the apparent
good. "For the man of good character judges every situation rightly; i.e. in every
situation what appears to him is the truth. Every disposition has its own appreciation of
what is fine and pleasant; and probably what makes the man of good character stand out
furthest is that fact that he sees the truth in every kind of situation: he is a sort of
standard and yardstick of what is fine and pleasant."(N.E.1113a30)
In book seven he deals with the virtue of temperance and the vice of
intemperance. He identifies persons who are weak-willed and those with self-restraint;
those who are tough and those who are soft; those who can control their appetite for
pleasure and those who cannot.
Book eight and nine Aristotle devotes to friendship, which he considers a kind
of virtue. There is (1) friendship of utility, based on business, trade, practical cooperation; (2) friendship of pleasure, where you get pleasure out of a person's company,
e.g. a witty person who tells interesting and amusing stories attracts friends; (3)
friendship of goodness is real friendship which Aristotle highly praises and values. It is
a kind of love of one another, unselfish and enduring.
In the final book ten, Aristotle considers the question of what is the highest
perfection of man, what kind of life is the most virtuous, the most pleasant and the
happiest. He has no doubt that it is a life of contemplation by which he means, wisdom,
philosophy, study of first philosophy, thinking about the highest things namely God. It
is in these activities that man reaches his peak and is at the same time happiest and
attains the highest pleasure. He speaks of intellect as the 'divine spark' in us. This is
certainly a reflection on the life of Aristotle himself, who surely devoted most of his
time to philosophy and got the greatest pleasure out of it. He had the habit of wisdom;
Value Ethics
47
the [36] sign that you have the habit is that you do it spontaneously and with pleasure.
Perhaps, our own experience differs from that of Aristotle because we have not got the
habit of studying we do not get pleasure from it. For us it is a struggle; we are inbetween; we seek our pleasures in more accessible forms.
Aristotle's method of doing ethics, then, can be summed up briefly in the
following manner. First, establish the basic purpose of human nature, the final end of
man, get a clear notion of the target he is aiming at. Then, we ask what kind of qualities
will man need to achieve that perfection. These qualities are the virtues to be attained
and the vices to be avoided and this gives us a picture of the good man growing towards
his final end. The good life is a life of moral and intellectual virtue, justice and
friendship. The fullness of happiness and the most pleasure is to found in contemplation
of the divine. The ten books of the Ethics give us a systematic, explanatory, theoretical
account of the moral life.
Aristotle started a tradition of doing morality in terms of defining virtues and
vices. He presents a high vision of what it is to be a human person. It is a classic in the
tradition of moral philosophy because it is so well written, so coherent and detailed, so
sensible in terms of keeping his feet on the ground, and so rich in its appreciation of
virtue and vice.
The Christian tradition as well as adopting a natural law approach, has also
invoked the virtue/vice morality. Many of the exhortations of the New Testament are
framed in that way praising virtues such as patience, humility, forgiveness, kindness,
love, trust, bravery etc. Much preaching is based on the vices to be avoided, the
attitudes that are evil, and the bad habits that will be punished. It is very natural to
invoke this approach of praising the virtues and condemning the vices.
Aquinas, as well as having a Natural law philosophy, also devotes much of his
writing to defining virtues and vices; about two thirds of the Summa Theologiae is
Why a Value Ethics?
48
devoted to the virtues. He elaborates considerably on Aristotle while accepting most of

what Aristotle has to say. As well as the moral and intellectual virtues we also have the
theologi-[37]cal virtues, the infused virtues of faith, hope and charity. The Catholic
tradition continues to invoke the virtue tradition in its spirituality, its moral teaching, its
preaching and exhortation.
After lying neglected for centuries, Aristotle and virtue ethics seems to be
undergoing a current revival.6 To counteract contemporary confusion about the basis of
moral obligation, it is easy to invoke the virtues, which are unquestionably desirable,
and the vices, which are equally obviously to be condemned. In reply to contemporary
emotivism, MacIntyre invokes the tradition of Aristotle's virtue/vice ethics. He
considers that we have lost an integral understanding of the good life as conceived by
Aristotle but claims that this intelligibility can be retrieved with effort. "My own
conclusion is very clear..the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a way that
restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and
commitments."7
Again, we have but sketched the bare bones of the history of a virtue ethics with
a view to taking our bearings, appropriating the achievements of the past and learning
from their failures. Let us now evaluate this tradition, this procedure, and this approach
to systematizing the data of morality.
(1) A virtue ethics seems to include many interior aspects of intention,
motivation, and human aspirations, that are not found in a morality that confines itself
to the externals of human actions. Virtue ethics focuses on the person: what kind of a
person? what does he stand for? how does he react? what can you expect of him? Thus,
it is more holistic than an ethic of rules of external behaviour. Virtue ethics focuses on
Value Ethics
49
what kind of a person we want to become, how character can be formed, how emotions
can be guided, how good habits are ingrained.
(2) Virtue ethics is effective in that it appeals to deep human aspirations. It
presents role models that inspire people to imitate their heroes, their saints, their ideals.
Aristotle in defining the virtues and vices was drawing up a picture of the great-souled
person, the ideal [38] model for that time and place. We spontaneously admire great
persons and want to be like them. It is very effective pedagogy to have such a model to
imitate. Children's stories put before them models of heroes and villains which inspire
their imitation and abhorrence. Literature and drama present us adults with more
sophisticated models for admiration or condemnation. Virtue ethics can be a very
positive force for good, in contrast to laws which often tend to be negative.
(3) Virtue/vice ethics embodies a good understanding of the dynamics of moral
education. It recognizes that we are not born virtuous; that virtue has to be acquired;
that feelings need to be disciplined; that good models, good ideals, good examples must
be presented. It is a positive, flexible approach to moral education. It recognizes that
there is such a thing as moral development, that it does not happen automatically but
needs to be nurtured. It does embody a vision of self-fulfilment of human potential. It is
very close to character formation.
(4) Aristotle gave philosophical respectability to virtue/vice ethics it is not just
pious exhortation. With Aristotle ethics becomes explanatory: we can talk intelligently
abut the purpose of human life, about happiness and pleasure, about virtue and vice,
about moral education, about voluntary and involuntary, deliberation, choice, wish,
feeling, etc. A positive development has taken place; his work is an example of the
permanence of genuine achievement.
However, we can also discern disadvantages and weaknesses in this approach to
systematizing morality.
Why a Value Ethics?
50
(1) There is the difficulty of defining the virtues. Even when Aristotle has
defined bravery, he still has to point out five kinds of behaviour, which look like
bravery, but in fact are not. Many aspects of behaviour do not fit the schema of excess
and deficiency, e.g., continent and incontinent, justice and injustice, friendship. Some
would question his principle that virtues are always a mean between two extremes.
Further, definitions of virtue seem to change. How do we define prudence today? How
do we define tolerance? How do we define justice? How do we define chastity? We
would hardly be satisfied with Aristotle's treatment of these topics today. [39]
(2) The question arises: does defining virtue make you virtuous? Does knowing
the Nicomachean ethics inside out make you virtuous? Does studying virtue make you
virtuous? Are virtues taught by instruction? What have we gained by defining virtue if
we have not become virtuous? In what way does instruction contribute to becoming
virtuous? Aristotle recognizes four situations where we know what is the virtuous thing
to do, but do not do it.(See N.E. 1146b5-1147b17) Plato seems to have identified
wisdom and virtue. Aristotle is more realistic, recognizing our weakness, our tendency
to rationalize, to convenient forgetting, and giving way to passion.
(3) Are lists of virtues and vices really foundational or are they simply another
form of relativism? Aristotle's list of virtues and vices represents his vision of an ideal
aristocratic Greek, from the city of Athens, in the context of that social, political and
cultural situation. In many ways it is dated and would not coincide with a contemporary
list of virtues and vices. It can be argued that each culture has its own models of human
conduct and hence this ethics would be relativist. The Spartans praised warlike qualities
and personalities; the Greeks lauded intelligent and wise persons; the Cretans wanted
business people, hardworking and money-making. Today, Americans, Africans,
Europeans, Hispanics, might each draw up their own lists of virtues and vices with little
unanimity between them. Does this lead to relativism? Are all cultures different? What
Value Ethics
51
do they have in common? It would seem that the virtue/vice approach is not ultimately
foundational. How do we pick our list of virtues and vices?
(4) To acquire a virtue requires effort to restrain ones inclination to pleasure;
hence it requires self-denial, discipline and character formation. From that point of view
it is difficult and unpopular in our modern culture, which seems to adopt a more laissezfaire attitude to personality development. Discipline, punishment, character formation,
restraining emotions, postponing gratification, instilling habits, and the like, are not
often high on the curriculum of schools or families.
(5) Aristotle still did not have a clear notion of the basis of moral obligation,
human conscience, freedom, personal responsibility, will [40] and love. In that sense his
ethics is not fully critical. There still seems to be something missing.
(6) You might question the principle that the good man is the criterion and
standard of goodness and virtue. You might criticize him that his ethics is too vague; he
does not give specific answers to specific questions about human actions. He simply
appeals to the virtue of prudence to apply general principles to concrete situations. But
yet the specific question as to which human actions are to be praised or blamed are
legitimate and he does not seem to be able to answer them. It is only the good and wise
man who will know the answer to that question. But where do we find the good, just
and wise man when we need him?
In conclusion, we can see that the virtue tradition has a valid and important
place in the history of ethics and in any pedagogy or philosophy of morality. We
distinguish and contrast the natural law tradition and the virtue/vice philosophy but we
can see that in many ways they are complementary rather then contradictory. Which
raises the question as to how they are to be fitted together? In what way are they
complementary; why are they so different in method, principles, definitions and
conclusions? What is the role of virtue ethics in the moral education of our children?
Why a Value Ethics?
52
4 An Ethic of Feeling
An alternative tradition systematizes the data of morality around the principle of
identifying the good with some specific feeling, such as pleasure, approval, efficiency,
or utility. This is more a grouping of philosophical schools than a single homogenous
tradition but we put them together for the sake of convenience. These schools have in
common the identifying of a single feeling that can be used as a criterion for
distinguishing right and wrong moral behaviour. The particular sensible criterion of
feeling chosen determines the method, the procedure, the principles and the conclusions
of the philosophy. This procedure yields concrete conclusions as to priorities, decisions
and actions in concrete living. In general it is an empiricist approach, excluding rational
judgments and abstract laws and appealing to the [41] sensible concrete data of the
experience of moral living. Let us conduct an overview of these schools, again not with
a view to advancing historical scholarship, but with a view to learning about the role of
various feelings in moral judgments and decisions and to what extent these feelings
give us knowledge of good and evil.
(1) Epicureans, Epicurus (341-270), also the Romans, Horace, Ovid and
Lucretius, explicitly defined the pursuit of pleasure as the final end of man. They noted
that animals naturally seek for pleasure and avoid pain and humans to a large extend
seem to follow the same example. They suggest that we organize our lives explicitly,
then, around the principle of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. This actually
requires a certain amount of ingenuity as certain pleasures often involve pain, e.g.
drinking too much wine can lead to a hangover. Pleasures are of different kinds, some
are more sensible, some more subtle and intellectual; pleasures vary in their intensity,
depth and duration. Discrimination has to be shown and life must be viewed long-term
and not just the passing pleasures of the moment. The slogan of 'eat drink and be merry,
Value Ethics
53
for tomorrow we die' does not give a fair impression of the Epicureans. Tranquillity of
mind was pre-eminently valued: if you are at peace with yourself and the world and if
you are not in pain, then you are happy. The good life involves being independent of the
ups and downs of fortune. They actually worked out a system of virtues, evaluated
according to their power in producing happiness. They also emphasized the value of
true friendship as a source of lasting pleasure.
This Greek/Roman philosophy of life emerged often in later times as variations
of Hedonism, sometimes as a philosophical theory, sometimes expressed in the
priorities and values of a way of life. Aristotle always considered that the masses and
the youth were led by the principle of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. There is
something very human and perennial about hedonism; it is not by any means dead;
there is a bit of the hedonist in all of us. It does place the attraction of pleasure and the
avoidance of pain at the very centre of moral evaluations in that it gives coherence to
a way of life. [42]
At some later point we will distinguish happiness and pleasure, and the role they
play in the moral life. I will suggest that there is some parallel with the distinction we
make between value and satisfaction, when we consider moral conversion.
(2) Moral Sense Theorists. This group of moral philosophers focused on
psychological analysis of the role of various feelings in the moral life. Anthony Ashley
Cooper (Lord Shaftesbury), (1671-1713), Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) and
Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747) are classified as Moral Sense theorists because of their
shared conviction that there is a moral sense by which we know right from wrong.
Shaftesbury reacted against the pessimism of Hobbes view of man as a wolf to man.
He emphasized that generous affections for the good of others leads to happiness; that
goodness lies in the proper balance of affections; the moral sense inclines us to do good.
Bishop Butler distinguished three levels of feeling, the lowest being affections and
Why a Value Ethics?
54
passions, the second being self-love and benevolence, the third moral sense and
conscience. Hutcheson defined the moral sense as the faculty of perceiving moral
excellence and its supreme objects. The aesthetic sense gives an immediate intuition of
the beautiful; the moral sense gives an immediate intuition of the good, namely, an
immediate, direct, simple perception of the good.
(3) The Classical British Empiricists. Empiricists claim that all knowledge is
really a form of sensation or laws of the imagination. How can ethical statements be
subsumed into this approach? How are statements about right and wrong, good and bad
to be verified in sensation? Let us take David Hume (1711-1776) as perhaps the most
radical of the classical British empiricists as an example. In his, Enquiry Concerning
the Principles of Morals, Hume uses empirical method to describe the workings of the
moral life; just as Newton has explained the movements of the planets, using the same
method Hume set out to explain moral experience. He discourses on the feeling of
benevolence, the usefulness of justice for order in society, deals with self-love, merit,
approval and disapproval. He is describing why we act, how we respond to sentiment,
how we come to have beliefs about right and wrong. He admires cheerfulness, courage,
tranquil-[43]lity, benevolence, politeness, wit, ingenuity, utility, happiness. But when it
comes to the crunch, whether we know right from wrong by reason or by feeling, Hume
unequivocally opts for feeling: "The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It
maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever
mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and
vice the contrary."8 "It appears evident, that the ultimate ends of human actions can
never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to
the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual
faculties."9 Approval or disapproval knowing certain behaviours to be right or wrong
Value Ethics
55
are matters for sentiment not for reason. In his view, moral perceptions are not to be
classed with the operations of the understanding but with tastes or sentiments.
(4) Utilitarianism. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) did not invent the principle of
utility; what he did was to expound it explicitly and universally as the basic principle of
both morals and legislation. The principle of utility judges human actions in terms of
their consequences in producing pleasure or pain. His presumption was that every
human being seeks by nature to attain pleasure and avoid pain, a psychological
hedonism. Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,
pain and pleasure. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every
effort we make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.
Right actions are those which tend to increase the sum total of pleasure while wrong
actions are those which tend to diminish it. From this he formulates the greatest
happiness principle: the right end of human action is to seek the greatest happiness of
the greatest number of those involved in the question. He provides a hedonistic calculus
to help work out the sum total of pleasure involved in alternative courses of action. He
takes account of factors such as intensity of pleasure, duration, certainty or uncertainty,
propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, purity and extent. Government aims at the
harmonisation of interests to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number. [44]
(5) Logical Positivism and Linguistic Analysis. This group of philosophers
question the precise meaning of ethical statements and analyze the propositions that
make up a moral philosophy. We will just consider briefly two examples of this trend.
G.E. Moore (1873-1958) published Principia Ethica in 1903 in which he
famously declared that 'good' is indefinable, by which he seems to have meant that it
cannot be explained in any other more basic terms or reduced to any other notion. This
gives him a weapon to criticize most of his predecessors who tried to explain moral
goodness in terms of happiness, pleasure, utility, consequences, etc. The notion of the
Why a Value Ethics?
56
good is like the notion of yellow; it is simple, direct, immediately perceptible, and very
difficult to define or express in other terms. To explain 'good' in terms of pleasure is to
commit the naturalist fallacy, which is an illegitimate transition from an 'is' statement to
an 'ought'. This is always illogical and never possible; if the premises only contain
factual statements, the conclusion cannot contain statements of value or obligation. The
good is one thing and pleasure is another. We perceive goodness directly, just as we
perceive the colour yellow; we cannot confuse it with anything else.
A.J. Ayer published his Language, Truth and Logic in 1936.10 He presumes that
metaphysical statements are meaningless because they cannot be verified by reference
to sensible experience. Can the statements of ethics be saved from the same critique?
This is how he deals with the question.
We shall set ourselves to show that in so far as statements of value are
significant, they are ordinary 'scientific' statements; and that in so far as
they are not scientific, they are not in the literal sense significant, but are
simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false. 11
A strictly philosophical treatise on ethics should therefore make no
ethical pronouncements. But it should, by giving an analysis of ethical
terms, show what is the category to which all such pronouncements
belong.12
We begin by admitting that the fundamental ethical concepts are
unanalyzable, inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can [45]
test the validity of the judgements in which they occur...We say that the
reason why they are unanalyzable is that they are mere pseudo-concepts.
The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its
factual content. Thus if I say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing
that money,' I am not stating anything more that if I had simply said,
'You stole that money.'...I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of
it.13
In fact we may define the meaning of the various ethical words in terms
both of the different feelings they are ordinarily taken to express, and
also the different responses which they are calculated to provoke.14
So according to Hume, ethical statements in so far as they go beyond factual
scientific statements are simply expressions of emotions. The task of ethics is the
analysis of ethical terms and to show what categories they belong to. Ethical judgments
are simply expressions of emotions of approval or disapproval. His example of the
Value Ethics
57
proposition 'you acted wrongly in stealing that money' being equivalent to the factual
statement, 'you stole the money' plus emotional of disapproval, has been much
discussed and criticized since.
(6) Contemporary Emotionalism. MacIntyre seems to consider emotivism as
the greatest challenge to ethical philosophy in the present time. His own writings are an
attempt to response to this challenge to the extent that he is able. I would agree that it is
a common view and pervades our culture as well as the empiricist philosophical
tradition. MacIntyre describes emotivism in the following terms:
Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more
specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or
evaluative in character.15
For what emotivism asserts is in central part that there are and can be no
valid rational justification for any claims that objective and impersonal
moral standards exist and hence that there are no such standards.16
The empiricist tradition concentrates on the feelings and sentiments that enter into
ethical judgments, decisions and actions. Propositions, if they are to be true, must be
verified in terms of sensible [46] experience and so ethical statements must be verified
in terms of pleasure, or happiness, or approval, or utility. Let us try to evaluate this long
and diverse tradition in general terms of advantages and disadvantages.
4.2 Evaluation: Advantages.
(1) One can certainly say that this tradition has highlighted the role of feelings in
the unfolding of human moral codes, decisions and actions. It is certainly true that we
act out of emotion and that all our judgments, decisions and actions are coloured by our
loves and hates, our likes and dislikes, our pleasures and pains, our approvals and
disapprovals. It would seem to be very one-sided to think that we act on the basis of
pure or practical reason alone. The likes of David Hume and Adam Smith have given us
rich descriptions of the sentiments in the ethical life.
Why a Value Ethics?
58
(2) The empiricists attend to how people actually behave and how feelings do
play a part in their moral lives. They use empirical inductive method in their
observations. They penetrate behind the action to the motive, feeling, passion that
inspired it. They use introspection in sorting out these various feelings. They have
identified various feelings and shown how they enter into moral decisions and actions.
It would be foolish to exclude feelings entirely from a system of morality. It is a very
difficult area and we should appreciate their contribution to identifying and highlighting
the emotional side of ethics
(3) They remind us to be very precise and accurate in our use of language and
attend to the meanings, functions and use of propositional statements. They raise the
question of how to define and identify moral goodness, which is not as easy as it might
seem at first sight. We will have our own difficulties sorting out the various meanings
of 'good' and identifying the specific meaning of moral goodness. They provide a
background from which we can pose the question of the good very precisely. Above all
we now need to be clear on relating feelings and understanding, pleasure and happiness,
factual and value statements. [47]
Disadvantages.
(1) It would seem to be very one-sided to think that all moral philosophy can be
reduced to the level of feelings. Just as it is a major oversight in epistemology to think
that verification is to be found in sensation, so it seems a parallel oversight to think that
right and wrong are a matter of feeling good or feeling bad. What happens when
someone approves of robbery? Why are your feelings of disapproval superior to his
feelings of approval? Does an ethics of feeling stand up to critical analysis? The crucial
task would seem to be to assign feelings their proper role in moral judgments, decisions
and actions rather than to eliminate entirely critical questions, sound arguments and
good judgments.
Value Ethics
59
(2) It is hard to see emotivism as a basis for moral education. If the good is a
matter of personal emotional preference why should the preference of the professor be
better than that of the student? Which preferences are best? Are they all equal? Is this a
coherent position? What if my emotive preference impinges on your preferences? I find
it hard to imagine an emotivist professor returning home from lecturing in a department
of moral philosophy and then teaching his children that it is alright to steal, if they feel
like it; that they can lie, if that is their preference. Why should the preferences of the
parent be better than that of the child?
(3) How do you argue with someone who holds that you cannot argue? If all
morality is about feeling, why so much argumentation, so much demonstration, such an
effort to prove that this is the correct position? Surely reason has something to say
about this! If there cannot be reasonable discourse about moral principles, what are we
all talking about? How can empiricists claim that there can be no rational justification
for moral positions, when they are clearly making a rational justification for their own
position?
This review of various approaches to feelings in ethics enables us to pose some
questions, precisely and critically. (1) Which feelings are relevant to ethics as the end of
human life, or as the criterion of right and wrong? There is surely a prior question as to
whether pleasure, happiness, utility, virtue, and so forth are the final end of human life.
[48] (2) How do feelings know right from wrong? Is approval a feeling or a
judgment? Does conscience operate as a feeling or through feeling? In what way are
feelings a criterion of good and bad? (3) Are there good and bad feelings? Or are
feelings neutral? (4) Description of the influence of feelings on our decisions needs to
yield to discrimination and critique of the positive and negative contributions to feelings
in the moral life.
5 An Ethic of Reason: Kant
Why a Value Ethics?
60
It is not hard to find serious lacunae in an ethic based on feelings alone. Hence it
is not surprising that some moral philosophers went to the other extreme to establish an
ethics on the basis of reason alone. The prime example of this seems to have been
Immanuel Kant in his efforts to purify moral obligation from all empirical elements.
5.1
Historical Sketch
Kant focused on the basis of moral obligation. In his monumental Critique of
Pure Reason17 he tried to identify the pure, a priori elements of human knowing at the
levels of sensation, understanding and reason. He outlined the concepts of sensation,
space and time; the twelve categories of understanding including substance, cause,
relation, existence, etc; and finally the idea of the world, of God and of the immortality
of the soul. His concern was to strip human knowing of all empirical or a posteriori
elements and to identify the purely a priori elements. This was his Copernican
revolution: knowledge was not receiving forms from the world, but the mind imposing
a priori forms on our sense perception of the world.
His efforts in the field of moral philosophy follow a similar path. He is trying to
find the one principle of moral obligation which is purely a priori, solely from the mind
and which is totally unmixed with any empirical, anthropological or psychological
matters. There are many elements involved in moral behaviour; feelings, habits,
intentions, consequences, principles, values, etc. He is not concerned with these; he
does not deny that they are there and that they are im-[49]portant but his task is to find
the one source of moral obligation that will be the same for all. He wrote three books on
ethics, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Critique of Practical Reason
(1788) and Metaphysics of Morals (1797). The Groundwork starts from common
knowledge of morality to strip it step by step of empirical and a posteriori elements, in
order to find the a priori moral law. The Critique of Practical Reason is more detailed;
it begins with principles and uses them to organize and conceptualize various moral
Value Ethics
61
experiences; it is a complement to the Critique of Pure Reason to show the full scope of
reasonable knowledge. The Metaphysics of Moral treats of various problems of moral
judgment and choice in concrete situations. We will follow the outline of the
Groundwork.
He is looking for the basis of moral obligation; this is now called deontological
ethics. He claims that moral obligation is to be found in rationality itself. It is not to be
found in human nature, as the proponents of natural law would hold. Nor is it to be
found in empirical elements like utility, or happiness, or perfection, or feeling, but
simply in the a priori elements of pure reason.
He begins the first section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals by
saying clearly, "It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even
beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will. 18 This
is at the beginning of what he calls the First Transition, namely, the transition from the
common rational knowledge of morality to the philosophical. It is the first stage in the
purification of the common idea of morality and he is working towards his concept
based on pure rationality. The only ultimate good then is a good will. There are many
other things, which can be called good but not without qualification. The good will is
good without qualification or reservation. So many things like courage, resolution,
perseverance, riches, power, etc., can be called good but not without qualification
because they can always be abused. "A good will is not good because of what it effects
or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of
its volition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to be valued
incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought [50] about by it in favour of
some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the sum of all inclinations."19
To clarify this further he asserts that a good will is one which acts for the sake
of duty and not one that acts in accordance with duty. Here he is trying to purify the
Why a Value Ethics?
62
will from selfish motives and inclinations by stressing duty. We have an inclination to
seek happiness, but if actions are done for the sake of happiness then, even though they
are done in accordance with duty, they are not done for the sake of duty and therefore
have no moral worth whatsoever. If you keep the law simply for fear of being put in
prison, then, that has no moral worth whatsoever, and is not done for the sake of duty.
It is only those actions which are done for the sake of duty that have moral worth. The
difficulty here is that actions done in accordance with duty often correspond with
actions done for the sake of duty; consequently our motivation is often very mixed and
hard to sort out. But Kant's principle is clear and he tries to maintain it, even though he
realizes the difficulties.
To clarify further the idea of duty Kant introduces the idea of law. Duty is the
necessity of acting out of reverence for the law. The aspect of law that is attractive to
Kant is its necessity and universality. He is trying to find the basis of moral obligation
that is common to all humanity, at all times and in all circumstances and so something
that is necessary and universal is required. The essential characteristic of law is its
universality. It would seem then that the basis of moral obligation is some kind of law.
He then sets out to try to formulate this law and moves on to the Second Transition, the
transition from popular moral philosophy, to a metaphysic of morals.
He formulates the famous Categorical Imperative in this second transition. The
categorical imperative is an imperative or command, which binds of itself and by itself
regardless of purpose, end or consequences. He distinguishes it from a hypothetical
imperative, where there are conditions attached and where something is done simply to
attain some other end. You may work hard in order to get money; that is a hypothetical,
not a categorical imperative. You have a further end in view and you are bound simply
because you have to take the [51] means to attain that end. A categorical imperative
commands actions, not as means to an end, but as good in themselves. The categorical
Value Ethics
63
imperative declares an action to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to

any purpose or any other end. His first formulation of this categorical imperative is,
Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will
that it become a universal law.20
He gives a second formulation as, act as if the maxim of your action were to
become by your will a universal law of nature.21 If you are in a moral dilemma, then
ask yourself could your proposed way of acting be universalized; could you visualize
everybody in the same circumstances following the same course of action, without
producing social chaos. He gives as an example a person tempted to commit suicide.
Could it possibly be accepted that everybody who feels miserable should be permitted
to commit suicide? There might be few people left and thus he concludes that such an
action is not permissible according to the categorical imperative. It is true that this
principle seems to work in very simple examples but the more difficult the examples
become the more problematic this principle becomes. This formulation of the
categorical imperative is known as the universalizability principle. Ask can a moral
choice be universalized and that will reveal whether it is permitted.
He does later give a third formulation of the categorical imperative, namely, So
act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other,
always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.22 He argues that if you
find something that is always an end and not a means, then that will always be
something commanded by the categorical imperative. But human persons are values in
themselves, ends in themselves and so never to be treated as means. Rational nature
exists as an end in itself and so rational nature is the ground of the categorical
imperative. This is an alternative way of asking whether something is permissible; we
ask, are we treating persons as ends or as means. He is thinking of examples where the
Why a Value Ethics?
64
rich exploit the poor and the powerful oppress the powerless. There the principle seems
to apply. [52]
Thus, Kant conceives man as the source of the laws which bind him. Man is
autonomous, the autonomy of the will; man is not bound by laws which come from civil
society, or God, or Church leaders, but by laws which spring from his own practical
reason. To say that a moral will is autonomous is to say that it gives itself the law,
which it obeys. The opposite of this would be the heteronomy of the law; if we accept
the heteronomy of the will we accept the assumption that the will is subject to moral
laws which are not the result of its own legislation as rational will.
That is the kernel of Kant's moral philosophy. He does go on to a consideration
of freedom, immortality and the existence of God. These he has bracketed in his
Critique of Pure Reason because there are no sensible intuitions corresponding to these
ideas. He reinstates them in the Critique of Practical Reason because they are
necessary postulates for a philosophy of morals. It is necessary to presuppose the
existence of freedom, if moral obligation is to have any meaning; hence we are justified
in asserting that we are free. Similarly, it is necessary to think of the immortality of the
soul, so that evil people who triumph in this life may be punished in the next; therefore,
we are justified in saying that the soul is immortal. Similarly, if there is to be a
proportion between happiness and virtue, then we must postulate the existence of God.
His method in summary form was to find the real source of moral obligation in
the dictates of practical reason alone. Here we witness an attempt to ground moral
obligation in reason alone with feelings, motives, inclinations, and other empirical
elements brushed aside. If you can establish moral philosophy on such a basis, then,
you have saved moral obligation from the empiricists, from the emotivists and from the
relativists. Kant claimed that he had established that foundation. It is a different
foundation from that of natural law philosophy or virtue/vice approach of Aristotle.
Value Ethics
65

(1) It is philosophically satisfying to be able to defend the objectivity of moral
obligation in a logical, coherent, comprehensive, convincing formulation. The
categorical imperative is a universal, [53] necessary, first principle. Once you have that
starting point you seem to have a foundation, a universal source of moral obligation.
Particular laws can be justified as applications of the general law to particular cases. It is
satisfying to derive particular moral stipulations from reason, because then you can
claim it is universal and necessary and immune to the vagaries of feelings and passions.
(2) The intention of rational moral philosophy is to defend moral obligation
against the relativists, the empiricists, the nihilists and the sceptics. In this it is well
intentioned and certainly nearer the mark than its adversaries.
Disadvantages.
(1) From a philosophical point of view it might be an advantage to have a
system that is abstract and universal. But for the person in the street this is not much
help in reaching moral decisions and living a moral life. Does anybody actually use the
categorical imperative in any of its three formulations to solve actual real life moral
dilemmas? So much of the drama of human life has been excluded, feeling, motivation,
intention, responsibility, conscience, conversion, pleasure, happiness, all seem to have
been sidelined, if not eliminated totally from moral philosophy. A rationalist morality
seems to imply that humans are reason alone, rather than a more complicated unity in
tension of physical, chemical, biological, sensitive, intellectual, and volitional attributes.
(2) A rationalist morality starts with a logically coherent, universal and
necessary principle. Perhaps it would be better to start with subjects as they are; maybe
there is something to be learned from how persons actually work out their values, make
their decisions and carry them out in a mixture of success and failure in all the contexts
Why a Value Ethics?
66
of life. Perhaps, a more inductive approach would be more fruitful and more in touch
with the reality.
(3) Logically coherent, philosophically satisfying formulations of a theory of
moral obligation tend to be static. But it is clear that moral subjects develop through
distinct stages of moral reasoning. Moral education takes them at their present stage and
moves them on [54] to the next. An understanding of the subject's feelings, ambitions,
ways of thinking, and problems at that particular stage is necessary for a good moral
education. It is not enough to present a single, static, system that is the same for
kindergarten, adolescence, adulthood and maturity. Growth and the challenge of
conversion are the reality of moral life with all its success and failure.
Conclusion. Kant sought the principle of moral obligation in reason, either in
the practical or speculative aspect. In both cases moral obligation seems to be the
conclusion of a line of reasoning, a rational necessity. But that would leave Kant open
to the naturalist fallacy, deriving an ought from an is. It would also seem to imply
that the rational process comes first and the obligation comes as a consequence. But
children have a sense of moral obligation long before they are capable of syllogistic
reasoning. Traditional cultures often do not have courses in formal logic; does that mean
they have no sense of moral obligation? Is moral obligation the pangs of conscience
an imperative of reason or is it a feeling?
6 An Ethics of Value and Valuing
Which brings us, finally, to the last of our major systematizations of the data on
morality in terms of values and valuing. The term value is of recent origin and the
history of axiology the study of values covers a short span of two centuries. What is
the significance of this new term and of this shift from talking about the good to talking
of values? It seems that talk of values always brings to mind the valuing subject, the
source of values, the creation of values, and the process of valuing of the concrete
Value Ethics
67
person. Considerations of the good often lead in the direction of metaphysical

speculation, abstract good, the good as a transcendental property of being; value
immediately invokes the subject as valuing, choosing, feeling, thinking, living out
priorities. Hence, it is within the existentialist and phenomenological tradition that the
notion of value began to emerge. This approach seems to be the most promising as it is
focusing on the thinking, feeling, valuing subject in the concrete. Although the word
quickly passes into everyday vocabulary, there is little una-[55]nimity as to the precise
meaning of the term or the critical foundation for its use.
6.1 Historical Sketch.
The term value occurs occasionally in Kant, Hume and Marx but in a premodern sense, as equivalent to good. Marx formulated a labour theory of value: a
method of valuing manufactured goods according to the work put in to produce it.
The term value began to take on its modern meaning in the works of Rudolf
Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), who propounded a philosophical theory of value. The
context is a post-Kantian problematic, where we cannot talk about values in the external
world without first considering the epistemological conditions for knowing values. He
proposed that the beginning of metaphysics is not in metaphysics itself, but in ethics. In
other words, the good was more universal than being. He sought to view all being in
relation to value. The existence of the world has to be explained in terms of its value, its
purpose and function.
His work was developed by Franz Brentano (1837-1917) in the direction of
psychology and epistemology, rather than metaphysics. He introduced the notion of
intention: psychical phenomena are defined as those phenomena which contain objects in
them by way of intention. "There is no hearing, he says, without something heard, no
believing without something believed, not hoping without something hoped for, no
striving without something striven for, no joy without something to be joyful about in
Why a Value Ethics?
68
short, no act of valuing without a value." 23 He finds a close parallel between theoretical
judgment and emotive acts like loving/hating. "When we know that a thing is good in
itself, what we know is that the feeling of love towards it is right (or justified). When we
know that a thing is bad, what we know is that the feeling of hatred toward it is right."24
He was an intuitionist: he held that there is a definite intuitive experience attached to
both specific judgments and to general moral ideas. The source of moral ideas is intuitive
awareness. His Vienna lectures on the origins of moral knowledge were published in
English in 1902 and greatly influenced G.E. Moore. This latter developed a kind of [56]
ethical intuitionism, which as we have mentioned earlier, was to be very influential in the
English-speaking world.
Alexius Meinong (1853-1921) was a student of Brentano and treated valuation
"as primarily a matter of feeling and secondarily a matter of desire." 25 The primary focus
of values is personal relations. "Value is attributed to things by virtue of their relatedness
to subjects. What lends objectivity to values is the validity of the evaluation by which
they are grasped."26
It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of Friedrich Nietzsche (18441900), as the first existentialist to talk freely in a modern sense of values and their
genesis. He was deeply suspicious of the origin and role of traditional moral values and
claimed they were inventions to preserve the status quo: the master and the slave in their
place of domination or submission. He regarded his task as the unmasking of these false
ideologies and to set man free to become the creator of his own values. Christian values
of love, humility, obedience and meekness arose out of the ressentiment of the slaves of
the power of their masters. Nietzsche was not aiming at a coherent system but was railing
at the poverty, slavery, and superficiality of traditional moral philosophy.
Despite the strong negative streak in Nietzsche's thought, he does affirm the
values of courage, insight, sympathy and solitude. He embodies his ideal man in the
Value Ethics
69
Superman, the man who has taken the place of God, who takes responsibility for his own
thoughts actions and values. He talks of the transvaluation of values; traditional values
undermined because of their dubious origin; his values extolled as authentic, the true
man, the fruit of the will to power.
Nietzsche talks of valuing and the genesis, source, emergence, foundations of
values. It is the process, the source, the origin, the genealogy of moral that captivates his
attention. This is the specifically modern sense of the word value. It is in this context that
the authenticity of values, the truth of value judgments is to be dealt with. His process of
unmasking the hidden motivations, the hermeneutic of suspicion, is of course legitimate
but a dangerous weapon as it can so easily be turned on himself. [57]
Max Scheler (1874-1928) steered a middle course between Kant and Nietzsche.27
Kant's ethics was too formal; it was empty of content, concerned only with the a priori
element in moral judgments. Scheler wanted to incorporate values and feelings into
ethics. He disagreed with Nietzsche who concentrated on the varying contents of moral
teaching over history and hence tended to be a relativist and a nihilist with an undue
emphasis on the will to power as the hidden motive behind ethical theories.
Scheler calls his position emotional intuitionism and non-formal apriorism. "His
central contention is that the meaning of the whole universe is finally measured in terms
of the worth of persons in terms of the richest fullness and most perfect development of
persons, the purest beauty and harmony of persons."28 He does not want to be a
subjectivist even though he says that values are given in emotional intentionality. "But
he clearly distinguishes between responding emotionally to something as desirable or
beautiful and reflectively judging something to be good or beautiful."29 Emotional
intentionality can point to the presence of values but it also needs an insight into
objective values. We will return to Scheler later to help understand Lonergans phrase
intentional response to value.
Why a Value Ethics?
70
This line of thinking was continued by Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) who

declared the need for an awakening, deepening, and broadening of value consciousness.
We discover values and do not create them. Values are given in experience in emotions,
as a hierarchy. Ethics is not just a question of what is to be done but to understand what
is valuable and worthwhile in our universe and our human world. The realm of values is
rich and complicated. He wrote a three volume study of moral values.30 Unfortunately, as
he invoked a simple, direct immediate intuition of value essences, he has little to say on
the constant struggle in each one of us to think, to feel, to deliberate, to know and to live
our values.
Philosophical interest in values and valuing seems to have waned in the second
half of the twentieth century. Although value talk passed into popular vocabulary, there
were no further attempts to give values a critical philosophical foundation. Often the
assumption [58] was that values are subjective, creations of the subject, arbitrary and to
be confined to private life as much as possible.
6.2 Evaluation
It would be premature to evaluate a value ethics in terms of advantages and
disadvantages, as we have yet to elaborate a comprehensive and critical ethics of value.
However, we can already perceive certain preliminary promises and difficulties.
It seems that values and valuing have already passed into popular culture and
many already think and act in terms of moral values, autonomy, authenticity,
conscience, the subject creating values, choosing values, defining values. Surely there
must be some reason for this and there must be some philosophical underpinnings for
this activity. The turn to the subject is surely a positive advance. If we can empirically
describe and identify the activities of coming to a judgment of value, maybe we will be
able to discover some control over true and false values. It seems to offer possibilities
of a flexible, comprehensive, foundational approach to systematizing moral experience.
Value Ethics
71
Perhaps the most apparent disadvantage of a value ethic is the difficulty in

working one out. Value philosophy seems to have been abandoned because of the
difficulty of saving values from subjectivism and relativism. Is it possible to develop a
philosophy of values which will be objective, foundational, critical and creative? The
present text attempts to do precisely that.
7 The Present Situation
Where have all these titanic intellectual struggles left us today? Have we solved
the problem of ethics? Are we moving towards agreement, coherence, deeper
understanding and moral sensitivity or towards disagreements, incoherence,
interminable arguments, misunderstanding and insensitivity to moral issues? We did our
historical review to get our bearings, to learn from history, to appropriate the past in
order to progress into the future. But what about the present? How much of these
traditions are alive and well today? What is the predominant ethos, set of values, theory
of morality being taught in [59] the institutes of higher learning and operating in the
minds of people? Diagnosis precedes treatment, so let us survey the present situation in
the academy, the market place, the schools and the mentality of contemporary culture.
Let us indulge in some gross generalizations to get an overall view of the present
situation of ethics as a professional discipline.
(1) Extensive Menu. Perhaps the first thing that would strike a Martian visiting
higher institutes of learning and inquiring about the teaching of ethics would be the
wide variety of theories, systems, approaches, and alternatives that are on offer. One
introductory text on ethics offers chapters on cultural relativism, subjectivism,
supernaturalism, intuitionism, emotivism, prescriptivism, consistency, the Golden Rule,
moral rationality, consequentialism, non-consequentialism.31 Some very learned scholar
might like to point out that this author seems to have forgotten descriptivism,
eudemonism, proportionalism, probabilism, deontologism, axiology, antinomianism,
Why a Value Ethics?
72
rule-utilitarian, act-utilitarian, situationism, discourse ethics, to name but a few. How

many ways are there to skin a cat? Why is it so difficult to answer the question of the
best kind of human life to live?
Some of these are minor groups which we left out of our survey. Situation ethics
holds that as each situation is unique no universal moral norms can fit perfectly.32 The
only rule that applies to every situation is to do the loving thing: love is the only
absolute principle. Other directives only apply if they conform to the law of love. It tries
to steer a middle course between lawlessness and legalism between being against all
laws and thinking that laws solve all problems. Discourse ethics tries to establish moral
norms in the community. If the forms of communication and dialogue in the community
are open, free, responsible, then the proper order of society and moral behaviour will
emerge. This arose in a post-Kantian context where we cannot have knowledge of moral
norms from experience. This is associated with the work of Jurgen Habermas.
Existentialist thinkers, such as Kierkegaard, Sartre, Camus, Marcel, each made their
own individual contribution to an ethical philosophy and have left their mark on
subsequent generations. Structuralism, Post-Structuralism [60] and Post-Modernism all
have an impact on ethical teaching. Post-Modern philosophers distrust the power of
reason, do not believe in universal laws, want to put behind them the illusions of
enlightenment thinkers. They view any attempts at overarching theories of philosophy
as illusions, as illegitimate totalitarian ambitions. They like to undermine such systems
by revealing the hidden motives behind such schemas, how they are used as instruments
of power to manipulate others, how they can be deconstructed by the hermeneutic of
suspicion. They like to think they have rediscovered the individual, the difference of
each unique singular, the value of the concrete.
(2) Splintered Traditions. Perhaps the second thing that our Martian might
notice is that all the great traditions have splintered and fragmented. There is seldom, if
Value Ethics
73
ever, unanimity even within one tradition as to the interpretation and presentation of the
theories of the founders; and even more so how those teachings are to be preserved,
applied, and taught, in new situations today. MacIntyre compares the present situation
in moral philosophy to the detritus left on a battlefield after near mutual annihilation.
His contention is that only bits and pieces of the great traditions have survived and that
the whole can never be recovered or reconstructed. The hypothesis which I wish to
advance is that in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is in the
same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science in the imaginary world
which I described. What we possess, if this view is true, are but fragments of a
conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance
derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key
expressions. But we have very largely, if not entirely lost our comprehension, both
theoretical and practical, of morality.33 This is a rather pessimistic view of the situation
but he is a respected scholar and is living in the midst of that situation.
The situation is further characterized by him as, firstly, dominated by endless
disagreements and debates which go on interminably, without showing promise of ever
coming to a conclusion. All the debates, analysis, reasoning of intelligent moral
philosophers do not [61] seem to bring agreement. Secondly, he holds that the various
positions are conceptually incommensurable, i.e. the rival premises are such that we
possess no rational way of weighing the claims of one as against another.34 The
conceptual positions are mutually exclusive; there is no common ground, no way of
solving the dilemma. Thirdly, he notes the predominance of impersonal rational
arguments in these debates: Its use presupposes the existence of impersonal criteria
the existence, independently of the preferences or attitudes of speaker and hearer, of
standards of justice or generosity or duty.35 Not only are the rival traditions
Why a Value Ethics?
74
incommensurable with one another but the remnants of each tradition have lost coherent
context and, like Humpty Dumpty, can never be put together again.
(3) Pluralism. Our world is no longer simple and homogeneous as village
societies once were. We now live in a pluralist, diversified, stratified, variegated,
specialized world. There is a legitimate pluralism of specialization, where each is
trained in his special task, knows more and more about less and less, but is invaluable in
the overall scheme of things, makes his contribution to the whole and benefits from the
specialist knowledge of others. There is a legitimate pluralism of cultures; we speak
many languages, have many characteristic ways of dressing, eating, ways of life, and
styles of relating, meanings and values informing a common way of life. There is a
legitimate pluralism of people of common sense, theoreticians, scholars, holy persons,
artists, and philosophers of consciousness. There is a pluralism of young and old, male
and female, rich and poor, sick and healthy, etc. We are accustomed to this wide variety
of meanings and values, this diversity of styles, tastes, life styles, and ways of doing
things.
Can the same pluralism apply to moral rules, to moral virtues, to moral values?
Can one choose ones moral values in the same way that you choose a new car? Are the
alternatives good/bad, virtue/vice, right/wrong, value/disvalue, correct/incorrect,
approval/disapproval, free choices in the same way as a brand of toothpaste? Is
pluralism illegitimate when applied to morals? There is a tendency to extend the
legitimate pluralism of cultures, specializations, classes, and so on, to moral rules and
values. So the faculty of philosophy is approached as if it were a supermarket offering a
wide [62] variety of attractive wares and you choose what you wish. The diverse menu
we mentioned is evaluated in terms of personal likes and dislikes, tastes and
preferences, with no rational way of judging which is correct or incorrect, right or
wrong.
Value Ethics
75
(4) Hermeneutic of Suspicion. One notices a pervading negative streak in terms

of knocking down rather than building up in contemporary moral philosophy. The
hermeneutic of suspicion invites us to suspect any claims to absolute truth or value, to
perceive such claims as manipulation of persons, as expressions of the will to power.
Unmasking invites us to discover the class interests, the bias, the ressentiment, the
hidden ideological interests that lie behind the mask. Claims to know truth and value are
derided as hubris, as illusions, as totalizing systems steamrolling the rights of individual
freedom. Allan Bloom paints a detailed picture of the scepticism, the relativism, the
individualism, materialism and the quiet nihilism of the contemporary college student.36
The pluralism of modern technological society is often taken to imply that just as you
can choose your specialization, your home your bank your toothpaste, so you can
choose your own system of truths and values. A professor can do anything he likes in
the classroom except teach a set of meanings and values that he considers true. It is
indeed easier to destroy than to construct. The moral landscape does seem to resemble
the post-battle wasteland envisaged by MacIntyre.
(5) Life Goes On. What might surprise our Martian friend is that, despite the
total disarray among moral philosophers, every individual and community, including the
professors of moral philosophy, continue to operate in terms of good and bad, right and
wrong! Parents continue to teach their children not to tell lies, to share their toys with
others, not to use bad language, to eat healthy food. Children are punished for being
selfish and greedy; they are rewarded for working hard, for cleaning their room, for
getting good grades. Professors teach an empiricist emotivism, but then are
conscientious in arriving in time for class, are scrupulously fair in grading papers, teach
their students not to plagiarize, and demand that the department maintain a high
standard of ethical integrity. Society continues to administer justice, punishing crimes
appropriately, demanding just distribution [63] of wealth, upholds the rights of
Why a Value Ethics?
76
minorities, rails at corrupt politicians, or dishonest financiers. We continue to judge

peoples character, classifying some as trustworthy, honest, sincere, devoted, brave, and
others as frauds, cowards, hypocrites, self-serving knaves. As individual moral subjects
we continue to feel satisfied when we fight for justice for the oppressed; we feel guilty
when we do not stand up for a friend unjustly dismissed from his job. We continue to
argue about the rights and wrongs of abortion or stem cell research or issues of war and
peace. We continue to judge the value or disvalue of persons, policies, actions,
programs and institutions. We continue to appeal to conscience, to personal autonomy
and responsibility. We are aware of our personal moral failings, we feel guilty and
ashamed every year we try to do better not always succeeding.
In conclusion, would our Martian friend note a strange disjoint between what
you and I are actually doing and the theoretical schemas of the philosophers and
professors? Does anybody in his right mind actually operate in terms of applying a
categorical imperative in any of its three formulations? Does anybody choose and act
in moral matters simply on the basis of feelings of approval and disapproval? Or does
anybody totally exclude feelings in favour of rational argument, reasoned deduction and
theoretical schemas? We seldom operate solely in terms of applying automatic moral
rules to situations and usually appeal to intelligence and conscience in discovering
exceptions and mitigating circumstances. We are helped by imitating our heroes and
abhorring our villains but we recognize the limitations of this procedure. Persons show
remarkable discernment, flexibility and competence in dealing with moral challenges in
everyday life and they have not done any course in moral philosophy! They have not
studied ethical theory. They are not versed in the history of ethics; they have not read
the classic tomes of the great moralists. There is a disjoint between the theories in the
books and the performance of persons. How has this come about and how can a value
ethic help to bridge the gap?
Value Ethics
77
To show how this has come about, we will need to distinguish the three stages of
meaning, common sense, theory and interiority. This in turn will help us to diagnose the
contemporary malaise about eth-[64]ics and to show the relevance and possibility of a
new method leading to a value ethics.
8 Why a Value Ethic: Stages of Meaning
We have given a historical review of the principal traditions in ethics and done
so with broad strokes of the brush. But it is possible and helpful to look at the historical
material from an even broader perspective and that helps us to diagnose the present
malaise. We are going to briefly consider three stages of meaning: (1) common sense,
where knowing is undifferentiated and descriptive; (2) theoretical, where knowing is
explanatory, by way of measurement and definition; and (3) interiority where knowing
is of invariant activities rather than specific content. Most of the theories of ethics that
we have considered belong to the theoretical stage. However, value ethics is
characteristic of the third stage of meaning, attend to the activities of the subject rather
than the content of propositions. My diagnosis of the present malaise is that we are
currently moving from the second stage of meaning to the third: from the theoretical
mode to the mode of interiority.37
(1) Common Sense. In the first stage of meaning, each culture has a distinction
between right and wrong, what they value and what they don't value, what is approved
and disapproved of. This is true of traditional cultures as well as modern; we start with
values which are implicit rather than explicit, operative rather then thematized. We do
not start from a state of valuelessness; nobody professes that they have no moral values
in their society! Moral obligation is immanent and operative in everyone. In every
society there is a distinction between good and evil, good people and bad people, right
conduct and wrong conduct, there are laws and rules about how to behave. Evil people
are punished; good people are praised and rewarded. Children are taught a moral code.
Why a Value Ethics?
78
There are various ways of administering justice in the group, settling disputes, and
punishing the guilty.
Traditional cultures are at a descriptive level: values are what seem to me to be
important. In description we relate things to ourselves, we assume a personal
perspective, and we look at things from our [65] own point of view. Near/far, right/left,
up/down, big/small, hot/cold are largely descriptive terms. You understand correctly
only if you grasp the commonsense context of a particular time and place. What is cold
in one place is considered hot in another; what is a big tree in one area is small in
another; what is sweet for one person is sour for another.38
Consciousness is operating in an undifferentiated manner in common sense
mode. The moral, the social, the cultural, the religious obligations have not yet been
named, identified, made explicit and defined. Taboos are confused with moral laws;
feelings of guilt are confused with real guilt; if you are close to a person who is guilty,
then you are often held to be guilty. Laws of hygiene are confused with moral laws.
Legal and moral are not differentiated. You find great variations in the particular mores
of different cultures. Values are operating but there is little or no explicit control of
meaning.
At the stage of description, there are no definitions of virtue and vice, no
concepts of natural law, no definitions of freedom and responsibility, and no distinction
between moral obligation and legal obligations. The moral imperative is operating, but
it has not been identified, made explicit, named, formulated, defined and implemented.
Words are used in a vague sense; writing may not have been invented; grammars have
not been written; terms have not been defined; there is little or no formal moral systems
or codes.
We all start as children operating in a common sense mode; where everything is
related to ourselves as we perceive it; where consciousness is undifferentiated; where
Value Ethics
79
sensing and feeling predominate, when it is difficult to prescind from the view of the
observer. Gradually, we have to learn to share, to follow rules, to satisfy others, to learn
to live in a social world; to understand that we are not the centre of the world
(2) Theory. The second stage of meaning is characterized by the theoretical
mode. Theory relates things to one another; it prescinds from the observer; it sets up a
system of terms and relations. Theory emerges because of the deficiencies of
description. We want to escape the relativity of private perspective, the vagueness of
descrip-[66]tive terms, the ambiguity of undifferentiated consciousness. In the sciences
measurement represents the breakthrough to theory; instead of big we say twelve
meters; instead of cold we say minus five degrees centigrade; instead of up there we say
north northwest. In each case we set up a system of relating things to a standard that
prescinds from the observers point of view.
In the human sciences and philosophy it is definition of terms which leads from
description to explanation. Aristotle's Ethics is a prime example of defining a basic set
of terms and relations at the core of ethics, namely, happiness, pleasure, virtue, vice,
perfection, final end, friendship, intellectual and moral virtues. Then he was able to
define each individual virtue with reference to excess and deficiency. Each of the
theories we considered in our historical section are constituted by a basic set of
principles and presuppositions, a method of proceeding and a way of reaching
conclusions. So you build up a coherent system of interrelated definitions within a
system and you have a theoretical moral philosophy.
In our brief historical sketch above, we recognized the ethical theoretical
movements of natural law, virtue ethics, rationalist ethics and emotivist ethics. They
are in theoretical mode. As theories, they start with principles, define concepts, give
explanations, apply universals to human conduct, and reach particular conclusions.
Such theories represent a great advance over the common sense assumptions of
Why a Value Ethics?
80
descriptive thinking. They add clarity, coherence, system, universality, uniformity,

objectivity, and comprehensiveness to moral understanding. But the theoretical mode
cannot be the final solution: what if you have contradictory theories? In the field of
ethics we have mutually contradictory theories: theories based on natural law, theories
based on virtue and vice, theories based on rationalism, theories based on feeling. What
are the limitations to all theoretical approaches to ethics?
The limitation of any theoretical position shows itself in the choice of first
principles and method. Conclusions can usually be traced back to the principles at the
beginning of the system. But how do you decide on the principles? Why do ethical
theories start with [67] different principles? It seems somewhat arbitrary. We have
pointed out individually the advantages and disadvantages of each system.
Theory cannot explain its relationship to common sense. Theory cannot account
for the advantages of theory over description. Eddington was hung up on the dilemma
of which table was real, the one of common sense, or the one of science. Obviously
only one could be real. As a scientist he had to hold that the scientific table was real.
Therefore, he had to conclude that the table of common sense was an illusion. But it is
a strange position to hold that we live in a world of illusions and only the scientist by
some magic gets to the real. The ethics of Kant illustrate this strange dichotomy
between the abstract rational categorical imperative, and the fact that nobody in his
right mind uses it to make actual moral decisions. People have been acting out of moral
obligation, appetite, emotion, desire, ambition, long before Kant put pen to paper. What
a strange difference between the theoretical world of concepts of Kant, and the real
world of persons challenged by moral dilemmas, thinking and feeling their way to a
solution, looking for advice and information, testing out possibilities and consequences,
tentatively experimenting and learning, finally knowing the right thing to do and doing
it.
Value Ethics
81
Theory cannot explain why there are a succession of theories and why there are
contradictory theories. Are these theories totally incommensurable? From a logical
point of view the theories we have mentioned start from different principles and
therefore are logically incompatible. But is there no common ground on which theorists
of good will from different traditions might be able to dialogue with one another and
even reach agreement? What are all these theories aiming to achieve? We hold that
there is such a common ground and it is to be found in interiority.
(3) Interiority. The third stage of Meaning involves a shift from theory to
interiority. We have already assumed that more comprehensive higher viewpoint in
presuming to be able to evaluate theories in terms of advantages and disadvantages.
What enables you to look at conflicting theories and compare them to one another?
Such theories are logically incommensurable. The conflicting theories start from [68]
different first principles and so do not have common first principles. What do they have
in common? Each theory is just an answer to a particular question, a derivation from
certain first principles. It satisfies for a time until a more comprehensive viewpoint is
called for. Once you start comparing and evaluating common sense and theory, the
succession and variety of theories, you are moving into the world of interiority.
(a) Interiority represents a shift from the data of sense to the data of
consciousness, from data about the sensible world to data about the activities of our
own minds. In interiority we apply empirical method to the activities of questioning,
thinking, knowing truth and knowing values. When you observe how many activities
are involved in a moral judgment, you realize the one-sidedness of many ethical
theories. Note the strange phenomenon of Hume asserting that all knowledge is
sensation, but at the same time in his performance, understanding concepts, making
judgments, arguing with other philosophers and claiming that his position is the true
one. He failed to advert to the data of consciousness; if he had attended to how he
Why a Value Ethics?
82
actually understood and made judgments and argued with others he would have written
quite a different book. Theories of ethics are either incomplete or one-sided because
they do not attend to the data of consciousness: they do not attend to how decisions are
actually made and executed. It is always tempting to simplify; to reduce ethical
operations to reason, or to feelings, or to obedience to laws. But when we look at the
concrete we realise that ethical activity is highly complex; that many factors intrude;
that the only adequate treatment is one that includes all the elements, clearly names and
identifies them, shows how they are related to one another and to what is a human
person and what he should be. Like building a boat, it is not much use unless it is
complete. So we are suggesting that we look, not so much at a persons outward
behaviour, not at previous theories, but at the inner workings of your own evaluations
and decisions.
(b) It is a shift from content to activities. The content of moral codes can fill
volumes; the Old Testament is full of laws, rules, precepts, prescriptions, norms, about
worship, marriage, purification, leprosy, eating and cleaning, etc. Other traditions have
their own [69] codes and canons. Many have tried to define and divide all the virtues
and vices. Each culture has its own moral code of conduct with its own variations to
suit local conditions. Such has it been since first homo sapiens emerged from the
forests. Codes of conduct constitute a multitude. But the mental activities, which
produced all these codes, seem to be basically questioning, thinking, formulating,
feeling, criticizing, knowing facts and knowing values. There are an infinity of things
about which you can question; but only one activity of questioning. There are an
infinity of things that can be thought about; but only one thinking.. There are an infinity
of concepts; but one act of conceptualizing. There are an infinity of things to be known;
but only one process of human knowing. There are a great variety of values; but one
activity of valuing. We do not have to know all the codes, rules, principles, applications
Value Ethics
83
of every culture and every time. We are looking for the invariant set of activities that
produce this infinity of instantiations.
(c) Identifying the activities helps us to identify the norms immanent and
operative in ourselves, in all cultures and in all human persons. Why is it that all
cultures have some kind of moral code? Why is it that everybody feels guilty when they
knowingly do something wrong? Why is it that to a large extent we agree that
corruption, injustice, exploitation of people is wrong? Why do we all approve of
progress, of development, of fair distribution of the goods of society? What are the
forces within us pushing us to approve of goodness and to disapprove of evil? What is
the dynamism operating in the activities of questioning value, thinking about what is the
right thing to do, judging what is the best, deciding and acting? These are all questions
we can ask ourselves and will try to answer more clearly in the text.
(d) When we move into the stage of Interiority we find it possible to identify the
source of moral theories. They are no longer incommensurable because we have
recognized the source of all theories. Natural law, moral sense theory and rationalist
ethics have no logical common ground; the starting point and principles of each are
quite different. Hence, there will be interminable disagreements between them at the
level of theory. They cannot even communicate with one [70] another because they are
each within a theoretical system and cannot comprehend any other theoretical approach.
They cannot communicate unless they have something in common; that common
foundation is to be found in interiority.
Interiority is a higher viewpoint which recognizes the source of all these
theories, evaluates their advantages and disadvantages, and finds the common source of
these in the activities of explaining the invariant activities involved in moral
questioning, deliberating, judging, deciding and acting. The conflicting moral theories
are contradictory contributions to the clarification of a single goal. They are resolved,
Why a Value Ethics?
84
not by interminable arguments, but by reaching a higher viewpoint which sees them as
dialectical contributions in the one process.
Conclusion. My tentative diagnosis of the present situation in ethics as a professional
discipline, then, is that we are in a state of transition from the theoretical stage of
meaning, to the stage of interiority. We are moving from thinking of ethics in terms of a
coherent, conceptual system of principles, terms, definitions, relations and conclusions,
to interiority where ethics is conceived in terms of appropriating the activities and
norms inherent in being a good human person. We are moving from system dominated
by logic, to a moving viewpoint dominated by method. We are moving from closed
system to open system; from ethics as a conceptual system imposed from outside, to
personal authenticity, conscience and autonomy properly understood.
The breakdown of theoretical systems is very evident today. The criticisms of
post-modern philosophers are often valid. It is not hard, as we have seen, to pick out the
inadequacies and disadvantages of any theoretical system. So logically coherent
theoretical systems of ethics are accused of being abstract, totalizing, static, inflexible
and impersonal which they often are. But that does not mean the demise of moral
philosophy. It means it is time to move on to interiorly differentiated consciousness, to
method, to activities, to a personal ethic based on value and valuing. [71]
Many elements of interiority have already emerged in our times. Consciousness
is a common theme. Intentionality analysis is the stock and trade of phenomenology.
Values and valuing are part of everybodys vocabulary. Conscience, as the ultimate
criterion of right and wrong has wide acceptance, even though sometimes conveniently
distorted. Moral autonomy is accepted as the goal of mature adulthood. Existentialism
has called attention to the subject, feelings, anxiety, choice, risk, self-constitution, the
notion of creation of self and values. The pieces are mostly there; we have to put them
together in a single comprehensive world-view.
Value Ethics
85
Perhaps what we are saying about interiority will only become clear as we
proceed with our identification of the activities and norms operating in moral life. The
key seems to be the method appropriate for such kind of identification. Our second
chapter will focus explicitly on finding a method that is empirical, critical, inductive,
progressive and foundational.
Suggestions Regarding Questions for Deliberation:
(1) Examples might be: telling a white lie out of loyalty to a friend; missing a lecture to
look after a sick student; break the speed limit on an emergency run to the hospital, etc
(2) You might consider compulsory military service unjust in certain instances. Parental
strictures might in some cases be too severe and unjust. You might consider certain
immigration laws unjust and feel justified in dodging them. You might consider a law
that allows abortion to be wrong. A tax that unduly favours the rich might be considered
unjust.
(3) It is almost impossible to live in peace and mutual understanding without clear
boundaries as to rights and duties, even concerning such mundane topics as, clean up
your own mess, don't disturb another's sleep, meals served at certain times only, etc.
Such rules concretize values such as respect, responsibility, tolerance, justice, love, as
lived in any community or society. [72]
(4) Wise and good persons are the criterion of goodness. Rules can guide them when
they are in unfamiliar territory, or have no time to think. Such a person will be able to
recognize when the rule applies and when an exception arises. The foolish person will
not recognize on his own when the rule applies or not; hence they are better off just
obeying the rule.
(5) You can easily instruct a person in the strategy and tactics of warfare, how to
assemble a rifle and to shoot it accurately, etc. You can simulate battle ground
conditions and indicate appropriate reactions. But can you teach bravery? You can work
Why a Value Ethics?
86
on motivation, inspiration, group morale, loyalty and patriotism. You can define bravery
and discuss it endlessly. But in the end it is the person's free and responsible willingness
and desire to be brave that counts.
(6) I presume most parents want their children to be honest and good; it is hard to
imagine a parent who would be proud of his child's dishonesty. We esteem moral values
sometimes without being able to give a coherent account of why.
(7) Discussed in the text. Value priorities might come from parents, religious tradition,
culture, school, books, government, or from yourself your own immanently generated
values.
(8) A restaurant chain can pledge itself to certain priorities, quality food, fresh food,
prompt service, customer satisfaction, friendly atmosphere, reasonable prices. These are
their values as an institution; this is what we come to expect; this is what we are willing
to pay for; this is what makes the chain a success or a failure.
A philosophy department will have a history, a set of procedures for decision
making, committees, a tradition, a distribution of roles and status, a physical layout of
offices and space, windows and views, large or small desks. All embody values,
importance, a right and wrong way of doing things. The history will embody a certain
tradition, a favouring of one set of values over another; it might favour orthodoxy,
innovation, scholarship, originality, popularity, truth, academic excellence, freedom of
expression, rigor in argumentation, and so on. [73]
A political party fairly obviously embodies certain political values, sometimes
verbalized in constitutions, statutes, written rules of procedures, vision statements,
policy statements, election manifestos, etc. Parties might favour, care for the weak and
marginalized, tax cuts for the rich, jobs for everyone, more efficiency in government
services, reduce or increase defence budget, more money for schools, self-reliance,
competition, affirmative action, reducing discrimination, more law and order, internal
Value Ethics
87
security, etc. These are all values produced by value judgments of various kinds. [74]
Endnotes
Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, Collected

Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 17, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004),
Horizons, 29.
The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, Translated by J.A.K. Thomson,
Introduction by Jonathan Barnes, (London: Penguin Books, 1955). I use this translation
of the Nicomachean Ethics throughout this book because of its accessibility and
readability.
2
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q 90-94.
Pope Paul the Sixth, On the Regulation of Birth, July 1968.
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Trans by J.A.K. Thomson (London: Penguin

Books 1955) Introduction by Jonathan Barnes, 34.
Just to mention a few texts at random: Yves R. Simon, The Definition of Moral Virtue,
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1986). Robert Bellah, and others, Habits of the
Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life, (New York: Harper and Row,
1985). Donald DeMarco, The Heart of Virtue, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996).
6
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1981) 259.
8
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, (Indianapolis: Hackett

Publishing Company, 1983) 85.
9
Ibid., 87.
10
A. J. Ayer, Language Truth and Logic, (England: Penguin Books, 1936, 1971).
11
Ibid., 136.
12
Ibid., 137.
13
Ibid., 142.
14
Ibid., 142.
15
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 12.
16
Ibid., 19.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Trans by Norman Kemp Smith, (New York:
St. Martins Press, 1965).
17
Why a Value Ethics?
88
18
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Trans by Mary Gregor,

(United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 7.
19
Ibid., 8.
20
Ibid., 31.
21
Ibid., 35.
22
Ibid., 38.
[75] 23 Robert T. Sandin, The Rehabilitation of Virtue: Foundations of Moral

Education, (New York: Praeger, 1992). 98. I am indebted to his outline of the history of
axiology.
24
Ibid., 99.
25
Ibid., 99.
26
Ibid., 99.
27
See Manfred S. Frings, Max Scheler: A Concise Introduction to a Great Thinker,

(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1966, 1996). Also Max Scheler, On Feeling,
Knowing and Valuing, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
28
R. Sandin, Rehabilitation of Virtue, 101.
29
Ibid., 101.
30
Nicolai Hartmann, Moral Phenomena, Vol 1 of Ethics, (London: Transaction

Publishers, 1932, 2002). Moral Values Vol 2 of Ethics, (London: Transaction
Publishers, 1932, 2003).
31
Harry Gensler, Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction, (London: Routledge, 1998).
32
Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, (Philadelphia: Westminster

Press, 1966).
33
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2.
34
Ibid., 8.
35
Ibid., 9.
36
Allan Bloom, On the Closing of the American Mind, (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1988).
37
For more on stages of meaning in the context of epistemology see, B. Cronin,

Foundations of Philosophy, 24-37.
Value Ethics
38
For more on description and explanation in knowing truth see, B. Cronin,

Foundations of Philosophy, Chapter Three.
89
2
Method in Value Ethics
For the root of ethics, as the root of metaphysics, lies neither in

sentences nor in propositions nor in judgments but in the dynamic
structure of rational self-consciousness Accordingly, ethical
method, as metaphysical, can take subjects as they are; it can correct
any aberration in their views by a dialectical criticism; and it can
apply these corrected views to the totality of concrete objects of
choice.1
(1) Which systematization of ethical phenomena in the previous chapter best fits your
own personal experience of the moral life?
(2) How would you explain to your child why it is wrong to tell lies? How would you
explain to your self why it is wrong to tell lies?
(3) Describe a personal moral judgment, decision and action they you personally made
recently either good or bad.
(4) Your house is on fire. You have time to save only three personal items of value.
What do you save? [78]
(5) A pregnant woman, a professor of philosophy, an old man, a priest, a doctor, a child,
an engineer, a navigator, a sailor, a cook, find themselves in a life-boat which will only
hold five people. Who would you throw out and why?
(6) Close your eyes, be still, think of nothing for five minutes.
(7) Do you accept that some kinds of behaviour are absolutely wrong, at all times, in all
places, for whatever reason?
(8) How would you go about solving a new moral dilemma, such as is involved in stem
cell research?
1 Method and Methods
The previous chapter outlined various systems of moral philosophy however
briefly. Implicit in each of them is a method of doing ethics, beginning with first
principles, and establishing procedures for reaching concrete conclusions. Natural law
ethics relies largely on a method of deduction from primary principles of morality
known naturally, through secondary derived principles, and by the use of prudence to
Value Ethics
91
apply the law to each concrete event. Virtue ethics puts before us an ideal, what kind of
person would we like to become; it defines appropriate virtues and vices and we imitate
and aspire to become that sort of person. An ethic of reason simply requires a lot of
serious thinking about the problem, apply moral reasoning, formulate concepts such as
consistency or universalizability, and with clear definitions and correct reasoning you
will find what is the good thing to do. An ethic of feeling asks you to attend to specific
feelings either pleasure or utility or approval or sympathy or love. The good is to be
understood in terms of these feelings. These feelings provide a guide for practical
conduct. So you can build up various theoretical systems of ethics in great detail, with
great sophistication, at great length.
But we have already begun to question and evaluate these various systems. We
tend to think that if you have a variety of different theories, then one must be true and
the others false; otherwise it would seem that all systems are equal and you become an
ethical relativist. [79] You may have been surprised that we dealt with these systems
not in terms of true and false but in terms of advantages and disadvantages. We
simply compared these theories as to their pedagogical efficacy, their clarity and
coherence, their ability to guide concrete behaviour, their helpfulness in solving
concrete moral dilemmas, their adequacy or inadequacy, their comprehensiveness or
narrowness. It may be that the question of true and false may arise later but for the
moment let us stay with comparing and evaluating the systems as systems. Are these
systems complementary, contradictory, or free equal alternatives? One could ask many
similar questions about value ethics, but that we will do later. To be relating, comparing
and evaluating systems seems to imply that you have reached a higher vantage point
which we have called interiority. How do you do ethics in the stage of interiority? What
is the appropriate method?
92
This chapter is devoted to set out an appropriate method which will be empirical,
critical, foundational and progressive. It will be empirical in the sense of verifiable with
reference to data in this case the data of consciousness rather than the data of sense; in
that sense it will be inductive, starting with data, moving to understanding and ending in
verification. It will be critical in the sense of true; not all hypotheses, fancy ideas,
interesting connections are true. It will be foundational in the sense of going to the
source, discovering the activities and forces behind moral behaviour. It will be
progressive in the sense leading to better understanding, adding to the wisdom of the
past, capable of incorporating improvements, flexible enough to deal with the very
general as well as the incorrigibly concrete. We are not looking for rules, which if
followed will automatically produce results; method is not just following instructions,
but being inventive, creative, flexible and resourceful.
However, let us start at the beginning which would seem to be, start with people
as they are. Each person, in every situation of time and space, is a unique instantiation
of moral behaviour. Behind the richness and diversity of the individual variations, there
seems to be a basic commonality, that we all refer to as moral experience. We feel
guilty, happy, proud, puzzled, shameful, insecure, determined, uneasy, weak or strong.
We experience the emotions of love and hatred, [80] fear and courage, pleasure and
pain, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, happiness and unhappiness, hope and despair and
complacency, loyalty and betrayal, honesty and lying, justice and injustice. We are
embedded in sets of human relationships in the family, the school, the community, the
ethnic group, the society and the nation. Some of these are criminals, some are heroes;
some are hardworking, others selfish and lazy; some are religious, others practical
atheists; some are kind, others are unkind; some are faithful, some cannot be trusted. We
ourselves feel ourselves morally responsible but know that we sometimes succeed and
sometimes fail in our moral obligations. We all share the same underlying activities,
Value Ethics
93
feelings, tensions, successes and failures. Why does the systematization of this data lead
in contrary directions and reach opposing conclusions?
We noticed a strange disjoint between the theories of moral philosophers, and
the universal human experience of moral life. People seem to know that it is wrong to
lie, without doing a course in moral philosophy. Parents seem to be able to teach their
children to be good, without a course in the metaphysics of goodness. Perhaps, if we
explore this innate ability to deal with right and wrong we might have a better starting
point than definitions and axioms. Definitions and principles can be chosen rather
arbitrarily; different definitions and principles will lead to different systems and a
variety of conclusions. Abstract systems lose touch with the experience of moral
discernment, the ethical struggle, the feelings and activities actually involved in moral
living. If we start with people as they are we might be able to learn from them; to make
what is implicit, explicit; to objectify what is performed; to identify, name, interrelate
the various elements involved in moral judgments. Our method is to start with people
as they are in the total diversity and richness of concrete moral experience. We aim to
discern in that diversity the pattern of related activities, that underlie, that are operative,
that are normative in this experience. Hence we move from the richness and diversity of
contents, to the basic invariant pattern of activities, that produces and underlies this
diversity. We move from that to discern what norms are operating within these
activities. [81]
The person, we are taking as our starting point, is obviously yourself. We start
each chapter with suggested questions for deliberation. They are to help you to read
yourself, to check everything that is said in the text with reference to your own moral
experience, to connect with your daily moral triumphs and failures. This is a voyage of
self-discovery; an invitation to discover the moral imperative, the moral activities, the
94
moral feelings, already operating within you. This kind of self-reflection is not easy; but
it is possible and if you are curious about moral systems surely that is the place to start.
We have used this method before in the field of cognitional theory reaching truth
of factual judgments we called it self-appropriation.2 However, we do not presume
that you are familiar with that text; hence we will give a summary of where we reached
in applying the method to cognitional structure understood as a three level affair. We
will then elaborate on consciousness and self-appropriation as a method in value ethics.
Finally, we will anticipate the kind of ethics that this procedure might produce. Those
already familiar with the method may skip this meagre summary. [81]
Transcendental
Precepts
VALUING
Level Four
JUDGING
Level Three
UNDERSTANDING
Be
Responsible
Be
Reasonable
Be
Intelligent
Desire/
Questioning
Question for
Value
Is it good? Is it
worthwhile? Is it
right?
Question for
Reflection
Is it true? Is it
correct?
Question for
Intelligence
What? Why?
Where? etc.
Proper
Activity
Product
Deliberative
Judgment
of
Value
Insight
Reflective
Insight
Direct
Insight
Judgment
of
Truth
Formulation
Expression
Definition
Level Two
EXPERIENCING
Be
Attentive
Sense
Appetite
Internal and
External
Sensing
Images
Memories
Level One
Diagram 1 Integral Cognitional Structure of Truth and Value3

2 Self-Appropriation of Cognitional Structure
Fortunately, we have an example of the method in use as it applies to cognition,
to knowing the truth, and knowing that you know the truth.4 This section will give a
summary of that method in operation as applying to the first three levels of cognitional
Value Ethics
95
operations (See Diagram 1). This will serve us well as a foundation on which we can
build further in terms of further questions and parallel operations at the fourth level. The
problem of knowing values is broader, deeper and more difficult than the question of
knowing [83] the truth. But ethics does seem to presuppose that you can know the truth,
and that there is a method of reaching the truth; values seem to presuppose facts; values
seem to be built on facts. Surely values built on falsehoods will never stand. So a
summary of our main conclusions about human knowing will serve as a jumping off
point for our work in value ethics.
Our reprise of cognition will also serve as an example of the method of selfappropriation in action. It is a method, namely, "a normative pattern of recurrent and
related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results".5 It is methodical in that
we state our procedure, apply the method, line up the results, check the conclusions,
clarify the terms, attain our position, and account for other views. The method of selfappropriation can be seen to be effective, to be critical and verifiable in the limited case
of knowing the facts. We can use the same method to apply to the knowing of values,
and then to deciding and acting according to true values.
2.1 Invariant Set of Interrelated Cognitional Activities
The starting point is people as they are in their native confusion and
bewilderment. Theories of knowledge abound; but each theory seems to contradict the
one that came before it. Why are there so many theories, so many disagreements, such a
variety of approaches, so many arbitrary assertions about the power or limits of human
knowing? We found that epistemology was in need of a new foundation, an agreed
starting point, a new method. We found that method in cognitional self-appropriation.
We asked the question, What do you do when you know? Everybody has
experienced some successful examples of knowing, either in solving practical problems,
in solving theoretical puzzles, in applied mathematics, in experimental science, in word
96
games, chess and the like. Our focus was on the pattern of activities underlying the
solving of puzzles. Solutions do not come immediately, do not come without a struggle,
do not come without invoking a series of related activities. We appealed to our own
personal experience, because it is here that we have privileged access to examples of
successful knowing. Initially, we were not interested in theories of knowledge but in
[84] the experience of knowing; describe what you do when you engage in a problem
seeking a solution.
The process seems to start when we question something presented to our senses.
It may be a strange object and we ask, what is it; or a leaking pipe and we ask, how can
we fix it; it may be an unfamiliar person and we ask, who is he? There are two elements
here, the presentation of sense and the question. We are presuming the structure of
sensitive knowing characteristic of purely animal knowing continuing to operate in us.
Our sensitive activities of imagining, remembering, coordinating, instinctive reacting,
seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling, we share with animals. The intelligent
question marks the emergence of the purely human knowing, transforming sensitive
knowing into a knowing of universals, of abstract laws, and of universal principles.
The question can be a why, a what, a where, when, how etc. It is intending a
solution but does not know what it is. The question is the dynamism behind the process
of finding a solution. But to be able to formulate a question you must know something
about the matter in hand, some knowns from which we can work to the unknowns.
The question sets the criteria for what will constitute a correct answer. Aristotle referred
to the active intellect as the aspect of taking the initiative, throwing light on images so
that the potentially intelligible will become actually intelligible. The question
illuminates the data with a view to sorting out the relevant and the irrelevant, the
significant and the insignificant. The question initiates the procedure, aims the process
Value Ethics
97
in a certain direction, focuses on finding the correct solution, and continuously rejects
irrelevant or inadequate solutions.
Direct insight is the pivot between puzzlement and getting it, seeing the point,
grasping the idea, getting the solution. The stronger the desire to know, the more we are
likely to find the solution; if you have no personal interest in finding a solution, you
probably won't. Understanding comes suddenly and unexpectedly; we cannot force it,
we cannot presume upon it; we can merely set the conditions which are favourable to
the occurrence of insight. Insight pivots between images and ideas; the data is given in
the senses, the imagination and [85] memory; but the solution is an idea, a definition, a
universal. It is a function of inner conditions of tension, training, concentration, interest
and desire rather than outer condition of time and place; Archimedes found his solution
not in his laboratory but while bathing. The first act of understanding is difficult, a
personal struggle, a triumph; but the insight passes into the habitual texture of the mind;
once you have grasped the correct definition of a circle then each new circle is simply
another example of how the definition works; we do not have to start again with the
question of what is a circle.
Understanding is passive in the sense that it comes, we receive the insight; we
set the conditions but wait for the ideas to come. Understanding is active in that we ask
the questions, search for relevant examples and images, try out various strategies, and
concentrate on the matter in hand. Human understanding is always an idea related to an
image; a form emerging from a phantasm; it is an understanding of what has been
experienced. There is a very basic strategy for answering any question, namely, identify
and name the knowns, identify and name the unknowns, combine the knowns and
unknowns in equations or examples or juxtapositions. Anticipate the solution, write
down the conditions the solution will have to fulfil. Work forward; work backwards.
Sometimes analysis works, sometimes synthesis is more effective. There is a heuristic
98
structure operating; thinking is purposive; there is a grand strategy; we can work from
the relatively unknown to the known.
Understanding can be expressed in words, which can either be clear or confused,
undifferentiated or differentiated, descriptive or explanatory. Formulating is a process
by which we put clearly into words the scope of the idea. It is easy enough to recognize
a circle when you see one, but to define it correctly is another thing. Socrates could
recognize individual instances of injustice, but could not find a universal definition. We
seek for clear and distinct ideas as opposed to confused and ambiguous ideas.
Philosophers are continually challenging one another, what do you mean by that
statement? There is a continuous call for further clarity, definition, distinctions,
qualifications, reservations; meaning what you say, and saying what you mean. [86]
Some think that once you have clear and distinct ideas you have certain
knowledge but that is a dangerous illusion. A further question arises at this point,
namely, are these definitions correct, does this solution work, can this possibility be
verified in the real world. There have been many theories of astronomy, but which of
them is true? Aristotle distinguished between the question asking for further information
and the question asking, is it true. The truth question is recognized by the fact that the
anticipated answer is simply, Yes or No, Is it true or not? Is it correct? Is it so? Does it
work? Is this the solution we were looking for? This is the critical question. Ideas,
definitions, concepts, laws, generalizations, formulations, can belong to the world of
science fiction as much as to the real world. Presuming that we are asking questions
about the real world, then, we must ask and answer the critical reflective question. The
question for reflection can only be answered after understanding and formulating,
clearly and distinctly. We ask the critical question about what we have already
understood. Is it correct? presupposes a sufficient understanding of 'it'.
Value Ethics
99
The question for reflection sets the criteria for a correct answer. How can you
know that this is the correct solution? Well, test it out, think it through to the end. Have
you sufficient evidence or not? Is there counter evidence? Are there gaps in the data? Is
there a clear link between the evidence and the conclusion? We ask these kinds of
questions in commonsense examples of mending pipes, fixing computers, diagnosing
noises in your car. We ask in mathematics when we can usually work backwards to
check if the answer is correct. We ask in experimental science where we can often
construct the crucial experiment. We do so in philosophy where we still must be able to
point to evidence for the truth of our conclusions. So we find that the reflective insight
has a basic structure on the lines of the hypothetical syllogism: Is B true? If A, then B;
But A, Therefore B. The question for reflection demands that a conclusion can only be
affirmed if there is a sufficiency of evidence to show that it is true.
The judgment is where truth is reached, where the true solution is found, where
hypotheses are verified in particular instances. The judgment is an affirmation or denial;
it is a mental act, a taking re-[87]sponsibility for what we hold to be true, or certain, or
probable or false. The cycle is completed and the original question has reached a term.
If we have sufficient evidence, it is only reasonable to affirm or deny. If we have
insufficient evidence it is only reasonable to postpone affirming or denying. We make a
certain personal commitment in the judgment, we take a personal stand. A certain
closure is reached, no further pertinent questions arise, the matter is finished, we can go
on to other fruitful questions and inquiries.
These activities that we have been identifying are structurally related to one
another. The later cannot occur without the earlier. We can summarize the position in
terms of three levels of activity. On the first level of experience the senses are
operating sometimes under the guidance of questions, sometimes not. On the second
level of understanding we ask questions for intelligence, invite acts of understanding,
100
and formulate clear hypotheses. The third level is that of judgment where we ask
questions for reflection, invite acts of reflective understanding producing judgments of
truth. (See diagram) We use the simple formula of experiencing, understanding and
judging as shorthand to encompass this manifold of interrelated activities.
You can experience without asking further questions and the process can stop
there. You can understand and not ask the further question of reflection and you end
with a hypothesis. Or you can ask the further question and complete the process of
knowing. But you cannot have activities of the third level without presuming that you
have understood the hypothesis and know what it is about. You cannot understand
unless you are understanding something; and that something is ultimately given in
experience. Cognition is a structure where some activities presuppose and go beyond the
more elementary acts. Knowing is not accomplished in a single act but in a series of
interrelated acts.
Thus, we can define knowing as a set of interrelated cognitional activities,
beginning with the question of data and ending with the judgment of truth. It is
complicated, mediated, discursive, difficult and very human. It is not experience alone,
which tends to be the em-[88]piricist position, for example Hume. It is not
understanding alone which seems to have been Descartes position. It is not judgment
alone which seems to have been Kant's position. It is not intuition a simple immediate
direct look as proposed by the phenomenologists. How can we make such seemingly
arrogant assertions? Because we have attended to our own experience of knowing, the
data of our own consciousness and that is what we have found.
2.2 Immanent and Operative Norms
In our efforts to understand we usually discover fairly quickly that there is a
right way to do it and a wrong way.
Value Ethics
101
We usually discover that it is best to pay very careful attention to the data that is
given. It does not help to be selective and ignore large areas of what is given. It does not
help to screen out anything that might lead to an unpleasant conclusion. It helps to have
an open mind, to examine carefully all the relevant data, to be attentive to discrepancies,
peculiarities, differences which might be a clue to understanding. Look again, look
carefully, look attentively, if you want to describe accurately and understand correctly.
So we can summarize this in the precept, be attentive.
A student looks for advice on how he can improve his grades. So I advise him to
develop a good method of study, to take good notes, to concentrate on the essentials, to
focus on the important matters, to read the best books, to pick out the significant
chapters, to work on central issues. Finally, in exasperation I blurt out, be intelligent!
Unfortunately, the basic problem is that the unintelligent student finds it hard to
distinguish the important from the unimportant, the basics from the elaborations, the
best texts from the worst, the significant events from the insignificant. It is the work of
intelligence and only intelligence to make these distinctions. Rules, laws, study
methods, techniques, tricks, procedures, logic, can never be a substitute for intelligence.
So we can formulate our second precept as, be intelligent.
Juries work on the principle of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Our whole
legal system is built on this presupposition. But we are en-[89]titled to ask what is
reasonable? You can give guidelines, you can distinguish circumstantial from direct
evidence, primary and secondary sources, truthful or dubious witnesses, interested or
disinterested sources of evidence, motives, etc. But in the end, if you do not already
know what reasonable is, it cannot be taught. Being reasonable means balancing the
evidence to the conclusion, assessing probabilities or certainties, following the evidence
and not prejudice, bias, emotional involvement, etc. One is expected to have reasonable
102
grounds for what we hold to be true. So we can briefly state our third precept as to be
reasonable.
These precepts do not come from logic; they come from the way the human
mind works. If you want to find the correct solution, these are the precepts that you have
to follow. They are the precepts which any intelligent and reasonable person would
follow even if he knows nothing about logic or cognitional structure. These norms are
immanent and operative in our knowing; they come from the inside not from the
outside. This is what it is to know correctly. There are few persons who would espouse
the contrary of these precepts and devote themselves to being inattentive, unintelligent,
and unreasonable. These precepts are the starting point from which rules are devised in
logic, in particular methodologies, in procedures of investigation. We call these
precepts, to be attentive, intelligent and reasonable, the transcendental precepts because
they apply universally, to all categories, in all cultures, at all times, where ever the
human mind seeks knowledge.
Start with people as they are; begin with the human mind as it unfolds in correct
and mistaken procedures. We can actually recognize correct answers when we find
them. We can actually recognize mistakes and correct them. We are involved in a selfcorrecting procedure of knowing. The structure we build up is basically unrevisable; it
is so fundamental that it cannot be wrong. If we were to discover basic flaws in our
theory then we would have to attend to new evidence, understand the new theory, and
affirm the truth of the new theory in a judgment. But that would involve invoking the
structure that we are trying to go beyond. Any theory of knowledge therefore must be
coherent with the activities involved in producing it. Performance of [90] knowing must
be coherent with the content or objectification of that process.
3 Consciousness
Value Ethics
103
This account of cognitional activities and norms is a summary of cognitional

theory and epistemology using self-appropriation as a method. Our present project is to
extend the same method and procedure to the field of value ethics. Can we identify the
invariant, interrelated activities involved in judgments of value, decisions and actions?
Can we identify the immanent and operative norms? What method can we follow in
order to achieve that kind of self-knowledge? Can we start with people as they are and
apply a dialectical criticism to distinguish good behaviour from bad?
In our first chapter we have rather exhaustively reviewed the methods used in all
the main traditional and contemporary schools and evaluated them. It is now our task to
outline our own method clearly and precisely. The method involves starting with
subjects as they are, you and I, in all the concreteness of our real situation. We are
trying to identify what makes a subject a moral subject. What are the activities we
perform which have moral import? How do we describe, identify and verify these
activities, not just for you or for me but for all human persons?
The method we use is that of self-appropriation: taking possession of ones own
interiority, becoming aware, identifying and taking responsibility for moral obligation,
deliberating, moral value judgments, decisions and actions. But what is this method of
self-appropriation? How can you look at your own activities? How can you take
possession of your own mind? How can you be aware of your own mental acts? It is not
an entirely new method but, as it goes against some strongly ingrained contemporary
prejudices, it will be necessary to explain and defend the method before applying it.
Our first task is to make a personal identification of awareness, of consciousness
as immanent and reflexive. We then explain self-appropriation as a method, how it is to
be used, what resources can help [91] us in our task, and how it is possible to have
verifiable knowledge of private mental acts.
3.1 The Experience of Being Conscious
104
To be conscious is commonly understood to mean to be awake, to be aware, to

be noticing what is going on and reacting to it. To be unconscious is to be unaware, to
be asleep, to be under anaesthetic, to have received a blow on the head and so to be
unconscious. 'Conscious' is grammatically an adjective; it must go along with a noun.
So you can talk about a conscious act, a conscious person, a conscious decision, a
conscious animal. Or you can say, he is conscious, I am conscious, I was not conscious,
etc. 'Consciousness' is the abstract noun made from the adjective. It simply refers to the
state of being conscious or aware. It seems to be a long difficult philosophical word, but
it simply refers to the common experience of being aware as opposed to the state of
being unaware. 'Conscience' is a noun referring specifically to our awareness of moral
guilt or righteousness; we will deal with that later.
The Latin origin is from con-scire, knowledge that goes along with. Aquinas
does use the word conscientia to refer to conscience, but for him it was an activity of the
intellect telling you the right thing to do. I do not think he had an equivalent of
conscious or consciousness simply as an awareness. It seems these terms were first used
by Hobbes and Locke. In the 19th and 20th centuries, they were very commonly used in
philosophical vocabularies. Even though it is a very simple notion, philosophers
contrive to make it difficult and to misconstrue its import. The big mistake seems to be
to think of consciousness as the same as knowing, as any kind of activity that goes on in
the head, as some kind of faculty, as a concept to be defined, as something abstruse and
mysterious. On the contrary, consciousness is an everyday experience; it is simply an
experience of being aware, awake; conscious as opposed to being unaware, asleep, or
unconscious.
In my early teaching days, I used to approach this topic of consciousness with
some trepidation, laden with texts, references, definitions and distinctions. The students
would be equally in awe, brows [92] furrowed, furiously taking notes, grappling with
Value Ethics
105
this most difficult of concepts. In my more mature years, I start with an exercise from
De Mello designed to help people to pray.6 It is simply an exercise in awareness. Can
you find a quiet place, find a comfortable position, put away distractions, and think of
nothing for five minutes. Empty your mind of thoughts, distractions, images; quiet all
mental activities, be simply at peace, complete silence of the mind. Students report that
it is quite difficult to attain complete silence of the mind; easy to suspend thinking, not
so easy to stop images, memories, feelings, flitting about, attracting us like little Sprites.
My point is that, whatever success you can have in arresting activities, there always
remains an experience of the self trying to be silent. Assuming that you do not fall
asleep, there is always a self that is aware, a subject that is conscious, You are still
around. Consciousness is first and foremost a simple experience of awareness, of being
conscious. Identify that experience for yourself, then you can move on to the
definitions! There are learned tomes written on consciousness and I am quite certain that
the authors have never attended to this simple experience of awareness of self.
Consciousness is such a basic, simple, primordial, pervasive experience that it is
difficult to put into words and articulate correctly.
Lonergan deals with consciousness in his Christology, where it is of some
importance to distinguish divine from human consciousness. He defines consciousness
as an Interior experience of oneself and ones acts, where experience is taken in the
strict sense of the word.7 Note that it is an experience, that it is an inner experience. It
is experience taken in the sense of an unstructured awareness presupposed by inquiry; it
is not experience in the sense that we describe a mature dentist or a wise judge as
experienced. It is an awareness of the self that goes along with the activities of the self.
In Insight consciousness is defined as, an awareness immanent in cognitional
acts.8 In cognitional acts, such as thinking or deliberating, we are clearly aware of
what we are thinking or deliberating about. But at the same time, in the same activity,
106
we are immanently aware of the self, who is the subject of the activities. Consciousness
is a quality of activities; some activities such as thinking and deliber-[93]ating are
conscious; some activities such as digesting and growing are usually not conscious. To
be conscious is simply to be aware of the subject at the same time as being aware of the
object of the activity. Consciousness is not another activity added on to the activity of
thinking; it is immanent in the thinking.
There is one awareness, which is normally focused on the object, with the
subject in the background. Consciousness is one awareness but it has two poles of
awareness, one primary awareness of the object and one concomitant accompanying
awareness of the self as the subject of the awareness. If I am aware of typing on this
computer, my main concentration is on the thoughts, sentences, keyboard, screen, and
so on. But there is a concomitant awareness that it is I who is the self who is typing, I
who is the self who is thinking, I who is the self who is looking. The key characteristic
of consciousness is this experience of the subject concomitant with the experience of the
object. It is nothing more complicated that the experience of watching a movie but at the
same time being aware that it is I who am watching the movie. The double awareness is
immanent in the activity, that is to say, the awareness is not separate from but part of the
activity.
There is one activity but two poles of awareness, an objective and subjective
one. It is not two activities. To be conscious is not in itself an activity; it is something
that goes along with an activity. This is the import of the word immanent implying
concomitant, going along with, part of, accompanying. It is not a quick look at an object
and then a quick look at the self; looking is a particularly inappropriate metaphor for
consciousness; looking is an activity, consciousness is an experience. The uniqueness of
consciousness comes from this characteristic of concomitant awareness of an object and
a subject in the same activity.
Value Ethics
107
To be conscious is an experience and not knowledge. It is given rather than

achieved. You do not have to study philosophy to be conscious. A child who is awake is
conscious; an uneducated person is usually aware of what he is doing and aware that it
is himself who is performing the actions. Aristotle was conscious of what he was do[94]ing writing the Ethics, but he was not able to articulate a definition of
consciousness. Descartes talked about the subject as a substance but did not identify the
experience of consciousness; but he was conscious nonetheless. You are conscious long
before being able to define consciousness. Theories about consciousness come after the
experience. What we want to be clear about is identifying this experience for yourself so
that you will know what we are talking about. It is a very simple experience, but
perhaps that is the difficulty.
Some philosophers seem to think that it is impossible to be aware of two things,
at the same time, in the same act.9 But this is because they think of consciousness as a
knowing, an activity in itself, a look outside and a look inside at the same time. These
are misinterpretations of the simple experience of being conscious of an object and at
the same time being conscious of the self who is looking at the object. Our appeal is not
to any theory or concept but to the simple experience. It is possible, because it happens
all the time.
Normally, the focus of attention is primarily on the object; it is only secondarily
an awareness of the self. Explicitly we are focussing on the object; implicitly there is an
awareness of self. Awareness of self is only an implicit part of our awareness when we
are playing football, solving a problem, digging a trench, studying philosophy. But it is
there in the background, an experience, immanent in the activities, implicit, indirect, and
concomitant. 'I am seeing the tree' is a rather simple conscious operation. The main
focus is on the tree as the object of seeing and awareness. The activity is basically
seeing but will usually involve some activities of understanding and identifying.
108
Immanent in the seeing is an awareness of the self as the one who is doing the seeing. It
is not a question of imagining what consciousness looks like but of identifying a very
simple experience.
Some might argue that machines can 'see' or 'hear'; that copying machines can
see, print and reproduce it; that computers can hear the human voice and respond to
commands. But few people would call these activities conscious. They are activities of
responding to sights and sounds, but there is no evidence of a concomitant awareness of
the self. [95]
Dogs and cats can also see and hear, and they are also conscious. In their activity
of seeing there is also some kind of subjective pole, some centre of control, some sense
of identity, and some ability to coordinate what is seen with an appropriate response.
After all there is a big difference between a dog that is asleep and one that is awake.
When using the sense of sight we usually focus on a central object but we have
peripheral vision up to about 180 degrees. In other words we can notice a movement at
right angles to us even though we are looking directly ahead. Similarly, we can be
centrally conscious of studying, but peripherally conscious of pangs of hunger. We may
be focusing directly on driving a car but we are also listening to music, smoking a
cigarette and even answering a telephone call; and being immanently aware of the self
who is the subject of these activities.
There are degrees of consciousness in that we can be well aware that we are
studying but not so well aware that the chair is very uncomfortable. One can distinguish
what is unconscious, preconscious and conscious. The unconscious is what cannot be
brought to consciousness or only with difficulty; it is repressed or denied. The
preconscious is what can be recalled to consciousness easily and freely, what is stored in
the memory and imagination. But there is a gradation in awareness. Motives can be
explicit, they can be implicit or they can be more or less unconscious. Various theories
Value Ethics
109
of consciousness give different technical meanings to unconscious and preconscious;

our concern is simply identifying the experience.
One can talk about a stream of consciousness. William James seems to have
identified and named this aspect of consciousness. Our awareness seems to be always
moving. We are aware at different levels in different degrees and our focus keeps
moving; when we are studying we find ourselves distracted by thought of football,
home, friends; we are moved along on a stream of images, ambitions, hopes, fears,
feelings; with a start we bring ourselves back to the library. It is a way of writing
perfected by William Faulkner and James Joyce; we follow the characters from the
inside, see the world as they see it, and follow their every stray fantasy or association.
[96]
Consciousness is an experience of unity. We perform many different activities
from eating, feeling, seeing, thinking, deciding and loving. But we are conscious that it
is the same self who is doing all these activities. Some activities depend on others,
thinking often depends on seeing. But what connects thinking to seeing? It is the one
self, subject, who is doing both the seeing and the thinking. This is the unity of
consciousness as given. Sometimes in life we experience disharmony between elements
of the personality. We are involved in too many activities and we cannot get it all
together. Or there is conflict between professed priorities and actual performance. Or
there is tension between financial and moral aspirations. Then we have to work at
integration, restore harmony, and achieve unity.
It is also an experience of continuity. When I wake up in the morning I usually
do not have to ask, who am I? I am conscious of a continuity stretching back fifty years
of the same self, doing and failing, feeling and thinking, healthy and sick. Many things
have changed but this sense of self does not seem to have changed. There is an
110
experienced continuity, a sameness, the same self but growing, changing, moving,
taking on various tasks moving through life's stages: different but still the same.
This experience is given. We do not teach children to be conscious. We do teach
them to be conscious of the danger of fire, or of their manners in front of guests, but if
they are unconscious this if rather fruitless. If it is not there we cannot make it to be. We
do not produce it by philosophical concepts or striving. We can expand or contract our
consciousness, but it is given as a datum at the beginning.
3.2 Levels of Consciousness
If we define 'to be conscious' as an experience of self immanent in activities of
knowing and doing, then, the experience of self will vary according to the kind of
activity involved. The acts determine the quality of the consciousness proper to that
level.
1. Empirical consciousness is characteristic of our activities at the level of sense.
It is a consciousness that goes along with activities of imagining and remembering;
touching, smelling, tasting, seeing and [97] hearing; feelings, impulses, instincts and
desires. In this sense we can say that animals are conscious. There is a difference
between a dog that is awake and one that is asleep. When the dog is asleep he is
unconscious; when he is awake he is conscious empirically. Before the emergence of
intelligence and will, the baby is conscious empirically. With the emergence of
questioning, naming, talking and thinking comes the possibility of intellectual
consciousness.
2. Intellectual consciousness. Humans can ask questions about their experience
and set the conditions for the emergence of understanding. Ideas emerge from images,
the universal from the particular, the abstract from the concrete. Now we have a
different kind of activity, a different level of consciousness and an awareness of self
characteristic of this level of activity. Students do a lot of thinking, arguing, studying,
Value Ethics
111
reading, research, writing, listening, understanding. They enter further into a world
mediated by meaning. This is a higher level of activity than that of mere sensing; it is a
different quality of consciousness that accompanies the activities.
3. Rational consciousness. It is not enough to have ideas and hypotheses; we are
usually in search of true propositions and correct explanations. The critical question
arises, is it true? This sets us off on another track, assembling evidence, weighing the
evidence, assessing the connection between the evidence and the conclusion. We are
preparing to take a stand as rational persons, to take responsibility for our opinions. It is
a different set of activities characterized by a higher level of rational consciousness of
self.
4. Moral consciousness. We constantly face the question as to what is the right
thing to do, what are our priorities, how do we spend our time, what is worthwhile, what
is of real value. We work out our priorities, we deliberate on our values, we formulate
goals and targets, we consider alternatives, we commit ourselves in value judgments.
Then, we decide to act or not to act, to go with our convictions of right and wrong, or
yield to the temptations of self-interest or advantage. The consciousness characteristic
of these activities is called conscience. [98]
We have devoted many pages to talking about consciousness. In itself it is a very
simple experience, an awareness of self immanent in awareness of activities and objects.
What is important is identifying that experience for yourself. If you do not do that now
or have not done it already, then, all that is said in the rest of this text will be so much
gibberish. It is not a complicated notion, but it is necessary to be precise in the
definition so that we can be clear about the process of self-appropriation. It is difficult to
deny this notion of consciousness it is hard to read a book and be unconscious at the
same time.
3.3 Reflexive Consciousness
112
Is it possible to shift the focus of awareness from the intended content of

cognitional activities to the activities themselves? Is it possible to focus on the activities,
by which we know or intend objects? This is all that is meant by reflexive
consciousness. It is not another kind of awareness but a shifting of awareness from the
content intended to the activities by which they are intended.
Again it seems to be possible because we are doing it all the time. If your doctor
asks you how are you feeling, you are usually able to give a detailed account of your
aches and pains, your feelings of loss of appetite, or fatigue or blurred vision; how these
internal symptoms have changed over the last day. If you are doing a post-match chess
analysis, you can ask your opponent, what did you intend by moving your knight to
queen four on your fifteenth move. He can give a detailed reply outlining his thoughts,
expectations, reasoning, anticipations and fears regarding possible continuations and
combinations. If you are visiting your psychiatrist you are usually able to recount your
dreams, to describe your motivations, to express your anxieties. If you are accused of
misconduct you can usually defend yourself with detailed descriptions of your
intentions, your motives, your justifications and excuses for the alleged behaviour. We
seem to be able to give an account of our feeling, our experiences, our thinking, our
dreams, our reasoning and our moral arguments. It does not call for special training or
expertise to do so in this commonsense mode. Thus, it seems that we are able to
reflexively shift the focus of attention from objects to the activities by which we intend
objects. [99] Can this ability be used systematically, explicitly, methodically in
examining how we understand, how we evaluate and how we decide? This seems to
have been possible in the field of understanding and judging; after all it has already
been done and so it must be possible.10 Is it possible to use the same method in
examining our moral choices, our stand on what is of value, our motivations and
Value Ethics
113
actions? It would seem to be possible for that is what we are doing; but let us be very
clear about the method.
A method which systematically describes mental activities must be some form
of introspection, that is, a reflexive consciousness whereby we focus our attention
inwards on the activities, feelings and intentions of the mind. Introspection is not to be
conceived as looking inwards instead of outwards; looking is a poor metaphor for the
activity of introspection, just as it is a misleading image for knowing. If we try to look
inwards we will see very little; mental activities are strictly invisible, so it is not much
use looking for them. What we do is shift the focus of awareness from the object that is
being looked at, to the activity of looking; we shift awareness from moving the chess
piece, to the reasoning behind the move; from the act of misconduct to the motives and
intentions and feelings behind the behaviour.
Our normal, natural, spontaneous orientation seems to be towards the external
world, the objects of our senses, of grasping, seeing, tasting, smelling hearing. We are
attracted by bright colours; we are startled by loud noises, intrigued by strange smells.
We are at ease operating on objects, the child playing with coloured toys, the worker
cementing bricks in place, and the scientist collecting samples for examination.
Introspection is more demanding and difficult. In introspection we are describing not
objects but activities and states. Scientific samples can be put on the table, measured,
weighed, tested, preserved; everybody can see them and participate and check the
results. Mental activities on the other hand are fleeting, they start and stop, they cannot
be frozen, they cannot be looked at, they are difficult to discern. But we do such
introspection already in a commonsense manner; so why not elevate this technique into
a systematic, critical method? [100]
One of the obvious difficulties is that it is hard to perform an activity properly
and at the same time to be doing introspection; it is hard to play football and at the same
114
time to analyze how well or badly you are playing. So introspection could more
correctly be called retrospection; we play football and the following day review the tape
and do the analysis. Similarly, for activities of knowing; we first attend to a puzzle,
work out the solution, check that it is correct; afterwards one can reflect back on what
you were doing, what images you used, how ideas came, what helped and what hindered
the process, what emotions were present; what were you doing for that half an hour that
it took you to solve the puzzle. Similarly, in the field of moral knowing and doing; it is
often retrospection as well as introspection. An examination of conscience usually
involves reviewing past actions, thoughts, and intentions with a view to moral
judgment. So these mental activities can be recalled, described, analyzed and
appropriated. They are fleeing in the sense that they do not stand still, pass quickly, but
in most cases can be remembered accurately and described just like the samples of the
scientist.
Empiricists have great difficulty accepting that such supposedly inaccessible,
private, fleeting mental activities can constitute data and so be verifiable. Scientists can
put their samples on the table; it is a public process, they can be measured, seen,
weighed and touched. The experiment can be repeated elsewhere, results checked and
so you seem to achieve 'objectivity'. But I cannot see what is going on in your head, and
you cannot see what is going on in my head and so how do you compare these private
mental acts to show that they are the same. In reply let us make a basic clarification
about verification and then show that it can be applied to the method of introspection.
For empiricists the verification lies in the seeing, in the sensible data presented
as proof, in the counting, the touching, and the weighing of scientific procedures. The
presupposition of this is that human intellectual knowing is fundamentally sensible in
origin, that all ideas, simple and complex come from the senses and that nothing beyond
Value Ethics
115
the sensible can be real. The procedure of verification is reduced to 'show me and I will
believe'; let me see the evidence and, then, I will see the conclusion. [101]
Our reply would be to ask what makes sensible data significant, that is,
meaningful in terms of a connection between a hypothesis and its verification. Why was
the seeing of the position of a star during an eclipse of the sun of such great significance
for proving Einstein's theory of relativity? What confers significance on sensible data?
A full account of scientific method would have to recognize three elements: theory,
verified, in instances. The instances are the sensible data experienced at a particular
time and place by the external senses. But it is theory that confers significance on the
data. Hypotheses are possible explanations or causes or correlations; they are products
of acts of understanding, sometimes concepts, definitions, axioms, principles, ideas that
are clearly different from sensible data. The verification is the judgment that this
sensible data are connected to the theory in such a way as to show that there is sufficient
evidence to affirm that it is correct. Hence there are three levels of operations going on
here; the forming of hypotheses in understanding, the reference to sensible
consequences in experience and the verification in judgment.
How then are descriptions of private mental acts verifiable? If I describe in detail
how I solved a particular puzzle and present this to students, they are able to recognize
the words, to identify the activity and to know what I am talking about. If I ask students
to describe their own acts of understanding I can recognize what they are writing about.
If one gives an example of remembering instead of understanding then we discuss the
difference between understanding and remembering. We identify the characteristics of
each activity; we note that animals can remember but cannot understand; remembering
refers usually to particular times and places whereas understanding usually produces
ideas; they are distinct activities; it does not take long to distinguish them; only
confusion will ensue if they are not distinguished. Communication about cognitional
116
activities can take place. It can lead to agreement; mistakes can be recognized and
corrected; so descriptions of mental acts are verifiable theory verified in instances.
Explanations of the relationship of cognitional activities to one another can be shown to
be correct, accurate, true by ref-[102]erence to each persons' awareness of their own
experience, in other words by of retrospection.
Fraud can occur in the empirical sciences; results can be forged, samples can be
doctored, the instruments can we interfered with, photographs can be altered. But
usually the scientific community will discover the fraudster by a process of comparing
results, repeating experiments in different places, an on-going process of correction is in
place. The same can be said for data of consciousness. Mistaken accounts of the process
of understanding can be shown to be mistaken. Truncated accounts of moral judging can
be shown to be inadequate.
We can distinguish data of sense from data of consciousness. Data of sense
refers to the data given in the experience of the senses; what are given in imagining,
remembering, feeling, seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and touching. Data is from the
Latin 'datum' meaning simply the 'given' before understanding, before interpretation,
before conceptualizing, before judgment. I am using the term data as raw data given in
the senses; not in the sense of census data or economic data or statistics. The higher
animals operate in terms of data of sense, activities of sensing, alone. The data of sense
is divided up among the empirical sciences as their starting point, their area of
investigation, the material object of their science. Thus, astronomers study the heavenly
bodies, botanists study plants, palaeontologists study fossils, etc.
Data of consciousness is what is given when we shift our attention from objects
of sense to the activities and feelings involved in sensing and understanding. When we
focus our attention on the activities of our mind, we are focusing on data of
consciousness. Just as the biologist can be conscious of frogs and dogs, so we can be
Value Ethics
117
conscious of the activities of seeing, hearing, understanding, desiring, and questioning.

Data of consciousness is simply given in experience, without selection or interpretation
or understanding. We have emphasised that consciousness is first of all an experience,
and then we can try to understand and define it. The first time we attend to mental
activities, we find a jumble of confusing and overlapping ac-[103]tivities which do not
seem to have any order or sequence. But once we start naming, describing, isolating
and identifying the activities, they begin to fall into recognizable patterns of interrelated
activities. The process of self-appropriation starts with this given data of consciousness
with a view to understanding the invariant pattern of relations existing between the
activities.
I can shift attention to my own thoughts, desires and feeling and have a direct
immediate awareness of them. I cannot become aware of your thoughts and feelings,
except mediately through your expression and my external senses. I have privileged
direct immediate access to the data of my own consciousness. Nobody else has such
access to my inner life. Nobody can see directly what is going on there. I can tell lies
and get away with it. You could say that data of sense are mediated by the senses of
seeing and hearing but we have immediate access to the data of consciousness; we are
nearer to the latter than to the former.
Furthermore, I am free to describe data of consciousness in as much detail as I
like. They are available to me just as the samples of the biologist are available to him.
Joyce takes seven hundred pages to narrate the thoughts and fantasies of Mr. Leopold
Bloom in the course of one single day. We are not so interested in details, but in the
patterns of relationships between the activities; we are not novelists, but scientists.
Some do not clearly distinguish between data and facts. For us this is a crucial
distinction. Data are given in experience; facts are affirmations of a judgment after
understanding the data. Facts, no matter how elementary, involve understanding and
118
judgment. Animals are aware of data only; humans can move from data, to
understanding, to judgments. Data are given in experience; facts are truths affirmed in a
judgment. A cow can experience grass as green; it is only a human being who can
experience colour, distinguish, compare and name colours and affirm in a rational
judgment that this grass is green. Empiricists tend to conflate three quite distinct
activities of seeing, understanding and judging. We distinguish clearly three levels [104]
of cognitional activity; data is given at the level of experience; judgments are reached at
the third level of judging.
Consciousness is not self-knowledge but it is self-awareness it is the beginning
of self-knowledge. Looking at samples of butterflies in a cabinet is not the same as
naming, identifying, defining and dividing them, as a biologist would do. Similarly,
being aware of mental activities is not the same as knowing them. First, there is an
awareness of activities and we have data. Then we go on to name, to identify, to
distinguish and compare these activities. Thus we are using the method of selfappropriation and are on the way to self-knowledge. We reach self-knowledge when we
can affirm that our identification of the relations between activities is the correct one.
Then, we have another instance of theory verified in instances, except that in this case
we are starting with the data of consciousness and finishing with self-knowledge.
Consciousness can be undifferentiated as in the child or the person of common
sense, or it can be differentiated into the many possible specializations of intelligence. It
is undifferentiated when no distinctions are made between feelings and thinking,
between activities and contents, between practical and theoretical. Common sense in the
first stage of meaning is generally undifferentiated. With the development of
intelligence you can have a specialization in terms of science, or in terms of scholarship,
or in terms of holiness, or in terms of artistic development. These are differentiations of
Value Ethics
119
consciousness each with its own specialized patterning of sets of intellectual operations
appropriate in each area.
3.4 Misconceptions about Consciousness.
As we have seen, to be conscious is an experience or an awareness; to be
unconscious is to be unaware of anything. Consciousness, then, is primarily an
experience whereby in being aware of objects we are also at the same time aware of
ourselves. Concomitant consciousness is awareness of the self immanent in the activity
of knowing or relating to objects. Reflexive consciousness is when we shift the focus of
awareness from objects to activities. In reflexive consciousness the primary focus is on
the intentional activities, the secondary [105] focus is the objects intended.
Introspection is a conscious activity, a focusing of awareness from objects to activities;
but awareness of the self is immanent in the activity of introspecting it is still 'I' who is
the self doing the introspecting.
This authentic notion of consciousness Lonergan names consciousness as
experience; to this he opposes a notion of consciousness as perception.11 Consciousness
as perception conceives of consciousness as an act of perception, an act of knowing,
where we know the self in an immediate intuition. But in perception there is already a
distinction between the subject who perceives, the act of perceiving, and the object that
is perceived. In consciousness as perception, then, the subject perceives the subject
through an act of perception or intuition. But this makes consciousness a distinct and
separate act from acts of seeing or thinking. Acts of thinking cannot be immanently
conscious, if consciousness is a separate act. Very strange conclusions follow from the
assumption that consciousness is perception, when it is applied to the consciousness of
Christ.
In contemporary science and philosophy, the most common misconception of
consciousness is to bypass the element of experience and immediately engage in a
120
discussion of the concept of consciousness. The presumption is that consciousness is a

quintessentially obscure philosophical idea, which must be dealt with in an
appropriately mystifying manner. If you talk about concepts with no reference to
experience then you can formulate, compare, define and divide concepts in whatever
way you wish ad infinitum, but you have no criterion of truth because you have
bypassed the experience to which consciousness is referring.12 The discussion becomes
a verbal tangle without a basis in experience, a formulation of a concept without
understanding.
Without reference to the experience of being conscious, you enter into a
conceptualism where knowledge is knowledge of concepts, where abstraction is
impoverishing, where definitions and division of concepts can go on ad infinitum. There
is a mentality which sometimes emerges in philosophy or history of philosophy which is
totally absorbed in concepts, ideas, hypotheses, definitions, learning, being [106] clever,
living in a cerebral world; but it has nothing to do with life, with experience, with the
real world. It is conceptualism rather than intellectualism.
In intellectualism a concept is an effort to formulate in a clear, correct,
explanatory manner a definition or a theory or an explanation of certain data of
experience or sense. But forming concepts presupposes understanding and
understanding presuppose data that are to be understood. The data we are starting with
is the experience of awareness of self immanent in the activities of knowing objects. We
distinguish conscious, from unconscious and from preconscious. We distinguish
conscious and intentional. We distinguish awareness from activities such as thinking,
knowing or deciding. We have distinguished concomitant and reflexive consciousness;
we have distinguished, differentiated and undifferentiated consciousness, degrees of
consciousness, levels of consciousness. We start off with an experience, we refer back
to the experience; we understand and explain and define the experience. So the starting
Value Ethics
121
point for our whole study is a simply common experience of being conscious. Many
experts on consciousness seem to jump this first elementary step on which all else
depends.
Another common misconception of the meaning of consciousness is to identify
it with particular activities, with thinking, or perception, or anything that goes on in the
head. If consciousness is identified with thinking then, animals are not conscious, and
we are not conscious when we are not thinking. But this does not seem to fit the facts.
Consciousness is not a separate activity beside or apart from thinking, perceiving,
choosing, and evaluation. There are not two activities, (1) I am thinking and (2) I am
aware of my thinking. Descartes did not identify a notion of consciousness. In the "I
think, therefore I am", you have the I conceived as a spiritual substance, the activity of
thinking, and the affirmation of existence; but you do not have consciousness. This is an
incomplete 'turn to the subject'. He is affirming a self, a thinking substance and an
existence, but has not been able to distinguish conscious and unconscious. [107]
When we assert that animals are conscious, some immediately conclude that we
are asserting that animals can think. Animals see, hear, remember, respond, desire, are
aggressive or friendly, they are conscious at the level of empirical consciousness. They
have external and internal senses. Many activities can be conscious other than thinking.
Sometimes animals are awake and conscious; sometimes they are asleep and
unconscious. Thinking is one thing; being conscious is another they are as different as
chalk from cheese.
Finally, there are the misconceived efforts to explain away consciousness, to
reduce it to the level of neurons, or electrical impulses, biology or sheer physics and
chemistry. A typical argument would identify consciousness as an invention of
evolution to give a competitive advantage in the struggle for survival. Therefore, it is
nothing more than an epiphenomenon of Darwinian evolution. It is reduced to the level
122
of its origins, its locus of emergence to what it was before it emerged. We are not here
concerned with the historical emergence of consciousness, or the biological conditions
for the emergence of consciousness. Such studies can be enlightening and can contribute
to our understanding. But there is the explaining of the origin of something and there is
the explaining away, the reduction of consciousness to some twist of evolutionary fate.
Our focus is the present, the reality of your consciousness, the richness of this notion,
and coming to terms with its possibilities.
4 Self-Appropriation as Method in Ethics
We have devoted considerable time and effort to be clear about consciousness
and our ability to be aware of data of consciousness, to describe, identify, define and
interrelate conscious activities, and to verify whether these definitions or explanations
are true or false. This preliminary work was necessary to prepare the way for explaining
self-appropriation. This is to be our method of ethics, the method appropriate in the
stage of interiority, the method that is intelligent, critical, foundational, and progressive.
The method can be called introspection, but as introspection is commonly
misunderstood as looking inwards, Lonergan preferred to use the term selfappropriation or intentionality analysis. [108]
To 'appropriate' is to make ones own, to take possession of oneself, to be in
control of oneself. Self-appropriation emphasizes that it is the subject who is
responsible for this process of self-awareness. It is to become aware of ourselves as
moral subjects, to recognize the feelings, inclinations, ambitions, motives, prejudices
and biases operating in the field of moral judgments, decisions and actions. This process
is first experience, then naming and identifying, then defining relative to one another.
Moral philosophy often emphasizes information, memory work, historical knowledge,
ability to manipulate concepts, comparing theories, expanding familiarity with sources
in scholarship; it can be very cerebral and conceptualist. Self-appropriation calls us back
Value Ethics
123
to ourselves, to recognize the meaning of moral terms in our experience, to evaluate

theories in terms of how they help to live a moral life.
Intentionality analysis seems to have been initiated by the phenomenologists. It
recognizes that all our knowing, deciding and doing are intentional. They are inspired
by a common intention and an intention specific to each activity. Seeing intends what is
to be seen, the visible. You cannot have a seeing without something that is seen;
grammatically it is a transitive verb; it must have an object, you see something. In
asking questions you are expressing an intention of finding the answer. Most of our
mental activities are both intentional and conscious. Moral questioning, value
judgments, decisions and actions are also intentional; they intend to achieve true values,
goodness, or happiness or pleasure. Phenomenologists did initiate a process of
analyzing and identifying the activities of the mind. Unfortunately, they conceived of
knowing as a simple, direct, immediate intuition of essences. Hence, they fail to
recognize the struggle initiated by asking the question, the active and passive aspects of
understanding, the formulation of concepts, the reflective insight and the final act of
judging. Phenomenology has given us the method, but not the results. Most of our study
will be a phenomenology of the activity of evaluating and deciding; by phenomenology
here we simply mean an accurate description leading to an explanation of the activities
and feelings involved in valuing and deciding. [109]
4.1 Resources for Intentionality Analysis
We are not suggesting that everyone go off into an isolated corner and starts
self-appropriation in solitary confinement. If you just look at the stars in the night sky
by yourself, you will understand very little and make slow progress in astronomy. You
need an astronomers guide, a map of the stars, a diagram of the planets, a compass,
binoculars; it is helpful to know where and when to look and what to expect. Similarly,
with self-appropriation; we need help from others, we need maps, we need to be told
124
what to look for and where. This section gives some indications of the help we get from
exercises, biography, literature, psychology and philosophy. This text itself is written on
that assumption that we can draw a more complete, accurate detailed map of mental
moral activities than has hitherto been available.
1. Awareness movements. Our generation is familiar with the notion of
conscientization initiated by Paulo Friere as a pedagogy of the oppressed.13 Using this
method we become more conscious our situation, the fact that we are being oppressed,
and our power to free ourselves. These days we are becoming more conscious of gender
issues, the value of the environment, the depletion of the ozone layer, the number of
endangered species, justice and peace issues. These issues are being brought to our
attention, we are being made more aware of them, we are expected to do something
about it, to change our priorities and behaviour.
There are many trends, which call for expressing your feelings, your ambitions,
your hopes and fears. Career guidance needs answers to those kinds of questions in
order to give some professional help in choosing a path in life. Counselling involves
revealing your deep self, your problems, anxieties, fears and traumas; it involves
appropriating these feelings, recognizing them accepting them and coping with them.
Progoff initiated a movement of journaling as a method of recognizing the movements
in your life, the pulls, and counter pulls, the progress and decline, by way of
objectifying your feelings in a journal or diary.14 Enneagram15 and Myers-Briggs16 are
popular ways of recognizing your personality type, so that you can better use your
strong points and blunt the damage of your weak points. Awareness has even become a
prayer form when, instead of attending to gospel [110] stories or religious symbols, we
focus awareness on stillness or silence or the feelings at the tip of your nose.17 Any kind
of penitential service will invite us to an examination of conscience, to become aware of
our faults and failings, our actions and omissions. So in talking about self-appropriation,
Value Ethics
125
we are not invoking something entirely new, nor something alien to our culture and
times; it is more that our culture is crying out for an ethics based on self-awareness.
2. Exercises. When doing self-appropriation of cognitional activities it was
easy to compose puzzles, mathematical problems, crossword puzzles etc. to provoke the
activities of understanding and then to reflect back later on how each person managed to
reach the solution. It is relatively easy to compose such problems of varying degrees of
complexity; they can be designed to identify direct or inverse or reflective insights. It is
a flexible and useful pedagogical tool for intellectual self-appropriation. Are such
exercises available when it comes to appropriating moral activities? The difficulty is
that real value judgments, actual moral decisions and action belong to the real world of
persons and cannot be turned into an experimental learning experience. You cannot very
well send students out to steal, so that they will learn what it feels like to be a thief! But
many exercises can be devised through role plays, discussion exercises, case studies,
moral dilemmas, movies, etc. that help bring to the surface the feelings, values and
reasoning process of the participants.
Kohlberg's entire theory of stages of moral development rest on a technique of
moral dilemmas presented to children of varying age groups and asking them to judge
the behaviour of the person in the stories.18 The answers reveal the level of moral
reasoning reached by the child. Such techniques can be used to record moral reasoning,
evaluations and feelings in a more or less systematic way. The value clarification
movement also devised many discussion techniques, exercises, and games, role-plays
by which the participants become more aware of their actual value priorities.19 Cases of
conscience are a simple basic technique of moral education; what do you do if there is a
conflict between honesty and loyalty; can you rob the rich to help the poor; can you
perform a direct abortion if the health of the mother is in danger, etc. Such hypothetical
126
questions and situations can be a [111] useful pedagogical aid and can reveal moral
reasoning, feelings, priorities and values.
3. Biography and Autobiography. Self-appropriation is not just reading
yourself but reading yourself in others. The ethical dimension of life is not just about
specific decisions or actions but is about all lifes decisions and actions. In including the
ethical dimension we move to a philosophy of life or action. The whole drama and
tragedy and comedy of life are included. In knowing and understanding the decisions
and action of others, we better understand our own decisions and actions. The better we
understand others, the more we understand ourselves. One simple way of objectifying
good and evil is in the form of story. Children learn to distinguish good behaviour from
bad in nursery stories, cartoons, stories of heroes and villains, of animal stories, of
success and failure of good girls and bad girls. Growing up we form our ideals from the
lives of the saints, gospel stories, from famous politician, war heroes, great inventors,
football stars, etc. These give flesh to our ambitions, nourish our dreams, encourage us
in our endeavours.
Biography presents us with real life heroes. It helps to see the basic sameness of
the human condition in the diversity of cultures, situations, times and personalities; their
struggles in the big theatre of life are mirrored in the simplest ordinary humdrum
aspects of our daily life. Good biography and especially autobiography gives us the
inner person, not just the external facts. We penetrate into the mind of the person,
his/her ambitions, intentions and struggles. We learn not just of plaster saints or ideal
models, but of the real struggle between good and evil in everybody. We can learn from
the biographies of villains and thugs, despots and tyrants, saints and sinners, because
there is a potential for that in all of us. Our own ethical drama unfolds as a story; a past
we are all too familiar with; a present we are struggling with; a future that is unknown.
Value Ethics
127
In biography we see the whole unfolding of a human life in all its complications,
dimensions and implications its ups and downs.
4. Literature. Fiction takes leave of the limitations imposed by real life and
allows the author to create characters, imagine situations, [112] spin out stories as he
wishes. We identify or disidentify with his creations. It is enriching abstraction;
philosophers need to appreciate the diversity, richness individuality uniqueness of each
life and each situation and each person. The author can help us to see situations from
inside the head of someone else; we can go back in time, enter foreign cultures and
different classes. We form models of Mr Leopold Bloom, Hamlet, Lord Jim, Titus
Groan, George Smiley, etc. In moral philosophy we are looking for the invariants, the
absolutes, the foundations. But each one of us is an individual not an abstraction;
marriage is not just a definition, it is an individual drama. Reading good literature might
have more effect on people's behaviour than moral philosophy textbooks. Martha
Nussbaum argues for the central role of literature in moral development.20 Just as
knowledge of the individual complements our knowledge of the universal, so our
knowledge of literature complements our knowledge of moral philosophy. Our
perception of particular people and situations is somehow prior to our formulation of
abstract rules about people and situations. The classics of literature embody a deep
understanding of the human drama, its tragedy and comedy, and we continuously learn
from them about ourselves.
5. Empirical Psychology. We owe a debt to Erikson, Piaget and Kohlberg for
their contribution on stages of moral development these we will look at more closely
when we consider moral development. These are classical professional studies; even
though open to criticism, they seem to hit the mark and can be verified in our own
experience of moral growth or decline. The science of psychology has made a
contribution to our understanding of personality, temperament, character, motivation,
128
feelings, behaviour change, etc. Most of what we are doing in chapters three to nine is
psychology i.e. an accurate and precise description of how we actually make value
judgments and decisions. Psychology has made a valuable contribution to understanding
our real freedom and the limits imposed by inhibitions, repressions, compulsions, etc on
the true realization of our freedom. As moral philosophers we are interested in
behaviour not from a total point of view but from the moral point of view. [113]
Unfortunately, much psychology is limited because of a constricted view of the
human person as in behaviourism, or other empiricist views of human being. Such
psychology, instead of helping us to understand moral values, reduces them to the level
of experience. Feelings of guilt are not considered as a possible symptom of real guilt,
but are simply a problem to be rid of, so that we can get a good nights sleep. Good
psychology must start with an openness to all the levels of human operation, to a
recognition of the complex interaction between the levels and the centre of
consciousness in the free and responsible human person.
6. Philosophy. We have already outlined a great diversity of theories of
morals; we also gave a personal evaluation in terms of advantages and disadvantages.
The reason we were able to evaluate them was largely because of reference to personal
experience. For example does Kant's Categorical Imperative really illuminate the
experience of deciding to marry or even to divorce? Much of the complexity of the
experience seems to have been left out. Yet it is worth studying the history of moral
philosophy, because all the contradictory contributions can be seen as clarifications
leading towards a single goal. We can learn from their mistakes. We can construct
better systems; we can overcome the limitations of explanatory systems.
It is evident too that some of the best moral philosophers did use the method of
self-appropriation, albeit in a cursory and implicit manner. Socrates had taught that if
you have knowledge of the good you would automatically do it; one can only do evil
Value Ethics
129
out of ignorance he taught. Aristotle replies in his usual direct fashion, "Now this
reasoning is glaringly inconsistent with the observed facts:"(N.E. 1145b27). What are
the observed facts to which Aristotle is referring? They are the facts concerning human
behaviour, human thinking, knowing and doing. He identified four scenarios where a
person may have knowledge of the good and still not do it (1146b30-1147b17). He is
appealing to the facts of moral experience known only by some kind of introspection or
self-appropriation. He is pointing out inconsistencies between knowing and doing in the
actual behaviour of human beings. You usually find that good moral understanding is
based on an implicit appeal to the data of moral ex-[114]perience. Aquinas identified six
movements of the intellect and six activities of the will before we reach a final decision;
did this theory drop down from heaven or did he attend to what he actually does before
making a definitive decision?21
Good philosophy has the advantage of a correct notion of the human person as a
framework in which to find real moral activity and growth.
7. Contemporary Philosophy. There are many individual elements emerging in
contemporary philosophy, which favour or move towards self-appropriation as a
method in philosophy. We have already mentioned the intentionality analysis of the
phenomenologists which explicitly recognizes the possibility of treating mental
activities as data for description and analysis. Existentialism has turned to the subject,
not as a substance as in Descartes, but as experience, as struggling with the drama of
life, as subjectivity. It has focused on making choices, freedom, creating, dealing with
the absurd, feeling anxiety, facing death. There has been emerging a philosophy of
values which we deal with in our next chapter. So there have been individual positive
elements from various angles moving in the direction of interiority if in a somewhat
haphazard manner.
130
So we are not totally alone in our appeal to self-appropriation. We are not alone
in using it as a method of describing and defining moral evaluations and decision. We
have help from a number of quarters. If we are justified in appealing to the data of our
inner experience then we can do so methodically and critically. Just as the biologist
implement scientific method in reference to his data of external sense, so we too can
apply scientific method to the data of our conscious awareness. Just as the biologist is
methodical in collecting his samples, classifying, defining, observing experimenting, so
we too can be methodical and critical in dealing with the data of consciousness.
Empirical method is not limited to the data of sense; it can also be applied to the data of
consciousness with the same criteria operating. [115]
4.2 Content to Activities
We have seen in our outline of the history of moral philosophy the variety of
positions, methods, systems and codes of ethics. Often these traditions are quite at odds
with one another, technically incommensurable, meaning they share no common
principles or criteria of evaluation. If we look also at the variety of cultures with their
ethical teachings on marriage, warfare, property right, respect for life, etc. we find an
equally bewildering variety of beliefs and values. If we compare different eras of history
from prehistoric times to the present day we see more variety, more apparent
contradictions. So we have such a variety of contradictory theories, codes of conduct,
systems of evaluating, variety of rewards and punishments. One could spend more than
a life time collecting all the codes of ethics that have been promulgated in different
cultures at varying time.
We are forced to ask what do all of these have in common. Many, who are faced
with this variety, these contradictions and mutually incompatible systems, accept the
seemingly inevitable conclusion of relativism. Some look for absolutes in basic
propositions like the categorical imperative or do good and avoid evil or justice. Some
Value Ethics
131
look for absolutes in the sacredness of law and order, intrinsically evil acts, absolutes of
duty or the absolute of love. Some look for a core content, the essentials of any system;
strip away the variety and you are left with the core essentials; the variety is either by
way of exception or corruptions. It seems to me that as long as you are looking at the
content or cultural expression of ethical teaching you will never find the absolute or the
invariant. For this you have to turn to the activities and the norms operating in the
activities. Garrett Barden expressed this well:
The thesis propounded here is that there are, indeed, no given or innate
propositions; that our traditions do place us in different, and, at least
sometimes, mutually incompatible, horizons; but that our traditions,
with their irreconcilable basic presuppositions, are themselves not
ultimate; that what is ultimate is a set of operations that give rise to
traditions; that this set of ultimate operations is common and that,
consequently, we are not irredeemably confined within the limits of
our present selves.22 [116]
Barden seems to have written in response to MacIntyre's After Virtue.
He shows that in cognitional and ethical theory what is ultimate is the set of
operations, which produce ethical traditions and theories. Theories may seem
to be incompatible, incommensurable, contradictory; but they all derive from
human beings performing the same operations well or badly. These operations
are questioning, understanding, verifying and evaluating. These are the source
of all ethical traditions, systems theories and practices. He identifies these
operations but does not elaborate on them in great detail.
Fred Crowe on the same lines identifies the invariants as the activities
questioning, experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding; the invariants are to be
found in the structural relations between these operations distinguishing the way up and
the way down; then in applying these to the person in the concrete and to history in its
actual unfolding. 23
I would tentatively summarize these invariant, transcultural, and activities as:
132
(1) Questions of Evaluation. The question of what is worthwhile arises in every

context. We are faced with choices and we ask ourselves which is the correct or the best
alternative. What is the right thing to do?
(2) Process of deliberation. We set about evaluating the act itself, the
alternatives, the consequences, the end to be achieved; the advantages and
disadvantages for oneself and for others. We consult our feelings, our expectations, our
obligations, our fears, our guilt or shame. We understand what is at stake, what must be
done.
(3) Value Judgments. We come to a conclusion, we reach a value judgment, we
give our answer to the question, what is the right thing to do. We affirm in general or in
particular that this is right and that is wrong, this is honourable or dishonourable, this is
a value or a disvalue, this fellow is to be trusted, this other fellow is dishonest.
(4) Decisions. To do or not to do? To decide to implement the value judgment or
not? We decide to act. I will do it. The choice is made, posited, assented to. Even
though the decision is an interior [117] invisible act, it is crucial and full of moral
import. We are on the way to good or evil. There are many situations where we know
the right thing to do and do not do it. Aristotle, Aquinas and Lonergan recognize
situations in which in various ways we bring our knowing into line with our doing and
not the other way round.
(5) We carry out the decision, the process is completed, full moral selftranscendence has been achieved or failed. The action is irrevocable.
4.3 Activities to Norms
We perform these activities in response to desires, imperatives, feelings that
emerge from within. Some of these tendencies are purely self-centered, they are desires
for our own satisfaction, they are with a view to our success, they are purely selfinterested and greedy. The criterion we apply might be happiness, it might be pleasure,
Value Ethics
133
it might be utility, or it might be a mixture of them all. Can we also recognize a sense of
obligation operating? We seem to be obliged to look after our family, to tell the truth, to
respond to our conscience, to be responsible. Just as we discerned transcendental
imperatives operating in cognitional process, can we identify a transcendental
imperative operating in and through the activities of moral judgment, decision and
action? That will be the special task of chapters five and six.
5 What kind of Ethics will Emerge?
It should be clear by now that this is not a traditional textbook on ethics. It is not
proposing a list of rules to be followed, either general or specific. It does not give
answers to specific questions about stem cells, relations between the sexes, justice, or
honesty. It is not another theory about right and wrong based on principles, definitions
and deductions. Neither do we indulge in the oversimplification of claiming that this or
that single attribute is the key to ethical behaviour. So if we are clear about what we are
not expecting, then what kind of ethics are we hoping to emerge in this text? [118]
(1) It should be transcultural, invariant and universal, in that it goes to the
source of all moral obligation, valuing, deciding, acting and loving. It overcomes the
inherent limitations of theory to embrace the activities and norms which are common to
all human persons of whatever culture or time. It will be an ethic of value and valuing.
(2) It will be a personal ethic, namely, one based on appropriating the deepest
and best inclinations of the human heart. The whole person, head and heart, is included.
The whole of life is included, thinking, deliberating, judging, valuing, deciding acting,
feeling. It is an invitation to become a full human person, to realize potential, to develop
to full human maturity, autonomy and authenticity.
(3) It will be a verifiable ethics because it is based on the data of your own
consciousness, your own experience of moral judging and deciding. Every statement in
ethics should be verifiable in your own experience. Just as "every statement in
134
philosophy and metaphysics can be shown to imply statements regarding cognitional

fact",24 so every statement in ethics can be shown to imply statements concerning our
own experience of moral decision-making. We should, therefore, find a criterion by
which to judge theories and discard those that are clearly mistaken, incomplete, or
inadequate.
(4) It should be a maximalist ethics, as opposed to a minimalist ethics. It is not
just a list of what not to do, nor a list of what to do, but a recognition of the dynamic of
moral obligation leading to the fullest development of the integral human person. It is
not confined to the morality of individual acts, but includes attitudes, values, habits,
orientations underlying all individual actions. It is not just concerned with laws and
codes and external activities, but the source of the codes, the reason for the rules, the
function of rules in moral education and keeping order in society.
(5) It will be a creative ethics in the sense that we are setting up a method to
tackle new situations, new challenges, new dilemmas, posed by emerging technologies
and situations. Genetics, ecology, new medical procedures, evolving economic
interrelationships, changing cultures and meanings, all pose a challenge and call for a
new creative ethical response. [119]
(6) Not just a personal ethic but also a social ethics. There should emerge an
ethic of duties as well as rights. It recognizes that we become persons in a society and
we have a contribution to make to that society, to its health and progress. As inheritors
of a tradition, we receive through education, socialization and inculturation; but as
leaders, teachers and parents, we pass on the tradition by the lives we live, the values
we teach, the institutions we preserve.
(7) It will be pedagogical in the sense that we are not just learning abstract
theories about objects but we are moving to self-knowledge. It will recognize and
incorporate the inherent desires of the subject, the deep desire for authenticity. Good
Value Ethics
135
pedagogy will recognise the stages of moral development. It will use the methods and
images and stories appropriate to each level. It will invite development, not by a
sudden leap to moral maturity, but by slow steps from one higher stage to the next.
(8) It will be foundational in the sense that our appeal is not to any external law,
not to any authority, not to any tradition or system, but to the subject himself, his or her
deepest and best inclinations. It is an invitation to maturity, to authenticity, to
autonomy. It is an invitation to move into the stage of interiority, to a value ethics, to
appropriate the subject as valuing, deciding and living value.
Suggestions regarding Questions for Deliberation:
(1) You might find that you sometimes operate in terms of actions you consider right or
wrong; at other times you might think in terms of what kind of a person you would like
to be; at other times you might work out the values and disvalues involved in a
particular choice. The latter is the more foundational and underlies the others.
(2) You might find yourself being very pragmatic in explaining to a child that if you tell
lies you will be found out and punished; no one will trust you again; you will become a
liar and who wants to be a liar? For a mature moral adult it is wrong to tell lies because
it is wrong to tell lies; you do not need to appeal to pragmatic criteria or consequences
or punishment. Morally [120] right and wrong are meaningful categories in their own
right. You have become a lesser person by being dishonest.
(3) It is important to personalize and concretize the discussions of this chapter with
reference to real examples. You are invited to keep such personal examples in mind as
you peruse the text.
(4) This is an example of a value clarification exercise. It will usually clarify what are
the values really operative in your life. The operative values may be very admirable or
shameful. We usually aspire to higher values.
136
(5) This example of a value clarification exercise can be used in a group discussion.
Discussion can be quite lively and enjoyable; sometimes produce more heat than light.
(6) It is very hard to still the mind completely; you usually find memories, imaginations,
worries, intrude. However much you suspend the thinking and imagining, you can never
eliminate awareness of the self, being conscious, the experience of consciousness
unless you fall asleep of course.
(7) There are absolutes in the field of moral philosophy. But are they to be found in the
actions, or in the intentions, or in the consequences, or in the values? This question we
will be able to answer after a long investigation.
(8) It is usual to set up a committee including biologists, economists, medical
practitioners, moral philosophers, and religious leaders. In this way it is hoped to
combine goodness, competence, right values, practical common sense and real
understanding. It does not always work out for the best and sometimes the opposite
process can occur. [121]
Endnotes
1
Insight, 627.
See Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy. This earlier text does deal with consciousness,
self-appropriation, method, and interiority, in the context of cognitional theory and
epistemology. Now the same notions are being extended to existential ethics.
Lonergan used a slightly more complicated diagram for the judgment of value,
including a what-to-do? line and an is-to-do? line. See Bernard Lonergan,
Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and
Existentialism, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 18, (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2001), Appendix A. The diagram I present in this text is simpler and
suggests very fruitful parallels between the activities and the levels. I would include the
what-to-do question as a question for second level operations. When we ask about the
value of something, we review all previous relevant experience, understanding, and
judging truth with a view to the judgment of value; alternatives for action are parallel
to alternatives for hypothesis. Judgments about possible courses of action are only one
sub-set of judgments of value. I think it important that we see how simply the threelevel structure of knowing facts can be expanded to become a four-level structure for
knowing all values. We have struggled for two millennia to get the three level structure
of cognition right. I hope we do not have to wait so long to be clear on judgments of
value. These matters are further discussed in later chapters.
3
Value Ethics
Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy.
Lonergan, Method in Theology, 4.
137
Anthony de Mello, Sadhana: A Way to God, Christian Exercises in Eastern Form,

(New York: Image Books Doubleday, 1978).
7
Bernard Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ.

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 7, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2002) 157.
8
Insight, 344.
Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1949) 158.
10
Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy.
11
Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 173, 255-63.
12
See Eugene Webb, Philosophers of Consciousness, University of Washington Press,

1988. He seems to be comparing the concept of consciousness as found in Polanyi,
Lonergan, Voegelin, Ricoeur, Girard and Kierkegaard. You can do this comparing,
contrasting, and distinguishing forever but end up with nothing unless you refer back to
the experience of being conscious. See Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained,
(Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1991); after two hundred [122] pages of tortuous
negations, Dennett eventually comes up with his definition of consciousness as:
"Human consciousness is itself a huge complex of memes (or more exactly, meme
effects in brains) that can best be understood as the operation of a 'von Neumannesque'
virtual machine implemented in the parallel architecture of a brain that was not designed
for any such activities. The powers of the virtual machine vastly enhance the underlying
powers of the organic hardware on which it runs, but at the same time many of its most
curious features, and especially its limitation, can be explained as the by-products of the
kludges that make possible this curious but effective reuse of an existing organ for novel
purposes" 210. I am not convinced that this definition advances our understanding of
consciousness.
13
Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Trans by M.R. Ramos, (New York: Herder
and Herder, 1972).
14
Ira Progoff, At a Journal Workshop: The Basic Text and Guide for Using the
Intensive Journal, (New York: Dialogue House Library, 1975).
15
See for example, Don Richard Riso and Russ Hudson, The Wisdom of the
Enneagram: The Complete Guide to Psychological and Spiritual Growth for the Nine
Personality Types, (U.S.A.: Bantham Books, 1999).
16
See for instance, Naomi L. Quenk, Essentials of Myers-Briggs Type Indicator

Assessment, (Canada: John Wiley and Sons, 2000).
17
Anthony de Mello, Sadhana: A Way to God.
18
138
See chapter seven on moral development.
19
See Louis Raths, Merill Harmin, Sidney Simon, Values and Teaching: Working with
Values in the Classroom, (Columbus: Charles Merrill Publishers, 1966). Jack R.
Fraenkel, How to Teach about Values: An Analytic Approach, (New Jersey: PrenticeHall, 1977).
20
Martha Nussbaum, Loves Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature, (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1990).
21
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Questions 7-17.
22
Garrett Barden, After Principles, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1990), vii.
23
Fred Crowe, "An Expansion of Lonergan's Notion of Value," Lonergan Workshop vol
7, 35.
24
Insight, Preface 5.
3
The Question of Value Arises
Spontaneously we move from judgments of fact or possibility to
judgments of value and to the deliberateness of decision and
commitment; and that spontaneity is not unconscious or blind; it
constitutes us as conscientious, as responsible persons, and its
absence would leave us psychopaths.1
(1) (a) John is forty-three years old. (b) John is a good doctor. (c) John is a good football player.
(d) John is a good person. Does the distinction true or false apply to each of these propositions?
What is the meaning of 'good' in these statements?
(2) Evaluate two political figures that you know well. How do you rank them and why?
(3) Can you think of any nouns (substantives) to which the term good or bad do not apply?
(4) Can an institution such as a university declare itself value-free? Can such a policy be actually
implemented? [124]
(5) What set of values or disvalues does the McDonalds chain of restaurants stand for?
(6) Are values a matter of (a) personal preference, (b) arbitrary choice, (c) imposition from an
authority, (d) responsible deliberation and appropriate decision?
(7) Can you rank the values operating in your life? Are some values more important than others?
(8) Can you avoid choosing? Can you avoid acting? Can you avoid evaluating? In what order do
these three activities normally occur?
1 Introduction
Let us begin by trying to get some sense of how values pervade our personal and
social lives. We easily and often describe things as good or bad, right or wrong,
worthwhile or worthless, brilliant or useless. Such judgments come in a constant stream
from morning to night, as we react to the morning newspaper, relate with our family,
commute with our fellow workers, do our teaching or administration or digging or
talking; as we work and relax, as we eat and drink, as we get on with lifes business. We
take it for granted that we are competent to make these value judgments and can be
Questions of Value Arise
140
rather surprised if others do not agree with us. We are constantly evaluating ourselves
and other people, policies, actions, things, institutions, leaders, possible courses of
action. Just about everything we do is influenced by these evaluations; we are constantly
choosing between alternatives that we judge as good, better, best, or bad, worse or
worst.
Increasingly, political life and activity is interpreted in terms of value. We hear
talk of family values, conservative values, democratic values, liberal values, traditional
values. We invoke the values of freedom, equality, honesty, justice, compassion, and the
like, as justification for policies. Values are embedded in constitutions, laws,
institutions, rules of procedure, policies and programs. Politicians make their decisions
in the light of these values, about war and peace, distribution of resources, care of the
elderly, education of the young, [125] availability of medicines, protection of law and
order. Agreeing to a budget means that some are going to get richer and other poorer;
who are we to favour and why? Policies can change the organization of the society and
determine in some ways how we are to live they are always value-laden. To favour
this legislation over that legislation is to evaluate one as better than the other; they are
judgments of value. Institutions, political parties, rules of procedure, civil laws, all
embody values. We are constantly judging our politicians as wise or foolish, responsible
or irresponsible, genuine or fake, good leaders or bad leaders, disinterested or selfserving.
The question of values is faced explicitly in the educational system. What values
from the past do we hope to be passed on to future generations? What aspects of our
tradition or heritage should be taught in our schools? Or do we think of education as
only passing on information, technical knowledge and skills, so that we get a good job
and advance a career but that too is a value judgment. What values does our
educational system embody in terms of facilities for disadvantaged, availability to the
Value Ethics
141
poor; what kind of character formation, ideals, discipline, respect, tolerance, do our
schools engender? What stand should a school take on bullying, use of alcohol, relations
between the sexes, drugs, moral values, and so forth? What kinds of priorities are in
effect in terms of sports, academics, or money-making? Who decides on these value
questions? How can they be taught? Which values should be taught?
Each one of us personally is faced with a determination of which values we will
espouse for ourselves; where do we take a stand for ourselves on issues of justice,
equality, honesty. What kind of person do we want to become? What ideals, visions,
values, hopes and dreams motivate us and drive us? Are we to be geared towards
personal advantage, egoism, exploiting others, always seeking satisfaction of our own
selfish desires? Or are we to respond to the needs of others, to the building of a just and
good society, to promoting progress, to loving our family, community, country and
humanity as a whole. We decide not only on our career choice, to become a dentist or a
pilot or a nurse, but also what kind of a person we are going to [126] be. Values impinge
on and constitute our social and personal lives at every turn.
With the language of values pervading our political and cultural discourse and
the reality of personal values challenging us existentially at every turn, you would think
that we would know the answer to such simple questions as, what is a value? where do
values come from? are there true and false values? what kinds of values are there? But
when you look for answers to such basic questions, you find the most divergent and
contradictory set of answers that you can imagine. Some claim that values are just
private arbitrary choices; some think they are the same as feelings; others that all values
are illusions to be unmasked; others that values are always being used by the powerful
to increase their power; for some they are a product of reason alone; for others values
are just social conventions invented for the convenience of living together, to be
discarded at will if situations change; for some values are simply bias, prejudice, already
142
predetermined. So we find an extraordinary confusion and disagreement continuing

about values, even though they form such an important part of our personal and social
lives.
It would seem to be important to sort out this confusion and so we begin our
own investigation in this chapter starting simply with the question of value and how it
arises. If we are looking for the source of value, for the genesis of value, surely the
place to look is the question of value as it arises and the contexts in which it arises. In
the later parts of this book we can examine how answers to these questions are reached.
But if we wish to identify the source, the origin, the foundation of value, surely we
should start with the context of the question of values. So in this chapter we will focus
on the context in which the question arises, the characteristics of all questions of value,
the implications of these questions, the ranking of these questions and, finally, identify
the specifically moral question of value. [127]
2 Context of Question of Value

2.1 Remote Context.
If you ask where do your values come from, it is probably helpful to distinguish
the values of the child, the values of the emerging adult and the values of the mature
adult. The values of the child come mostly from outside, from parents, teachers and
society. The values of the emerging adult are in a state of transition; it is the stage of
questioning. The mature adult has taken a personal stand and should know why and
where they stand on questions of value. Let us examine these three stages in more detail.
In the first instance, we receive our values from others. We are told what is
important, we are told what is right behaviour, we are told not to tell lies, nor to use bad
language, etc. We are receptive to parents, peers, teachers, the schools, the culture, and
the church leaders. In the process of socialization we conform to the patterns of
behaviour of the society. In the process of education we learn the skills, the traditions,
Value Ethics
143
the history, the heroes, the beliefs of the group. In the process of inculturation we
assume the culture, the meanings and values, of the ethnic or national grouping. For the
most part this is a reception; we conform to what we presume to be right. It is not a
totally passive reception: it is an intelligent, reasonable and responsible process. We are
respecting authority, presuming on their wisdom, goodness and competence. We are
accepting the values of the society as our values. We believe these are the best on the
basis of the authority of parents, teachers, leaders and society in general.
This is the way of belief. We accept these values not because we experience,
understand and judge for ourselves, but on the basis of trust in our elders and betters. It
is the way of heritage; the traditions of the society are handed on from one generation to
the next. It is called the "way down" precisely because it is belief, not immanently
generated knowledge of values.2 We made the same distinction in cognitional structure
between the way up of immanently generated knowledge and the way down of belief
and tradition.3 The way of belief is accepting as true on the basis of trust in another's
research or understanding or authority. This is an aspect of collaboration in [128] the
pursuit of truth; a scientist does not have to repeat all the experiments to prove all the
assertions in the textbook. You have to trust the authors, the experimenters, the
instruments, the conclusions of others. You do not do so uncritically, but you cannot
make your own instruments, you cannot repeat all the experiments, you have not
enough time to check all the assertions in the text. So you accept as true on the basis of
trust in fellow researchers. This is a quite reasonable procedure in the context of
increasing specialization and the imperative to push back the boundaries of knowledge
to discover new truths. But belief operates in the field of value judgments also. Our
values are first accepted on the basis of trust in those whom we respect as competent
and good and trustworthy.
144
But there comes a time when we wish to internalize our values, when we
question the values of the tradition and want to know the rationale for these values.
Perhaps, we begin to realize the fallibility of parents and teachers. Perhaps, we begin to
discover that our history was not always one of glorious victories of the good and the
true, but a human mixture of cowardice, betrayal, self-interest and incompetence.
Around adolescence the young person seeks independence and this questioning of
values is just one aspect of that process. Instead of continuing to accept the value
tradition, the adolescent wants to challenge why these are values, where did they come
from, and why should they continue to be upheld. They are seeking a foundation for
values, the immanently generated reasons for values. They want to know for themselves
on the evidence of their own eyes, their own understanding, their own judging, as to the
basis of these values. Immanently generated knowledge in cognitional terms is
knowledge born of personal experience, personal understanding and personal judging;
you know for yourself that it is true. In the field of value the same process occurs; we
seek values that we have personally experienced, we have personally understood, we
have personally judged as true factually and now personally affirm as true values.
The time of adolescence and well beyond is a time for questioning values. It is a
time when we seek autonomy and authenticity. We are free to evaluate our tradition and
make the transition from belief to immanently generated knowledge of values. This is
the general con-[129]text in which the move to autonomous values is being made. The
authority of others is called into question and the authority of self and personal
experience is the only acceptable base for the mature adult. Presumably the reader, if
she has reached this point, has some interest in the source of values, the critique of
values, the appropriation of authentic values. To find a personal foundation for values is
a lifelong task of deliberation, evaluation, implementation, integration and autonomy.
Value Ethics
145
Mature adults then become the bearers of the tradition; they become the
innovators and the creators; the ones who apply the tradition to new circumstances and
keep it alive and well. They are the ones who articulate the tradition, express it in art,
literature, science, philosophy and theology. They are the ones who as parents, teachers
and leaders, pass the tradition on to the next generation of children.
We see ourselves as receivers of the values of our tradition, and also creators and
innovators in terms of appropriating and handing on the tradition. We are mediators in
historical process. We pass through three stages of accepting passively the tradition,
questioning actively and passing on creatively. For the moment we identify ourselves
with the process of questioning: the movement from values accepted on the basis of an
outside authority to values based on personal experience, understanding, evaluation,
decision and action.
2.2 Proximate Context
The remote context of the questioning of values occurs at this stage of life when
we wish to appropriate our values and become authentic persons of value. But in a more
proximate context in what form and in what shape do value questions arise? Let us
specify the form of the value question as it occurs in ordinary circumstances so that
there will be no ambiguity about what we are talking about.
It is usually in the context of choice that the question of value emerges. We are
faced with alternative courses of action. We have to decide between them. We ask,
What is the best thing to do? What is the best of these alternatives? How do I make a
good decision here? Normally, this will set us on the way of deliberating, adding up ad[130]vantages and disadvantages, anticipating consequences, comparing alternatives,
assessing the worth of each possibility. Life is full of situations of choice, where we
normally want to do the right thing, make a good choice, get the best out of the
situation. It is true that decisions can be posited without any thinking, without any
146
evaluation, blindly, arbitrarily and at random. But in practice this is rather rare and has
little to recommend it. We come to recognize rather quickly that there are good
decisions and bad decisions; that there are various consequences that need to be taken
into account; that we learn from previous experience; that good decisions usually follow
from good evaluations.
In the context of personal relationships we are constantly reacting, is this person
trustworthy? Do I like this person? Do I want this person as a friend? Is this a good
professor? Is this a good writer? We are constantly asking about the worth of persons
from various points of view; their worth as academics, their worth as football players,
their worth as conversationalists, their worth as possible friends. We answer these
questions as best we can and so are constantly passing judgments on the value of the
people we meet, endlessly discussing the peculiarities of professors, the fads and foibles
of our friends, the triumphs and failures of our heroes. We are always assessing people
and our social life is largely determined by such judgments.
In the context of cognitional structure, after we have reached a judgment of truth
there arises the question of application, of worth, of where do we go from here. You
might have discovered the structure of DNA, or you might have understood nuclear
fission, or you might have discovered that the ozone layer is being depleted. So far it is
a matter of evidence, experiments, calculations, research programs and results. But now
the question arises as to what are the possible applications of this scientific
breakthrough, how can it be applied for good or for evil. These are value questions. You
can use nuclear physics to produce electricity or to make nuclear bombs. You can use
genetics to devise better medical procedures, or to make bio-chemical agents for germ
warfare. You can treat your discovery of depletion of ozone layer simply as an
interesting fact about which you intend to do nothing; or you can formulate remedial
action and push for ap-[131]propriate policies. Judgments of truth are relatively easy to
Value Ethics
147
handle, as there is one criterion of sufficient evidence operating. Judgments of value

expand enormously the range of possible criteria, the range of alternatives and
consequences and become much more difficult to handle.
In conclusion, then, we see that value questions can be immediate, concrete,
practical questions that we ask constantly and answer very quickly. These questions
usually arise in the context of choice of alternatives or in the context of personal
relations or in the field of applying or implementing discoveries or truths. Or
alternatively the question of value arises in the more remote context of the transition
from unquestioning acceptance of inherited values, to more reflective questions asking
about the ground of values, the criteria of value, the objectification of the process of
evaluating with a view to internalizing values.
3 Characteristics of Questions of Value

We are taking a position that the origin of values and value judgments is the
question of value. Values do not seem to arise from likes and dislikes, do not arise from
the unconscious, do not arise from simple looking and finding, do not arise from
sensitive feelings. If values arise from questions, then, it is worth while examining the
characteristics of this question and the immediate implications of this position. So let us
try to pin down some of the characteristics of this process of questioning as it occurs in
you and me by way of self-appropriation.
3.1 Arises Spontaneously
We cannot seem to avoid discriminating and evaluating. Questions of worth
arise from within, it seems to be a natural process, it is hard to prevent. It is difficult to
imagine a human person not evaluating; it would be a very truncated human being who
knows facts but has no knowledge of values. The ability and urge to ask, what is
worthwhile? seems to be part of our humanity. [132]
148
You do not really teach children or students to ask questions of value. You teach
the content of what is to be evaluated, the criteria to be used in evaluation, give specific
answers to specific questions. But unless the basic ability to ask questions of value, to
seek answers is there, no amount of teaching can put it there. The question of value
emerges from within; you can say it is a priori or innate in that sense.
A baby operates in terms of likes and dislikes, what is agreeable or disagreeable,
what is satisfying or not satisfying. This is a purely sensitive criterion of being attracted
by what gives pleasure and repulsed by what gives pain. But gradually this criterion is
transformed by the emergence of intelligence, the emergence of questions of fact and
value. Once questions emerge then intelligence and reason are operating. If intelligence
is operating then a new criterion of truth and value is emerging. So likes and dislikes
give way to, Is this good for me? Can I have this now or later? Is parental approval more
important than bodily satisfaction? The child is moving from the immediacy of the
world of sensitive pleasure and pain, to the world mediated by questions of value and
judgments of value.
The question of value does not arise in animals, it does not arise from the senses,
it does not arise from sensitive feelings. Pets will have foods that they like and dislike,
behaviours that they enjoy and punishments that they fear. They can be trained by
manipulating rewards and punishments. But this is purely at the sensitive level and no
question of value arises.
3.2 Arises from the Beginning
Parents quickly identify a quiet baby, a good baby, a troublesome child, a willful
child. Sometimes the child will respond, sometimes not; sometime he will do what he is
told sometimes not; sometimes he will do one thing, sometimes another. The child is
learning to choose between different alternatives; she is valuing one thing more than
another, and changing these primitive valuations on different occasions. Even children
Value Ethics
149
question the value of different objects or courses of action. Well meaning parents can
buy their child a very expensive toy for Christmas. The child unwraps it on the big day.
Then, [133] spends the rest of the day playing with the box that contained the toy, rather
then the toy itself.
Intelligence and will emerge in an undifferentiated compound of child
behaviour. It is not that intelligence develops first and then value judgments and
decisions follow. They seem to emerge together but in an undifferentiated whole. Our
diagram of cognitional structure might seem to imply a temporal priority, by which we
experience first, then understand, then judge facts, then judge value. There is a
structured relation of dependence operating, but it is not a temporal priority. In its
emergence in the child the whole structure is operating from the beginning even though
in an undifferentiated and primitive manner.
3.3 Arises in every Culture
Cultural anthropologists studying the beliefs and customs of different cultures
often point to the diversity of clothing, building, marriage customs, languages, religious
practices, etc. These are the most obvious aspects of cultures when you look at them
from the outside and fail to penetrate to the meanings and values operating. But beneath
the diversity there a common element and the root of this is the question of fact and the
question of value. Every culture asks the question of what is important for our survival?
How are we to live? Who do we approve of? Who do we blame? What behaviour is
allowed and what is forbidden? All cultures have distinctions between what they
consider good and what they consider bad; what they consider right and what they judge
to be wrong. The answers may differ in some ways but the central thrust of the question
is always there. We have something in common with all the cultures of the world no
matter how simple or modern. All are seeking the best way of life; all are struggling to
150
find answers to existential question of the best way to live, how to deal with sickness,
relationships, with justice and peace.
3.4 Arises at every Stage of History
Just because the term value only became current at the end of the nineteenth
century, does not mean that previous civilizations were [134] devoid of values. Once
you have intelligent human beings you have questions of value being asked and
answered in different ways. Traditional societies were very fixed in their ways; there
was a smaller range of choice for the individual; most behaviours were specified by
fixed roles and status and everyone knew what was expected of them. But where did
these traditions come from? Why were they different from other cultures? They came
from evaluations that this is the best way of living for us, at this time, and in this place.
This is the way we do things and it is the best way to do them.
So whether we are thinking of hunter gatherer societies, or the great civilizations
of China, or Egypt or Central America, or the Greek/Roman break through to
philosophy or the religious traditions of Buddhism or Judaism or Christianity or Islam,
each raised the question of value and gave their own particular answer appropriate to
their own stage of development and unique situation.
3.5 Unavoidable
Is it possible to exclude choices and values from your life? Is it possible to deny
that values are operating? It seems to me to be impossible. To choose not to choose, is
already a choice. To decide not to decide, is already a decision. To eliminate values
from your life is to judge that this is a valuable thing to attempt to do. A nihilist is
saying that my philosophy of value is better than yours! No matter how we twist and
turn we are faced with the process of questioning values and deciding what to do about
it.
Value Ethics
151
You can, of course, eliminate values from part of your life: you can simply
ignore, denigrate, disparage and eliminate religious values from your life. You can
eliminate values from some of your relationships and be guided only by sensitive likes
and dislikes. You can pretend that values do not operate: you can foster a pretence that
an institution is value-free. You can affirm certain values in theory but deny them by
practice. You can go against the values you believe in, but that all that is another story
for later.
One way of dealing with values is to try to eliminate or bracket them either
completely or from a certain defined arena. The notion of [135] a value-free sociology
was propounded by such as Max Weber in the laudable intention of making sociology
an acceptable academic discipline and distinguish it from the value-laden ideologies of
communism, socialism and free-market capitalism. The idea was that sociology could
have an objective method, rules of procedure, clearly defined concepts and methods.
The private values of the researcher, or interviewer or theorist could be systematically
excluded. This drew a picture of the neutral sociologist, just as the neutral scientist,
trusting in their methodologies to arrive at objective results. Values were viewed as
irrational, arbitrary, private, ideological. Values were viewed as irrational because they
somehow go beyond knowing truth and do not seem to be amenable to reason and logic.
They were viewed as arbitrary, because there seemed to be no way of measuring or
controlling or reasoning about values. They were viewed as private, because they
characterize the person and his choices and that was considered their proper place. They
were viewed as ideological, because they were intertwined with the systems of
socialism, capitalism, communism and fascism, which were fighting for the minds and
hearts of people in the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century.
If you can have a value-free sociology, then surely you can have a value-free
economics, a value-free educational system, a value-free psychology, a value-free
152
politics, a value-free morality of political correctness! Because values are so hard to

deal with, they tend to be pushed under the table. But they do not disappear! Lonergan
remarks that a value-free theory of values resembles a theory of knowledge that
prescinds from the knower!4
There is no such thing as a value-free position. We are human beings who seek
vital, social, cultural, moral and religious values. Values are implicit in all of our
choices. They may not be thematized but they are operative. In the narrow focus you
might argue that economic theory and research does not involve an explicit value
system but when economic policies are put into practice you can see the values
emerging.
A neutral educational system claims to leave religious and moral values to the
parents, to the private life of the person or family. It [136] concentrates on science,
intellectual development and claims not to discriminate or teach a particular value
system. But in fact it does; it is saying that religion and morals are a matter of private,
arbitrary choice; that the academy cannot make any contribution to such choices. In sex
education the facts of biology are explained in great detail with charts and diagrams and
the claim that it is value-free. They just give the biological facts and the rest is up to
personal choice. The message received by the student is that the biological facts are
important, but friendship, discipline, love, relationships, trust, intimacy, fidelity, have
nothing to do with sex!
So we have described in a rather compact descriptive way, how, when and where
the question of values come up. Let us proceed to try to pin down more precisely the
implications that follow from the assertion that values arise from questioning.
4 Intentionality of the Question of Value
The question of value is our starting point because it represents the source, the
beginning, the genesis of our knowledge of values. We have identified the various
Value Ethics
153
forms of the question of evaluation which arise in the practical, social, political or moral
life. We have seen that this question of value is spontaneous, universal and
unavoidable. Let us now examine some of the deeper implications of this process of
questioning.
The question is always a strange mixture of the known and the unknown. If we
knew nothing, we could not ask questions. If we knew everything we would not need to
ask questions. But because we are in the process of developing, we ask questions on the
basis of what we know, seeking further knowledge. The question is intentional in the
sense that it intends the kind of insight which will satisfy as an answer to the question.
We do not yet know the exact answer, but we set the criteria by which the correct
answer will be recognized. It is in this sense that intentionality is particularly useful.
When we ask questions for understanding, we are asking why? when? where?
etc. We are looking for more information in order to understand better and formulate a
hypothesis; we are in thinking, [137] brainstorming mode. The questions determine the
kind of insight that we are searching for and the kind of answer which will satisfy the
question. At the level of understanding we are looking for a possible explanation, a
hypothetical solution, a bright idea, a good definition, a possible course of action. We
are intending the intelligible. When we are satisfied that the hypothesis is sufficiently
clear, nuanced, and differentiated, then, we move on.
The question for reflection arises; it asks, is it true or not, is it correct or not, and
looks for a yes or no answer. This question intends the real, the truth, correct judgments
of fact and will not be satisfied until that is attained. Here we set off in a critical mode;
we are not looking for more information or ideas; we are looking for the simple yes or
no, affirmation or denial. Only what is relevant to this will be considered. We weigh
the evidence, we grasp its cogency, we posit the answer, we make a judgment. It is a
special act of understanding which grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for the
154
affirmation of the conclusion. The question determines the level of consciousness on

which we are operating and the kind of activities to be performed in order to reach the
answer which will settle the question.
Similarly, the question of value determines that we are operating beyond the
level of facts and truth and at the level of evaluation and knowledge of values. The
question for deliberation is different from the question for reflection; that is what
determines the new level of consciousness. Lonergan in Insight talked about practical
reflection,5 by which he meant the question for action, namely, which of these possible
courses of action is the right one. Because he was thinking of only three levels of
consciousness this was just one kind of reflective insight emerging at the level of
judgment of truth. He was implicitly reducing the level of deliberation to that of truth
and fact. However, he later realized that this is a new kind of question of value which
means we are operating at a fourth level of consciousness.6 Just as we distinguished the
hypothesis from the judgment by distinguishing the question for intelligence from the
question for reflection, now we are further differentiating out the question for
deliberation, which raises us to a new level of consciousness. It is only by recognizing
that it is a new kind of question that we avoid [138] reductionism and recognize the kind
of activities and intentionality operating at this fourth level.
Intentionality is a notion that has become current in contemporary philosophy
because of the work of the phenomenologists. It is a useful tool for clarification and
here we focus on the question for deliberation. It is important to see that the question
for evaluation is different from the question for understanding and the question for
reflection. It is the intentionality of the question which determines the level of
consciousness on which we are operating. Value is defined by way of the question, not
just by way of an answer; value is what is intended in questions of value and found
when the question of evaluation is satisfactorily answered. The meaning of good and
Value Ethics
155
value is to be found in our own experience of asking questions about values, and
following that up with judgments of value, following up with decisions and actions. It is
only in reference to this universal human experience that we can identify the meaning of
good and value. The data to which we appeal to give meaning to talk about good and
value is the data of consciousness, the experience of being obliged, the activity of
asking questions for evaluation, the effort to sort out values, the judgments of values
and the consequent decision and action. Hence we can justifiably define values in terms
of intentionality: a value is what is intended in questions of value. Later we will be able
to expand this answer in terms of deliberative insights and judgments of value.
In this context the notion of value has become a transcendental notion. It is
transcendental simply in the sense that it is totally general, applies to all cases, at all
times and in all minds. It is opposed to categorial which is specific, limited and has a
definite content.7 Transcendental in this sense entails no specific reference to God or
metaphysics. Wherever people ask questions of deliberation, value is being intended
and we identify those values in terms of the question that is asked, and the answers
given.
The question of value, as a mixture of knowns and unknowns, sets in motion a
process by which we name the unknown, anticipate the characteristics it must have if it
is satisfy the question, combine it [139] with the already knows, work out the
combinations and find the correct answer. It was very puzzling for Plato that a slave
could find the answer to a question of geometry, simply by being asked leading
questions by an interlocutor. How can somebody, who at first does not know the
answer, in the end recognize the answer as the correct answer? The same process which
is operative in mathematics, geometry, science and common sense, is also operative
when questions of value are asked. There is a heuristic structure which is spontaneously
invoked, a basic procedure for finding answers. It is a process of thinking things out,
156
clearly and distinctly, step by step, until all pertinent questions have been exhausted. It
is a process of lining up evidence with a view to the conclusion. It is a process of being
sure about the criterion, being clear about what is intended, being responsible about
evidence, memory, examples, experience, definitions, feelings, etc. You can be
presented with a crossword puzzle and after half an hour have it solved correctly; you
know you are right. You can be presented with a moral dilemma; similarly, with clear
thinking, an appeal to previous experience and knowledge, a reasonable awareness of
possible alternatives, responsible seeking of true value, we can work out the solution
and then recognize it as the correct answer to the question. This is how the mind and
heart works in knowing the truth; this is how the mind and heart works in knowing
values.
The question of value sets the criterion which guides the process to a correct
solution. If you are looking for a good pair of shoes in a department store you have
implicitly set your criteria of what you mean by good: they must be your size, they must
be fashionable, they must be within your financial expectations, etc. If you are looking
for a good school for your child you implicitly set the criteria that will determine your
answer: academic standards, discipline, affordability, sports program, accessibility, etc.
If you are looking for a good tutor for your kids you will implicitly set the criteria:
trustworthiness, competence, wages, experience, etc.
We know that in our past experience we have made good judgments of value
and some mistaken judgments of value; we have answered the question of value
correctly or have been mistaken. Again, we have this strange ability to recognize a
correct and a mistaken an-[140]swer to the question. We know that there is a right way
to go about finding the answer to the question of value and a wrong way. The right way
involves careful deliberation, gathering of relevant experience, assembling a case for,
consulting our deepest feelings, consulting and getting advice, eliminating bias and
Value Ethics
157
short cuts, etc. The wrong way might be to jump to conclusions, to follow our biases, to
be moved by selfishness, to be seeking to manipulate people, not to think too much of
the consequences, etc. So there are norms operating in the unfolding process set in
motion by the question. These norms are immanent and operative in the very process.
They come from the inside and not imposed from outside.
The question we are identifying is not the question as formulated in words, but
the prior spirit of inquiry, the pure question.8 The formulated question presupposes
previous ideas, insights, concepts, and knowledge of language. The explicit question
might be well formulated and helpful in seeking a solution; or it might be a false
question leading you up a blind alley. But where do the formulated questions originate
from? In the beginning is the desire to know, intellectual curiosity, the spirit of inquiry,
the Eros of the mind, active intellect, the tension of wanting to understand. If you have
reached thus far in this text, you must be personally familiar with this wonder as the
beginning of philosophy, this determination to get to the bottom of things. We are not
blindly asserting an arbitrary starting point; we are reflecting on our own experience of
the crucial role of the desire to know in the genesis of values.
Succinctly then, we can assign six functions to the desire to know in the
unfolding of the process of knowing values. These will be elaborated further in our
discussion of feelings, but let us state them simply here.
(1) The question of value initiates the whole process. It takes the initiative, it
starts the process, it is hard to think of anything that could be prior to the question.
Aristotle insisted that the active intellect had to be in act, because it initiates the process
of throwing light on phantasms so that forms could be abstracted from images. In
intentionality analysis the active intellect is understood as the desire [141] to know. The
desire can also be referred to as a response: we hear a strange noise at night and we
respond with a question, what is it? We see a blind man begging and we respond with
158
pity but also questions about what to do, the value of the welfare services, priorities in
the society, etc. The desire for value and the response to value become more sensitive,
stronger, more discriminating and accurate in the life well-lived. They become
submerged, distorted, distracted and blunted in the life not so well-lived.
(2) The question of value intends value. It points us in the right direction; it sets
in motion a heuristic structure for the finding of the solution; it guides the inquiry in the
direction of value; it is sensitive to clues and hints that seem promising; it senses a dead
end has been reached and a new approach has to be tried; it senses that we are on the
wrong path and redirects towards real value.
(3) The question motivates us to persevere until the end. It provides the mass and
momentum of the drive to know; otherwise our searching would be paper-thin. It carries
us through confusion, frustration and failure to a resolution. It is the determination, the
commitment, the resolve to find the true solution. It is the pure motivation of the search
for truth; not for academic success, not to impress the students, not to be famous.
(4) The question provides the dynamism of the process of knowing. The question
is always leading us on, never satisfied with half measures or superficial understanding.
It is always leading to higher viewpoints, more comprehensive visions, from descriptive
to explanatory, from the restricted to the unrestricted. Knowing is never a closed
system, but always leading to further questions and deeper understanding.
(5) The question specifies the content that is intended and eventually found.
Lonergan gave a technical meaning to the term notion. In Insight he spoke of the
notion of being, as an intention, an anticipation, a heuristic pointing, the desire to know
everything about everything.9 He contrasted this with a concept of being, which would
be a static, limited, formulated definition. In a similar fashion he speaks of the notion of
value as what is intended in questions of [142] value. Value is the content that is sought
in the question, grasped in the insight, affirmed in the judgment and implemented
Value Ethics
159
through the decision and action. In Insight he clearly distinguished between the proper
and the borrowed content of a judgment of truth.10 The borrowed content is the specific
determinations of a particular judgment of truth. The proper content is truth as such, the
yes or no of affirmation or denial. We can make a similar distinction here, between the
borrowed content of particular specific judgments of value and the proper content of
value as such. The proper content of the question of value is value as such, what will be
reached in the yes or no of the judgment of value.
(6) The question of value sets the criterion that must be satisfied if the question
is to be answered satisfactorily. The question for intelligence is answered when a
satisfactory level of understanding is achieved. The question for reflection is satisfied
when sufficient evidence for the conclusion has been found and no further pertinent
questions arise. The question of value is answered when we have responsibly
deliberated and judged, decided and implemented, as authentic persons, with a happy
conscience.
Perhaps we can begin to appreciate the importance of the question as the source
of values and valuing!
In taking the position that values begin with questions leading to understanding
and knowledge, we are in stark contrast to many of the contemporary positions on
knowledge of values. Some suggest that values are choices, personal preferences,
emotional reactions; this is sometimes the case but if you want to find the truly good as
opposed to the apparently good surely the question leading to understanding and
knowing is crucial. Some suggest that values are an irrational ideology imposed on us
by class interests, by society, by unconscious psychological forces, by the will to power;
but self-appropriation reveals the dangers of such deceptions, and also our ability to
understand correctly and know surely. G. E. Moore claimed that the good is indefinable;
in a sense he is right that it cannot be defined in more primitive terms; but we can give
160
an indirect determina-[143]tion of the good by referring to our moral experience, our

moral questions, our moral insights and our judgments of value.
Conclusion: In the context of these incomplete, dubious or ambiguous accounts of
value, can we come up with a better solution? How do we define values in a way that is
convincing, intellectually satisfying and practically relevant? We have applied the
method of self-appropriation to identify and define at least indirectly the notion of
value. Now we are be in a position to identify different kinds of values, and later we
will focus specifically on moral values.
5 Ordering of Value Questions

Is there a chaos of conflicting values or can values be ordered in some
systematic way in terms of relative importance? Is there any principle on which we can
establish priorities among these questions of value and the values intended in the
questions? Can we be intelligent, reflective and responsible in deliberating on values?
Can we begin to sort out the confusion between economic values, medical values,
political values and moral values? Is there a principle we can use to structure these
values in some preliminary way? In this section we try to answer these questions
positively even though we are still focusing on the different types of questions of value.
5.1 A Scale of Values?
On what principle might we base our ordering of values? Aquinas, when he
came to specify the goods proper to a human person, considered first the good proper to
the human person as a substance; then the good proper to the human being as a living
thing, and, finally, the good proper to the human person as rational. Max Scheler talks
about an a priori emotive grading of values in terms of: first, sensible values; second
values of life or vital values; third, spiritual values beautiful, right and wrong, truth:
and fourth, the value of the holy and unholy. His justification for this ranking is given in
value-feeling or intuitive evidence of preference. Higher values are more enduring,
Value Ethics
161
indivisible, independent, and yield deeper inner satisfaction.11 Lonergan asserts a

distinction between five types of value, without [144] clearly articulating the
justification for this: Not only do feelings respond to values. They do so in accord with
some scale of preference. So we may distinguish vital, social, cultural, personal, and
religious values in an ascending order.12 It is clear that the five kinds of value
correspond in some way with the levels of consciousness and that is the position I will
elaborate.13
The levels of consciousness are initially defined by the type of question asked.
The question for intelligence asks for more understanding, information, clearer
definition, and seeks intelligibility. The question for reflection seeks the truth, asks is it
so, assesses the evidence for affirming a conclusion. The question for deliberation seeks
true value of persons, actions, things, institutions. The religious question might be
something like, Is there salvation? What is the ultimate fate and meaning of human life?
We are suffering from an unconditioned, unrestricted love; with whom, then, are we in
love?14 Each question gives rise to activities proper to that level and reaches products
required at that level. We call them levels of consciousness because they are conscious
activities; because they are different levels of activity the consciousness proper to each
of them is different. We have already seen that these activities constitute a single
cognitional structure and the activities are defined in terms of five levels of
consciousness.
How can the levels of consciousness ground the distinction between five kinds
of value? We do so by asking, what is the good proper to each level of consciousness?
What is the value to be affirmed specific to each level? How is the good of each level to
be realized? In practice, we are operating at many levels at the same time; the levels are
distinct but not separate; we specialize at one level in the context of influences and
dependencies on other levels. But if we apply this principle of the value proper to each
162
level of operation, we get at least a preliminary scale of values that has solid
foundations. If we can assume now that we are working in the framework of five levels
of consciousness, we can see that one way of dividing values is according to the level at
which they are intended. So we will talk about vital values at the level of experience,
social values at the level of un-[145]derstanding, cultural values at the level of judgment
and personal values at the level of deliberation and religious values at a fifth level.
Values are intended in questions of value and as we will see later are known
in judgments of value. Hence in asking, what is the value proper to the level of
experience, we are asking a question of value, deliberating and judging; we are
operating at all levels of consciousness in order to answer a question specific to one
level. Hence vital values are judgments; they are not the sensitive satisfaction of animal
needs and desires. Just as in functional specialization we are operating at all levels to
perfect the product of each level data, hypothesis, truth, value so now we are
operating at each level to find the good, the value, proper to each level.
5.2 Vital Values
We start by asking, what is the good proper to the level of experience? Now
experience incorporates sensitivity, the psyche, biological operations and all that is
characteristic of the human person as animal. What good needs to be achieved at the
level of experience to allow the proper functioning of the human person. These we will
call vital values.
Vital values are health, food, shelter, reproduction, warmth, sleep, etc. These are
material needs which we share with animals because we are animal. These have to be
satisfied in some minimal way to lay the groundwork for higher activities and values.
Psychological needs for security, sociability, family could be included. Nowadays, we
have a wide appreciation of the value of the environment, ecology, sustainable
development, endangered species, etc. Water, oil, rain, fish, food, climate, and the like,
Value Ethics
163
are important in terms of their fulfilling of our vital values. A considerable amount of
our time and effort we put into satisfying needs and desires at the level of experience. If
these values are not realized then higher values are harder, if not impossible to achieve
primum vivere deinde philosophare (first live and then philosophize).
Animals satisfy their needs and desires simply in response to the instinct for
self-preservation and survival. Animals know nothing of [146] vital values; vital values
are a judgment of value affirmed by a mature knowing person. Eating is primarily a
biological activity, but it is done by the whole person and so incorporates elements of
intelligence, of moral and even a religious dimension. We do not eat as animals eat
see the monkeys tea party. We spend much time and energy discussing what are
healthy foods and which promote health and which tend to promote heart attacks, or
strokes, or gout, or ulcers, etc.
5.3 Social Values
What is the good proper to the level of understanding, to the activities of
thinking and formulating? Here we advert to the fact that the person is a social animal;
that we live in groups, that we depend on one another; but that we are intelligent and
intelligence seeks order. We attend to the fact that private satisfaction of individual
needs, give way to social cooperation and organization so that individual needs can be
satisfied regularly, efficiently, in an orderly manner. Lonergan associates this second
level of consciousness with the good of order. It is not just a question of enough food
for me here and now as in vital values, but a system that will provide food for everyone,
at regular intervals, at reasonable prices, recurrently. A good of order is a system of
cooperation and specialization in a group, where all contribute to the society and receive
benefits from the society in a mutual complementary manner. Intelligence seeks order;
there are many systems of social organization where needs are met, not simply in terms
of me looking after my own vital needs individually, but in terms of a group
164
differentiated in terms of status and roles, specialized tasks, skills, complementarity and
cooperation.
We take for granted this order in the society which makes this kind of
specialization and cooperation possible on a wide scale. But we notice that countries
sometimes degenerate and divide to such an extent that the good of order breaks down
altogether and the individual is left to fend for himself. What can you do if social order
has broken down? Money is useless; public institutions have disappeared; distribution
system has broken down; law and order are absent. You do what you can to survive;
look after yourself and your family. The [147] social group degenerates into competing
individuals and small groups.
The economy, the infrastructure of transport, institutions, distribution of goods
and services, production and communications are part of this good of order. It is the
common way of life of people living together. Lonergan usually defined culture as the
meanings and values informing a common way of life. The common way of life is the
social organization that is set up; it is the repository of higher values and also the
realization of vital values in an organized way. If the common way of life does not
provide for the vital values of individuals and families it will not survive; it must do so
efficiently, regularly, easily, so that people can devote themselves to other affairs.
Social arrangements, forms of marriage, kinship, rights and duties, will be a big
part of the good of order. The mode of production, exchange of goods and services,
money, the economy, will be important. Leadership structures need to be devised so that
the order can function, change, adapt and progress. A system of education, passing on
traditions and values, training in skills, learning new skills will be part and parcel of a
good of order. Law and order must be preserved by laws, punishments and rewards, a
way of administering such a system.
Value Ethics
165
Social values are higher than vital values in the sense that social organization is
with a view to satisfying vital values more efficiently and cooperatively. Social values
are values, they are judged to be good, the good of order emerges historically in
response to needs and opportunities. Goods of order are devised by human beings trying
to make the world a better place to live in. The social order is not an ant hill: human
beings deliberately devise social organizations, evaluate them regularly, change them
when necessary. It is the achievement of the good proper to the level of intelligence, but
all levels of consciousness are involved in deliberating on social values. Monarchy,
feudalism, tribal systems, great civilizations, aristocracy, democracy, socialism,
communism, fascism, dictatorship, are forms of social organization devised throughout
history. We continue to argue over the social value embodied in the best kind of social
order. [148]
5.4 Cultural Values
What is the good proper to the level of reflection and judgments of truth? We
will call these cultural values and they are the meanings, the beliefs and the truths of a
society. (We are using the word cultural in a broader sense that the more usual sense
of high class or artistic.) Every society has a core of beliefs which all accept, value
and hand on to the next generation. These beliefs are expressed in the myths of origin
and legends, in the laws and institutions, in the constitutions and charters, in the
celebrations and feasts, in the respect accorded to leaders, teachers, priests, story-tellers,
legislators, and heroes. A democratic society will have a core set of beliefs concerning
the rights of the individual, the freedom of each citizen, elections will allow
participation in democratic process, distinction and balance of powers of legislature,
judiciary and executive. A communist society will have a core set of beliefs about the
State, ownership, the individual in the collective, social welfare and organization. Now
the question of truth arises; what is the truth about the human person; what are his rights
166
and dignity in context of larger society? Are the core beliefs of democracy true or those
of communism? What is the true notion of human person, rights, dignity, human
freedom, human potentiality?
Cultural values are not given, they are achieved. Truth is a value and needs to be
nurtured in the family, education, common sense, science, philosophy, and media.
History is a struggle to discover the truth about human persons; hence the need for
appropriate social and political and economic structures. Lonergan describes the
function of culture thus, Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a
meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover,
express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value.15 This
can be done individually, but also needs to be done in institutes, such as schools,
universities, churches, political groups, etc.
5.5 Moral or Personal Values.
Above and beyond the question of truth, there arises the question of moral value,
what is the best way to live as a person in society? [149] What is the proper way of
relating to others in terms or respect, justice, love, etc.? How do we develop as free and
responsible persons, knowing, deciding, and implementing an integral scale of values?
It is not so easy to formulate the question of moral value clearly, so we have postponed
it to a later section (Sect 6) to do so adequately.
5.6 Religious Values
Although we are not primarily concerned here with elaborating a fifth level of
consciousness, we recognize that it is there. What is the form of the question intending
religious values? To be fully human is to be open to the divine. We can recognize this
openness by the unlimited nature of our questioning, by our experience of the holy and
fascinating, by our openness of mind and heart to the possibility of God's intervention in
our lives. Hence worship, prayer, grace, unconditional love, meditation, asceticism, self-
Value Ethics
167
sacrifice, service, love of neighbour etc. are examples of religious values which go
beyond moral values.
However, it is helpful to recognize that religious values are there and they are
operating in most of us and influence our moral values. We often study morals in the
context of moral theology. But the level of moral obligation does not depend for its
validity on religious values. We need to be able to dialogue with men of good will on a
common ground. Similarly, we need to have a firm foundation for our religiously
motivated moral values: a religious teaching needs the best moral system that there is;
otherwise it can go astray when difficult situations arise or new moral dilemmas arise.
Fundamentalists fanatically affirm religious values but seem to have lost sight of moral
values of respecting human life.
5.7 Sublation in Scale of Values
We have done our best to identify the scale of values based on the good to be
found proper to each level of consciousness. This does seem to ground a basic
distinction and classification of groups of values. Because we operate as a whole with
many levels of consciousness operating at the same time, it is sometimes difficult to
separate in real life the values proper to each level. However the principle of the [150]
levels of consciousness and classes of values is relatively clear and sound.
Now we ask how are these classes of values related to one another? In what way
are they dependent on one another, emerge from one another, go beyond one another to
constitute something new? As before the notion of sublation16 helps us to articulate
these relationships. The activities of the levels of consciousness sublate one another.
Now we can extend this idea to the values proper to each level of consciousness.
Briefly, the notion of sublation holds that (1) something new emerges, (2) previous
levels are left intact, and (3) products of previous levels are enhanced, increased in
value and significance. Let us apply this framework to the scale of values.
168
Firstly, something new is introduced in a higher level of value which cannot be

reduced to the previous level. Moral values are really new and distinct from cultural or
social values. One can argue that the good of order requires laws and therefore
punishment and reward and hence be built on principles of justice. But does that mean
that justice is simply a matter of intelligent social organization? If a person steals public
money, is this just a social inconvenience, a disruption of the good of order, or is it a
moral fault? Values go beyond facts; values are distinct from facts. Facts are answers to
the question of, is it so? Values are answers to the question, what is it worth? They are
distinct questions, distinct intentionalities, distinct activities and distinct levels of
consciousness. The value question cannot be reduced to the level of the fact question. In
asserting this real distinction we are refuting any form of reductionism which would
evacuate the meaning of religious, moral and cultural values to the status of vital or
social values. Much public discourse assumes that the only good of the society is the
good of the economy, the satisfaction of private desires and needs, equitable distribution
of goods and services, the greatest satisfaction of the greatest number of citizens. But
does that produce a society proper to human persons, or an ant hill proper to termites.
Secondly, the previous level retains its integrity, its criteria, its activities, its
achievements, its proper procedures. Reaching the [151] higher level does not destroy,
or negate, or bypass or belittle the previous achievements. Economics is a human
science concerned with production, distribution of goods and services, money, inflation,
economic development, imports and exports, etc. How do you alleviate the poverty of
millions of people in countries around the world? Good intentions alone are not enough.
The moral idealist can initiate fanciful plans and policies but if they are not grounded in
sound economics they can do more harm than good. The moral intention to alleviate
poverty must respect the laws of economics, of development, etc.
Value Ethics
169
In the same way that judgments of fact, depend on clear and distinct
understanding, so cultural values depend on social values. There is a structural
dependence of the higher values on the lower values. Religious values presuppose moral
values. It is strange to find a very religious person stealing from the collection box.
What kind of religious fervour can allow such basic moral ineptitude? One supposes a
religious person to be also prudent, just, brave and temperate.
Thirdly, the higher level enhances the value and significance of activities of the
lower level. The less comprehensive is swept up into a wider and deeper framework of
value. Hunger is satisfied by food in the animal as in the human. But for a human
person eating is not just a biological activity, but a vital value. We are concerned with
healthy food, balanced diet, proper proportion, not just satisfaction of hunger and eating
the most pleasant or satisfying food. But as persons living in a society we are concerned
with the production, distribution, preparation of food, regularly, efficiently, for
everyone equally, in an orderly fashion; vital values are swept up into social values. But
social life is an empty shell, if it is not infused with beliefs and truth, core meanings
mediated by judgments; social values are subsumed into cultural values. But is the
imposition of order, the equal distribution of goods and services, simply a matter of
convenience or is there a moral dimension involved? Is it right to allow gross
divergence of incomes in a society? War and peace, definition of marriage, use of
human embryos, world poverty, availability of medicines, are moral questions. There is
a distinct moral dimension that cannot be reduced to the convenient, the successful, the
more efficient. These [152] questions are swept up into the moral dimension and it is
only there that they get their appropriate, correct response.
The process of sublation represents a new integration, a higher viewpoint, a new
unity of the old and the new. The higher depends on the lower in the sense that it cannot
be reached without passing through the lower. The values of the higher levels are
170
distinct, higher, more important, more valuable than those attained in lower levels.
Higher levels go beyond, add something new to lower levels. The values at lower levels
continue to be operative, continue to be valid, continue to be values even when higher
values are attained. The value of the lower levels is even enhanced in the context of the
attainment of the higher levels; a good moral philosophy is of increased value in the
context of a moral theology. Attainment of values at a lower level set the conditions for
the possibility of values at a higher level.
A common family meal gives us a good example of how the scale of values are
represent and lived; how they are distinct but not separate; how they are interrelated and
interdependent. Obviously, there are vital values being realized in healthy food,
refreshing drink, a balanced diet, the satisfaction of biological needs. But it is a social
occasion, roles and status are recognized, availability of goods depends on the good of
order, social conventions have to be maintained. It is also a cultural occasion with the
meanings and values of the culture being observed. A family represents a basic tool for
the inculcation of values and the passing on of values to the next generation.
Celebration of meals is cementing common meaning and value. There are moral issues
at stake in the personal relations between the members, respect, tolerance, freedom,
responsibility, duty, sharing in the work and sharing in the rewards. Finally, there is a
religious dimension in the grace before and after meals. We can see a hierarchy of
values in action, interdependent, interrelated, but distinct without being totally
separable.
In view of the counterpositions it is important to note that we have been able to
name a variety of value questions, recognize where they come from, talk intelligently
about them and, finally, we succeeded in establishing a real hierarchy of importance
among sets of [153] values. The principle on which this is based is that the values are
defined by what is intended in the question at the five different levels of consciousness.
Value Ethics
171
The pattern of relations between the levels of consciousness will be similar to the
pattern of relations between the values realized.17 We have noted for ourselves the
relations between the levels of consciousness in terms of the way up of immanently
generated knowledge, the way down of belief and the principle of sublation defining the
relation between the levels. So we can conclude that the same pattern of relations
applies to the values intended and realized at each level. This prioritizing is not
arbitrary; it is critical, verifiable and applies to all people at all times as it belongs to the
invariant structure of what it is to be a human person.
5.8 Terminal and Originating Values
This is another distinction which is useful to bear in mind if we want to be clear
about moral values.
Lonergan defines terminal values as those, "that are chosen, true instances of
the particular good, a true good of order, a true scale of preferences regarding values
and satisfactions."18 They are what are produced, the object of action; the money given
to the poor, the vegetables growing in the garden, the educational institutes that are
functioning for the good of the society, the books in the library, the buildings, the
policies being implemented.
Lonergan defines originating values as "authentic persons achieving selftranscendence by their good choices."19 By doing good acts we constitute ourselves as
good people. By doing evil acts, producing evil objects, we constitute ourselves as bad
people. We normally attend to the goods that are produced because they are visible,
measurable, and tangible. But equally important is the self that is constituted as morally
good or bad by these activities. Our choices produce good objects; but they also make
us into good persons. They change us. By our choices we produce the one and only
edition of ourselves.
172
Terminal values are subordinate to originating values, for the originating values
ground good will, and good will grounds the realization of the terminal values.20 [154]
5.9 Values and Disvalues
We must not forget the opposite side of the coin. As well as values there are the
opposites which can also be chosen and implemented. Good, bad; right, wrong; good,
evil; honesty, dishonesty; fidelity, infidelity; truth, falsehood; generosity, meanness;
freedom, slavery; happiness, unhappiness; peace, war; progress, decline; health,
sickness; etc. Although we are obliged to choose values, we are free not to do so and to
choose the opposite disvalue. Some mental ingenuity is needed to convince ourselves
that evil is really good or that a dishonest course of action is justified just this once. We
will study that process later.
There are gradations of good and evil; ambiguous moral situations; conflicting
value situations, grey areas in between the white and the black.
It is to be noted that the opposite of a value is often stated as a negation, value
and disvalue, honest and dishonest, etc. The opposite of a value is often the absence of a
value, the absence of something that should be there. Disvalues do not have the same
status as values.
6 Specifying Moral Values21

The first problem is to define clearly and specifically what makes moral values
to be moral values, as the good proper to the fourth level of consciousness. This is
central to our study and is not as simple as it might seem. Just as we defined the other
values as the good proper to that level of consciousness, can we now do the same in a
convincing manner for moral or personal values? We have identified five types of
values. What is the precise role of moral values in this hierarchy, what distinguishes
moral values from other values? The second problem not unconnected with the first
is to determine to what extent all values are moral values. If values are the good and if
Value Ethics
173
we have specified different classes of values, maybe from some point of view all values
are moral values? Do moral values include or exclude the other kinds of value? If we
buy a computer, are we performing a purely economic activity seeking only economic
values, or are there moral implications or aspects to the activity. It would seem [155]
that human actions can be many levelled at the same time, can be quite complicated,
multifaceted, on a par with the analogous nature of the values we seek.
6.1 Stating the Problem
If we can state the problem well, we will be on the way to solving it; so let us
look at some examples and debates which might hone the question to a finer point.
(a) Virtue and Skill. Aristotle had great difficulty distinguishing these because
they seem to have so much in common. It might be useful to examine the commonality
and the distinction between a skill and a virtue to help us define the specific nature of
virtue. Let us compare a program for teaching piano and a program for producing brave
soldiers.
The piano training course will involve instruction on scales, keys, tones,
semitones, etc but also rudimentary exercises with fingers in the correct position hitting
the right keys. The potential piano player will have to get access to a piano, start with
the elementary scales and keys, move on to reading music, music theory, hours of
practice of playing; more theory, more practice, more instruction, correction, repetition.
The program will be a combination of instruction and practice. It will take time, it
presumes the student wants to learn and is willing to give the time and has some talent
in music. If the student persists he will develop habits, reflexes, coordination; basic
techniques become automatic, attention can be diverted to more subtle improvements;
the person eventually becomes a good piano player. People will say, oh, he can play the
piano, he is a good piano player; he has developed his potential to become a pianist.
174
Now can you have a training course to produce brave soldiers? Can you model it
on the above? You can have a program to teach soldiers to march in unison, to use
weaponry, to respond immediately to commands, to endure hardships. You can design a
program to eliminate the cowards; put the group in a dangerous situation and see how
they react. You can instil group loyalty, and blind obedience to a commander. You can
give instruction about bravery, you can teach the [156] definition of bravery, you can
put before the group many examples of bravery, you can try to instil a desire to be
brave, you can put a high value on bravery. But in the end can you teach real bravery?
Can you guarantee that your soldiers will act bravely when the crunch comes?
Learning to play the piano is a skill; it involves willingness, some basic talent,
instruction and lots of practice. Given those conditions you can almost guarantee
results; the person becomes a good piano player. To acquire a skill is to develop
sensorimotor habit, ingrained reflexes of fingers, nerves, brain, memory and
imagination.
You can teach a soldier many skills, you can instil reactions of obedience and
response. You can do a limited amount to instil bravery, but in the end can give no
guarantee of results. Bravery is a virtue, it seems to be a perfection of character, it seems
to come from the inside more than a skill, it is a quality of the person as a person rather
than a skill or talent. To acquire a virtue is to acquire a habit of will; it is to become a
good valuer and a good decider and a good doer. It is to develop at the fourth level of
human consciousness in terms of ones values and decisions and actions as a person.
(b) Moral and intellectual virtues. Aristotle distinguished between
intellectual and moral virtues. What is the ground of this distinction? It is not difficult to
see that intellectual virtues are perfections of the intellect, the good of the intellect
realized in various habits of understanding. Aristotle identified the intellectual virtues
as, science, art, prudence, intelligence, wisdom, good deliberation, understanding,
Value Ethics
175
judgment and cleverness. Intellectual virtues are perfections of intellect; moral virtues
are perfections of character. But what is character? Aristotle struggles with the notion of
will as deliberate choice, with the person as originating cause of action, with the
voluntary and involuntary, the temperate and intemperate person. But he does not have
the notions of person, will, freedom, conscience, consciousness, value and so he finds it
very hard to pin down the notion of moral virtue.
(c) Indifferent moral acts?22 In traditional moral theology there has been a
long-standing dispute as to whether there can be human acts that are morally indifferent.
These acts are human acts and there-[157]fore free and responsible; but do they
necessarily have moral value? Can playing football, eating a meal, going for a walk, be
considered as morally indifferent, neither good nor bad. Bonaventure and Duns Scotus
held that you can have indifferent acts both in theory and in the concrete. Aquinas held
that all human acts, if they were not in some way bad, were of their nature good; hence
there are no indifferent human acts. Aquinas argued that even though a human act may
be neutral as to its object, the end at which the person is aiming is either what it ought to
be or what it ought not to be. A person acts well once the purpose of this activity is in
itself in agreement with reason, even though he intends to achieve nothing other than
what the activity is of its very nature aimed at achieving. Eating, even simply for the
sake of satisfying hunger, is a good action. Hence you cannot have indifferent acts. We
will see if the scale of values can throw light on this question.
(d) Moral Reductionism. There are many understandings of the human person
and his/her development which exclude a moral dimension altogether. Many forms of
psychology of self-actualization think in terms of success, adjustment, getting rid of
guilt feelings, achieving private selfish ambitions. There are interpretations of selfactualization which exclude the moral perspective. So much of this psychology is
limited to vital and social values. You are happy if you are a well-adjusted, functioning
176
efficiently, a respected member of a group which affirms your worth. Moral

development and religious awareness are eliminated from proper human flourishing.
Guilt is something to be dealt with; not something indicating that you might possibly
have done something wrong. Various self-help psychology's assist people to be more
aware of their feelings, to adjust better to their environment, to respond to good
inclinations, to be free of addictions, compulsions, etc. and promote psychic health and
flourishing. But they rarely have in mind the full potentialities of the human person as
free and responsible, with duties and obligations, with a moral dimension of what they
stand for as persons.
There are many views, as we have seen, where the moral is equated with the
useful, the pleasurable, the good of order, the self-interested. These are implicitly
reductionist views; they reduce [158] the meaning of moral to utility or pleasure or
success. To counter these we need to identify, name, discuss, assert and affirm moral
values as distinct from other values but as intimately related to all kinds of values.
6.2 Stating the Solution
1 Moral Good Specifically as Such.
We have seen how we defined vital, social and cultural values as the good
proper to that level of consciousness, the intentionality operative and the activities by
which that intentionality is realized. Now we apply the same schema to moral values.
We ask what is the intentionality proper to the fourth level, what is the perfection of the
activities of that level and what good is to be achieved. This is slightly more
complicated than previous levels because we have to include the activities of
questioning, judging, deciding, acting, being and becoming, progressing and declining.
Furthermore we have to consider that somehow the fourth level sublates other levels,
brings them into a unity, and we must consider the person as a whole, not just as parts.
Value Ethics
177
Knowing is the perfection of a part; moral virtues are somehow the perfection of the
whole.
2 Framework.
Defining the moral only makes sense in the context of a full understanding of the unity
and diversity of a human person: that the human person is free and responsible in his
actions; that the human person is moving from potentiality to actuality on each level of
consciousness; and that there is a dialectic between value and satisfaction operating in
this dynamic. These topics will be dealt with in due course but to understand the moral
question presupposes this broad context. So let us say a quick word about each of these
topics.
Unity. The human person performs many activities, seeing, eating, sleeping,
working, thinking, questioning, relaxing, knowing, doing, seeking, hoping, creating,
being honest, praying and worshiping. The diversity is sufficiently obvious to be
incontrovertible. However, there is a unity of the self or person which causes modern
philosohers some difficulty. We appeal to the experience of identity of the [159] self
perduring in all of these activities over long periods of time and awareness of the same
person operating at different levels. Our notion of consciousness has identified this
awareness of self immanent in most of our activities. Moreover, this is not just a
phenomenal unity but it is a substantial unity, the unity of one substance or central form
or thing grasped by direct insight.
Value judgments. To make correct value judgments normally precedes moral
decisions. To do so we need to be moral persons. As we have seen, we start by asking
the question of the worth of a person. We deliberate in terms of criteria operating. Many
biases, distortions, self-interest, twisting of evidence, ignoring of data, can interfere with
the proper unfolding of the deliberating process. To know what is the right thing to do
in a particular situation, is already a moral achievement. But it is only knowing and this
178
must be extended to living. But we can already assert that one aspect of the moral
person is that he judges well as to what is the right thing to do: he is a good judger of
values.
Deciding. The human person is both free and responsible; without that morality
has no meaning. We do not bring animals to court for stealing food to satisfy their
hunger. We do not hold the mentally incompetent responsible for their actions. We
accept that the human condition imposes limits on our freedom, but in principle we are
free and responsible for our actions and it is only those actions which can be deemed
moral or immoral. Both freedom and responsibility are open to misunderstanding. To be
free is not to be understood as license to behave in any way we wish; but as selfdetermination, as assenting to doing the right thing rather than dissenting, saying yes to
goodness rather than no. Responsibility recognizes that we are obliged, duty bound, live
in a society with other people; we have responsibility to ourselves and to others. Later
we will elaborate an understanding of freedom and responsibility in a manner worthy of
what we are as human persons. Moral only has meaning in this context of authentic
freedom and responsibility.
Implementing. We become complete moral persons only when we have decided
and carried out our decisions. Knowing what is the [160] right thing to do is the first
step; deciding to do the right thing is the next step. But the process is only complete
when the right action has been performed. Many items can interfere between the
decision and the action; we can change our mind; chicken out when it comes to the
crunch; falter at the last jump. It is only at this stage that terminal values are achieved
and the person becomes a good person in consequence.
Developing. The person is a dynamic reality at each of the levels that we have
identified. He is a self-actualizing being, one that moves from potentiality to actuality.
He achieves his being not in one instant but in a process of growth over time where the
Value Ethics
179
development at one level interacts with growth or lags at other levels. The body
obviously grows through distinct and ineluctable stages; intelligence develops through
the asking and answering of questions and passing into the habitual texture of the mind;
we pass through distinct stages of moral development, identified and named by various
psychologists; we develop religiously and the prayer of a child is not the prayer of the
retired person. One expects more of the morally good adult, than you expect of the
morally good adolescent or child.
Dialectic. In the unfolding of the dynamic of the human person there is a
dialectic operating between true values and satisfactions. The process of self-actualizing
is not automatic, it is not necessary, it is open to many paths and directions. There are
tensions and conflicts operating between our desires, our convictions, our satisfactions.
There is the dynamic towards self-transcendence and true value; the following of the
deepest and best inclinations of our hearts; the pursuit of truth, goodness for ourselves
and others. But then there is another path which is often in conflict with that one, of
satisfying sensible appetites, going backwards instead of forward, choosing decline
instead of progress, horizontal finality rather than vertical finality. It is only in the
context of this dialectic that moral values and the moral question can be understood.
This dialectic will be spelt out in detail in the section on conversion.
We can see, then, that the good proper to the fourth level activities will be
manifold because the activities are many. So we look to the [161] perfection of the
person as one who knows well, a judger of values, a prudent person; as a free and
responsible, a good chooser of values: as a good doer or actor, implementer, an integral
person; as one who develops, growing, becoming; as one who struggles with tension
and does not always triumph. These are the perfection of the parts; what about the
goodness of the whole?
3 Personal and Interpersonal.
180
But when we speak of a morally good person, we do not refer to the goodness of
the activities, we refer to the goodness of the whole. What do we mean by that?
When we speak of a good person, we are usually referring to the whole, to the
person as the centre of the activities of judging, deciding, implementing and developing.
We refer to the person as the centre of relationships with other people. Lonergan often
replaced the term moral with the term personal values. We can relate to other
humans simply on the level of experience, we eat together in the same place but we are
strangers. We can relate to others at the level of social organization and so we relate to a
waitress or a shop keeper or a bus conductor as part of the good of order. We relate at
the level of cultural values, when we have intellectual arguments, dispute the latest
theory of physics, insist that our theory is better than theirs. Finally, we relate as persons
fully when we enter into relationships of trust, of marriage, of family, of community, of
friendship with other persons.
Although we use the phrase self-actualization, we do not intend a private
morality of developing ones personality apart from or in exclusion of the good of
friendship, the family, community, society and nation. The good is both personal and
social. Most moral choices take place in the context of interpersonal relations. Apart
from the context of community, moral values do not seem to have much content. Love
of the good includes equally the good of self and the good of others. In the true
friendship envisioned by Aristotle, there was no tension between love of self and love of
the friend provided that both are genuinely good. Love of self is not the same as selfish[162]ness. Selfishness is where we exclude the other unfairly for the benefit of
ourselves.
4 Sublation.
We used the schema of sublation to suggest how the values in the scale of values
relate to one another. The higher sublates the lower, in going beyond to something new,
Value Ethics
181
in leaving intact the lower levels, and in enhancing the value of lower levels. As we are
not considering religious values, we treat moral values as the highest values and
therefore the highest level of sublation and hence sublating all previous values. This
means firstly, that moral values are new, unique, specific, distinct from and higher than
any previous level of values. We reject any form of reductionism by embracing this
principle of sublation. But, secondly, it means that moral values enhance the importance
of all previous values and so the vital, social and cultural values are in some sense are
included, incorporated, part of moral values. Each level sublates the previous levels and
also integrates it into a whole. Intelligence integrates sense into an integrated whole
which is a definition or explanation. Judgment integrates previous levels into a whole
which is an affirmed truth. Judgment of value and will integrate the previous levels into
a whole person who is the one sole integrator and operator, the one who experiences,
understand, judges and decides. The person represents the whole, the centre of
consciousness, the integrator of all activities of the one human being.
The scale of values represent increasing levels of responsibility. We admit
readily that we are not responsible for the colour of our eyes, or the shape of our nose.
We admit more reluctantly that we have little control over our memory and do not feel
responsible for lapses of memory. But we are reluctant to admit that our judgments are
wrong; we take full responsibility for our judgments because we freely and responsible
affirmed them. In judgment we take a stand on what we hold to be true. This is coming
close to what you stand for as a human person. But more important are the moral values
which you espouse and for which you are also truly responsible. More than the truths, it
is the values we espouse that make us what we are as persons in the very core of our
freely constituted personhood. Moral values [163] are at the fourth level and so sublate
the other levels of value and so come close to the core of what we stand for as moral
persons.
182
5 Free and responsible decision.

Lonergan often refers to fourth level activities as the level of deciding. But we
have seen that at the fourth level of consciousness there is first, knowing value, then
deciding, and then execution. So there is more involved that simply deciding, although
we will give it pride of place. Some think that all deciding is an exclusively fourth level
activity, and always a moral decision. But we decide to drink tea or coffee; we decide to
use a nine iron rather than an eight in a game of golf; we decide to take a bus rather than
drive, we decide to wear a blue shirt rather than white. These decisions do not seem to
have monumental moral import; but they are certainly decisions. Decisions in and of
themselves are not necessarily moral decisions. It may not be appropriate to assign
deciding to a level of consciousness and to think of it in broader terms.
The problem of decision is analogous to that of value. We decide at each level of
consciousness and the activities of each level are voluntary activities, willed freely and
responsibly. However, the decisions relating to personal relations, to moral judging and
doing, to the person as a whole, sublate all the other decisions. Moral decision-making
is a specific kind of deciding, it has pre-eminence in relation to other decisions, it
incorporates other decisions into the wholeness of the human person.
In this sense we decide what we are to become as human persons. We can speak
of volitional integration in the sense of the pre-eminence of deciding. We do not argue
like the medievals over the primacy of will or intellect; but we do note the reality of
how knowing interrelates with deciding. This we will explore further in chapter eight.
6 Conclusion.
So I think it is useful to distinguish a general sense and a specific sense of the
term moral. [164]
In a general sense, we can affirm that all values are values and are to be
affirmed, valued, chosen, and implemented. In all decisions we should seek the good
Value Ethics
183
and avoid evil, of whatever kind. The human person seeks for many different kinds of
values. We recognize a dynamic operating at each level of consciousness, sometimes
called the transcendental precepts, be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be
responsible. But the first three are not strictly speaking moral values, nor do they
represent a specific moral obligation. We have an obligation to develop our talents, but
it is not exactly a moral law. We have an obligation to observe norms of polite
behaviour but it is not a moral obligation. So we distinguish between a general
obligation towards development on all levels and a specific obligation, to be
responsible, at the fourth level of moral values and decisions.
In its specific sense, moral value refers to the value of the person as a whole
person sublating all other values, to the person as centre of interpersonal relations, to the
person as deciding freely and responsibly, to produce the first and only edition of
himself. In this sense, moral values have a specific meaning and are not reducible to
other kinds of value. If a certain attitude or behaviour is morally wrong, then, it is
wrong because its wrong. One might eschew a course of action like abortion because it
is dangerous, or because it is expensive, or because you might be found out; but none of
these touch the simple fact that it is a morally wrong course of action. In establishing
the meaning of moral, we cannot reduce it to what is useful, to what is practical, to what
is pleasing, to what is true, to what is feasible, to what is desirable. Moral values are
specifically distinct from other values; they cannot be reduced to other values or put at
the same level as other values.
Have we managed to solve the problems posed in the beginning of this section?
Perhaps, we can see better now that skills are acquired by instruction and practice but
belong to the part rather than to the whole. We acquire skills of playing musical
instruments, driving cars, using computer programs; we become musicians, drivers,
computer programmers, but we are not changed in what we are as persons. Moral
184
virtues change us at the very core of what we are worth as human beings. Virtues are
acquired only if we are willing to [165] change at the core of what we are. Virtue cannot
be forced on anyone. For that reason, it is difficult to have a training course in bravery,
or temperance, or kindness, or honesty, unless participants deeply want to change and
are willing to change at the core of their being.
Intellectual virtues, as Aristotle called them, are perfections of the intellect, and
thus only of a part of what it is to be a human being. Moral virtues are perfections of the
whole. Moral character, then, is the perfection of the activities of knowing moral values,
deciding for values, and living values; it is the perfection of the whole, the habits that
belong to the whole; the habits that belong especially to the will, to the activity of
deciding.
Are there human actions which are morally indifferent? We would tend to agree
with Aquinas. In our terminology, all correct value judgments, good decisions and
consequent actions are morally good in a general sense; vital values if they are realized
are good in themselves as vital values, but also contribute indirectly to the attainment of
moral values. All values are values, but that does not reduce all values to the same level
and moral values in their specific sense are pre-eminent. [166] Suggestions Regarding
(1) This illustrates the difference between judgments of fact in (a) and judgments of
value in (b), (c), and (d). It also illustrates that good is an analogous term, its various
meanings combine similarities and differences. Being a good doctor or football player
are skills. When we talk of a good person we are usually referring to moral qualities.
(2) You might evaluate politicians in terms of whether they are effective, rich, honest,
good speakers, good debater, persuader, competent, intelligent, trustworthy, decisive,
respects others, team player, leadership ability, or their opposites. You often find a
Value Ethics
185
mixture of good and bad qualities and find it difficult to choose one politician over
another.
(3) You usually find that most substantives can be classified as good or bad from some
point of view. Try a page of a dictionary at random. It shows the wide extension of the
term good and the ubiquity of the process of evaluation.
(4) The actual values of a University are expressed in its constitution, its statutes or
charter, its vision statements, its tradition, buildings, institutions, programs offered,
distribution of finance, rules of discipline, criteria of admission, academic standards
required, time given to sports, size and quality of library, etc. To declare a department
value-free is usually an attempt to protect academic freedom, free speech, pluralism of
viewpoints, that no one viewpoint dominates, that students have a choice, that values are
relative. But that itself is taking a position on values, namely, that all values are equal
and that values are a matter of free choice. These tensions and contradictions become
evident when you try to put these policies into action. Advocates of academic freedom
can become quite intolerant of those who hold that values can be true or false.
(5) McDonalds seems to stand for fast foods, cheap food, food that is attractive to
children, quick polite service, do away with frills, uniformity of product and service,
some concessions to healthy food, young temporary employees, etc. It is a formula
[167] which seems to have worked. But it is a set of economic, vital, commercial
values.
(6) Our values are a matter of personal preference in the sense that we are responsible
for our values; but we do not choose our moral values in the same way that we choose
the colour of our clothes. They are a choice but not a random choice; we are what we
value; we become the originating value of good terminal values. Conversely, we
degrade ourselves by doing bad deeds. By your fruits you will know them. As children
we accept the values of our family, community and nation and church. Gradually we
186
appropriate these values for ourselves, accepting some and rejecting others. Hopefully,
this is done with forethought, responsibility and mature decision.
(7) Value clarification exercises help in this process of ranking our actual values. There
is a ranking going on even if we are unaware of it. How do you spend your money?
What do you do in your leisure time? What are your moral values?
(8) We usually evaluate, decide and act in that order. These are so much part of human
life that it is impossible to avoid them altogether. To stay in bed and try to avoid human
life is just another way of evaluating, deciding and acting. [168]
Endnotes
1
B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 18.
Frederick E. Crowe, Old Things and new: A Strategy for Education, (Georgia:
Scholars Press, 1985). This gives an excellent analysis of the way of heritage and the
way of achievement and their proper integration.
3
See Cronin, Foundations, 263-7.
Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980: Collected

Works of Bernard Lonergan vol 17. (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004) 403.
5
Insight, 633-5.
In his own words Lonergan says, In Insight the good was the intelligent and
reasonable. In Method the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for
deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in
the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by
a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. Bernard Lonergan, A Second
Collection, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), Insight Revisited, 277.
6
Method in Theology, 11.
Insight, 34.
Insight, Chapter 12.
10
Insight, 300.
11
See Manfred Frings, Max Scheler, 80-5.
12
13
Bob Doran asserts, the relations among the levels of value are isomorphic with those
among the levels of consciousness, to which the levels of value respectively
Value Ethics
187
correspond. Theology and the Dialectics of History, (Toronto: University of Toronto

Press, 1990) 95.
14
Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, 206.
15
16
We previously applied the notion of sublation in relation to cognitional structure in

Foundations, 263-4. Now we apply it to ethics. See paper presented at Lonergan
International Workshop in Toronto, 2004, by Kenneth Melchin, entitled, Thinking
About Sublation: Exploring One of Lonergans Contributions to Ethics.
17
See Michael Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness: is there a fifth level" in Method:

Journal of Lonergan Studies, vol. 12, No 1, 1994, 8.
18
19
Ibid., 51.
20
B. Lonergan, Insight, 601.
21
I found the following readings helpful but not fully satisfactory on the question:
Joseph de Finance, An Ethical Inquiry, (Roma: Editrice Portificia Universita
Gregoriana, 1991), 67-86; Dietrich Von Hildebrand, Ethics, (Chicago, Franciscan
Herald Press,1953), 169-79; Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Beyond the New
Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1974), passim. M. Frings, Max Scheler, 71-94.
22
I am indebted to the treatment of this question in: De Finance, Ethical Inquiry, 42634.
4
Deliberative Insight
In the judgment of value, then, three components unite. First, there

is knowledge of reality and especially of human reality. Secondly,
there are intentional responses to values. Thirdly, there is the initial
thrust towards moral self-transcendence constituted by the
judgment of value itself.1
(1) Is it ever good to act without thinking?
(2) Give some criteria by which you judge between a good doctor and a bad doctor.
(3) Can you expect to solve moral dilemmas in the same way that you would solve
mathematical puzzles? What would be the difference?
(4) Are really intelligent people more likely to solve moral dilemmas correctly than the
less intelligent?
(5) Can a computer solve mathematical problems? Can a computer solve moral
dilemmas? [172]
(6) Recall a conversation in which you argued the merits or demerits of a recent movie
or book. How did the arguments unfold? Who won?
(7) Your sister asks for advice on procuring an abortion. What do you do?
(8) Does the end justify the means?
1 Introduction
The question of value, as we have seen, arises spontaneously, arises in many
different contexts, at various levels of consciousness, with varying relevance to the
quality of human living and flourishing. The questions intend an answer, which is
arrived at when we pass a judgment on the value, choose the course of action and
implement the decision. We deliberate on the various alternatives, we evaluate which is
the best, we choose and we act. We will later focus on the judgment of value, but the
next step in the process seems to be deliberation, namely, thinking, comparing,
Value Ethics
189
inferring, gathering evidence, seeking information, and so forth, so that we can arrive at
a confident judgment of value.
Decisions are more obvious and apparent than the evaluation that precedes it.
You decide to buy a Toyota Corolla, you sign the check, take delivery and drive off into
the sunset. You decide you want to be a doctor, tell your parent, apply to various
schools, plan the finance of your studies and off you go. You decide to tell the truth,
admit you had too much to drink, should never have been driving, were responsible for
the consequences, take the appropriate punishment and make restitution for the damage.
But what is less obvious and apparent is the thinking, reasoning, judging and evaluating
that leads to the decision. Human decisions and actions are not random occurrences
they do not drop like magic from heaven. They mostly follow from good judgments of
value. You choose a course of action because you have judged that it is the best course
of action, for you, here and now, in this set of circumstances. You decide to buy a
Toyota, because you judge that it is the most suited to your needs and pocket. You want
to be a doctor because you have the desire to heal, the appropriate aca-[173]demic and
manual skills and you feel that you will be happy as a doctor you value being a doctor.
Now where does this judgment about the best course of action come from? That is our
present concern and it is no easy matter.
We can learn a certain amount about this process of deliberation from the history
of philosophy and will summarize these points in Section Two. We can glean some
hints from Lonergan's use of 'deliberation, evaluation, choice, action', which we will
discuss in Section Three. But we do not wish to be dependent on historical authorities,
telling us how to deliberate and make good judgments of value. We have personal
resources of our own, by which we can identify good deliberation and distinguish it
from hasty, or incomplete, or mistaken deliberation. For that reason, we started the
chapter with questions for personal self-appropriation, an invitation to read the
190
deliberations of your own mind and heart when confronted by a moral question. When
we find ourselves in a moral quandery, we are being pulled in opposing directions by
conflicting feelings, confused ideas, incomplete inferences, tension between wanting to
do the right thing but also afraid of the unpleasant consequences of telling the truth. It is
from this maelstrom of conflicting feelings, desires, ideas, hopes, facts, consequences,
and alternatives, that our judgment of value and decision emerge. Together we are
daring to delve into these deepest recesses of mental activities and feelings, to find the
foundations and source of good moral judgments
It seems obvious that 'understanding and reasoning' have some part to play in
this process of deliberation. Some philosophers have argued that such deliberation is a
purely and exclusively a rational procedure and that feelings have to be excluded
entirely and explicitly. Without going that far, it is clear that we argue about right
courses of action; some arguments we recognize as strange, some as irrelevant, some as
convincing. We appeal to reasons, to evidence, to facts, to witnesses, to inferences. The
whole world was involved in the UN debates in assessing the justification for preemptive invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Many arguments, facts, justifications,
precedents, judgments, laws, inferences, alternatives, consequences [174] etc. were part
of the debate. It is hard to imagine that such a debate could exclude understanding and
reasoning altogether!
Equally, it seems obvious that feelings have some important role to play. The
various branches of empiricism emphasize the role of experience, feelings, sympathy,
heart, feelings of approval and disapproval, as the determining or sole factor in moral
'thinking'. There have been many variations, in which feelings like pleasure, utility, selfinterest, sympathy, etc. are considered as primary factors in the process of deliberation
and evaluation. The empiricist tradition does not recognize the role of understanding
universals and judging as true or false, and so almost by definition they appeal to some
Value Ethics
191
kind of feelings to account for our experience of 'ought', of moral approval and
disapproval, our sense of guilt in doing wrong or satisfaction at doing the right thing.
But are we faced with two alternatives, that are mutually exclusive? Must we opt
for one extreme or the other? Does an affirmation of the central importance of
intelligence and reason in moral argument, automatically, by definition, exclude a role
for sympathy, egoism or altruism, responsibility, anger or fear. Even in the formal
presentations of the UN debate, one could sense the deep feelings of participants over
the alternatives before them. Does that vitiate their arguments? On the other hand, is it
tenable to hold that feelings of approval or disapproval are the sole element in moral
deliberation. Surely questions such as, where do these feelings of approval/disapproval
come from? Corrupt persons approve of certain actions which other people disapprove
of as criminal? Once questions arise we start thinking and reasoning and so are involved
in some kind of cognitive deliberation.
It seems unavoidable that both reason and feelings have a role to play in moral
deliberation. Further, I suspect that reasoning and feeling processes are in fact closely
intertwined. We are in search of an understanding of a deliberative process, which will
include rather than exclude the role of feelings. Similarly, we are looking for an
understanding of feelings which will discriminate between those feelings which drive
the process of deliberating, evaluating, choosing [175] and acting, from those feelings
that are simply transient, or irrelevant or obstacles to the process.
So let us propose an outline for our personal identification of the elements that
go into producing a judgment of value.
We started this chapter with the caption where Lonergan asserts that in a
judgment of value three components unite, namely, (1) 'knowledge of reality and
especially of human reality', (2) 'intentional responses to value' and (3) 'the initial thrust
towards moral self-transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself'.2 There is
192
some explanation before this assertion and a brief elaboration afterwards, but the
statements remains rather enigmatic and compact. Our task is to elaborate and identify
in our own consciousness these three elements and even more important to show how
these disparate elements unite in a single judgment of value.
The first component presumably encompasses the cognitive element, the
activities of questioning, understanding, reflecting, deliberating and judging. In this
present chapter we will deal exclusively with the activity of deliberating as a cognitive
activity. We will focus on Mind, the activities involved in knowing values.
The second component is the intentional response to value, which we treat as the
affective component, the feeling element, the contribution of Heart. This element we
will deal with in the following two chapters, to assess the meaning of Lonergans
statements on this area, and then to present out own systematic view of how feelings fit
into the process of evaluation.
The third component I understand as willing self-transcendence and subdivide
into the volitional element of free deciding and the notion of self-transcendence. Hence
I will refer to free deciding as the third element and the notion of self-transcendence as
the fourth element. The notion of deciding, of Will, we deal with in chapter seven. The
notion of self-transcendence, of Spirit, we will deal with in chapter eight. .
It is only in chapter nine that we will consider how these elements unite in a
single judgment of value. Our aim in this present chapter is [176] to capture the
cognitive or Mind element involved in the judgment of value. It is a rather obvious and
predominant aspect, but we hope to identify its precise shape and structure, without
excluding any of the components to be considered later.
2 Learning from Aristotle
We have already given a brief account of Aristotle's virtue ethics. We have seen
how he worked out an explanatory scheme of terms and relations in which he framed his
Value Ethics
193
approach. He succeeded in defining the basic terms of happiness, final end, function of
man, virtue and vice, voluntary involuntary and also each specific virtue and vice. It is
easy to see that some element of reasoning or intelligence was involved in these
operations. What has he got to say specifically on deliberating towards a practical
conclusion?
1. Aristotle clearly distinguishes between theoretical, practical and productive
sciences.3 The theoretical seek truth for its own sake; the practical concern the question
what is the best way to live; and the productive sciences concern the arts (techne) the
production of poetry or statues, or music. Practical science is mostly politics with ethics
conceived as part of politics. It is not just concerned with theoretical answers to
questions about the best way to live, human actions and purposes but is aimed to
produce a better state of affairs both for the society and for the individual. You can have
a practical science, systematic knowledge through causes, about the ways people live
together in the city and the laws regulating their interaction. In the Nicomachean Ethics
he discusses the final end of human life, virtues and vices, the aim of the science is
action, promoting a good way of living. He discusses happiness and pleasure,
intellectual and moral virtues, deliberation and choice, friendship and contemplation. He
recognizes that moral philosophy, as rational reflection on human action, has something
important to contribute to human life and happiness.
2. He explicitly recognizes a process of deliberation. This is a special form of
reflection appropriate for practical matters. We deliberate about what is possible, not
what is impossible; about difficult matters [177] and not about certitudes; hence we
deliberate more in the arts than in the sciences. We deliberate about practical things that
are in our power. Most controversially he affirmed that we deliberate about means and
not about ends. A doctor deliberates about practical things he can do to make his patient
healthy; he does not deliberate about whether health is a good thing; that is taken for
194
granted. Similarly, he asserts that the final end of human living is happiness or human
self-fulfilment. We do not deliberate about happiness as an end, but we do deliberate
about the means to achieve this end, through virtuous living and a modicum of the good
things in life. He distinguishes between deliberation and choice; the choice is a result of
deliberation, it implies a rational principle: choice is a deliberate appetition and directs
our aim according with the deliberation. Deliberation can be either correct or mistaken.
Resourcefulness helps the process of deliberation but is not identical with it. (N.E.
1112a17 - 1113a12)
3. There is a practical syllogism which differs from demonstrative syllogism in
that the major premise is a judgment of value, e.g. all dry food is wholesome or stealing
is wrong. This is combined with a minor premise which is a statement of particular fact,
e.g. this is dry food, or this is stealing. The conclusion is not so much a proposition as
an action. If the person is lacking knowledge of the major premise he/she is morally
corrupt. If knowledge of the minor premise is missing then the person is mistaken or
self-deceiving. If the person has knowledge of both premises the action should follow.
4. Prudence (phronesis), sometimes translated as practical wisdom, is
recognized by Aristotle as an intellectual virtue concerned with correct deliberation.
(N.E. 1140a24 - b30) The prudent person is the one who knows, not just what is right
in general, but what is morally right in this concrete particular situation. The prudent
person knows what is conducive to the good life. Prudence is not learnt by instruction
but by experience; young people can be good at mathematics but they cannot be prudent
because they lack the requisite experience. It is wisdom but a practical wisdom of
knowing what is the right thing to do in these particular circumstances. The virtue of
prudence is of great relevance, then, because all virtuous living eventually involves
[178] concretely doing the right thing, at the right time, in the right amount, for the right
reason, etc.
Value Ethics
195
5. Aristotle discovered the distinction between right by nature and right by

convention. (N.E. 1134b18 -1135a8) To be right by nature is natural justice which has
the same validity everywhere and does not depend on whether people recognize it or
not. To be right by convention is legal justice which is an action at first indifferent but
which once laid down become obligatory, e.g. what is the correct ransom for a prisoner.
Some, like the Sophists, hold that all laws are of the latter kind because they see the
variety of laws in different cities. Against them Aristotle asserts the existence of a
natural law which is universal, does not depend on acceptance and has the same validity
everywhere.
So we have picked out some of the more important ways in which reasoning is
invoked in the ethics of Aristotle. This is not to deny, as we will see later, that he also
assigns a very important role to feelings in moral education. He is a sound and sensible
guide in this as in many others matters philosophical.
3 Lonergan on Deliberation
The framework and inspiration of our study comes from the thought of Bernard
Lonergan. Our question now is what specifically can we learn from him about the
cognitive aspect of how a judgment of value is produced? We have already given a
resume of his cognitional theory.4 We recall the basic diagram of cognitional operations
to your attention. Our focus is now on fourth level operations, the question of value,
deliberative insight and the judgment of value. In our last chapter we explored the
question of value, namely, is it worthwhile? This question is explicitly recognized
Lonergan's writings and is not problematic. The judgment of value is also explicitly
recognized even if it is not given detailed elaboration. What is problematic is what
comes in-between the question and the answer; what kind of cognitive activity produces
the judgment of value. Lonergan often uses the term 'deliberation', again without an
elaboration of what it entails; he never uses the term 'deliberative insight'. [179] In
196
trying to figure out what Lonergan meant by deliberation, (1) we will consider his use of
the word in various contexts especially in combination with evaluation. (2) We will use
analogies of various kinds keeping an eye on our diagram all the time. If the structure of
judgment of value is the same as the structure of the judgment of truth, then surely there
will be a structural similarity between the insights that produce them. What kind of an
insight must you have, in order to answer a question of value, in a judgment of value?
(3) We check all this out constantly in our own cognitional experience which is the final
authority in the whole matter. Our present focus is on the cognitive activities, the
structure or form of reasoning involved in reaching a judgment and not the motivations,
the feelings, the desires, that underlie such activities, which we recognize in the
following two chapters.
3.1 Deliberative Insights Primary Sources
Our present concern is the precise meaning of deliberation and how it answers
the question of value by producing a judgment of value. Let us do some textual
hermeneutics to discern what Lonergan meant by this term. "To deliberate about 'x' is to
ask whether 'x' is worthwhile."5 The question of deliberation is the question of value:
what is the value of 'x', where 'x' may be a thing, a person, an action, a policy, an
institution or anything else? Deliberation follows from the question of value and
produces the judgment of value. But what is it precisely as an activity, what is its
structure or form? Despite the infinite variety of particular deliberations, is there one
structure underlying all processes of deliberation?
1. Lonergan does talk about judgments of value in Insight in the context of the
act of believing. To believe requires, "(1) a preliminary judgment on the value of belief
in general (2) a reflective act of understanding that, in virtue of the preliminary
judgments, grasps as virtually unconditioned the value of deciding to believe some
Value Ethics
197
particular proposition, (3) the consequent judgment of value, (4) the consequent
decision of the will, and (5) the assent that is the act of believing."6 [180]
So it is clear that Lonergan recognizes and analyses the judgment of value as
distinct from the judgment of fact already in the framework of Insight thinking. Also of
great importance is the recognition that the judgment of value emerges from " a
reflective act of understanding,.that grasps as virtually unconditioned the value of
deciding to believe".7 Here we have a clear statement of the similarity between the
reflective insight of judgments of truth and of value, and also the use of the terminology
of virtually unconditioned in the context of value judgments.
2. In later writings Lonergan regularly uses deliberation in conjunction with
evaluation. Typical would be, "There is a responsible level on which we are concerned
with ourselves, our own operation, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of
action, evaluate them, decide and carry out our decision."8 What is the difference
between these two terms 'deliberation' and 'evaluation'? Lonergan is not one to use
redundant terms. Deliberation always comes first in this listing of activities. Surely the
implication is that deliberation is a process of thinking or reasoning and that evaluation
is short-hand for the judgment of value.
There is a special little technical problem as to what brings deliberation to an
end for the judgments of value to emerge. Lonergan seems to think that it is a decision
that brings deliberation to an end: "Accordingly, the process of deliberation and
evaluation is not itself decisive, and so we experience our liberty as the active thrust of
the subject terminating the process of deliberation by settling on one of the courses of
action and proceeding to execute it."9 This seems to suggest, even though it is not
entirely clear, that it is a decision that terminates the process of deliberation. This notion
may be a carry-over from a difficulty raised in Insight where he discusses practical
insight and practical reflection in the context of the possibility of an ethics. He
198
enunciates a series of six corollaries on the gap between practical reflection and
execution. On the one hand, he affirms that practical reflection as knowing can have an
internal term and we can know what is the right thing to do: "In so far as it (practical
reflection) is a knowing, it can reach an internal term, for one can grasp the virtually
unconditioned and thereby attain certitude on the possibility [181] of a proposed course
of action, on its agreeableness, on its utility, on its obligatoriness."10 On the other hand,
he asserts: "because the reflection has no internal term, it can expand more or less
indefinitely."11 "It is not reflection but decision that enforces the norm"12, "What ends
the reflection is the decision." 13
I find it very difficult to grasp a coherent interpretation of these conflicting
statements. He seems to be saying that practical reflection, i.e. reflecting on what is the
right thing to do, can expand indefinitely and it is decision and action that brings it to an
end. This would seem strange. (1) It would imply that practical reflection has no term of
its own, no term at which it reaches a conclusion, no point at which it knows what is the
right thing to do. (2) Why should decision arbitrarily interfere with the process of
reflection and bring it to an end! At what point? For what reason should decision
interfere? (3) What is the point of reflection, if it is not going to achieve some
contribution to a good decision; if it is not purposive, aiming at something, coming to a
term of its own? (4) How does the later terminology of deliberation and evaluation fit in
with the terminology of practical and reflective insights of Insight? (5) And where, pray,
is the judgment of value in all this? If decision brings deliberation to an end, then, the
judgment of value has been bypassed: we would pass from the question of deliberation,
through deliberation, to decision and action. This is hardly the normal case.
3. We might also ask, is the characterization of the cognitive component of a
judgment of value as 'knowledge of reality and especially human reality' adequate and
exact? I think not. How is this statement related to his oft repeated series of activities of
Value Ethics
199
questioning, deliberating, evaluating, deciding and acting? There is an obvious sense in

which we need a good understanding and knowledge of reality and human reality to
make true and relevant judgments of value. If you are going to raise interest rates, know
your economics. Lonergan here explicitly warns about 'idealists' whose intentions are
good, but whose knowledge is deficient and in the end they do more harm than good.
That we will discuss later. Such knowledge is presupposed as a general background to
the judgment of value but does [182] not accurately define the cognitive component that
enters into the judgment of value itself.
4. A last hint I wish to extract from Lonergan's text is from the statement,
"Judgments of value differ in content but not in structure from judgments of fact".14
Judgments of fact and of value are both judgments, i.e. statements of what one affirms
to be the case, what is really true and what is really of value. In both cases the criterion
operating in the judgment is the self-transcendence of the subject, which is cognitive in
the case of judgments of truth but is headed towards moral self-transcendence in the
judgment of value. Now in Insight we have a detailed precise elaborated
characterization of the judgment of truth. Clearly, also in Insight the judgment of truth is
produced by the reflective insight, which in turn is analyzed in depth and in detail. Now
if judgments of fact and of value have the same structure, surely it is reasonable to
suppose that they are produced by similar or analogous insights. Reflective insight
produces the judgment of truth; I am going to suggest that 'deliberative insight' produces
the judgment of value. This is a step that Lonergan did not take simple and obvious as
it may seem to us. Why did he leave us with such a patch work of bits and pieces?
(1.) I do not think he was clear in his mind about the role of the judgment of
value as knowledge of values, as an activity of the fourth level of consciousness. He
never worked out the fourth level in the same detail and richness as he did the first three
levels in Insight. Included at the same level are, the activity of deciding and religious
200
openness, faith hope and charity. So when he refers to fourth level activities in Method
it is not clear, whether he is referring to activities involved in knowing values, activities
involved in good decision-making, or activities involved in the religious dimension of
faith, hope and love.
(2.) He has performatively differentiated the way from below upwards and the
way from above downwards in Method in Theology; this is the basis for the eight
functional specialties of theology, research, interpretation, history and dialectics; then
foundations, doctrines, systematics and communications. But he has not thematized
these [193] two ways in the Background chapters of Part One. Hence the dynamic of the
pure desire to know, working towards immanently generated knowledge of truth and
value, is not clearly distinguished from the operation of love poured into our hearts by
the Holy Spirit, thus transforming our valuing, knowing, understanding and
experiencing.
(3.) Clearly and legitimately his focus in Method is on theology and its method.
Hence, he tends to skip or skimp on the possibility of an immanently generated
knowledge of moral values. He has given us Insight, which can be seen as a detailed
treatment of intellectual conversion. He has given us Method in Theology, which can be
seen as an extended treatment of religious and Christian conversion. For moral
conversion, we have to rely on some basic sketches and work out a detailed elaboration
for ourselves.
3.2 Deliberative Insights Secondary Sources
This author would not be the first to suggest the notion or at least the
terminology of deliberative or evaluative insight producing the judgment of value. Most
discussion on the judgment of value has centred on the meaning of intentional response,
apprehension of value, and the role of feelings in producing the judgment of value.
However, Mark Doorley,15 Pat Byrne,16 and Bob Doran17 have used terminology
Value Ethics
201
suggestive of something like a deliberative insight, a grasp of the virtually

unconditioned of value.
But let me concentrate on Michael Vertin's excellent and detailed article on
"Judgments of Value in the Later Lonergan".18 The article aims at a coherent
interpretation and expansion of Lonergans treatment of fourth level intentional
consciousness. He draws many fruitful parallels between the levels of consciousness,
noting similarities and differences. His focus is to show how affective and cognitive
components combine in producing a judgment of value. He coins the term deliberative
insight; the term insight showing the continuity of this term with the earlier Lonergan,
and the term deliberative suggesting a discontinuity. He realizes that value judgments
are not always about possible courses of action; a value judgment about an actual value
belongs to the pattern of complacency, about possible [184] values belongs to the
pattern of concern. However, at the core of the issue there seems to remain an
unresolved ambiguity centring on deliberative insight. There is a shift from intellectual
cognition that is reflective, to affective cognition that is deliberative.19 Why should the
discursive cognitional response at levels two and three be intellectual, while at the
fourth level it is affective?20 Deliberative insight at one point seems to be a cognitive
grasp of the virtually unconditioned;21 while at other times it is identified with the
apprehension of value in feelings.22 One is left with many questions about affective and
intellectual cognition; deliberative insight, apprehension of value, and intentional
response to value; transcendental feelings and categorical feelings. These terms remain
up in the air unless we refer clearly to the experience of knowing value, and identify the
role of cognitive activities and feelings in the process. Questions remain as to which
feelings enter into the dynamism of knowing values; and which feelings are
concomitant, irrelevant or positively obstructive to the process.
202
More recently, William F. Sullivan has applied Michael Vertins interpretation

of Lonergan to the euthanasia debate in Canada.23 He applies Lonergans principles
about judgments of value to concrete cases of euthanasia. He follows faithfully Michael
Vertins interpretation and expansion of Lonergans principles. It is an admirable effort
by an expert in his field he is a medical doctor to apply these categories to specific
cases in his area. He is respectful of how individuals reach opposing judgments of value
due to their history, the role of feelings in their life and their interpersonal relations. He
fleshes out many distinctions such as between value and satisfaction, judgment and
decision. It is a scholarly, detailed and systematic presentation. But the core ambiguity
seems to remain. We still have a jump from intellectual cognition at second and third
levels, to affective cognition at fourth level.24 We still have deliberative insights, which
are both a grasp of the virtually unconditioned and an apprehension of value in
feeling.25 He admits that there is an affective dimension to all knowing, but then the
affective dimension in knowing values is importantly different.26 There seems to remain
a fudge over the core issue: it is still not clear to me how feelings enter into a judgment
of value. [185] The articulation of these difficult matters is important and he has helped
us all with a clearly differentiated statement of a position.
Lonergan scholars have struggled with the questions of value, feeling and
judgments of value; we have not yet achieved an agreed, comprehensive, critical
framework. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the issue. I do not think that a
coherent interpretation of Lonergan texts will solve the issue the texts are incomplete
and ambiguous. We need to apply the ultimate test of self-appropriation; the words have
to be given meaning in reference to the data of consciousness, the data of moral
experience. That is the ultimate authority and it is from there that we can correct and fill
in the gaps left by Lonergans incomplete treatment.
4 Knowledge of Reality especially Human Reality
Value Ethics
203
'Knowledge of reality especially human reality' is how Lonergan characterizes

the first component that unites with the other two components in a judgment of value.
As an account of the cognitive element in all judgments of value, this is strangely
vague and unsatisfactory. In Insight he makes it clear that reflective insights produce
judgments of truth and explains precisely at length and in detail, what is a reflective
insight. Surely there is a need for similar precision and detail in specifying where the
judgment of value comes from. That would surely lead in the direction of deliberation
or deliberative insight and not something vague like 'knowledge of reality'.
However, it is useful to point out that correct judgments of values, decisions and
actions presuppose correct and adequate knowledge of the area in question. If you want
to intervene in the economy by changing interest rates, or adjusting tax brackets, or
increasing government expenditure, be sure that you understand correctly how
economies work and what are the likely consequences of adjustments. If you are passing
moral judgment on trading practices, business transactions, bonuses, effects of
multinational corporations, again be sure you know what you are talking about. If you
want to set up a course in business ethics, you have to get a person who is competent in
business as well as in ethics. A commonsense approach to [186] economics will be
adequate in simple societies; but in a modern, technological, global economy
specialized knowledge is required. It is a little know fact that Lonergan spend his last
ten years teaching economics and his lectures have been published in Collected Works
15 and 2127. When asked why he was interested in economics he is reported to have
answered, 'so that the widows and orphans will not starve.' At the commonsense level,
we think of alleviating poverty by almsgiving, international handouts, welfare
payments, and the like. But it is the economic decisions of the Ministers of Finance, the
IMF, the World Bank, the oil cartels, the multinationals, which determine how the
204
economy will develop, who will benefit, which country, class, or group will profit; and
in the end, whether the widows and orphans will starve.
Many areas of human reality have become so specialized that professional
competence is a prerequisite to know what is the right and good procedure. Medicine is
an obvious example with genetic engineering, stem cells, embryo research, new
advances raising new ethical questions all the time. The human sciences are needed
more than ever to promote and produce healthy human living conditions, promoting
mental health, family life, education, total human development. Ethics cannot stand still,
repeating the old nostrums and praising traditional virtues; it has to be foundational and
intercultural as well as detailed and specialized; ethics should combine competence in
human reality with moral sensitivity and goodness.
Further, it is clear from our diagram of cognitional activities that judgments of
value depend structurally on judgments of truth. When you ask the question for
deliberation, is this person good? is this action right? is this policy just? you are
presuming a correct and adequate understanding of the person, action or policy
concerned. The way from below upwards is the way of immanently generated
knowledge. Direct understanding depends on images, sensing, data, experiencing.
Reflective understanding depends on direct understanding of possible explanations,
definitions and hypotheses as well as on experiencing. Similarly, deliberation and
judgments of value will depend on and presuppose previous correct judgment of truth,
as well as understanding of possibilities, alternatives, consequences. [187] Hence, while
we appeal to the good person as the criterion of moral goodness, we must also
remember that he/she must be competent in the area of expertise and a wise person.
5 Deliberative Insight Systematic Presentation
Having taken care of all these preliminary matters, we now come to the nub of
the question. We have a precise idea of the question for deliberation; an anticipatory
Value Ethics
205
notion of the judgment of value; the focus now is what happens in-between. Lonergan
seems to refer to this regularly as deliberation or deliberating. Now what is this process
of deliberation? How does it begin, how does it proceed and how does it end? Does it
have many different forms or is there one single basic universal form? I am proposing
that such an important process will have a single basic form, even though there may be
many specific variations. Using the various analogies available in the diagram of
cognitional activities, I am proposing that deliberation is in the end a single insight into
the sufficiency of the evidence for the conclusion in a judgment of value. I intend to call
this a 'deliberative insight,' to be understood on the analogy of reflective insight. It is a
cognitive activity by which we grasp the sufficiency of the evidence for the positing of a
judgment of value. It is similar in structure to the reflective insight; it differs from the
reflective insight in that it intends value and not truth. So let us explore the implications
of such a hypothesis and check if it coheres with our own experience of where
judgments of value come from. This is an attempt to give a systematic, comprehensive
overview of the structure of deliberative insight, an interpretation and expansion of
Lonergan's texts. It might help to refer to our diagram of cognitional activities and to
note again the parallels between third and fourth level activities. At the third level,
questions for reflection lead to reflective insights, which in turn produce judgments of
truth; at the fourth level questions for deliberation lead to deliberative insights, which in
turn produce judgments of value. [188]
5.1 Deliberation as Insight
Deliberative insight will be an insight, an act of understanding, embodying in
some way the five characteristics of all acts of understanding.28 It will come as a release
of the tension of inquiry; we are presuming the question, Is it worthwhile? operating
consistently, deeply, driving towards a solution. It will come suddenly and
unexpectedly: we cannot force such insights; we provide optimal conditions of
206
concentration, attention to relevant data, manipulating images, data, examples in

suggestive ways and then it comes. It pivots between the abstract and the concrete: we
have universal moral laws, but they have to be applied in a concrete situation. Which
laws apply in this situation? Is this a situation of killing, murder, manslaughter,
accidental killing, or what? Is this concrete situation an exception to the abstract
definition? The emergence of the insight depends on inner conditions more than
outward circumstances; the inner conditions are the questions, the habits, the feelings,
the intentions, the ambitions, the desires, and so on, moving to evaluation, decision, and
action. Outer circumstances, such as poverty or riches, male or female, time and place,
culture and language, may be quite irrelevant. Finally, the deliberative insight will pass
into the habitual texture of the mind: if we discover that a friend is really a fraud, we are
not likely to forget it; if we realize that we did the right thing is one situation, we are
likely to do it again in a similar situation; by means of individual judgments of value we
establish habitual value stances and priorities.
Deliberative insight, then, will not be intuitive, that is, a simple, single, direct
vision of value; it will be discursive, worked out painfully and slowly, open to
interference of various kinds; involving sensing, remembering, understanding, a context
of facts, a context of ideas, a context of previous deliberative insights. It will involve
active focusing, researching, questioning, thinking, writing, talking; and will also be
passive, waiting, listening, hoping, receiving. Many existential elements will tend to
intrude for better or worse fear of consequences, mixed motivations, selfishness
struggling with altruism, willingness in tension with unwillingness. Deliberative insight
ushers us into the world mediated by meaning and value, not the world of [189]
immediacy of sensing of the out there now real. Deliberative insight will grasp a unity, a
connection, a whole, a value, a relation, a form immanent in a multiplicity of images,
situations, experiences and events.
Value Ethics
207
5.2 Structure of Deliberative Insight

But a deliberative insight will be modelled on reflective insight because it is
preparing to issue a judgment. If the structure of judgment of fact is the same as the
structure of the judgment of value, then surely the form of deliberative insight will be
similar to the form of reflective insight. Hence the unity we are looking for in
deliberative insights is the connection between evidence and conclusion; is it sufficient,
convincing, possible, probable, impossible or improbable? The descriptive way of
expressing this is 'weighing the evidence' for or against the conclusion.
All good or value is conditioned or contingent (except for God, the formally
unconditioned good). There is no necessary good, and so all judgments of value will be
of contingent values, values that will be real values, if certain conditions are fulfilled.
The judgment of value will start with a conditioned, proceed to establish a link between
the conditioned and its fulfilling conditions; determine if the conditions are in fact
fulfilled; then proceed to enunciate the virtually unconditioned value of this person, act,
policy, or thing. The deliberative insight is the grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence
in the premises for the conclusion. It is a single insight that unites a vast multiplicity of
data, insights, facts, previous evaluations, and so forth. Hence deliberative insight
follows the form of the hypothetical syllogism of reflective insight, that is: If A, then B.
But A. Therefore B.
This analysis of the fundamental underlying structure of deliberative insight is
important because it reveals the structure of the human mind as it grasps the good and
knows value. We are not born knowing what is right, but we are born with the capacity
to work it out for ourselves. Listen to any argument about abortion, capital punishment,
just war, homosexuality, gender discrimination, for example, and underlying all the
partial points, whether they are valid or [190] not, is the structure of, (1) a question of
value to be answered; (2) arguments, connections, inferences, links, relevance; (3)
208
appealing to evidence, experience, facts, memories, previous experience; (4) an

appropriate conclusion emerging by which we affirm or deny the value. In all cultures,
at all times, this is the fundamental underlying transcendental structure of moral
reasoning. This is how the human mind works, how our mind works, how your mind
works, how all minds work. It is as clear as: if A, then B. But A. Therefore B. This is
the fundamental form of inference of value that we are in process of identifying and
objectifying.
We usually formalize this procedure in more detailed explicit ways so as to
apply to particular cases. We have the formal structure of deductive syllogistic logic; we
have the rules of inference and the fallacies that occur when the rules are broken; we
have inductive logic and principles of scientific method; we have many forms of
modern symbolic logic; many disciplines develop their own particular forms of
methodologies, procedures, rules, all the guide the process of inference from evidence to
conclusions. All of these may be relevant to procedures of moral reasoning. The
structure of moral reasoning is similar to the structure of scientific or philosophical
reasoning. It is the content and criteria that makes the difference between reflective and
deliberative insight.
5.3 Content and Criteria
The difference between reflective insight and deliberative insight will be in the
content rather than structure; reflective insights intend truth; deliberative insights intend
value. The transcendental notion of value motivates the intentionality of asking
questions until a satisfactory solution is found; the notion of value recognizes value
when it is found and provides the criterion of true value in the happy conscience of the
good person. This is transcendental in the sense that it is beyond categories, applying to
all human persons, making judgments of value, of any kind, in any time or place. This is
Value Ethics
209
a very high level of generality; let us try to be more categorial so that we can be clear
about what we are saying. [191]
The criterion of truth operating in questions for reflection is relatively univocal:
it has one meaning, one intention, guiding the activities to a successful conclusion. The
criterion of value is much more analogous: value takes on different meanings depending
on the context of the question that is asked. What is the value of this food and what is
the value of this person, are two value questions; but the first is intending vital values
and the second is intending moral values. Persons, things, policies, can be evaluated
from many different points of view. How do we know which point of view is operative?
Fortunately, it is the question which usually sets the criterion that is operative and that
must be satisfied. The criterion is goodness from one perspective or another. It is only
when we are clear about the criterion operating, that we can assess the relevance of
evidence for the truth or falsehood of the judgment. Perhaps we will be able to see this
in action in some of the following examples.
5.4 Valuing Things
We are constantly evaluating things in a loose sense as either good or bad. We
apply these judgments to cars, to dogs, to schools, to books, to paintings, to tools, to
institutions, to just about anything in the universe. Let us examine how and why we do
that with a few typical examples.
How do we evaluate a book, describe it as good or useless? Clearly we start with
a criterion of what we hope to get from reading the book recreational reading,
escapism, help for an exam, a solution to a particular problem, general enlightenment,
inspiration, et cetera, all of which are legitimate and in turn a value. We judge the book
on whether it satisfies these criteria, how well it does so, with or without reservations or
deficiencies or qualifications. We set the conditions to be satisfied by reading the book;
if the conditions are fulfilled, we judge it as good. If they are not fulfilled, we judge it as
210
a failure, a waste of time, a useless book. If you are buying a book, you establish clearly
what you are looking for line up possibilities, judge prices, presentation, material
finally pick out what you evaluate as best and buy. [192]
How do we evaluate a painting, describe it as good or bad? Here we are in the
field of aesthetics the appreciation of beauty, whether of painting, music, poetry,
literature, sculpture, and so forth. Different people will approach a painting from
varying points of view. A decorator may just be looking for something to go with the
curtains in the living room. A student may just be looking from a descriptive point of
view, with little technical knowledge of colours, shapes, harmonies, connections,
allusions, and so forth. Some may judge only by the feeling evoked; this is sad, that is
frightening, this feels horrible. A connoisseur will judge it from a developed
appreciation of harmony, shape, colour, tone, mood, skill; he or she will judge it in the
light of history as merely imitative, or creative, or a masterpiece. An art dealer will
evaluate in terms of hard cash, publicity, auctioning, commission, among other things.
Because criteria and appreciation differ so much you rarely get unanimity in art
appreciation. But we can see in each case a criterion operating and the work of art
fulfilling or not fulfilling that criterion. Art appreciation can be articulated, one can
defend a painting you admire; there is deliberative insight involved in art and art
appreciation; it is not random or arbitrary activity.
We can evaluate schools, and again we will be operating according to different
criteria. You will be looking for something affordable; some place within a reasonable
distance; a school that offers the kind of education you are looking for; well
administered, good teachers, high academic standards, small classroom numbers, good
sports program, and so forth. As you visit the school and talk to teachers and pupils you
be evaluating the information as to whether it satisfies these criteria of not. There will
Value Ethics
211
be a constant stream of tentative value judgments being made, leading to the final,
definitive judgment of whether it is a good school overall.
The value of things will vary as to the criteria operating in the situation. A good
book for holiday reading is not the same as a good book for passing exams. Gold is very
valuable but not much use if you are in a desert with nothing to eat or drink. King
Richard surrounded by his enemies would willingly have given his kingdom for a horse
to escape with his life. This does not mean that all values are subjective. Valuable is a
very flexible notion, depending on particular [193] criteria operating in concrete
situations with individual persons evaluating. But there is a single transcendental
structure underlying each of the examples a conditioned value, a link between the
conditioned and its fulfilling conditions(criteria), the fulfilment of the conditions and
hence the judgment of value the virtually unconditioned of value. Even though the
notion of good and value is analogous, there is one series of activities producing
knowledge of goodness, and one underlying heuristic structure by which we move from
questioning to knowing value. This can be seen in any of the above examples.
5.5 Scale of Values
There are different kinds of values, and many ways of slicing the cake. Let us try
a few distinctions just to become more concrete. Each level of consciousness and their
proper activities have an aim, a product, and a criterion to determine whether that aim
has been reached. In other words, there is a good or value proper to each level of
consciousness. Let us show how the invariant structure operates in each case.
Vital values would be those elements necessary for life, for survival, for selfpreservation as a living beings. Vital values will be those proper to the first level of
human consciousness. Hence, food and drink, security, clothing, shelter, health, et
cetera would seem to be basic vital values; if these are not satisfied in some way, it is
212
difficult to think of higher values. Food is valuable from the point of view of survival.
So we talk about good food, good housing, good clothes, or their opposite.
But we dispute about what food is healthy. How do we solve these disputes?
Well, obviously, what is good food for a weightlifter, may not be good food for an
aging diabetic, so the individual person will set the criterion. Whatever food promotes
the health, life expectancy, etc of this person is good food. Now you look for evidence
to prove that this food is good for this person. You look for data from nutritionists,
doctors, dieticians, etc. sort out the nonsense from the sense, assess the value of the
information and eventually reach a conclusion. So we are following the schema of the
hypothetical syllogism. Is [194] this good food for me? This food will be a vital value, if
it promotes health, life, survival, and so on. But this food does promote health, life,
survival, and so on. Therefore it is a vital value. We can and do argue responsibly about
vital values.
Social values derive from our social nature. We cooperate as a group to survive
together, we organize, specialize, complement one another so that regularly, efficiently,
the needs of individuals are satisfied through a social order, a good of order. So we form
institutions, companies, communication systems, economic systems, productivity,
distribution, law and order, criminality, and social organizations of all kinds. The aim is
order, the criterion efficiency, the value cooperation. Understanding aims at order,
regularity, clarity, the good of order. So, you have a local good of order; also a regional,
national, international and global good of order to think about.
Again we follow the form, "x" will be a social value, if it promotes cooperation,
order, efficiency, etc. But "x" does promote cooperation, order, efficiency, etc.
Therefore it is a social value. Let us take an example from economics; should interest
rates be raised? It is a value question because it will seriously effect the distribution of
goods and services to various groups in the society. What is the criterion operating? It
Value Ethics
213
should be the intention of the best standard of living for everyone in the society. In view
of that, evidence is collected, previous experience is recalled, calculations are made,
probable consequences are assessed. In view of the whole a judgment is made, raise the
interest rates. Should interest rates be raised? Interest rates should be raised, if the
standard of living of the society calls for it. But the standard of living of the society will
be protected by raising interest rates. Therefore, raise the rate half a percentage point.
Cultural values are "the beliefs and values informing a common way of life."29
We include beliefs about equality, purpose of life, education, research institutions, truth
telling; a political economic educational system based on truth of history, the reality of
international relations, a kingdom of truth. Anything that promotes truth, understanding,
and expansion and implementation of knowledge will be a cultural value. Anything that
hinders correct understanding and truth [195] will be a cultural disvalue. A
communitarian arrangement should allow people to find the truth for themselves.
Systems should be accountable and transparent. Media should not distort the real
picture. Science, technology, medical developments, research for peace and progress are
all cultural values. Here the value is truth of common beliefs, of politics and politicians,
truth about human nature and human order.
We can and do argue successfully about cultural values. There is one basic
structure to these arguments though an infinite variety of examples and variations.
Always there is a question, is this the best science curriculum we can devise for this
group of students? Well, what is the criterion, what is the intention, what is the
particular good to be attained by teaching these students this science curriculum. If you
are aiming at the highest standard, then, does this curriculum regularly, efficiently,
achieve the highest standard? Consult science teachers, attend to previous experience,
learn from experience, devise new strategies, set up pilot schemes. We do value the best
214
curriculum. We do posit deliberative insights on improving pedagogical efficiency. And

in doing so we implicitly follow the form of inference of the hypothetical syllogism.
Moral values recognize that the human person is free and responsible in his or
her knowing and doing, as an individual within a society. You can have healthy moral
individuals and also healthy moral societies, nations, institutions, corporations,
governments. If so, there is harmony rather than conflict. You can also have depraved
individuals as well as corrupt societies, deformed institutions, corporations in moral
decline. The human person develops in his potential as originating value producing
terminal values, freely and responsibly. You can have authentic individuals in conflict
with inauthentic traditions; or authentic traditions striving to convert inauthentic
individuals.
How do we argue about moral values? There might be a case of stealing in a
boarding school. What should be done? The criterion operating should be that stealing is
dishonest, that it should be discouraged, that just punishment be imposed. But you
might find that [196] there are extenuating circumstances; that suspension might lead to
a greater evil, that the person has learned his lesson; that a lesser punishment might be
better. Headmasters, judges, police, parents, are making these judgments every day.
They are judging what is the best punishment and reward, that will foster honesty and
justice in the family and the society. In moving from the question to the judgment, they
pass through the heuristic structure of deliberative insight, learning from experience,
assessing consequences, intending the good of all and judging finally that this is the best
course of action.
There is a good proper to each level of conscious intentionality; each level has
its own proper value. But the higher levels depend on the lower levels; so the higher
values will depend on the lower values. The higher levels of operation sublate the lower
levels; so the higher values will in turn sublate the lower levels. Hence we can talk of a
Value Ethics
215
legitimate true hierarchy of values relating to one another as higher and lower, as
mutually dependent and interrelated. In other words, some values are more basic than
others, some values are more excellent than others, not all values are of equal value. So
we can also have value judgments about value judgments.
5.6 Deliberative Insights in Moral Philosophy
The moral philosopher will make judgments of value about his method, about
his principles, about his criteria, about human nature, human action and human
purposes, and the consequences of human action. You can usually distinguish moral
philosophies as to what they value most in human life, whether it be virtue as an end in
itself as in the Stoics, or pleasure as understood by the Epicureans and Hedonists, or
utility as understood by the Utilitarians or Consequentialists. Sometimes power is
elevated to the status of a final end or criterion as in the philosophies of Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche, and what is called real politik. Moral philosophy must make value
judgments at the theoretical or methodological level but also give guidance or criteria or
applications to the concrete details of everyday evaluations, choices and actions. Many
moral philosophies err by way of simplification; concentrating exclusively on one value
to the exclusion of other values; concentrating on the consequences [197] and excluding
the motivations; extolling the rational, universal, moral imperative at the expense of
human feelings, aspirations and affects. Moral philosophy is fraught with multiple
possibilities of going wrong.
Let us look as some of the areas in which deliberative insights operate in order
to work towards a comprehensive grasp of human moral good.
(1) Moral Persons. Deliberative insights need to be made as to the real sphere
of the moral as distinct from all other values. They will be concerned with the free and
responsible development of human persons as good valuers, choosers and doers; it
pertains to persons in their relations with other persons; it pertains to the goodness of
216
activities of the fourth level of human consciousness. We are not talking of skill,
intelligence, strength, beauty, talent, personality, or temperament; we are talking of
what a person has done, is doing with his life as a whole in relation to responsible
choice, promoting the good, doing the right thing, being virtuous, being a human
person, and flourishing in the fullest sense of that ambiguous term. Moral philosophy
will depend on how we value the life of a human person, human nature, its
development, its purpose, its proper self-realization.
We do normally distinguish between moral goodness and other kinds of
goodness, and have done our best to articulate this difference. We are in fact constantly
judging people as really good or evil, and these are either true or false judgments. We
judge their ability as bankers, footballers, conversationalists, teachers, but we also judge
them as moral persons he is a good guy behind it all, he is a good person. He may
not be very intelligent but he is a good person. We judge the integrity of a person's
motivation we live with them over a period of time and see how they react in various
situations we check for consistency between what they say and what they do.
(2) Moral Acts. We deliberate about specific human actions and classify them
into classes and categories. We distinguish human actions that are free and responsible
from acts of the human being that are reflexes, instinctual, biologically or
psychologically beyond the [198] control of will and responsibility. We judge when
actions are due to ignorance, or misunderstanding, and decide whether it is culpable or
inculpable ignorance. We judge the quality of the freedom. Is the act premeditated,
planned, chosen deliberately; or is freedom lessened by compulsions, instinct, passion,
addiction or the like? We distinguish between actions that are serious from the moral
point of view, killing, stealing large sums of money, rape, et cetera, from those we
consider trivial like white lies, bad language, and being impolite.
Value Ethics
217
We can classify human actions into typical action situations such as adultery,
abortion, murder, genocide, corruption, lying, perjury, and fornication. Even though an
extreme situation ethics claims that there are only an infinite number of particular
concrete human actions and therefore we cannot apply general rules, we know that
human actions, although unique in their concreteness, can be understood, classified,
defined, and evaluated and thus general moral imperatives can be formed about these
categories.
(3) Moral Consequences. We evaluate human actions partly in terms of their
consequences. Consequences are sometimes intrinsic to an action, such as killing the
foetus in abortion, deceiving a friend in telling a lie. So all human action has immediate,
direct, intrinsic consequences, that condition the morality of the action. But
consequences can be extrinsic and they can be either, immediate or remote, foreseen or
unforeseen, direct or indirect. If you judge it appropriate to invade another country, then
the remote consequences years down the road bear on the morality of your judgment.
(4) Moral Intentions. We also evaluate moral actions in terms of intention.
What was the person intending to achieve? Moral idealism, in the sense of having high
ideals but little or no competence, will probably do more harm than good. Almsgiving
can sometimes cause dependency, encourage addiction, and demean persons. Planting
trees at random can do more harm than good. Good intentions by themselves are not
enough.
(5) Motivation. We also evaluate in terms of motive. What was the motive of
the crime, what was the person trying to achieve for him-[199]self by doing this; what
was a persons motivation in choosing a career or embarking on a course of action?
(6) Moral Reasoning. How then does a person answer the question, What is the
right thing for me to do in this situation? A person thinking in terms of moral laws will
ask, What kind of an action is this? Which moral laws apply here? Which law has
218
priority? The solution will be a deliberative insight into the application of moral laws to
concrete situations. A person thinking in terms of virtue ethics might ask, Which virtue
is called for here? Which virtue has priority? If I want to become a good person what do
I do here? What would my role model do in this situation? The solution will be a
judgment of value in terms of grasping the virtuous course of action. If the person is
thinking in terms of moral values, he will understand the situation, the possibilities and
alternatives, the consequences in terms of moral and other values; he will deliberate,
judge, decide, and act, attentively, intelligently, reasonably and responsibly; he will be
guided by conscience and answerable only to a good conscience.
To be unqualifiedly good human persons, our actions must be wholly good, the
intentions benevolent, the motives wholesome and the consequences good for all. But
all that together is rather a rarity in human affairs. Yet we must establish this as the
standard of human moral judgment, and if anything is lacking the action must be judged
somehow defective. Goodness belongs to the whole, evil results from some kind of
defect, as Aristotle and Aquinas noted. Evil lies in some kind of absence of what should
be there, in the action, the amount, the time, the intention, the consequences, et cetera.
Many moral judgments of value will be comparative rather than absolute: this is better
than that, rather than this is wholly good and that is wholly bad.
In each case the value to be ascertained is a conditioned value. In each case it
will be a real value if those conditions are fulfilled. We assemble examples, distinctions,
evidence, previous evaluations and line them up as the fulfilment of the conditions. The
deliberative insight grasps the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence for the
positing of the judgment of value. [200]
5.7 Link between the Evidence and the Conclusion
Evidence should be relevant to the conclusion. There may be a long process of
reasoning to show the connection between the evidence and the conclusion. Forms of
Value Ethics
219
inference can be implicit or they can be formalized in moral arguments. Listen to a

moral debate and evaluate the arguments. There can be all sorts of red herrings thrown
into the procedure, items that distract deliberately from the issue at stake. Insults are not
a good argument but are present in many debates. The person who shouts the loudest
should not necessarily win; nor the one who keeps talking to the end, when everybody
else capitulates out of sheer exhaustion. It is not a question of scoring points by
cleverness or humour, or belittling the opponents. Understanding of good procedures of
inference should be flanked by understanding of fallacies, evasions, distortions, bias,
blindness, twisting of data, and ignoring of data.
Hence, we can see the necessity of a clear criterion of relevance, the need for a
coherent structure of thinking, a philosophy which determines what is relevant, a correct
grasp of argumentation and how it should proceed; a grasp of fallacies and how they
intrude and interfere.
5.8 Sufficiency and Relevance of the Evidence
Who decides what is sufficient? Are there any rules which will determine in all
cases what is sufficient? The final criterion is simply reason itself in its practical
application; in the case of judgments of fact it is reflective understanding; in the
question of judgments of value it is deliberative understanding; the former is oriented to
truth; the latter to the good.
We rely on juries to reach a verdict on the basis of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. You need rules as to what is permissible as evidence, rules about which
questions can be asked, distinctions between direct and circumstantial evidence, etc. But
if the rules were sufficient, a computer could produce the verdict. The jury is
continually making judgments of value about witnesses, about evidence, about
arguments, about motives, about responsibility. They do not [201] need to study moral
philosophy to evaluate impartially though it might help.
220
Deliberation on a moral dilemma is purposive; it is aiming in the direction of a

judgment. At first we may be totally puzzled by a new situation or question. We ask
about it, do research, discuss it with friends, gain a personal acquaintance with the issue,
ask how we feel about it. Gradually, we find that we are moving in the direction of
approving, that the evidence is pointing in one direction, that counterarguments are
invalid or can be refuted. A point is reached when the mind is satisfied, when we have
considered all the angles, when no further pertinent questions arise, we know we are
right. At that point the deliberative insight issues in a judgment.
Very often we cannot be certain of our judgments of value. Consequences in the
future are by their very nature difficult to foresee. Information on possible courses of
action may be incomplete, unreliable, partial and mistaken. We do not have time to
collect all the relevant information, we have to trust in the advice of our friends, believe
what is written in the brochure. Values may be conflicting. There may be conflict
between a vital value and a moral value; we want to use the money for a new computer,
but we promised to use it to pay back a loan. There may be a conflict between different
moral values, as loyalty to the group and ones duty to report wrongdoing.
Many of our moral decisions will be a question of probability, high or low as the
case may be. The degree of probability will be determined by the weight of the
evidence, and the link between the evidence and the conclusion. There are many cases
where we cannot fully understand the matter in hand, where full information is not
available, where many values impinge on the situation, where complicated moral
inferences are involved.
5.9 Unifies and Organizes
It is the function of understanding to unify and organize data of sense and data
of consciousness. In the context of deliberative insight, understanding unifies and
organizes in terms of the good, of value, knowledge of the good, all kinds of values.
Value Ethics
221
Insight sees what is [202] relevant and discards what is irrelevant; intelligence grasps
the important and leaves aside the unimportant. Intelligence is operative in working on
values because of the need to precisely grasp what is important from what is
unimportant.
The reflective insight is a single insight, which unifies a vast amount of evidence
in terms of inferring a conclusion about the real. It is an insight into the sufficiency of
the evidence for the positing of a conclusion. Days, weeks, months, years might be
spent assembling the evidence, and lining up a reasonable conclusion. The question of
truth is operative as a principle of organization, a principle determining what is
important or unimportant, what is relevant or irrelevant. All the preliminary work is
swept up into the unity of a single insight into the truth of a judgment.
Similarly, the deliberative insight is a single insight, which unifies and organizes
a vast amount of data in view of a judgment of value. The evidence is usually wider,
more subtle, more prone to bias and distortion, than in the case of judgments of truth.
Much of the data may already be previous judgments of fact and preliminary or
tentative judgments of value. But all of this preparatory work coalesces in a single
deliberative insight, a single grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence for the positing of a
value judgment. The judgment simply affirms or denies, yes or no, it is right or it is
wrong; it is good or bad..
5.10 Understanding in Three Modes.
I think it is helpful to think of understanding operating in three modes. First,
there is the mode of direct understanding of the intelligible in the sensible. In this mode
we are brainstorming, looking for definitions, divisions, forms, reasons, causes,
correlations, hypotheses, possible explanations. It is a relatively relaxed mode where we
can be creative, expansive, enjoy the process, rejoice in the results. Not that much is at
stake. It can be quite an enjoyable process especially if it is successful.
222
The second mode is the reflective, the asking of the critical question of truth, is
this true or not. Here things are getting a bit more serious. Most of us do not wish to tell
lies, nor do we wish to be [203] mistaken, nor do we relish the though of being shown to
be wrong. To affirm a truth is to take a personal stand. We are not forced to judge, we
do it freely and responsibly, on the basis of the evidence available to us. We cannot
plead that our data was inadequate, because we should have realized that before positing
the judgment. Reflective understanding is an intellectual process from the question to
the judgment. It is understanding in a critical, reasonable mode.
The third mode is that of the value question, what is this worth? is this
worthwhile? This is even more serious and touches the person in his inmost being. What
do we value? What are our priorities? What do we really love? What do we want to
become as free and responsible human persons? The deliberative process is an
intellectual process from the question of value, to the judgment of value. It is
understanding aiming at knowledge of good and evil. The story of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil in the garden of Eden, seems to imply that such knowledge
is a divine prerogative to which humans should not aspire. Surely history has shown us
how difficult it is to acquire this knowledge and to live according to it. I would think of
knowledge of good and evil to be the highest goal to which we can aspire, a goal we all
grapple with in our own limited ways. We hear a lot about the mapping of the human
DNA in terms of the sequence of billions of proteins in the double helix. Of much more
importance is the mapping of the human mind, the processes involved in knowing truth
and value, the partial attainment of the knowledge of good and evil.
6 Conclusion: Is there a deliberative insight?
My answer is clearly yes and it is based primarily on self-appropriation: on
understanding correctly the data of consciousness regarding how we in fact make good
value judgments. It would seem to be of some importance to identify clearly the
Value Ethics
223
intellectual element in the judgment of value. It was of great importance for Lonergan to
find the one universal structure or form of reflective insight, issuing in judgments of
truth. Surely an elaboration of the universal structure of deliberative insights issuing in
judgments of value is of even greater importance. It does not answer all our questions,
but at least [204] we have the general structure of the deliberative insight in all its
generality, but which becomes specific in each instance of a value judgment. Now we
know that value judgments are not arbitrary preferences, not emotional outbursts, not
random choices. We can identify the criterion at work, the search for relevant evidence,
the link between the evidence and the conclusion, and the positing of the conclusion, as
a process of understanding in the deliberative mode. Nor is this just a matter of
terminology. For Lonergan knowing is an act of understanding correctly; but if we can
know value, then it is also an act of understanding correctly. It is not understanding in
the reflective mode, but in the deliberative mode.
Some might object that if you affirm the fully rational character of moral
knowledge, then you have automatically excluded any affective component in the
judgment of value. But that assumes that the cognitive excludes the affective. Our
position is that judgments of value can be fully rational and at the same time fully
affective. We can affirm that because of our inclusivist view. The cognitional aspect is
the structure or form of the judgment, the activity of understanding. The affective
dimension is the desire to know value, which initiates, underlies, motivates, drives
forward, intends and recognizes value when it is found. The judgment of value
synthesises the two aspects: the desire to know value is satisfied in the judgment of
value, when the virtually unconditioned has been attained and no further relevant
questions arise.
Lonergan did not use the term deliberative insight; he did point in that direction.
He wanted to grant a role to feelings but did not seem sure how to do it. The notion of
224
deliberative insight would seem to be faithful to his spirit and to pin down the cognitive
aspect of knowing value. I cannot conceive of what happens between the question for
value and the judgment of value, if it is not a deliberative insight into value. The
complementary task of elaborating correctly the role of feelings lies before us. [205]
(1) Normally, we evaluate possible courses of action; normally we know something
about a politician before voting for him; normally we think of the consequences and the
alternatives. There may be exceptions when we act out of habit, or impulsively, or
because there is no time for thinking.
(2) You would expect a good doctor to be competent, clean, well mannered, good
reputation, affordable, available, etc. Choosing a doctor is a judgment of value, where
these criteria apply. Choosing the criteria is also a judgment of value.
(3) Mathematical problems challenge intelligence, mathematical training, ability to
manipulate numbers, etc. Moral questions challenge your integrity, your feelings, your
experience, your judgment, your wisdom, your awareness of value.
(4) All else being equal, a more intelligent person will be more likely to solve a moral
dilemma than a less intelligent person. The more intelligent will understand the matter
better, the consequences and the alternatives. But that is leaving aside experience,
competence, wisdom, integrity, sensitivity to values, which have a bearing on the
outcome.
(5) A calculator can perform many complicated mathematical operations much more
quickly than a human. A computer with the right software can do accounts, calculate,
solve, differentiate and integrate very quickly. A computer might provide background
statistics on ozone layer, abortions, stem cell research, traffic accidents, but judgments
of value have to be made by humans.
Value Ethics
225
(6) We classify movies (or books) as good, thrilling, funny, entertaining, informative,
stunning, inspiring, demoralizing, depressing, romantic, etc. They all seem to be
judgments of value. We can legitimately argue with others about whether these criteria
are present or not. If you claim a movie is inspiring, you should be able to explain why
and how and where. If you gratuitously assert that a movie is inspiring with [206] no
evidence to back up this claim, you friend can equally assert that it is uninspiring.
(7) Whether abortion is moral or immoral is a basic moral judgment of value which
should incorporate knowledge of biology, of human relationships, of human
authenticity, scale of values, integrity, etc. Giving advice is a further judgment of value
as to how best you can help your sister to come to the right decision. It is not enough to
assert that abortion is wrong; you should be able to explain convincingly the reason.
You have to respect another's right to decide. Finally, you have to decide to support the
course of action or to condemn it or to stand aside and pretend neutrality. It is a series of
difficult moral judgments of value.
(8) Can you rob Peter to pay Paul? This does not seem to make much moral sense. It
seems to work as a general principle. There may be exceptions when the good to be
achieved completely outweighs the 'evil' means. Absolutes in morals are to be found in
good judgments of good persons, rather than in written principles and propositions.
[207]
Endnotes
1
Barnes, Jonathan, Aristotle, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 27.
Chapter Two, Section 2.
Insight, 729-30.
226
Insight, 729.
Method in Theology, 9. See also 6, 50, 79, 340. Also The Subject in Second
Collection, 79 and 84.
9
10
Insight, 634-5.
11
Insight, 635.
12
Insight, 635.
13
Insight, 635.
14
15
Mark Doorley, The Place of the Heart in Lonergan's Ethics: The Role of Feelings in
the Ethical Intentionality Analysis of Bernard Lonergan, (Lanham: University Press of
America, 1996), "evaluative insight", 75.
16
Pat Byrne, "Analogical Knowledge of God and the Value of Moral Endeavour", in
Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, 11, 2, (1993): 103-135, especially 115-116.
17
Robert Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, (Toronto: University of

Toronto Press, 1990). "virtually unconditioned in the realm of value" P 58.
18
Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, 13, 2, (Fall 1995): 221-48.
19
Ibid., 231, 236.
20
Ibid., 233.
21
Ibid., 237.
22
Ibid., 231, 233.
23
William F. Sullivan, Eye of the Heart: Knowing the Human Good in the Euthanasia
Debate, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).
24
Ibid., 145,153, and other places.
25
Ibid., 151.
26
Ibid., 151. [208]
27
Bernard Lonergan, Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation analysis,

Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 15, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1999). Also Bernard Lonergan, For a New Political Economy, Collected Works of
Bernard Lonergan vol 21, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).
Value Ethics
28
Insight, 28-31.
29
227
5
Lonergan on Feelings
Because of our feelings, our desires and our fears, our hope or
despair, our joys and sorrows, our enthusiasm and indignation, our
esteem and contempt, our trust and distrust, our love and hatred,
our tenderness and wrath, our admiration, veneration, reverence,
our dread, horror, terror, we are oriented massively and
dynamically in a world mediated by meaning.1
(1) Can you suggest ways in which feeling might influence moral judgments?
(2) Are feelings good, bad or indifferent? Are some specific feelings good or bad? Can
you list some good feelings and some bad feelings?
(3) Trust your feelings! How do you feel about that? Are you comfortable with that? Do
you appeal to feelings as indicators of value?
(4) Would we be better human beings if we had no feelings?
(5) How do you feel when two warring nations make peace and promise to cooperate
with one another? [210]
(6) How do you feel about the following: Martin Luther King; Adolf Hitler; Nelson
Mandela; Saddam Hussein; President George W. Bush; Mother Teresa; Albert Einstein?
(7) Do values derive from feelings or do feelings arise from our values?
(8) Would you feel comfortable in a golf club that practiced racial discrimination?
1 Introduction
Lonergan names the first component of the judgment of value as the knowledge
of reality especially human reality. We made this more precise in our identification of
the activity of deliberative insight, the cognitive component of knowing value. In earlier
times we might have been content to get this cognitive component clear and then
presumed that our work had been done. But now we realize that the cognitive
component alone is like a skeleton, without flesh or blood or life. The cognitive
component alone is incomplete it is an activity. But what feeling orientation, what
Value Ethics
229
intentionality, what motivation underlies, directs and gives mass and momentum to the
activity? To use another metaphor, the cognitive component is like a computer but
without software, or power or a keyboard. In more technical terms, the cognitive
component by itself is a structure without a content; an activity without direction; it is
like Mind, without Heart, or Will or Spirit. We need to fill in the total picture. We now
turn our attention to these further components of the judgment of value, starting with the
difficult notion of feelings or Heart.
It is a difficult area because of the fluidity, the diversity, the extent of the field of
feelings. The terminology is loose and varied; emotions, feelings, passions, sentiments,
affects, have many different shades of meaning and change from one author to another.
These terms always have multiple meanings and shades of meaning in connotation and
denotation. Feelings can be seen as multilayered, subtle, wide and diverse; or as
obvious, superficial, and transient. Psychologists come up with various theories of
feelings but, unfortunately, [211] one theory seems to succeed another with no broad
agreement on terminology or basic principles.
Philosophers are not much at home when dealing with feelings. Leave that to the
self-help psychologists, to the poets and the artists, to the novelists and the literary
critics, to the symbolists and the psychiatrists. Philosophers have tended to be more at
home with concepts, arguments, reasoning, the thinking faculty, the Mind rather than
the Heart. But if we are to make any useful contribution to understanding the judgment
of value we must include the Heart, the feeling component. After all, the human person
makes judgments as a person not as a Mind. Even though we differentiate out the
cognitive, affective, and volitional, we are not suggesting that they operate in separate
compartments. We operate as one total, willing, knowing, valuing, feeling person with
all of these aspects interrelating in many ways.
230
It is not difficult to see that feelings enter into our judgments in some way or
another both as a help and as a hindrance. We choose a life partner not on the basis of
a calculus of advantages and disadvantages, but on the way we feel about the person.
We choose a career not entirely on the prospective cash benefits, but on how we feel
about being a nurse, a pilot, an astronomer, or a politician. We know that our feelings
sometimes get out of hand: we shout at the children, throw dishes on the floor, abuse the
referee, or retaliate against an opponent. Feelings seem to be very influential on our
judgments, our decisions and our behaviour. We cannot avoid facing the issue. The
unexamined life is not worth living, said Socrates; but a large part of our life is the life
of feelings and so we must come to terms with the issue.
It is more and more accepted that ethics must deal with the question of feelings.
A coherent conceptual system such as a natural law system, or a Spinozean ethics
demonstrated in the mode of geometrical principles, may satisfy the desire for
coherence and system, but is strangely removed from the realities of a pregnant teenager
contemplating abortion, a harassed mother beating her children, or a loving idealist
volunteering for service in an Aids clinic in Africa. Our [212] starting point is people as
they are. Feelings play an important part in our moral evaluations, decisions and actions.
We are not just minds, but total feeling beings. Feelings have a role to play and we
cannot ignore or eliminate or brush over that role.
It is important to be very clear about the scope of our interest in feelings.
Luckily, we are not obliged to provide a total comprehensive account of the feeling life
of the human person that would take a couple of volumes in itself. We are interested
in feelings in so far as they enter into a judgment of value and, later, in so far as they
influence decision and implementation. We are asking a few very specific questions:
Which feelings enter into the judgment of value? How do these feeling enter into or
influence the judgment of value? How can these feelings unite with the cognitive
Value Ethics
231
component to constitute the judgment of value? Is the influence of feelings intrinsic or

extrinsic? Which feelings foster good judgments and decisions? Which feelings
interfere with the proper unfolding of judging and valuing and deciding?
We wish to be very concrete. We offer the preliminary questions for deliberation
in that spirit. We are not spinning theories out of the sky but doing some concrete selfappropriation of feelings. The self-appropriation of direct insight turns out to be
relatively accessible and, with the help of a good teacher or text, quite attainable. More
difficult is the appropriation of the judgment of truth because it is more complicated, not
always very dramatic, not always clear, sometimes prolonged over time and emerging
slowly. Even more difficult, then, is the appropriation of the judgment of value, which
compounds the difficulty with the intrusion of vague and complex notions of value and
feelings. However, let us not be undaunted; it is the difficult tasks that are worth doing
well.
Our strategy is to distinguish the hermeneutical question from the systematic
presentation. We intend to devote this chapter to presenting and interpreting Lonergan's
various statements about feelings. Here we will try to summarize what is relevant;
identify what needs to be clarified; indicate what seems to be missing; accept what
seems to be right. In our next chapter we will make a systematic presentation [213] in
our own words of the role of feelings in ethics. There we will base ourselves, not on
texts, but on self-appropriation on discerning the desires of the human heart.
2 Learning from History
We will again begin with a bit of background from Aristotle, who is surprisingly
rich on the topic of emotions in ethics. We will use our previous treatment of the
empiricists and emotivists to pose precise questions. This should set the background for
our study of Lonergan on feelings in value ethics.
2.1 Aristotle on the Emotions in the Ethical life
232
We tend to think of Aristotle as the master of logic, metaphysics and physics.

We perhaps think of him as the one who defined happiness, the final end of man, virtue
and vice, the individual virtues and the vices, voluntary and involuntary, wish, choice,
deliberation, and the like. But his text on ethics is very concrete and so he deals with
many instances where emotions impinge on ethics. We will pick out the main points
with a view to learning from a great master and perhaps going a few steps beyond his
achievements.
(1) Neither virtue nor vice is innate in us. We are neither born good nor bad by
nature. We are born with a potentiality to be virtuous; if that potentiality is not realized
we become vicious. Whether we are to become good or bad will depend on the
development of habits through a process of education.
The moral virtues, then, are engendered in us neither by, nor contrary to
nature; we are constituted by nature to receive them, but their full
development in us is due to habit. Again, of all those faculties with which
nature endows us we first acquire the potentialities, and only later effect
their actualization.2(1103a30)
Nowadays, we seem to presume that humans are born good and so can be
allowed to develop naturally and to follow their natural instincts; anything which
inhibits such expression is discouraged. There was a time when it was presumed that
children are naturally bad and so a strict discipline of punishment and repression was
[214] needed to knock that out of them. Aristotle espouses neither extreme position. We
become good by actualizing our potentialities; we become bad by not actualizing this
potential.
(2) Happiness is the final end of the human person, that for which everything
else is chosen and it is never chosen for the sake of something else; it is the perfection
of man, self-sufficient. A life of virtue and contemplation, with some other
qualifications, leads to happiness. This happiness of Aristotle is quite different from our
Value Ethics
233
contemporary use of the word, in which happiness is akin to pleasure. For Aristotle
happiness is a kind of self-fulfilment or self-actualization.
(3) Young people tend to follow their feelings; the young are for that reason not
ready for instruction in ethics. Aristotle repeats this a number of times. (1095a5) The
search for pleasure and avoidance of pain is likely to lead the young astray, if they are
taken as ends in themselves.
Pleasure induces us to behave badly, and pain to shrink from fine actions.
(1104b10)
Now when people become bad it is because of pleasures and pains,
through seeking (or shunning) the wrong ones, or at the wrong time, or in
the wrong way, or in any other manner in which such offences are
distinguished by principle. (1104b22)
In order to start the process of acquiring virtue, the subject has to go against his feelings
and do the virtuous act with great difficulty and pain.
But the virtues we do acquire by first exercising them, just as happens in
the arts. Anything that we have to learn to do we learn by actually doing it.
(1103a34)
Desires can overcome rational convictions "the desire carries his body
forward" (1147a35); knowledge is dragged about by the emotions
(1147b15).
(4) The process of education is largely seen as training the youth to take pleasure
in good things and to feel repugnance at evil. For Aristotle the process of moral
education is largely, if not wholly, a matter of training the emotions. This may seem
surprising at first as we [215] think of Aristotle mostly for his logic, his metaphysics,
and his theoretical wisdom. But actually he was a person who had his feet on the
ground. Feelings have to be trained by habit.
Hence the importance (as Plato says) of having been trained in some way
from infancy to feel joy and grief at the right things: true education is
precisely this. (1104b15)
Since to feel pleasure and pain rightly or wrongly has no little effect upon
conduct, it follows that our whole inquiry must be concerned with these
sensations. (1105a7)
234
For it is with pleasures and pains that moral goodness is concerned.

(1104b10)
So it is a matter of no little importance what sort of habits we form from
the earliest age it makes a vast difference, or rather all the difference in
the world. (1106b25)
(5) Feelings do not respond very well to instruction or discourse but seem to
respond more to force. Aristotle is in favour of discipline and laws and an educational
system which will deliberately force pupils to do the right thing even if it is against
their feelings. He is in favour of a state-sponsored educational system with good laws
and regulations. In the absence of such a system, the parents or a tutor might be a
substitute.
In general, feeling seems to yield not to argument but only to force.
(1179b29)
But to obtain a right training for goodness from an early age is a hard
thing, unless one has been brought up under right laws. For a temperate
and hardy way of life is not a pleasant thing to most people, especially
when they are young. For this reason upbringing and occupations should
be regulated by law, because they will cease to be irksome when they have
become habitual. (1179b31)
But law, being the pronouncement of a kind of practical wisdom or
intelligence, does have the power of compulsion. (1180a6)
(6) However, by doing repeated acts of virtue, even if it is under compulsion,
there is a kind of displacement of pleasure and pain doing the virtuous thing becomes
easy, habitual and pleasurable. Education is about training the emotions to take pleasure
in good and to [216] feel grief at evil. By dint of repeated acts of virtue we develop a
habit of acting in that way; we build up a disposition to act spontaneously and easily in
the right way.
So with the virtues. It is by refraining from pleasures that we become
temperate, and it is when we have become temperate that we are most able
to abstain from pleasures. Similarly with courage; it is by habituating
ourselves to make light of alarming situations and to face them that we
become brave, and it is when we have become brave that we shall be most
able to face an alarming situation. (1104b34)
Value Ethics
235
(7) The criterion that you have become virtuous is that you take pleasure in
doing the good act. What was at first done under compulsion and with difficulty and
pain, has now become a source of pleasure. The brave man takes pleasure in being
brave; the temperate person takes pleasure in being temperate.
Indeed we may go further and assert that anyone who does not delight in
fine actions is not even a good man; for nobody would say that a man is
just unless he enjoys acting justly, nor liberal unless he enjoys liberal
actions, and similarly in all the other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions
must be pleasurable in themselves. (1099a20)
(8) Aristotle makes a distinction between the real good and the apparent good.
An evil person will consider some form of behaviour to be good for him; but because of
his evil dispositions and habits this may not be the real good but only an apparent good.
But if a good man considers a form of behaviour to be good, then it will be really good.
If these consequences are unacceptable, perhaps we should say that
absolutely and in truth the object of wish is the good, but for the
individual it is what seems good to him; so for the man of good character
it is the true good, but for the bad man it is any chance thing. (1113a24)
For the man of good character judges every situation rightly; i.e. in every
situation what appears to him is the truth. (1113a30)
How the end appears to each individual depends on the nature of his
character, whatever this may be. (1114a30) [217]
(9) The good man then is the criterion and standard of goodness. He is the
one who will be able to distinguish between real and apparent goodness. He also
distinguishes between true/real pleasures associated with the activities of the good
person and false/apparent pleasures of the bad man.
and probably what makes the man of good character stand out furthest is
the fact that he sees the truth in every kind of situation: he is a sort of
standard and yardstick of what is fine and pleasant. (1113a33)
But in all such circumstances it is generally accepted that the good man's
view is the true one. If this formula is correct, as it seems to be; that is, if
the standard by which we measure everything is goodness, or the good
man qua good: then the true pleasures too will be those that seem to him
to be pleasures, and those things will be really pleasant that he enjoys.
(1176a20)
236
(10) Aristotle then outlines and defines the moral and intellectual virtues.
Paradoxically in the end it is the person who lives according to these virtues who will
also enjoy real pleasure in life.
So happiness is the best, the finest, the most pleasurable thing of all. (1099a24)
So for a man, too, the life according to his intellect is the best and most
pleasant, if indeed a man in the highest sense is his intellect. Hence, this
life, too, is the happiest. (1178a1)
I would like to emphasize a few points from this summary regarding the relationship
between the emotional and ethical life.
(1) It is very clear that the training of the emotions plays a central role in moral
education for Aristotle. Emotions are not peripheral, they are not added on as an extra,
they are not a footnote; training in virtue is training to take pleasure in the good and to
be averse to evil. He has by no means a totally negative attitude to pleasure and pain. He
talks about pleasure and pain from Book One to Book Ten. We seem to have forgotten
this aspect of Aristotle's ethics and concentrated on the rational side of defining the
virtues.
(2) Aristotle seems to have achieved a recognition of the cognitive and affective
dimensions of moral philosophy. On the one hand, we [218] have the division of the
virtues into moral and intellectual; then the enumeration and definition of these virtues
flanked by the extremes of the vices; finally, we have phronesis or prudence by which
intellect grasps what is the right thing to do in this concrete situation. On the other hand,
we have the criterion of pleasure and pain leading the youth astray, but the virtuous
person spontaneously, easily and with pleasure recognizes the right thing to do and does
it. In the virtuous person there is a harmony between intellect and the emotional life.
The virtuous person is both knowing and feeling; these are two dimensions of one
virtuous act and one virtuous person; they can be spoken about separately but in any
acting person they are both together. However, I would call this a juxtaposition rather
Value Ethics
237
than a synthesis: Aristotle has not shown us precisely how these disparate elements
enter into a judgment of value in the life of a virtuous person.
(3) There is a certain ambivalence in this treatment of pleasure and pain. On the
negative side, the masses are ruled by the search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain;
even virtuous people are prevented from doing the good and the noble by pleasure and
pain; it seems that the youth start off from a position of following their feelings in
seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, hence they are not fit to study ethics; when we seek
pleasure in depraved activity they are not really pleasures. On the positive side, he
seems to be saying, that true/real pleasure is to be found in seeking happiness, in
practicing the moral and intellectual virtues and especially in exercising the highest
faculty on its highest object in contemplation. He clearly recognizes a displacement of
emotional satisfaction. Pleasures and pains associated with youth and depraved actions
seem to be different from those associated with practicing the virtues.
(4) Clearly Aristotle has a notion of moral development. This is both intellectual
and affective. We are not born with the habits of virtue. We have to be forced to do the
right thing through discipline, good laws and punishment. We have to do acts of virtue,
with difficulty, out of fear or obedience, reluctantly. At a later stage the affective and
the intellectual are brought into line and we get pleasure in doing the right thing for its
own sake. [219]
(5) Most of what Aristotle says is good common sense. It is the method of
education adopted spontaneously by most cultures. There is something fundamentally
sound and true in what he says. He has a balanced approach, does not take up extreme
positions, allots everything its proper role. It is just so unfortunate that his style is so
obscure and his remarks scattered all over the text. But there is a basic healthy attitude
to be retrieved here.
238
Perhaps the key question we would like to ask Aristotle is to be more precise on
which feelings help in moral development and which feelings hinder progress. The
pleasure of acting virtuously is surely a help to virtuous living; but pleasure also leads
astray, hinders, pulls strongly in an opposite direction. This is the key distinction we
need to focus on and Aristotle is vague on that distinction. Our questions are very
specific: Which feelings enter into the judgment of value, decision and action? Which
feelings are a help, which are a hindrance? We can take Aristotle as a good starting
point, but we need to be more precise in specifying the influence of feelings on value
judgments and decisions.
2.2 Place of Feelings in Ethics The Empiricists
We have already given a historical summary of the contribution of the empiricist
tradition to the role of feelings in ethics. As a reminder perhaps we could summarize
some of the contributions they make to the discussion. For the Epicureans and
Hedonists, pleasure is the supreme purpose of human life and everything is to be
organized around that principle; they soon learn that there are different qualities and
quantities of pleasure and that a certain asceticism is involved in aiming for the
maximum of the best pleasure. But are they talking of pleasure or happiness? For the
utilitarians and pragmatists the organizing principle of social life is the greatest
happiness of the greatest number. But again we have to ask, what is happiness? Do they
mean pleasure or economics or standard of living, or quality of life? Moral sense
theorists asserted a sense faculty of knowing the good. But we ask, what is this faculty?
What is conscience? How do we in our own experience come to a knowledge of values?
The intuitionist school asserted that the good is indefinable and is known [220] only in
a simple, direct, immediate perception of the good. Let us see if we can find anything
like this intuition in our own experience of moral judgments.
Value Ethics
239
The contemporary situation is dominated by emotivism. The various forms of

emotivism are very much still with us; our culture is very much a sensate culture.
Emotivism holds that values are simply expressions of private likes and dislikes,
preferences, choices and feelings and that they are beyond rational analysis. The
advertising industry manipulates us by their clever use of images and evocation of
pleasant feelings. Our politicians are not far behind playing the game of sound bites,
one-liners, the picture that's worth more than a thousand words. The self-help
psychology industry helps us to be comfortable with ourselves, to have high-self
esteem, even though you might deserve by your actions to be in jail. Nor is there any
shortage in the academy of philosophical justifications of attending to emotions and
only emotions in assessing moral guilt. Contemporary emotivism is perhaps the most
serious challenge to the possibility of true moral judgments of value. As MacIntyre
says, "For what emotivism asserts is in central part that there are and can be no valid
rational justification for any claims that objective and impersonal moral standards exist
and hence that there are no such standards."3 Without endorsing his solution to the
problem, let us face challenge to reach a sophisticated, verifiable, assessment of the role
of various feelings in the unfolding of moral convictions.
3 Lonergan on Feelings Historical Sketch
Let us now learn what we can from Lonergans texts. What contribution does he
make to the debate? What are the limitations of his contribution? To be crystal clear on
this topic we must divide out treatment into two parts: the period up to finishing Insight
and the subsequent work on Method in Theology and beyond. We find a significant shift
in Lonergan's terminology and focus between these two periods. To put them together in
one section would be to invite confusion. [221]
3.1.1 Up to Insight (1953)
240
Lonergan in this period worked on his dissertation on Grace and Freedom4; he

worked on the Verbum articles, published as Word and Idea in Aquinas5; and finally he
worked on Insight. His ultimate objective was a method in theology and these studies
were considered as preparatory steps in the process. His focus was on human
understanding and knowing. As he said in his own words, "My purpose was not a study
of human life but a study of human understanding."6 Hence the focus in Insight was
cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of God and
apologetics. His focus was human understanding, but he did incidentally say something
about human feelings. I will treat this material on human feelings in three sections,
namely, the desire to know, interference of the biases, and The Possibility of Ethics.
3.1.2 The Desire to Know
Although Lonergan in Insight does not say that the desire to know is a feeling, it
is clear from what he does say that there are feeling elements involved in the desire to
know. This will be of great importance to us later when we discuss the intentional
response to value, so I wish to give a detailed account of the role and function of the
desire to know in the process of understanding and knowing as outlined in Insight.
The desire to know is a conscious, felt, pervasive, deep orientation of the whole
human person. It is pure in the sense of not being mixed up with other desires for
success or fame or advantage or satisfaction. It is detached in the sense of attachment to
the truth and an openness and willingness to follow the truth wherever it leads. It is
disinterested in the sense of passionately interested in understanding, in understanding
correctly, in assembling all the data, insight, concepts, facts, etc. needed to make a
correct judgment. The desire is in principle unrestricted; it produces an endless stream
of questions; the answers close off certain areas, but open up other areas to further
questioning. Questioning intends knowledge of everything; it excludes nothing, in
principle; thus being can be defined as the objective of the unrestricted desire to know.
Value Ethics
241
Even thought the desire is in [222] principle unrestricted, in practice we are limited in
time and space, we impose our own limitations and qualifications, we restrict ourselves
to a familiar world and fear to venture beyond it by further questioning. There is a clear
parallel between the functions assigned to the desire to know in Insight and the later
terminology of intentionality. These seem to be six.
(1) The desire to know initiates the process of knowing. The desire is prior to
any particular questions; specific formulations emerge from actuation of the desire. It is
a priori in the sense that if the desire is not there it cannot be given or taught. You can
teach specific answers to particular questions; you can encourage students to ask
questions. But if the desire to know is not rooted in the heart of the person, then you
cannot put it there; it is roughly equivalent to Aristotle's Active Intellect. It is deep,
permanent, the mass momentum drive of our intellectual and human lives.
(2) The desire to know is directional, it intends objects, it points to, it is
intentional. A formulated question intends an answer; the question already specifies the
kind of answer it is looking for. The question expresses a known/unknown. If a student
knows nothing about a subject he can't very well ask specific questions; if a student
knows everything about a subject then further questions are superfluous; it is the student
who half understands, is struggling towards understanding, who needs to ask questions.
Questions for intelligence intend the intelligible in the sensible. If you want to
answer such questions, you must attend to the data, the whole of the data, the data as
given (not as already filtered or interpreted). But attending to the data is for the purpose
of understanding the answer to what? why? where? when? questions. Questioning
intends the forms in the data, the ideas in the images, the universal in the particular. But
then further questions arise, Is it true? Is it correct? and then you are off on another
intentional direction looking for sufficient relevant evidence for a judgment of truth. A
further question arises as to the implications, applications, the worth of, the goodness of,
242
the value of, this conclusion and again you are directed by the question for the evidence
for the value of something. It is the [223] dynamism of questioning that reveals the
structure of conscious intentionality and the four-level structure of our diagram of
cognitional operations.
(3) The desire to know is the dynamic, the operator, in the constant stream of
further questions animating any research project or effort to solve a problem. It is
important to see how the desire to know is linked up with the activities of knowing.
Without this dynamism our cognition would be an activity going nowhere, in neutral
gear, static and lifeless. Lonergan often describes this desire as the Eros of the mind.7
The dynamism of the desire could not achieve anything without the activities of
imagining, remembering, understanding and judging. The dynamism is unrestricted.
Aristotle was on to something when he recognized the need for an Active and Passive
Intellect. Or to use a rather crude analogy: if you have a motor car (cognition) without
fuel (desire) then you are going nowhere; if you have fuel without a vehicle, you are no
nearer to your destination. But if you have both you are on your way. The desire to
know seems to have a constitutive, intrinsic role to play in the unfolding of knowledge
of truth and would seem to have a similar role to play in the emergence of judgments of
value.
(4) The proper content of the desire to know is the intelligible, the real and the
good.8 At the second level of cognitional structure, the desire to know intends the
intelligible in the sensible, and recognizes it when it is reached. At the third level, the
desire to know intends the real as opposed to the merely possible and recognizes when it
is reached. At the fourth level the desire to know intends real value as opposed to
apparent value. The desire to know intends the content rather than the act. So it is that
being can be defined as the objective of the desire to know. Similarly, when Lonergan
comes to define the 'notion' of being explicitly and explanatorily, it is in terms of the
Value Ethics
243
desire to know that he does so. "That notion must be the immanent, dynamic orientation
of cognitional process. It must be the detached and unrestricted desire to know as
operative in cognitional process. Desiring to know is desiring to know being:"9 Hence
we can again see the fundamental importance attached to the desire to know in the
beginning and unfolding of metaphysics. [224]
(5) The desire to know motivates us to be pure, detached and disinterested in the
search for understanding, truth and value. It is the desire that pushes us to be more than
weekend celebrities. It motivates to the intelligible, the true and the good, for their own
sake. There is strong motivation to overcome the biases to which we are prone.
(6) Finally, the question sets the criterion by which you recognize the correct
answer as correct. When you read a difficult piece of philosophy for the first time you
may feel disappointed, frustrated and confused because you have not understood
anything. When you continue to study the background, the history, the terminology, you
feel you are making progress, you feel better disposed to the author, and you are
encouraged to continue. If you continue to study you reach a point where you feel sure
that you have understood, you are delighted to have mastered a piece of philosophy, you
are satisfied and no further pertinent questions arise.
Lonergan distinguishes between a proximate criterion of truth and a remote
criterion of truth. 10 The proximate criterion is the virtually unconditioned; if there is
sufficient evidence, if the evidence is linked to the conclusion, then the conclusion must
be affirmed. The remote criterion of truth is the pure, detached, unrestricted desire to
know. If the desire to know is satisfied, if no further pertinent questions arise, if we
have been totally honest and open in our inquiry, then we can confidently know that we
have reached the truth. Why do we have two criteria of truth? Why does he sometimes
appeal to the virtually unconditioned, and at other times to no further pertinent
questions arise? I think it is because in a judgment of truth two components combine, a
244
cognitive and an affective; the activities must be performed correctly in harmony with
the intentionality of the desire to know. A correct judgment of truth can only be attained
when both of these aspects are fully implemented. We can expect a parallel in the
attainment of a judgment of value.
I have perhaps laboured the point to show that the desire to know is intrinsic
and constitutive to the process of knowing. It is not something external or peripheral or
accidental. It is a conscious desire. We [225] can operate or not according to this desire.
We can recognize this desire unfolding in curiosity, determination, conviction,
frustration, joy, satisfaction, a dynamism operating in and through our questioning and
understanding. Further, we can objectify explicitly the role this desire has to play in the
unfolding of the activities of imagining, remembering, understanding, formulating, and
judging truth and value. It is true that Lonergan focused on cognitional activities; that he
does not write a treatise on feeling; he does not seem to explicitly say that the desire to
know is a feeling. But he certainly acknowledges the crucial role of the desire to know
as the origin of questions, as the intention of truth and value, as the unrestricted
dynamism of understanding, as the detached disinterested motivation, as source of the
notion of being, as the criterion by which we know that we have reached the truth.
3.1.3 Interference of the Biases
If everybody everywhere lived according to the dictates of the pure, detached,
unrestricted desire to know there would be universal progress, development and
happiness. But such is, unfortunately, not the case. It is evident that the desire to know
struggles in a chaos of many other, personal, group and social desires and does not
always win out. One can present Lonergan's account of the four kinds of bias as the
obstacles to the proper unfolding of the desire to know and their implications for human
living. The biases are in the field of desires and feelings but distort, misdirect, stunt,
hinder the proper unfolding of the process of knowing.
Value Ethics
245
(1) Dramatic Bias. As well as the desire to know there are clearly unwanted
insights, a love of darkness, elementary passions submerging higher aspirations. If you
allow this process of excluding unwanted insights to continue, distortion spreads
through cognitional process, making knowledge of self and of others more and more
difficult and rare. If certain insights are unwanted, the questions that lead to these
insights have to be blocked. To systematically exclude a range of questions and data can
lead to rationalizations, blind spots, distortions, repressions, inhibitions, flights from
self-knowledge, loss of touch with reality. Although the blocking of unwanted ques[226]tions, images, and insights can be an unconscious activity of the censor, there will
normally be conscious connivance with the concomitants and consequences of dramatic
bias. Particularly in sexual development affect-laden images can be repressed only to
reappear associated with different images. Unconscious blocking of questions, and
insights can lead to lack of self-knowledge, loss of contact with reality, inappropriate
emotional reactions, distortions of the whole cognitive process of the individual.
(2) Individual bias. The egoist is a person who uses the whole range of
intellectual processes and skills exclusively for his own advantage: he is the cool
schemer, the shrewd calculator, the hard-hearted self-seeker".11 This is taking care of
oneself to the exclusion of ones obligations to society. There is in a sense in which we
are obliged to look after and love ourselves; but we are also obliged as members of
society to care for the welfare of others. The egoist thinks and feels only for his own
desires and fears, advantage and disadvantage. The source of individual bias is an
incomplete development of intelligence. An objective development of questioning
would reveal that intelligent courses of action are the same for all; that society cannot
survive if everybody acts on egotistical principles; that rights are balanced by duties;
that if you take from society you must give to society. The egoist is aware and
responsible for his self-deception, his refusal to ask these specific questions. This block
246
on the Eros of the human mind leads to an uneasy conscience, an awareness of sin
against the light.
In the egoist sensitive desires and feelings are allowed to submerge the desire to
know. Sensitive desires seek their own satisfaction; they tend to be very strong, but
transient. They seek the good for me, not the good in itself, the apparent good not the
real good; they seek satisfaction of sensitive desires and impede the satisfaction of the
detached unrestricted desire to know. The egoist is looking for the satisfaction of his
desire for success, for money, for pleasure, for the agreeable. The desire to know would
pull him out of his egoism, but it is not allowed to operate. [227]
(3) Group bias. As human beings we are also social beings. We form groups,
we identify with family, community, school, ethnic and national groups. We feel we
belong to them, we defend them, our identity is linked with them, we sacrifice ourselves
for the good of the group. We respect loyalty to our family, we praise love of our
country, we admire putting the interests of the group before our own personal benefit.
That in itself is legitimate and praiseworthy
But it can also be a source of bias, in this case, group bias. We can become so
identified with our nation that we cannot believe it ever did anything wrong so we
rewrite our history to reflect our bias. We identify with the interests of our groups so
that we cannot see things from an objective point of view. The group can be based on
class, religious affiliation, ethnicity, specialization, economics, politics or nationality. It
refers to the very human phenomenon of the in-group and the out-group. Feelings of
belonging, identification, loyalty to the group parallel feelings of distrust, resentment,
hatred and suspicion of the out-group. The desire to know is not allowed to transcend
group interest; it is not allowed to raise questions or challenges to the basis of group
interests, seeking a universal viewpoint, asking what interests all the groups have in
common. Struggle between groups often ends up with a dominant and oppressed group,
Value Ethics
247
winners and losers, the rich and the poor, the strong and the weak. The winners feel
vindicated, victorious, righteously celebrating their power. The losers are seething with
resentment, hatred, revenge and frustration. Such powerful group feelings militate
against the proper unfolding of the detached disinterested desire to know.
(4) General bias. General bias arises from common sense focus on the practical
and the concrete; again it is an incomplete development of intelligence, a blocking off of
further relevant questions, a disregard for theory, for the long-term view, for the need
for long-term strategy. Common sense is proper to each time and place; its success is
palpable, immediate and practical; it solves problems, is inventive within limits,
promotes short-term solutions but eschews the universal, the long-term, the explanatory.
General bias can lead to long-term decline; detached and disinterested intelligence
becomes increasingly irrelevant; the social situation deteriorates cumulatively [228] and
we end up with violence and a social surd. Lonergan appeals to cosmopolis as the force
for reversal of the long cycle of decline. There is such a thing as progress and its
principle is liberty. Intelligence is relevant in the short-term and in the long-term. We
need a social science that will understand the forces of history and how we are
becoming increasingly responsible for the unfolding of history. Detached and
disinterested intelligence and criticism is needed, more then ever before, to counter the
long cycle of decline.
Such is Lonergan's masterly treatment of bias. It is the contrary of the pure
detached unrestricted desire to know. Bias introduces distortions into the unfolding of
the desire. The distortions are in the area of feelings. In dramatic bias the subject is not
aware of how unwanted insights, images and feelings are not allowed to reach
consciousness and so continue to operate unconsciously to produce distortions,
unpredictable emotional reactions, unreasoned guilt feelings, abnormalities and
neuroses. In individual bias all the resources of intelligence are harnessed for selfish
248
self-interest. The desire to know is allowed free reign in terms of serving self-interest,
but blocked from thinking or feeling of the good of the whole. In group bias
intelligence and creativity and progress are embraced for the in-group but at the expense
of the out-group and to their disadvantage. Feeling of loyalty to the group are
heightened by fostering feeling of suspicion, distrust and hatred of the outsiders. In
general bias intelligence is limited to the practical, the concrete, the short-term solution.
The desire to know is not allowed to operate as detached, as disinterested, as
unrestricted. As Lonergan says "Were all responses made by pure intelligences,
continuous progress might be inevitable."12 Unfortunately, the polymorphism of our
desires and feelings does not allow this. Lonergan identifies these specific biases by
which sensitive human feelings interfere with the proper unfolding of the desire to
know.
3.1.4 Possibility of Ethics
Here we are confining ourselves Lonergan's position, as expressed in Insight.
Lonergan had embarked on a text on methods in general and had thirteen chapters
complete, when he was appointed [229] to teach in Rome. He decided to use the six
months remaining to round off his text and show the possibility of metaphysics, of
ethics, of proving the existence of God and showing that it was reasonable to think of
God intervening in history.13 He wrote chapter eighteen on the Possibility of Ethics
apparently as a reply to the Kantian position. There is much to be learned from this
chapter on freedom, the method of ethics, practical insight, moral impotence,
rationalization, and other matters. However, here we are interested only in the source of
moral obligation as expressed in Insight. He felt he had to say something on ethics and
that Kant would make a worthy adversary. Later, he develops a more sophisticated
position on feelings, values, the notion of value, judgments of value, decision, existential
ethics, and the like. Let us just isolate for now the source of moral obligation as
Value Ethics
249
presented in Insight and acknowledge his wider perspective later in our treatment of
feelings and values.
Lonergan in Insight is still thinking in terms of three levels of consciousness,
experiencing, understanding and judging. In this framework he has completed his
metaphysics and now he visualizes doing ethics as an extension or prolongation of the
principles of metaphysics, from knowing to doing. He talks about the parallel
interpenetration of metaphysics and ethics, seeming to mean that they are the same kind
of thing; nothing really new is involved in doing ethics; simply the extension of
principles of rationality from speculative intellect to practical affairs. Decision and
action are activities of the will and the will is conceived traditionally as rational appetite.
Decisions are rational, if they follow the dictates of reason. He is thinking of deciding
and acting as activities extending the activity of knowing to doing. He uses the
terminology of rational consciousness to deal with the three levels of cognitional
activity; he coins the term rational self-consciousness to deal with the extension of
rationality from knowing to doing.
The principle he appeals to is the exigence for self-consistency between knowing
and doing. "Man is not only a knower but also a doer; the same intelligent and rational
consciousness grounds the doing as well as the knowing; and from that identity of
consciousness there springs inevitably an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and
[230] doing." 14 This is the theme of the chapter and the basic tenet of his position on
moral obligation. It arises from the necessity of being consistent in your knowing and
your doing. It is hard to affirm that lying is wrong and still continue to tell lies. This is
an inconsistency, it causes tension; such tension can be relieved either by telling the
truth, or changing your knowing to suit your doing, in other words rationalizing.
He explicitly compares himself to Kant on the source of moral obligation: for
Kant it is found in practical reason, for Lonergan it is found in speculative reason. "In
250
brief, we have been dealing with the question, Is there a meaning to the word 'ought'?
Our answer differs from the Kantian answer, for if we agree in affirming a categorical
imperative, we disagree inasmuch as we derive it wholly from speculative intelligence
and reason."15 There is a certain similarity between his position and that of Kant in that
both derive moral obligation from reason; Kant derives it from practical reason,
Lonergan derives it from purely speculative reason. Lonergan accepts that his exigence
of self-consistency between knowing and doing is comparable to a categorical
imperative.
He compares judgment with decision: "However, there is a radical difference
between the rationality of judgment and the rationality of decision. Judgment is an act
of rational consciousness, but decision is an act of rational self-consciousness. The
rationality of judgment emerges in the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire
to know in the process towards knowledge of the universe of being. But the rationality of
decision emerges in the demand of the rationally conscious subject for consistency
between his knowing and his deciding and doing."16 Further, willing is rational and so
moral.17 Questions for reflection arise, we consider various possibilities. Only one
possibility can be the best. The principle of contradiction, which operates in judgments
of fact, also operates to demand consistency between knowing and doing; there cannot
be a contradiction between knowing and doing. There is a necessary connection between
the conclusion, this is to be done, and the rational grounds from which this conclusion
was derived. "Such is the meaning of obligation".18 It is because of the freedom of the
will that this necessity [231] becomes a contingency: what we conclude is the right thing
to do, is not always what we actually choose.
To sum up, I think it is clear that Lonergan appeals to speculative reason alone
for the source of moral obligation. It is a rational ethics. To emphasize the point we
could quote his apparent elimination of feelings from the field of moral obligation:
Value Ethics
251
"Accordingly, it will not be amiss to assert emphatically that the identification of being
and the good by-passes human feelings and sentiments to take its stand exclusively upon
intelligible order and rational value."19 Being is the sphere of knowing, the good is the
sphere of choosing. Feelings do not play a constitutive role in moral reasoning and
decision. How are we to interpret this explicit and emphatic statement? I think that his
statement reflected the way 'feeling and sentiment' was being used in Catholic ascetical
theology at that time. The word 'feeling' had a narrow, negative connotation, often
associated with concupiscence, sin, lust, anger, illicit pleasures. Feelings were regarded
as dangerous, a source of temptation, an obstacle to prayer, and the spiritual life. Feeling
were to be controlled by fasting, mortification, self-denial and even repression.
Pleasurable feelings were particularly dangerous and in need of control. This is the
meaning given to the word feeling at that time. In this sense, Lonergan's statement was
quite normal and acceptable. The word had this pejorative connotation and used in that
sense his statement was quite correct: if you do not overcome the biases of feelings, you
cannot have the proper unfolding of the desire to know.
Lonergan does have other occasional references to feelings and images in Insight
but they are not of great interest to us.20 Perhaps because of the narrow range of
meaning, he uses it so seldom. His focus was cognitional activities and not feelings.
This will change in Method.
However, it is appropriate to point out that Insight was written with feeling.
It is quite clear the Insight was written by someone with a passionate commitment to
understanding, to understanding correctly, to the development of intellect and to the
implications of that develop-[232]ment for personal living, for social progress, for the
moral and religious life. Insight is not an abstract emotionless thesis written to impress
or show off; it is deeply concerned at the plight of persons and societies caught in the
conflicting cycles of development and decline and what we can to do about it. Insight is
252
written by a person acting out of the pure detached unrestricted desire to know, for the
sake of better human living and development. If you want to grasp what he meant by the
desire to know, the Eros of the human mind, try to imagine his state of mind as he
worked on this monumental manuscript and rounded it off by writing the last six
chapters in about six months.21 He felt this was important; his desire to complete it
pushed aside distracting diversions, to focus, concentrate, write, rewrite; he was
absorbed devoted and this is revealed in every paragraph he wrote. His writing
embodies a feeling orientation towards the importance of knowing.
3.2 From Insight to Method and Beyond
Lonergan finished the writing of Insight in 1953 (even though it was not
published until 1957) before going to Rome to teach theology at the Gregorian
University. His focus naturally shifted to theology and his thought on method continued
to develop up to 1971 when Method in Theology was finally published. Fred Crowe has
described the shift in emphasis over the years by making four points.22 (1) Lonergan
shifted from constantly quoting 'the natural desire to know God', to quoting Romans 5.5
on God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit. This represents a shift from
predominantly intellectual interests to a focus on love, the affective and values. (2) He
shifts from 'our minds are restless' to 'our hearts are restless', from Aquinas to
Augustine. (3) Lonergan shifts from a use of the term feeling that is narrow and
negative, to a positive broad appreciation and incorporation of the feeling element in a
theory of values. (4) Lonergan expands his three level cognitional structure to add a
fourth level incorporating, deliberating, evaluating, deciding and acting in a responsible
manner. It is not just intelligence and reasonableness that governs conduct but
responsibility, a new category or dynamism operating at the fourth level of
consciousness. [233]
Value Ethics
253
We might note here that it is not only Lonergan who is shifting from a narrow
negative notion of feeling to a broader positive one. It is the whole culture that is
moving in that direction. The Index to Insight of 1957 edition gives one reference to
feeling; the Index of the Collected Works edition of 1992 gives about twenty-five
references. What has changed? The text has remained the same, but the theological and
philosophical community had moved on to a wider and more positive appreciation of
the importance of feeling in knowing. Lonergan had moved with them and so in Method
in Theology there is explicit acceptance of the positive role of feeling in theology and an
attempt to incorporate that in the process of doing theology. Hence in comparing the
role of feelings in Insight and in Method, we have to constantly keep in mind that the
word feeling has changed its meaning its connotation and denotation. What
previously was excluded from being a feeling, can now be included in the category of
feeling. A change in the meaning of the word does not necessarily signify a
substantive change in the thinking of Lonergan on feeling. So we need to be very
careful in our semantics, when comparing the early Lonergan to the later, and must
always keep in mind this semantic shift that occurs in the whole community of scholars.
Let us now consider some of the influences on Lonergan in this period between 1953
and 1971 in this area of feelings and values.
3.2.1 Influence of Max Scheler (1874-1928)
One of Lonergan's sources for a new notion of feeling and value is Max Scheler
whom he refers to in Method. His introduction to Max Scheler was through reading
Manfred S. Frings, Max Scheler: A Concise introduction into the World of a Great
Thinker.23 Scheler was a Catholic Intellectual who wrote copiously on all subjects of
philosophy. He also influenced Karol Wojtyla, who became Pope John Paul the
Second.24 Scheler was within the Kantian tradition but was reacting against the
formalism of Kant's philosophy. He was influenced by Brentano and Husserl and
254
attempted to extend phenomenological method to the field of ethics. He called himself

an emotional intuitionist and the method he used a non-formal a priorism. Kant's
formal ethics excluded feelings (as empirical elements) from ethics. Scheler, by
contrast, grounded the universal and necessary [234] character of moral norms on the
non-rational yet revelatory character of feelings. Scheler wrote extensively on
sympathy, ressentiment, fellow-feeling, compassion, community, person, and the like.
There are fifteen volumes of his collected works.25
Against relativism, Scheler held that values are essences in the world
independent of our knowing them and that they constitute a graded realm of values. As
well as the external realm of values you have a corresponding range of emotional
responses to values. This is the aspect of Schelers ethics which interests us most and is
most pertinent to our consideration of feelings and values. He listed the graded realm of
values in terms of sensible values, vital values, spiritual values and religious values.
(1) Sensible values range from agreeable to disagreeable, including sensible
feelings of enjoyment and suffering and the feeling-states of pleasure and pain. "The
fact that the agreeable is preferred to the disagreeable is not given by way of induction
or observation, rather, this order lies in the essence (Wesen) of these values as well as in
the essence of sensible feeling." 26
(2) Vital values or values of life range from the noble to the vulgar, the good and
the bad (not in the ethical sense). "Corresponding states of this modality are those of
health, disease, states of aging, feelings of forthcoming death, weakness and strength."27
These first two categories are values relative to life.
(3) Spiritual values are given in spiritual feeling and spiritual acts of preferring,
love and hatred of the human person. In this category he includes aesthetic values,
values of right and wrong, the value of pure cognition of truth.
Value Ethics
255
(4) The value modality of the holy and the unholy appears only with objects
pertaining to the absolute. Here he values cults, sacraments, forms of worship. Spiritual
values and values of holiness are values pertaining to the Person. The holy is a higher
value than the spiritual. [235]
Corresponding roughly to these objective value essences are the value-feelings
in acts of preferring which together form a typology of feeling.28
(1) Physical feeling-states (e.g. pain, sensation of tickling, itching, etc.) These
feelings are exclusively in time and place in a body. They are not intentional; they
belong to a determinate organ or part of a body; they are local and extended; they
encompass bodily pleasures and pains.
(2) Body or vital feeling states, such as health, illness, vigour, strength, etc.
"Vital feeling states spread through the body, and the whole body is given to us through
them which makes them deeper in depth than physical feeling-states."29 Vital feelings
form a unified lived experience of ones own bodiliness: they indicate ascent or decline
of vitality. They are continuous not punctual; they have a retrospective and prospective
orientation.
(3) Psychic feeling-states are intentional and genuinely communicable, can be
felt and refelt. "Psychic feelings, motivated by the understanding of trans-vital values
and networks of value, are intentional feelings in the proper sense." "Value (or disvalue)
here is the object-correlate of intentional feeling; and the feeling itself is a valueobjectifying act."30
(4) Spiritual feeling-states of person (e.g. blissfulness, despair, conscience, peace
of heart) pour forth directly from the core of the person and shine through the person
and his life. They permeate every other content of our experience; the rest of our 'state
of mind' vanishes. "To have or not to have spiritual feeling-states is not dependent on
256
willful intentions at all. They appear only 'on the back' of comportment and never as a
given content for purposeful willing."31
Love is the fundamental spiritual act. "The seat of the value-a priori is in acts of
feeling, preferring (or rejecting), and ultimately in love and hatred, where cognitions of
values and value intuition (Wert-Erschauung) take place".32 Man is, before he can think
or will, ens amans. "The pursuance of love and hatred, however, is the deepest source of
sorrow, joy, blissfulness and despair as feeling states, and they in turn are fundamental
to all feelings."33 [236]
Evaluation, Although we have only treated of a few of Scheler's ideas, one can see why
Lonergan would be interested in his treatment of feelings and values. However,
although Lonergan admits a debt to Scheler, it is still unclear how much he buys into the
system of Scheler, even when he takes over terminology such as intentional and nonintentional. From a Lonergan point of view, Scheler was in a counterposition on
knowing values in his emotional intuitionism. "Values cannot be grasped rationally;
reason is no more perceptive of them than the eye is of tone qualities. Values are given
in feeling-acts. Thus the object-region of values is governed by eternal, changeless laws,
which are not identical with, but analogous to logical laws. These laws can only be
grasped in 'emotional' acts."34 Lonergan will never say that feelings know values.
Feelings may reveal, point to, apprehend values but he will never say that feelings alone
know value. Knowing in Lonergan is always understanding. What he, perhaps, learns
from Scheler is that feelings influence and are in some way part of understanding.
Scheler was rejecting the empty formalism of a Kantian ethics based on reason alone.
But Scheler did not have a more adequate epistemology than Kant and so had recourse
to the direct intuitions of essences in phenomenology. Lonergan has worked out a
correct account of knowing truth and thus is in a better position than Scheler to account
for the knowing of values.
Value Ethics
257
Scheler is also in a counterposition on the objectivity of values as essences

ranked in a hierarchy independent of our knowing them. "In the totality of the realm of
values there exists a singular order, an 'order of ranks' that all values possess among
themselves. It is because of this that a value is 'higher' or 'lower' than another one. This
order lies in the essence of values themselves, as does the difference between 'positive'
and negative' values. It does not belong simply to 'values known' by us."35 It is not
hard to see here the 'out there now real' of the counterposition on the real. Scheler is still
thinking of knowing as a confrontation or contact between a subject in here and an
object out there joined by an intuition, a simple single act of seeing or perceiving or
feeling. Although it is laudable to defend the objectivity of values in an environment of
relativism, we have to be careful to seek objectivity in the right place. [237]
Scheler converted to Catholicism when he was fourteen but seems to have left
the Church later. In his own private life he was not exactly a model of the virtuous man.
His life was plagued by divorce, scandals, expulsions from universities, money
problems and betrayal of his friends.36 Although a brilliant speaker and writer, his flow
of ideas sometimes got the better of him and so we find inconsistencies, shifts of
position and a lack of precision and system in his thought.
3.2.2 Influence of Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977)
Lonergan also acknowledges a debt to Dietrich von Hildebrand in this area of
feelings and value, particularly his Ethics published in 1952.37 Von Hildebrand was also
a Catholic intellectual in the phenomenological tradition. He also wrote voluminously
on the spiritual life, philosophy, ethics, marriage and transformation in Christ. He made
the acquaintance of Max Scheler during his student years and was much impressed by
him. Von Hildebrand converted to Catholicism in 1914, and remained a devout and
rather conservative Catholic all his life. Von Hildebrand left Germany before the war
258
and after a short period in Austria and Switzerland went to America and taught at
Fordham University from 1941 to his death.
One can see that Lonergan was indebted to von Hildebrand in his terminology
value responses, intentional responses, affective response, satisfaction, moral
consciousness, the heart, subjectively satisfying and dissatisfying, merely teleological
trends, psychic states, intentional and non-intentional, are all terms used by von
Hildebrand. But we wonder what these terms mean for von Hildebrand and whether
they have the same meaning when transposed into a Lonergan framework. Von
Hildebrand studied Thomas Aquinas and Saint Augustine but remained a
phenomenologist at heart. He, like Scheler, wants to establish the unalterable character
of the moral law and the absolute nature of moral values against the relativists. He
wants to establish a true hierarchy of values based on Augustine's Ordo Amoris. But he
continues to speak in terms of intellectual intuition of essence, knowing as perception or
confrontation. He has a more central role for cognition than Scheler, insisting that: "All
responses necessarily presuppose a cognitive act. The ob-[238]ject must first reveal
itself in its nature, before it can become an object of our responses."38
I do not see much to be gained here by summarizing or further delving into von
Hildebrand. His way of thinking is similar to Scheler. Although he is discussing the
very thing we are interested in, feeling and values, he does so in a context that is quite
alien to our account of cognitional structure. He writes at length and in detail but it is
difficult to pin down his meaning precisely. Even if we manage to pin down von
Hildebrands meaning, there is no guarantee that that is the meaning imported into
Lonergans framework.
If one asserts that knowledge of values is an intuition, then, there is not much
more to be said about it. If intuition is a simple, immediate, direct act of perception, then
no further description or differentiation into parts is called for. But the problem arises
Value Ethics
259
when there are disagreements in judgments of value. If one person has an intuition that
'p' is true, and another person has an intuition that 'p' is untrue, how is the contradiction
to be resolved! Once you start debating about possible hypotheses, forming definitions,
gathering evidence, weighing the relevance of the evidence, arguing towards a
judgment, then, knowing is no longer an intuition but a complicated, critical, discursive
process, something like we have outlined. Similarly, our knowledge of value will be
knowledge by judgments of value and will be reached only after a complex process of
interrelated cognitional operations. We are searching for the source of values; we are
very aware of disputes and controversies about the source of values; it does not seem
that values are given in intuition, rather, through working through the controversies, the
arguments, the feelings, the insights and judgments. There is a question of
distinguishing true and false values; this is done by arguing, clarifying, assembling
evidence, following our better feelings, reaching conclusions.
Lonergan had recourse to Scheler and von Hildebrand because they were the
only philosophers talking about a morality based on values. The Catholic tradition was
still relying on natural law, as expounded by Aquinas and developed in moral theology.
The empiricists were splintering into conflicting groups arguing about the [239]
verification principle, language games, empirical reference, signification, and the like.
The existentialists were undermining rather that providing a foundation for values.
The value discussion of the first half of the 20th century was not continued into the
second half. It is Lonergan who takes up the baton but gets little help from his
predecessors or contemporaries.
3.2.3 Feelings in Method A Summary
Let us assemble step by step Lonergan's statements on feelings in Method and
then we will be in a position to make an assessment and move on to a systematic
presentation.
260
(1) He makes a distinction between non-intentional and intentional feelings in

which he draws on Max Scheler and von Hildebrand. Non-intentional feelings are states
and trends. They do not intend objects; they are not a response to objects. Examples of
states would be: fatigue, irritability, bad humour, anxiety. The states have causes and
disappear when the cause is no longer operative or is removed. Examples of trends or
urges would be hunger, thirst, sexual discomfort; they tend to a goal and disappear when
the goal is achieved. In non-intentional states and trends, "the relation of the feeling to
the cause or goal is simply that of effect to cause, of trend to goal. The feeling itself
does not presuppose and arise out of perceiving, imagining, representing the cause or
goal."39
"Intentional responses, on the other hand, answer to what is intended,
apprehended, represented. The feeling relates us not just to a cause or an end, but to an
object."40 Intentional is being used in the phenomenological sense of a subject being
related to an object by way of an intention. We have seen that in the levels of
consciousness each question intends a particular answer. In this context now we are
talking of feelings relating us to objects intentionally. We feel good towards certain
people, certain classes of objects, we are attracted by them; on the other hand we are
repulsed by certain types of people, certain topics, certain activities. We have instinctive
feeling reactions either negative or positive or in-between. If you are watching a news
bulletin you will find yourself reacting to the persons who are presented, the events
which have happened, the crimes that have been [240] reported, the scandals and the
successes. It is perfectly true, as Lonergan says, that "Such feeling gives intentional
consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power."41 These are deeply ingrained feeling
responses. Without them our living would be paper thin. We have to feel strongly about
something to persevere to the end. Without such feelings our convictions would be very
Value Ethics
261
weak, we would give up easily. By our feelings "we are oriented massively and
dynamically in a world mediated by meaning."42
(2) Intentional feelings respond to two main classes of objects: "on the one hand,
the agreeable or disagreeable, the satisfying or dissatisfying; on the other hand, values,
whether the ontic value of persons or the qualitative value of beauty, understanding,
truth, virtuous acts, noble deeds."43 Response to true values carries us forward towards
goodness and self-transcendence.
Response to the agreeable or disagreeable is ambiguous; it may be the road to
self-transcendence but then again it might be self-regarding moral decline. What is
agreeable may well be a true value; but it also may be something morally wrong, but
with an appearance of good. What is disagreeable may be a true value and we have to
grit our teeth and do it. On the other hand, we may find it so unpleasant that we do not
do it, meaning that we are operating under the criterion of pleasure and pain.
I find this distinction very fundamental and of crucial importance for
understanding how we know values. Lonergan does not give much assistance by way of
examples or illustrations for identifying this distinction in our own lives. Like many of
his terms it is heuristic: this is the bare bones work out the specifics for yourself. This
we will try to do in detail in the next chapter.
(3) Lonergan also uses a phrase 'apprehension of value' which seems to be close
to the intentional response to value but not simply synonymous. This phrase is wide
open to misinterpretation, so let us give the quotations where the phrase occurs and then
try to divine the precise meaning. [241]
Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie
apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feeling.44
Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional response
which greets either the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of
beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great
achievements.45
262
Again, our apprehensions of values occur in intentional responses, in

feelings: here too it is necessary for feelings to reveal their objects and,
inversely, for objects to awaken feelings.46
Now the apprehensions of values and disvalues is the task not of
understanding but of intentional response. Such response is all the fuller,
all the more discriminating, the better a man one is, the more refined one's
sensibility, the more delicate one's feelings.47
In normal English usage the word 'apprehension' can be used as equivalent to
comprehension either as the activity of comprehending or referring to what is
comprehended. It can also be used in the sense of arresting, taking somebody into
custody, laying hold of somebody. It can also be used of a foreboding, a suspicious
feeling about something.
In Scholastic philosophy and in Lonergan's work on Word and Idea in Aquinas,
the term apprehension refers to the activity of insight into phantasm. Simple
apprehension was the phrase used in Scholastic philosophy for the first act of intellect,
the direct understanding; the second act was division or composition which was the
judgment. So in the Verbum articles Lonergan talks of apprehensive abstraction as the
grasp of the form in the matter, the universal in the particular, the idea in the phantasm.
Occasionally, the phrase reoccurs in Insight where he speaks of apprehensions of
possibility or necessity,48 apprehensions of durations,49 and distinguishes affective from
apprehensive. In this context it seems to refer to a grasp of some content. It seems to be
another metaphor for understanding and to refer to the act of insight. Just as we talk of
seeing the point, or grasping the point, so we [242] can talk of apprehending the point.
But it occurs rarely, is not given a technical definition or significance and is not really a
technical term.
So much for the background. What about the phrase 'apprehension of value' as it
occurs in the above quotations and other later writings of Lonergan? Let us be clear
about the following points.
Value Ethics
263
(a) It is not knowledge of values but something intermediate and less than
knowledge. Apprehension, even as a metaphor for insight, was only an insight into
possibility. Knowledge occurs through a complicated and interrelated series of activities
of sensing and understanding, and reaches its term only in the judgment. Those who
think that Lonergan has gone soft in his old age and held that feelings on their own
know values are quite mistaken. He never says this. Apprehension is not knowledge.
(b) It would be quite inadequate to think from the first quotation above that
feelings only enter into the cognitional operations somewhere between judgments of
fact and judgments of value. This would be rather strange and artificial. Feelings
motivate all cognitional operations. It is probably true that just as responsibility for our
judgments is deeper and more personal that responsibility for our opinions, so
responsibility for our moral judgments is deeper and more personal than for our
judgments of fact.
It would also be inadequate to interpret this quotation as saying that the only
thing that occurs between judgments of fact and judgments of value are apprehensions
of value. He has already identified the question of value and the process of deliberation
and they surely are involved in some way intermediate between judgments of fact and
value.
(c) It is clear from the above that there is a strong feeling element in this
apprehension of value, but is it exclusively a feeling element? Are other elements of
cognition involved in the apprehension? An answer Lonergan gave at a question and
answer session seems to indicate that there are. "There are apprehensions of values, and
these occur insofar as one is apprehending things, experiencing, understanding, judging;
and further, there is added on to this an intentional response, a feeling that is not just a
feeling state like fatigue or hunger [243] or thirst, but a response to an objectas
264
something good."50 So it seems that the apprehension of value goes along with the other
activities of knowing and guides it in the right direction.
(d) Bernard Tyrell suggests that intentional response to value and apprehension
of value are roughly synonymous and interchangeable.51 However, he does suggest
some nuances.
"At the same time, by using the expression 'apprehension of values,' Lonergan
does indicate that he understands the grasp of values to involve a certain 'knowing of the
heart,' an activity that involves 'discernment' and 'recognition'."52 Love illuminates the
process of knowing and reveals or points to and recognizes values. It is in this limited
sense that you can have a 'knowing of the heart'
It may be that the two phrases complement one another, one being active the
other being passive. "It seems to me that the 'intentional response to value' as Lonergan
understand it involves both a receptive and an active dimension. As apprehensive the
intentional response is receptive of value; it recognizes value. As a response it actively
greets and discriminates values."53
(e) My own interpretation is that Lonergan assigns a precise, explanatory role to
intentional response to value. He does not seem assign a precise, technical meaning to
the phrase apprehension of values. It is not a judgment of value; it is not pure feeling
and seems to go along with activities of knowing. It can be used in a rather loose sense.
It might be considered as a grasp of possible value. It seems to be used to describe our
sensitivity to values, hence it is used as a descriptive term. Good people will be
sensitive to, aware of, will recognize, apprehend values.54 Persons who are less
developed morally will be insensitive to values, unaware of value issues, be unable to
recognize and apprehend values.
(4) Lonergan assigns a special place to love as the supreme example of
intentional response. "But there are in full consciousness feelings so deep and strong,
Value Ethics
265
especially when deliberately reinforced, that they channel attention, shape one's horizon,
direct one's life. Here the supreme illustration is loving."55 He often speaks of God's
love flowing into our hearts by the power of the Holy Spirit. (Rm. 5.5.) For the [244]
person who is fully in love with God his affective response will be in harmony and he
can follow his desires knowing that they lead to God. Ama et fac quod vis; love and do
what you will.
(5) Lonergan gives us his interpretation of Pascal's saying that the heart has
reasons which reason does not know. By reason he means "the three levels of
cognitional activity, namely, of experiencing, of understanding and of judging. By the
heart's reasons I would understand feelings that are intentional responses to values."
"The meaning, then, of Pascal's remark would be that, besides the factual knowledge
reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying, there is another kind of
knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a
person in love."56
(6) A somewhat similar distinction is needed in relation to the Latin tag, nihil
amatum nisi praecognitum, nothing is loved unless it is previously known. Knowledge
usually precedes love. But there is the minor exception of people who fall in love with
another person or country or cause. There is the major exception to the Latin tag,
namely, God's gift of love flooding our hearts. Then we are in the dynamic state of
being in love. But who it is we love, is neither given nor as yet understood. So the other
Latin tag has to be taken into account, namely, nihil vere cognitum, nisi prius amatum,
nothing is truly known unless it is first loved.57
(7) Lonergan has a rich appreciation of the relation between symbols, images
and feelings. He defines a symbol as "an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes
a feeling or is evoked by a feeling."58 Feelings relate us to objects; some we desire,
some we fear, some we seek, some we avoid. Feelings are related to one another. Some
266
sets of feelings are compatible; others are incompatible. Feelings are tied up in
interpersonal relationships. Feelings are related to the subject as the mass, momentum,
drive of conscious living. Symbols can be differentiated or undifferentiated. They can
mean different things to different people. The same feeling can be expressed in different
symbols. As our affectivity changes so old symbols loose their efficacy and new
symbols gain in their appeal. "Symbols obey the laws not of logic but of image and
feeling."59 [245]
(8) Although feelings are fundamentally spontaneous, we do not have complete
control over them, yet we can influence our feelings by reinforcement, approval,
curtailing or controlling. So our feelings can be enriched and refined by a process of
education through the arts and through appreciation of admirable persons and moral
values. Conversely there can be decline and aberration of feelings.60
Evaluation. How are we to assess these various statements about feelings? Have
they answered the questions we asked about the role of feelings in value judgments
decisions and actions? On the positive side there is a real appreciation of the importance
of feeling and an effort to come to terms with feelings and values in relation to
knowledge and theology. On the other hand there is a certain ambiguity, an absence of
elaboration and gaps that leave us tantalizingly unsatisfied.
One of the ambiguities is the role of feelings in knowing values. Two reputable
authors are already in print interpreting Lonergan as saying that feelings know values.61
This is probably based on a misunderstanding of his statements that we apprehend
values in feelings; but that is not the same as knowing values in feelings.
The elaboration is lacking in the distinction between intentional response to
values and to the agreeable/disagreeable. Unless we can identify in our own experience
what he is referring to in this distinction, then we will be like a blind person talking
about colour. Hence, in our systematic presentation in the next chapter we will launch
Value Ethics
267
out into the deep and try to identify what he is talking about and establish precisely how
the intentional response to value enters into our knowledge of values.
4 Broadening our Notion of Feeling
We have devoted some time and effort to Aristotle, the emotivists, the
phenomenologists and Lonergan in order to grasp the extent of the difficulty and as a
starting point for our own appropriation of feeling. We realize that facile
oversimplifications will simply not satisfy. We hope we have honed the questions that
arise, so that we will know what we are looking for, when we attend to our own feeling
[246] life. It is to ourselves, our own consciousness the final arbiter in all these matter
that we now return. Our question still is simply how do feelings enter into judgments
of value. Our first focus is on our very notion of feeling; the probability that we need to
move from a narrow notion of feeling, to a broader appreciation of their role in our life.
We still tend to operate out of a very narrow view of feeling, where we consider
feelings as occasional, superficial, transient, negative, undifferentiated and sensitive.
We tend to think of feelings as occasional, as something that comes and goes at
will. We think of ourselves as normally calm and without feeling, and suddenly
somebody annoys us and there is an irruption of anger. When the anger passes we return
to our state of neutrality, of calmness, of normality.
We tend to think of feelings as superficial; we recognize only the more obvious
expressions of feelings. We recognize passion, anger, joy, pleasure, guilt, grief and the
like, which are strong and obvious. But we do not recognize determination, conviction,
commitment, responsibility, hope, aspirations to a better life for ourselves, our children
and our society, as feelings. We recognize only our more obvious likes and dislikes, our
pleasures and pains.
268
We think of feelings as transient; very strong when they arise, but will pass
quickly and we will return to normal. We are advised not to act out of feeling, wait till
you calm down, cool it man, don't do anything you might regret later, sleep on it first.
Often we think of feelings from a negative point of view, suggesting that we
would be more rational without them. Wouldn't we be better off without these wild
animal impulses that we can hardly control. Why can't adversaries just sit down and be
reasonable and compromise? Why are the kids always fighting? Why do we spend so
much time on the education of the mind and so little on the education of the heart? We
might even think of our feelings as dangerous, that they have to be controlled,
suppressed, or even repressed. [247]
Our notion of feeling tends to be undifferentiated. We use the word globally,
generally, in no clearly defined sense. A normal dictionary will give about eight
different meanings for the word 'feeling'. Surely we must make an effort to sort out the
types of feelings, the definition of feeling, the function of feeling in living.
We tend to confine our notion of feelings to sensitive feelings, to bodily changes
associated with feelings, to physics, chemistry, and biology of feeling, and to the
sensitive psyche. But can we not feel the love of God flowing into our hearts? Do we
not experience the grace of conversion? Do we not feel an obligation to help those in
need? Do we not feel obliged to do our duty? Do we not feel responsible for causing an
accident? Are there other kinds of feelings that cannot be called sensitive?
Let us try to work towards a broader appreciation of the role of feeling in our
life.
First, we must think of feelings as permanent: we are always in a feeling
disposition towards the world and ourselves. Once we are awake, we are operating in
terms of the mass, momentum, power, drive of feeling or the absence thereof. I think it
is a mistake to think of feelings as occasional or transient; as if we act out of feeling and
Value Ethics
269
then revert back to a state of neutrality. But if you are in neutral gear, you go nowhere.
Love, convictions, determinations, commitments, hopes and dreams are relatively
permanent affective dispositions; they do not go away when we are eating our lunch or
playing golf. There are relatively permanent dispositions, inclinations, habits, feeling
responses, value priorities, various levels of enthusiasm, joi de vivre or depression.
Secondly, our feeling disposition at any one time is multilayered. On the surface
we can be 'happy' enjoying some pleasure and at the same time deeply uneasy or guilty
or depressed. There are feelings that are superficial, very obvious, very strong and on
the other hand counter-currents that are very deep and long-lasting. You can be grieving
because of some bad news but rejoicing because of some other good news. Feelings at
different levels can be conflicting. The image of a symphony seems appropriate for the
life of feelings; many different [248] feelings, operating at different levels, with varying
intensities, sometimes in harmony and going in the same direction; sometimes
conflicting and producing disharmony and chaos.
Thirdly, feelings vary in intensity, duration, depth, intentionality. They vary in
intensity; you can be mildly angry, deeply angry, red hot angry. Feelings can last for a
few minutes, a few hours or for the whole day. Feelings can be on the surface, not
disturbing your deeper calm and happiness. Or you can be deeply disturbed and
presenting a superficial appearance of tranquillity. Sentiments can be deep and
unnoticed: approval, esteem, sympathy, compassion, empathy, concern, contentment,
care, commitment, kindness, love, hatred, and the like. They can vary in intentionality,
in the sense of orientating us towards action, towards a response, towards a judgment
and decision. Lonergan distinguishes between non-intentional and intentional. I suspect
there may be a little overlapping here and certain gradations between totally nonintentional and intentional.
270
Fourthly, our feelings not only motivate our outward behaviour but also the
inner life of the mind. Feelings motivate physical activity but equally all our
questioning, studying, thinking, formulating, reflecting, criticizing, judging truth,
deliberating and judging value. The intellectual life is shot through from beginning to
end with feeling. It is inadequate to think of feeling entering into our lives only when
moral values and decisions are at stake. Research, writing, experimenting, exploring,
concluding, putting things together is shot through with feelings such as dedication,
perseverance, frustration, exhilaration, anger, pride, ambition, love, aggression, and the
like. Typically moral sentiments, such as, approval, esteem, sympathy, compassion,
empathy, concern, contentment, care, commitment, kindness, love, hatred, dedication,
perseverance, are relatively permanent and motivate our behaviour to others.
Fifthly, feelings develop. Our feeling life develops along with our intellectual,
moral and religious development. Aristotle recognizes this; young people act out of
their feelings; they are not fit to study ethics; only the mature whose feelings are under
control can study goodness. Feelings develop by being encouraged, fostered, curtailed,
[249] trained and controlled. There can also be decline and aberration of feelings if they
are allowed to distort out perspective by bias, twisted resentments, repressions, and the
like.
The emotional reactions of the good man will be quite different from those of
the evil person. When we see a motor accident happen, we should normally respond by
feelings of sympathy and offering a helping hand; that is what a good person
spontaneously does. A thief on the other hand will spontaneously respond by thinking,
this is a good opportunity to steal and proceed to do so. When we are confronted by an
example of injustice, e.g. police beating up peaceful marchers, we should respond with
anger and indignation; the callous person will respond with a shrug of his shoulders and
move on.
Value Ethics
271
Sixthly, we should think of feelings not as disruptive elements but as parts of an

integrated whole. Feelings were considered to be dividing the person, preventing him
from doing good, a separate force over which we have little control. Now I think we can
better understand that the person is one. The one person who experiences, understands,
judges and decides is also the one who has emotions and is affective. The one subject is
the unifying centre of all these different activities. The activities are accompanied by
various emotional responses. But it is the one self, who understands and experiences the
joy of understanding, who does the right thing and experiences the satisfaction of
knowing that you have done the right thing. The image of the symphony is appropriate
here also; there is only one conductor, but many instruments. Some instruments play
deep and persistent; others are light and occasional. Mostly there is harmony, but
sometimes disharmony and tension. Usually the same mood pervades all the parts but
there can be subtle contrasts, suggestions, conflicts.
Seventhly, we should think of feelings as often interpersonal and often
concerned with values. We feel about persons more strongly that we feel about things.
Our feeling life starts in the close bond of baby and parent and works on from there.
Moral values are also personal values; they have to do with interpersonal relations.
[250]
Eightly, we might have to consider a range of feelings that cannot be called
sensitive, that do not originate in sensitivity, even though they might be accompanied by
sensitive changes. I am thinking of the desire to know, about the transcendental
imperatives, about the notions of intelligibility, truth, and value. Perhaps there is a range
of feeling that is deep, permanent, directing towards truth and value; a range of feeling
that does not originate in sense and might have to be called immaterial or spiritual. This
is a range of feeling that we do not often think of in the category of feeling, but are
feelings nonetheless.
272
Conclusion. Although it is still true that feelings can be disruptive, passionate,

dangerous elements in our life, we are coming to a more positive appreciation of their
role for good, the positive contribution they make to the intellectual and moral and
religious life. Above all we have to learn to appreciate the deep undercurrents of
permanent feelings towards the true and the good and the beautiful, which underlie the
more superficial, obvious expressions of feeling.
We have made a start on unravelling the confusion related to feelings and
values. We have looked at some background figures, picked out what might be of help
from the history, explored some basic distinctions, so that we will be in a good position
to put together a comprehensive understanding of the role of feelings in the moral life in
the next chapter.
(1) (a.) In some cases feelings can take control and overcome our better judgment.
Think of road rage, crimes of passion, quarrels, brawls on the football pitch, marital
squabbles, etc. Usually we regret afterwards, when we cool down.
(b.) On the opposite side, you can think of a person carried away by emotions to protect
his family from armed burglars; or a soldier sacrificing himself for his company; or a
person giving his life to the service of the poor, or the oppressed or the marginalized.
[251]
(c.) One can think of a selfish person, doing everything for himself, thinking only of his
own pleasure and convenience; unwilling to consider the feelings or rights of others; his
feeling life is totally centred on himself and his own convenience.
(2) We tend to classify love, compassion, sympathy, commitment, etc. as good; but that
presupposes an authentic and competent person. There is love of darkness, compassion
for rapists, sympathy for terrorists, commitment to discrimination. We tend to classify
anger, frustration, hatred, intolerance, and the like as bad; but anger at injustice,
Value Ethics
273
frustration in trying to improve a situation, hatred for evil, intolerance of sin and bad
will are commendable feelings. In our terminology, intentional response to value always
leads to self-transcendence; intentional response to satisfaction is strictly neutral.
(3) We do seem, as a matter of fact, to appeal to certain feelings as justification for
action or inaction. The problem really is which feelings, at what level, in what context?
Do such feelings replace, support, or go contrary to activities of knowing value? We
hope to answer these questions in the next chapter.
(4) Try to think of minds without hearts; computers without power; cars without petrol.
Where would we be without the mass momentum drive of feelings? Where would we be
with no desire for truth or value or God?
(5) The good person rejoices in goodness, peace, progress, justice, cooperation, even if
it does not impinge on himself or herself directly.
(6) The good person rejoices in other good persons; the good person is angered,
appalled, disappointed, ashamed, at the evil done by other human beings. How you feel
about these persons depends on how much you know about them, whether you
information is correct, and your own personal value system.
(7) Value judgments emerge from deliberative insights moved by the intentional
response to value. The unfolding of this feeling and thinking activity requires
detachment, disinterestedness, [252] purity, dedication. But there can be the
interferences of dramatic, individual, group or general bias which will produce a
distorted judgment of value.
(8) To feel comfortable can refer to the purely physical, a comfortable bed, couch,
position. Here it refers to feeling responses to values; is your value system at home with
racial discrimination? There is the comfort of a clear conscience, the knowledge that
you are in the right, that you have faced up to challenges, that you are trying to be
authentic.
274
Endnotes
1
The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, trans by J.A.K. Thomson;

Introduction by Jonathan Barnes; (Great Britain: Penguin Edition, 1953).
3
MacIntyre, Alisdair, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1981) 19.
4
Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St.
Thomas Aquinas: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 1, (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2000).
5
Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas: Collected Works of Bernard
Lonergan, vol 2, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
6
Phil McShane, Ed. Language, Truth and Meaning, (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1972), 310.
7
Insight, 97, 245, 355, 498.
Insight, 300, 373.
Ibid., 378.
10
Ibid., 573.
11
Ibid., 245.
12
Ibid., 248.
13
Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection, ( London: Darton, Longman and Todd,

1974) Insight Revisited, 268.
14
Insight, 622.
15
Insight, 624. [253]
16
Insight, 636.
17
Insight, 622.
18
Insight, 637.
19
Insight, 629.
20
For more detailed analysis of feelings in Insight see Mark Doorley, The Place of the
Heart in Lonergans Ethics: The Role of Feelings in the Ethical Intentionality Analysis
of Bernard Lonergan, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996).
Value Ethics
21
275
See Frederick E. Crowe, Lonergan, (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1992) 71.
22
F. Crowe, "Lonergan's New Notion of Value", Lonergan Workshop III, Scholars

Press.
23
Marquette University Press, 1996.
24
Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, (London: D. Reidel Publishing

Company, 1979).
25
See Frings, Max Scheler, xiv.
26
Frings, Max Scheler, 80.
27
Ibid., 81.
28
Ibid., 30-3.
29
Ibid., 31.
30
Stephen Strasser, Phenomenology of Feeling: An Essay on the Phenomena of the

Heart, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1977), 48.
31
32
33
Ibid., 41.
34
Strasser, Phenomenology of Feeling, 46.
35
Max Scheler, On Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing, (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1992), 221.
36
See Introduction by Harold Bershady in Max Scheler, On Feeling, Knowing, and

Valuing, where he paints a very unflattering picture of Schelers private life.
37
Dietrich von Hildebrand, Ethics, (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1953). See also
Dietrich von Hildebrand, The Heart: An Analysis of Human and Divine Affectivity,
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1977).
38
Von Hildebrand, Ethics, 197.
39
40
Ibid., 30.
41
Ibid., 30.
42
Ibid., 31.
43
Ibid., 31.[254]
44
Ibid., 37.
45
Ibid., 38.
46
Ibid., 67.
47
Ibid., 245.
276
48
Insight, 33.
49
Insight, 180.
50
B. Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, Collected Works

Edition vol 17, (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004), "Horizons" 27.
51
Tyrell, Bernard J. "Feelings as Apprehensive-Intentional Responses to Values",

Lonergan Workshop vol VII Ed F. Lawrence. 336.
52
Ibid., 336.
53
Ibid., 338.
54
See Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, 27-9,

where the phrase apprehension of values is used in the sense of sensitivity to values.
55
56
Ibid., 115.
57
Ibid., 122.
58
Ibid., 64.
59
Ibid., 66.
60
Ibid., 32-3.
61
Louis Roy, Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique, (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 2001), 136. John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics,
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1983), 42-4.
6
Self-Appropriation of Feelings and Values
Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional

response which greets either the ontic value of a person or the
qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble
deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements. For we are so
endowed that we not only ask questions leading to selftranscendence, not only can recognize correct answers constitutive of
intentional self-transcendence, but also respond with the stirring of
our very being when we glimpse the possibility or the actuality of
moral self-transcendence.1
Questions for Deliberation
(1) Your counsellor asks you: How do you feel about that? It may be a career choice or
marriage difficulty or financial proposition. What feelings do you refer to?
(2) In looking for a job do you prioritize, job satisfaction, or salary, or career, or family?
(3) Can you identify in yourself feelings, desires and aspirations that cannot be merely
sensitive feelings? [256]
(4) Is it always good to be: 1. sympathetic? 2. loving? 3. non-violent?
(5) Is it always bad to be: 1. hateful? 2. angry? 3. revengeful?
(6) List activities that give you satisfaction. Are there different kinds of satisfaction?
(7) Try to imagine a human person totally void of any sense of moral obligation. Where
does this moral 'ought' come from? Can we get rid of it?
(8) What are your deepest and best inclinations and aspirations as a human person?
1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we elaborated on Lonergan's position regarding feeling
and values. We studied the texts carefully and found some invaluable contributions, as
well as certain ambiguities, gaps and further unanswered questions. From the phase of
indirect speech we move to direct speech: from what Lonergan said, we move to what
you and I say on the subject. We now take a stand for ourselves, acknowledging our debt
278
to Lonergan but appealing to the ultimate authority the data of our own consciousness.
Can we present a systematic position on feelings and values that will build on
Lonergan's contributions, that will be coherent with the data of consciousness, and that
will make sense in our own experiences of moral concerns?
We are now looking at the second component that enters into the judgment of
value, namely, the affective component, the intentional response to value. We have to do
this in a way that it will unite with the deliberative insight, the cognitive component, in a
judgment of value. We are looking for an understanding of thinking and feeling that will
be complementary, rather than contradictory, inclusive rather than exclusive. As this is
crucial to our whole position on values, we do it slowly and carefully, step by step. Our
primary reference in this chapter will be to the data of your own experience rather than
to texts of Lonergan or anybody else. [257]
Perhaps, again, to put it in very down to earth terms, we have already identified
the cognitive element of the judgment of value as the deliberative insight. We have
identified the activities of exploring possibilities, knowing facts, assembling evidence,
weighing consequences and alternatives, linking the evidence to the conclusion, finally
uniting all in a deliberative insight and producing a judgment of value. But those are all
very cerebral activities; they rely entirely on the activities of the Mind. But will the most
intelligent person always make the best judgment of value? Is being a moral teacher,
leader and guide, simply a matter of superior intelligence? Surely, to trust a persons
moral judgment, we must look for something more than speculative intelligence; we
look to Heart, to feeling orientation, to intentional response to value. Can we pin down
precisely what that means? Do feelings come into this business of moral evaluation at
all? And if we have many levels of feeling, to which feeling orientation do we refer?
How does the feeling orientation relate to the cognitive activities analyzed in
deliberative insight?
Value Ethics
279
Lonergan distinguishes between three kinds of feeling, (1) Non-intentional states

and trends, (2) Intentional responses to the agreeable and disagreeable, and (3)
intentional responses to values. Our procedure is to accept this as a working hypothesis:
this man is usually right, so let us understand the hypothesis and then assess the
evidence for or against. So we will identify and explore these three kinds of feelings
separately, one by one. The challenge of Lonergan's three-fold characterisation of
feelings is to be able to translate into more familiar terms, and relate them to our own
experience. In the adult person these three categories do not exist neatly, separate and
apart, but as interrelated and integrated in one single whole. My approach is to
differentiate these basic kinds of feeling and then to integrate them: the only alternative
is confusion. First, we will identify intentional and non-intentional. We will focus at
length on the intentional response to value with its basic characteristics (Section Three).
Then we will identify intentional response to agreeable and disagreeable in sensitive
animal consciousness and in human consciousness (Section Four). Having distinguished
clearly we will be in a position to see how they interact in many ways moving through
tension to a [258] kind of integration (Section Five). We will consider the possibility of
a hierarchy of feelings (Section Six) and finally show how the cognitive and affective
components unite in a judgment of value (Section Seven). We will briefly consider the
legitimacy of the question, How do you feel about that? (Section Eight). And conclude a
long chapter with a brief summary of principles (Section Nine). Please keep in mind the
questions for deliberation suggested above; that you are the subject of this text; that we
are working on the basis of self-appropriation.
2 Intentional and Non-Intentional
Let us try to be clear about the meaning of this term 'intentional'. Lonergan is
using it in the technical sense that it has in phenomenology especially in Husserl, where
intending, intentional, intentionality, refer to qualities of activities as directed towards,
280
as pointing to. Seeing intends colour and so is intentional. Hearing intends sound and so
is intentional. Knowing intends essence and so is intentional. Von Hildebrand uses the
term in the sense of any meaningful relationship between subject and object. Lonergan is
not using the term in the colloquial English sense of deliberate, as in 'he hit her
intentionally'.
Lonergan introduces the term of intentional response to value after he has
explained the intentionality of questioning, the differentiation of levels of intentional
consciousness and the notion of intentionality analysis. So it is from that context that we
must get the precise meaning of 'intentional'.
They (operations) are transitive not merely in the grammatical
sense that they are denoted by transitive verbs but also in the
psychological sense that by the operation one becomes aware of
the object. This psychological sense is what is meant by the verb,
intend, the adjective, intentional, the noun, intentionality. To say
that the operations intend objects is to refer to such facts as that by
seeing there becomes present what is seen, by hearing there
becomes present what is heard, by imagining there becomes
present what is imagined, and so on, where in each case the
presence in question is a psychological event.2 [259]
By saying that operations intend objects, he is saying that operations make
objects present psychologically. If there are different modes of intentionality, then there
will be different levels of intentionality analysis and different intentional objects.
Cognitional activities are all intentional in the above sense. Empirical consciousness and
intentionality will be only a substratum for further intentional activities.
The novelty here is that Lonergan now uses the terminology of intentional and
non-intentional to refer to feelings and to distinguish three kinds of feeling: nonintentional feelings, intentional response to agreeable and disagreeable, and intentional
response to value. This is the focus of our interest here. What does Lonergan mean by
these three kinds of feeling and in what way do they enter into judgments of value?
Non-intentional states and trends are relatively simple. They are feelings that do
not put us in a stance over against an object; they are not responses, they are not
Value Ethics
281
intentional, but they are usually called feelings. Hunger and thirst are simple examples.
Hunger has a cause and when the cause is removed the hunger disappears. Feelings in
this sense do not intend. These feelings do not enter into intentional consciousness and
there is not much more to be said about them. They may be part of the context of human
thinking, feeling, deliberating, judging and deciding but they do not enter into the
process itself. Not all feelings are intentional, not all feelings put us in a stance towards
objects, and not all feelings enter into the mass momentum drive of human evaluation,
decision and action.
Firstly, there are states such as fatigue, irritability, bad humour, anxiety, which
are feelings but are not intentional; they do not put us in a meaningful relation to objects;
they do not point to or intend, or make objects present psychologically. The feelings are
just there. These feelings have causes in over-work or chemical deficiency, or
unresolved conflict. The feelings are the effect of a cause. They are real and may provide
the context or circumstance in which we make moral judgments, but they do not enter
into the judgment itself. [260]
Secondly, there are trends or urges, such as hunger, thirst, sexual discomfort
which again are feelings but not intentional. The trends or urges have goals; hunger
urges to food and then disappears. These feelings do not presuppose or arise out of
perceiving, imagining, representing the cause or goal.3 They do not put us in an
evaluative stance towards objects.
Non-intentional feelings are not relevant to moral evaluations. They do not put us
in a stance towards objects, they do not help or hinder the process of evaluating; we
identify them in order to leave them behind, so that we can consider those feelings that
do enter in some way into making judgments of value.
3 Intentional Response to Value
282
Now we focus on the human intentional response to value. It is 'intentional' in the

sense of meaningful pointing towards, intending, making present, recognizing. It is
response in the sense of appetite that is activated, potency that is actualized, a passivity
that becomes active. It is a value in a sense to be defined. We will approach this by
way of explicating related notions that set the context for understanding, defining and
identifying the intentional response to value in our own consciousness.
Intentional responses, in simple language, might be called gut reactions, feeling
responses of approval or disapproval; they are spontaneous in the sense that we do not
will them or have total control over them. If you are watching the world news you will
be told about war in one country, a building collapsing in another place, a politician
rigging an election, an agreement between rebels and the government in another nation.
If you review your reactions, you will probably find that you have gone through a gamut
of emotional reactions to the persons you have seen and the events you have witnessed.
There may be anger that a despot has succeeded in rigging another election. There may
be joy, that peace has been restored to a suffering country. There may be horror at the
loss of innocent life in an earthquake. You might hate the very sight of some of the
persons presented, as you consider them to be total hypocrites, war-mongers, [261]
dictators, or plain thugs. Others you approve of for their genuineness, and you feel like
cheering when they are successful. Some events make you want to get up out of your
chair and go to join the rebels; in other cases you are moved to write a letter of protest to
your local member of parliament; in other cases you share the good news with a friend.
We are constantly reacting emotionally to persons, whether they are members of
our own family, students in class, fellow motorists, passengers in the bus, the shop
assistant or the counter clerk. Walking along the street, we might react with disgust to a
not so clean homeless person; we might react angrily to unruly children blocking our
Value Ethics
283
way; we might react with pleasure when somebody is polite and respectful; we might
feel attracted to a handsome well-dressed person of the opposite sex.
We have a wide repertoire of emotional reactions, but my particular reactions are
a product of my culture, education, parents, knowledge of the background of the news,
and previous value judgments. My emotional reactions have been formed and deformed
in many ways. The person sitting beside you may react in a different way, because of his
different understanding of the context, or because of his evaluation of the situation or
person. What particular person or cause moves you to anger is a function of your
development or decline, intellectually, morally, emotionally and religiously.
Is there any rhyme or reason to these reactions? Are they to be trusted? Can we
introduce some clarifications or principles to help us to discern these feeling reactions?
To do so we must return to the technical terminology introduced by Lonergan.
3.1 First Approximation: Pure Desire to Know
In our treatment of feelings in Insight, we have already seen the pivotal role
played by the pure, detached, unrestricted desire to know in the unfolding of cognitional
structure. We saw that it performs at least six functions in terms of being the source of
formulated questions, being the intentionality of each particular question, being the
dynamism of cognitional activities, motivating us, providing the con-[262] tent, and
being the criterion by which you judge whether you have reached the correct answer .
Lonergan did not refer to the desire to know as a feeling in Insight, as the term feeling
at that time had a very narrow, negative connotation. However, it is very clear that many
feeling elements were already identified as operating in the desire to know and that the
biases are largely distorted feelings interfering with the proper unfolding of the desire to
know.
In the perspective of Method and the expansion of three level cognitional
structure to four levels, Lonergan is clear that there is one desire to know which is now
284
extended to the desire to know value, the questioning of value, the grasping of value, the
affirmation of value, the deciding for value, and the implementation in action. "But as
the many elementary objects are constructed into larger wholes, as the many operations
are conjoined in a single compound knowing, so too the many levels of consciousness
are just successive stages in the unfolding of a single thrust, the Eros of the human
spirit.4 It is the same fundamental desire underlying the question of intelligence, the
question for reflection, the question for deliberation. The same fundamental desire is the
intentionality of the intelligible, the intentionality of the real and the intentionality of
value. It is the same dynamism operating in the activities of knowing the intelligible, the
activities of knowing the real, and the activities of knowing value. It is the same desire
which in the specific question sets the criteria by which we know whether or not we
have reached the correct answer.
I contend that in the context of Method in Theology the desire to know must be
named a feeling. In order to assign the desire to know its proper function in the activity
of knowing truth and value, we must recognize it as the affective element that unites
with the cognitive to form a judgment of value: we have to name it as a feeling, or else it
will fall into a black hole of anonymity. Is it surprising that the desire to know has an
important function to perform in the stream of activities leading to knowledge? It is not
'merely' a feeling or 'only' a feeling but it is a deep positive feeling orientation towards
the value of knowing. In the positive, deep, broad appreciation of the human Heart
evident in Method, we have to affirm that the desire to know is a feeling. If the Eros of
the human spirit is not a feeling, what is it? If a [263] desire is not a feeling what is it? In
the tripartite division of feelings, (1) non-intentional states and trends, (2) intentional
response to agreeable or disagreeable and (3) intentional response to value, the desire to
know must be placed in the class of intentional response to value. It is hard to think of
the desire to know as not being a vital part of "the mass, momentum, drive, power"5 of
Value Ethics
285
feeling. This is not difficult to understand or appreciate in the context of the broader
appreciation of the feeling life of the human person that I have outlined at the end of the
last chapter. Lonergan moved in the direction of appreciating the richness, importance
and basically positive orientation of our deep feeling life; we have to do the same.
This is our first approximation in our attempt to pin down the meaning of
intentional response to value. Few have difficulty identifying the desire to know in their
own experience and in others; what could be simpler or more obvious? I am suggesting
that the intentional response to value is a nuance on this desire; that it is a specification
of the unfolding of this desire at the fourth level of consciousness; that the intentional
response to value is an aspect of what can be referred to as the desire to know.
We identified six functions of intentionality in the unfolding of the activities of
knowing truth and value. In the earlier context of Insight these functions are performed
by the pure, detached, unrestricted desire to know. The same functions are also fulfilled
in the operations of knowing value: the questions of value are formulated expressions in
particular instances where value is being sought; it is the intention directing towards
value above and beyond that of truth; it is the dynamic moving towards the judgment; it
is the pure motivation of love of value; it intends the content specific to the question;
and it is the criterion by which we recognize the truth of a judgment of value. The
dynamic operating in activities of knowing value are analogous to the dynamic operating
in knowing truth. It is a single desire; it is always pure, detached, unrestricted; it always
performs the same six functions. The obstacles to its proper unfolding continue to be the
biases, the distortions of feeling towards the egoist, towards the self-interest of the ingroup, towards the practicality of general bias. [264]
3.2 Second Approximation: Transcendental Notion of Value
In Insight Lonergan defines value as "the good as the proper object of rational
choice".6 Also he states, values "are true in so far as the possible choice is rational, but
286
false in so far as the possibility of the choice results from a flight from selfconsciousness, or from rationalization, or from moral renunciation."7 The problem with
this formulation is the meaning of 'rational choice'; it seems to by-pass the judgment of
value altogether. Rational is a term he has used proper to activities at the level of
judgment of truth, the question for reflection and reflective insight. Choice is an activity
of the will, it is a form of decision; it is not a knowing but presupposes a knowing. But
no amount of reasoning about truth can get you logically to a knowledge of value. There
is no logical transition from third level operations to fourth level operations, from
knowledge of truth to knowledge of the good. Reasoning to the good from the truth
would involve the naturalist fallacy. In this G.E Moore was correct: you cannot reason
logically from a knowledge of what is true to a knowledge of what is good.
Lonergan gradually began to realize that his treatment of value in Insight was
inadequate. Knowing the intelligible presupposes a notion of the intelligible. Knowing
the truth presupposes a notion of the truth. Now Lonergan begins to realize that there
must also be a notion of value and this calls for an elaboration of a fourth level of
intentional consciousness where this notion is operative. In Insight Revisited he
describes this important shift in perspective in his own words:
In Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method the good
is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation: Is this
worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the
intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value
made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience.8
Lonergan elaborates on this notion of the good for the first time in The
Subject.9 [265]
Just as we can in the end only define truth as that which is intended in questions
for reflection, what is grasped in reflective understanding and expressed in a judgment
of truth, so we can only know about what is good, as that which is intended in questions
of value, what is grasped in deliberative insights and what is expressed in judgments of
Value Ethics
287
value. He extends his technical meaning of the notion of being to the notion of the good.
This seems to me a recognition that the only way to know the good is by appropriating
the experience of aspiring to know value and implementing value in decisions and
actions. Thus, it is futile to try to derive the good from speculative intelligence. Thus, the
good is a distinct notion to be known only by way of intentionality analysis. It cannot be
derived or deduced from any other notion and cannot be reduced to any other notion. We
can only know about ethical activities, judgments of value and decision and action from
how human persons in fact perform these activities however well or badly they
perform them. Hence Lonergan began to express himself in terms of transcendental
method, transcendental notions and transcendental precepts. This is the terminology of
Method in Theology, even though some of the ideas expressed are already there in
Insight.
Crucial to this new terminology is the distinction between transcendental and
categorial. "Categories are determinations. They have a limited denotation. They vary
with cultural variations."10 Categorial is specific, can be pointed to; it has content. The
beliefs of a specific culture can be listed, written down, learned off by heart, they are
expressed in a language, at a particular time in a specific place. These specifics are
categorical.
"In contrast, the transcendentals are comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted
in denotation, invariant over cultural change."11 Every culture asks questions and intends
to seek the truth. Every normal person asks about what is worthwhile, deliberates about
alternatives and affirms what is of value for him/her. The transcendentals are common to
all human beings of whatever time and culture. In appropriating the activities of
cognitional structure, we became familiar with three intentions characterizing the three
levels, the intention of the sensible, of the intelligible and of the real. [266] They are
what is intended in questions for intelligence and reflection. Now we add the notion of
288
value. Value is a transcendental notion that is intended in questions for deliberation,

grasped in deliberative insight, affirmed in a judgment of value, decided for in a good
decision and implemented in appropriate action. This is transcendental in that it applies
to all cultures, of all times, to all human persons, of all ages and stages.
It is important to be clear on the distinction between concept and notion. A
concept is a formulated definition of something, a concept of a circle, a concept of time,
a concept of development. It is specific, expressed in a language, usually clear and
distinct, always limited. But where do concepts come from? Prior to concepts are the,
"the prior transcendental notions that constitute the vary dynamism of our conscious
intending, promoting us from mere experiencing towards understanding, from mere
understanding towards truth and reality, from factual knowledge to responsible action."12
The transcendental notions, constitute the very dynamism of our conscious
intending, promoting us from mere experiencing towards understanding, from mere
understanding towards truth and reality, from factual knowledge to responsible action."13
The notions are named as intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility. These notions
are a priori. They are unrestricted and they are comprehensive.
So we see that the language of the pure detached unrestricted desire to know
from Insight is transposed into the transcendental notions of Method in Theology. The
transcendental notion of value gives rise to specific questions of value but precedes such
formulations. The transcendental notion of value is the dynamism moving the activities
of deliberation forward towards a judgment of value. The transcendental notion of value
intends value, gives the searching direction, points to, is sensitive to the good and value.
Finally, the transcendental notion of value recognizes value when it is found; it is the
criterion that the question has been answered and that the good has been found. [267]
It is in the context of this kind of terminology that Lonergan introduces the
intentional response to value. I would hold that the intentional response to value is again
Value Ethics
289
a nuance on the transcendental notion of value. We can recognize the transcendental

notion of truth operating in our questioning, our understanding and reflecting, our
judgments and the criteria by which we know the judgments are true. We can recognize
the transcendental notion of value operating in our questions for deliberation, our
deliberative insights and our judgments of value. Similarly, we recognize the intentional
response to value operating in this context.
3.3 Third Approximation: Transcendental Precepts
Lonergan always insisted that the proper unfolding of the activities of knowing
should be according to norms that are immanent and operative in the knowing. There is
a proper way to know and the rules do not originate from logic, or methodology, but
from the very activities themselves. The normativity is in the activities; it is not
extrinsic, but intrinsic, to the activities. This earlier reference to the normativity in
Insight is expressed more explicitly in the terminology of transcendental precepts in
Method. Here the normativity is differentiated into the five levels of intentional
consciousness: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love.
They are called imperatives or precepts; they express an obligation, a command, an
ought, a conscious feeling of being bound to do the right thing.
These precepts are not pulled by magic out of the sky despite the term
transcendental. They are in fact empirically based. Why are there five and only five?
Why are they expressed in these terms? These five precepts express in a masterly
synthesis the actual deep feelings of obligation that operate in our human living. They
are closely bound up with the activities of integral cognitional structure but also underlie
our deciding and doing and being and becoming. Beneath particular rules, or cultural
norms, or moral laws, or categorical imperatives, there are these feeling orientations
operating, deeply, permanently, consciously. [268]
290
'Be attentive' is the imperative operating under the influence of the pure desire
directed to the level of experience. We are all familiar with the feeling of being drowsy,
distracted, day-dreaming, in a fantasy world, quite relaxed and at ease with the world. If
we were permanently in this state not much would ever be done. But there is a contrary
feeling of being alert, being attentive, being awake, conscious of our surroundings and
ready to move and react. The first condition of learning is to pay attention; how often
does a teacher remind her pupils, pay attention, please. We will not achieve much in
the library unless we concentrate, direct our attention, and control our wayward
fantasies.
If we want to understand what is happening to the ozone layer, better look at
what is happening, attend to all the scientific data, go back as far as you can, collect as
much data as is needed, do not ignore any of the data even if it does not seem to help
your hypothesis. Do not neglect data even if it is not what you expected. So not screen
data by already anticipated conclusions. Do not deny data that is staring you in the face.
Be totally open to reality and willing to accept the truth. To be attentive is a basic
postulate of scientific method; it is a basic postulate of all empirical methods; it is a
basic postulate of our own transcendental method where empirical method is applied
both to the data of sense and to the data of consciousness. It is so basic that it would be
inconceivable to espouse the opposite, to be inattentive, as a motto of procedure.
'Be intelligent' expresses the normativity of questions for intelligence spilling
over one another in the search for correct answers. At a first moment, our curiosity is
aroused, we are puzzled, something does not make sense, we wonder, we start looking
for a solution. We ask, Why? where? how? how often? what rate? when? what? All
express questions seeking further understanding. At a second moment there is a struggle
to understand, research has to be carried out, we need more information, we must
conduct controlled experiments. At this stage the tension of inquiry builds; we can feel
Value Ethics
291
frustrated that we are not getting results; we feel depressed when our hypothesis is
disproved and we have to start again; but we continue to be determined, committed,
resolved not to give up. There is a third moment when [269] we feel the joy of insight,
the release of tension, the satisfaction of understanding, the puzzle is solved, the solution
has been found.
It is not hard to see that if you want correct answers you need to understand your
hypothesis, your explanation, your theory. That you need to express your hypothesis in a
coherent, consistent, differentiated fashion. To be intelligent is to concentrate on the
important, the significant, the essential, the relevant and to abstract from the
unimportant, the insignificant, the unessential and the irrelevant. Again there are few
successful scientists who espouse stupidity in their method or procedure. To be
intelligent is, to ask questions, to assemble images, information, ideas, definitions,
examples in an effort to understand.
Be reasonable is to realize that there is a further normativity emerging in the
question, Is it true? Is it correct? Is the solution the right one? This is the critical
question. We feel differently when we face this question. We move from the mode of
brainstorming, to taking a stand on personal beliefs and truth. It is a serious business.
We assemble information, examples, definitions, explanations, evidence, arguments, in
such a way as to show that there is sufficient evidence for the truth of the conclusion. If
there is anything we assert to be true, we should be able to show the force and relevance
of the evidence that shows it to be true. We should be able to give a reasonable account
of what we hold to be true. That is to be reasonable, the opposite is to be unreasonable.
To be reasonable is to ask the critical question, to assemble the evidence and the
arguments in the right way and to show that the conclusion follows from the evidence.
Juries are asked to pass judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. It is presumed that
everybody understands what a reasonable doubt is.
292
Finally, 'be responsible' is to spontaneously move to the question of evaluation,

to realize that values are at stake. We feel obliged, we feel responsible, we realize that
there is a right way to act and a wrong way, that much hangs on the decision and
evaluation. It is a higher level of consciousness; there is more at stake. The issue is what
kind of person we are and what are we to make of ourselves by out evaluations,
decisions and actions; what do we stand for as free and respon-[270]sible persons. We
struggle to think clearly and to feel authentically. Our moral conscience is now
operating. It has a thinking component but also a feeling component. We feel guilty,
remorseful, shameful, depressed, discouraged my our moral failures. We feel happy, at
ease, satisfied, at peace when we rise to our moral obligations. Or we may be some
where in between these clear cut alternatives; we may feel perplexed, confused,
doubtful, unsure, anxious, or indecisive. These feelings propel the activities of asking
questions, deliberating, reaching a judgment of value, deciding and acting. We feel
differently when questions of value arise above and beyond questions of truth. We
recognize also the feeling of irresponsibility but few would espouse that as a principle of
action.
Note the difference between Lonergan's position in Insight and in Method here.
In Insight the meaning of moral obligation is derived from speculative intelligence and
reason. "Is there a meaning to the word 'ought'? Our answer differs from the Kantian
answer, for if we agree in affirming a categorical imperative, we disagree inasmuch as
we derive it wholly from speculative intelligence and reason."14 But in Method moral
obligation is a transcendental precept. It is a fact that human beings act in this way. It is
a given that humans are morally obliged. Whether they become moral or immoral adults
depends of many factors, but if you have a normal human person you have one who is
responsible in the sense of the transcendental precept.
Value Ethics
293
'To be in love' can be added as the transcendental imperative characteristic of a

religious experience at the fifth level of intentional consciousness. It is to be in love in
an unconditional manner; it is a religious conversion expressed in Christian terms, even
though it is intended as transcultural, referring to all experiences of religious conversion
wherever or whenever they occur.
Perhaps, all the precepts could be summed up in the simple precept, 'to be
authentic'. The dynamism unfolding in the various levels of consciousness is the one
Eros of the human spirit; it is not only cognitional but also affective. It is not only
knowing value but spills over into decisions, actions, becoming and being. This precept
is not something added on to a human person from the outside but is the [271]
normativity of what it is to be a human person. We are pointed in a certain direction by
these precepts to the intelligible, the real, the good, and ultimately the unrestricted
goodness of God.
3.4 Intentional Response to Value
I have gone into this background, because it is the context in which Lonergan is
working, when he introduces the terminology of intentional response to value. He is
referring to something in the area of the pure desire to know, the notion of value and the
transcendental precept to be responsible. It is the latter which seems to be closest to the
meaning of the intentional response to value
In using the term value here, he is referring to the transcendental notion of
value underlying all questions, deliberations and knowledge of specific values. It is
value as known through our own experience of seeking for and implementing value. It is
recognizing value as a notion distinct from the notion of the intelligible or the true. It is a
notion that is not reducible to pleasure, to truth, to utility, to power, to anything else.
In using the term 'intentional', he is referring to the intentionality of the
transcendental notions. The question for intelligence intends the intelligible, the question
294
for reflection intends the real and the question for deliberation intends the good and
value. Intentionality guides the subject, through the questions and the deliberation, to the
judgment. It sets up the heuristic structure combining knows and unknowns by which it
is to be found. Intentionality recognizes the answer when it is found.
The term 'response' suggests an appetite that is activated, a desire responding to
its proper object, a potentiality that is activated. A response seems to presuppose a
reaction to some stimulus. It is the first step in moving us to ask the question of value,
evaluate and judge. Desire lies dormant until it is awakened as a response to a situation,
a person or an incident.
I am suggesting that this intentional response to value is conscious. If it is
conscious it can be adverted to, named, identified and defined. It is not in itself an
activity but the dynamism, the motiva-[272]tion, the intention, the mass momentum
drive power of an activity. It seems to be the normativity immanent and operative in the
activities of knowing value. It is a feeling.
If the intentional response to value is conscious, then, it must be present in the
data of consciousness and hence empirically verifiable in the sense of generalized
empirical method. Hence we have an empirically verifiable notion of human being that
is normatively bound. It is simply a fact that to be a human person is to be obliged as
intelligent, reasonable and responsible. Not only can we recognize the activities proper
to moral deliberation and knowledge but we recognize the dynamism, intentionality,
criterion and content operating in and through the conscious activities.
3.5 Characteristics of Intentional Response to Value
Let us identify some characteristics of this intentional response to value.
The intentional response to value is a priori.15 It is innate in the sense that it a
possible response, not a specific content; it is the pure question that precedes any
particular formulation of a question. It is a spontaneous capacity to respond in a certain
Value Ethics
295
way. Teachers can teach the categorial content of a moral code, but cannot impart the
transcendental notion of value. If the response is not there, no amount of teaching will
put it there. Teaching can help the emergence, give body, encouragement, expression to
the response, but if the intentional response is not there, you can do nothing. The
response is not learned from experience, it is not a posteriori.
The intention of value is unrestricted. It is not restricted to any particular value
or values but is open to value in general, to all values without limit or restriction; it
aspires to the infinite good. Just as the desire to know is unrestricted, so the desire to
know value is unrestricted. It would be a contradiction to say that there are some aspects
of value that, in principle, we do not want to know about.
It is universal in the sense that any human person as a human person has an
intentional response to value. We traditionally define a human person as a rational
animal. More correctly the person should be [273] called sensible, intelligent,
reasonable, responsible and open to the ultimate. We are born with a potential to be
actualized, a feeling to be stirred, a desire to be activated. This is not limited to one
culture, or one time or one place but applies to all persons of all times and cultures.
Hence it is universal and transcultural.
It is permanent. This desire cannot be totally extinguished from the heart of
persons. No amount of evil deeds, habits or feelings can totally extinguish a person's
conscience. No matter how habitual a life of thievery or corruption becomes there is
always deep down an uneasy conscience, a sense of guilt, a recognition of moral failure;
and that also constitutes the possibility of conversion. Conscience can be corrupted by
misguided teaching, by a decadent culture, a deviant social order, a dysfunctional family
background, etc. But the potential remains there for moral self-transcendence.
Response to this desire leads to self-transcendence.16 Hence, we recognize the
importance of identifying, naming, objectifying, articulating this response to value. This
296
response is the beginning of moral behaviour, the foundation on which all behaviour and
all moral philosophy must be based. The more we are aware of this desire the easier it is
to live by it. The more we can discriminate between this desire and the multiplicity of
conflicting desires, the better we can discern the right thing to do in particular situations.
If it always leads to self-transcendence the intentional response to value is
fundamentally good. Whatever obstacles might prevent the actualizing of this goodness,
at the core of the human person is this thrust towards moral goodness. We are not born
actually good or bad, but we are endowed with an intentional response to goodness.
Emergence, development and actualization of the intention of value is not
automatic; it requires teaching, socialization, inculturation, maturation. We remain
always free and responsible. Just as intelligence and reason need a context of
stimulation, response, encouragement, and teaching, to emerge and operate, so the moral
sense, the sense of value needs the help of others to emerge and flourish. [274]
In what sense can this intentional response to value be classified as a feeling?
First, let us affirm that this intentional response to value is immanent and
operative wherever you have human beings operating. It is very often operating in an
undifferentiated manner, confused with many other desires. It can become very obvious
and powerful a force in the person who responds to it. It can wither and retire into the
background in those who have not responded to it.
Second, the desire operates on the conscious level and not on the unconscious.
For most people it is a principle of moral behaviour, it is a motive of action; it can be
implicit or explicit. It is conscious in the same way that the desire to know, or the
obligation to be reasonable, or even grace is conscious. It is first experienced but may
not be thematized. It is a significant aspect of the mass, momentum, power, drive of
human feeling. Hence it can be called a feeling: a felt awareness of a desire for the good.
It is not a feeling in the sense of transient, superficial, sensitive appetites. It is a feeling
Value Ethics
297
in the sense defined above, as deep, permanent, strong, pervading, feeling orientation in
life.
Third, it can be thematized, named, explained, distinguished from all other
desires. This is the foundation of ethics, the source of value, the beginning of the
normativity proper to the person as free and responsible. It is not the work of ethics to
prove moral obligation by a deductive syllogism, but to identify it in its operations, to
distinguish it from other impulses and obligations, to thematize and objectify this feeling
in all its implications. Just as the logician cannot prove the principle of contradiction,
because in doing so he has to presume that it is operating; so the moral philosopher
cannot prove moral obligation, because in doing so he must presume that it already
exists.
Fourth, it is a different category of feeling than intentional response to the
agreeable or disagreeable. It cannot be a sensitive feeling; it does not belong to the world
of sense. Animals do not operate according to the precepts of be attentive, intelligent,
reasonable and responsible. Lonergan talks of two categories of feelings. Intentional
response to value is special and unique because of what we have said [275] above. It is
not on the same level as sensitive feelings of anger, sensitive feelings of guilt, sensitive
feelings of joy. But it has to be classified as a feeling, because it is such an important
aspect of the mass, momentum, drive of human consciousness. If it is not a sensitive
feeling what kind of a feeling is it? I think we are obliged to use the term spiritual
feeling. We are obliged to grasp the nettle, to call a spade a spade. Let us be very clear
on the meaning of this term spiritual feeling.
Lonergan has clearly defined what he means by spiritual and material and his
analysis would seem to be correct.17 The spiritual is what is intelligent and intelligible;
the material is intelligible but not intelligent. Further, the spiritual is neither constituted
nor intrinsically conditioned by the empirical residue, even though it may happen to be
298
extrinsically so conditioned. The material is intrinsically constituted or conditioned by

space and time.
The activities of asking questions, understanding, formulating definition, asking
further question, reflective understanding and knowing the truth are spiritual activities,
in the sense defined explanatorily in Insight. Even though they are spiritual, they are
conscious, we can describe them, define them, relate them to one another in an
explanatory system. The intentionality, the norms, the transcendental precepts are
immanent and operative in the unfolding of these activities. We seem to be obliged to
refer to these desires as spiritual appetite. They must be spiritual also in the strict sense.
The intentional response to value is spiritual in the strict technical sense of the word. It is
not intrinsically conditioned by space and time; it is the dynamism of intelligence and
not merely intelligible.
But just as we can be aware of spiritual activities of understanding and knowing,
so we can be aware of the dynamism operating within the structure. We feel moral
obligation as the underlying dynamism of fourth level activities. We feel in the sense of
being aware, of experiencing. For most people it is operative but not identified, isolated,
named and defined. That is what we are trying to do in this text. The intentional
response to value is an experienced obligation to seek, to know and to do the right thing.
It is one of the deepest and [276] best of the inclinations of the human heart. Without
that intentionality we cannot reach a correct judgment of value.
But because we are human, our awareness of spiritual activities or norms is
extrinsically dependent on proper functioning of the brain, the nerves, the senses, the
psyche, the bloodstream and all the components of the biological pattern of experience.
There will be physical, chemical, neurological, organic and psychic concomitants to the
experience of spiritual activities or norms. We understand as human beings painfully
questioning, imagining, understanding and conceiving in a discursive process with many
Value Ethics
299
twists and turns. We do not understand as pure spiritual beings who, apparently,
understand universals directly and immediately, with no time or effort being expended.
The expression spiritual feeling is open to many misinterpretations. I use it
reluctantly but do not see any suitable alternative. I do not intend any kind of religious
association here; we are not entering the field of prayer, spirituality, mysticism, or
religious feelings. Spiritual is simply opposed to material, just as intellectual is opposed
to sensitive. Just as we can assert that the activities of understanding and judging are
essentially spiritual activities, so we can assert that the dynamism operating through the
levels of consciousness is spiritual feeling. Just as we can identify, name, and interrelate
the activities, so we can identify name and interrelate the normativity inherent in the
activities. The challenge is to extend our connotation of the word feeling, just as
Lonergan has done, and to recognize these two distinct categories of feelings operating
in us.
We will return to this topic of intentional response to value later when we are in
a position to see how it relates to the intentional response to the agreeable and
disagreeable. We will then be more concrete and consider examples from concrete
experience to clarify this distinction. [277]
4 Intentional Response to Agreeable or Disagreeable
Let us now consider the other side of the coin feelings that are intentional
responses to agreeable or disagreeable. Let us just remember that the human person is a
unity integrating many levels of operations, feelings, and conjugates. We can specify the
levels as physical, chemical, biological, neurological, psychological, intellectual and
volitional. We have considered some of the higher conjugate forms of human
functioning, questioning, understanding, knowing, knowing values, deciding and acting
and the dynamism operating in this structure. I am interpreting intentional response to
the agreeable and disagreeable as fundamentally sensitive feelings, sensitive appetites,
300
likes and dislikes, which have a purely sensitive foundation. I am identifying it with the
pleasure/pain principle but recognize that this can be transformed in the service of
human flourishing. So our first task is to identify sensitive appetite, feelings that are
intentional but purely sensitive. Afterwards we can consider how they develop or decline
in the total human context and can contrast them more effectively with the intentional
response to value.
4.1 Introduction: Unity of Human Person
Again we are remembering our basic understanding of the human person as one
integrated whole, operating on many levels but all these levels are integrated according
to principles of sublation and dependence. There may be some who have a mind/body
problem. If you imagine the body as material, and the mind as spiritual, you create for
yourself an imaginary problem of how one influences the other. We are working in the
context of explanation; the unity of the human person is evident from experience; the
levels are evident from the various activities and characteristics; the interrelationship of
the levels is verified in everyday experiences of thinking and doing. The human person
has physical, chemical, organic, neural, psychic, intellectual and volitional attributes.18
The intellectual component can be subdivided into levels of consciousness, the
experiential, intellectual, rational, personal and reli-[278]gious. These components
interrelate in terms of higher integrations of lower manifolds, in one integrated human
person.
This is just to show that when we speak of levels of consciousness, we do not
think in terms of one layer piled on top of another extrinsically added from the outside.
There are a multitude of complex interrelations between the levels of activities and
feeling and valuing. The activities of knowing truth and value are not just added on to
sensibility from the outside, extrinsically, but knowing always continuously depends on
sensing, imagining, remembering, feeling.
Value Ethics
301
4.2 Animal Sensitivity

(1) Some feelings are non-intentional states and trends; they are not intentional,
do not make objects present, do not put us in a stance over against some object. But
sensitive feelings can also be intentional. Activities of memory and imagination, seeing
and hearing are intentional; so also anger, sensitive desire, fear, put animals in a stance
towards objects either by way of attraction or repulsion. So it is these sensitive
intentional responses that we need to identify.
(2) Animals operate according to basic instincts, drives, reflexes and appetites.
To explain why a weaver bird builds a nest in a particular way, you do not appeal to
decision or to understanding but to instinct. The bird is operating in the biological
pattern of experience. Its behaviour is not as fixed as that of a stone; it has a wider
flexibility; but that wider flexibility can be fully explained in terms of physics,
chemistry, biology and sensitive psychology of instincts, appetites, reflexes and drives.
It is the task of scientists in these disciplines to explain the origin, the function, the
development of these aspects of animal behaviour.
(3) Animals operate in terms of sensation. The higher animals have three internal
senses, instinct, memory and imagination; as well as five external senses, seeing,
hearing, tasting, touching and smelling. They often far excel human beings in the
sensitivity of their senses; it is said that the ability of a dog to smell is a hundred
thousand times as acute as that of a human being. The term feeling can be used in the
sense of touching, or seeing, as a simple sensation. Animals also have [279] the internal
senses of imagination and memory and some kind of co-ordination of input and output.
These acts of sensation are intentional. Imagining intends images, seeing intends the
seen, hearing intends sound, etc. There is a structure of sensitive cognition operating;
animals know particular, sensible objects.
302
Higher animals also have learning and development in terms of association,

imitation, pleasure and pain, reward and punishment. The sense faculties of memory and
imagination combined with external senses enable a dog to associate a behaviour with a
reward and to repeat it when given a certain sign.
(4) Animals can feel basic emotions like aggression, anxiety, affiliation. They
can feel happy, excited, depressed, tired, angry, even guilty. The limbic brain is
associated with these kinds of feelings. Mammals made a jump forward in the
development of feelings because of the need for the parents to take care of the young. It
is not hard to look at the behaviour of a dog and know whether it is friendly or
aggressive, timid or wild. Evolutionary biologists can help us to understand the function
of such responses in the evolution of the higher animals. These emotions are also
intentional; anger puts a dog in a specific stance towards an enemy. The word emotion is
said to derive from the Latin movere, meaning to move; emotions function as a spur
to response, to action, to self-preservation and survival of animal species.
(5) The higher animals, especially the mammals, experience sociality, feelings of
pleasure in being together, co-operative instincts, working together, recognition of
position within a group - you can have a pecking order among hens. There can be a
certain social order: mothers caring for their young, males seeking females, drones given
specific tasks in the whole hive, etc. Animals seem to enjoy playing, they groom one
another, they recognize a hierarchy, they can work as a group in hunting or feeding.
Animals experience sociability or spontaneous intersubjectivity; they hunt cooperatively,
care for their young, share food and show some form of reciprocity. A BBC program
showing monkeys grooming one another in some kind of a tit for tat system remarks
profoundly, 'this is the foundation [280] of human morality'. Perhaps the opposite is
more accurate, namely, if monkeys do it, is not human morality. It may indeed be the
Value Ethics
303
beginning in the sense of the biological infrastructure from which human morality
emerges; but it is hardly the foundation of human morality.
(6) Finally, animals are empirically conscious: have some sense of identity, some
sense of awareness of belonging to a particular species, some primitive sense of being a
subject. After all, there is a difference between a dog that is awake and a dog that is
asleep. There is a co-ordination in the dog that is awake by which incoming sense
information is processed and the appropriate response follows. A lion caused a sensation
in the Nairobi National park when it adopted and suckled a series of baby oryxes. Why
was this a cause for such excitement? Because it is more normal for a lion to make a
breakfast out of a baby oryx. This lion seems to have been disoriented by the loss of its
own cub and sought a substitute in an unexpected place. Lions usually recognize their
own kind; they usually recognize breakfast when they see it; there are established
interrelations between species that are usually respected. We notice when animals give
inappropriate responses.
Animals operate in the biological pattern of experience. They feel in many
different ways as we have described above. The physical, chemical, organic,
neurological, substratum is there to support the sensitive psychology of the animal. The
animal does have a sensitive psyche, a psychology, a pattern of behaviour, an affective
dimension that conditions its behaviour. Such feeling abilities have evolved over time
and are partly the reason for the survival of one species relative to another.
(7) The criterion of pleasure and pain, preferences based on satisfying appetites,
likes and dislikes, etc. are already operative in the biological pattern of experience.
Animals can experience intentional response to the agreeable or disagreeable, to pleasure
and pain. They operate in terms of instincts and drives, appetites and desires. If they
have survived as a species it means that they have been successful in adapting to their
304
niche in the environment and to changes and chal-[281]lenges from other species. They
operate in terms of survival, self-preservation, satisfaction of needs and desires.
(8) Do animals think, reflect, deliberate, evaluate, decide and act? We tend to
project our own thought process into animals. When we see them choosing what food to
eat, we tend to assume that they are choosing in the same way that we are choosing. But
we must bring in Occam's razor here or the Canon of Parsimony: realities are not to be
multiplied without necessity. All animal behaviour can be fully explained in terms of
reflexes, instincts, desires, and intentional responses to pleasure and pain. There is no
need to appeal to activities of understanding, judging and deliberating in the proper and
full sense of those terms. There is no evidence whatsoever that higher animals - except
humans perform such activities. At most we can say that in a loose analogous sense
that animals evaluate and choose. Animals operate in terms of sensitive operations of
seeing, hearing, smelling, remembering, and imagining and the sensitive appetites
associated with these in terms of likes and dislikes, sense preferences, reflexes, sense
responses, needs and satisfaction of needs, pleasure and pain, survival.
Conclusion. (1) Animals experience non-intentional states and trends, e.g.
hunger and thirst, sexual tendencies, tiredness, etc. (2) Animals experience intentional
responses to the agreeable and the disagreeable. The activities of sense faculties, seeing,
imagining etc. are intentional; the experience of desiring, appetite, anger, etc. are
intentional feelings. These are intentional in the sense of putting them in a stance
towards; response in the sense of sense appetites, desires activated by stimuli. But this is
intentional response to the agreeable or disagreeable, in other words, the criteria of
pleasure and pain operating. (3) Animals do not have intentional response to value, do
not intend value, do not know value. They operate in terms of preferences based on the
criterion of pleasure and pain, survival of the fittest, likes and dislikes, self-preservation,
etc.
Value Ethics
305
The intentional response to agreeable or disagreeable can be identified with the

affective sensitivity of the higher animals. It is roughly equivalent to the criterion of
pleasure and pain. It is organic, biologi-[282]cal, animal, sensitivity. The 'decisions', and
actions of animals can be explained totally in terms of sensitivity, appetites, feelings,
desires, responses. Moral categories do not apply to animals. They sense, but do not
think; they have likes and dislikes, but do not deliberate on which is of more value; they
choose in terms of pleasure and pain, but not as free and responsible. They act out of
desires but not as a response to value. These feelings can be said to be self-regarding in
that there is no element of self-transcendence in the animal beyond the sensation
intending the sensitive. All these appetites, desires reactions and actions are amoral; the
category of moral simply does not apply.
4.3 Human Sensitivity
Traditionally, the human person has been defined as a rational animal. We
prefer a more differentiated identification of the physical, chemical, organic,
neurological, psychological, intellectual, rational, responsible, religious components
integrated in the unity of one human person. Sensitive appetites, intentional responses to
the agreeable or disagreeable, can now be seen as belonging to the lower components
integrated into the unity of a higher form. In themselves these sensitive intentional
responses are amoral, ambiguous, neutral, just an aspect of what it is to be a human
person. Some, like perhaps Plato, have despised our sensitive nature as something to be
escaped from, to be suppressed, or eliminated if possible; more extreme forms have
regarded sensitive appetites as evil in themselves. Materialists and hedonists have
glorified our sensitive nature, as if it were the essence of the human and as if sensible
pleasure was the only pursuit worthy of a human person. We see our sensitive desires as
a real part of our human nature but in itself indifferently disposed either to moral
development or moral decline. Sensitive desires are amoral rather than immoral.
306
We are entitled to say that the intentional response to agreeable and disagreeable
is lower than the intentional response to truth and value. In our view of the levels of
consciousness and the hierarchy of values, the intentional response to agreeable belongs
properly in the context of the physical, chemical, organic, neurological, psycho[283]logical in the list above. The intentional response to truth and value belongs
properly to understanding, knowing, valuing and deciding. So just as understanding
sublates experience, knowing sublates understanding, valuing sublates knowing,
deciding goes beyond all other activities to issue in free and responsible human action;
so sensible desire are analogously sublated by the intentional response to value. The
hierarchy of values is also to some extent a hierarchy of feeling responses. This we will
explore later.
Now the human person is a unity of levels, activities, conjugates, feelings,
purposes, finalities; all of these factors interact with one another in very complex ways.
In the concrete they are intertwined, inseparable, intermingled and influenced in many
ways by other factors. Further, the person is developing or declining and so over time
the pattern of interactions and causation may change. Above we have tried to identify
clearly the intentional response to value and later the intentional response to the
agreeable and disagreeable. As well as being influenced by many other factors, these
surely will influence one another so that our affectivity is some kind of harmony some
kind of unity. We will try to identify certain principles and threads of causation within
the field of feeling, recognizing that in the concrete many other factors come into play.
Sensitivity reaches its full potential not in the animal but in the human: "Thus
organic differentiation reaches its maximum in animals, and psychic differentiation
reaches its maximum in man."19 Human sensitivity is perhaps structurally similar to that
of animals, but sensitive feelings are open to enormous differentiation, specialization,
Value Ethics
307
redirection, sublation, sublimation, transformation in the context of a full human

functioning.
In the context of moral development, sensitivity becomes more differentiated and
refined. Books on animal feelings classify about six basic feelings: joy, distress, anger,
fear, surprise, disgust. These are described as innate and universal.20 However, it is
accepted that these can be divided and subdivided into subtler and more nuanced
feelings almost ad infinitum. Language, literature, poetry, art, tragedy, education, all
play a part in the continued development and different-[284]tiation of feelings. We are
making our own contribution to this development by our identification of a basic
distinction between intentional response to value and the intentional response to
agreeable and disagreeable.
Feelings can become more integrated into the intellectual moral and religious
development of the person. There should be a harmony between our convictions and our
feelings. It makes it much easier to do your work if you are happy in your job. A job that
you dislike intensely will probably require great effort of will and will probably not be
done well. It may take a lifetime to educate your feelings by redirection, reinforcement,
practice, discipline, encouragement, etc.
Feelings can be a powerful ally in moral development, in achieving your goals,
in overcoming obstacles. If you feel strongly that you want to be a doctor and would be
very happy to be a doctor, then you are prepared to pay for the education, do the slog
work, work your way up from the elementary tasks to become a proficient doctor.
Although I spent some time on animal sensitivity in order to be absolutely clear
what we were talking about, we now have to admit that sensitivity in the human is
influenced by the activities of understanding, judging, deciding and loving; and the
precepts of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. So human sensitivity
is animal sensitivity transformed by the new context of activities and norms operative in
308
the human being. Sensitivity in itself is morally neutral but will be a big influence in the
moral development or decline of the human person. We can recognize a tension
immediately between the already operating criterion of sensitivity, and the emerging
critierion of truth, value and goodness in the context of a morally developing human
person. We will discuss the principles of these complex interrelationships and examples
later on.
However, sensitive feelings remains in principle sensitive feelings no matter how
they may be transformed or redirected from outside. The sensitive psyche remains a
sensitive psyche even if it is redirected towards moral responsibility and action.
Sensitivity will always be intrinsically dependent on space and time; it will never be
intelligent; it [285] will always be essentially material. The proper science for studying
sensitivity will always be biology or psychology but not anthropology.
4.4 Characteristics of Intentional Response to Agreeable or Disagreeable
1. These sensitive feelings are intentional, that is, they are purposive, oriented in
a certain direction, put us in a stance towards things and people. They are integrated into
the mass, momentum, drive, power of our life mediated by meaning and motivated by
value and inspired by religious aspirations.
2. Sensitive feelings always remain material in the strict sense of 'intelligible but
not intelligent', and either constituted or intrinsically conditioned by space and time.
Sensitive feelings belong to the physical, chemical, organic, neurological conjugates of
sensitive feelings. You cannot have sensitive feelings without sensitivity, without senses,
without a body. The basic six emotions have characteristic facial expressions which
some psychologists claim are universal across cultures.21 Sensitive feelings are already
in place in the infant long before the emergence of questioning, understanding or
knowing truth or value. Intentional response to the agreeable or disagreeable is already
operative before the emergence of the intentional response to value. Sensitive emotions,
Value Ethics
309
as sensitive, are constituted by physical, chemical, biological, and psychic components.

It would be nonsense to think of angels or God having sensible feelings.
Hence, intentional response to the satisfying and dissatisfying is intelligible but
not intelligent. We can understand the function of feelings in evolutionary biology. We
can identify the physical and chemical and biological basis of sensitive feelings. We can
develop explanations of emotions, theories of feelings, explanatory definitions of
feeling, etc. Although they are the context out of which intelligence emerge, they remain
sensitive. Although they can be co-opted by intellectual desire, they remain basically
sensitive.
3. Sensitive feelings are material and not spiritual. Hence they are not a priori in
the same sense that the intentional response to value is [286] a priori. They tend to be
superficial, short-term, and transient. Our tendency has been to think of feelings as
exclusively sensitive. Now we have to realize that the mass momentum drive power of
our feeling life is partly material and partly spiritual: in part sensitive appetite, in part
spiritual appetite. How do these interrelate in one human person?
5 Complex Interrelationships
Our procedure has been guided by the principle of differentiating in order to
integrate, distinguishing in order to eventually unite, breaking into parts in order to put
together again. The only alternative to such a procedure is confusion. Now that we have
set up the two ideal types of the intentional response to value and the intentional
response to the agreeable and disagreeable, we can consider their interrelationship in
human living. Because of the complex and difficult nature of this relationship, it will be
necessary to consider different aspects separately as we go along. Let us first state,
briefly, the principles which govern this interrelationship. Then, we will elaborate more
concretely.
5.1 Principles of Integration A Summary
310
(1) The total context is a mature human person, questioning, understanding,

knowing, feeling, evaluating, deciding and acting; developing or declining, moving
towards self-transcendence or away from self-transcendence. We are trying to identify
two feeling intentionalities operating, one focusing on values and the other focusing at
satisfactions. We will recognize that these intentionalities are complementary but can
also in some cases be in conflict. Value and satisfaction can become, respectively, the
criteria for evaluation, decision and action and set up a dialectic of linked but opposed
principles of change. This we will explore in more detail when we consider moral
conversion.
(2) The intentional response to value is a desire for value; it is spiritual, a priori,
transcultural, universal, permanent, basically good. It intends self-transcendence and
normally leads to self-transcendence. [287] There will be sensitive concomitants and
conditions but these are extrinsic.
(3) The intentional response to the agreeable or disagreeable is sensitive appetite
for sensitive satisfaction. It is material, it is conditioned by space and time, it can be very
intense and powerful; it tends to be transient and punctual; it has a finality to a higher
integration. It is morally neutral. It remains intrinsically sensitive in its origin and
conditions and operation.
(4) Intentional response to the agreeable and the disagreeable is already in place
and within this context emerges the intentional response to value as a new criterion of
value. As Lonergan says, "..for natural spontaneity takes care of itself while knowledge
and virtue have to be acquired." 22 This means that it is a long hard struggle to transform
the already in place criterion of pleasure and pain, and to slowly respond to value, know
values, decide on the basis of values and implement these right choices. There will be a
process of emergence where when sensitivity is ready, form emerges.
Value Ethics
311
(5) The intentional response to value has the advantage of being deeper and more
powerful than natural spontaneity. It is universal, permanent, transcultural, a priori, as
explained above. Furthermore, it is basically good, leading to self-transcendence. The
intentional response to satisfaction is morally neutral. Sensitivity is fixed in a routine
and can to some extent be controlled and redirected according to a higher criterion.
There is a hope that the desire for true and the good will win out in the end.
(6) Natural spontaneity is not to be destroyed but to be displaced, transformed,
redirected, integrated, developed, sublimated or sublated. We are not talking of
contradictory, mutually exclusive principles. Natural spontaneity can be harnessed in
the search for values and become the mass momentum drive power of the search for the
best way to live. There can be a basic complementarity operating.
(7) The emergence of the intentional response to value in the context of other
feelings can be traced by the psychology of moral development which is largely a
question of learning to take pleasure in goodness; it is a training of the emotions. It is
somehow parallel to [288] the emergence of understanding from imagination. Just as
understanding sublates imagining, so we can consider the intentional response to value
sublating the response to satisfaction. The response to value is something new, different,
higher and distinct. It enhances the value of the sensitive response to satisfaction. It
leaves the functioning of sensitivity to operate according to its own intrinsic nature and
laws.
(8) The dialectical tension between satisfaction and true value are basic terms for
understanding moral conversion. These are not to be understood as a struggle between
good and evil. Rather, a principle of good trying to transform a neutral sensitivity in the
search for goodness and truth. Sensitivity is morally neutral, neither morally good nor
evil.
312
(9) Natural spontaneity is itself morally ambiguous. Anger is not a bad thing in
itself; we should be angry at injustice. Feelings of guilt can be out of proportion to real
guilt. Feeling is just one of the components of the judgment of value. Feelings by
themselves will never know what is of value. But they can be a help, point in the right
direction, add body to our resolutions.
(10) The two intentionalities are distinct but not separate. They are distinct
because we are talking about two really distinct intentionalities. But they are not
separate, apart, juxtaposed; rather, they are integrated into a whole, fused, interrelated,
mutually related in many ways. It is difficult to point to a particular emotional reaction
and claim that is completely sensitive or completely spiritual. These are not
compartmentalized but fused into the unity of an integrated functioning human person.
(11) The intentional response to value is not the totality of a criterion of the
good. It is the feeling component. But our thesis is that there are four components, the
cognitive, the affective, the volitional, in the context of the self-transcending subject.
Each has its own contribution to make to the good life and the criterion of right
behaviour.
(12) It is legitimate and necessary to ask, how do you feel about it? Moral
evaluations and decisions need the guidance of the intention [289] of value. But
discernment has to be used in sorting out our complex life of feelings and especially
distinguishing the response to value from that of satisfaction.
5.2 Spiritual Feelings Sublate Sensitive Feelings
To get a better understanding of the relation between intentional response to
value emerging from the intentional response to agreeable/disagreeable, it might be
helpful to use the analogy of activities of understanding sublating the activities of
imagining and sensing. The activities are easier to identify than the normativity and
intentionality that informs them. Insight goes into great detail about the activities but is
Value Ethics
313
not so explicit on the underlying intentional feelings. There is surely a parallel between
the activities and the feelings that underlie them. Here we will apply the principle of
sublation. Just as the activities of understanding sublate the activities of experiencing, so
intentional response to value sublates intentional response to the satisfying/dissatisfying.
Sublation has three elements: (1) it goes beyond, (2) enhances but (3) leaves intact what
is sublated. We will explain this in relation to the activity of understanding sublating the
activity of sensing and then show how spiritual feelings sublate sensitive feelings.
(1) Intelligence emerges from already established patterns of sensitive
imagination. Imagining is already in situ; it functions along with the external senses and
the sensitive memory; in animals it is linked to the biological pattern of experience and
animals seem to be very limited in their ability to operate out of free or creative images.
Images are always sensitive, particular and concrete. Early acts of intelligence such as
naming, relating, grasping cause and effect, go beyond images to ideas, to the universal,
the abstract and the intelligible. Activity of intelligence goes beyond the limitations of
imagining but continues to operate only in and through the use of images. Imagination
dominates the mind of the child and the power of images, pictures, examples diagrams
continue to powerfully influence the adult mind as advertisers, politicians and
rhetoricians know well.
In intellectual conversion the person grasps and accepts that the criterion of truth
is the sufficiency of the evidence for a judgment. In [290] the mind of the unconverted it
is the unquestioned imaginative assumption of knowing as contact between an 'in here'
and an 'out there' that operates as the criterion of reality. In the converted mind there is
still a dependence on images, but intellect has taken control, sets the conditions, uses the
images, sometimes creates new images in order to understand.
(2) Understanding neither eliminates nor destroys imagination and sensation; it
rather sets it free, enhances its value, transforms its operation and extends its range.
314
Under the control of intelligence, imagination becomes creative, flexible, suggestive,

sophisticated and fertile. New images, various examples, a multitude of possibilities
enrich the search for understanding. Images that were crude and basic become more
ethereal and broad. Images of concrete, sensible individual things are replaced by
abstract symbols of mathematics, or the letters of alphabets, or by flow charts or
diagrams. The great achievements of science and mathematics, philosophy and theology
are only possible because of the work of the imagination providing phantasms, images,
diagrams, symbols, examples, illustrations, constructed pedagogical images. Human
understanding and knowing always continues to depend on images.
(3) Yet the basic functioning of internal and externals senses continue to operate
according to their own laws and limits. Images remain images, particular, sensible and
concrete. Spectacles improve your eyesight but do nothing for your intelligence.
Imagination continues according to its own principles and laws. The basic structure of
sensitive imagination and memory continue to operate according to their biological and
psychological laws. Proper functioning of understanding continues to depend
extrinsically on proper functioning of the brain, the senses, imagination and memory.
Now let us transfer the notion of sublation from the activities to the feelings
underlying them to the desire to know in relation to sensitive desires.
(1) It is reasonably clear that the desire to know questions seeking
understanding, truth and value go beyond sensitive desires. This is a new reality which
begins to emerge in the two year old and [291] never emerges in the animal. It opens up
the possibility of a truly human life of knowing, valuing, deciding, loving and doing.
Here too in the field of desires and feelings, we have intellectual norms emerging within
the context of already operating sensitive appetites, but going beyond them, controlling
them, setting them free, co-opting them into their role as part of the mass, momentum,
drive, power of human feeling. This relentless desire to know is new: it is a desire for
Value Ethics
315
truth and value: it is not reducible to sensitive desires. Something new has emerged. The
desire to know is not on the same level as other sensitive desires. The normativity of the
transcendental imperatives is not the same as the normativity of good canine behaviour.
(2) The spiritual desires enhance the importance of sensitive appetites. Sensitive
appetites can be powerful tools in the search for truth and goodness. When we learn to
find pleasure in virtue and knowledge, such sensitive aspects become a powerful
reinforcement; it is easier to do because it is habitual, spontaneous and pleasurable.
Cerebral resolutions by themselves are usually ineffectual. But if you can call in the
required sensibility, discover the more refined pleasure to be got from being virtuous,
then resolutions can become effective. In this sense we can see that the transcendental
imperatives, underlie, penetrate, transform and unify the totality of human feeling.
(3) But sensitive appetites continue to be material, continue to have their
sensitive components, concomitant physical and chemical changes, activities in the
neurons of the brain, appropriate facial expressions and, basically, remain intact as
sensitive feelings. Sensitive appetite remains intact, integral, and continues to operate as
sensitive. We do not become angels; we continue to feel hunger, to desire satisfaction, to
seek comfort. The needs of the psyche, of the unconscious, of sensitivity have to be met.
We never eliminate sensitive appetite, but it can be redirected, controlled, developed,
and co-opted.
Conclusion. Our thesis suggests a very intimate connection between the
activities of knowing and the desire to know. Hence it is not surprising that there is a
useful analogy between the activities of knowing and the feelings involved in knowing.
Just as there is a struggle between the activities of intelligence and of imagination, so
also [292] there is a struggle between the desire to know and sensitive desires. We are at
present investigating the connection between the desire to know value and the desire for
satisfaction. The notion of sublation lays down clear parameters for this relation. Let us
316
illustrate this relationship more concretely so that these principles may be recognized in
our own experience.
5.3 The Spiritual Orients Sensitive Feelings
We have identified the intentional response to agreeable and disagreeable as the
response to pleasure and pain, as the criterion of satisfaction (as opposed to value), as
self-regarding (as opposed to disinterested). They belong basically to sensitivity
appetite, the affective aspect of the biological pattern of experience; they are material in
the sense of being intelligible but not intelligent, intrinsically constituted or conditioned
by the empirical residue. Most feelings are conscious but there is a case for feelings that
are repressed, denied, unconscious. This kind of intentional response is morally
ambiguous; the category of moral does not apply; you don't blame a goat for eating
somebody else's maize. In this context, when psychologists say that all feelings are
morally neutral, they are correct; these sensitive feelings are just given; it is what we do
with them as free and responsible that introduces the moral dimension.
We have also identified the intentional response to value as the normativity
immanent and operative in activities of understanding, judging truth and judging value.
We further differentiated this normativity as being attentive, being intelligent, being
reasonable, being responsible and being in love. These are a priori, innate, permanent
dispositions of the human spirit. They are felt primarily in and through the activities;
they are not separate and apart from the activities; the intentional response to truth is a
constitutive element in the judgment of truth. These feelings are spiritual (spirit as
inquiry) in the sense of being the dynamic of intelligence, and are not intrinsically
conditioned or constituted by the empirical residue. Response to these feelings always
leads towards self-transcendence whether intellectual or moral. Hence, these
intentional responses constitute the precise goodness of the human person, albeit a
potential for [293] goodness rather than an already actualised goodness. These deeper
Value Ethics
317
feelings are not neutral; they push towards what is intelligible, true and good. Without
them we cannot know terminal values not become originating values.
The human person is one integrated whole. You can distinguish the physical,
chemical, organic, neural, psychic, intellectual, moral and religious dimensions of the
one acting whole person. But the oneness of the person is not just the sum total of the
parts but the integration of many dimensions into one, rich, diverse, acting person. The
affective side also has many dimensions; but these do not exist as separated parts but as
integrated more or less into the whole. What we aim at in this section is to explore
how this integration takes place, to what extent it takes place and how we can recognize
in our selves the transformation of sensitive feeling by spiritual feelings. This is a
complicated process with many subtle interdependencies and interrelationships.
Very obviously, natural spontaneity is already in place before intelligence and its
concomitant desires emerge. The child is already acting in intentional response to the
agreeable and disagreeable undisciplined squads of emotion. The biological pattern is
established, pleasure is sought, pain is to be avoided. The development of sensitivity,
especially of imagination and memory, prepare the way for the emergence of
intelligence and accompanying desires. Slowly the child starts to talk, to name, to
understand, to read, to count; this is accompanied by development of motor skills,
walking, running, throwing, catching, using instrument, putting on clothes, tying laces,
and becoming independent. Desires to be self-reliant, curiosity in seeing how things
work, asking questions, giving and receiving, agreeing and refusing, loving and being
loved, are part of the emergence of as yet undifferentiated spiritual desires, an inchoate
emergence of the transcendental precepts. Knowledge makes a bloody entrance.
Already there is a conscious and unconscious feedback effect of this emergence
of intellectual moral and religious feelings on sensitivity.23 Unconsciously, the
emergence of intellectual activities, such [294] as reading, automatically condition and
318
pattern the focusing of the eyes, ability to attend and concentrate, pattern the muscles of
the eye, etc. Automatically, the activity of talking patterns the use of tongue, throat,
teeth, lips and breath in the production of sound. The emergence of intelligence
conditions the imagination and memory so that they can be harnessed for the purposes of
cognition. The emergence of the intellectual pattern of experience and attendant motor
skills, forms the muscles of face, hands and legs as well as the nerves, neurons, and cells
of the brain. Emergence is always followed by integration; the new emergence has to be
integrated into the whole, of which it is only one part.
But also consciously intellect takes control of one's sensitive living. The child
decides to go to school, values knowledge at the expense of more immediate
satisfaction, learns to control desires, begins to criticize fantasy and seek the truth, to be
good, to be kind, to be loving, to be obedient. The person assumes conscious direction of
life and conscious response to value as opposed to satisfaction. The sensitive appetite is
conditioned by the spiritual dimension and this is shown in manners, clothes, behaviour,
control of emotions, postponing gratification, sharing with others, and the like.
5.4 The Spiritual Transforms Sensitive Feelings
Sensitivity reaches its highest point of development, not in the animal, but in the
human. We have seen how this is so in the intellect's use of the imagination for its own
purposes. Now we wish to see how spiritual desires transform, redirect, differentiate the
sensitive appetites.
In what sense can we speak of the imperatives of intelligence reasonableness
and responsibility and love transforming already established sensitive feelings?
Although sensitivity has the advantage of being already in place, the spiritual
normativity that emerges is deep, permanent, penetrating, intentional of the intelligible,
the real and the good. These normally will become the dominant factors in human living.
Children and young people as Aristotle keeps reminding us follow their feelings for
Value Ethics
319
pleasure in sensible things. At the other end of the scale you have Aristotle asserting that
human [295] happiness is to be found in contemplation which is also the most
pleasurable of all human activities. You also have Aristotle again asserting that the
real sign of virtue is that its exercise gives pleasure the brave man gets pleasure out of
being brave. The temperate person finds moderation to be pleasurable, the just person
rejoices when he sees justice being done and injustice being overturned. So we can trace
a process by which we start by operating in terms of the agreeable and disagreeable;
these are slowly transformed and displaced when we aim at being intelligent, being just,
being patient, and learn to control our impulse for satisfaction.
But that does not mean that pleasure is evil or is eliminated from human life we
find pleasure in work, job satisfaction, pleasure in seeking the truth, pleasure in doing
good and being rewarded with a happy conscience. One of the paradoxes of human life
is that if you seek pleasure in the satisfaction of sensitive appetites, you will probably be
very unhappy. But if you seek happiness in work, in building a good social order, in
using your talents for others, you will find both happiness and pleasure.
Happiness is to be found in responding to the imperatives of being attentive,
intelligent, reasonable and responsible and in love. It is to be found in the process of
self-transcendence. It is human potential being actualized through activity. It is the
human person striving towards his/her final, supreme end. Pleasure is primarily the
satisfaction of sensitive appetites; it is usually short-term, transient, self-centred, an end
in itself. But it can be transformed to accompany the search for happiness and the
activities of self-transcendence
Children tend to be are totally self-centred, self-regarding and pleasure oriented
and the whole world exists only to satisfy their physical and psychological needs. This is
natural and to be expected. But a long transformation of affective disposition takes place
by the time of maturity. A mature moral person loves the good both in himself and in
320
others, in people and in things. The mature good person recognises all human persons as
equal and truly wishes them well in all things. The mature person seeks terminal values
and thereby constitutes herself as originating value. The self-centredness of the child
[296] is transformed into the disinterestedness of the authentic person. The pleasure
seeking of the child is transformed into the search for happiness, meaning the path of
self-transcendence.
5.5 Anger as an Illustration
We have seen in the relationship between intelligence and imagination,
intelligence never operates without imagination, but redirects imagining for its own
purpose. So here we are identifying how intentional response to value should control and
redirect intentional responses to satisfaction for its own purposes. It is the intentional
response to value that should be in charge, just as it is intelligence that should be in
charge of imagination. In moral conversion the person seeks value and not satisfaction.
Let us consider anger as an example of this transformation or redirection.
Animals get angry if you cross into their territory, threaten their cubs, take their
food, or disturb their peace. It is part of their way of surviving, it has worked it
preserves some kind of order in the animal kingdom. Children too can be angry, if they
don't get what they want, are slapped by another kid, or just for no apparent reason can
throw a temper tantrum. So we inherit all the dynamics of the sensitive anger as it
functions in the biological pattern of experience.
But Aristotle says, "The man who gets angry at the right things and with the right
people, and also in the right way and at the right time and for the right length of time, is
commended; so this person will be patient, inasmuch as patience is commendable,
because a patient person tends to be unperturbed and not carried away by his feelings,
but indignant only in the way and on the grounds and for the length of time that his
principle prescribes."(N.E. 1125b33) We do not expect adults to throw temper tantrums
Value Ethics
321
at random; we do not expect an adult to get angry at some trifling inconvenience; we do

not expect an adult to get angry at a friend for no reason; we do not expect her anger to
continue when the cause has been resolved. There is a proper time, and place, and
manner to express anger in mature moral persons. [297]
Sensitive anger in itself is morally neutral, but in the mature person should be at
the service of the intentional response to value. It is proper to be angry at the sight of
prisoners being abused; it is proper to be angry if politicians lie to us; it is proper to be
angry if politicians are corrupt, if poor people have no medical assistance, if the poor are
exploited by the rich, if parents neglect their children.
They say that a person over forty years of age is responsible for his face;
meaning that by that time the face reflects the kind of person this is. Similarly, you could
say that a mature person is responsible for his-her spontaneous emotional reactions to
persons and situations. In the good moral person anger will be a reaction to evil, anger
will point to some injustice, it will be a spontaneous intentional response to a value or
disvalue expressed in the sensitive feeling of anger. Anger arises in a context of
perceptions, social situation, previous value judgments, previous history, etc. Anger in
itself even in a good person is no guarantee that the cause of the anger is evil. We might
be angry at somebody indicted for child abuse only to find that the person is innocent
and our anger shifts to the false accuser. We might be angry at some action we perceive
as injustice only to find when we go into the matter that it was a just and right action.
The mature person is not a person who has eliminated anger but one who to a
large extent, through good habits of life and intelligence and human relations has
brought his intentional response to satisfaction/dissatisfaction into line with the
intentional response to value. Anger is not in itself a criterion of evil; but the anger of
the just person in a context where he knows what is going on, understands the persons
322
involved, is an indicator of evil and injustice. Righteous anger points to the possibility of
wrongdoing, is sensitive to evil, and may reveal situations of injustice.
The development from random childhood tantrums to the mature patient adult is
long and difficult, and to some extent is never complete, in that we never have complete
control over emotional reactions. But we realize that the developments need to be made.
We have all witnessed sports players involved in an angry brawl and remarked how they
are behaving like children. [298]
We should also note that in an evil person anger and hatred can be directed at
what is just and right and good. Groups like the Nazi's in Germany, the Pharisees in the
gospel, terrorist groups, the Ku Klux Klan and the like, are built on anger and hatred of
what is good. In a good person righteous anger is an indicator of evil; in an evil person
anger may well be directed at good people and an effort to destroy the order of society.
Just as there is moral development so there is moral decline and spontaneous feeling
reactions follow.
5.6 Development and Decline of Feelings
In some way the spiritual feelings we talked about above, underlie, penetrate,
transform and unify the more sensitive feelings. The spiritual feelings give basic
directionality to the feelings: to be angry at the right time, for the right reason, in the
right amount, etc. The spiritual feelings penetrate the other superficial feelings: what is
the difference between the road rage of an immature person and the righteous anger of a
person in search of justice? Spiritual feelings transform sensitive feelings: love
transforms sexual attraction into a deep and permanent interpersonal bond. The spiritual
orientation unifies the life of feelings: the determination to be a doctor eliminates
irrelevant attractions, brings into line recalcitrant feelings, makes sacrifices of time,
energy and money, all oriented to the single goal of becoming a good doctor. In this way
we can see that feelings develop along with the moral character of the person.
Value Ethics
323
But feelings can be an integral part of moral decline also. Strong feelings can
overpower our power of decision and lead us to do what we do not want to do: we will
the good but find ourselves doing the advantageous. We find likes and dislikes become
our criterion for action, the equivalent of good and bad for us. Emotional preferences
take the place of reasonable value judgments and become the basis for our decisions and
actions. Pleasure and pain become the criterion of our choices, the purpose in our life.
Feelings become soured in this downward spiral and we give way to dramatic
bias, individual bias, group bias, and general bias. Self becomes the centre of the
universe to the exclusion of the good of others, or the harm done to others by our selfish
behaviour. Everything [299] is skewed in terms of personal advantage. The apparent
good takes the place of the real good. We set our hearts on wealth, fame, exercise of
power, sensible pleasure as ends in themselves. We are disappointed when they do not
deliver the happiness to which we deeply aspire. We spiral downwards through
rationalization, avoiding self-consciousness, making excuses, blaming others, hating
ourselves more and more. The freedom to which we aspire becomes an addiction to
pleasure of one kind or another.
5.7 Education of Feeling of Moral Responsibility
We are now focusing on the desire to know the good, the desire to do the good,
the desire to be good. The sense of moral obligation, of 'ought', of what is right and fair,
is a continuation of the desire to know into the realm of goodness, action and society.
We can refer to it as the precept 'to be responsible'. Similarly, this feeling of being bound
to do the right things emerges from the plethora of other feelings and desires of
childhood and adolescence. We recognize the joy of insight, the frustration of failure,
the pride of achievement, the determination to persevere, as emotions closely associated
with the unfolding of the desire to know. In the context of values, we should recognize
the guilt of failure, the shame of being exposed, satisfaction in doing the right thing,
324
remorse at the consequences of our evil deeds, the pleasure of being approved and
rewarded. Moral responsibility is a deep, permanent, feeling disposition towards
knowing and doing right actions.
Kohlberg, the great psychologist of moral development, has been rightly
criticized for focusing exclusively on the development of moral reasoning through its
three levels and six stages to maturity. He thought he was giving a complete picture of
human moral development by his acute analysis of reasons given for moral behaviour.
But moral development is as much about the development of feelings as it is about
reasoning and we have known that since the time of Aristotle. Where would reasoning
be without feeling, without motive, without felt obligation, desires and fears. Do
syllogisms really determine our behaviour so much? Erikson was more realistic in
treating moral development in terms of trust and interpersonal development. [300]
How does the education of moral feelings happen? It must be significantly
different than instruction about mathematics. Let us suggest certain ways by which
feelings are educated morally. This is not the place for a treatise on the moral education
of children but let us try to flesh out Aristotle's notion that the aim of moral education is
to train youth to feel pleasure in doing good; that it is wholly an education of the
emotions.
(1) Imagination. We tell children stories of heroes and villains, helpless females
and rotten witches, cowboys and Indians, cops and robbers; animal stories about the
clever hare, the forgetful elephant, the wicked snake, the evil dragon, etc. These stories
are designed to lead us to approve of goodness, to hate the evil one, to inspire to great
deeds, to disgust at cowardice or stupidity. The child's imagination needs to be filled
with images and stories, heroes and villains persons with their defects or virtue writ so
large as to be a caricature, like Scrooge the miser, Tarzan the hero, Cinderella's goodness
contrasted with the ugly sisters, etc. These provide a kind of objectification of types of
Value Ethics
325
behaviour and ways of being, which both stir the desires and clarify the ideal. Later in
adolescence we are familiar with identification with pop stars, football players, actors
and actresses. Later on we study the more complex and ambiguous figures of Hamlet,
Macbeth, Jane Ayre, George Smiley and the like. Imagination lights up our feelings,
imagines possibilities, considers alternatives and heads for the stars.
(2) Imitation. Children imitate the behaviour of parents, siblings, peer group.
They learn to identify with family, community, ethic group. They tend to behave in a
way that is approved of in the group, and to avoid what is disapproved of. Children learn
proper behaviour mostly by imitation, imitating what they admire, avoiding what they
detest. This should normally take place in the context of close, intimate, feelings of
loving relationship with parents and siblings. There the trust that Erikson talks about is
born; basic trust in others, trust in the world, trust in oneself. Then sympathy,
compassion, and love grow and spread and develop. Hence children learn to feel
sympathy with the sick, to console someone in pain, to recognize the feelings [301] of
others, to follow the example of the good behaviour of others around them.
(3) Controlling emotion. The child goes from being a bundle of self-gratifying
emotions, the centre of the universe, demanding immediate satisfaction of needs and
wants, to a notion of sharing, right and wrong, a universe of equal persons. The child has
to learn that they are not the sole centre of the universe but there are other people,
siblings, parents, friends who also have feelings and needs and who are also centres of
consciousness. So some idea of fairness, sharing, reciprocity, respect has to be
inculcated. This is one of the first manifestations of the pure desire to be responsible, the
ought of moral obligation. It is the child moving into a world of valuable human beings
and appreciating their value; the world mediated by meaning and suffused with value.
The child has to learn to share; to postpone gratification, to substitute a higher kind of
pleasure for this immediate one. Feelings are not being repressed, but redirected,
326
displaced, refined, and to some extent brought under control. Children have to learn to
recognize their own feelings, to name them, to accept them. They learn to feel
appropriately in different situations, funerals, accidents, sickness, celebrations, etc.
(4) Approval and disapproval. Approval from parents is a pleasant experience
and disapproval is unpleasant. We use rewards and punishments in the moral education
of children. They seek approval by behaving well. Pleasure in indulgence of their
sensitive appetites is replaced with a more satisfying feeling, that of being approved.
Slowly they are taught to take pleasure in goodness, enjoying sharing toys, feeling
satisfied that they have done the right thing, giving presents, and the like.
Moral obligation is a universal, persistent, pervasive, deep, orientation of the
human heart. There are corrupt human beings and corrupt societies but they are the
exception rather than the rule. Human persons persist in distinguishing right from
wrong, despite the relativists and sceptics and post-modernists. Moral obligation
operates in the context of deliberative insights, judgments of value, decisions and actions
and is closely related and bound up with these activities. [302] What Kohlberg says
about moral reasoning is true; but it is not the whole picture. The context of moral life
and behaviour is the feeling of moral obligation: there is honour among thieves.
Although Kohlberg explicitly focuses on reasoning process in moral
development, he actually cannot avoid talking of emotions. Punishment and reward
operate in terms of emotion, fear of punishment and pleasure in reward. Approval of the
group or their disapproval at someone who steps out of line is not only rational but
deeply emotional. Obeying the universal law and respecting all human beings is both a
rational and emotional position to take up. The final stage of autonomous good person
working according to his informed conscience is the good person responding to the
desire for goodness by good judgments, good decisions and appropriate actions. One of
Kohlberg's basic principles of education is that people feel the inadequacies and
Value Ethics
327
limitations of their present state and are attracted to the next stage as being more
adequate and complete. What is this 'attraction' to the next stage, if it is not some
expression of the finality of 'to be responsible'? Why should we be attracted to
something, if it does not present some answer to our desire for goodness?
(5) Satire and Humour. How do you shift a person out of the cycle of moral
decline? Direct logical arguments are usually not very effective, because the process of
rationalization has taken place and the declining subject has his answers all ready.
Appealing directly to feelings and human aspirations may not be effective either, as the
feelings have already been soured and twisted. A more indirect approach may be more
effective. So Lonergan in Insight24 suggests the possibility of satire and humour. Satire
would hold up to the audience the foolishness of the counterpositions by exaggeration of
its salient weaknesses. So we laugh at ourselves and might just realize how wrong our
position is. Humour keeps us in touch with the limitations of human persons. "It listens
with sincere respect to the Stoic description of the Wise Man, and then requests an
introduction."25 This is another subtle way of appealing to feelings in the pursuit of
moral excellence. [303]
Conclusion. From this section we have some slight notion of the emergence of
the intentional response to value from the midst of self-centred pleasures and
satisfactions. The emergence of the feeling of moral obligation is universal. It is helped
by the environment, by teachers, by examples, by stories, by correction, but if it doesn't
emerge from the inside all the teaching is in vain. Just as in teaching facts a teacher
presupposes a receptive, questioning audience, so teaching values presupposes a desire
to know value, an attraction to the good, an eagerness for value. These two categories of
feeling are not two separate sets of feelings, sensitive and spiritual, but one symphony of
interrelated transformed feeling, a result of sublation and dependence, and myriad of
other interrelationships.
328
6 Hierarchy of Feeling?
We earlier introduced the metaphor of a symphony to symbolize how we have so
many levels of feeling, of varying intensity, some dormant, some active sometimes in
harmony, sometimes in conflict. Now a symphony orchestra operates on a principle of
unity; hopefully, all the musicians are working from the same page, of the same score,
following the one conductor. Is there a principle that we can introduce to help in our
discernment of feelings? Is there a principle by which can determine the depth of our
feeling? Can we distinguish between feelings leading to self-transcendence and those
leading to selfish satisfaction?
Efforts have been made in this direction before. We remember Max Scheler who
established four categories of feelings (physical, vital, psychic and spiritual),
corresponding roughly to the four levels of value essences existing in the ontological
world (sensible, vital, spiritual, religious values). We do not want to follow the principle
of his emotional intuitionism, but can we establish a hierarchy of feelings on some
principle that we can validate following our own method and context?
Elizabeth Morelli, working from a Lonergan background, has proposed one
schema for such a hierarchy of feelings. She claims [304] that anxiety is the feeling
characteristic of the fourth level of consciousness. She states her position thus:
We have established, then, that the general form of anxiety is that of a
feeling state. It bears the descriptive characteristics of pervasiveness,
perdurance, and indefiniteness, and it functions as a quality of an
underlying intention. It is one of the three basic or fundamental states in
that it is an intrinsic or essential qualification of the transcendental
dynamism of conscious intentionality. As such, it is an immanent quality
of conscience, and it is identical with the consciousness of the fourth level
of conscious intentionality the level of freedom 26
As anxiety is the feeling characteristic of the fourth level, wonder is the
characteristic of the second and doubt the characteristic of the third: as
wonder gives rise to inquiry and understanding and to such affects as
perplexity and relief, and as doubt gives rise to reflection and judgment
and to such affects a wariness and confidence, so anxiety gives rise to
deliberation and decision and to such affects as boredom and excitement.27
Value Ethics
329
One is present to oneself on the second level as wondering, on the third

level as doubting, and on the fourth level as anxious.28
Certainly there is some connection between decision making and anxiety; every
decision is a leap into the relatively unknown with consequent risks and the attendant
anxiety. The state of indecision seems also to be one of great anxiety. However, there
are many decisions that we make, even big decisions, where we decide with little
anxiety, not too much soul searching and it can still be a good decision. We can be
anxious about many things, not only moral judgments and decisions.
Fred Crowe suggests a different scenario.29 He accepts the principle that,
Feelings accompany the cognitional on every level. They are as all pervasive as the
cognitional.30 So he suggests an isomorphism between the levels of cognitional activity
and the feeling characteristic of that level. Just like animals we feel satisfaction of
sensitive desires at the level of experiencing. We feel the thrill of insight, of finding a
solution, at the level of understanding. We feel security in a conclusion based on
sufficient evidence at the level of [305] judgment. We experience the torment of a bad
conscience and the peace of a good conscience in the context of moral judgment,
decision and action. He does not claim that these terms satisfaction, thrill, security and
peace are definitive or exhaustive. He notes the tendency of the cognitional to absorb
feeling, to turn feelings into a kind of knowledge, to reduce feeling to a knowing. He
suggests that even though feelings are isomorphic with cognitional activities, feeling
should still be regarded as independent and self-governing; as an equal autonomous
partner in the human enterprise.
These various efforts suggest that it is possible and desirable to relate feelings to
the levels of consciousness in a useful and illuminating way. For Lonergan the levels of
consciousness are differentiated by the activities and the intentionality characteristic of
these levels. The levels are qualitatively different modes of intending and hence
qualitatively different modes of being conscious subjects.31 He suggests that feelings
330
respond to values in accord with a scale of preference.32 He says explicitly in an

interview, edited by Philip McShane: There are feelings that are intentional responses
and that do involve such a discrimination and put themselves in a hierarchy and you
have your vital values, social values, cultural values, religious values.33 He seems to
assert here that there is a hierarchy of feelings and that it does follow the schema of the
five levels of value the five levels of consciousness.
So, is there such a hierarchy? What is its basis? Can such a hierarchy of feelings
help when we ask the question, how do you feel about that?
There does not seem to be any basis for such a hierarchy, if we only consider
sensitive feelings. Such feelings can be compared to one another in terms of intensity,
importance, degree of differentiation and refinement, their importance or unimportance,
but do not seem to yield a principle of an ordered hierarchy of feelings. Sensitive
feelings are all sensitive and all of a piece.
But if we recall our distinction between two classes of feeling the spiritual and
the sensitive then at least we have the beginnings of such a hierarchy of feelings. We
defined sensitive feelings the in-[306]tentional response to the agreeable or
disagreeable as material, as biologically based, as intrinsically conditioned by space
and time, as characteristics of animal sensitivity, as neutral from the moral point of view.
We defined spiritual feelings the intentional response to value as not originating in
sensitivity, as a spontaneous capacity, as innate, permanent, deep, as not intrinsically
conditioned by space and time, as orienting us positively to the intelligible, the true and
the good and beyond to the infinite. We related these two classes of feelings to one
another in terms of sublation. Spiritual feelings are higher, a new reality, irreducible to
the sensitive and should be the mass momentum drive towards human selftranscendence. Spiritual feelings do not eliminate or destroy sensitive feelings; rather
they emerge in the context of sensitive feelings, slowly redirect and transform sensitive
Value Ethics
331
feelings and continue to depend on the proper functioning of sensitive feelings. Just as
the activities of understanding goes beyond imagining, uses imagination for its own
purpose, but continues to depend for its operation on images, so what we are calling
spiritual feelings sublate sensitive feelings. Spiritual feelings are higher, they should be
in charge, they should lead towards self-transcendence. When we ask, how do feel about
that? We must discern this basic hierarchy of two classes of feelings, one of which
guides towards self-transcendence and the other is morally neutral.
Within this class of spiritual feelings is there a further hierarchy to be discerned?
Although we have separated out our treatment of the affective and the cognitive in
separate chapters, we have indicated how closely they are related together. If the
activities form a structured hierarchy of interrelated activities, would one not expect that
the feelings permeating such a structure would also form a parallel hierarchy? Besides,
Lonergan has already given us a masterly synopsis of what these feelings are,
particularly by differentiating the five transcendental precepts permeating the activities
of the respective five levels of consciousness. We expect the quality of consciousness to
be different as we move from operations of sensing to understanding, to judging truth
and value, to worshipping God. We have already elaborated on these transcendental
imperatives as the felt obligation to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and
in love. Now [307] we are merely pointing out how they form a hierarchy, how they are
distinct intentionalities, and are clearly differentiated in terms of higher and lower.
Lonergan has already given us a hierarchy of feelings. Why are we still looking for
something that has already been found?
On the one hand, there is the single thrust of the Eros of the mind, the spirit of
inquiry, which permeates all the activities of understanding and judging, and leads on to
the knowledge and love of God. There is a continuity of this feeling element through the
five levels of consciousness. It is the one desire to know that is differentiated into the
332
aim proper to each level. The desire to know performs its six functions at each level of
consciousness. It initiates the process by formulating a question or responding to a
challenge. It intends the end proper to that level of consciousness and directs towards it
it senses when we are getting close or when we are heading into a blind alley. It
motivates us to be detached and disinterested and resists the biases. It provides the
determination and dynamism to win the struggle to understand. It provides the content
and criterion to be satisfied at each level. There is a deep feeling component, not just to
our active life of working, teaching and living, but also to our intellectual endeavours,
our scholarship, our research and writing. The deepest and best inclination of the human
heart is a single thrust towards what is true, what is of value and what is infinitely
valuable.
On the other hand, this single feeling component can be differentiated according
to each level of consciousness and we can distinguish the imperatives to be attentive
intelligent, reasonable, responsible and in love. These line up in a clear hierarchy of
importance based on the principle of sublation. I have given an elementary expose of
these principles. Our feeling life is so rich and diversified and differentiated and
sophisticated and refined that much more work remains to be done in this area.
There is a further aspect to the matter. It would seem that at each level you can
distinguish feelings proper to the initial phase of asking questions, feelings proper to a
middle stage of struggling to understand, and to a final stage of satisfaction in
achievement. Aristotle [308] pointed this out some time ago in relation to the senses.
First, there is a sensitive desire or appetite, then there is a struggle for attainment, finally
there is sensitive satisfaction in achievement. First there is hunger, then there is a
struggle to find food, then there is satisfaction of hunger probably followed by sleep. It
seems that there is a similar pattern of stages in the unfolding of the desire to know. At
each level there is a set of feelings characteristic of the initial stage puzzlement,
Value Ethics
333
wonder, response, alertness, tension, desire and the like. Similarly, there is a set of
feelings characteristic of the phase of struggling such as frustration, discouragement,
determination, commitment, pride, self-esteem, ambition, sheer grit, and the like.
Finally, there is the satisfaction of desire characteristic of success at each level. This is
important as it reveals the criterion operating at each level. Let us elaborate on this
feeling of closure as it operates in its own way on five levels.
Presumably, we are familiar with the satisfaction proper to sensitive appetites, to
satisfying hunger, to slaking of thirst, to resting when we are tired, to the gratification of
sexual desires, and the like. There is a joy in smooth performance of the activity proper
to each of the senses. It is better to be able to see well than to be squinting and groping
in the dark. Imagination is happy with fantasy, fiction, free flow of images and feelings,
stories, movies, novels and the like. There is a satisfaction in learning skills, learning to
walk, to ride a bicycle, to swim, to play football, and in exercising these skills well and
with ease. On visiting a restaurant for a meal, you will be dissatisfied if you are still
hungry at the end; it is unpleasing to the eye, if the food is presented badly; you are not
happy, if unpleasant smells radiate from the kitchen or toilet; raucous music can make
conversation difficult and spoil the evening.
However, these sensitive satisfactions are hardly comparable to the joy of
insight, the proper functioning of intelligence, the satisfaction of understanding clearly
and distinctly. Why do people spend so much time on crossword puzzles, FreeCell, card
games, Su Doku, draughts, chess, bridge, and other mathematical puzzles? It seems to be
the satisfaction of understanding well, bringing order out of chaos, winning by superior
exercise of intelligence, the satisfaction [309] of solving problems. There is nothing
much at stake at this level; it is a matter of opinion, a matter of definition; even if you
are defeated you console yourself with the thought that it is only a game. No issue of
truth, of life or death is at stake. Beginners in any of these fields feel nervous, confused,
334
and anxious about their performance. Competent performers act with ease, conviction,
almost spontaneously such performance is very satisfying. There is a feeling element
to knowing when we have understood.
There is a further, higher and deeper satisfaction in knowing well, in knowing the
truth, in knowing that we have reached the truth. It is an experience of closure: no
further pertinent questions arise. We are satisfied that we have been open and honest,
that we have done all the necessary research, that the insights are invulnerable, that the
desire to know has been satisfied. There are times when we are unsure of our
conclusions; we recognize that we are not masters of the field, that there are many
loopholes that have not been closed off. We feel shaky about our conclusions; we
present them tentatively, hesitantly, anxiously. We are open to correction, to learning
from our mistakes, we hope to understand better in the future. But there are other times
when we are sure, we feel confident, we present our conclusions with conviction, we are
ready to rebut adversaries. We do not need reassurance from others, we may in fact be
going against public opinion, we may be criticized by the establishment, but we are sure
of the immanent grounds for our conviction. There is a feeling of deep satisfaction in
knowing that you know correctly.
There is a further, deeper, satisfaction in knowing value and living a life in
conformity with value. This is the satisfaction of a happy conscience. The desire for
value has been satisfied; it is not only cognitional but is part of a life well-lived. It is an
experience of being at peace with oneself, knowing that we are in the right, convinced
that we are living according to the deepest and best inclinations of the human heart.
Opposed to a happy conscience is the guilty conscience, the confused conscience, the
doubtful conscience. The guilty conscience feels shame, division, tension; we knew
what was the right thing to do but did not do it. We may try to rationalize, to avoid
thinking of it, to repress the feelings, to lose ourselves in more activity. We [310] are
Value Ethics
335
divided within ourselves and it is not a pleasant experience. The confused conscience is
pulled in contrary directions by various feelings and arguments; it may be a difficult
issue and feelings conflict; from one point of view we approve, but from another we
disapprove; this creates a feeling of tension and anxiety that is only resolved when we
have sorted out the feelings and arguments. The doubtful conscience is still unsure;
sufficient information may not be available to resolve the doubt; it may be a grey area,
neither white nor black; there may be intrinsic ambiguities, contradictions, and conflicts
in reaching a resolution. There is a strong feeling element in acting according to ones
conscience.
This would seem to be what Aristotle meant by happiness. He insisted that
happiness is found by living according to a life of virtue. He admitted that there were
certain minimum conditions of physical comfort and health, which seem to be
prerequisites of happiness. Finally, he insisted that happiness was to be found in the
exercise of our highest faculties on their highest object for the longest period of time. So
surely it is knowing what is of ultimate value, and living according to those convictions
that constitutes a happy life.
One could talk of a higher level of happiness and satisfaction to be found in
Beatitude, in the satisfaction of our religious aspirations. It could be described in many
ways, as unconditional love, as peace of soul, as holiness, as union with God, as
consolation, as a life of grace, and the like. It is a higher satisfaction, a higher feeling,
the satisfaction of a higher aspiration.34
It seems then that there is a hierarchy of feelings and that it runs parallel to the
hierarchy or structure of cognitional activities. Self-appropriation calls for such a
discernment and differentiation of feelings. We have shown above in a somewhat
inadequate and incomplete manner how this can be done. Discernment of the two
classes of feelings sensitive and spiritual are of great importance when it comes to
336
answering the question, How do you feel about that? It is important in discerning our
intellectual and moral state, our fidelity or lack of fidelity to the transcendental precepts.
Lonergan consistently and often referred to this structure of feelings without [311]
ever calling it a hierarchy of feelings. He pointed out with great discernment the
functions of the desire to know; he spoke often of the normativity immanent and
operative in cognitional activities; he explicitly differentiated this normativity into the
transcendental precepts proper to each level of consciousness; finally, he spoke in terms
of apprehensions of value, the intentional response to the intelligible, to the true and to
what is of value.
7 Unity of Cognitive and Affective Components
We have identified the activities of knowing truth and value in our reprise of
cognitional structure and in extending it to the activities of questioning value,
deliberative insight and the judgment of value. We called this the cognitive component
of the judgment of value. We have now identified the normativity operating within these
activities of understanding; we have elaborated on the desire to know, the transcendental
precepts and distinguished two basic classes of feeling operating within these activities.
We have called this the affective component of the judgment of value. The question now
arises as to how these two components unite in a single judgment of value. We usually
operate from a dualistic scheme where, if you emphasize feeling, to that extent, you
exclude understanding; and if you emphasize understanding, to that extent, you exclude
feeling. What we were looking for was notions of feeling and understanding that would
be inclusive rather then exclusive. Can the judgment be fully cognitive and fully
affective at the same time? It is now that we need this inclusive notion, as we put
together reasoning and feeling in a single judgment of value. Feelings pushing
understanding along from the outside will not do; then feeing would be extrinsic and not
a component of the judgment itself. It is a synthesis we are looking for and not just
Value Ethics
337
sticking two diverse things together from the outside: "Now you get the synthesis of this
feeling side and the cognitional side on the level of the question, is this worthwhile?
the judgment of value, the decision, the action. So when you bring in the fourth (level),
you move into a philosophy of action. You're up there with Blondel." 35
Our position is that the cognitive component and the affective component, far
from being exclusive, include one another, demand [312] one another, require one
another and are intrinsic constituents of the judgment of value. They are distinct realities
but not separate. The simplest illustration is surely the relationship between the desire to
know and the activities of knowing. Can you have a desire to know, that is separate from
the activities of knowing? Can you have activities of knowing, that are not driven by the
desire to know? Is it difficult to view the desire to know and the activities of knowing as
complementary, constitutive, intrinsic elements leading to a judgment of value? Perhaps
it is easier to identify the activities of cognitional structure, and not so easy to discern the
dynamism, the intention, the desire that is moving the activities forward from the
inside not from the outside. The unfolding of knowing might be compared to a double
helix of feelings and activities, intertwined at every stage, depending on one another and
supporting one another. The analogy limps, however, as it suggests that the affective and
cognitional components are two separate elements. Let us use some historical references
to further explore the unity of these two components in a judgment of value.
Conceptualism and Intellectualism. It seems Aquinas was very familiar with
the natural desire to know God, he acknowledged that philosophy begins in wonder, his
writings were governed by Questions and not by Theses. He recognized most of the
activities of knowing and the dynamism operating within them. He was always open to
further understanding and changed his position if necessary. His was an open system, a
way of asking questions rather than a list of answers.
338
This is in great contrast to the conceptualism of neo-Thomism of the 19th

century. The conceptualists concentrated on concepts, definitions, syllogisms, inductive
and deductive arguments, propositions, ultimate and permanent truths. Theirs was a
closed system of theses and propositions. It was not open to further questions. It was
permanent truth. Their moral philosophy was a system of applying universally valid
rules to concrete cases. It was a basically static system of the interrelationships of
concepts by definition and division. This is what reason meant, the ability to define and
divide concepts. It was a [313] view of reason shared by the Enlightenment and by many
modern thinkers, who should know better.
In the revival of Thomistic studies, the transcendental Thomists, first Marechal,36
then Coreth,37 Rahner38 and Lonergan, rediscovered the dynamism of intellect. They
discovered intellectual light, the process of questioning, the power to discover new
truths, that intellect contained within itself the criterion of truth. They discovered the real
Saint Thomas as opposed to the Thomism of the Neo-Scholastics. They rediscovered the
flexibility of intellect and the active and passive intellect as one functioning mind.
Lonergan made his own contribution to this movement, especially in the Verbum
articles, when he rediscovers the intellectualism of St Thomas. He discovered knowing
as a self-assembling structure of operations moved along by the dynamic of questioning.
He discovered the source of concepts in the minds reflection on the limits and extend of
its own insights. He discovered the normativity intrinsic to the process of knowing. He
discovered intellect not as subject to the rules of logic, but as the source of the rules of
logic. Logical rules apply to arguments from the outside. The mind operates according to
rules which are of the very nature of reasoning. He discovered a mind that is intrinsically
dynamic, on the move, never satisfied, always creative. He discovered the importance of
the unrestricted desire to know, and what he later identified as the transcendental
precepts.
Value Ethics
339
Now it seems to me that the conceptualists would have no problem with the
cognitive component of a judgment of value. They are quite at home with concepts and
propositions, and the judgment looks like a proposition. But they seem to have excluded
the affective element, they seem to have excluded the role of the desire to know in the
dynamic unfolding of knowledge. They were not seeking further understanding, but
closed system. Hence the dominance of logic rather than method. Conceptualism
illustrates what happens to philosophy or theology, when the affective component of
knowing is excluded. It becomes static rather then dynamic, closed system rather than
open system. What Lonergan has rediscovered is the affective [314] component, the
feeling component, the normative component, the intentional component, which is
essential to the unfolding process from question to answer.
Active and Passive Intellect. Aristotle distinguished very clearly between an
Active and a Passive Intellect. He claimed that the Active Intellect must be in act itself
in order to make the potentially intelligible to become actually intelligible. The function
of the Active Intellect was to throw light on the phantasm, so that the intellect can
abstract the form from the matter. It is the Active Intellect which initiates the process of
knowing. The Passive Intellect, by contrast, is receptive, it is the tabula rasa (empty
blackboard) waiting to be filled. It receives the forms immaterially, so that knowing is a
becoming, an identity, but not as in material reception of forms.
Aristotles account of knowing is in metaphysical terminology, inevitably. So
knowledge was elaborated in metaphysical terms in the Islamic tradition, in the Middle
Ages and in Scholasticism. Sometimes this elaboration and differentiation was done
fruitfully and correctly as in Aquinas. Sometimes there were very strange interpretations
of the reality of Passive and Active Intellect. Of particular importance was Aquinas
insistence that there is one human Intellect in each person and that Passive and Active
are not to be separated into two Intellects.
340
Our task in intentionality analysis is to translate the correct metaphysical account

of knowing into recognizable, verifiable, psychological terminology. Aristotles crucial
distinction was between Active and Passive Intellect; our major distinction is between
the desire to know and the activities of knowing. I do not think there is a direct, perfect
parallel between these distinctions, but it does serve as a metaphor or guide. Hence we
can use as an approximate analogy, the Active Intellect is to the Passive Intellect, as the
desire to know is to the activities of knowing. The Active and Passive Intellects
cooperate and complement one another, and form one Intellect for one knowing. In
Aquinas there is one Intellect and it is immaterial. In our self-appropriation we affirm a
cognitive and an affective component and they form a unity and the unity is a spiritual
reality. [315]
Structure and Content. Finally, Lonergan appeals to the image of structure
and content in order to show the unity of the cognitive and affective components in a
judgment of value. The structure of the judgment of fact and the structure of the
judgment of value is the same; but they differ in content, the judgment of fact aiming at
truth, the judgment of value aiming at value. They are the same in that they are both
judgments, different in that one aims at truth, the other at value. The structure we have
analyzed in terms of the questioning, the deliberative insight and the judgment;
deliberative insight we analysed in terms of the hypothetical syllogism. In what way can
we now think of the intentional response to value as the content of a judgment of value?
It might help to take a parallel from third level activities. The question for
reflection intends the truth, reflective insight grasps the truth of the sufficiency of the
evidence for the judgment, the judgment expresses the truth in an affirmation or denial.
Lonergan clearly distinguished between the proper content of the judgment and its
borrowed content.39 The proper content of the judgment is its specific contribution to
cognitional process, namely, the yes or no of affirming the truth. So, one can say that
Value Ethics
341
truth is the proper content of the judgment of fact. The direct borrowed content is found
in the question, to which one answers yes or no; the indirect borrowed content emerges
in the reflective act linking the question and the judgment. In other words, the proper
content of questions for reflection, reflective insight and judgments of fact is the truth
simply as such. The borrowed content is the specific question, the specific evidence, that
is judged to be sufficient for the positing of the judgment.
If truth is the proper content of third level activities, then surely value or the
good is the proper content of activities at the fourth level of consciousness. On this
parallel the proper content of the judgment of value is precisely value as such; the
borrowed content is the value of this specific answer, grasped in deliberative insight, to
this particular question for deliberation.
When we affirm that the intentional response to value is the proper content of the
judgment of value what are we affirming? We [316] are affirming that in the question
for deliberation, what we are properly intending is the value to be found in this specific
question or situation. What is properly grasped in deliberative insight is the value to be
found in this person or this alternative or this action. The judgment of value properly
expresses, affirms, accepts this value in this particular case. Intentional response is the
dynamism of the process, sets the process in motion, seeks out alternatives and
possibilities, sets the criterion to be satisfied and gives its blessing to the judgment of
value in a good conscience.
It is in this sense that Lonergan says that intentional responses reveal values,
point to values, apprehend values, recognize values, are sensitive to true values. Never
does Lonergan say that feelings know values. Such would be a nonsense. If it is
knowing, then, it is cognitional; if it is feeling, then, it is affective; if it is willing, then, it
is volitional.
342
We are claiming that the cognitive and affective elements are constitutive
elements in the judgment of value. We are admitting that in this clearly specified sense,
knowledge is affective. We could use the term affective cognition in this clearly
specified sense.40 This term is open to misinterpretation on the lines of feelings knowing
values and so we use it rather sparingly.
8 How do you feel about that?
We posed this question at the beginning of this long chapter in an effort to keep
our feet on the ground, and to avoid getting lost in the clouds of abstract terminology.
Our focus was how feelings enter into correct judgments of value. We imagined a
counsellor asking a student how he feels about being a doctor; and how a married person
might feel contemplating a possible divorce. Let us see whether this long expose on
feelings has helped us to assess the proper role of feelings in these situations.
First, let us note that the question is legitimate and necessary. We should attend
to our feeling reactions in deciding a career, in passing moral judgment, in making
decisions about our interpersonal relationships and way of life. We need to discern the
role of feeling be-[317]cause our feeling orientation can both help and hinder the process
of correct value judgments and decisions. Feelings play a legitimate, necessary and
important part in our judgments of value, our decisions and actions. What is needed is
discernment about which feelings are influencing us and in which direction are they
pointing us.
But secondly, we need to ask, which feelings help and which feelings hinder the
process of moral evaluation? We have many feeling reactions some superficial,
transient, self-regarding; some deep, disinterested, permanent, intending the good of
value. We used the metaphor of a symphony to situate the various levels and kinds of
feelings. So we need to discriminate within the affective dimension. Which feeling
Value Ethics
343
should we listen to, follow, encourage? Which feelings need to be resisted, controlled,
and discouraged?
We have given the technical terminology and essential characteristics of two
groups of feelings in distinguishing intentional response to value as opposed to
intentional response to satisfaction. Putting this into more familiar language we can say
that the group of feelings that point in the direction of good evaluations are the deepest
and best inclinations of the human heart. They are the feelings that urge us to be
attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible and in love. They are the feelings that lead
us to true values, that when implemented constitute us as good persons. These feelings
intend true values, good decisions and consequent implementation. They are
disinterested as opposed to selfish. They point to the good rather than to the merely
satisfying. If they are followed, they lead to a happy conscience, a peace of mind, a
tranquillity of heart, which is very close to the happiness we all aspire to. We did the
right thing even if we lost money in the process.
Feelings that intend satisfaction are in themselves morally neutral. Sensitive
appetites seeking satisfaction continue to operate in human persons. There is not
necessarily a contradiction between pleasure and value. However, there can be a conflict
of interests. If sensitive pleasures become an end in themselves, if they are contrary to
true values, if they become selfish, self-interested and self-regarding, they tend to
oppose the process of good valuing and deciding. They in-[318]troduce bias, they
override deeper feelings, they change the orientation of the person, then invite
rationalization and excuses and result in an unhappy conscience.
Feelings, even the intentional response to value, do not by themselves know
values. Feelings point in a certain direction, they guide a process, they are sensitive to
values in a situation, they recognize value, but they never know values. It is only when
the affective and cognitive aspects fuse together in a deliberative insight that we can
344
know value in the resultant judgment of value. The intentional response to value initiates
the process by suggesting, or being sensitive to the value issue. It drives the process
forward by the felt moral obligation to assemble information, deliberate about possible
alternatives and consequences, judge truly the value of various courses of action, decide
wisely and implement willingly. The reward is feelings of a happy conscience.
We have assigned a very precise, clearly defined role to feelings in moral
evaluations, decisions and actions. Spiritual feelings make a primary essential
contribution and enter into the very intrinsic constitution of the knowledge of value.
Sensitive feelings can help by reorienting the momentum of sensitivity in the direction
of value; or they may hinder the search for true value by seeking their own finality in
satisfaction and going in an opposite direction to the search for value.
Some attempts have been made to establish ethics on the basis of feeling alone.
The empiricists have been doing this for a long time, but in more recent times, you have
an ethic of love, an ethic of sympathy, an ethic of the heart, etc.41 One presumes that
love, sympathy, empathy, the heart, etc are good things in themselves. But the question
is love of what? Of whom? For what reason? Terrorists love disorder and chaos.
Thieves love money and property. One can be so perverted as to love evil and hate the
good. Love taken in isolation can never support an ethics of value. Similarly, for
sympathy, empathy, compassion, pity, etc. The heart of light can also be the heart of
darkness. [319]
Emotional reactions of this sort can never by themselves be a sufficient criterion
for a judgment of value. You might react very negatively to a person on first
impressions; he doesn't dress well; seems to have little to contribute, seems to be a
nonentity; but as you get to know the person you find a deep perceptive mind, a kind
heart and a wonderful vision of life. You might feel that a politician is corrupt and selfinterested; but you can discover that it is the media who are presenting a deliberately
Value Ethics
345
negative image of the person. You might have a very negative view of the role of
multinationals but if you examine the economics and the details you might have to move
to a more positive feeling towards them; or vice versa.
Even the intention of value is blind. It points in a certain direction, is useful in
emergencies but does not of itself give knowledge of values. A developed sensitivity
helps to find direction, when there is no time to think, or when little information
available, or when we are faced with a new situation. But by itself feeling is blind, does
not give knowledge of values and is one component in four in the totality of a judgment
of value.
9 Summary of a Position
Let us state our position on feelings and values very precisely and briefly as a
concluding summary.
(1) The activities that constitute the cognitive component of the judgment of
value are clearly differentiated in the diagram of the integral cognitional structure of
truth and value. Formulated questions lead to insights and definitions; the question for
reflection leads to reflective insight and the judgment of truth; the question of value
leads to deliberative insight and the judgment of value.
(2) We can now define intentional feelings as the affective element that: initiates
activity, gives direction to activities, intends a goal, motivates towards achievement, is
satisfied in achievement. This applies to both sensitive feelings and spiritual feelings, to
both attraction and repulsion. We define feelings in terms of their function in relation to
sensitive and intellectual activities. It is a functional definition. [320]
(3) We are obliged to distinguish two classes of feelings. They are both feelings
in the sense defined above, but their origin and goal are quite different. I can find no
better terminology that that of spiritual and sensitive to differentiate these two
classes.
346
(4) Spiritual feelings are the desire to know, the transcendental imperatives, and
the intentional response to value. These are spiritual in the technical sense of not
originating in sense, not being intrinsically conditioned by space and time, by being
innate and a priori as spontaneous capacity, by being permanent and deep felt
obligations, by always leading to moral development and conversion.
(5) Sensitive feelings are biologically based, are intrinsically conditioned by
space and time, are forms of aggression, affiliation or anxiety. They entirely dominate in
the behaviour of animals, in initiating response, directing aggression towards a goal,
motivating and satisfying in achievement.
(6) In the child sensitive feelings predominate; but there emerges the desire to
know, the obligation to be honest, truthful and good, which controls, redirects,
penetrates, transforms sensitive feelings into an integrated affective life of the mature
moral adult. There are a multitude of interrelations between sensitive and spiritual
feelings; they are distinct but not separate.
(7) The cognitive and affective components form a unity between the activities
of knowing and the underlying desire to know. The desire initiates the activities, directs
the activities, motivates the activities, is the dynamism of the activities, is what gives the
content and criterion to the activities. For a true judgment of value you must (1) perform
the activities of grasping the virtually unconditioned of value issuing in a judgment of
value, and (2) satisfy the desire to know in that no further pertinent questions arise.
These two criteria are equivalent. The feeling of moral obligation and moral arguments
are both involved in a happy or unhappy conscience.
(8) All knowledge of value is affective cognition in this clearly defined sense.
Without a desire to know, could we ever know anything? Without performing the
activities, the desire to know remains a frustrated feeling going nowhere. It is the affects
that we have called spir-[321]itual that constitute the dynamism of knowing. Sensitive
Value Ethics
347
affects can help or hinder both the search for truth and value; they help by way of
cooperation and reinforcement, being transformed or co-opted by the desire to know;
they hinder by seeking sensitive goals that conflict with truth and value.
(9) We recognize the importance of this feeling component in moral philosophy
and life. Discernment of the different feelings is a crucial aspect of moral judgment and
moral conscience. Self-appropriation of feelings seems to be still in its infancy.
(10) Moral obligation is situated in the transcendental precept to be responsible.
It cannot be derived from practical or speculative intellect; it is not knowledge but desire
for knowledge of value; it is not a categorical imperative derived from concepts of law
and duty; it is not the knowledge of first principles of the practical intellect. It is a
spiritual feeling, a desire to know what is of value, to seek, to become, to live according
to values. It is a felt obligation which, through the activities of deliberation and
judgment, issues in moral knowledge. Moral education must include the cognitive and
affective components.
(1) There are a multitude of sensitive feelings but also a hierarchy of spiritual feelings.
We should appeal to the deepest and best inclinations of the human heart and follow
them but often we do the opposite.
(2) Job, family, career, are the most important value judgments that we make in life.
Usually a balance has to be reached; you cannot do all that you would like to do. Value
of family, spouse, children, career, prospects, money, future, yourself and others, all are
in play in a concrete judgment of value, followed by decision. Cognitive, affective, and
volitional elements are involved. There are no simple answers.
(3) Being bound by the truth, being obliged to be responsible, desiring wholeness, the
joy of a clear conscience, are difficult to account for in terms of sensitive feelings. [322]
(4) We often consider sympathy to be an unqualified good. But some can be sympathetic
348
to terrorists, to rebels, to criminals, to abusers. Sympathy should be for the right reason,
in the right amount, for what is good.
Similarly, we think of love as always good; but some can love evil, love stealing, love
destruction, love pleasure. Real love is seeking and rejoicing in the truly good, which is
known in a correct judgment of value
To decide on a policy of non-violence, as Ghandi, was a noble and heroic path. But
whether this can be universalized to families, to societies, to war situations, is doubtful.
Many difficult judgments of value are involved.
(5) Reverse of the above. We should hate evil and to that extent evil persons. We should
be angry at injustice, corruption, abuse of power, etc. It is hard to think of an example
of revenge as such, which would be commendable.
(6) You might list: 1. A steak, medium rare, with onions and chips on the side. 2. A
conversation with good friends. 3. Finishing a difficult task well. 4. Being at peace with
your conscience and God. 5. Listening to great music. There are clearly different kinds
of satisfaction, not all of them bad!
(7) A person with no sense of moral obligation is by definition a psychopath and you
hope never to meet one. In all normal persons, including criminals, there is some
remnant of a conscience, a sense of responsibility, an obligation to tell the truth, to
honour our word. It is when normal becomes psychic illness, compulsion, repression,
addiction, that responsibility is lost and a person is classified as insane and hence not
responsible. The moral ought comes from inside, it is what we are as moral persons.
(8) Freud found the libido (a chaos of feelings for pleasure, parricide, incest) and
claimed this was what we are at our deepest level. But was he right? This does not fit in
with my experience of counselling or self-appropriation. I feel that the [323]
transcendental precepts represent our deepest and best inclinations.
Endnotes
Value Ethics
Insight, 624.
Insight, 624.
B. Lonergan, A Second Collection, 277.
B. Lonergan, A Second Collection, 82.
10
11
12
13
14
Insight, 624.
15
16
17
Insight, 538-43.
18
Insight, 494.
19
Insight, 492.
349
20
Dylan Evans, Emotion: The Science of Sentiment, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001), 7.
21
Ibid., 7-14.
22
B. Lonergan, Finality, Love, and Marriage, Collection: Collected Works of Bernard

Lonergan, vol 4, (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1988), 26.
23
Insight, 538.
24
Insight, 647-49.
25
Insight, 649. [324]
350
26
Elizabeth Morelli, The Feeling of Freedom in Timothy Fallon and Philip Boo
Riley, Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J. , (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1987). 103.
27
Ibid., 101.
28
Ibid., 102.
29
Frederick Crowe, S.J. Lonergan at the Edges of Understanding, in Method: Journal

of Lonergan Studies, 20, 2, (2002), 175-198.
30
Ibid., 184.
31
32
33
B. Lonergan, Second Collection, 223.
34
See Oscar Lukefahr, The Search for Happiness: Four Levels of Emotional and
Spiritual Growth, (Missouri: Ligouri, 2002).
35
36
Joseph Marechal, Le Point de depart de la metaphysique: Lecons sur le

developpement historique et theorique du probleme de la connaissance, (Bruxelles:
LEdition universelle; Paris: Deselee, De Brouwer, 1944-1949).
37
Emerich Coreth, Metaphysics, trans by J. Donceel, (New York: Herder and Herder,
1968).
38
39
Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968).
Insight, 300-301.
Our difficulty with this phrase as used by Michael Vertin is that he does not seem to
clearly specify the meaning. See previous discussion in Chapter Four Section 3.2.
40
41
John Fletcher, Situation Ethics, (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1966) is really an

ethic of love; love is the only absolute. Charles Shelton, Morality of the Heart: A
Psychology for the Christian Moral Life (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company,
1997). He bases himself on empathy. Max Scheler also seem to rely on emotional
intuitionism and hence largely on emotion.
7
Deciding Free and Responsible
As the fourth level is the principle of self-control, it is responsible for
proper functioning on the first three levels Therewith vanish two
notions: the notion of pure intellect or pure reason that operates on
its own without guidance or control from reasonable decision; and
the notion of will as an arbitrary power indifferently choosing
between good and evil.1
(1) If you are choosing a University for post-graduate studies, what steps would you
take to ensure you make a good decision?
(2) Do we choose our own personal moral values, e.g. honesty, loyalty? In what sense
is this a choice?
(3) Identify a bad moral decision that you made in your own life. What led you to make
this decision? What feelings were present? What intention had you in mind? How did
you feel afterwards? Can you improve in good decision-making?
(4) Are prisoners free? In what sense?
(5) Are rich people more free than poor people? In what sense? [326]
(6) Is a good moral person more free than a depraved person? In what sense?
(7) Are we equally free to choose either good or evil?
(8) Can you know clearly what is the right thing to do and still not do it? How does that
come about? Can you know clearly and distinctly what is the wrong thing to do and
still do it?
1 Introduction
We are basing our analysis of values on Lonergan's enumeration of the three
components of the judgment of value. Having dealt in detail with the first two elements,
knowledge and intentional response, we now come to the third component which he
states as: "Thirdly, there is the initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence
constituted by the judgment of value itself."2 In the same paragraph he elaborates:
"Finally, the development of knowledge and the development of moral feeling head to
352
the existential discovery, the discovery of oneself as a moral being, the realization that
one not only chooses between courses of action but also thereby makes oneself an
authentic human being or an unauthentic one."
These statements are not self-
explanatory. One asks what is this "initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence
constituted by the judgment of value itself"? What is this notion of moral selftranscendence? We are looking for the components of the judgment of value and we
find that somehow the judgment of value is itself one of the components. This seems to
involve some element of circularity; but is it the vicious circularity of logic or the
benign circularity of human developing.
This third component seems to include two distinct elements that are best
treated separately. There is the obvious element of self-transcendence, but also there is
the implicit element of choosing, deciding, free responsibility the possibility of
deciding for or against self-transcendence. Everyone has the possibility of selftranscendence but there are those who decide to respond to that aspiration and those
who refuse or hesitate or compromise. What is this mysterious power to say yes or no,
to assent or dissent, to freely decide as [327] responsible persons. So in this chapter we
will deal with the notion of free decision and in the next chapter the notion of selftranscendence. These are distinct notions of considerable importance for moral
judgments, compacted here in Lonergan's third component, which we will expand into
two distinct elements of free deciding (Chapter 7) and self-transcendence (Chapter 8).
We have defined the cognitive and the affective components of the judgment of
value as intrinsic constituent parts of the judgment of value: there is the element of
judging or knowing or understanding and there is the element of value intended by the
desire to know and do the good. Now we are moving to the context in which this
happens the human person who becomes, grows, develops or declines; who does so
freely, responsibly, deciding and choosing which direction to move in. I would define
Value Ethics
353
these as extrinsic elements to the judgment of value, setting conditions for the
possibility of judging, establishing the context in which affirming values makes sense.
They are necessary but extrinsic conditions for valuing.
Deciding can be regarded as the volitional element, the free deciding to seek
value and become centres of benevolence and beneficence. If we decide that we do not
want to make a particular judgment of value, we will usually find a device by which we
avoid it. We do not reach good value judgments without deciding to consider the
possibilities, to weight the evidence, to face the alternatives and consequences. Hence
deciding can be considered as the efficient cause of the process, the extrinsic but
necessary condition for the possibility of asking, deliberating, affirming and
implementing judgments of value.
2 Identifying Deciding and Choice
Deciding is a distinct activity from knowing, desiring, wishing and the like. In
this section we explore the characteristics of this activity of deciding and the
implications for values and moral behaviour. We are facing the question, To what extent
and in what sense do we choose our values? [328]
The Medievals argued in terms of a faculty psychology and argued strenuously
on the relations of priority or inferiority between intellect and will. Their method was to
start from acts, deduce powers from which the acts proceeded, deduce faculties as the
basis of these powers. The Voluntarists argued in favour of the superiority of will on the
grounds that (1) the corruption of the will is greater than the corruption of the intellect;
(2) the will is essentially free whereas the intellect is bound by necessary truths; (3)
even though the will is dependent on the intellect to know the good, the will can also
command and influence the intellect and hence is a superior cause; (4) in heaven we are
united to God primarily by the will and only secondarily by the intellect. The
Intellectualists argued for the priority of the intellect arguing that the intellect possesses
354
its object by identity whereas the will tends towards its object but does not possess it;
the will can only tend towards the good known by intellect and hence the intellect is the
superior faculty. The relationship between intellect and will was a very complicated
matter with much dialogue between two faculties. We can keep these points in the
background but our task is to return to the activity of deciding, return to intentionality
analysis and do some empirical investigation on the relationship between the activities
of knowing values, deciding about action, and implementing the decisions. We find that
complications remain but at least we can establish the relationship on the basis of
observable fact the facts of psychological experience.
Lonergan puts 'deciding' on the fourth level of consciousness, along with
questions for deliberation and judgments of value, along with all that is involved in
religious belief and love. It may be more helpful to think of the four levels of
cognitional activity as in our diagram, with deciding as a distinct volitional activity. The
four levels of cognitional structure culminating in the knowledge of the judgment of
value have a certain parallel and commonality. There are clear parallels between the
questions, the insights, and the products of the insights. The levels can easily be related
to one another by way of sublation and dependence.
Volitional activity seems to be quite different from cognitional. There is a
question but it is simply a matter of 'yes' or 'no', assent or [329] dissent. The question is,
will I do it or will I not do it? It is not a question as, What is the best thing to do? as that
is a question for deliberation. Hamlet's question, to be or not to be? to commit suicide or
not to commit suicide? presents simple alternatives for decision. There is an activity of
deciding but it is in no way like having an insight, it is the person simply assenting or
dissenting; there is no assembly of evidence, no hypothetical syllogism, no arguing for
or against as all that by definition has been done in the process of deliberation. There is
355
Value Ethics
a product of deciding in action but action proceeds from decision not in the way that a
concept proceeds from an insight or a judgment proceeds from reflective insight.
One might think that deciding enters into the picture only after the judgment of
value in terms of implementing the value in action: this is the best thing to do, then, go
and do it. In that way of looking at it, deciding comes after the knowledge of value. But
Lonergan points out in the citation at the beginning of this chapter that the fourth level
is responsible for the proper unfolding of the first three levels. Deciding is involved
from the very beginning of the unfolding of cognitional process in choosing the proper
unfolding of the pure detached unrestricted desire to know and in eliminating bias,
illegitimate short cuts, hasty judgments, self-interested opinions, the interference of
prejudice and fear. Having insights is an aspect of cognitional activity; but we decide to
establish the conditions in which these insights are likely to occur. We pass judgment
when a sufficiency of evidence has been grasped; but the indecisive person may still
hesitate; the rash person may have already acted before the evidence was complete.
Cognitional process unfolds properly if we decide for understanding, decide for the
truth, and decide against self-interest and distortion. The proper unfolding of the process
of knowing is simultaneously the implementation of the decision for truth.
Let us be clear about terminology. Deciding covers a wide range of general
decisions, specific decisions, decisions for or against any kinds of actions. We use the
term 'choice', when there is a clear decision to be made between alternatives: you
choose A instead of B. So it is clear that choice is also a decision. We also use the term
'to will' in [330] the sense of to decide. As well as using the terminology of deciding
and choosing, we can continue to use the terms to will, willingness, even the will. We
do not want to fall back into a metaphysical connotation of the term 'will'; by it we
simply mean that, if a person actually wills something,
then he has the power to do
so. Hence for us 'to will' is to decide; willingness is a inclination or readiness to decide;
356
the activity of willing is the same a deciding. We can continue to refer to the 'will'
without any connotation of a faculty psychology meaning simply the potentiality to
decide. Our task now is to identify in our own consciousness these acts of deciding,
choosing, willing, in a very concrete personal way.
2.1 What Deciding is Not
We will make a series of points all aimed at identifying the activity of deciding
and distinguishing it from other mental activities. Let us distinguish deciding from the
judgment of value; from the execution; from desires; from imaginings or wishes; and
from animal 'deciding'.
(1) It is clear that the act of deciding is different from the judgment of value. The
judgment of value is cognitional, knowing values; the deciding is volitional, willing the
values. You can make a judgment of value and then decide (a) to implement the
judgment, (b) to ignore the judgment, or (c) to go quite contrary to the judgment.
Decision is not necessitated by the judgment of value. St Augustine identified a time in
his life, when he had made the value judgment that his life was a moral shambles, but he
could not bring himself to decide to change it. Judgment of value is cognitive; the
decision is volitional, it moves us to action. Judgment of value is not the cause of
deciding, it does not necessitate a particular decision: the decision is free. As we will see
from Aristotle, there are many ways in which we can make the right judgment and still
make a wrong decision. This surely helps to show that they are different activities.
Perhaps the key difference is manifested in the question of value, as distinct from
to the question for decision. The question of value asks, Is this the right thing to do? Is
this the best thing to do? What are the alternatives? What are the advantages and
disadvantages? They are questions for deliberative insight and judgment, Yes or No
[331] to a proposition. The question for decision is quite different, Am I going to do it or
not? Am I going to assent of dissent? To be or not to be? Am I going to commit suicide
Value Ethics
357
or not? The question for decision may very well in the concrete initiate a review of the
judgment of value and the recurrence of questions for deliberation, but this simply means
that deliberation is continuing; in principle the two kinds of questioning are quite
different.
(2) The activity of deciding is distinct from the execution. You can decide to do
something, but the execution may not be for months. You book a holiday and pay for it,
but it does not happen for three months. You decide to propose marriage, but it might
take weeks or longer to share this with the Beloved. You decide to steal, but the
opportunity only presents itself once a month.
If some time intervenes, you can change your decision! The gospel story tells of
two sons. One says, Yes, he will go to work in the farm but in the end he does not go.
The others say, No, I will not go but in the end he does go. Both made decisions and
both changed their decisions. But that does not alter the reality that they first made a
decision, then changed it. Decision is a mental act which is distinct from judgment of
value and also from execution.
(3) We must distinguish deciding from desiring. We have already identified in
detail the various desires of the human heart the deep desires for wholeness and
goodness and the more superficial desires for sensitive satisfaction. Aristotle defined
choice as intellectual appetite and the Medievals defined will as spiritual appetite. This
may have led to some confusion, as such phrases are conflating two very different
realities of desiring and deciding. We are clearly distinguishing between desire for value
and the deciding for value; the sensible desire for pleasure and the decision for pleasure.
For desiring, no matter how noble, is not deciding. Desiring requires deciding to move to
action. A strong desire for truth and goodness makes it easier to decide for truth and
goodness. A strong desire for sensitive satisfaction makes it more difficult to decide
against such satisfactions. To decide to go along with desire is easy as we are carried
358
along by desire. To go against desire is difficult; it is an uphill struggle; we have to [332]

grit our teeth and get it done; but sometimes that is the way it has to be.
(4) We must distinguish free decisions from idle thoughts, spontaneous
imaginings and various wishes. Imaginings, feelings, and thoughts can come into our
minds spontaneously, without our will or consent. We can imagine ourselves
volunteering to go on the Peace Corps, or giving to charity, or visiting a sick neighbour,
but that is not, as yet, a decision to do so. We can imagine evil things happening to our
enemy, but as long as they are idle wishful-thinking, we have not yet decided to inflict
evil. It is quite a different thing to plan intentionally to do some evil deed to our enemy.
Sexual fantasies can arise spontaneously; as such we are not responsible. At a certain
stage, when we become aware of such imaginings, we become responsible either for
continuing or not continuing that line of thinking. Idly discussing the possibility of
stealing is not the same as the decision to steal. So we must distinguish between feelings,
imaginings, thinking, deliberating and deciding. Deciding is a distinct activity by which
we deliberately, consciously, willingly decide to do good or evil. Wishes, desires, hopes
and fears are distinct from decisions.
(5) Animals eat some foods and refuse others; they cooperate with a shepherd or
resist; they move in this direction or that. Are they choosing? A parallel with cognitional
activities might help. It takes a long time to sort out the question, are animals intelligent?
To do that you have to distinguish what animals are capable of doing, and what they are
not capable of doing. They do have five external senses and three internal senses; they
have emotions, they can remember they have an imagination. They can learn within the
limits of memory and imagination. They can communicate feelings and warnings and
desires and needs. But they cannot ask questions, know universals, formulate correct
definitions, consider evidence and affirm the truth of judgments. By way of metaphor we
Value Ethics
359
can perhaps speak of animal 'intelligence' but only in the sense that their memory or
sense learning is faster than we expected.
There is no need to appeal to a free act of decision to account for animal
behaviour. They do act, they move, you can say that they [333] choose this food rather
than that food, but you do not need to appeal to a spiritual faculty for this. Animals are
moved by instinct, by natural appetites and desires and needs, by biological responses, by
their sense knowing, memory and imagination. Animals are simply responding to
external stimuli as creatures living in the biological pattern of experience and the drives,
needs, impulses, appetites, feelings, reactions, laws characteristic of that level of
existence. Hence we do not need to invoke a spiritual faculty of deciding to account for
the random wanderings of a cow around a field. We should not project what goes on in
our minds into the brain of the animal. Just as animals do not have epistemological
problems, so also they do not have moral problems. We recognize the comedy of
accusing a goat in a court of law for eating a neighbours maize.
Humans are also animals and we feel the same reflexes, feelings, appetites, and
instincts sometimes we act on such impulses. But the more we identify the activities of
judgments of value and human deliberate decision-making, the more we see how
ridiculous it is to talk about animal deciding. All of animal activity can be explained in
terms of biology, instincts, desires, needs, self-preservation, etc. Humans can go in the
opposite direction to biological needs and desires by an act of free deciding. They can
choose to fast, choose to feel pain rather than pleasure, take responsibility for their
actions, exercise self-control and self-determination, and choose moral values rather than
satisfactions.
(6) The decision is a mental act that seems to follow the judgment of value and
issues in action. Hence it is an activity which is proportionate to a judgment of value.
Just as judging and intending values are spiritual activities, so willing seems to be a
360
spiritual activity. Deciding is an activity that is invisible and sometimes hard to isolate
and identify. Judgment is a cognitional activity which is usually expressed in a statement
or proposition; but the actual affirmation or denial is an invisible mental act. By selfappropriation you can learn to identify this act. Now we are working on decisions;
mental actions which we can distinguish and identify by careful self-appropriation. In
our daily lives we are making decisions all the time. Mostly it is without effort or drama
or excitement. Often in practice the decisions are [334] hard to distinguish from
judgments of value and execution; they happen so quickly and are so intimately
connected. But when faced with a long drawn out process of deciding, we may be able to
recognize (a) the various inputs into the deliberative insight and judgment of value, (b)
desires pulling us in opposing directions, (c) the responsibility of making the right
decision and (d) the carrying out of the decision, as distinct stages in the process.
2.2 What Deciding is
(1) Just as a judgment says yes or no to a hypothesis, so deciding says yes or no
to a possible course of action. In the context of judgment we use the terminology of
affirming or denying, so in the context of deciding we use the terminology of consent,
assent or its opposite dissent. Decision is saying yes or no to a possible course of action.
Consent and dissent are commonly used terminology's and indicate the common
acceptance that consent/dissent is different from affirmation/denial. The essential
definition of freedom is the will's ability to move itself or not to move itself, to decide or
not to decide, to assent or dissent.3
(2) There is no human life without decisions. Just as there is no avoiding values,
so also there is no avoiding decisions. All human voluntary action involves some kind of
habitual willingness or specific willingness to act. If actions are not voluntary, then they
are not human acts; they result from reflexes, instincts, involuntary reactions: we are not
responsible for such. To try to avoid decisions is already a decision. You decide, to
Value Ethics
361
decide or not to decide. A bureaucrat was being pestered by a subordinate to make a

decision. The bureaucrat replied, The decision is that there will be no decision.
(3) We normally associate decisions with actions: we decide to go to the cinema,
to eat a meal, to meet friends. But decision is also efficient cause of the judgment of
value. We decide to deliberate, we decide to consider alternatives, we decide to be
responsible and in the end we are willing to pass a judgment of value. We could consider
deciding as the efficient cause of the judgment of value the efficient cause being what
makes it to be or to happen. Hence, it is an extrinsic [335] element, but also a necessary
condition for the occurrence of the judgment of value.
(4) Decisions are free. A sufficient and correct definition of freedom is simply the
ability to assent or dissent, to say Yes or No to a course of action. We will discuss this in
more detail later. Reason is bound by the evidence: if there is sufficient evidence and you
want to be reasonable, you are obliged to pass the judgment. The sufficiency of the
evidence requires the judgment, if we want to judge reasonably. You might say that the
sufficiency of the evidence is the formal cause of the judgment.
But the judgment of value is not the sufficient cause of the act of deciding. You
can know and not decide. The connection is contingent, not necessary. The will can go
against the judgment of value. It is possible to know what is the right thing to do, and
still not do it. Plato and Socrates presumed that if we know the right thing to do, we
would do it. Aristotle was more realistic. He visualizes about four ways in which we can
know the good and not do it.4 (a) He sees the possibility of having knowledge but not
using it; he seems to be distinguishing between deliberate conscious acts and those done
without reflection even though habitual knowledge is already there. We know that
cigarettes are bad for our health but put that at the back of our minds when we smoke. (b)
Errors may arise in the practical syllogism. We may admit that stealing is wrong but not
recognize that this particular act is a case of stealing. (c) Circumstances may prevent the
362
normal use of knowledge. We may have habitual knowledge but this is impaired if we
are asleep or mentally disturbed or in the grip of strong emotion. (d) We may know the
right thing to do but our desires are contrary and we do the opposite. So there are many
things that can happen between the correct judgment of values and its implementation in
appropriate decision and action.
(5) The originating cause of the decision is the person; the decision emerges from
the person and may conform to the judgment of value or may go against it. The decision
may follow conviction or it may follow desires for satisfaction. We can go against our
conscience, against our reason, against our feeling. We can choose to do evil [336] rather
than to do good. The originating cause of a voluntary action lies in the agent himself,
says Aristotle.5 We are responsible for our decisions. We make ourselves to be what we
are by our decisions. This is why moral values are so closely identified with personal
values, the value of the person as originating value.
(6) Just as there are many values and many contexts where values operate and
conflict, so there are many kinds of decisions to be made. We decide on what clothes to
wear, what to eat for breakfast, which transport to use to work, how to spend our leisure
time, what to study, what to do with our salary, and the like. All of these are decisions,
whether about social values, cultural values or economic or intellectual values. Our
special interest is in moral decision-making.
(7) The decision is of moral importance in its own right. Often we have
overemphasized the morality of actions, but it is in the decision that the real good or evil
seems to lie. Decision itself has moral import regardless of whether the action is carried
out or not. It is something which carries weight, is a step in the direction of selftranscendence or a step in the opposite direction. To decide is itself an action which
carries enormous moral weight or value. It is often asserted that real evil or good comes
from the heart, from the inside, from ones intentions, motivations and decisions.
Value Ethics
363
If a husband decides that he will be unfaithful to his wife, plans to meet a

girlfriend at a certain place, has everything all set up; but unfortunately falls off his
bicycle, breaks his wrist and ends up in hospital, has he been unfaithful, has he
committed a moral fault? The answer must be Yes, even though it did not come to the
full extent of implementation. He decided; he was fully committed to his decision; it was
a serious, deliberate, premeditated decision. By that decision he diminished himself and
sets himself on the way to being actually and fully unfaithful.
You can be put in jail for deciding, even though you never committed the crime.
Conspiracy means meeting with others with the deliberate intention of committing a
crime. Even if the crime is never committed you can be found guilty of conspiracy and
put in jail. Our society recognizes that the decision to commit a crime expressed in [337]
conversation with others is already a crime. The law also recognizes assault with intent
to cause bodily injury as a crime. Whether you succeeded in causing bodily harm or not
is something extra. Loitering with intent also clearly recognizes that this person has
already decided to commit a crime and is just waiting for the appropriate time.
(8) We normally think of decisions in terms of specific actions or outcomes; we
decide to do something or not to do it. This is when we are in the mode of concern: we
are action oriented, something needs to be done, the decision leads to a specific
implementation. But we can distinguish complacency from concern.6 We can distinguish
acts of will which do not have immediate, direct, specific actions in mind this would
seem to be the mode of complacency. We can think of complacency as simply accepting
goodness, rejoicing in beauty or success or development or peace. It is a deciding, but
issues in no specific action; it is an act of the will; it seems to change attitudes rather than
producing an action. We can think of this as accepting who you are and what you are;
accepting both success and failure; accepting our lot in life, whether it be for better or for
worse. We can think of the attitude of acceptance in face of a diagnosis of terminal
364
illness, acceptance of the limitations of growing old, accepting the passivities of

diminishment, about which we can do little or nothing. In the end there is the acceptance
of inevitable death.
Contrary to acceptance, we can think of persons who resist, reject, resent, deny
their lot in life; persons who refuse to accept the diagnosis of their doctor and seek for a
doctor who will give the diagnosis they want; persons who resist and struggle against
death even to the last moment; persons who live their entire lives resentful and angry that
they are of limited intelligence or talent: persons who deny the aging process and pretend
to be eternally young; persons who are resentful or jealous or envious when they see
success and goodness in others and not in themselves. These too are acts of the will, a
mode of deciding, that does not issue in a specific action but rather in an attitude to life, a
stance taken in relation to something.
Complacency is an act of assent to goodness in general, a rejoicing in goodness,
an acceptance of limitation. It is a deciding but a [338] special kind of deciding. It is of
great importance as an attitude to life.
2.3 Emergence and Differentiation
(1) Intelligence emerges in the behaviour of the child, slowly and fitfully, in
reactions, recognition, gestures and finally language. Similarly and simultaneously we
can see the emergence of will and decision in the behaviour of the child. We can note the
acceptance of food or the refusal of food, consent with the will of the mother or dissent.
It is a tug of wills with the child testing the limits of tolerance of the parent. Children can
be described as wilful, stubborn, bold, disobedient, cooperative, good or bad. Just as
cognitive psychologists have traced the emergence of intelligence in the child, so other
psychologists have traced the moral development of the child from the earliest age. Preeminent in this field as we have seen are Piaget, Erikson and Kohlberg. What we want to
stress is that deciding emerges concomitantly with knowing. It is not as if the first three
Value Ethics
365
levels of consciousness develop first and then the fourth. They emerge as an
undifferentiated bundle of actions and reactions. It is only later that they can be
differentiated and identified as distinct.
(2) Decisions are operative from the beginning of cognitional structure. Just
because we put deciding at the fourth level, does not mean that we cannot make a
decision until we have already performed all the other preceding activities. We are
already deciding to ask questions at the level of intelligence: to be intelligent. We decide
to operate in the intellectual pattern of experience, we decide to formulate correctly; we
decide to ask the question for reflection, attempt reflective understanding and judgment.
Performing all these activities presupposes the activity of deciding.
In our previous text we considered cognitional theory and epistemology
identifying the activities of questioning, understanding, formulating, and judging truth.7
We prescinded from decisions in the interests of doing one thing at a time. But decisions
are the necessary and sufficient cause of these cognitional activities. They are voluntary
activities for which we are responsible. We decide to judge in the sense that we decide to
be reasonable, to exclude bias, to face the evi-[339]dence, to speak the truth. The proper
unfolding of this list of cognitional activities presupposes a habitual willingness to be
attentive, intelligent, reasonable and, finally, responsible.
(3) Deciding can be habitually operative. If you make a decision to join an
academic program, then you do not have to renew this decision every time you wake up
in the morning, go to lectures, read a book, do the exams. The decision has passed into
the habitual texture of your mind. Many of our broad decisions become habitual in this
sense. Marriage or a career choice is a major decision in our life which passes into the
habitual texture of our lives. We do not have to think about them until there is a clash or
a crisis. Many decisions become routine. Habits are voluntary and make it easier for us to
concentrate on more important things; we can consign many aspects of our life to habit
366
and routine in order to be able to concentrate on the challenging bits. In a good person
there is a habitual willingness to seek true values, to implement true values, to become a
true originating value.
(4) Decisions can be general or specific. General decisions will affirm the
goodness of being healthy, being kind, becoming responsible, fulfilling ones work
duties. Then there are specific decisions to do this now, to react to this person in this
way, to be in time for work or to be late. General decisions are operating in the
background, motivating specific decisions. General decisions can effect many specific
decisions. We decide as to our goals in life, and also the means to attain them. We decide
about long-term strategy, as well as short-term tactics; we decide on vision statements,
goals and targets.
(5) The depth of commitment involved in a decision can vary. You can make
very superficial decisions which can be changed easily. The two sons in the gospel said,
Yes I will go, and No I will not go; but both changed their minds. It seems to indicate
that their decisions were taken on impulse and were not very deep. Similarly, a decision
to marry can be serious, deep, a real commitment of will, a determination to be truly
faithful regardless of what happens. In our modern time we sometimes have a very
superficial commitment, which really amounts to saying, I will be faithful to you for as
long as [340] it suits me: if we have problems we will divorce and each will go his or her
own way; we will stay together as long as we are happy together. Much the same can be
said about any decision how deep is it, how serious, how determined. Is it just a whim,
an impulse, based on feeling or based on conviction?
(6) Some have spoken of a fundamental option. This refers to a deep permanent
orientation of moral decision-making to the good and the true. Normally, particular
decisions are simply implementations of this fundamental decision. It is possible to make
Value Ethics
367
an occasional specific bad decision without altering the fundamental deep commitment
of a fundamental option.
(7) Judgments of fact usually refer to the present actual state of affairs, to things
already existing. Decisions usually regard actions which do not yet exist; they are
alternatives, possibilities, actions which can come into existence by implementing
decisions. Thus a certain amount of risk is always involved in decisions. We cannot
predict the future, we cannot be certain how things will turn out. Existentialists like
Kierkegaard emphasize this aspect of decisions. Some speak of anxiety as the feeling
most characteristic of the activity of deciding. 8
(8) Decisions are irrevocable. Once you have decided, it can never be true that
you did not decide. Even if you change your mind, the fact remains that at this point in
time you decided to do something. It is easy to see that if you verbally abuse somebody
today, there is nothing we can ever do to change the fact that today you abused this
person. You can apologize, you can take back your words, you can compensate, you can
ask for forgiveness, you can affirm the opposite of what you said. But words once said
can never be unsaid.
Similarly with a decision. Even though it is a mental act, inaccessible to all but
yourself, it is still an act which is posited and once posited can never be said not to have
been posited. Once we have decided, we have performed an activity which has moral
weight and importance. We can change our minds, many things may interfere before the
decision is implemented, but still an act of deciding is an action like every other. If you
decide to kill someone and change your [341] mind a day later, you can never deny that
for that day you had decided to kill a person.
2.4 Levels of Decision-making
368
Let us look at the relation between knowing and deciding in terms of levels of
decision-making, culminating in the pure decision to produce the one and only edition
of oneself. At each level of the scale of values we decide for value or for satisfaction.
The vital value of health is often in conflict with satisfaction. Certain foods are
very pleasant to eat, but they are bad for your health. Exercise is healthy, but it is easier
to snooze. Smoking is bad for your health, everybody knows this, it is written on each
packet of cigarettes, but millions continue to smoke. Medicine is good for you, but it
often tastes bitter. It is we who decide on these issues; or else drift along in search of
satisfaction.
We recognize the social values of the good of order; how we are all better off by
cooperation, specialization, organization of society, the give and take of community. We
can decide to share or, on the contrary, we can wrap ourselves in self-interest. Instead of
giving to our country or community, we can focus on what we can get out of it. We can
choose the satisfactions of self-interest and selfish egoism, over against the good of
cooperation and order.
Each of us participates in the creation, and propagation of the cultural values of a
society. We receive these values through education, socialization and inculturation. We
then take our turn internalizing these values, improving their definition and
implementation, making the culture more authentic or less. We become the educators of
the next generation, the leaders, the innovators, the instruments of socialization. We can
choose the value of truth, or let it be swallowed up by expediency or conformity. We
can choose transparency and accountability, or dishonest practices and dubious
accounting. We can allow our politicians to mislead or be corrupt, or call them to
account by protest and demands. We can choose to be part of the problem rather than
part of the solution by our own corruption, in-[342]difference, dishonesty or
inauthenticity. We are responsible for our decisions for or against cultural values.
Value Ethics
369
Finally, we decide for or against moral values. It is an existential decision; a

decision not only to produce terminal values, but to produce the one and only edition of
oneself. By our moral value we make ourselves to be what we are as free and
responsible persons. One has to have found out for oneself that one has to decide for
oneself what one is to make of oneself; one has to have proved oneself equal to that
moment of existential decision;9
Thus, we can see that there is a deciding proper to the end and activity of each
level of consciousness. We can see that decisions increase in responsibility and depth as
we move to the higher levels of consciousness. I labour the point in order to bring out
the importance of the activity of deciding in all facets of human life and particularly at
the point of deciding what kind of life we are going to live, what kind of persons we
would like to become and how we are going to implement our judgments of value in a
life of value. This includes all values but especially moral values, by which we mean the
value of the person, as free and responsible, living in relationship with others, and
promoting the integral flourishing of both person and society.
In some sense the activity of deciding represents an apex in terms of the levels
of consciousness. Knowing represents a part of the human person; willing somehow
encompasses the whole. There is a sense in which metaphysics is the most
comprehensive view reached in philosophy; but that is only from the viewpoint of
knowing. There is a sense in which ethics is the most comprehensive view because it
includes human deciding and acting as well as knowing. Ethics differs from
metaphysics in that it is a practical science. The centre of the study of practical science
must be the activity of deciding. This is what all knowing leads to; this is where all
human action originates. This is where we touch the person as moral person; not the
person as a good footballer, not the person as a medical specialist; not the person as
professional teacher; but simply the person in so far as they are responsible for what
370
they value, what they have become, and how they act in relation to others. Cognitional
integration is limited to [343] truth. Volitional integration includes everything;
philosophy becomes a philosophy of life.
3 Priority: Values and Decisions
We have been at pains to identify and distinguish clearly between the cognitional
activity of knowing value and the volitional activity of deciding, yes or no, to various
courses of action. Let us not make the mistake of separating these activities as if one
could unfold quite happily without the other. The Medievals argued about the relation
and priority between the faculties of intellect and will. We revert to the empirical basis in
intentionality analysis and make no assertions, which cannot be verified in our own
experience. If we can get this relationship between values and decisions right, we will be
able to answer the question, To what extent do we choose our values? Two extremes
have to be eliminated first, the illusion of isolated reason and the fantasy of arbitrary
will.
3.1 Myth of Isolated Reason
In our citation at the beginning of the Chapter, Lonergan notes the end of, "the
notion of pure intellect or pure reason that operates on its own without guidance or
control from reasonable decision."10 Why is this so? In doing cognitional theory and
epistemology one naturally focuses on the activities of questioning, understanding,
formulating, reflecting, judging truth, deliberating, and judging value. One can recognize
these activities in your own experience, you can see how they build up in an integrated
cognitional structure and one can grasp that this structure is not open to basic revision.
But if the unfolding of pure understanding leads so directly and inevitably to that
conclusion, why do so many philosophers disagree on cognitional theory and
epistemology. Why do some students agree and accept and others resist and refuse? Why
do individuals with the same information and education, come to different conclusions?
Value Ethics
371
Belatedly we are led to the recognition of the role of deciding, not only in
implementing our value judgments in external actions, but also in the processes of
reaching our value judgments. We put 'decid-[344]ing' as a fourth level activity but this
not quite accurate as it is already operating in the activities of knowing. The proper
unfolding of the desire to know requires 'reasonable decisions' at each step of the Way
Up. We decide what data we are going to attend to, which research projects to follow,
which books to read, which topics to concentrate on. We push ourselves when data are
accumulating but understanding will not come. We are tempted by short-cuts, deceits,
borrowing from others, complacency in accepted opinions. We decide to follow certain
clues, to assemble sufficient evidence, to posit the judgment. We relentlessly question
the implications of our conclusions, the actions that should follow, what is worthwhile?
It is clear that if you wish to understand correctly you must decide to establish the
conditions for the occurrence of insight. We cannot command the flow of insights; we
cannot fully control the unfolding of cognitional activities, but we can decide to set the
conditions for the occurrence of insights and we can decide to block interferences,
biases, distractions or distortions. The activities of knowing are in the same need of
decisions as external activities like buying a car or cooking lunch.
The proper unfolding of the desire to know supposes the presence of willingness
and good decisions. But what if deciding is skewed or weak, or overcome by other
desires? If you allow arguments that are unsound to enter into your reasoning, if you do
not make the effort to gather all the relevant data, if your definitions are fuzzy and
incoherent, can you expect to reach a correct conclusion? If you allow feelings of selfinterest, a touch of ethnic bias, feelings of resentment, processes of denial, repression,
rationalization, etc, to interfere, then again you cannot expect to reach the truth. If instead
of the path of intellectual development and conversion you choose the path of decline
372
and remain happily unconverted, then, again you cannot expect to reach correct
judgments of value.
There is a normativity immanent in the unfolding of the activities of knowing.
There is a right way of doing it and many wrong ways. The right way is to allow the pure
desire to know free reign, to raise further questions, to challenge every hypothesis, to
eliminate every bias, to criticize every proposed judgment, to evaluate each proposed
course of action. Lonergan later expressed this normativity in terms [345]of the
transcendental precepts, be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible. This
formulation is in the imperative mood; this is the way it should be done.
The normativity is operative, but it still requires a free decision to be
implemented. The implementation of these imperatives supposes a habitual willingness,
a continuous deciding to follow these imperatives. Precepts are there to be followed
freely and responsibly; which allows also for the possibility that they will not be
followed responsibly. No matter how you look at it, decisions are part of the process of
knowing and without good decisions knowledge of truth and value will not be attained.
3.2 Myth of Arbitrary Will
The second myth that Lonergan explodes is "the notion of will as arbitrary power
indifferently choosing between good and evil"11 In other words, can we decide arbitrarily
between good and evil, right and wrong, between any alternative courses of action? Can
we decide independently and apart from knowing? Can we choose the good without
previously knowing the good? How does our will or deciding operate anyway? It is
evident that we do not normally choose arbitrarily, that is, at random, without thinking,
without judging, without evaluation. A little self-appropriation reveals this.
This is evident for economic values. Do you go into a department store and
choose clothes at random, without thinking, arbitrarily? Not usually. Why does it take so
long to decide on a purchase? Normally there are criteria operating in terms of your size,
Value Ethics
373
your needs, your available finance, current fashion, your likes and dislikes. If you choose
badly, you will probably find yourself back at Customer Service to return the items.
This is evident also in cultural values. When you choose a college, you do
research, you seek advice, you visit the place, you line up what you see with what you
are seeking. You choose the courses carefully or you might find yourself out of your
depth, or of no relevance to your interests. You choose the topics to study, you choose to
research in this particular area. These are not random choices, they are guided [346] by
your needs, your priorities, your values, your criteria, your likes and dislikes. There are
good choices and bad choices.
What about our moral values? Do we choose them arbitrarily or are we in some
way constrained towards certain values and against certain disvalues? Most persons
aspire to develop, to become good persons, to be authentic, true to their nature. In
making good decisions we automatically ask what is the right thing to do, the way to
become a good person. A judgment of value emerges from a process of deliberation,
assembling evidence, learning from past mistakes, moving towards sufficiency of
evidence for the good of something. That process is guided by a deep desire to know
what is true and good. To flout these aspirations, desires and ideas is to make bad
decisions, to become unauthentic, to choose blindly instead of reasonably. It is to choose
inattentiveness, unintelligence, unreasonableness and irresponsibility.
In trivial matters, where not much is at stake, we can and do choose arbitrarily,
between coffee and tea, a red dress or a blue dress, Pepsi or Coke. If matters are very
balanced and we find it hard to decide, we can have recourse to tossing a coin for it; you
might have two Universities which are offering attractive courses and the advantages and
disadvantages seem to balance out after all of your deliberation. You cannot decide. You
toss a coin. But this is rather exceptional. Where it is a matter of indifference, we do not
374
care one way or the other. But the normal procedure for human decision-making is to
follow deliberation that produces true judgments of value.
There are occasions when there is little time available for deliberation, when you
have to act quickly or immediately. Certain sporting activities, football, basketball, etc
often require immediate reflex decisions to pass or not to pass, to go left or go right, to
tackle or to hold off, etc. Police and soldiers are sometimes in life threatening situations
where they have to decide in a split second to shoot or not to shoot. The training that
such persons undergo is precisely to train their reflexes, to see quickly, to think quickly
and to evaluate and decide immediately. [347]
Decisions then are normally not made arbitrarily, that is, at random. Good
decisions follow good judgments of value in implementing and becoming. However, we
can choose arbitrarily, we are free to make bad choices, we are open to go against our
better judgment. We might baulk at this serious deliberation and simply follow our
feeling, seek satisfaction, become a drifting aesthete. But to act arbitrarily is to be
inauthentic. It is to go against the precept to be responsible.
3.3 Some Priorities
Is there a priority between judgment and deciding? The Medievals argued
fiercely about the priority of Intellect or Will; the Voluntarists praising the will, the
Intellectualists extolling the role of intellect. Is there any meaning or utility in this
argument transposed into our modern context?
(1) In terms of chronology, I do not see any sense in saying that understanding
emerges before deciding or vice versa. The child is an undifferentiated blob of sensing,
feeling, desiring, deciding, understanding, wanting. All are emerging, all are active, all
are mixed up together and so interrelated that it makes no sense of trying to claim one or
the other emerges first. The process of maturation moves us from undifferentiated to
differentiated consciousness. It is a long, difficult, unfinished, business of untangling the
Value Ethics
375
multiple interrelationships between knowing, deciding, feeling, loving, learning,

believing, trusting. Our efforts in self-appropriation try to identify some lines of
causality, some structure of the activities, some priorities or dependencies. In the
concrete everything is interrelated in a manner too difficult to comprehend. In the
abstract we can identify some priorities and causes.
(2) Conscious operations of the five levels can be related to one another in terms
of sublation. The higher activity is a going beyond the previous activities to something
new, the operations of previous levels are still respected in their integrity and
independence, the products of previous levels are enhanced and of increasing importance
for the higher level operations. In this sense there is a structural dependence of
understanding on sensing, of knowing truth on understanding and sensing, of knowing
values on knowing truths, [348] understanding and sensing, and finally the activity of
deciding, which normally depends on values, truths, understanding and sensing.
Putting it another way, you can have experiencing which remains as such;
without understanding. You can have understanding and sensing, without going beyond
to judgment of truth; you can have knowledge of truths which do not go beyond to
judgments of value, and you can have judgments of value which are not implemented,
not decided upon. You have an order of dependence of the higher on the lower.
On the other hand, we have to note the circularity of deciding, in the sense that
good attentiveness, acts of intelligence and judging are concomitantly the result of good
decisions. You cannot pass a good judgment of value without making good decisions.
On the other hand you need judgments of value to make good decisions. Two Latin tags
illustrate this mutual relationship. On the one hand, Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum
(nothing is loved unless it is first known), illustrates the dependence of loving on
knowing. On the other hand, Nihil vere cognitum nisi prius amatum (nothing is truly
known unless it is first loved), illustrates a certain priority of loving to knowing.
376
(3) In the end, we have to note that deciding is at the top of the scale and sublates
all the other levels and so is in some sense pre-eminent. It is pre-eminent in extending
knowing to doing. The doing is two-fold; it refers to the proper execution of the internal
acts of experiencing, understanding, knowing truths and values; and also to the external
acts of implementation of judgments of value in lifes activities. Knowing is a specific,
limited part of what we can do as human beings. But there is more to life than knowing.
The point of knowing is usually with a view to implementation. It is in deciding that our
knowledge is applied to our careers, our relationships, our moral conduct, our financial
transactions. It is our decisions, which are at the core of what we stand for as human
beings and how we become authentic human beings. Moral values are higher values than
cultural values because of the freedom and responsibility embodied in our decisions. We
may be limited in our intelligence and our education, but we are fully responsible for
what we decide to make of our-[349]selves as free and responsible persons. It is in ethics
that deciding becomes thematic, central, and explicit. In considering moral values we
move from the speculative to the practical, from the part to the whole. We move from the
knowing subject to the existential subject, the living, deciding, feeling, acting, becoming,
and being.
(4) Aquinas treated of the intimate relation of intellect and will, in great detail
and with acute perception.12 Most of what he says conforms to what we learn by way of
self-appropriation. He distinguishes twelve steps on the road to the execution of a good
decision six activities of the intellect, intertwined with six activities of the will. Let me
give a rather crude summary of this process. In order to be moved to action a person
must perceive some good (1). If he sees that this is really desirable it becomes a wish (2).
If the intellect sees this good as attainable (3), the will can form the intention (4) or
tendency towards the good. Now the intellect starts the process of deliberating (5) on the
reasons for or against carrying out this intention. Once we consent (6) to the process of
Value Ethics
377
deliberation, we become responsible for our thinking; all the previous activities can
happen spontaneously without our consent. Deliberation issues a last practical judgment
(7), that this specific action is the best course of action. Choice (8) follows as the will
decides in favour of the action. The intellect issues a command (9) to direct the will in
the use (10) of the means to carry the decision into execution. Finally, there is the
perception of the end that is attained (11) and its enjoyment (12).
This might sound somewhat abstruse and abstract, but it seems to conform to the
process of making simple decisions. Let us consider an example of going to the cinema.
We are reading the morning newspaper and a movie catches our eye; we read about it (1)
and are attracted by the thought of seeing the movie (2). We could forget about the whole
thing at this stage or we might continue to consider possibilities of when where and how
it might be possible (3). We form an intention (4) of putting aside time, arranging
transport, inviting a friend. We deliberate (5) about whether it is the right thing to do,
whether other priorities are being sacrificed, what is the best time to go. We consent (6)
to the idea, we approve of it, we take responsibility for it. We judge, when is the best
time, what is the best form of trans-[350]port, who is the most pleasant company to share
this experience, we issue a last practical judgment (7) that this is a good thing to do. We
decide that it is a good idea and a good thing to do (8). We take practical steps to procure
transport, invite a friend, make arrangements, as it moves towards the time of execution;
this is the intellect issuing a command (9), that it is to be done and the will using the
means to achieve the end (10). Finally, there is the knowledge that the end has been
attained (11), and the enjoyment of the movie (12).
It is true that we can make quick and good decisions without explicitly following
each of these steps. The whole process can be compressed into seconds or minutes,
where the various steps cannot be identified. On the other hand, a career decision can be
quite protracted and could be analysed in even greater detail than the twelve steps. You
378
could usefully try to identify these steps in your own decision-making procedures. The
analysis of Aquinas highlights certain aspects of the relationship between intellect and
will, which are of permanent importance.
(a) He shows clearly the intimate interconnection and intertwining between the
activities of knowing and deciding. There is a discursive process in the emergence of
knowing: from the general idea of going to the movie, to knowledge of when where and
how, to knowledge and appreciation of the value of the movie, to knowledge of the
alternatives and possibilities, down to the specific details of driving, paying, sitting and
enjoying. There is a discursive process in the deciding: from a general approval of the
idea in the beginning, to a specific approval to the particular time and place and movie,
to the means to achieve the end, to carrying out the decision. The two process are
intertwined, reinforce one another, need one another and complement one another.
(b) The two activities of evaluating and deciding have an integrity proper to their
own nature. The activities involved in evaluating must be performed in sequence, must
be performed correctly, must be allowed to unfold properly, and to reach its proper term
securely. If some data is pushed aside, if relevant ideas are not correctly understood, if
there is a hasty jump to judgment, if the process is not al- [351]lowed to reach a term,
then the evaluation will be faulty. Decisions based on mistaken evaluating will
themselves be faulty. The activities of deciding also have an integrity of their own. We
approve of the general idea of going to the movies; we assent to investigate further; we
decide to drive rather than walk; we agree that it is a good idea; we decide to implement
in certain specific ways. Just as we have to learn to evaluate well, also we have to learn
to decide well.
(c) Aquinas includes feelings in his analysis. Wishing and enjoying, as the first
and last acts of the will, seem to be explicitly and totally feelings though feeling
elements surely pervade the process. Aquinas attributes these feelings to acts of the will,
Value Ethics
379
as acts of deciding. Our analysis has moved in the direction of distinguishing the feeling
element the desire to know as a distinct reality in itself, not to be confused with
deciding. We established clearly the characteristics of sensitive and spiritual desires.
They are quite different from deciding. It is true, of course, that desiring enters into the
process of evaluating and deciding. But it is inviting utter confusion not to distinguish
between desiring and deciding. Evaluating is evaluating; deciding is deciding; desiring is
desiring. There are three distinct realities that are interconnected in many ways. Our
policy has been to differentiate in order to integrate, to distinguish in order to unite.
Perhaps we begin to see how the cognitive, affective, and volitional elements are distinct
realities, which combine into one developing triune consciousness.13
(d) Perhaps, we can now appreciate how these three components are
interdependent, complement one another, but are distinct from one another. The activities
of knowing cannot unfold without the desire to know and the free cooperation of will.
The desire to know goes nowhere of itself, without the ability to know, and the deciding
to act. Deciding is blind without intellect to present possibilities of the good to be done;
if desiring is in harmony it makes deciding easier; if it is contrary, deciding becomes
more difficult.
(e) The malfunctioning of any one element can disrupt the whole process. If we
have wrong information, ill-formed opinions, mistaken judgments, then, not only our
judgments but also our feelings [352] and deciding will be out of tune with reality. If we
have judged wrongly that certain leaders are tyrants, we will have negative feelings about
them, not support them, even though they are in reality good leaders deserving support.
If we allow the desire for satisfaction to dominate our minds and hearts then we will be
biased, our judgments distorted, our feelings soured. Despite our best evaluations and
feelings we can decide badly and choose evil rather than good. The good of the whole
requires the good of each of the components.
380
(f) We have already touched on the question of whether deciding beings

deliberation to an end.14 I would continue to insist that deliberating is purposive, and
comes to a term in a judgment of value. The judgment might be tentative, it might be
provisional, it might be only probable rather than certain. There may well be
circumstances where we do not have time to consider all the evidence, or the required
evidence is unattainable, yet we have to make a decision. In such cases we make a
provisional judgment as to the best thing to do. We judge that further research is a waste
of time; we judge that we have reached the point of decreasing marginal returns; we
judge that there are other matters more worthy of our attention. We do not sacrifice
knowing to an arbitrary, blind choice of what to do.
3.4 Good Will
Will is good by its conformity to intelligence. It is good in the measure
that antecedently and without persuasion it matches the pure desire both in
its detachment from the sensitive subject and in its incessant dedication to
complete intelligibility. A will less good than that is less than genuine; it is
ready for the obnubilation that takes flight from self-knowledge; it is
inclined to the rationalization that makes out wrong to be right; it is
infected with the renunciation that approved the good yet knows itself to
be evil. In brief, as man's intelligence has to be developed, so also must his
will.15
Just as we have to learn to actualize the potentiality of our power to understand
and to know, so also we have to learn to actualize our power to make good decisions.
Just as our intellects develop by being put to good use, so our will becomes a habitual
willingness for real good only by being exercised in that way. There is a real difference
[353] between a good will and a bad will, a habit of good decisions and a habit of bad
decisions. Aristotle made a distinction between the intellectual virtues and the moral
virtues. Intellectual virtues were perfections of knowing: science, understanding,
wisdom, art, prudence, etc. Moral virtues are attributed to perfections of character, of
behaviour, that involve choice and deliberation, the whole person.
Value Ethics
381
Kant was on to something when he insisted that there is nothing morally good in
the universe of human behaviour except the good will. The only real moral goodness
belongs to the good will; all other goods can only be good in a qualified sense. He is
right in that deciding is the key moral act. There is the goodness of the cognitive
component to be found in a good judgment of value. There is the goodness of the
affective component to be found in intentional responses to value. But there is the
goodness of deciding for the good, which goes to the heart of the matter. The cognitive
component is a perfection of knowing. The affective component is a perfection of
feeling. The volitional component is a perfection of the whole, of deciding, of freely
taking responsibility as human persons for what we do and what we become. It is the
goodness of self-control, self-direction, self-determination, of self-transcendence. Our
feelings may have been distorted by psychological trauma, by abuse, or by neglect; we
may not be fully responsible for our feeling orientation to the world; we can make
excuses for our distorted feelings. Our judgments of value may be distorted by a poor
education, limited intelligence, lack of experience; we can think of excuses for our poor
judgments. But deciding is by definition our own. In deciding we become responsible for
what we do with our limited understanding and perhaps soured feelings.
What then are the qualities of good deciding, over and above the goodness of
knowing and feeling. It seems to be a habitual willingness to choose in favour of value as
opposed to satisfaction. Such willingness should be strong and energetic, rather than
weak and slothful. It is told that Aquinas parents were not too pleased that their son was
to become a celibate monk, so they introduced a girl to his quarters to tempt him.
Aquinas snatched a burning branch from the fire and chased her from the building. It was
a firm and energetic [354] reaction, a sign of a strong will. There was no hesitation, no
weakness, so shilly-shallying. He never wavered in his vocation. Deciding for value
should be permanent, consistent and deep. It is not a great moral virtue to decide to be
382
honest today, if you decide to be dishonest tomorrow; decisions can be superficial and
fickle, blown about by the winds of change. Decisions should be comprehensive, for all
values at each level of consciousness. Not all values can be realized in a human lifetime
but in principle universal willingness includes all values. It is not a great moral
achievement to keep eight of the ten commandments; to choose certain virtues, with the
spice of a few vices thrown in for good measure. It should be a habitual willingness,
meaning a habit of deciding well, a disposition ingrained in the will.
Can you train persons to this universal willingness? Can you educate people to
choose values as opposed to satisfactions? You can, if the person has the initial
willingness to cooperate, if the person is willing to make the effort, if the person already
values universal willingness. We educate our children to discipline, to sharing, to virtue,
to willingness, to moral goodness. But we have no guarantees of success, unless the
willingness comes from within. No training course can put that there if it is not already
there in some inchoate form. Psychologists have produced exercises and techniques for
training the will, but they all presuppose that there is an initial willingness to do the
exercises and profit from the exercises in the participants.
One author speaks of a strong will, a skilful will, a good will and a transpersonal
will.16 By strong will he means will-power, determination, perseverance through
difficulty. Such will-power, he claims, can be reinforced by exercises, by focussing on
goals and targets, by various psychological techniques. The skilful will recognizes the
need for the reinforcement of feelings, the need for convincing arguments, for seeing the
worthwhileness of it all. The good will is the moral will; it is not only the good for
oneself but for the group, the society, the common good of society. It recognizes that we
are social beings in relationship with others. The transpersonal will recognizes a
hierarchy of needs as enunciated by Maslow.17 After the basic needs are satisfied, there
Value Ethics
383
remains a need for meaning in life, for a cause to devote oneself to, for ultimate meaning,
for a kind of self-transcendence. [355]
3.5 Good Decision-Making
In the context of an individual, good decisions presuppose (1) a correct process of
deliberation, deliberative insight and all that that entails, proceeding towards the
judgment of value. (2) Intentional desire for value as a feeling orientation towards the
good and the noble, allowed to motivate, animate, and drive the process of deliberation.
(3) An understanding of what it is to be truly human in the sense of self-transcendence,
development and conversion. Combine these with a good will and you have a good
person making good decisions.
However, decision-making often takes place in the context of a group, a parish, a
company, a school, a government, a local council, an executive committee, a board of
trustees, etc. But the same principles apply. It is a question of setting up the group
structures for all the components to be represented, cognitive, affective and volitional.
Usually the experts will provide full information on all feasible options. One has to
presume that there is a desire for the good in all the participating individuals. One hopes
that there is a shared vision of the values to be pursued in the decisions. Finally, someone
or some group have to make the right decision.
Often, the topic of decision-making does not distinguish between the judgment of
value and the decision. So much of decision-making literature is usually on the judgment
of value, rather than the decision. But there is a clear distinction between information and
decision. Typically, committees are set up to study an area and to make
recommendations. They are responsible for gathering the information, studying the
alternatives, assessing alternatives and consequences, presenting proposals and
recommendations. Some individual or group has to make the decision. It is the executive
that now takes over and implements the decision. There is the gathering of information,
384
studying proposals, making feasibility studies and the like. But there is in the end the
decision. They are two quite different activities and need to be clearly differentiated. 18
The goodness of the judgment of value depends on the information being
complete and correct. It depends on the authenticity of those collecting the information to
sort it correctly, to evaluate it [356] honestly, to order it correctly, to devise alternatives
responsibly, to present it objectively.
The goodness of affectivity is whether the individuals or group are spontaneously
oriented to value or satisfaction. Are they habitually desiring the good of the task in
hand, for the success of the project, for making the world a better place to live in? Or are
they pursuing selfish desires, out for themselves, seeking career advantage, operating out
of hidden agendas, looking for the easy fix rather than the true solution?
The goodness of deciding lies in the willingness to do the right thing. The
decision comes at the end of the process of feasibility studies, policy reports,
recommendations. The good qualities you look for in a decision are its depth, its
firmness, its resoluteness, its permanence, its commitment. Bad decisions are usually
fickle, frivolous, superficial, revisable, transitory, arbitrary, blind, and irresponsible.
4 Responsible Freedom
Perhaps the difficulty here is that everybody thinks they know the meaning of
the word freedom. Everybody uses the term often, argues passionately about it, defends
it vigorously, is prepared to shed their blood for it, and to take to the streets in protest at
infringements of their freedom. We all presume that we know the meaning of freedom
until we attempt to define it, to isolate its various shades of meaning and to evaluate
which is the correct meaning. The essence of deciding is this element of freedom and
responsibility. What precisely is this notion of freedom?
4.1 Towards a Definition of Freedom
Value Ethics
385
There are many nuances of meaning given to the word freedom. In a socialist
ideology freedom means free as a member of a group; in a liberal capitalist system it
means free as an individual pursuing personal goals. Parents believe in one kind of
responsible freedom; their teenage children mean something else. Some consider
censorship an infringement of their liberty; others consider it a defence of [357] people's
freedom to live in a decent environment. In what sense are prisoners free? In what sense
is an animal free? Is God free? Is the rich person more free that the poor person? Is the
temperate person more free than the alcoholic? These questions cannot be answered
without a very careful reflection on the meaning of freedom, which in turn can only be
done in the end by a process of self-appropriation.
Just as it was difficult to catch the mental act of deciding, so it is also difficult to
pin down the freedom of the act of decision. Plato thought that the person who knows
what is good will automatically do it; he did not seem to have much room for freedom
of choice. Aristotle recognized the difference between voluntary and involuntary actions
but freedom was not a great value for him. Throughout history many different theories
have been proposed to explain or to deny our freedom. In theological circles it has been
notoriously difficult to reconcile continued human freedom and a grace, which is really
efficacious, which produces its effect regardless of the dispositions of the subject. Our
modern notion is coloured by the French and American revolutions, which pioneered
individual freedom of all citizens over against authoritarian political or religious
regimes. So the predominant meaning of freedom even today is freedom from
oppression, from any constraint, freedom to do as one wishes, freedom from restrictions
of any kind.
So it is clear that there are many analogous meanings of the word freedom, and
that the shades of meaning are subtle but of great importance. We can learn from the
theories and the history but in the end only in our immediate experience of our own
386
freedom will we be able to identify these nuances, the limits of freedom, its
development or decline. If there is no personal freedom than all talk of morality is void.
If we are vague and ambiguous about freedom then our understanding of moral
obligation will be vague and ambiguous. So we go to some pains to be precise and
correct about our notion of freedom.
Freedom is such a basic notion that it is hard to find a synonym, or to express
what it is in other terms. However we must make some attempt to pin down some of the
characteristics of a free human deci-[358]sion. What we have said so far at least clears
the way. The free human decision is not determined by the laws of nature as formulated
in the sciences; you cannot explain freedom in terms of genes, reflexes, unconscious
motivation, inhibitions, compulsions, etc. Nor is the free human act to be explained in
terms of knowledge. To know the good does not necessarily entail choosing the right
action. Nor is freedom to be thought of as simply the absence of determination, a
random, chance, irrational, swinging from one thing to another.
Human freedom, then, is the human person as the free cause or determinant of
his own decisions and actions. Every event must have a cause or an explanation. We
have ruled out laws of nature as sufficient explanations of free choice. The
indeterminists claim that there is no cause that it is chance, random, behaviour. For us
the cause is to be found in the person, the self, the subject. It is the person who freely
chooses. Free choice is only possible when you have a human person. Human action
does have a cause or explanation; it is the self, self-determination. Within the constraints
of our human condition, it is the self that decides whether to seek the good or evil, to
choose satisfaction or value, to promote progress or decline, to be selfish or altruistic, to
act or not to act.
The essence of freedom is that the will may or may not move itself to its free act.
This is the necessary and sufficient definition of freedom.19 We can choose not only
Value Ethics
387
between alternatives but we can accept or reject the lot. In any free act there is always
the alternative of not acting. In any concrete action there is the possibility of choosing
alternatives or of not choosing at all. We are free to decide or not to decide; to will or
not to will.
Freedom is a quality of the act of deciding. Albert the Great though of Free Will
as a separate faculty from the intellect and the will. Aquinas rejected that. Freedom is an
attribute of will, an accident not a substance. There are some actions, which spring from
a free will; there are some actions, which spring entirely from instinct, from passion,
from chemistry, from mental illness. And there are some human actions, which spring
from a mixture of influences; there are degrees of freedom. [359]
Freedom is a directed dynamism: it is aimed towards self-realization or selfactualization. To realize freedom, to actualize freedom, to enhance freedom, that is the
direction we must choose. This might seem to be a contradiction in terms, that to be free
we must choose the good. But the position has a respectable pedigree. Aristotle
explained that the final end of all human actions is happiness. No matter what proximate
goals or intentions we might have, the final aim of everything that we seek is our
happiness. By happiness Aristotle certainly did not mean pleasure and says so explicitly.
He struggles with certain notions like final end, self-sufficiency, function of man,
perfection of man. He admits that pleasure and wealth and a good family contribute to
happiness. The person of highest happiness seems to be the person of contemplation.
Happiness seems to have been a kind of heuristic term, which Aristotle lays down as a
basic definition at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics and then strives to give it
specific content throughout the text. At least one commentator has suggested that
Aristotle meant by happiness a kind of self-actualization; the happy man "is the man
who makes a success of his life and actions, who realizes his aims and ambitions as a
man, who fulfils himself."20 Aquinas also held that humans necessarily will supreme
388
beatitude. But supreme beatitude is the final end; we are not free as regards the final end
but only as regards the means to attain the end. We deliberate not about happiness or
beatitude but about the means to attain them. Hence to be free does not mean freedom to
go against your nature. We are human beings; we start in a state of potentiality; but
there is dynamism towards growth, development, differentiation, self-transcendence.
We can choose the means to achieve that aim. We are not free to change our nature, to
be other than human.
To say that an act is free does not mean that you spin a dice and each alternative
has an equal possibility of being realized. In the moral sphere freedom realizes itself
through self-transcendence. Rousseau and others considered that humans are born good
but are corrupted by society. Calvinists and Jansenists seemed to consider that we are
born evil and only the grace of God can save us. Aristotle took a middle position we
are born potentially virtuous but not ac-[360]tually virtuous. But the dice seems to be
weighted in favour of becoming virtuous rather than vicious. The choice between good
and evil does not stack up at fifty-fifty. Our normal basic orientation is towards the
good, towards virtue, towards self-transcendence. We enhance our freedom in choosing
self-transcendence; we destroy our freedom by choosing evil, vice and decline. Thus
effective freedom, as we shall see, is not a given but a personal achievement.
By our free choices we define what kind of persons we shall become, what we
are worth as human persons. We easily complain about our failing memories, but we
take responsibility for our judgments of fact. How much more do we take responsibility
for our judgments of value, our moral decisions and actions! You often hear a person
praised for his football skills or whatever and the commentator adds that he is a good
person as well! We can praise a person's intelligence, his musical talent, efficiency,
business acumen, rhetoric or skill but when we say he is a really good person we are
talking about a different category altogether. Primarily in the end it is our moral
Value Ethics
389
goodness that defines what we are as persons. Personhood seems to be closely linked
with the activity of choosing, deciding and acting. This counts for more than
intelligence or skill. Moral goodness can exist in the uneducated, the unintelligent, the
unskilled, the poor, the socially deprived. It is a human person's free choices that make
him to be a good person.
Freedom and responsibility are two sides of the one coin. Positively freedom
means to be responsible. It means choosing good and avoiding evil; it means choosing
moral values and rejecting disvalues; it means promoting progress and reversing
decline; it means choosing the path of self-transcendence in all its phases, stages,
implications and detail. This is what a human person is meant to be; the perfection of
our potential, the fulfilment of our nature. We make ourselves by our responsible
choices to be responsible persons. We distinguish our position from that of Sartre
because of the notion of potential and actual. For Sartre we define our nature by our
choice; essence precedes existence. We would rather think that our nature is not static,
fixed, determined, rather it is a dynamic potential. As children we are in potentiality to
be educated, skilled, cooperative, virtu-[361]ous, good. Which path we choose is what
defines us as persons, we become as persons.
Negatively, freedom means the possibility of choosing evil, the possibility of not
following through on our judgments of value, the possibility of perverting the hierarchy
of values in our choices, the possibility of decline. In this case we constitute ourselves
as selfish, licentious, evil persons. It means choosing the incoherence of
rationalizations, the escapism of avoiding self-consciousness. It may mean capitulating
to moral renunciation: 'I know what I should do but it is too much to ask'. It might entail
moral indifference, a perverted conscience, a distorted set of priorities.
4.2 Limitations to Human Freedom
390
We are free as human beings, not as animals are free, not as angels are free, not
as God is free. As human persons we represent a higher integration of physical,
chemical, biological, botanical, zoological, intellectual, moral and religious elements.
We are not a mixture but an integration, a whole, a unity. That is the context of our
freedom and it defines the limits of our freedom. We are not totally free in the sense that
we can do anything; we are not free in all our actions; there are degrees of freedom and
responsibility depending on the our deliberation, our intention, our knowledge or
consent. Just as human knowing is different from the knowing of animals and inferior to
the knowing of angels or God, so as a parallel our freedom is to be understood as a
human quality different from that of other beings.
(1) Limitations as physical, chemical, living. It is fairly obvious that we are
bound by the laws of physics and chemistry. The lens of the eye refracts light in exactly
the same way as the lens of a camera, according to the same rules of concave/convex,
focal length, etc. Our digestion depends on a balance of acid and alkali; if there is too
much acid you neutralize with a bicarbonate. We operate within the laws of physics and
chemistry that apply to all material bodies in our movements, range of tolerance of
temperature, need for oxygen, emitting carbon dioxide, etc. To live and survive we have
to accept these laws, live with them, use them for our benefit. If we want to fly we have
to invent and construct airplanes. To survive in cold climates we have to [362] wear
warm clothes and build solid houses. If our eyes are defective we can correct them with
spectacles. As living beings we are subject to the constraints of all living things, birth,
growth, aging, death; the necessity of reproduction, satisfaction of basic needs; search
for food; specialization of senses; development of skills; protection from disease,
danger, predators. There aspects are relatively obvious and taken for granted.
(2) Psychological limitations. More difficult to assess are psychological factors
setting the context for our exercise of freedom and responsibility. Developmental
Value Ethics
391
psychology traces the elements operating in us through the life cycle of birth, childhood,
adolescence, independence, marriage, child rearing, aging and dying. They emphasize
the importance of the early family environment, which seems to determine the basic
outline of our personality, character and temperament. Personality as used in
psychology seems to refer to the totality of an individual's behaviour and emotional
characteristics. The structure of the personality whether we are reflective, or emotional,
or talkative will be laid down early in life. As we are not responsible for choosing our
parents, we are not responsible for these basic aspects of our personality structure,
character and temperament. We can later adjust and adapt and use that for good or evil
and for that we are free and responsible.
Willing and freedom emerges along with the understanding of the child and is
recognized in accepting and refusing, responding and not responding, obeying and
disobeying. Perhaps at first the child is largely determined by instinct, emotion,
appetites and desire, by the sensible. We do not normally consider a child legally
responsible for his/her actions; but parents can recognize good behaviour and bad
behaviour and administer appropriate rewards and punishments. Normal psychological
development to maturity involves negotiating the stages of development; it involves
balancing the areas of physical growth, emotional changes, sexual developments,
intellectual desires and moral values. The exercise of responsible freedom presupposes
such balanced growth. [363]
There is a parallel development of moral understanding, deciding and action. In
another place we will outline Kohlberg's stages of moral development. It is not normal,
morally or psychologically, for a thirty-year-old to be relying on instructions of their
parents. It is easy to see that serious psychological maladjustment makes the exercise of
responsible freedom almost impossible. Mental retardation, serious neurosis or
psychosis, schizophrenia, compulsions, fixations and so forth, can be so severe that the
392
question of real freedom and responsibility does not arise. We do not punish the insane
for their misdeeds; we sent them to a hospital or psychiatrist.
More difficult to assess are the in-between cases. To what extent do mild
compulsions, projections, regressions, repressions, denials, anxieties, phobias interfere
with the responsible exercise of our freedom. Is a kleptomaniac responsible for his
stealing? To what extend does unconscious motivation influence our actions and desires
and so undermine our freedom? It is clear that there is a large area of diminished
responsibility. The exact extent of the diminishment can only be assessed in individual
cases by a competent psychiatrist.
(3) Habits and Addictions. More normally we have the question of habits and
addictions; do they enhance our freedom or obstruct it? We have already explained
Aristotle's understanding of habits of virtue and vice and their function in the moral life.
Habits so understood are states of willingness to act in a certain way. Individual acts
motivated by individual decisions establish a pattern of response, where willingness
becomes easier, more spontaneous and pleasurable. Good habits enhance our free
decisions. Willingness becomes routine, spontaneous, we do not have to think about it
or make a big effort to decide. Just as insights pass into the habitual texture of the mind,
so decisions or choices become habitual; freedom is operating but it is on automatic, we
have habitual disposition to do good, we can turn our attention and effort to more
productive issues. Because we are human, our decisions become embodied in our
emotions, or spontaneous reactions and even in our chemical makeup.
Unfortunately, the same is true for bad habits. Individual evil choices when
repeated become habitual. There is an inbuilt disposi-[364]tion to continue with that
kind of behaviour. It becomes more difficult to change and alter the behaviour. Yet we
are still responsible for our actions, our freedom is operative even if it is not explicitly
invoked. A football player who loses his temper cannot plead in mitigation that he has a
Value Ethics
393
habit of losing his temper. A person who has the habit of telling lies, is still free to tell
the truth even though it will be more difficult for him than for an honest person. Vicious
habits leave freedom intact.
Addictions are somewhat different. They are not just strong habits; something
different is in play. Even with a strong bad habit, freedom is intact and we can change
our behaviour. Whereas habits enhance and embody free decisions, addictions take
away our freedom and muzzle it. An addiction is where the physical, or chemical, or
psychological compulsive aspect of behaviour has taken over. Our freedom is impaired,
limited, no longer in control. For a smoker nicotine becomes an accepted part of the
chemical balance in the blood and the body has a need for a continued supply of
nicotine. If there is no re-supply, the chemical balance of the body is upset and all sorts
of cravings, headaches, aches and pains can be experienced. Smoking can be an
addiction. As an addiction it is difficult to change by will power alone. Very often a
substitute will have to be provided or nicotine supplied through another channel, and the
individual helped by the support of a group or even by hypnosis.
There is a wide range of substances and patterns of behaviour, which can be
addictive. We think immediately of smoking, alcohol and drugs; but one can also be
addicted to sleeping pills, nose drops, tranquilizers, chocolates, etc. One can be addicted
to betting, to working, to certain forms of sexual behaviour; to fasting (anorexia), to
feasting (bulimia). A workaholic is addicted to work; it is not that he works hard or has
a habit of work, or is generous with doing overtime; he must work, is not free not to
work, it has become compulsive addictive behaviour.
(4) Sociological Context. Let us now consider from our own experience to what
extent we are influenced by our social environment. What is certainly true is that the
process of socialization gives us a [365] language, a common way of living, makes us
part of a group, and teaches us a view of the world. The child born in a Kikuyu village
394
will learn to speak Kikuyu, will eat and enjoy local foods and drink, will learn about the
traditions of the Kikuyu, will be taught to respect the elders, will learn to work hard, to
herd and to cultivate at the right time. A child born in an urban American setting will
learn to speak English, will dress in the current fashion, will watch television for an
average of two hours a day, will identify with America, will speak with a local
Bostonian or Texan or whatever accent. The social environment sets the context for
moral development and certainly influences considerably the setting, the limits , the
possibilities in which freedom will be realized.
It is also true that a bad social environment will influence the context of the
moral development of the child. A child growing up in a slum area will be exposed to
theft, to violence, to social tension, to prostitution, etc. early on in life. This increases
the probability that he/she will follow the example of those around and become like
them. Similarly a child growing up in a family where the parents are always fighting,
drinking, abusing the children, will be left with scars and traumas, which will influence
later behaviour. On the other hand a person growing up in a model home, with loving
parents, psychological and financial security, good example and good schooling has a
probability of turning our as a good citizen.
So while we admit the influence of social environment on the moral
development of the person we do not admit that such influence is inevitable or
determining. A person born in a slum does not inevitably become a thief or a prostitute;
there are many examples of people born in a deprived environment but managing to
react against such influence to escape from the environment and become heroically
moral citizens. A person can be reared in a disturbed family and have a propensity to
abuse or alcoholism but that does not mean that they will inevitably turn out as abusers
or alcoholics. Nor does it follow that the person from the ideal family, school, and
neighbourhood will turn out as a model citizen. [366]
Value Ethics
395
It is fairly clear from experience that parents cannot determine the future moral
behaviour of their children; if determinism were true then they would have control over
the behaviour of their children. But it just does not work like that. A parent may deeply
desire that their child follow their footsteps to become a doctor, or a farmer, or a pianist;
they can force them to go to piano lessons, force them to go to certain schools, force
them into certain leisure time activities, but in the end the child becomes an adolescent
and either accepts or rejects for himself. A parent can inculcate good moral habits, give
good example, set standards and expectations, but to the chagrin of the parents the child
can turn out to be a criminal.
Governments have tried to determine the behaviour of their citizens in
Communist and Utopian schemes. The State controls the education, the media, and the
political and financial institutions. They can fill the minds of the citizens with their
ideology, their ideals, their politics. They can censor contact with the outside world,
other ideologies, alternative life styles. But where has such a system ever worked for
long? In the end people make up their own minds and say this is rubbish. Cults and
some religious institutions have tried to determine the behaviour of their members by
strict rules, total indoctrination, and withdrawal from the wider society. But again it
only works for a limited time with a limited number of individuals.
There is nothing that can stop the emergence of true human freedom and
responsibility. The task of education is not to prevent that emergence but to prepare for
it, equip the individual to deal with it and then allow the mature adult to take
responsibility for his own choices in life, to stand on his own two feet as a moral person.
In the end there is the mystery of human freedom. Where does the willingness to
change come from? Where does the willingness to be persuaded that this is something of
value come from? The alcoholic has to really want to change in order to change. Where
does that wanting come from? Where does that openness to be persuaded come from?
396
You can bring a horse to the water but you can't make him drink. Where does this basic
willingness come from? It can only [367] come from the person and if it is not there it
cannot be forced from the outside.
4.3 Freedom as Achievement
Lonergan distinguishes between essential and effective freedom. Essential
freedom is defined thus: "Man is free essentially inasmuch as possible courses of action
are grasped by practical insight, motivated by reflection, and executed by decision."21
To be free essentially is to be free in principle, by definition as a human person you are
free; not with the freedom of an animal but with the freedom of a rational, responsible
human person.
But the effective exercise of that freedom may be narrow or broad: "But man is
free effectively to a greater or less extent inasmuch as this dynamic structure is open to
grasping, motivating, and executing a broad or a narrow range of otherwise possible
courses of action. Thus, one may be essentially but not effectively free to give up
smoking."22 So the actual range of possible alternative courses of action varies from
person to person. Our actual freedom is limited by our financial, social and cultural
situation. But it is also limited by the use or misuse that we have made of our freedom.
If we have allowed ourselves to become addicted to cigarettes then we are not free
effectively to give up smoking; we cannot just decide to give up smoking now and carry
out the resolution successfully. So the exercise of freedom expands and enhances our
effective freedom; the non-use or abuse of our freedom constricts and destroys the range
of our effective freedom.
We have already identified the physical, sociological and psychological limits
and context of human freedom. Now we are talking of the actual exercise of free choice
itself. In some ways freedom is analogous to a habit the more it is properly exercised
Value Ethics
397
the easier and more spontaneous it becomes; the less it is used and the more it is abused,
the more difficult it becomes to exercise it properly.
Our human life is a progress through dialectical tension between seeking
satisfactions and following true values. The gospel says that the truth will set you free:
if we choose to follow true values and im-[368]plement them, we are making good free
choices and we enhance our freedom. We extend its range. We are learning to live by
our free choices and not following appetites, physical desires which might be in conflict
with true values. It is the good person who is truly free; the good person has made good
choices, constituted himself as a good person, habitually seeks the good in freedom and
responsibility. Nelson Mandela, who was imprisoned for twenty-seven years by the
apartheid regime of South Africa, did not allow resentment, anger, or revenge to destroy
his goodness as a person; he remained free to forgive and to reconcile. In the inner
struggle of satisfactions against values, true values won out: he remained free, he was
not determined by what was done to him.
Freedom is to be realized in the harmony of desires, a balance in the dialectical
tension and not in the elimination of one of its terms. Human freedom is not the
freedom of an angel, but of an incarnated spirit; it has a physical, chemical, biological,
zoological, intellectual component. The aim is not to eliminate sensitive desires and
physical needs but to integrate these in the final volitional integration of the good moral
person. That is when the range of effective freedom is widest and we become truly free.
If however we follow the opposite path of following satisfactions as opposed to
true values, then the will is not being exercised and so it loses control. Bad habits make
us vicious persons and it is very difficult to change; will power is debilitated; vicious
forms of behaviour are ingrained; it is difficult to reverse direction. The gospel says that
the sinner is a slave of sin. The slave is not free; the sinner is not free in the sense that
398
his effective freedom is limited. Abuse and neglect destroy freedom; the proper exercise
of responsible freedom enhances and strengthens our real freedom.
4.4 Are we Really Free?
But is it still possible that freedom is an illusion? The determinists of various
stripes would grant that we think we are free, but they would appeal to hidden
motivation, unseen determinants, unconscious forces which undermine the reality of
that freedom. 'We feel [369] we are free but all the time we are enslaved' would be their
argument. How do we reply?
From the beginning of the text we have been trying to develop an ethics based
on self-appropriation, namely, based on adverting to the experience of moral living,
understanding the elements involved in choice, decision and action and affirming the
truth or falsity of these elements. We have been using an empirical method simply
expressed as, theory verified in instances. We have noted how knowledge based on data
of consciousness differs from knowledge based on data of sense; in other words how
interiority differs from normal theory. Here specifically we are concerned with a correct
grasp of the real meaning of freedom. Is it real or is it an illusion? How do we find the
answer except (1) by adverting to our own experience, (2) thinking our notion through
to the end, and (3) then verifying this by a return to the data.
(1) Each one of us has privileged access to the data of our own consciousness.
Allow me to advert to my own experience of freedom and limitation. I know that I am
free to act or not to act, to work or not to work, to make good choices or to make bad
choices, to get drunk or to remain sober, to resist temptation or to accede. I know I am
faced with a range of choices and I am free and responsible in my decisions. I know that
my choices are limited by age, by finances, by the group I belong to, by the
commitments I have made. I experience these limitations, I can identify and name them,
and my freedom is exercised in a context of which I am aware.
Value Ethics
399
I can look at my past and review the choices that I have made; some were hasty
and ill-judged; some were selfish and destructive; some were brave and liberating; some
were cowardly and enslaving; at times I followed desire for satisfaction as opposed to
true values; there were times when I followed the crowd, times when I took a stand for
better or for worse; times when I followed authority and other times when I defied
authority and tradition. I can recognize the unfolding of my human freedom with its
limitations and failings.
(2) My freedom is reasonable and responsible, not simply indeterminate,
uncontrolled, arbitrary. I have made some capricious, arbi-[370]trary decisions; I have
made such random, hasty, unreflective decisions and actions. But I now know that they
were poor decisions and I should have thought out the implications. There are criteria
that one sets for buying a new car or a new house; you want to find one that suits your
needs and can afford; you think it through, sleep on it, view the alternatives, which best
satisfies the criteria. Similarly our lives have a consistency and continuity in our moral
choices. If lying is wrong for me today then it is difficult to hold the opposite tomorrow.
I recognize arbitrary choice as a wrong way of thinking about freedom, that it does not
cohere with the felt moral obligations of the human person.
(3) That is my experience; one might claim that is all right for you but I have a different
experience. But how can it be different? Either you have not adverted to the data, or
you have not thought the notion of freedom through to the end or you have not verified
by adverting to the data of consciousness. Can a person coherently assert that he is
totally determined in all his actions and at the same time punish his child for disobeying,
or criticize a politician for lying, or praise a friend for being generous?
The notion of freedom I have outlined is actually presupposed by so much of our
social life, by the universality of praise and blame, by punishment and reward. I do not
think that my personal experience of freedom is so different from that presupposed by
400
the legal system, by our regular judgments on other peoples' behaviour, by our
educational system. We recognize degrees of freedom, we recognize extenuating
circumstances, we distinguish the freedom of children from that of drug addict, from
that of the mentally ill, from that of mature adults.
There is a parallel between the self-affirmation of the knower and the selfaffirmation of the free human person. Self-affirmation of the knower as a knower,23 is
based on self-appropriation of the activities of knowing. We identify the experience of
sensing, understanding and judging in our own lives. We define this as knowledge. If
these activities occur in proper sequence and following the intrinsic [371] norms of the
process, then I am a knower. But these activities occur in me. Therefore I am a knower.
Similarly, our affirmation that the human person is free and responsible is based
on the same way of arguing. I examine my own experience of freedom and limitation,
thought, decision and action; the factors, which diminish, and those which enhance
freedom. We define freedom in the light of this experience. If these decisions and
actions occur, then we are free. But such decisions and action do occur in the way
defined. Therefore, we are free.
We can distinguish between real freedom and illusion. We can distinguish
between dreams and reality. We enjoy fantasies about what great things we might do,
but know that they are not realistic. We might suffer from the illusion that we are
heroically good morally and then fall on our faces when reality hits us. We might have
illusions about how good other people are only to be disillusioned by their selfishness
and betrayal. There is a self-correcting process operating in our knowledge of our own
freedom just as in our knowledge of science or common sense. To claim that all our
experience of freedom is an 'illusion' is to void the word of any meaning whatsoever.
5 Choice of Evil
Value Ethics
401
We explained earlier the principle that we always decide for our own happiness.
It is a metaphysical principle, a definition, but also is translatable into common
experience. You might conclude from that that it is impossible to choose evil. In a sense
it is. It is impossible to choose evil as evil, pure evil, as such. We can only choose evil
under the appearance of some good to us. We make it appear good and then we can
choose it.
We use various tactics in this process but the strategy is the same. We will
outline the broad lines of this strategy in this section and indicate some of the tactics we
use.
5.1 What is Evil?
The notion of evil is a very difficult notion to grasp, even though we are very
familiar with it in our every day lives. Lonergan makes a [372] basic and correct
distinction between physical evil, moral evil and basic sin.24 So let us use this as our
framework for talking about evil. Without simple basic distinctions such as these, we
have nothing but confusion.25
First, physical evil are the shortcomings of a universe that seems to work
according to the principles of an emergent probability. The universe seems to be
developing, moving towards higher forms, orders, regularities, but doing so in terms of
probabilities not in terms of necessary determinism. So physical evils are the
extinctions, the droughts, the earthquakes, the diseases, the imperfections of a universe
that is moving from undeveloped to developed; which admits of breakdowns, false
starts, failures. These are physical evils over which we have some control, but not a lot.
It is the nature of the universe we live in to be undeveloped and to be working according
to schedules of probabilities, rather than a rigid, clockwork determinism.
By moral evil Lonergan means the consequences of basic sin. The consequences
are both personal and social. In the person that is a corruption of intellect, a distortion of
402
feelings, a weakening of the will, and a cycle of decline sets in. In society there is the
irrationality of the social surd, the irrelevance of detached understanding, competing
egoisms, the emergence of force, breakdown of social order, etc.
We get to the heart of the matter in the definition of basic sin, which we can
translate as basic evil. "By basic sin I shall mean the failure of free will to choose a
morally obligatory course of action or its failure to reject a morally reprehensible course
of action." 26 Basic moral evil lies in our failure to affirm and decide for the appropriate
moral value or course of action. It is our failure to reach a correct judgment of value and
a failure to decide for the good and the true with sufficient firmness, depth,
perseverance, clarity. The failure to affirm the good leaves us open to alternative
courses of action, which begin to seem quite attractive, and which we eventually
choose. The spiral of moral decline has begun. As Lonergan puts it: "if he fails to will,
then the obligatory course of action is not exe-[373]cuted; again, if he fails to will, his
attention remains on illicit proposals; the incompleteness of their intelligibility and the
incoherence of their apparent reasonableness are disregarded; and in this contraction of
consciousness, which is the basic sin, there occurs the wrong action, which is more
conspicuous but really derivative."27 There are many factors mentioned here and I
would like to build on this in outlining the stages of moral decline.
5.2 Stages of Moral Decline
Stage one. The beginning of evil lies in not choosing strongly enough the option
for the good. Deliberation should normally present the good in a true value judgment;
intentional response drives that process towards value rather than satisfaction. But it is
deciding which says Yes or No to these processes, to their unfolding in the correct way,
and to how firmly they are affirmed. The beginning of infidelity is a lack of firmness in
fidelity. The beginning of lying is in lack of firmness in our affirmation of the value of
Value Ethics
403
honesty. The beginning of our manipulation of people is our lack of respect for the
dignity of the human person.
So the source of human moral evil, in you and me, is an absence, a negative, a
lack. To grasp the meaning of human evil, you have to have an inverse insight, an
insight into the absence of an expected intelligibility. What should be there is not there.
Human evil is irrational; you can only grasp the irrational by the roundabout procedure
of an inverse insight. In not choosing strongly to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable and
responsible we are leaving ourselves open to choose to be inattentive, unintelligent,
unreasonable and irresponsible. There is no reason why we should do that.
I think this conforms to common experience. The paradigm case of Eve in the
garden is an illustration. She was not sufficiently convinced of the cogency or
legitimacy or reason for the command not to eat the fruit of the tree. She left herself
open to temptation. She did not exclude other alternatives.
Stage two. This absence of a strong affirmation of the right value or
alternative, leaves open many other possibilities. They are [374] not excluded. They
present themselves as possibilities. In fact they begin to be attractive. Eve continued to
gaze at the fruit and savour how delicious it might taste. Now we are shifting from the
real good, which we have not affirmed sufficiently, to the apparent good which is now a
possibility. We substitute lower values for the higher values that we should have
chosen. We begin to substitute satisfactions for values.
The processes that now take place are twisted reasoning, soured feelings and the
dynamic of decline.
Stage three. Corruption of Intellect. We have not affirmed sufficiently strongly
what we should have chosen; we have substituted a lesser good or a satisfaction. Now
we have to justify that in our own minds. We have to bring our judgment of value into
line with our weak will. We have to bring our knowing into conformity with our
404
willing. We do this through rationalization, avoidance of self-consciousness, moral

renunciation and various other excuses.
Rationalization. Instead of reforming our behaviour in response to a guilty
conscience, we attempt to change our value judgments and our conscience to bring it
into line with our behaviour. Usually, this takes the form of focusing on the apparent
good and forgetting about the real good. There are few things that are totally bad and
that bring no good, of any kind, to anybody it is an ill wind that does not blow
somebody good. So we focus on the good of vital values; or we focus on the pleasure
that will be experienced; or we bracket moral obligations, consequences, laws,
punishments, etc. It is difficult to choose evil as evil; so we dress it up as the apparent
good, what seems good to us, now, at this moment.
We rationalize stealing by pretending that we are just borrowing without
permission; that this is community property so I really own it anyway; he is so rich that
he will be able to replace it in a week; I am just redistributing the goods of the society in
a more equitable manner; I need it for my family, and the like. Or we might argue to
ourselves that, Okay, there is a rule that this is wrong, but this particular case is an
exception, the rule does not apply here and now for me. Or we appeal to a situation
ethics where we are completely free to say [375] that this situation is unique, no laws
apply, I have to do the loving thing and this is what I am doing. Loving in this case can
easily mean, what is convenient, what I like to do, what I get pleasure out of doing. Or
one can argue that, Everybody is doing it, so why shouldn't I. Or we might argue, Well
I will just do it this once and then never again. Eve in the garden began to think, Maybe
God has a hidden agenda in forbidding us to eat this fruit; maybe we will become like
God if we eat!
We avoid self-consciousness by not thinking about it; "just do it" as the T-shirt
slogan puts it. Engage in a ceaseless round of activities, an activism, that does not allow
Value Ethics
405
time for reflection, evaluation, self-awareness. If we always act on the spur of the
moment, or in anger or on impulse then we are avoiding awareness and the struggle
inside us is suppressed.
Moral renunciation is surrender. We admit that it is wrong, but it is beyond our
human capacity to resist the temptation. I am too fixed in my ways to change. I know I
should give up cigarettes, but I just can't. Once we have admitted that to ourselves it
becomes a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy and truly we will not be able to give them up.
This kind of mental activity introduces more and more incoherence into our
judgments, our conscience and our actual behaviour. We are living in a state of tension
with ourselves. We usually find that we are caught in a situation of covering up our bad
habits, we are involved in lying, deception, self-delusion, denial; this is the path of
disintegration and self-destruction.
Stage Four Deformed Feelings. We have already distinguished between the
intentional response to value that are feelings leading to true value; and intentional
response to satisfying and dissatisfying that are morally ambiguous. Now that our weak
will has chosen satisfaction over against value, our feelings tend to fall in line. The
feeling for value is smothered, choked, neglected, ignored. We substitute short-term,
sensible, selfish, pleasures which are not true values. Our body, our psyche, our
imagination, our habits, tend to fall in line with this behaviour and to expect it. The
pleasure/pain criterion substi-[376]tutes itself for the value/disvalue criterion. We become
insensitive to values and sensitive only to our own sensitive desires.
All the biases flourish in this context. We feel only for ourselves, we are
sensitive only to the good of our own little group. The disinterestedness of intelligence
has little hold when you are oriented only to personal preference, satisfying sensible
likes and dislikes, seeking advantage for yourself and your group over against others
406
and other groups. You begin to feel quite happy in a situation of competing egoisms and
conflicting groups.
One is now open to all sorts of deformations of feelings. Ressentiment,
inferiority complex, raw selfishness, lack of self-esteem, denial, hatred, depression,
shame, revenge, superiority complex, enjoyment of power, of wealth, of fame, despair,
sensuality, etc. As Aristotle pointed out, you are truly virtuous when you take pleasure
in doing virtuous acts. But when we allow ourselves to be attracted by sensible
pleasures like the masses then pleasure becomes the end. Then we begin to do the
apparent good rather than the real good. We learn to take pleasure in evil, rather than in
good. The intentional response to value is smothered, twisted, diverted, ignored. We
become insensitive to true values. We end up loving evil and hating the good.
Stage Five Cycle of Decline. We will examine in the next chapter the dynamic
of horizontal finality in development and of vertical finality in conversion, a process we
name self-transcendence. For the moment we consider the opposite, the possibility of
decline and refusal of conversion. It starts in the will we make weak decisions for the
good and hence leave ourselves open to lesser goods, or substitutes. Our rationalization
follows in an attempt to maintain some kind of coherence between our knowing and
doing. Our feelings fall into line as we manage to stifle our conscience and learn to take
pleasure in evil. The feeling aspect, the cognitive aspect, the weak will aspect, each
feeds into the other in a cumulative process of decline and disintegration. There is a
dynamic about the process of decline, a momentum with each aspect feeding the others.
Vices become ingrained habits. They are deep dispositions to evil rather than to the
good. We become divided against ourselves. Conscience occasionally [377] asserts
itself. But it is no longer a trusted judge between good and evil. Self-transcendence
becomes immanence; we are locked in our little world of short-term satisfaction,
selfishness and egoism.
Value Ethics
407
Stage Six Personal consequences. There is a contraction of freedom and weak

will tends to become bad will. In this context the power of deciding well is considerably
diminished. Judgments of value are twisted into presenting the apparent good rather
than the real good. Desires are a chaos seeking more of satisfaction than of value. The
dynamic of decline has taken hold. Deciding to reverse the process requires a
tremendous effort; but the motivation, the desires, the aspirations that would favour that
effort are absent. Deciding become weak, superficial, fickle, irresolute. Addictions and
other psychic illness can lead to complete breakdown of the power of deciding.
Stage Seven Social consequences. No man is an island, and so the decline of
one person vitally effects the family, the friends, the relatives, the work mates, the local
community, all the groups to which the person belongs. The good of order is distorted to
deal with the behaviour of persons in moral decline. The person in moral decline tends
to seek out those of a like mind, and similarly tends to corrupt those who still believe in
moral values. Irrational structures, laws, procedures, patterns are put in place. The
process of rationalization becomes social, they are taught in the schools, they are
propagated in the media, they are pandered to by politicians. The process of individual
decline becomes social decline and the social institutions follow suit.
The cycle of decline becomes rooted in the society. Decisions are made for
pleasure not for value. Sensitivity to true values is smothered in the rush for sensible
pleasures. The ideology of rationalization takes hold on the public imagination. It
becomes more and more difficult to initiate a reversal.
Conclusion. Deciding is the efficient cause of our judgments of value, and of
our actions. It is an important though extrinsic component in the judgment of value. It is
one of the necessary conditions for the occurrence of a good judgment of value. In this
chapter we [378] have distinguished the act of deciding from sensible and spiritual
desire, from cognition, from wishes. We have seen that deciding requires training; we
408
need to learn to have a habitual strong willingness to seek values rather than
satisfactions. Weak will can become strong; fickle will can become deep and
permanent. Just as we need to learn to know well, we have to learn to decide well, to
make good choices.
Suggestions on Questions for Deliberation:
(1) I am sure you would normally look for information booklets, check on the courses,
professors, procedures, faculties, expenses, the sports program, ask advice from family
friends and alumni; visit the place and do a tour; look over application form; talk to the
registrar. Good decisions suppose comprehensive and correct judgments of value, which
presuppose relevant factual information.
(2) Just to point out that choice is not usually an arbitrary, random activity. If you do not
choose your clothes or books at random, why should you choose your moral values in
such an irrational manner. What kind of persons do we want to become; how do we
understand the authenticity of the human person; do we desire values; do we aspire to
autonomy; do you want to grow up or not?
(3) The point is self-appropriation. The point is to identify the words value, decide,
desire, aspire, guilt, conscience, deliberation, etc. in your own experience.
(4) Prisoners, as human persons, are free. They may not have exercised their freedom
responsibly. As such they may have ingrained habits of criminality and in that internal
sense will find it hard to go straight. They are constrained externally in their movements
but remain essentially free.
(5) The range of alternatives in possessions, education, medical care, travel, etc. is wider
for a rich person than for a poor person. It is detachment from these things that free us
spiritually. The poor man is not necessarily detached in his mind from possessions. [379]
(6) The good moral person has committed himself to true values and lived according to
these and has learned to take pleasure in such a life; hence it is easier for him to
Value Ethics
409
continue in the same line. He has become what he has become freely and responsibly;
he has enhanced his freedom and responsibility. The depraved person has chosen
satisfaction rather than true values; he has developed habits of vice; he takes pleasure in
such behaviour; his thinking has fallen into line with his acting. His conscience is
deformed even as it continues to invite to change. It is very difficult for this person to
change morally. His freedom has become narrowed and weakened.
(7) We are oriented in some fundamental sense towards the good. The transcendental
precepts, as well as being imperatives, are also immanent and operative in human
activities. We are oriented to the good in that fundamental sense. We can decide not to
choose that path, leave ourselves open to alternatives, admire their seeming
attractiveness, choose the apparent good for us and in this convoluted way we can
choose evil.
(8) Habitual knowledge can be temporarily and conveniently forgotten. Sensible
passions can overcome our moral convictions. Knowledge of what is right can be
mistaken. Ones knowledge might be obstructed by drink or drugs. Our power of
deciding might simply be too weak to carry out the right action. [380]
Endnotes
1
Grace and Freedom, 320-21.
Nicomachean Ethics, 1046b10 1047b15.
Nicomachean Ethics, 1111a20.
See Frederick E. Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, Supplementary issue of Lonergan

Workshop, Volume 16, ed. Fred Lawrence, 2000. Complacency and Concern in the
Thought of St. Thomas, 71-204.
6
B. Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy.
410
Elizabeth Morelli, The Feeling of Freedom, in Timothy Fallon and Philip Boo Riley,
Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1987) 85-106.
8

10
Method in Theology,121.
11
Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q 7-17. See also Austin Fagothey, Right and
Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice, (Saint Louis: The C. V. Mosby Company, 1953,
1967), Especially 12-13 for a summary and interpretation of Aquinas, to which I am
indebted.
12
See Andrew Tallor, Head and Heart: Affection, Cognition, Volition as Triune
Consciousness, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997). Presents many
Lonerganian themes in common with this text, but from the point of scholarship rather
than self-appropriation.
13
Chapter Four, Section 3.1.
14
Insight, 714.
15
Roberto Assagioli, The Act of Will: A Guide to Self-Actualization and Self-Realization,

(Northamptonshire: Turnstone press, 1974, 1985),
16
A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, (New York, 1970).
17
Michael Shute, and William Zanardi, Improving Moral Decision-Making, (Axial Press,
Halifax, 2003) An example of decision-making following a Lonergan background.
18
Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 320-21.
19
Jonathan Barnes in his Introduction to The Ethics of Aristotle, (London: Penguin

Books, 1953), 34.
20
Insight, 643.
21
Insight, 643. [381]
22
Insight, Chapter eleven.
23
Insight, 689-90.
24
25
I found the following reasonably helpful but not free of confusion: Peter Vardy, The
Puzzle of Evil (Great Britain: Fount, 1992). Mary Midgley, Wickedness: A
Philosophical Essay, (London, Routledge, 1984). Martin Buber, Good and Evil: Two
Interpretations, I Right and Wrong II Images of Good and Evil, (New Jersey: Prentice
Value Ethics
411
hall, 1952). Harold Kushner, Why Bad Things Happen to Good People (New York: Pan
Books, 1981).
Insight, 689.
26
Insight, 689.
27
8
Moral Self-Transcendence
For we are so endowed that we not only ask questions leading to selftranscendence, not only can recognize correct answers constitutive of
intentional self-transcendence, but also respond with the stirring of
our very being when we glimpse the possibility or the actuality of
moral self-transcendence.1
(1) Think of one way in which you have grown and one way in which you have
declined in moral sensitivity since adolescence.
(2) Are you attracted by the notions of self-fulfilment, self-actualization, human
flourishing, self-development?
(3) Is to become a better moral person part of your aspirations in life?
(4) Would you prefer to suffer an injustice or to do an injustice?
(5) Would you prefer to have a good daughter, or a clever daughter?
(6) Four thieves rob a bank. Do you expect them to share the money fairly between
them? [384]
(7) Why are we so different from Albert Schweitzer, Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther
King?
(8) To whom would you go for advice on a personal moral dilemma: (a) a close friend?
(b) a competent professional? (c) a clever lawyer? (d) a moral, wise person?
1 Introduction
Let us keep in mind where we are. We have already identified three components
of the judgment of value, the cognitive, the affective and the volitional. We have
identified each of these, painstakingly, precisely, in explanatory mode. We have seen
how the first two components, the cognitive and the affective are intrinsic constitutive
elements of the judgment of value. We have seen the element of free and responsible
deciding as the necessary condition for the possibility of a judgment of value even
Value Ethics
413
though it is an extrinsic element. We now consider the total context of the developing
person, who posits the judgment of value and thereby constitutes himself or herself as
morally self-transcending, an originating value. This is clearly stated by Lonergan as
one of the components of the judgment of value2 and so we must examine it very
closely.
This chapter will be devoted to elaborating the notion of moral selftranscendence as the context in which correct judgments of value are posited. To make
good judgments of value, you need to be the kind of person who makes good judgments
of value. To become the kind of person who makes good judgments of value, you need
to make good judgments of value! To posit a correct judgment of moral value is to
change yourself morally for the better. To affirm an incorrect judgment of value is
usually to become a lesser moral person. There is a becoming involved in moral
development and affirming true moral values is part of the process. Just as in Aristotle
we become virtuous by doing virtuous acts, so in affirming true moral values we
constitute ourselves as good moral valuers. When we take a stand on judgments of truth
we are responsible for those judgments; they become part of us, what we believe, what
we stand for as persons. Much more so when we affirm our moral values; it is not [385]
just an act of the intellectual faculty, but an act of the person, taking a stand on what is
important, what has priority regarding persons, interpersonal relations, how he plans to
interact with others an affirmation of personal priorities in life. As we pointed out
earlier, when we achieve terminal values, we at the same time constitute ourselves as
originating value.3
This might sound like a vicious circle. But vicious circles belong to logic, and
we are talking of the realities of life. The reality is that the three components of the
judgment of value that we have already examined interrelate in a context of becoming
or of declining. We are calling this becoming self-transcendence. To understand fully
414
the authentic judgment of value, we must have a clear understanding of this developing
context. We are thinking of it in terms of final cause, or general finality.
2 Self-Transcendence
The term itself is open to misinterpretation from the beginning. Transcendence
in this context does not refer to God or to the transcendent, or to the spiritual. Similarly,
the term self-transcendence does not refer to leaving the self behind, as if it were of no
importance. Equally, the term is not used to create an aura of mystery or obscurantism.
Transcendence for Lonergan is the simple process of going beyond by asking further
questions and attaining correct answers.
I think there are two counterpositions in mind here. The first is Kantian
immanentism. Immanence is the problem of being confined in the subject. For Kant we
cannot be sure that we know the thing-in-itself, because we have no way of comparing
what is in here and out there to be sure that they correspond. So for him our knowledge
is immanentist, knowledge of concepts rather than of reality. The post-Kantians inherit
the same problematic and are also unable to solve it. Immanentism is a common
opinion among contemporary philosophers and when you think in terms of images of
in here and out there you will never be able to solve it. It is also a common opin[386]ion among non-philosophers. Solving this problem is central to establishing a
notion of truth and of value.
I think the second counterposition Lonergan has in mind are the incomplete and
inadequate notions of self-development, self-fulfilment and self-actualization current in
psychology. Some of these are based on a truncated notion of the human subject; they
often ignore the dimension of religious or moral development. They often advocate the
elimination of guilt rather than accepting that it might indicate wrongdoing. They often
espouse a self-serving notion of human success, which eliminates notions of right and
wrong, true and false, true and false values. Sacrifice, genuine love, suffering, service
Value Ethics
415
of others have no place in such counselling.4 So Lonergan escapes from this verbal
tangle by using a term of his own and intending an authentic notion of self-realization.
2.1 Immanence to Self-Transcendence
To transcend for Lonergan usually means simply, to go beyond. It usually
refers to the process of questioning, which no sooner has it come to a term in a
judgment, that it goes beyond to further questions, in an endless sequence of further
questions, opening out, going beyond all limited horizons.
There is an elementary transcending already operating at the level of sensing.
Sensing intends the sensible; seeing goes beyond itself as an activity, to what is seen;
there is a distinction between the seeing and the seen. We attend to what is there, not to
what we want to be there. We attend to the whole of the relevant data and resist
screening, censoring, denying, distorting by ulterior motives or hidden agendas.
In the activities of questioning, understanding and formulating we intend the
intelligible; we go beyond the activity of insight to intelligible relations, causal
connections, concepts, hypotheses, definitions. The activities are one thing, the contents
of these activities are another they are distinct. We go beyond ourselves to the
intelligible. Questions for intelligence intend the intelligible; the activity of un[387]derstanding grasps the intelligible in the sensible; this intelligibility is expressed
and formulated clearly in a concept or a definition.
In questions for reflection, reflective insight and the judgment of truth, we
intend and attain the real; we do not constitute the real by our knowing it. The real is
known as independent of our knowing it. When we attain the truth, we have gone
beyond the subject knowing, to what is known. Cognitional self-transcendence means
that we attain the real, the true, the actual, what is the fact. We are not locked in
ourselves as in a prison but can go beyond, to all that is intended in questioning and can
be affirmed correctly in judgments.
416
We have dealt with this question in detail in Foundations,5 where we considered

the themes of cognitional theory, epistemology and intellectual conversion. Questioning
intends answers; they lead beyond the subject and ask about reality. If the questions can
be answered truthfully we have attained the real. The criterion of the real is what can be
affirmed in a correct judgment. The real is attained in a correct judgment and not in an
imaginative jump from the in here to the out there. The image of going beyond
that Lonergan uses in relation to self-transcendence should not be taken too literally: it
is not the going beyond from the in here to the out there of imagination, but the
going beyond of questioning to correct answers.
In this text we are applying the same process to the notion of true value. We can
only attain true value by a process of questioning, deliberating and judging and so a
process of moral self-transcendence. In questions for deliberation we intend values. In
deliberative insight we assemble the cognitional arguments and evidence for the truth
of values. In correct judgments of value we attain knowledge of value. We go beyond
sensible satisfactions to the truly good, the good independent of the affirming subject.
We go beyond the apparent good to the real good. It is still cognitional in the sense that
it is only knowledge of value; it becomes complete moral self-transcendence when we
decide and act in accordance with this knowledge.
One could also talk of religious self-transcendence, going beyond a worldly to
an other-worldly perspective, going beyond creation to the creator, going beyond
human possibilities and achievements, to [388] the perspective of sin, salvation,
redemption, holiness, grace, unconditional love, and religious experience.
Self-transcendence, then, is a process of growth, of continuously expanding
horizons, of going beyond limits to the unlimited. It is not just an intellectual
development in the head, but a development of the whole person, an expansion in many
directions, an achievement of our finality and potentiality.
Value Ethics
417
2.2 Self-Development to Self-Transcendence

Lonergan does use the term self-transcendence is the clearly defined sense of
the previous section. In that sense it is closely associated with the process of
intellectual, moral and religious conversion. But I think he uses it also in a broader
context, with a broader meaning, referring to the whole human person, becoming as a
whole, and in each of his different aspects. In this sense self-transcendence refers to the
whole process of human development and conversion. It is a global term encompassing
all aspects of human fulfilment of potencies, authentic human flourishing. It helps to
appreciate this wider view if we consider some of the counterpositions which are
extremely prevalent in our contemporary culture.
There are many incomplete and inadequate notions of human self-development,
self-fulfilment, self-realization, and self-actualization current in psychology and in
everyday attitudes to life. The general notion of self-fulfilment is a very attractive one,
as it does respond to a deep human aspiration to become more fully human, more
authentic, and to develop ones potential to the full. However, this presupposes a
correct notion of what is human nature, what is its proper flourishing, what are its
intrinsic limits. We will just pick out three of the more obvious distortions for the
purpose of clarification by contrast, namely, the truncated subject, the alienated subject,
and the self-creating subject.
The Truncated Subject. To what do we as human persons aspire? What is the
most we can hope for? What are our deepest and best aspirations? Many popular
notions of self-development aim at the development of social skills, emotional
development, successful [389] adjustment to situations, but explicitly exclude moral
and religious aspirations. The implicit notion of a human person is of one who is
skilful, intelligent, successful, happy in relationships and climbing the economic ladder.
Notions of altruism, philanthropy, self-sacrifice, are either excluded entirely or are
418
perversely distorted towards a self-serving view of human development. If the moral

dimension of the person is excluded, then guilt, remorse, and conscience become
inconveniences on the way to self-development. The aim of the therapist becomes
eliminating remorse, repressing guilt, suppression of genuine conscience and the
substitution of some goal of success or happiness. There are many theories of selfdevelopment based on truncated notions of the human person and human aspirations.
The Alienated Subject. To be authentic is to be true to oneself. But what
happens if you have a totally false notion of what it is to be a human person? The
alienated subject has a false notion of what it is to be a human person, is trying to
conform to that notion, and is alienated from his true nature. There are those who think
of the human person as intrinsically self-interested and society as simply a battleground
for competing egoisms. This is accepting a Hobbesian notion of human person and
society: homo homini lupus, man as a wolf to man. But is this the true notion? Are these
the deepest and best inclinations of the human heart? Some view the universe as a
meaningless accident in the history of the cosmos and human persons as biological
realities suffering from the illusion that they can know, that they can decide, that they
have moral principles. Self-transcendence does not have much chance in this
philosophy of life. If you have a false notion of the self, and try to be true to this false
notion, then you become an alienated subject, a subject in basic tension, alienated from
your true self.
The Self-Creating Subject. Finally, there are the exaggerated notions of selfconstitution, which do not recognize any limits to the process of human development.
Nietzsche looked to the ideal of the Superman; the one who has overcome all illusions
and taken responsibility for his life; the one who is strong, courageous, powerful; who
has a super intellect seeing through the masks, the resentments, the ideologies of the
masses; the one who is true to the will to power. [390] Nietzsche popularized the notion
Value Ethics
419
that we create our values, we are responsible for what we become, and that there are no
limits to that becoming. Sartre is also credited with the notion that existence comes
before essence; that our freedom is unlimited and that we can make of ourselves what
we choose; we can make our own essence to our own image. There are many
exaggerated notions, which stress that we are totally free to choose our values, that we
are totally responsible for our becoming, that we are arbitrarily free to become what we
will. We will try to be very clear as to what extent we constitute ourselves as authentic
persons. In elaborating our notion of self-transcendence we must be careful to base
ourselves on an adequate notion of the human person and to pin down clearly the limits
of self-transcendence.
2.3 Development and Conversion
In presenting a comprehensive notion of human becoming, we have to
distinguish the process of development from the related notion of conversion. These are
distinct processes and must each be clearly identified and appropriated.
Development we will deal with in terms of genetic method, which grasps
continuity through stages of becoming. We deal with notions of sequences of stages,
emergence of new realities, principles limiting this becoming. Development seems to
deal with horizontal finality. We expect the physical development of a growing person
to go through invariant stages, which unfold outside the control of our will; they just
emerge, happen, we adjust as well as we can. Moral development seems to unfold also
in a series of stages and levels which to some extent are also transcultural, universal,
invariant and beyond our control. Again it is a question of adjusting as well as we can
to different ways of thinking, feeling, deciding and doing characteristic of each level
and stage.
Conversion is a process of becoming which we deal with in terms of a
dialectical method. Here we will deal with linked but opposed principles of moral
420
deciding the choice between satisfaction and value. At each stage of moral
development there is the possibility of conversion or lack of conversion. At each stage,
within the limits of [391] that stage, there is the possibility of good response or bad
response, choosing to become a good person or choosing to become bad person,
choosing value or satisfaction. At each stage we are free, and at each stage we make a
choice. Conversion is different from development; so first we treat of the stages of
moral development and later the possibility of moral conversion.
3 Understanding Moral Development
Do one's moral judgments change over a lifetime? Does this make moral
judgments merely subjective opinions subject to random changes? Does the moral
reasoning of the child, the adolescent and the adult differ structurally? If the notion of
development applies to the moral person, then, we should be able to identify a
beginning, a middle and an end to the process. Development seems to imply a
teleology, an end that the process is aiming at, a target as Aristotle would say. Surely no
study of ethics, which takes people as they are, can ignore this process. Surely, an
understanding of our own behaviour and of others will be considerably enhanced by
such a study.
Aristotle had a simple but clear notion of moral development. He often asserts
that young people are led by their passions and are not fit students for moral
philosophy. So he imagines the starting point of moral development as being a situation
where emotions dominate and reason is weak. The actual learning of virtue is difficult
and arduous at first. It is necessary to follow discipline, good laws, and go against
emotional impulses. The first acts of virtue are done with gritted teeth, opposing natural
tendencies to follow emotions. But, as individual acts of virtue are performed, the
subject realizes that it is possible and not so unpleasant, and it becomes easier to
perform further acts of bravery, temperance, justice, and the like. Eventually, the
Value Ethics
421
practice becomes habitual; it becomes a habit, a virtue, a spontaneous disposition to act

in a virtuous way and to take pleasure in such practice. The mature moral person
exercises a balance between reason and emotion, takes pleasure in goodness, practices
both intellectual and moral virtues and is happy to boot. This Aristotelian sketch of
moral development would seem to be accurate so far as he goes but [392] we would
hope for a more precise and differentiated treatment of the process of moral
development.
Moral development is a whole of which the parts are also developing. It is clear
that there is a physical, bodily, biological development going on through life, setting
the context for other developments. Intellect and skills are developing through learning,
higher viewpoints, clearer perceptions, surer judgments, more complicated operations.
Emotional development is proceeding apace where the chaotic emotional outbursts of
the child are channelled, directed, purified and brought into line with adult demands.
We develop psychologically in dealing with relationships, learning from experience,
acquiring a philosophy of life, a settled personality and temperament. Moral
development is a supervening integration of all these developments in terms of free and
responsible deciding, recognition of the superiority of moral values, recognizing the
struggle for moral authenticity, judging, deciding and acting in accord with a true scale
of values and thereby producing an integrated mature good human person.
3.1 Understanding Development
Let us now consider the kind of becoming that we call development. Obviously
there is something that changes and something that remains the same. If there were
nothing that stayed the same, it would not be change but annihilation or creation or
chaos. Heraclitus claimed that everything is changing, therefore, you cannot step into
the same river twice it will have changed in the meantime. If he thought his position
through, he might have realized that on these principles you cannot step into the same
422
river once because it is continually becoming and never the same. Process philosophy
would seem to face the same problem. There has to be something that remains the same
to be able to identify what has changed. Equally, if nothing changed there would be no
development, merely static immobility. Hence, our task would seem to be to identify the
elements that change and those that do not change and the relation between them; we
have to identify being and becoming. [393]
Development is a special kind of change. It is orderly, predictable within certain
limits, continuous, and intelligible. It is not physical change, as in changes of the
weather from one day to the next, or the changes in the positions of the stars, or
fluctuations of the stock market. It is not chemical changes as in iron rusting, ozone
layer depleting, a battery discharging or being charged. It is only in living things that we
get the full reality of development in the sense that we are using it. Hence it is in the
laws of biology that we look for the first understanding of life and how it develops. It is
only by extension or analogy that we apply development to the non-living world. The
characteristic of living things is that they possess their being, not in a static immobility,
but by development, generation and corruption, a beginning, a middle and an end: living
things possess their being by becoming over time.
Aristotle asked about the intelligibility of living things and coined the notion of
soul as the first principle of a living organic body. There is an identity between the
living thing that is generated, the living thing growing through its various stages of
development and finally dying or corrupting, ceasing to exist as a living thing,
degenerating. He applied this notion to the smallest of living creatures, to plants, to
animals and to human beings. The essential characteristic of living things is their ability
to move of themselves, a principle of self-movement or self-organization; orderly
changes emerge from within, unfold in a fixed sequence of stages and then cease.
Nowadays, if you ask, What is Life? You are apt to get the answer, the DNA. Aristotle
Value Ethics
423
had a more satisfactory answer. Life is not the material or biological substrate
however indispensable that might be. Life is the totality of the stages of generation,
growth and decay, the organizing principle that operates through the stages, the total
intelligibility of being and becoming of the living thing. Soul is a term, which has
unfortunately lost its original meaning and is now unusable. But Aristotle was certainly
closer to understanding life than contemporary reductionist biologists.
Aristotle was working on an empirical principle observe the movements of the
living things. It was not hard to distinguish between the movements characteristic of
plants, or animals and of hu-[394]mans, respectively. Plants grow, take in nutrients and
give out residues, increase in size, reproduce by various ways, respond to sunlight,
water, soil, but do not walk about, do not have a developed sensitivity and are not very
flexible in adapting to environment. Animals develop sensitivity, mobility, superior
organization and differentiation, more control over the environment and consciousness
at the level of sensitivity; but they do not show any propensity to talk, discuss politics,
write books or invent motor cars. Humans incorporate all the achievements of plants
and animals to go beyond, to ask questions, enunciate truths, judge values, decide about
their becoming and submit to an all-powerful God. Aristotle differentiated three kinds
of soul, vegetative, sensitive and rational according to the activities observed and
verified. Similarly he recognized an obvious hierarchy of powers in these living beings.
Lonergan abandons much of the Aristotles terminology of body and soul,
substance and accident, but retrieves the original insight now expressed in his own
terminology, in the context of modern science and his own cognitional theory. He coins
a terminology of central and conjugate forms corresponding roughly to Aristotles
substance and accident. He uses the terms potency, form and act, as the content of acts
of experiencing, understanding and judging, respectively. He has a metaphysical
framework by which we can recognize what stays the same and what changes in the
424
process of development.6 Lonergan deals with development in the context of a genetic

method.7 This technical background is there, if you wish to investigate further; it is
presupposed in our consideration of development.
What then is development in the strict sense? If you are trying to understand a
stone, you gather the empirical evidence, you formulate your hypotheses about chemical
elements, identify the elements, research the origins, confirm the conclusions and now
you understand the stone, which has remained conveniently static during the research.
Understanding 'development' presents a new challenge in that the subject is changing,
there is a unity in becoming, a beginning a middle and an end, all of which have to be
included in the development. Lonergan gives a useful definition of development, which
will [395] help us to draw out some of the implications of this notion for making
judgments of value.
The first part of Lonergan's definition states that development is "a flexible
linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations."8
Development in flexible in that there are a number of ways to reach the same
goal; the same aim can be achieved by different means; development is not the same as
the functioning of a clock. Food is needed but there is a wide range of acceptable form
of fruits, vegetables, meats, fish, crabs, and the like, which can be cooked in various
ways. Humans always use language but there is no fixed, universal and necessary
language, other than invented by human intelligence. There are hundreds of thousand of
languages constructed according to varying rules of grammar, agreement, phonetics,
semantics, and linguistics. Some social organization is necessary, but each culture, time
and place can have a variety of structures of organization.
Development is a linked sequence of stages. The stages are easy to identify,
fetus, baby, child, infant, adolescent, youth, adult, maturity, parenthood, aging. Freud
identified the stages of sexual development as oral, anal and genital. Kohlberg
Value Ethics
425
recognized seven stages of moral development. Piaget recognized stages of cognitive

development. But the stages are linked, related to what went before, related to what
happens afterwards, part of a sequence. There is a sequence or order by which one thing
develops from another; later developments depend on earlier developments. Intellectual
developments depend on psychological developments, which depend on neurological,
which depend on biological, which depend on physical and chemical. The sequence is
what links the stages the stages understood as linked together.
The key is to grasp the sequence, understand what is going forward. Later in
this chapter we will see how Kohlberg defines the levels and stages, which one
normally goes through to reach moral maturity. Each of these individual stages is worth
further study; each study contributes to our understanding of an aspect of moral
development. Kohlberg has also helped us to understand the links be-[396]tween the
stages in his stated principles of stage development how and why one moves from
one stage to the next. Grasping the sequence is precisely grasping the stages and the
links between the stages, and now you have an understanding of development. All the
data on each of the stages is relevant; all the data on the links between the stages is
relevant. The insight into development is an insight into the totality of empirical data on
both the stages and the links between the stages.
Higher integrations are the central forms, the unity identity whole, which
perdures through the process of development of the whole and of the parts. The
direction of development is towards further differentiation and specialization. But these
new emergent realities have to be integrated into the whole, adjustments have to be
made and unity preserved. Emergence of the genital stage of sexuality calls for
adjustments, reorientations, redirection, integration; this biological development has
moral implications, decisions have to be made, feelings brought into line, behaviour
adapted, relationships readjusted.
426
The direction of development is towards further differentiations and

integrations. The child is an undifferentiated mess of feelings, ideas, images, impulses,
decisions, desires, and fears. Intelligence is operating in naming, understanding,
relating cause to effect, but imagination is dominant; if a child asks why?, don't give an
explanation, tell a story. The child's moral behaviour is confused with desire to please,
fear of punishment, some sense of fairness and unfairness, respect for the authority of
parent figures, respect for the rules that are laid down.
The process of differentiation of all these elements is long and arduous and
takes place in successive stages. Kohlberg, as we shall see, traces this development
fairly well. The child learns to distinguish between accidentally knocking over a pot of
tea and deliberately writing on the wallpaper. He distinguishes moral laws such as dont
lie, from practical advice, dont go near the fire. He discovers that there are exceptions
to the rules. That there are conflicts of rules: Mommy says one thing and Daddy says
another. He discovers that some rules are [397] unjust. Some situations don't seem to
have any rules. So they move to a higher viewpoint, a higher integration, a different
way of structuring moral responsibility in the stage of conventional morality, seeking
approval and disapproval. But that itself is not a final resting place. The young person
discovers that you can't please everyone; approval from certain types of person is
neither desirable nor possible; what is approved may be felt to be wrong. Some people
might approve and others disapprove. Why should one rely on others for your moral
life and values anyway? And so the young adult moves to conscience, value, autonomy,
personal moral value judgments as a yet higher integration of a moral position.
The final part of Lonergans definition of development specifies that, "the
higher integrations meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds
through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence."9
The tension is between what the thing is at the present stage and what it is to become in
Value Ethics
427
the next stage. The underlying manifolds of physical, chemical, biological and
psychological elements are to be transformed successively by the new integrations that
emerge. The principle of emergence is the expectation of new realities that will develop
and emerge in due course. The principle of correspondence is the necessity that these
new developments do not disrupt the equilibrium of the whole; new elements have to
be integrated into the whole. Growth involves a constant tension between present habits
and future possibilities.
There is an operator pushing for change; there is an integrator holding things
together. What is this operator? Lonergan coins this notion of the operator as what
drives the process forward and upward. What is the common thread driving the process
from stage to stage? In the case of cognitional development it is the desire to know. In
the case of moral development, it is the desire to know the good, to do the good and to
become good. This is what keeps us going from stage to stage. Our deepest aspiration is
to become authentic persons; not just persons of skills, of success, of money, of
achievement, but of persons as authentic persons deciding and becoming true persons
of moral value. [398]
What is the integrator? What is it that pulls everything together into one? What
is it that calls for adjustments, when things are out of line. I think it is the person, the
subject, the one, who cannot tolerate blatant contradictions between belief and action,
or between one aspect of behaviour and another. We are probably familiar with the
phrase getting it together. There are times in life, when we are simply overwhelmed
by the rate of change and need to take time out to adjust, to take stock, to reorient
ourselves. The first year away from home, the first month in a new job, the death of a
parent or sibling, diagnosis of terminal disease, are crisis points requiring
readjustments, adaptation, learning, and above all integration.
3.2 Lonergan on Moral Development
428
Lonergan rarely speaks of moral development as distinct from moral conversion,

and then only briefly.10 He admits that moral development is extremely complex.11 The
complexity comes from the fact that moral development is one component of a process
of total development, where all the other components are also dynamic and developing.
A persons orientation in life can be basically religious, ethical, aesthetic or practical. A
person can be oriented towards self-satisfaction or towards values. It is difficult to draw
sharp distinctions. Besides the complex reality of moral development, there are the
complexities and confusions of the various theories of moral development.
However, he does appeal to Piaget to throw some light on the subject. He has
appealed to Piaget in reference to cognitive development; now he appeals to him to
understand moral development. Piaget studied the moral development of children by
observing how they play games of marbles and how their attitudes to the rules of the
game develop in distinct stages.12 Piaget noted that young children (5-7 years of age)
regard the rules of the game as immutable and absolute. They are an extension of the
authority figure and cannot be changed or infringed. In a second stage the children (8-11
years of age) agree that [399] the rules can be changed if everybody agrees but
somehow an injustice is being done to the game they feel guilty about it. In a third
stage the children (12-13 years of age) agree that the rules can be changed if all agree
and no injustice is being done to the game and everybody is happy.
Piaget with the help of collaborators also studied childrens attitudes to
punishment and the development of a sense of justice. He generalized from these studies
to the conclusion that moral development as a whole moves from a stage based on
respect for the law, to a stage based on mutual agreement. The first stage emphasizes
the immutability and absoluteness of the law; that it is backed by authority; that it
comes from outside and from above. Morality at this stage is clearly and simply
obedience to this law. In the second stage morality is based on mutual agreement among
Value Ethics
429
equals; each participant is free and autonomous; what is good is good for the group and
not just for the individual. It is based on mutual respect and recognizes the autonomy of
each person as free and responsible. This is quite different from a law imposed from
above to which we owe absolute obedience.
Lonergan seems to accept this model of moral development as a movement from
obeying an external law, to increasing autonomy and the subject taking responsibility
for his own becoming. In the first stage the person is responsible for his own judgments,
decisions and actions and hence for his becoming as a moral subject but is not aware of
this fact. Later the person through self-control and self-determination, realizes that he is
responsible for his own becoming. The critical point is reached when autonomy decides
what autonomy is to be. The subject finds out for himself that it is up to himself to
decide what he is to make of himself.13 He becomes a self-starter rather than a drifter.
Lonergan then sees moral development as always moving in the direction of autonomy,
the subject taking more and more responsibility for his own life and his own becoming.
In the end the subject is responsible, for producing the first and only edition of
himself.14
3.3 Kohlberg on Moral Development
I would like to outline Kohlbergs stages of moral development. He is more
detailed, differentiated and complete in his treatment of moral development. He also
studied children and their responses to [400] questions about moral dilemmas,
punishment, and the reasoning behind moral behaviour. Understanding the invariant
stages of the development of the structure of moral reasoning should help us to
understand our notion of the moral judgment of value. Kohlberg has never written a
standard textbook of his theories but there are many others who have summarized and
applied his theories.15
430
Our professed aim from the beginning has been self-appropriation of ourselves
as moral thinkers, knowers, deciders and doers. Awareness of the process of
development should help to understand our own coping with moral dimension of life.
An appreciation of the normal stages of moral development will help us to realize that
there are different ways of thinking about moral issues and that some are more mature
than others. One of the reasons for the variety of theories of morality is that people are
at different levels of moral reasoning. The higher forms of moral reasoning are
incomprehensible to those who are still at a lower level.
Levels and Stages. This is a simple summary of the stages and levels of moral
development as expounded by Lawrence Kohlberg. He seems to me to be more
comprehensive and accessible than the theories of Piaget or Erikson.16 There are three
levels, the pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional. Conventional here
means much the same as social or socialized. The pre-conventional level is the level of
egoism when the individual is not even conscious of belonging to a group; principles of
moral reasoning at this stage do not include the group. Conventional morality is
strongly, if not entirely, determined by the group, belonging to the group, and wanting
to be approved of by the group. The post-conventional is when one goes beyond
conformity to find the basis of moral principles in ones autonomy as a thinking human
being.
Level One. Preconventional level. This refers mostly to children in the seven
to thirteen age group. It is rare that an adult would be fixated at this level but it does
sometimes happen. Here the child is responsive to labels of good and bad, but interprets
these in terms of either the physical or hedonistic consequences of action. Good and
bad at this level mean leading to punishment or leading to satisfac-[401]tion. Results of
action are viewed in very physical terms. There is a sense that the rules are absolute,
because they come from adults who are big and strong and always right. There is little
Value Ethics
431
understanding of intention as a factor and no understanding of the reason for the rules;
they are viewed as quite arbitrary and the child has difficulty distinguishing moral rules
from physical rules, e.g. between don't tell lies and don't play with the scissors.
Behaviour is regulated by fear of punishment and desire for reward. This is all quite
egoistic.
Stage One. Punishment and Obedience Orientation. The dominant motive
here is fear of punishment. Parents are obeyed because, if not, you will be punished.
The degree of punishment determines the gravity of the fault. Children are very
responsive to this approach. It is a very basic level of moral behaviour. There is a
strong temptation for parents to use this, because it is so effective in producing
conformity. Many childhood stories work on this fear of punishment; the evil person in
the story is killed or eaten. Parents invent stories of monsters, or devils or witches to
frighten the children to be good. Even religious groups can use stories of devils, hell
and punishment, God as a terrifying Judge, to cower people into conformity.
Stage two. Instrumental Relativist Orientation. Here an element of fairness,
reciprocity and equal sharing are present. The child responds better to hope for a
reward. This is more positive and optimistic. This stage represents a more positive view
of what is good rather than a simple avoidance of what is prohibited. There is the
beginning of the awareness of being part of a group or family and that other people have
to be taken into consideration. Rewards are still interpreted in a physical sense. There
is no self-sacrifice; even participation in a group is for egoistic purposes. At this level it
is better to talk about heaven rather than hell, reward rather than punishment. Ideals of
the lives of good people can be put before the children to great effect.
Level Two. Conventional level. Maintaining the expectations of the
individual's family or group is perceived as valuable in its own right. This involves
conformity and loyalty, supporting and justifying the order and of identifying with the
432
persons and groups involved. [402] The society or group is dominant. The process of
socialization has taken place. Living in harmony with the group and being approved of
by the group are very important. One's self-worth is measured by the approval of the
group. Group roles are determinants of right and wrong.
Stage three. Good boy nice girl orientation. Good behaviour is what
pleases or helps others and is approved of by them. One's behaviour is governed by the
search for approval. Self-sacrifice is accepted if it is necessary to get approval. The
psychological pleasure of belonging and being respected is substituted for the cruder
physical criterion of pleasure in earlier stages. There is the beginning of awareness that
intention plays a part in moral evaluation. He means well! is important. Problems arise
when people do not conform to their roles, when roles conflict, when some people
approve and others disapprove of a certain behaviour.
Stage Four. Law and Order Orientation. Here there is an orientation towards
authority, fixed rules and the maintenance of social order. Right conduct consists in
doing one's duty, showing respect for authority and maintaining the social order for its
own sake. Here there is an abstract concern for law. Law is seen as the ultimate
guarantee of peace, order and the individual's rights. Any deviation from the rules is
feared as possibly leading to social chaos. The rules are viewed as unchangeable,
because they maintain social order. The reason for the rules may not be appreciated.
This is the basis for a legalistic attitude and is very common in society and in the
church. According to Kohlberg, the majority of adults are around stage four. The hero
of stage four is the student who reports his fellow students for breaking the rules;
keeping the rules is more important than loyalty.
Stage Four and a half. The cognitive disequilibrium leading to stage five is so
important that Kohlberg came to call it stage four and a half. This is characterized by
scepticism, egoism and relativism. It is a stage often reached at university or college or
Value Ethics
433
a bit beyond. It is a tendency to rebellion and independence from family and social
norms and even from church regulations. It is a stage of questioning the basis for the
rules of the society and the church. [403]
This stage tends to be sceptical because it sees that rules are inadequate, but does
not know what is to take the place of rules. It tends to be egoistic because it is
questioning the values of stage four and so is being alienated from the society, and is
thrown back on oneself. This stage tends to be relativistic, because of the awareness of
varying rules in different families and societies. It is a transitional stage from
heteronomy to autonomy. It is questioning the authority that makes the rules,
questioning the basis for the rules, and aware that the rules are sometimes wrong.
Conscience may be in conflict with some of the rules.
Post-Conventional level. This is the level of autonomy, when a person
decides for himself on the basis of principle or conscience, as to his choices. It is going
beyond the society in its actual reality, to formulate a moral theory or philosophy from
which you can criticize society. It is a search for the best kind of society. One author
sums up the final position well when he says: "If a person spends his whole life doing
what he has been told to do by authority, merely because of fear of authority (stage
one), or because it will bring him pleasure (stage two), or because it is expected by the
group (stage three), or because that is the law (stage four), he has never really made
moral decisions which are his own moral decisions." 17 This is a stage where you make
up your own mind for yourself, and it may well conflict with accepted wisdom.
Stage Five. Social-Contract legalistic orientation. This is a kind of moral
philosophy of rights and duties which came in with Locke and then the American and
French revolutions. Law is not respected for itself but is seen to function for the society
and can be changed. Law is an invention of man and can be continually improved. Law
is there to protect the rights of individuals. There is usually a touch of utilitarianism
434
about this. Here a person has to decide whether a law is just or not before obeying it.
There is an appeal to rights that are inalienable and so not given by the society but
which society has a duty to respect.
Stage Six. Universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the
decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical [404] principles appealing to
logical comprehensiveness, universality and consistency. They are universal principles
of justice that are abstract. They are not concrete rules of do this or don't do that, but
universal moral principles. Kohlberg cites Martin Luther King, J.S. Mill and Emmanuel
Kant as examples of this stage. He also seems to include religious heroes such as
Ghandi, Christ, Buddha, St. Francis of Assisi in stage six. Apparently Kohlberg was
thinking of creating a special stage seven for such religious persons.
Principles of Stage Development. Kohlberg's thesis claims that there is an
invariant sequence of stages that every person must go through. These stages have been
empirically identified. He followed a group of respondents over a period of thirty years
doing continuous interviews and research. He developed a technique of telling a story
and then asking for a moral evaluation of the actions and actors in the story and the
reasons for these evaluations. His interest was the structure of moral reasoning revealed
by the answers. He was not so much interested in good and bad behaviour but the
reasons for evaluating behaviour as good and bad. In this way he discovered the
sequence of stages and that they unfolded according to the following principles:
(1) Stage development is invariant. The order in which the stages occur never
changes. Just as in sexual or motor development there is a sequence of stages and you
cannot jump or skip or go backwards. You have to crawl before you walk, walk before
you can run, grasp before you can throw, etc. Similarly in moral development there is a
predetermined sequence which does not depend on the individual or family or culture.
Value Ethics
435
(2) Subjects cannot comprehend moral reasoning at a stage more than one stage
beyond their own. They can understand the next stage but not beyond that; it is beyond
their horizon. It is no use putting moral ideals like 'it is better to give than receive'
before a child of ten years old. It is no use at this stage explaining the transcendental
imperatives of Lonergan; you have to appeal to punishment or reward.
(3) Subjects are cognitively attracted to reasoning that is one stage above their
own predominant stage. They can understand and appre-[405]ciate the way of thinking
of one stage beyond even though they have not arrived there yet. They are attracted to it
because it resolves difficulties that they are experiencing and makes more sense.
(4) Movement though the stages is effected when cognitive disequilibrium is
created. A person becomes dissatisfied with his stage because it does not answer certain
questions or personal problems. There is an incompleteness, an inconsistency, a
contradiction, a confusion, which cannot be solved at that stage. This moves the subject
to the higher stage.
(5) Up to stage four, each stage represents a more adequate perception of the
social system and ability to think more abstractly. Moral development follows the steps
of socialization. At first moral thinking is purely individualistic. At stage four it is very
much influence by the society and social conformity.
(6) A subject can become fixated at any particular level. Just as in emotional or
motor or sexual development a person can become fixated at a particular stage so also in
moral development you can have adults who still behave like children. It is normal for a
child to pass through a stage of thumb sucking but you expect that by adolescence that
is finished; so a subject whose behaviour is still oriented to egoistic pleasure in
adulthood has become fixated at an infantile level.
3.4 Critique of Kohlberg
436
We have turned to the psychologists to help fill out the details of the process of
moral development. Kohlberg has done us a favour in outlining the levels and stages in
such detail and with such precision even if we have to disagree with certain points.
We can use Kohlberg as a kind of mirror in which to see ourselves and ask if what he
has said is true in our own experience.
These psychologists are telling us that there is enough empirical data to assert
the reality of moral levels and stages. Kohlberg claims that these stages of moral
development are universal and cross-cultural; that moral obligation is a universal fact of
human existence. The move towards moral autonomy takes place through distinct stages
which are identifiable, empirically verifiable, can be identified [406] in our own
experience and in the expressed opinions of others. It is transcultural, universal,
pertaining to human nature.
Kohlberg and his stages have had an enormous impact on American education
and Christian catechetics. He came at a time when values were being discussed but
there was little control over which values were really important. The 'value clarification'
approach simply brought out into the open the actual values of the group, but had no
way of rectifying a situation where a group might value stealing or violence. The bag of
virtues approach where each ethnic group or state or community chose the virtues to be
inculcated in schools seemed very arbitrary and unsatisfactory. Along comes the
saviour, Kohlberg, to introduce a bit of reason, empirical evidence, universal
developmental stages and so a foundation for an educational system that wanted to
encourage moral values. It was not relativist and not emotivist; it was both philosophical
and empirical. He immediately became a kind of guru. Unfortunately, even he was
unable to establish the truth of moral judgments, or to answer the question of where
values came from, and how they could be critiqued, or how you could establish a scale
of objective values.
Value Ethics
437
In favour of his approach, I would make the following points. (1) He has
identified different structures of moral reasoning at different stages and his observations
are very acute, perceptive, illuminating and basically true. The over all reality of
developmental stages is there for any parent or educator to see. (2) His concentration on
the form of moral reasoning and not the content of moral codes is of great interest to us
because we have followed the same path. He bolsters our position in giving
respectability from the point of view of empirical psychology. There are invariant
patterns of moral reasoning. (3) His claim to be intercultural, invariant, universal is also
important. If this reasoning and stages are really intercultural then he has found
something that belongs to human nature as such. (4) In this way he preserves the
objectivity of moral reasoning in a form of justice for all. (5) His outline of levels and
stages of moral development is an excellent example of Lonergans definition of
development. First, study the levels and stages; second, study how the stages form a
sequence; third, study the principles that make the sequence [407] move forward
(principles of stage development); fourth, study the principles of integration of new
developments.
This schema is important for teaching values. You have to make some effort to
speak to the stage at which the majority of your students are. If you are teaching young
children, then you will have to stick to stories, an appeal to fairness, insist on keeping
the rules, threaten with punishment, and cajole with promises of rewards. But if you are
teaching in a university you are dealing with students on the verge of autonomy, in the
transition from conventional to post-conventional moral reasoning. Now you can begin
to appeal to responsibility, standing on your own two feet, making good moral decisions
for your self, developing your own conscience, giving theoretical ways of analyzing
right and wrong.
However, Kohlberg is open to criticism and I would make the following points.
438
(1) Because of his methodology of discussing stories and eliciting the reasons
for evaluations, Kohlberg focused exclusively on the moral reasoning of the subjects.
He did not consider their feelings, or their decisions, or their implementation. Many
psychologists have detected a divergence between what people say verbally about moral
reasoning and how they actually behave themselves when it comes to the crunch.
Relying exclusively on discussion, Kohlberg might have missed important aspects of
moral behaviour, as it actually occurs in real life.
(2) Many have argued that feelings play an important part in moral judgments
and decisions. It is surely a defect in an account of morality, if it entirely ignores this
perspective. Similarly, an educational system based entirely on moral reasoning will not
be comprehensive as it is leaving out a vital perspective. Many of the educational
strategies based on Kohlberg's theories were a complete failure. Perhaps it is because it
is so narrowly focused on reasoning. A feminist critique has also challenged this
focusing on reasons rather than feelings in stage development.18
(3) Kohlberg does not identify and analyze the activities of deciding and
implementing. The situations he discussed were purely hypo-[408]thetical stories. It is
evident that judgments in the context of a classroom discussion might be different from
the judgments made in the heat of a real life dilemma. Kohlberg fails to distinguish
between judgments of right and wrong and the free decisions and implementation which
follows on after them in real life. He asks the question, what would you do in such a
situation? But an answer given in a discussion might differ from one given in a real
situation.
(4) I suspect that the neat schema of three levels and six stages do not work out
so neatly in real life. It is nice to divide moral development into three levels and six
stages and to line them up one after the other. I suspect that real people are a bit more
complicated and prone to mess up this neat schema. Some people's reasoning is hard to
Value Ethics
439
classify. Some advance in one area but regress in others. Perhaps there is more
overlapping of the various stages. I suspect that even though we advance from one
stage to another, vestiges of the previous stages continue to operate in us. It is not
completely unknown for morally mature adults to put on their safety belts solely out of
fear of being fined rather than because it is the right thing to do. There is a certain
inflexibility about Kohlberg's stages, which makes me uncomfortable. I am not sure
that the child is always totally egotistical; I suspect that they are capable of quite
altruistic actions even though this may not be the norm. I am not sure that in some cases
stages can be skipped and the end point of autonomous conscience reached by other
routes.
(5) There seems to be no analysis of rationalization, of how we reason ourselves
into doing what is wrong and the twisted kind of justifications we give for doing things
we know to be wrong. It would be very interesting to examine the ways by which we
make excuses for our moral failures, how we cover up, deny obvious facts, rebut correct
arguments, persuade ourselves that white is really black. If we are to fully understand
the process of moral development, surely we should learn by contrast with moral
decline.
Conclusion. We have studied the reality of moral development. We have seen that the
person develops as a whole, through distinct levels and stages. We can see that
reasoning develops, that affectivity [409] develops, that deciding becomes more
responsible, that relationships with society develop. In this context it is difficult to think
of a static ethical system, equally applicable to all levels and stages of development. It
would seem that any attempt to systematize the data on moral development will have to
adopt a dynamic point of view, a view that promotes moral development and reverses
moral decline.
440
Moral development is a limited affair; there are clear limits to what we can make
of ourselves. The levels and stages are there for all to see. There are some exceptionally
heroic moral persons, but they remain human persons, just like you and me. Dreams of
self-creation inspired by Nietzsche and Sartre are simple fantasies worthy of cinema but
not of empirical reality. Development is not a process of endless limitless becoming or
self-creation it is a distinct process with clear stages and definite limits.
There is a rough parallel between Kohlbergs levels and our own outline of
moral systems in our first chapter. You could simplify Kohlbergs levels as first,
obedience to the law, second, be as virtuous as you can, and third, adopt a universal
moral principle position. We outlined a rough transition from an ethic of law, to an ethic
of virtue, and finally to an ethic of values claiming that the ethic of value incorporates
and goes beyond and is better than the previous systems. A moral system must start with
people as they are; the permanence of morality is the permanence of the set of activities
performed by persons in making moral judgments, decisions and actions.
4 Understanding Moral Conversion
4.1 General Notion of Conversion
1. From horizontal to vertical. Conversion has to be distinguished from
development. Development implies continuity along one direction or orientation, even
though it presumes some change within that overall orientation. Conversion involves
something new and different in the very orientation. Lonergan has recourse to the notion
of horizon. A horizon is, "the limit of one's field of vision."19 From different standpoints
there will be different horizons. Every-[410]one has limits to his world. There are the
things with which we are familiar and at home. There are things of which we know
something and can ask questions about it. But, then, there are things which are so
outside the horizon of our minds, that we cannot yet even ask intelligent questions about
it. "Horizons then are the sweep of our interests and of our knowledge; they are the
Value Ethics
441
fertile source of further knowledge and care; but they also are the boundaries that limit
our capacities for assimilating more than we already have attained."20
Lonergan distinguishes a horizontal exercise of freedom, which leaves the basic
horizon intact; and a vertical exercise of freedom, which involves a change in the
horizon itself. For example, there are many forms of empiricism. There are
developments that can take place within the tradition of empiricism. Empiricist
principles can be applied to new areas of human knowing. The principles can be
formulated in different terminologies. It can be applied to language and become a kind
of linguistic analysis. These are horizontal changes; the basic horizon of empiricist
principles remains intact. By contrast, conversion involves a vertical exercise of
freedom that changes the horizon itself. A shift from empiricism to critical realism
would be a change in the basic horizon; it would be a vertical exercise of liberty. It
would be a move into a new horizon. The movement into a new horizon involves an
about-face; it comes out of the old, by way of repudiating characteristic features; it
begins a new sequence that can keep revealing ever-greater depth and breadth and
wealth. Such an about-face is what is meant by a conversion.21
2. From genetic to dialectic. Genetic method deals with development in terms
of continuity of a sequence of stages. Kohlberg's exposition of levels and stages is a
consideration of the development of moral reasoning, how one stage leads to another,
the continuities and the discontinuities. Any living organism will go through stages of
growth, development, changes of various kinds, which are understood using genetic
method. Conversion is more appropriately studied in the context of a dialectic method.
Here there is a conflict of linked but opposed principles of change.22 Dealing with
conversion we have to identify the forces leading us to moral goodness, the drives
obstructing the move to virtue, and how the conflict works its [411] way out in the
normal person. The dialectic is present at all stages of moral development. It is a free
442
choice of the individual at each stage. Although the tension is partly resolved in the
mature good person in principle it never goes away; we never eliminate either of the two
terms.
3. New beginning. Conversion is an about-face that involves a repudiation of the
old and an embracing of something new. It is a change of orientation. It involves a
choice and a decision. Conversion involves rejecting the old way and accepting the
new. There is both a negative and a positive aspect to every conversion.
It is clear that conversion is not just a higher viewpoint, a minor change of
horizon or a development in one particular direction. It involves a decision which is a
vertical exercise of liberty that is so basic that the subject himself is transformed.
Conversion is a transformation of the subject. Nor is it a minor transformation. "Rather,
it is a radical transformation on which follows, on all levels of living, an interlocked
series of changes and developments."23 It is a new beginning because it brings about a
new self to be understood. It is a transformation of the subject and becomes the basis for
a whole new series of developments. By conversion is understood a transformation of
the subject and his world. Still it is not just a development or even a series of
developments. Rather, it is a resultant change of course and direction. There emerges
something new that fructifies in inter-locking, cumulative sequences of developments on
all levels and in all departments of human living.24
4. Three conversions. Lonergan identifies three basic conversions, intellectual,
moral and religious. The order of exposition that Lonergan favours is first, intellectual
conversion, then moral conversion, then religious conversion. There is a certain logical
progression from intellectual, to moral, to religious conversion. It should not be assumed
because of this that this is the order of occurrence in reality or that this is the order of
dependence. It does not follow that intellectual conversion precedes moral conversion,
nor that moral conversion precedes religious conversion. Nor does it follow that moral
Value Ethics
443
conversion is dependent on intellectual conversion or that religious [412] conversion is

dependent on moral conversion. "Conversion has many dimensions. But there is no
fixed rule of antecedence and consequence, no necessity of simultaneity, no prescribed
magnitudes of change."25
Moreover, there can occur any combination of presence or absence of the three
conversions; it is possible to be converted morally and not converted intellectually.
However, normally a conversion in one dimension will naturally create a tendency to
conversion in the other dimensions, but this need not necessarily occur. Human persons
are very flexible and inventive in combining elements of conversion with elements of
decline.
5. Sudden/gradual. Nor should we think that conversion must of necessity be
such a sudden and once and for all experience as that of Paul on the road to Damascus.
Conversion is often a slow and tortuous process. "Conversion may be compacted into a
moment of a blinded Saul falling from his horse on the way to Damascus. It may be
extended over the slow maturing process of a lifetime. It may satisfy an intermediate
measure."26 Since conversion may be a slow maturing process, then, there is an infinite
variety of degrees in the achievement of conversion.
6. Willingness. Conversion is above all a change in willingness. Development
focused on reasoning and affectivity, without excluding deciding. Conversion is
centrally about saying Yes, or No. It is about deciding for satisfaction or value. It is
choice, will, the exercise of will, the acquiring of universal willingness, deciding always
for value. Within each stage of moral development there is the possibility of deciding
well, or deciding badly; the possibility of good will operating or bad will; the possibility
of conversion or lack of conversion.
7. Intellectual and Religious Conversion. Intellectual conversion27 is accepting
judgment as the criterion of the real, rather then the unquestioned imaginative
444
assumptions of the out there now real; it is accepting that knowing is not looking, but a
series of interrelated cognitional activities; it is moving from the world of immediacy
into the world mediated by meaning. Religious conversion is being [413] grasped by
ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and permanent selfsurrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations.28 This is the context in which
moral conversion might or might not occur.
4.2 Moral Conversion
The meaning of moral conversion can be stated quite simply: "Moral conversion
changes the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values."29 It
involves a turning away from satisfactions and a turning to values and involves a radical
transformation of the self because it is in moral decisions that the subject constitutes
himself as a free and responsible subject. It is when satisfaction and value conflict that
we have to make a moral choice. Now we have to consider what is meant by these two
key terms value and satisfaction. We have to give meaning to these terms by appeal
to further clarifications, illustrations and examples, not only from texts but also from our
own experience. We have already (Chapter Six) discussed the difference between the
intentional response to value and the intentional response to the agreeable or
disagreeable, in the context of the judgment of value. It runs parallel to the distinction
Lonergan draws here between value and satisfaction in the context of moral conversion.
1. Satisfactions. Lonergan gives very little help in identifying what precisely is intended
here. He rarely elaborates on what is meant and continues just to refer to satisfactions, as
if everybody knows what he was referring to. The intentional response to the agreeable
or disagreeable is in itself morally neutral or ambiguous. Presumably, satisfactions
simply as such are also neither morally good nor bad. Further, we have to remember that
the desire to know can be satisfied; such satisfaction is actually a criterion that you have
reached an invulnerable insight. Moral conscience can also be satisfied, a happy
Value Ethics
445
conscience. Satisfaction itself can be a value. Hence, we presume that by satisfaction

Lonergan is referring to sensitive satisfaction that is in some way is in conflict or
opposed to value.
Sensitive satisfactions simply stated are pleasures. They result at the level of
feeling and experience when sensitive needs, wants and [414] desires are met. Animals
in the biological pattern of experience have appetites, drives, desires, instincts, reflexes,
senses, memory and imagination. They act exclusively in terms of satisfying appetites
here and now; seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. If they are hungry and there is food,
they eat, if they feel like mating and there is a mate, they mate. If they are tired they go
to sleep. Hence they seek immediate, selfish, gratification of physical appetites, seeking
the pleasurable and avoiding the painful.
Children are spontaneously orientated towards sensible pleasure and satisfaction.
As animals we inherit all the instincts, impulses, appetites and senses of the animals.
Our orientation is towards the immediate egotistical gratification of all desires and
needs. Small children operate on this criterion of behaviour. The child learns only
gradually that pleasures can be postponed, cancelled or disciplined. From pleasing
himself, the child may learn the value of pleasing the parents. The child is taught
obedience by way of reward and punishment. Now a different kind of pleasure and pain
is introduced into the equation. The child learns the value of obedience and gradually
learns to distinguish what is pleasing to the parents and what is not pleasing. Later that
will develop into the notion of what is right behaviour and what is wrong. Normally,
some sense of orientation to what is valuable beyond simple pleasure and pain will
be present by the time the child reaches the age of reason.
But sensitive satisfaction continues to play an important part in the life of the
adult. If it is the dominant motivation, then, the adult remains in what Kierkegaard
called the aesthetic stage and what Lonergan would call morally unconverted. It is a
446
phase dominated by sense, pleasure and impulse. The self is dispersed in the pursuit of
pleasure and sense enjoyment. One drifts from one thing to another; this person is most
aptly called a drifter; he has no other principle guiding his life than the search for
pleasure. Pleasure can be found in all sorts of ways, on different occasions, in different
places. There is no cure for such a drifter unless he breaks into a new horizon. The
person simply has to make a choice, Either-Or; either to remain at that level or to make
the transition to the ethical level by an act of choice, by self-commitment. Lonergan
would call this a moral con-[415]version, a transition from satisfaction to value.
Lonergan does not invoke Kierkegaard in this context, but it seems that the transition
from the aesthetic to the ethical stage is remarkably similar to Lonergan's moral
conversion.
Satisfactions are not evil but they are ambiguous; they may coincide with what is
truly valuable and they may be in conflict with what is truly valuable. In themselves
sensitive feelings as sensitive are amoral: the category of morality does not apply. It is
only in the human person, when sensitive feeling is integrated as human sensitivity, that
the moral question arises. Moral education as Aristotle pointed out is to teach children to
take pleasure in good and noble works; it is an education of the emotions. Aristotle also
insists that the criterion of virtue is when you take pleasure in the exercise of the virtue.
He is also clear that contemplation as well as being the highest form of activity proper to
human beings is also the most pleasant of all activities. Hence we are in no way trying to
eliminate satisfaction from the moral life but to grasp the difference between the
satisfactions, which are in conflict with moral values and the satisfactions, which
accompany and reward moral living.
Satisfactions that oppose true values are usually selfish, physical, immediate and
an end in themselves. The child at first is thoroughly egotistical; it is concerned only
with its own private hunger, thirst, desires and needs. This cannot be called a moral fault
Value Ethics
447
because the intentional response to value has not yet emerged. Similarly, animals are not
renowned for their altruistic behaviour. The unconverted or the aesthete in Kierkegaard's
sense is also looking for selfish pleasure; a situation is viewed only from the point of
view of the possibility of pleasure for the drifter. The point of view of other participants
in the situation is not considered. The drunkard, the thief and the drug addict are
thinking only of their own satisfaction.
The pleasures that conflict with true values also tend to be strong, physical
pleasures, predominantly of touch; cravings and passions that tend to carry us away and
take control. The sexual impulse is enormously strong; if allowed free reign it would
almost certainly conflict with values such as respect, love, temperance, justice and the
[416] like. To a lesser extent hunger and thirst are very demanding physical desires,
which can lead easily to excess. Such strong sensitive feelings tend to take control, to
overcome the desire for value, to determine our decisions.
The child cannot postpone gratification; it must have a drink here and now
immediately. It is a short-term view. The drifter thinks only of the immediate future and
the possibility of imminent pleasure; the long-term consequences of behaviour are not
considered. It is only with difficulty that the child learns that sometimes you have to
work now and rest later, eat your vegetables now and the desert later, that gratification
can be postponed.
The child and the drifter are motivated by the search for pleasure and the
avoidance of pain. Pleasure is an end in itself. The pleasures of drink, of sex, of drugs
are sought for their own sake regardless of consequences. The higher pleasures that
Aristotle talks about accompanying virtuous activity and contemplation are not sought
for their own sake. We seek contemplation because it is the fulfilment of human
aspirations; and as a by-product we get the greatest satisfaction. But we do not practice
contemplation for the sake of the pleasure that it gives.
448
2. True values. The pleasure principle of the young child is gradually modified
by the inculcation of values, vital, social, cultural, moral and religious. The child has to
learn that there are other people in the universe who also have needs and desires. So the
child is taught to dress properly, to keep clean, to respect the elders, not to fight with the
other children, to help in the housework. Here values are conflicting with the pleasure
principle. As the child learns to read, goes to school, appropriates the cultural and
language values of the society, the horizon is widened, further values are introduced in
to the equation. Moral values also emerge; the child is taught to obey its parents, to share
with the other children, not to tell lies, not to use bad language. The orientation of
behaviour shifts from selfish satisfactions to the realization of true values. The process
continues throughout life. [417]
True value is what is intended in the question for deliberation, what is responded
to in the intentional response to value, what is grasped in deliberative insight, what is
affirmed in a judgment of value, what is decided for and implemented by an authentic
person. Values are known, not by looking, but by a series of interrelated activities,
respecting the cognitive, affective, volitional components. Our intellectual knowledge of
truth differs from sense knowing; similarly, our knowledge of values differs
fundamentally from sensitive response to pleasure. The authentic person is the one who
lives according to these values and not according to the criterion of sensitive
satisfaction. Values tend to be long-term, spiritual, moral or intellectual, altruistic; they
line up in terms of a scale of values; they tend not to eliminate pleasure but to redirect,
sublimate, displace it, so that we learn to take pleasure in goodness.
A new criterion of value judgments, decision and action emerges in the human
being. It emerges first in terms of responding to rewards and punishments, seeking the
approval of parents and society and avoiding their disapproval. In a good family morally
right behaviour will be approved and morally wrong behaviour will be disapproved of.
Value Ethics
449
In adolescence the teenager will attempt to move from dependence to autonomy, to

express the criterion of behaviour in terms of personally grasped ideas of justice, social
contract, equality, what is right or wrong independently of approval or disapproval of
parents, society, or church. Moral behaviour will then develop according to this criterion
of true values. These are grasped by asking questions of value, deliberative insights,
judgments of value, good decisions and execution.
3. Dialectic. Moral conversion is a dialectic by which we mean linked but
opposed principles of change.30 The principles of behaviour are linked because they are
operating in the same human person. They are opposed because one is urging to
immediate, short-term, selfish gratification of physical appetites and impulses. The
other is urging the choice of true values, the postponement or sublimation of sense
gratification; a life lived according to moral values. By dialectic we mean that these are
in conflict. The conflict is not resolved by eliminating one of the criteria. Nor is it
resolved by a [418] complete victory of one of the criteria over the other. It is resolved
by a balance, a harmony in the tension of opposites. Moral conversion is precisely
finding that balance of tension. It is not the exclusion of pleasure; not the unremitting
search for pleasure; but the good life of the virtuous, happy man.
To identify this dialectical tension between satisfaction and value it might be a
help to go back to intellectual conversion and note a parallel dialectic at work.31 We
defined intellectual conversion as the transition from 'body' to thing, from animal
knowing to intellectual knowing, from 'looking' to cognitional structure, from the out
there now real to the real as the verified, from imagination to judgment, from the world
of immediacy to the world mediated by meaning. Intellectual conversion is not a matter
of eliminating either of these two powers but of critical distinction and harmony.
Elementary knowing is operative from birth but critical intelligence slowly emerges; but
it rarely takes complete control; many unquestioned imaginative assumptions survive the
450
most critical of intellectual lives. And so we find ourselves operating at one time from
the pure desire to know and at other times according to the criteria of the out there now
real.
Similarly, in moral conversion there are two criteria operating, satisfaction and
true values. Satisfaction is operative from birth; it holds the stage, it is dominant. As we
grow up it is a matter of notions of right and wrong asserting their influence slowly and
gradually. Self-appropriation helps us to recognize these two principles operating; they
pull us in opposite directions. They suggest two criteria of what is good, the good of
physical satisfaction and the good of true values. There is a constant tug of war between
the two drives. To be morally converted is to operate easily and regularly according to
the principle of true values. Rarely does a person achieve complete ascendancy of true
values over satisfactions. It is a matter for most of us of a constant struggle, a dialectic
of progress and decline, two steps forward and one backwards.
It is important to recognize these two principles operating in oneself. The story
of the temptation in the Garden of Eden is a place [419] where we can recognize this
dialectic at work. On the one hand is the commandment of God, not to eat the fruit of
the tree in the middle of the garden. On the other hand is the fruit that "was good to eat
and pleasing to the eye, and that it was desirable for the knowledge that it could give".
(Gen 3,6) You can almost see Eve concentrating on the anticipated pleasure of eating the
apple, the delusion she entertains from the lies of the serpent and the putting away into
the back of her mind the commandment not to eat the fruit and any rational
consideration of the choice she was about to make.
A similarly instructive story is to be found in the Book of Daniel chapter
thirteen. It is a story of two old men who are attracted by the sight of a young lady
bathing in a garden. Far from averting their eyes, or avoiding that place again, they make
a habit of coming to the same place and indulging their desire. "They threw reason
Value Ethics
451
aside, making no effort to turn their eyes to heaven, and forgetting its demands of
virtue." (Dan 13,9). This is deliberately putting aside the criterion of true values and
adopting the criterion of the pleasure principle. Something like this always happen when
we choose to do evil. We ignore our conscience, we do not listen to reason, we do not
think of the consequences, we do not think of the harm we are doing; we surrender to the
search for immediate, short-term selfish pleasure.
5 Moral Self-Transcendence
Our concern in this chapter has been, how the process of moral selftranscendence enters into the judgment of value. Self-transcendence involves a process
of becoming. By making good judgments of value, we become good judgers of value. In
order to become good judgers of value, we have to make good judgments of value. This
is not a vicious circle but a statement of the reality of how we develop intellectually and
morally. We do so through various incremental processes, particularly, development and
conversion. Such becoming is not a single, enormous leap into moral rectitude, but a
discursive, incremental, slow, and precarious entry into the world of value. Let us
summarize these processes by way of conclusion. [420]
(1) Genetic development. The psychologists have elaborated in detail on the
development of moral reasoning through levels and stages. How does that fit in with our
notion of moral conversion? Significantly absent from Kohlberg, particularly, is any
consideration of how the interviewees actually behave in their own lives. It is one thing
to give a moral judgment on a hypothetical situation; it is quite another as to how you
will actually behave in that situation yourself. We are not only interested in moral
reasoning, but in moral feeling, valuing and behaving. Our notion of moral conversion is
wider that the categories of the psychologists and is sufficiently broad to apply to each
stage of moral development. The child begins the process of moral conversion when he
chooses not to do something forbidden out of fear of punishment; the motive later
452
changes perhaps to behaving in order to gain parental approval; later it is a case of social
conformity, later autonomy, later still the realization of universal values, right and
wrong.
(2) Dialectical struggle. This, as we have explained, is the struggle between the
search for pleasure and the inclination to true values. But the dialectic of opposites
operates at each stage of the developmental levels and stages, as outlined by Kohlberg.
At each stage you can choose physical, short-term, immediate, gratification of sense
rather than the right, valuable, virtuous course of action. At first, the child learns through
punishment and reward; it learns to do the right thing, perhaps, for a dubious motive out
of fear of punishment or desire for a reward. But at least it is learning to do the right
thing. But not every child will respond positively and you will have bold children who
will misbehave despite the punishment they know is coming; and good children who
will do the right thing. Later the approval of the group will be valued and later the idea
of fairness, justice, sharing. But at each stage there is an emerging choice of the child to
be good or to be bold, an emerging freedom and self-determination, an emerging
responsibility for its own life and what to make of it.
(3) Satisfactions and pleasures are not evil and are not to be negated. When we
do virtuous acts for the first time it is rather difficult because we are usually denying
some physical satisfaction and at first that is difficult. Yet it becomes easier the next
time and easier the next [421] time until pleasure is displaced and we have learned to
take pleasure in the virtue. The sign of having a virtue is that we do the virtuous activity
spontaneously and with pleasure. Ironically, if we seek satisfaction for its own sake, we
often do not find it; if we seek true values in virtuous activity, we often find satisfaction
as well.
(4) Fidelity to the transcendental precepts. There are different kinds of
satisfactions. The pleasures of immediate sense gratification are one kind. Peace of soul,
Value Ethics
453
harmony of spirit, being at peace with oneself and ones conscience is a higher kind of
satisfaction. If we are morally converted and are faithful to the transcendental precepts
the one criterion of true value is in control and we are at peace with ourselves. The
pleasure principle has been displaced or sublimated or suppressed. We are a whole, a
unity, an integrated being, not at war with ourselves and our conscience. We can be
totally honest, totally open, have nothing to fear.
(5) Moral progress is marked by the achievement of real freedom. Freedom as
we have seen is self-determination and not arbitrary choice. It is the good man who is
free to choose. It is the good person who has chosen well and is constituted as a free
person. He is free from attachments, constraints, fears, compulsions and addictions. The
good person is truly free because his good habits mean that he is acting not out of an
animal pleasure principle but out of conscious, knowing, free choice. He has extended
the range of his effective freedom. The person of bad habits contracts and slowly
destroys his freedom.
(6) The result of moral self-transcendence is wholeness, integration, balance,
transformation of the person, where all desires are as one. The dialectical tension will
never completely disappear but one can establish a harmony, a triumph of progress over
decline, of self-transcendence as opposed to decline. This wholeness is much talked
about in modern spirituality and psychology. It is a kind of peace of mind, peace with
yourself and your conscience, where habits have made it easier to be virtuous, in fact, it
is pleasurable to be virtuous. The harmony is between conflicting desires, those
characteristic of the biological pattern of experience and those of [422] the pure desire to
know and love. But the harmony includes felt obligations, intentional responses to
values, ones conscience, ones intellectual development, ones spiritual development. It
is a process of self-realization, actualizing potential; as opposed to its opposite which is
self-destruction and disintegration that we encounter in moral decline.
454
(7) It should be noted that moral conversion is always partial, always fragile and
always free. There are real limits to moral conversion. It is partial because usually we
are very virtuous in some areas but retarded in others. It is rare that you find a human
being who is completely and fully and perfectly morally converted. It is fragile because
it is easily broken, we easily backslide or regress, the temptation of decline is always
there. We never eliminate the two poles of the dialectic. The most we can hope to do is
achieve a fragile triumph of true values over satisfaction. Lonergan refers to the human
incapacity for sustained development. It seems from ones own experience and from
accounts of the experience of others, that we have spurts of development followed by
fits of decline, areas in which we are progressing and areas in which we are declining. It
seems to be humanly difficult to achieve continuous moral progress, in all areas, and at
all times. Moral conversion is always free; even if reinforced by habits, spontaneous
inclinations, feelings and pleasure, we are always free to reverse the process, to choose
satisfactions over true values.
Conclusion. Our primary focus in this text is where do moral values come from. Our
general answer is that they come from judgments of value. We have identified four
distinct components of the judgment of value. In this chapter we have examined the
notion of moral self-transcendence in so far as this impinges on judgments of value.
Why then is this element of self-transcendence, both development and conversion,
important for reaching correct judgments of value?
Aristotle states clearly and repeatedly that the standard and criterion of
goodness is the good person. He does not develop an ethic without taking people as
they are into account. It is the good person who knows about goodness, recognizes it
when he sees it, is sensitive [423] to values, responds positively to values, implements
terminal values and becomes an originating value in the process.
Value Ethics
455
It is precisely this process of becoming a good person that we have been

analyzing in this chapter. We do so by developing morally and by a process of moral
conversion. In developing we pass through specific clear stages and levels of moral
reasoning and feeling; we can become fixated at any level; various distortions of
reasoning and feeling can occur; there are clear limits to the stages of development; we
constitute ourselves as reasoning and feeling persons appropriate to our stage of
development. By a process of conversion we cultivate a universal, habitual, willingness
to respond to values rather than satisfactions; we learn to make good decisions, by good
decision-making; we recognize the attractions of the apparent good but learn to opt for
the real good. We nurture habits of willingness, moral virtues, spontaneously we seek
the good, rather than pleasure. We constitute ourselves as good persons.
The moral judgments of the converted, mature person will normally be correct.
The moral judgments of the unconverted, the immature, the seekers after pleasure, the
drifters, will tend to be unreliable, distorted, biased. By the dual processes of
development and conversion we constitute ourselves as the standard and criterion of
moral goodness.
(1) The point of this question is to call attention to your own experience of moral
development or decline. You might have become more sensitive to gender issues, to
social justice issues, to practical business ethics, to racial discrimination. You might
have become less sensitive to issues of truth telling, driving under the influence, filling
out tax returns honestly, and the like.
(2) Self-improvement psychology presents many ideals of how to be successful,
happy, well-adjusted, and mature. Sadly, they often work out of a truncated, or
alienated, or unrealistic [424] notion of the human subject and often ignore true moral
and religious values.
456
(3) We have many aspirations in life. One of them should be to become an authentic
moral person knowing true values, deciding for and implementing these values. Other
than religious values, moral values should be the most important values in our life.
(4) This question dates from the time of Socrates who opted for suffering an injustice
rather than doing an injustice. If we do an injustice we become unjust; we do a serious
injury to ourselves as moral persons. If we suffer an injustice, it only touches us on the
outside; we do not compromise our integrity.
(5) You can almost guarantee your child will acquire job skills, if you pay for a good
education. But you have no guarantee that your child will opt for values rather than
satisfactions. If you wish the best for your child, you would wish them to be good,
rather than clever.
(6) There is honour among thieves. If they have agreed beforehand, they expect the
agreement will be followed. One presumes a basic sense of fairness, even among
thieves but be prepared for exceptions.
(7) These are some of those who might be considered morally converted to a heroic
degree. Most of us just stumble along the road of moral compromise and mediocrity.
(8) Ideally, the best adviser would be one who is wise, experienced, competent in the
matter in hand, morally mature, and also a friend. The worst advice would come from
the foolish, the inexperienced, the incompetent, the immature, the person who does not
care about you. [425]
Endnotes
1
Chapter Three, Section 5.8.
See Walter Conn, The Desiring Self: Rooting Pastoral Counseling and Spiritual
Direction in Self-Transcendence, (New York: Paulist Press, 1998). See especially
Chapter two on the history of the notion of self-realization.
Value Ethics
457
B. Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy, Chapter ten From Authentic Subjectivity to

Genuine Objectivity.
6
See Insight. Chapter Eight on Things is a pre-metaphysical treatment of substance.

Chapter Fifteen on the Metaphysical Elements deals with central and conjugate potency,
form and act.
7
Insight, 484-507.
Insight, 479.
Insight, 479.
10
B. Lonergan, Topics in Education, 96-102. Also B. Lonergan, Philosophical and

Theological Papers 1965-1980, vol 17 of Collected Works, 322-5. Also B. Lonergan,
Insight, Human Development, 494-504.
11
B. Lonergan, Topics In Education, 96-8.
12
Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, (New York, Simon and Schuster,
1997).
13
B. Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, vol 17 of Collected

works, 315. Also Method in Theology, 240.
14
15
Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the
Idea of Justice vol I, (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981). The Psychology of
Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of the Moral Stages vol 2 (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1984). A simple text which I follow is Ronald Duska and Mariellen
Whelan, Moral Development: A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg (New York: Paulist
Press, 1975). See also Walter Conn, Conscience: Development and Self:Transcendence
(Alabama: Religious Education Press, 1981), especially 91-103 which give a convenient
summary of Kohlberg's stages. See also Walter Conn, The Desiring Self: Rooting
Pastoral Counseling and Spiritual Direction in Self-Transcendence (New York: Paulist
Press, 1998).
16
Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: Norton,l 1963). Identity: Youth and
Crisis (New York, Norton, 1963). Erikson approaches moral development from the
point of view of trust; he deals more with the affective aspect of moral development.
[426]
17
Duska and Whelan, Moral Development, 69.
18
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Womens

Development, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
19
20
21
22
Insight, 242.
23
24
25
26
27
Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy, Chapter Nine.
28
29
30
31

Insight, 242-3.
Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy, Chapter Nine on Intellectual Conversion.
458
9
Judgments of Value
Such judgments (of value) are objective or merely subjective

inasmuch as they proceed or do not proceed from a self-transcending
subject. Their truth or falsity, accordingly, has its criterion in the
authenticity or the lack of authenticity of the subject's being.1
(1) It is morally wrong to kill another human being. Is this a true statement? Are there
exceptions?
(2) Does expertise in making correct judgments of value make you a better person? In
what way?
(3) Is it wrong for one person to use another as an instrument of sexual pleasure? Why?
(4) It is sometimes asserted that what consenting adults do in private has nothing to do
with the State or anybody else, as long as they do not harm anyone. How do you
evaluate that position?
(5) What qualities would you look for in a tutor for your own children? [428]
(6) What do you mean by conscience? In what sense is it a feeling? Can it be mistaken?
(7) "This is my culture. You do not belong to my culture. Hence you cannot pass
judgments on my values or behaviour." Do you agree with this position?
(8) Imagine that you are a teacher of moral values, either as a parent or professor.
Should you,
(a) be neutral and simply provide information for children or students to make
their own choices;
(b) help the students to clarify their own values, without you passing judgment
on their choices;
(c) teach a scale of values, which you have reasoned out, feel are true, which
enhance decision-making, and aim at self-transcendence?
460
Judgments of Value
Aspects
Symbols
Components
Causes
Analogy
Cognitive Aspect
Mind
Formal Cause
Structure
Affective Aspect
Heart
Int. Response to Value
Material Cause
Content
Volitional
Will
Free Deciding
Integrative
Spirit
Self-Transcendence
Efficient Cause
Final Cause
Diagram Two. Four Components of the Judgment of value. [429]

1 Four Components
This would seem to be a convenient place to summarize what we have said of
the four components before we proceed to show how they unite in a judgment of value.
Please refer to diagram 2. You may have felt that we were wandering from the point in
some of the previous chapters, but we hope to show how everything now comes
together. A judgment of value is necessarily a complicated activity, but I think we can
show how, where and when it emerges. If we can succeed in doing that, we will have
uncovered the source of values and be able to mount a critique of values.
1.1 Four Components Summary
Central to the diagram are the four components, which we have named, the
deliberative insight, the intentional response to value, free deciding, and the process of
self-transcendence.
The deliberative insight is the culminating point in reasoning towards what is
right and good. Judgments of value presuppose adequate understanding and information
about the matter in question. It presumes a grasp of possibilities, of alternatives, of
consequences, of motivations. It presumes correct definitions of terms, correct process
Value Ethics
461
of reasoning and inference, correct formal arguments from evidence to conclusions. It

presumes a grasp of principles and of concrete situations, and the insight that grasps the
relevance of the former to the latter. One should be able to give a reasoned explanation
of the moral positions that we take. One should be able to refute counter arguments. All
the activities encompassed in the activities of experiencing, questioning, understanding,
formulating, reflecting, judging truths, questioning value and the process of
deliberating, are relevant and presupposed by the deliberative insight. The deliberative
insight itself is a grasp in this totality of the sufficiency of the evidence for the
prospective judgment of value. This is the cognitive aspect.
We have closely associated the intentional response to value to the pure,
detached, disinterested, unrestricted, desire to know the truth, to know what is
worthwhile, to do what is right and become a person [430] of value. This is an innate,
spiritual orientation to what is good. It is an intention of value in the sense that, at first,
we ask questions about what is right, without knowing the answer; but we can work our
way to the answer, and when we find it recognize it as correct. It is response in the sense
of being sensitive to values, recognizing values, pointing in the direction of value, being
attracted to value. Value itself is a transcendental notion; it can be defined only in the
indirect manner of what is questioned, what is grasped and what is affirmed in a
judgment of value. We feel responsible; we feel obliged; we feel that there is a right
way to behave and a wrong way; we praise those whom we consider good; we blame
those we deem to have failed in their responsibilities. We feel our own conscience as
happy or uneasy. This is the affective aspect.
Thirdly, the motor force of this process is the person deciding freely and
responsibly. We have the power to say yes or no to the process of moral knowing,
feeling and becoming. Deciding is motivated by the good as known by correct
understanding. It is helped by the desire for the good, which makes it easier to say yes.
Judgments of Value
462
Deciding comes in before the judgment of value, in the sense of assenting to the
processes of reflecting, deliberating and feeling. Deciding also follows the judgment of
value, in the sense of implementing courses of action that are judged to be right and
obligatory and good. We have to learn how to decide well to decide firmly,
consistently, deeply, comprehensively, habitually, responsibly, in favour of what is
good. This is the volitional aspect.
Each of these components presuppose a context of the human person in via,
becoming, developing, moving towards moral development and conversion. It is in this
context of teleology that the judgment of value has a place; it is part of the being on the
way, a partial achievement of self-transcendence. The human person as a developing
subject is the proper context for the judgment of value. Animals do not make judgments
of value. Angels do not make judgments of value. We humans make judgments because
we are on the way to knowing the good, on the way to realizing the good in society, on
the way to becoming good person. This includes a horizontal finality as well as a
vertical finality, a development and a conversion, a [431] genetic development and a
dialectical struggle. To become good persons we need to make good judgments of
value; to make good judgments of value we need to be good persons. This might be
called the integrative aspect as it relates the parts to the whole in the context of selfconstitution.
To become a good person requires that each of these components be present. If
one is absent or deformed or defective, the whole action or person is defective. It might
be helpful to show how each of these components can be defective or deformed as a
contrast to the ideal that we have sketched above.
The processes of reasoning can be defective: fallacious arguments, irrelevant
distractions, not thinking things through to the end. Information can be inadequate,
inconclusive, mistaken or plain wrong. We might not attend to all the evidence, be
Value Ethics
463
aware of all the possibilities, think about the possible consequences of the action. We
may allow processes of rationalization, thinking up excuses, justifying our evil deeds, to
hold sway even though deep down we know it is indefensible. Thinking, reflecting
and deliberating are complicated procedures and can be short-circuited, distorted,
conflated, confused, in a variety of ways.
On the flip side of the intentional response to value is the love of darkness, the
selfish desire for satisfaction, the hard-heartedness of the person who is closed to love
and value. An immoral life can lead to insensitivity to value, a sympathy for criminals, a
jealousy of good people. A life of seeking selfish pleasure establishes habits in our
psyche. We are prone to the bias of individual self-interest, the selfishness of the ingroup, the long-range defect of practical common sense. Feelings as well as developing
can also be declining and distorted. Resentment, pride, ambition, greed, egoism,
revenge, envy, as feeling orientations can take control. Or feelings can be dulled into
indifference, an I don't care attitude, a form of moral insensitivity. In many ways, then,
distorted feelings can become a powerful obstacle in the way of moral growth.
Deciding can be weak, the weak-willed person. We can allow ourselves to be
diverted from truth and goodness. We allow the process [432] of moral decline to
become habitual. We make resolutions, but break them as soon as opportunity arises.
We do not decide for the good sufficiently strongly and then all sorts of alternatives rear
their ugly head. Weak-will gives way to bad will, when we decide for distortion of
rationalization, distortion of feelings, satisfaction of our own sensible desires at the
expense of others. We can refuse to be fully human. Deciding can be irresponsible,
haphazard, self-interested, rash, superficial, or unreliable.
As well as the authentic notion of self-transcendence that we have outlined, there
are many notions of self-fulfilment based on a truncated idea of the human person. The
goal of human life is presumed to be pleasure, or success, or wealth, or fame, or power.
Judgments of Value
464
The dimension of truth and value is submerged under these more palpable goals. Instead
of self-transcendence we have immanence; persons caught in their own circle of selfish
ambitions, sensible pleasures, narrow goals. The drifter is the aesthete seeking always
for pleasure, going nowhere in life, not achieving, not becoming, indifferent to truth and
value. Instead of development, we have decline; instead of conversion, we have
stagnation.
These components tend to be solidary; if one goes wrong, the others tend to go
wrong also. These components are intertwined in many ways. We are particularly
interested in how they form a unity in the subject, the person, and in the judgment of
value. Hence we will try to indicate how these components form a unity on the part of
the subject and a unity on the part of the product, the judgment of value.
1.2 Unity on the Part of the Subject.
The principle of integration is the conscious subject: the one who performs all
these activities, who is the subject of these feelings, who is responsible for the control of
the whole process. The various activities, some sensible, some intellectual, are united in
the same subject. The levels of conscious activities are levels of the same subject. So
the cognitive, affective, and volitional aspects of the process of making a judgment of
value are united in the one person, who is the subject of all these aspects. They are
interrelated activities because it is the same person who is responsible, coordinating and
directing. [433]
The symbols of Mind, Heart, Will, and Spirit correspond roughly to these four
components. These are descriptive terms, overall symbols of aspects of our humanity,
familiar from popular culture. We need to show that our analysis can be translated into
down-to-earth descriptive language, which anybody can understand. There are these
distinct aspects. We have been at pains to identify and define them in an explanatory
framework. But they are not separate, cannot be separated; they are interrelated in a
Value Ethics
465
multitude of ways. They all play a part in the emergence of a judgment of value and so
they all play a part in the unfolding moral drama of our lives.
We are talking about an existential ethics, one in which the subject is
transformed in the process. We are not just talking about passing individual judgments
of value, but the elements of the person by which he develops or declines, moves to
conversion or away from conversion. The whole person and all the essential elements of
human being are involved. We are not talking about a peripheral activity but how the
knowing, desiring, deciding, developing person becomes an integrated, mature, good
human person.
1.3 Structure and Content
The question remains to show how these four components unite in a single
judgment of value. We will use the notion of structure and content and then the analogy
of the four causes. We dealt with this briefly in terms of the unity of the cognitive and
affective elements (Chapter Six, Section Seven). Let us now show how four components
unite in a single judgment of value.
Lonergan himself asserts that the structure of the judgment of fact and the
judgment of value is similar; whereas they differ in content, one intending truth, the
other intending value.2 Let us see how this can be used to show how the deliberative
insight and intentional response to value fit together to form a judgment of value.
The structure of a deliberative insight, as of reflective insight, is the hypothetical
syllogism. We are looking for the universal structure of all deliberative insights and
there are four steps. [434]
(1) All deliberation starts with a question of value, What is this worth? What is
the right thing to do? Is this person, policy, action, thing, event, good or bad? This
represents the conditioned. Only God is necessarily good; for everything else we have to
Judgments of Value
466
ask, to check, to find out, to confirm and that starts in a specific, precise question, Is B
good?
(2) The goodness of things in this world is contingent. It is partial, it is fleeting,
it is conditioned. But there are values, some things are better than others, we are always
making value judgments. To specify how to answer the question of worth, you have to
specify what conditions need to be fulfilled to make this good in this or that respect. If
this is a reliable, inexpensive, comfortable car, then, it is good. So the next part in the
structure is to establish a link between the conditioned and its fulfilling conditions. You
can symbolize this by saying, If A, then B, where A represents as many conditions as
you wish. But if they are present, then B is. This is the hypothetical element. It
establishes a connection between the conditioned and its possible conditions. What
evidence do you need? Is the evidence sufficient? Is the evidence linked to the
conclusion?
(3) Then your problem is establishing, if these conditions are fulfilled or not.
Here you go to the evidence, the information, the reasoning, the justification, the
arguments for and against. You go back to the data, the definitions, the facts, the
previous judgments of values, the whole context. In the end you are compelled, the
evidence is sufficient, the conditions are met. You posit the antecedent: but A.
(4) The conclusion follows of necessity, the question is answered and affirmed,
the judgment of value is true. Therefore B. B, which started out as a conditioned, is
now affirmed as virtually unconditioned; for the moment, in this time and place, this is a
true value.
The structure of deliberative insight is the hypothetical syllogism. You want to
find out if B is good. You proceed, if A then B. But A. Therefore B. Which car is good
for you? Establish what you want in a car, comfort, affordability, speed, etc. Does this
car fulfil these conditions? If yes, go ahead and buy it. If not, then keep looking. The
Value Ethics
467
same procedure can be followed in judging which is the best school [435] for your
children, who is a good person to baby-sit the infants, what is the right thing to do in
moral affairs. This is a basic heuristic structure; it is how the mind works in finding out
about values.
But have we left out something? A structure, without a content, is like a skeleton
without flesh and blood. We have the universal structure or form, but where is the
dynamic, what is being aimed at, why should we follow this procedure anyway? What
drives us so naturally and inexorably through these steps? What is animating the process
is the desire for value, the intention of value, the transcendental notion of value, the
precept to be responsible. The dynamic is the questioning, the intending, which is
operative in all the steps and which inevitably unfolds according to the above structure.
We want what is best for ourselves and our kids and our country. It is not always
clear what is best; we need to find out; we have to work at it; we want to work at it. We
are not usually satisfied with half answers or guesses, or random choices. We want to be
sure we are right on questions of value. We feel our way through a maze of evidence,
we sort out the truth from the falsehoods and distortions, we are sensitive to issues and
values as the process continues, we feel convinced, we are convinced. Without the
content of this dynamic towards value, the structure would remain static and empty.
Deliberative insight unites with intentional response to value, in the same way
that a structure unites with a content. These are the intrinsic constituent parts of the
judgment of value. Both are needed. If you have only formal reasoning, you have logic,
you have formal inference, you have concepts, but it is all up in the air, conceptualist,
static, deductive, abstract. If you have only feeling, then you have a dynamic, you touch
the heart, but you are in danger of becoming the idealist doing more harm than good;
you have no control, no criterion operating, no way of ensuring that you are right.
Judgments of Value
468
There is also an analogy to be found in the notion of passive and active intellect
of Aristotle, which we mentioned earlier. In analyzing the activity or understanding
Aristotle correctly perceived that it involves activities and passivities. The active part he
identified with throwing light on the phantasm so that what is potentially visible [436]
would become actually visible, so that the potentially intelligible would become actually
intelligible. We translate that in intentionally analysis as the desire to know, the wonder
that is the beginning of all philosophy, the activity of questioning. Questioning intends
knowledge, feels its way to knowledge, knows that knowledge is achieved when no
further pertinent questions arise. But there is the other aspect of passivity, receiving,
becoming, the tabula rasa being informed immaterially by the form in a process of
abstraction. Correct understanding requires the abstraction of ideas from images and the
receiving and storing of these ideas in the mind. Aristotle did not elaborate much on the
structure of the judgment, but I think we can see some rough parallel between the active
intellect and the intention of value, and the passive intellect as the activities of
deliberating and judging value.
1.4 The Four Causes
A further way of seeing how these elements unite in a judgment of value is to
consider them on the analogy of the four causes. Aristotle used this schema of causes to
great effect and it seems to apply helpfully to the judgment of value. The four causes are
the four answers to the questions, What is it? What is it made of? What is moving it?
And What is it for? These give the formal, material, efficient and final causes,
respectively. Lonergan gives the example of a bridge; where the formal cause is the
design, the plan, the architecture; the material cause is the steel, bricks and cement; the
efficient cause is the builders who construct it; the final cause is the purpose of
communication.3
Value Ethics
469
On this scheme, if you ask, What is a judgment of value? you would have to
answer that it is an affirmation emerging from a deliberative insight it is a judgment.
This is the formal cause. It is different from a grasp of possibilities; it is different from
concepts or definitions; it is different from fantasy or imagination; it is different from
the decision; it is different from execution. The unity, identity, whole of the judgment of
value is its form the single intelligibility that makes it what it is, and distinguishes it
from everything else. [437]
The intentional response to value would be the material cause. What is it made
out of? It is made out of value: it intends value in the question, grasps value in the
deliberative insight and affirms value in the judgment. Without value you cannot have a
judgment of value. The specific judgment gives determinate form to indeterminate
value. In this way the judgment of truth differs from the judgment of value; they are
made out of different things, they intend, grasp and affirm different contents, namely,
truth and value, respectively. The cognitive and the affective components are the
intrinsic constituent causes of the judgment of value, just as the formal and material
causes are the two intrinsic constituents of a sensible substance. The two further
components are extrinsic causes.
The efficient cause is the motor cause, what makes it move, what makes it
happen. It is free responsible deciding which controls the process, moves it in one
direction rather than another, allows it to proceed or not. This is a sine qua non, a
necessary condition for the occurrence of judgment, but is extrinsic to the process rather
than intrinsic. It is the volitional aspect.
The final cause asks the question, What is it for? What is the purpose? Where is
this process going? The single judgment of value is a part within a whole. But the whole
is a developing unity; there is a teleology operating in the questioning, deliberating and
reaching a judgment of value. But there is a total teleology in which the human person
Judgments of Value
470
is on the way in terms of knowing what is the right thing to do, on the way to becoming
a good person, on the way to self-transcendence and happiness. It is only in the context
of this developing subject that the judgment of value makes sense. Each judgment
represents one incremental step on the way to self-transcendence, on the way to
becoming authentic human persons. Only human beings make judgments of value and
so the context is set by the developing, transforming, becoming of the human person,
moving from potentialities to actualities.
We are appealing to Aristotle's four causes to indicate how the four components,
identified at length and in detail in this text, finally coalesce into one judgment of value.
Hopefully, we have said enough [438] on this topic to be able to continue to the
judgment of value itself and its own characteristics.
2 Characteristics of Judgments of Value
Just as there are four characteristics of a judgment of fact, so there are four
characteristics of the judgment of value.
1 No Further Content other than Yes or No. The judgment of fact is intended
in the question for reflection, which asks simply, Is it true? and expects a simple Yes or
No answer. The judgment of value, then, will similarly be a simple Yes or No answer to
the question for deliberation. The judgment of fact expresses the truth, the existence, the
reality of what is affirmed. The judgment of value expresses the goodness, the
worthwhileness, the value of what is affirmed.
Judgment is a simple yes or no or anything in-between. You may have to be
content with a probability; you may have to admit ignorance and refrain from giving an
answer. Between the Yes of complete certainty and the No of absolute denial, there is
an infinite variety of probabilities, possibilities, uncertainties, degrees of clarity and
certainty. We cannot always expect unambiguous, certain, affirmations or denials.
Value Ethics
471
Aristotle pointed out that we cannot expect mathematical precision in ethics and
politics.
The judgment of value adds no further content to the deliberative insight, except
the yes or no uttered in answer to the question. If further clarification is needed it means
that we are retracing our steps and asking further questions for understanding, looking
for more information, defining our terms more clearly, formulating more satisfactory
hypotheses. You cannot very well affirm that something is really good, if you do not
understand fully what that something is.
2 Affirmation or Denial. Just as judgments of fact affirm or deny a matter of
fact, so a judgment of value affirms or denies a matter of value. The act of affirming or
denying is an activity of mind. It is not just a synthesis of words as 'it is wrong to steal',
but an affirmation that 'it is true that it is wrong to steal.' One can give lip service to
judgments of value, utter the words but not affirm the meaning. One [439] can spend a
semester teaching about Rawls on Justice and surprise the class by announcing on the
last day that you think it is totally wrong. There is indirect speech where you are
explaining the positions of other thinkers; and there is direct speech where you are
explaining and defending your own moral stance. Most courses on ethics are historical,
in the sense of teaching Kant's ethical system, natural law in Aquinas, Aristotle on the
virtues, and the like. But the real task of ethics is to take a stand for oneself, to affirm or
deny for oneself.
There is a deliberative process, a struggle to assemble evidence and link the
evidence to the conclusion. But the judgment of value is distinct from that process
because it posits, assents to, affirms the content of; it goes a step further than
deliberation. You could conceivably deliberate forever; a fearful, timid, temperament
will hesitate to judge. But normally there comes a time, when the relevant facts become
clear, the values involved become clearer, the suggested course of action and the
Judgments of Value
472
consequences become clear; it is just foolish not to judge. On the other hand, it is rash
to judge without sufficient deliberating.
The act of judging happens in the mind. It can be expressed in words or in deeds
but the reality is a mental act of judging the value. Because it is inaccessible and
invisible, people can lie about their judgments of value, people can be hypocrites,
people can be traitors, moles, spies; the external does not always conform to the
internal.
Even though the judgment of value adds only affirmation or denial, that is an
enormous step forward, a commitment, a preparation for decision and action.
Affirmation or denial is no small thing. Assent to or dissent from a moral stance is a
serious matter. To affirm a moral rule as true is to assert that it is not just true for you,
but true and binding for any human person in the same situation. It is to affirm that this
is the truly virtuous thing to do not just for you, but for any human being.
3 Taking a Personal Stand. We take a personal stand. We take a personal
stand in judgments of fact because nobody is forcing us to the judgment; we can
continue to reflect, we can qualify our judg-[440]ment, we can make probable
judgments, we can admit ignorance. These are factual judgments concerning our
beliefs, our opinions and our commonsense knowledge. We defend our view of the
truth; we have attained truth. Some easily complain of their memory; few complain of
their judgments. We are responsible for our judgments of fact.
Much more so are we responsible for our moral judgments. Our moral
judgments constitute us as moral persons. We are coming very near to the centre of the
person, what he is worth, what he stands for in terms of values. This is originating
value: by our good acts not only do we produce good products, but we also thereby
constitute ourselves as good persons.
Value Ethics
473
We have no excuses for our value judgments; we posit them freely and
knowingly. We could do more research, we could be more discriminating, we could be
better morally; but we are what we are because of our previous judgments and, of
course, decisions and actions that follow. You sometimes hear excuses like, 'the devil
tempted me', or 'I lost my temper', or 'everyone is doing it'; but such excuses don't
excuse; we are responsible for our judgments of value. Admittedly, we inherit many
values from our family or culture, but as an adult one is expected to make up ones own
mind. That is what it is to be a responsible adult.
What is the real worth of a person? Is it his intelligence? Is it his wealth? Is it his
power? Is it his race? Is it his socio-economic class? The real worth of a person is his
moral worth, the values he stands for, the kind of person he is, and from that follows the
appropriate decisions and actions. You can have a youth with all the advantages of a
rich technological society, computers, internet, access to the best schools, all the
clothes, toys, facilities you can dream of; yet when you talk to him you find that he
stands for nothing; self-absorbed, following the crowd, no mind of his own, a
materialistic scale of values, morally warped. On the other hand, you can have a person
emerging from a deprived background, struggled for a minimal education, surrounded
by thieves, corruption, degradation, exploitation and violence; and yet they emerge as
persons of worth, with a healthy scale [441] of values operating, caring for their
families and community; people who have something to teach us all.
'Mind' we use with reference to intelligence; 'heart' we use with reference to
values, love, goodness, moral worth, feeling. We respect intelligence, but much more
we respect a healthy scale of values, a good person, a good heart. That is the moral
worth of the person. It does not come from the family or education, it does not come
from socio-economic status, it does not come from ethnicity or culture; it comes from
Judgments of Value
474
the person, the responsible individual person, judging, deciding and acting and thereby
constituting himself as a worthwhile person, a person of value.
4 Knowing Value Comes to a Term. Judgment of fact brings the process of
knowing to a term. Judgments of value bring the process of knowing values to a term.
Deliberating is purposive; it does not just go round in endless circles; it is the judgment
that brings the process to an end. We judge that we have a sufficient understanding of
the relevant facts, that the relevant values have been appreciated and apprehended, the
alternatives and consequences assessed; no further pertinent questions arise; the
judgment emerges. We decide and act on the basis of the judgment. We move on to
other matters. Knowledge accumulates by way of increments. We proceed step by step,
one thing at a time. We finish one area and we move on to another. Judgments of value,
just as judgments of fact, pass into the habitual texture of the mind. We establish our
lives on a set of basic values, which provide the background to our particular specific
judgments and actions.
5 Context of Judgments of Value. We reach a value judgment about one
matter, but other matters arise. Judgments of value, just as judgments of fact, take place
in a context. That context is ourselves as self-transcending persons. We continuously
constitute ourselves as valuable persons by our good judgments, decisions and actions.
We constitute ourselves as worthless persons by bad judgments of values, wrong
decisions and evil actions.
There is the context of history and the growing awareness of certain values like
human rights, freedom, gender equality, the environ-[442]ment, the sacredness of human
life. Perhaps, also there is a growing insensitivity in other areas. We are all part of our
society and culture and are to some extend limited by the horizon of our place and time.
It is hard to blame Aristotle or St. Paul for accepting the institution of slavery; it was so
much part and parcel of their way of life.
Value Ethics
475
There is the context of the developing subject. There are stages of moral
development; the later stages depend on how we have negotiated the earlier. There is
the possibility and actuality of moral conversion within each of these stages. We do not
expect the moral reasoning of the child, the adolescent, the young adult and the mature
adult to be the same. You do not use the same pedagogy in teaching values at these
stages; you do not apply the law in the same way to persons in various stages; you do
not have the same moral expectations of persons at different stages.
There is the context of growing knowledge about the world, health, resources
and the ecosystem, where the discovery of new realities requires a reappraisal of our
moral position. In the context of knowing the harm caused by cigarette smoking, then,
there are moral implications to producing and consuming such products. Promiscuous
sexual activity takes on a new dimension in the context of Aids pandemic. The
discovery of greenhouse gasses requires a revision of how we consume fossil fuels.
6 Self-correcting process of Knowing Moral Values. We learn from our
mistakes. We do not always get it right the first time. We are obliged to live, before we
have learned to live properly. In moral matters experience is a great teacher. But that
process of realizing that we have made a mistake, admitting it, understanding why we
erred, correcting the judgment and behaviour in the future, is part of the human
condition. The process of self-correction is continuous. It is immanent and operative in
the dynamism of the intention of values and the realization that we are continually
falling short of getting it just right. The fact that we make mistakes in moral matters
does not prove that we can never have certain moral knowledge. The extraordinary
thing about our moral knowing is that we can recognize a mistake and work to correct
it. Science works on the principle of the [443] self-correcting process of human
knowing. Moral knowledge works on the same principle; we are getting nearer and
nearer to moral truths. The absolutes are not in the propositions, or statements, or
Judgments of Value
476
formulations but in the activities of persons deliberating, judging, deciding and doing,
on the path to self-transcendence.
3 Various Kinds of Judgments of Value.
Lonergan seems to have framed his discussion of value around the question,
What is the right thing to do, here and now? But there are many other forms of
evaluation; moral values have a wide range of application; values judgments occur
within each level of the scale of values.
(1) In the context of a rule based moral philosophy, the judgments of value will
be expressed in the form of commandments, norms, regulations, prescriptions, such as:
it is wrong to kill, it is wrong to steal, it is wrong to commit adultery, it is wrong to tell
lies, etc. Or you can put it more positively as: respect life, respect the property of others,
be faithful to your marriage partner, tell the truth at all times, etc. These laws can be
very general as in the above, or very specific as applied to particular places and times.
The primary principles of natural law are value judgments, the secondary principles of
natural law are similarly specific judgments of value. Judgments of value are operative
in the context of vital, social, cultural, personal or religious values.
(2) In the context of a virtue/vice approach to ethics, judgments of value would
be expressed in terms of: it is good to be brave, it is good to be honest, it is good to be
patient, it is good to be kind. On the other hand, it is bad to be cowardly, to be
dishonest, to be impatient, to be unkind. In virtue ethics we ask the question, What is
the best kind of life for a human person? When we list the virtues to be praised and the
vices to be avoided, we are making comparative value judgments. We also make
particular judgments on the virtues or vices of individuals; John is a liar, Michael is a
thug, Mary is a flirt, and the like, express moral judgments on persons. They are
judgments be-[444]cause they are affirmations, which are either true or false. They are
items of moral knowledge, true or false judgments of value.
Value Ethics
477
(3) "Ought statements are moral judgments of what we ought to do or what we

ought to hold. There is no logical transition from 'is' statements to 'ought' statements. In
our terms, the intentionality of the truth in third level operations is one thing and the
intentionality of the good in fourth level operations is another distinct reality. Third
level operations result in 'is' judgments; fourth level operations result in 'ought'
judgments. It is not a question of logic but of what it is to be a knowing and valuing
human person. Statements of fact are either true or false. Similarly, statements of value
are either true or false.
(4) General/Specific. General judgments of value are usually universal of the
kind, stealing is wrong, education is good, a high standard of living is better than a low
standard of living, classical music is better than jungle music, the young should respect
their elders. We have made a multitude of such judgments and they have passed into the
habitual texture of our minds. They constitute the context from which we make
particular or specific judgments of value at particular times and places. They are true or
false as the case may be, as general statements.
Specific judgments of value focus on the concrete and the particular. This
specific proposed action is morally right or wrong; I ought to spend this afternoon
studying rather than going for a walk; I must tell the truth even though I might be
punished; I should buy books with my allowance and not beer.
In the end every rule has to be applied to a particular specific instance. How
general principles are applied to the particular involves a further insight into the
connection between the two.4 One of the difficulties we have already mentioned for an
ethic of rules is precisely how universal rules are applied to particular cases; the
exception proves the rule; circumstances alter cases.
(5) Simple and Comparative Judgments. When we assert the value judgment, it
is wrong to kill, we can call this a simple judgment. When we are judging between
Judgments of Value
478
alternatives, we are often involved in [445] comparative judgments of value. What is

the best thing to do? How does this alternative compare to that? There are many
alternative ways of spending ones afternoon; which is the best? We judge that it is best
to study in the library and that is a comparative judgment.
Different moral values may be in conflict; loyalty to the peer group may demand
that we keep quiet, but honesty to authority may demand that we give evidence against
one of the group. There can be conflicts between different moral rules and you have to
compare and prioritize. There can be conflicts between different virtues or vices. Such
situations require us to compare what is at stake and to judge appropriately. Different
kinds of value may be involved in a single course of action; for instance economic and
moral values may clash and again a comparative judgment is necessary. Is it wrong to
pay a bribe for permission to distribute food to the poor? There are endless possibilities
of conflict between various values in a situation.
(6) Non-moral judgments of value. There are many kinds of value, as we have
already seen, and in each case we can identify the judgment of value. Although we
concentrate on moral judgments as our focus of interest, it is important to distinguish
them from other judgments of value. Aesthetic values, practical values, intellectual,
social, cultural, and religious, all provide a context in which we make judgments of
value.
Aesthetic judgments: this is horrible music, this is a good painting, this is a welldesigned building, I enjoyed that film, it is a beautiful day, that was an exciting game.
Aesthetic judgments will vary greatly depending on the background of the person
beauty is in the eye of the beholder. But certain criteria can be applied, such as
harmony, balance, form, content, story, flow, etc. Aesthetic judgments are not totally
arbitrary or subjective.
Value Ethics
479
We make many practical value judgment every day. What is the best way to
invest your money? What is the best design of a building? Where should the water be
connected? Is it worth buying this computer? What crop should we plant in this field?
Which car should I buy? Do we need more workers or less? [446]
We are continuously making judgments about persons. We judge a person by
his or her appearance, how they dress, how they speak, how they present themselves.
We make friends with those we trust and like and seek their company. We shun those
we do not like, those we disapprove of we judge them poor company. We judge
political figures, we judge film actors, we judge professors, authors, teachers, and
associates. The gospel injunction not to judge your neighbour is asking the impossible;
the intent seems to be, not to judge your neighbour too harshly.
We pass judgments on peoples intellectual capacities. We evaluate quickly who
are the good professors, what are the best books to read, whose advice is trustworthy
and whose advice is useless. We describe people we know as, smart, sharp, brilliant,
brainy, or alternatively as slow, dull, stupid, and other pejorative terms. In our own
intellectual pursuits, we judge which subjects to concentrate on, what topics are the
most important, what study methods to follow, how to allocate your study time.
People will often differ in their evaluations because they are applying different
criteria. One car suits one person who is rich and old; another suits a young student who
has limited financial resources. One kind of food suits one person but not another.
Tastes differ. Many of our value judgments are probable rather than certain. We do not
have complete information; we do not have endless time to deliberate; we might be
quite inexperienced in the field; we may have mixed motives operating; we do not
know how the future is going to work out. Often our judgments have to be provisional.
For the moment it seems that this is the case, but if I find out more about it I might
Judgments of Value
480
change my mind. Judgments can be mistaken for various reasons and so the selfcorrecting process of human knowing is called into play
We are actually involved in multiple processes of evaluation most of our
conscious life. These involve moral evaluations as well as the integral scale of values.
The four components, cognitive, affective, constitutive and volitional will be present in
all judgments of value, in varying degrees. To evaluate well, we have to be competent
and [447] knowledgeable, intending true value rather than selfish satisfaction, willing
the world a better place with better persons and social organization, and moving
towards growth and conversion.
It is an illusion to think that an ethic of natural law or a virtue ethic or any other
kind of ethic can avoid judgments of value. There might be a temptation for some to
think of natural law ethic as objective because it lays down the law, clearly and
precisely, for all people, equally. But this is glossing over the fact that each of these
laws is also a general judgment of value and requires a further specific judgment to be
applied to the concrete. Similarly, in a virtue ethic the list of recommended virtues is a
result of many judgments of value. There is no avoiding the process of evaluation. That
is why it seems that a value ethic is foundational; it identifies the foundational set of
activities by which we know values; it gives us a transcendental method which is
applicable at all times and in all circumstances.
4 Criterion operating in Moral Judgments: Conscience
It might be helpful here to draw a parallel with the proximate and remote
criterion of truth.5 The proximate criterion of truth is the sufficiency of the evidence for
a particular judgment. Is this fellow a thief or is he not? Well, what is the evidence, is it
linked to the accused, is it direct or circumstantial, is it possible that the witnesses are
lying, or the evidence was planted, or the police were corrupt, and so forth. In each
individual case of a judgment of truth there must be sufficient evidence and the
Value Ethics
481
evidence must be linked to the conclusion. Lonergan regularly referred to the proximate
criterion of truth as the reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned.
The remote criterion of truth is the proper unfolding of the pure, detached,
unrestricted desire to know. It sets the overall context in which particular judgments of
truth will be made. Are we normally intellectually honest, open and sincere, are we
biased, prejudiced, twisted, closed, emotionally driven, etc? Do we allow further
questions to arise? The remote criterion is that no further pertinent questions arise the
desire to know is satisfied. [448]
It would seem helpful to make a similar distinction, when we talk about the
proximate and remote criterion of true moral judgments. The proximate criterion of a
value judgment is the virtually unconditioned of the judgment. The deliberative insight
grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for the conclusion and the judgment follows. In
each particular case we need to understand the details, the particulars, the
circumstances, the motivations, the consequences, the possibilities, the exceptions, the
means for the end, the alternatives, etc. We should be able to show proximately that this
course of action is better than that, that this value is more important that that, that this is
wrong for the following reasons, that this is right for the following reasons. The
proximate criterion is the correctness of the relevant judgment of value. It is the
virtually unconditioned of a value judgment. We have referred to this component as the
cognitive component.
The remote criterion of moral goodness is the proper unfolding of the desire to
know and do the good. It is the exclusion of bias, the honesty and openness to face all
questions, the perseverance to ask all relevant questions, the brushing aside of any
tendency to obscurantism, the determination to think things through to the end. This
criterion is satisfied when no further relevant questions arise. The desire to know the
good is satisfied.
Judgments of Value
482
But there is a further aspect to the matter. Judgments of truth arrive at the
perfection of the intellect, fulfilling the potential of a part. But judgments of value
pertain not just to the perfection of the intellect, but to the whole person. All our actions
are incorporated in moral judgments, decisions and actions. The desire to know
becomes the desire to be, the desire to become, the desire to achieve the good, the desire
to decide rightly, to extend knowing into doing. Hence, it becomes the pure desire to
know and love and do the good and become the good. Moral values move us to consider
the whole person, as is and as becoming. In this sense we accept Aristotles principle,
that the good, wise person is the standard and criterion of goodness.
The total criterion of moral value is the happy conscience of the truly good and
competent person: what the good and wise person [449] would do in that set of
circumstances. It is the fully moral, mature person who is the criterion of true moral
value. It is the good person who knows about goodness. It is the virtuous person who
knows about virtue. It is the habitually good and wise person with a happy conscience
who is the total criterion of moral goodness. The total criterion is "the authenticity or
lack of authenticity of the subject's being."6 It is only in the context of total intellectual
and moral openness and integrity that we can be sure that our moral judgments are true.
In our terminology the total criterion of moral goodness is conscience.
4.1 What is Conscience?
This notion has a long history, emerging very vaguely in Greek thought but
clearly understood and pivotal in the thought of St. Paul. In Aquinas we have a
distinction between synderesis and conscientia. For him synderesis was a habitual
knowledge of basic moral principles situated in the intellect. Conscientia, on the other
hand, is not a habit or a power but an act; it is the action of applying habitual knowledge
to specific, particular situations.7 In more modern times, the moral sense philosophers
held that conscience is a superior faculty that intuits what is right and wrong; it is a
Value Ethics
483
faculty distinct from the intellect. Freud for his part identifies conscience with, what he
calls, the Superego the conventions and demands of conformity with the society writ
large for us and internalized. Nietzsche defined the good conscience as that venerable
long pigtail of a concept which our grandfathers fastened to the backs of their heads and
often enough also to the backside of their understanding.8!
We tend to think descriptively of conscience as a voice whispering in our ear
and telling us what is right or wrong. We tend to think of it as a special faculty or
ability. Many think of conscience as sensitive feeling and identified with feelings of
guilt or approval. Everybody has a conscience and seems to know what it is, but when
you try to define it, you find it is not so easy to pin down.
Lonergan as usual gives a very simple and accurate definition of conscience; he
simply defines conscience as consciousness at the fourth level of intentional
consciousness. But to speak of the [450] fourth level of human consciousness, the level
on which consciousness becomes conscience, is to suppose the context of intentionality
analysis.9 Conscience then is an awareness proper to the activities of the question for
deliberation, the deliberative insight, the judgment of value, the consequent decision and
action. It is an awareness of the normativity of the precept to be responsible as it
operates in human persons.
Let us now explore in detail the notion of conscience as 'consciousness at the
level of moral judgments, decisions and actions'. We should be familiar now with the
idea that as well as being directly aware of objects, we are concomitantly aware of
ourselves as subjects. We have systematically explored the possibilities of a heightened
awareness of our experience, understanding and judging. Conscience is this awareness
at the level of deliberating, judging value, choice and decision and action. When we
make choices we are conscious of whether we are doing right or wrong. It is
spontaneous. We cannot avoid it. The awareness may be subtle and deep, rather than
Judgments of Value
484
sensible and strong. But along with making our judgments and choices, there is the
awareness that we are making good judgments and choices or the awareness that we are
making bad judgments and choices.
A heightened awareness of the obligation to choose the good and reject evil is
the basis of moral behaviour. What we have been doing in ethics is appealing to
yourselves as moral subjects to discover the source of moral obligation. We have been
trying to discover the upwardly directed dynamism of human intentionality. You,
hopefully, have been trying to discover in yourself the precept to be responsible, the
intention of value, the urge to self-transcendence. We have been trying to identify the
stages of moral development and trying to move forward and upward in those stages.
We can develop our sensitivity to moral values; we can strengthen our intentional
response to values; we can become better moral subjects and that is the aim of teaching
moral philosophy.
This is a very broad understanding of conscience. Yet I think that it is correct,
because conscience is an awareness, which pervades ev-[451]erything that we do.
Because we divide consciousness into four levels that are structurally distinct, we
perhaps think of the fourth level as the one that is reached last; but in fact it is there
from the very beginning. Even though Insight is explicitly about understanding and
judgments of truth, you can see that judgments of value and decisions are being made
from the beginning about what is worth studying, what authors are worth reading, what
method is best, and the like. The distinction between the four levels is not necessarily a
chronological distinction; that is, they do not necessarily follow in a time sequence one
after the other. It is more a question of a kind of spiral which continues to circle around
and upwards. Moral judgments and choices are not confined to specific moments but are
involved in everything that we do. How we spend our time, our career choices, our
relations with others, out leisure activities, are permeated with judgments and choices
Value Ethics
485
that have moral implications. We should not think of morality as operative only when
we are faced with temptation and sin. It is rather, what are we to do with our lives; what
are we to make of ourselves; what kind of people do we want to become.
Walter Conn in Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence basically
follows Lonergan's interpretation of conscience. He says that it is more correct to say
that a person is a conscience, than that a person has a conscience:
Conscience, then, in a few words, should be understood as the
fundamental, dynamic reality of the personal subject who has
committed, dedicated, indeed, surrendered her or himself to the radical
demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable,
be responsible, love.10
The point at which these lines intersect, the radical meaning of human
conscience, I am suggesting, is the reality of the authentic personal
subject, intellectually, morally, affectively, and religiously converted,
operating on the fourth and highest level of moral, responsible,
existential consciousness.11
Conn has a deep knowledge of the developmental psychologists Erikson, Piaget
and Kohlberg, as well as comprehensive understanding of Lonergan and he elaborates
this broad notion of conscience and how it works. [452]
Conscience is not an activity in itself, but an awareness that accompanies the
activities characteristic of moral judging and deciding. Conscience is not a faculty in
itself, it is not a sensitive feeling in itself, and it is not in the intellect or in the will. It is
simply the awareness accompanying the evaluating, deciding, acting dimension of life
as free and responsible. A correct grasp of the role of conscience presupposes a correct
grasp of the meaning of consciousness. Because it is difficult to grasp the notion of
consciousness correctly, so it is more difficult to grasp a correct understanding of
conscience.
In Insight Lonergan distinguishes between rational consciousness and rational
self-consciousness. Rational consciousness is the awareness of making a correct
judgment of fact based on sufficiency of the evidence, the assurance that one in not
486
Judgments of Value
biased and the fact that further relevant questions do not arise. Rational selfconsciousness is the awareness of the necessity for consistency between knowing and
doing; it is the extension of rationality from knowing to doing. This moral selfconsciousness would be equivalent to conscience. He does not, for a moment, entertain
the idea of conscience as a separate faculty.
4.2 How does Conscience work?
PERSON
AWARE OF :-
Moral Obligation
Be Responsible
Questions of
Value
Deliberative Judgments of
Insights
Decisions
Value
Diagram Three. How Conscience Works. [453]

Let us explore further this notion of awareness immanent in the activities of
moral judging and deciding. This awareness is a consciousness of the self, which is
immanent in all the activities of deliberating and deciding. What is conscience aware
of? Please refer to Diagram Three.
(1) We are aware of the drive of moral obligation. The precept here is to be
responsible. Spontaneously in every normal human person, there arises the distinction
between good and evil, and the obligation to seek the good and avoid the evil. It can be
called innate in the sense that it is part of the spontaneous unfolding of the human spirit.
It is found in every culture, in every age, in every normal person. A person without this
Human
Actions
Value Ethics
487
drive is defined correctly as a psychopath and in need of psychiatric help. This is the
beginning and foundation of all moral judgments, decisions and actions.
(2) We are aware of the activities of questioning value, deliberating about value,
judging value, deciding freely and responsible, and finally living up to our convictions.
The process may take weeks or it may take a few seconds. We are aware of our
obligation to perform these activities properly. We are aware of the dynamic underlying
these activities.
We distinguish firstly the question, where we ask what moral values are
involved, what are the alternative courses of action, what are the likely consequences,
what are the social, political, economic implications and so forth. We are obliged to ask
all the relevant questions, to face all the issues, not to cover up or deny or sweep under
the carpet.
Next is the deliberative process, where we study the situation, ask advice, do
research, consult our feelings, discriminate and sensitize ourselves, work out the means
and the ends, consult experts, and the like. The quality of our moral judgments will
depend on correct deliberation. We are obliged to examine the relevance of arguments,
the process of inference, the alternatives available, the rights of all involved.
Then, we make a judgment of value, that this course of action would be better
than that, that such a value is more important than [454] another, that in these
circumstances this should be done. Rash moral judgments lead to rash moral behaviour.
We are responsible for our judgments; we can be called to account for the behaviour
that follows.
Distinct from the judgment, but close to it, is the decision, the act of deciding,
which although it is a pure mental act has huge moral implications and is itself a moral
act. In a sense, once you have firmly decided to commit adultery in your mind, you are
already guilty of adultery. Once you have decided with others to rob a bank, you are
Judgments of Value
488
guilty of conspiracy. Once you repent in your heart, your sins are forgiven. We are
aware of our obligation to freely and responsibly decide on our actions, our values, what
kind of a person we want to become.
But the execution of the decision is another step towards good or evil and
completes the process. Circumstances may intervene to prevent the implementation of
the decision. The final morally good or evil act is posited and can never be recalled or
changed.
Conscience is operative throughout the whole process. The dynamic is to be
responsible, to intend values, to desire the good. The dynamic operates through all these
activities. But the contrary affect is also present; the attraction of satisfaction, the lure of
pleasure, the comfort of the agreeable. The real evil very often is not to be found in the
action but in the processes of rationalisation, avoidance of self-consciousness, moral
renunciation, prejudice and bias, or sheer bad will, which intervene in the deliberation,
the judgment of value, and the decision.
(3) Our consciences urge us to good actions. We are endowed with this moral
urge to do our duty, to love our family and country, to know good and evil, to become
good persons. Our conscience blames us when we fail. We feel guilt, remorse, unease.
We cannot sleep, we seek to make amends, we regret our failures, we repent of our sins.
Our conscience rewards us when we succeed. We feel real satisfaction at fulfilling our
duty. We are rewarded with a happy conscience, we are at peace with the world. This
would seem to be the happiness Aristotle envisaged for the moral, contemplative
person. [455]
Our consciences can be aroused over actions, past, present or future. Conscience
is a pervasive awareness, before, during and after evaluating, deciding and acting. We
can feel guilty of a transgression committed decades ago, or feel happy about a decision,
which will only be implemented in the years to come.
Value Ethics
489
(4) We are responsible for what we do to our conscience. These are all free acts
from the beginning to the end. It is we who develop our conscience by responding to
true values, or destroy our conscience by rejecting the good and choosing the evil
course of action. The hardened habitual thief has become what he is, not because of his
environment, not because of his parents, not because of the company he keeps, but
because of his own free decisions, which, slowly but surely, made him to be what he is.
(5) Consistency or inconsistency. In Insight Lonergan used the criterion of
consistency between knowing and doing as the basis of moral obligation. He seemed to
consider this an extension of rationality from knowing to doing. He was thinking in
terms of three levels of cognitional structure and this was the only way he could fit in
moral obligation. Later, in Method he identifies moral obligation with the transcendental
precept to be responsible which is a given of human nature, an operative principle in
the activities of moral discernment. I think we can maintain the usefulness of the idea of
consistency but it needs to be broadened. The criterion of a happy conscience can be
broadened to mean consistency between our awareness of moral obligation and our
fulfilment of these obligations in correct judgments of value, good decisions and prompt
implementation. Conscience is the self as aware that we have moral obligations, are
driven by the transcendental precept to be responsible, and our implementation of this
drive. Are we faithful or do we fall short? To what extent are we faithful and to what
extent do we fall short?
(6) Is conscience a feeling? We often remark that we feel guilty, we feel
responsible, we feel obliged, we feel remorse, we feel shameful. There is certainly an
affective component to conscience. In our analysis of the affective component of the
judgment of value, we drew a [456] detailed distinction between sensitive feelings and
spiritual feelings. Conscience is a crucial test case where this distinction applies and has
deep ramifications.
Judgments of Value
490
Sensitive feelings have an intrinsic material aspect; they are conditioned by

space and time; higher animals experience many sensitive feelings such as joy,
excitement, anger, aggression, anxiety, affection, guilt, sorrow. We too use the terms,
feeling guilty, feeling shame, feeling remorse, feeling regret, or alternatively, feeling
happy, at ease with our judgments and decisions. Conscience, however, is not to be
identified with sensitive feelings. Sensitive feelings can be disproportionate to real guilt.
Children feel very guilty at accidentally breaking dishes, where there might be no blame
attached whatsoever. A habitual thief may claim that he feels no guilt at stealing and
hence is not guilty. We can feel guilty at breaking a taboo, but no real guilt might be
involved. A scrupulous person may be overcome by guilt feelings at a trivial fault,
which a normal person would brush off as a minor infringement. Our feeling stance can
be deformed or developed, adolescent or mature, formed by a good education or
deformed by a sensate culture. Sensitive feelings alone are no sure guide to moral guilt
or innocence.
On the other hand, there are what we called spiritual feelings, the desire to know
and do the good, the intentional response to value, the precept to be responsible. These
are deeper, more permanent, inclinations of the human heart and they always lead to
self- transcendence. These we also feel, we feel responsible, we feel obliged, we feel
that we have neglected our duty. We have examined the many ways in which sensitive
and spiritual feelings interrelate with one another, either on the way to development or
on the road to moral decline.
We are faced with a dialectic of feelings that calls for discernment. Are we
really guilty? On the surface we might have no guilt feelings at all; but is that because
we are not really guilty, or because we have become habituated to guilt and rationalized
away our guilt feelings? We may have strong guilt feelings, but it may be because we
are scrupulous or have broken some long held taboo, or because we are neurotic. We
Value Ethics
491
may have no strong surface feelings of guilt, but we may [457] have a deep-down
unease about what we are doing. On the surface our conscience may be quite happy, but
this may be a contrivance covering up a deep long felt unease. In the truly good person,
feelings will be sensitive to values; a happy conscience will indicate true goodness; an
unhappy conscience will indicate real failures and vices. In evil persons conscience will
be deformed and perverted by a habitual life of dishonesty or selfishness. For most of us
who follow the middle way we have to be continually struggling to find true happiness
in doing good, to bring our actions into line with the deepest and best inclinations of our
heart, to resist the rationalizations, excuses and distortions. We have to discriminate
between sensitive and spiritual feelings. We have to deal with mixed feelings, confused
feelings, conflicts of feelings, ambiguous feelings.
(7) Can conscience be totally corrupted? Aquinas posed this question and
answered No. The process of moral decline corrupts the understanding, deforms the
feelings, limits freedom and sets us on a spiral of decline. But this still leaves basic
freedom and responsibility intact. The person is still deemed to be responsible for his
actions. If he is responsible, then he is not determined, and so the possibility of
changing his ways is there. It is only when mental illness, insanity, compulsive
addiction takes over, that a person is no longer responsible for his actions and
conscience is no longer operative.
(8) Conscience is the awareness of the feeling and passes judgment on the
feeling. Conscience is aware of the obligation, the feelings, the judgment, the decision,
the actions. By conscience we are able to distinguish whether guilty feelings are really
indicative of the real guilt of the transgression. Conscience hence is wider than feeling,
it passes judgment on feeling, it distinguishes sensitive from spiritual feelings, it
discerns between conflicting feelings. There is obviously a feeling component here, but
Judgments of Value
492
conscience is aware of the source of that feeling, the reason for that feeling, the decision
and actions which gave rise to the feeling.
The judgment of conscience on our own actions is the final judgment of value.
We are passing judgment on ourselves and our actions, our motives and our intentions.
To pass an adequate judgment [458] the four components must be present, cognitive,
affective, volitional and self-transcendence. It is the good person who is the standard
and criterion of goodness.
4.3 Development and decline of conscience
The psychologists Piaget, Kohlberg and Erickson have traced the development
of moral reasoning from their perspective of psychology. We too can trace the
development of conscience through the various stages. For the child the dominant
figures are the parents who are to be pleased or displeased, obeyed or disobeyed, they
are the authority figures; they judge what is right or wrong by rewards and punishments,
approval or disapproval. This seems to be followed by a social orientation where justice,
equality, law and order are the dominant theme. Here obeying the law predominates,
whether it is the law of the society, or community, or church, or international
community or political correctness. Morality is defined in terms of obedience to law, or
breaking of laws. This is followed by a more internalized value system, which allows
for more flexibility, exceptions, for situations not covered by law.
But within any of these stages we note that the good person does the good thing
and further confirms himself as a good person. Doing the good thing becomes a habit.
Feelings are brought into line with moral values. Conscience is operating, being
educated and informed, being sensitized as to what we are and what we can become. We
learn from mistakes. We have first to live before learning how to live properly. Open to
others, to true values, to self-transcendence. Kohlberg looks at moral development as a
Value Ethics
493
progress from heteronomy to autonomy, from dependence on others to dependence on

yourself and your own moral principles.
The problem with extolling conscience and moral autonomy is that these terms
are so often misunderstood. Conscience is often interpreted as an excuse for doing what
you like, following your attraction to pleasure, rather than the intention of the good. It is
often appealed to when some authority, secular or religious, makes demands on us,
which we find unpleasant and not to our liking. It is often used as an excuse to bypass
the difficult process of moral [459] deliberation, research, argumentation, and judgment.
Adolescents appeal to conscience to justify any kind of sexual behaviour that attracts
them.
A mature conscience will always value the heritage of social, cultural, moral and
religious values into which we are born and in which we are educated, socialized and
inculturated. An informed conscience will be serious about deliberation, research,
listening to the opinions of others and learning from specialists in the field. A good
conscience will be laced with an appropriate humility. Conscience is not a panacea; it is
not a magic formula for the knowing of good and evil. A judgment of conscience
requires complete understanding of the facts, a genuine desire for the good of value, free
and responsible exercise of decision-making, in a person who is on the way to selftranscendence.
But conscience can also decline. The bad person disobeys the law, cares less
about other people, is insensitive to values, and becomes oriented to pleasure as an end
in itself. Conscience is blunted, hardened, ignored, stamped upon, kept in ignorance.
Eventually, we end up with a depraved person, dedicated to evil, whose conscience has
for the moment been silenced but is still operating deep down, as a possible call to
conversion.
Judgments of Value
494
5 Objectivity of moral value judgments.

5.1 Critical Realist Position.
The debate on the objectivity or subjectivity of moral values usually takes place
in the context of naive realist presuppositions. In this context objectivity is conceived as
the out there now, already existing, already constituted, independent of the subject.
Subjectivity in this context is understood negatively as the private interests, feelings,
biases, preferences of the subject, which are all to be excluded if we want to gain
objectivity.
The naive realist position holds that values are somehow out there now real.
They are objective in that sense and do not change. There is an objective order of values
in the things themselves. Plato asserted [460] that the virtues and values are Forms in
the supersensible World of Forms. How then do we know these values? It is usually by
some form of intuition, by which we directly perceive them either through intellect, or
emotion or perception. Intuitionism seems to imply that values are out there now to be
apprehended by intuition. It is thought that this is the only way to preserve values that
are ultimate, stable, unchanging.
Another extreme, the subjectivist position, would hold that we create our values,
we invent them, we construct them, we choose them for ourselves on the basis of
subjective preference. It is our acts, which bring values into existence. Each one does it
for himself. I cannot impose my values on you and vice versa.
The critical realist position asserts that true values are what are affirmed in true
judgments of value. Our principle when considering knowing was that 'genuine
objectivity can only be gained through authentic subjectivity.' This principle we apply
also to moral value judgments. Authentic subjectivity is self-appropriation of the proper
activities involved in making moral decisions. Authentic subjectivity is to recognize
Value Ethics
495
what is bias and to exclude it; to recognize the pure detached desire to know the true
and the good and to implement such precepts in our lives; the courage and the honesty
to carry out the programme. Authentic subjectivity is to be faithful to the transcendental
precepts, to be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable and be responsible. Authentic
subjectivity is to recognize the normativity operating at each of the levels of
consciousness. It is only through attention, intelligence, reason and responsibility that
we can attain the objective truth of fact or value. That is the only way to objectivity.
Value judgments are true, if they reward the self-transcending subject with a happy
conscience; they are false if they result in an uneasy conscience.
5.2 Absolute Notion of Objectivity of Moral Values
The principle of non-contradiction states that a judgment cannot be true and
untrue at the same time and in the same respect. It is easy to explore this in
epistemology in judgments of fact, but the same holds true in judgments of value. To
the extent that it is true, that this [461] is the right thing to do for me here and now, it
cannot at the same time be untrue that this is the right thing to do. It is true for anybody,
in the same time, in the same situation, in the same respect. Times do change, cultures,
meanings, language change and that changes the perspective. The ultimate permanence
and continuity in moral values is not to be found in the content, which is subject to
particular times and cultures, but in the invariant structure of activities which produce
moral judgments, decisions and actions.
Many seek the absoluteness of moral values in the wrong places. They oppose
relativism and think that the only defence is the absoluteness of moral rules, or
formulations, or categorical imperatives, or natural laws. But the absolutes are not to be
found in particular formulations, in one time or place. They are not to be found in the
formulated content of laws or virtues or ways of behaving. Meaning changes, languages
change, human mores change, symbols change, doctrines change, cultures change. Is
Judgments of Value
496
there anything that does not change? For a human person it is only the invariant
structure of human activities of experiencing, understanding, judging the facts and
judging the values that does not change. This is what Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant,
Hume, have in common; they perform the same activities, some more adequately than
others. The value of this study is to find and identify this series of invariant, unrevisable
activities, which define what it is to be a good human person. Garett Barden argues this
point at length and asserts, "I have consistently argued throughout this work that
propositions are not ultimate but that they have an intelligent, reasonable, and
responsible source that, for the propositions we make, is ourselves." 12
The notion of normative objectivity is also relevant to moral objectivity. If you
wish to be objective, it is true that you have to eliminate bias, self-interest, prejudice,
and other interferences with the proper unfolding of the pure desire to know. To guard
against such bias methodologies and procedures must be set up and followed. Social
research methods embody many of these procedures. Total honesty, total openness, total
genuineness is called for especially when it comes to moral values. [462]
5.3 Do we create moral values?
What is the difference between Lonergan's position on the self-constitution of
the moral person by his choices, producing the first and only edition of himself, and
Sartre's position that existence comes before essence that we make our essence by our
choices?
We would hold that to perform the activities of experiencing, understanding
judging fact and value, deciding and acting we are performing the activities, which
make us to be human persons. Immanent and operative in those activities there are
norms, which oblige us to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. It is in
implementing these that we develop as persons and achieve human self-actualization
and produce the one and only edition of ourselves. We become authentic by being
Value Ethics
497
faithful to the deepest and best inclinations of our nature. It is a process of moving from
potentiality to actuality. We become moral or immoral persons by actualizing or not
actualizing these potentialities. We bring ourselves into being as originating values. We
do not create ourselves out of nothingness; we actualize potentialities we find in our
nature.
Sartre seems to be claiming something more; that we produce essence out of
existence. He does not recognize the notion of potentiality to actuality; he does not
recognize the limits that are there in human nature. He seems to think that values can be
plucked out of the air, arbitrarily, at random, existentially.
There is a sphere in which human persons confer meaning and that meaning is
constitutive. We give meaning to sounds and we constitute language; that is the work of
human intelligence and ingenuity. We constitute countries by agreeing on boundaries,
names, constitutions, legal systems, and international recognition. The good of order,
cultural values, knowledge, education, are achievements of centuries. We bring
goodness into being in ourselves, our values, our forms of social organization, our
constitutions, our laws, and our common way of life.
But this is not an arbitrary creating out of nothing: it is more in the line of
bringing potentialities into actualization. We are discovering the laws of physics and
chemistry, rather than creating them. Cre-[463]ation out of nothing seems to be a divine
prerogative. We are pointed towards truth and goodness and can bring them into being.
Our creating of ourselves is only being faithful to our nature, being true to ourselves,
responding to he deepest and best inclinations of our hearts. The inventiveness of
intelligence is not an arbitrary pulling rabbits out of hats, but of realizing potentialities
of nature.
Is there an objective order of values? Not in the sense that the order of values
pre-exists human persons, as already constituted, hierarchically organized, named, out
Judgments of Value
498
there now real. There is an objective order of values in the sense that to be a human
person is to perform activities at five levels of human consciousness; that each level has
its own intentionality; that this hierarchy of activities is normative, interrelated, selfassembling and self-constitutive; that corresponding to this hierarchy there is a
hierarchy of vital, social, cultural, moral and religious values, to be realized in our
common life together.
6 Clarification by Contrast
Our task has been to trace the source of our knowledge of values, our knowing
of good and evil. Our answer has unfolded in the previous chapters and we have
identified the role of understanding, the place of feelings, the influence of deciding in
the context of a self-transcending subject. We have identified these individual elements
and we have seen how they unify into a single judgment of value, a single act of
knowing good or evil. We have seen that the only guarantee of the objective validity of
our knowledge of values lies in the integrity of the acts of understanding, desiring, and
deciding, of a self-transcending subject.
Some might complain that this is a complicated position. Can you not give us
something simpler? Surely it cant be as complex as that? But the reality is that
knowledge of good and evil is a complex business. Attempts at simplification might
satisfy for a time but ultimately will be seen to be inadequate. It seems that this
temptation to simplification is the bane of contemporary attempts to deal with
knowledge of values. It might help bolster our position, if we pin-[464]point the lacunae
in certain contemporary accounts of values intuitionism, emotivism and rationalism.
There is a school of thought that claims that we know values by an intuition; that
this intuition is a single, simple, direct, immediate knowledge of value. Sometimes it is
said to be an emotional intuition, sometimes an intellectual intuition. This is a
Value Ethics
499
characteristic of the phenomenological approach to values, as in Max Scheler or Nicolai

Hartmann, and the English empiricists, such as Henry Sidgwick or G. E. Moore.
All my own experience of struggling with values and my experience of teaching
values, indicates that out knowing of values is discursive, complicated, involves many
factors, is a struggle, and usually attained only after overcoming mistakes and
inadequacies. I have no experience of direct, immediate, perception of values. Our
knowing values is discursive in the sense that it is worked out over time, it is worked
out through conversation between different alternatives; that our knowledge of values is
always, provisional rather than final, probable rather than certain, virtually
unconditioned rather than formally unconditioned. It is complicated in that it involves
many activities of questioning, understanding, defining, reflecting, deliberating and
judging; that it involves many components such as thinking, desiring and deciding; it is
a judgment not of the intellect but of the whole person as standard and criterion of
goodness. A characteristic of the intuitionists writing on ethical knowledge is the
absence of the notion of deliberation. If we know values by a simple, direct perception,
then, clearly we do not need this complicated struggle to line up means and ends, direct
and indirect, evidence and counterevidence, arguments with counter arguments, that
characterizes the process of deliberating. But it seems to be that our knowledge of good
and evil is a struggle; it is not given in a simple intuition; that we go through the
difficult process of deliberating in order to come to a conclusion in the judgment of
value. In the end, it is a question of psychological fact: do we know values by intuitions
or by deliberating and judging? In my experience we do so by the latter and not the
former. Intuitions seems to be an attempt to simplify our account of knowing values to
[465] one factor alone, but in the end it is found wanting as a total account of knowing
values.
Judgments of Value
500
An alternative contemporary account, emotivism, emphasizes the role of feeling,

emotions, personal preference, as the sole source and explanation of values. This
attitude is very much part and parcel of our contemporary sensate culture. It gets
philosophical backing in the empiricist philosophy of A.J. Ayer or the situation ethics of
John Fletcher. This attitude claims that values are a personal preference based on
feelings of likes and dislikes, feelings of approval or disapproval, feelings of love or
hate; that these choices are private and emotional; that no one else can tell us what to
value. Sometimes these theories are based on self-interest, personal preference;
sometimes on love, sympathy, compassion, empathy, and the like. Common to all of
them is the exclusion of reasoning, deliberating, judging and the notion of true or false
values. This position is, of course, relativistic to varying degrees.
Again, it is unfortunate that one element in the process of valuing has been
glorified to the exclusion of all other components in the interest of simplification. But
does it work? Is that how we reach knowledge of values? What are the psychological
facts? Feelings obviously play a part in moral judgments and decisions. We
distinguished two kinds of feeling orientation, a deep permanent spiritual intention of
true value and a sensitive feeling dimension which is morally neutral. Identifying the
proper role of feeling, then, requires discrimination and discernment. Feelings are very
complex, multilayered, subtle and ambivalent and are really difficult to identify and pin
down. But do desires or feelings by themselves ever give knowledge of true values?
Even at their very best, purest, most spiritual, do feelings know values? Feelings intend
values, desire values, recognize values, are sensitive to values rejoice in true values, but
by themselves are only inclinations and not knowledge. If we know values it is by
activities of experiencing, understanding, defining, reflecting, deliberating and judging.
These are cognitional activities. They operate in tandem with the desire to know good
and evil. In our analysis the desire to know value is the dynamic driving the activities
Value Ethics
501
from questions of [466] value to judgments of value. Our analysis seems to conform to
the facts of experience and that has been our recurrent argument.
Feelings, then, are indispensable to knowing values, but do not constitute a total
explanation of the source of values. Feelings combine with the cognitive and volitional
components in the context of a self-transcending subject to form a comprehensive,
complete account of the source of our true values. Simplification seems plausible in the
short-run, but is found wanting in the long-term. Even the most well-intentioned moral
philosophies of love, compassion, sympathy, and empathy require a cognitive and
volitional component to be complete.
Perhaps, a last group we could consider by way of contrast would be the
rationalists. This group of thinkers accounts for our knowledge of value by way of
reason alone, understood often as formal, deductive reasoning from premises to
conclusions. Kant claimed to derive knowledge of values from practical reason;
Lonergan in Insight claimed to derive obligation from speculative reason; conceptualists
work out systems of first principles, secondary principles and practical applications,
appealing to definitions, divisions and deductions. Natural law theorists were often in
this rationalist, conceptualist mode. Rawls theory of justice would seem to be in the
same kind of position, which excludes any recourse of input from feelings.13
What do we say about this? In what way do we differ? Our appeal is again to the
data of our own consciousness. There is clearly a cognitive element in our knowledge of
values: we question, we argue, we appeal to facts, we point to consequences, we
consider alternatives, eventually we reach a judgment of the right course of action in
this situation. There may be an element of deduction by which we apply universal
principles to the concrete situation, but this presupposes an understanding of the
concrete situation, which is attained not by a deduction, but by induction, by
observation, understanding and judging. Universal imperatives still require an additional
Judgments of Value
502
insight into the concrete situation to which they apply. Some very clear thinking is
required to distinguish direct and indirect causes, immediate and remote consequences,
normal and abnormal cases, natural and un- [467] natural means, culpable and
inculpable ignorance, means and ends, and the like. Very clear thinking is called for in
difficult cases. But the casuist with all his clear thinking is not necessarily the good
person who is the standard and criterion of goodness. If casuistry relies solely on
definitions, deductions, inferences, logic and clear thinking, something important is
lacking. To know values we need to care about values, feel responsible for values,
desire them passionately. The good person, sensitive to values, aware of the concrete
situation, has a better chance of finding the right course of action, than the aloof casuist
thinking through his abstract deductions. Again it is not a question of opting for either
clear thinking or sensitive feeling. Both are needed to feel and to think our way to the
correct course of action. The rationalist seems to err on the side of excluding care,
passion, feeling and responsibility from the search for goodness. [468]
(1) This is a true statement in the context of a moral law ethic; the opposite would be a
false judgment of value. It is stating that normally it is wrong to kill. Because it is a
general statement it allows for specific exceptions as in a just war, or self-defence and
perhaps other exceptional situations.
(2) To make a correct judgment of value you must have a deliberative insight,
intentional response to value, display a habitual willingness to seek goodness, to be on
the way to self-transcendence, and all that these components entail. By true judgments
of value you are cognitionally self-transcendent. By implementing and living it you are
really morally self-transcending.
(3) What is the value of a human person? What is the purpose of sex in the total context
of personal and social development? Can you distinguish developing and declining in
Value Ethics
503
sexual growth? Can you use a person as an instrument, a means rather than an end?
What personal values are being expressed in casual sex for pleasure?
(4) The guiding principle of what is right and wrong comes from within rather than
from without; from conscience rather than the State or any Authority. But conscience
must be informed; formed rather than deformed. Your first obligation is not to harm
yourself; namely, to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. Immoral
behaviour harms those who engage in it; makes them to be immoral persons; and will
inevitably effect their family, school, community, society.
(5) We would normally look for somebody who is competent, a good teacher, a good
person, a good model, a likeable and happy person, one who will be a good influence on
our kids. These are all value judgments.
(6) Answered in the text.
(7) Implicitly, this is cultural relativism. But cultures are not absolutes. What is basic is
human persons who are attentive, [469] intelligent, reasonable and responsible; for these
imperatives are transcultural. One person can criticize the values of another culture, not
on the basis of cultural superiority, but on the basis of transcendental method.
(8) The first position is the value-free attitude. But this itself is a value position; it
involves valuing neutrality and implying that we choose our values at random; that we
have no values to teach. But can values be excluded? What is the value of what is left?
There are many contradictions involved in this position.
The value clarification movement designed projects to help participants become
explicitly aware of the values they aspired to. But it has no critique of values, and no
guarantee that values would be implemented just because they were aspired to.
Teaching true values involves instruction, aspiration, inspiration and encouragement in
good decision-making. The teacher can do so much, the pupil has to respond. Without
that response the teacher or parent can do little. [470]
Judgments of Value
504
Endnotes
1
Insight, 674-5.
See Gula, What are they saying about Moral Norms. Also F. Crowe, Three Thomist
Studies, "Universal Norms and the Concrete Operabile in St. Thomas Aquinas".
4
Insight, 573-5.
Summa Theologiae, Pars Prima, Q 79, Arts 12 and 13.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future,
(London: Penguin, 1970), 145.
8
Walter Conn, Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence (Alabama: Religious

Education Press, 1981) 208.
10
11
Conn, Conscience, 203.
See Garrett Barden, After Principles, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1990), 124. Conceived as a reply to MacIntyre's After Virtue, this book is an extended
discussion of where the absolutes in moral values are to be found.
12
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1971, 1999).
13
10
Promoting Moral Values
Finally, morality reached by mutual agreement and based upon
mutual respect is an important part of human morality, the part of
morality that arises when the subject moves to the level of ethical
value, autonomy of spirit, realization of his own freedom and
responsibility and respect for the freedom and responsibility of
others. It flowers in human cooperation, in concrete enterprises and
in civic virtue.1
1 Foundations
We have now completed a long, and sometimes tedious, journey of selfdiscovery. We started out wondering about values and where they come from and now
we have discovered the answer. We have identified the components, how they work,
how they combine together, how we make good or bad judgments of value. We have
cracked the code, discovered the knowledge of good and evil. This is no small claim,
not just a footnote in the history of philosophy, but a major breakthrough, the end of an
era and the beginning of another. Our major debt is to Bernard Lonergan; even though
he did leave a few false clues, the main points of our discovery of the integral
cognitional structure of facts and values are already present in his writings. What
remains to be done? The implications of our discovery point in every direction. Our
intention is this last chapter is to give a [472] prcis of where values come from (section
one); to give some indications of how this discovery can be make more practical
(section two); to answer the question of how to teach values (section three); and to
conclude with some hopes of the recognition of the value of the human person in the
context of a global ethic (section four).
1.1 Where do Values Come from?
We started our text wondering why people so easily appeal to values and yet
how difficult it is to find a rationale for the process of valuing. We set out to find that
506
rationale, not on the basis of theories of axiology, but on the basis of personal selfappropriation. We wondered what was lacking in previous systems of ethics and why
we should now have recourse to a value ethics and so we considered the role of method
in ethics as a pivotal issue. We considered the alternative traditions and methods in the
appeal to feelings, reason, intuition, and free choice. We looked at the noble traditions
of natural law ethics and virtue ethics. We set out with the hypothesis that the method
of self-appropriation might help us to find a foundation, which underlies all these partial
and limited attempts to formulate a philosophy of moral conduct. We were able to start
with people as they are; we embraced the empirical principle but insisting on including
data of consciousness as well as data of sense observation. We eschewed exclusive
appeals to the authority of sentiments alone, or reason alone, or intuition alone. We did
not see much point in working out abstract systems of concepts, which can only be
related to concrete situations with great difficulty. We were aware that relativism is
somehow incoherent, that there must be some absolutes somewhere; but one has to be
very careful in identifying that absolute; it is not in propositions, not in formulations,
not in laws, not in lists of virtues, not in an authority telling us what to do. It is internal:
it is to be found in the norms which are immanent and operative in the activities of
asking and answering questions about the value of persons and behaviour.
Starting with people as they are we set out to identify the activities we perform
when we are facing a moral dilemma. If we are facing a problem, then we are
questioning which way to go, which to choose, [473] which is right, which course is
better than the other, what values are at stake here. The questioning is the dynamic
operative throughout the process from the initial question to the final judgment of value,
usually followed by decision and action. We identified the activity of deliberating by
which we meant assembling evidence for or against, learning from previous judgments,
appealing to examples, examining hypotheses, considering alternative courses of action,
Value Ethics
507
envisaging various immediate and remote consequences of action. We noted the four
components operative here, the cognitive, the affective, the volitional, within the total
context of a process of self-transcendence. Deliberative insight incorporates all four
components into a unity and issues in a judgment of value. The judgment affirms the
truth of the value statement, adds no content of its own, we take a stand and become
responsible thereby. With good will and resolution, we freely and responsible decide to
follow the right course of action and become actually self-transcendent when we
implement the decision. So we examined and identified five specific, distinct, personal,
activities involved in moral consciousness: questioning, deliberating, judging, deciding
and implementing.
Like most things, there is a right way to do it and a wrong way to do it.
Sometimes we have to read the instructions to find the right way of assembling a table,
or cooking a new dish. In the case of the activities of knowing values, the norms are
immanent and operative in the doing. To start asking, What is the right thing to do?
already implies that we at present do not know, but that we can find out, and the
procedure for finding out unfolds in terms of assembling data, arguing to conclusions,
combining the known and the unknown, and pushing relentlessly until we find the
answer and know that the answer is correct. There is a right way to question the worth
of something, to deliberate about the matter, to reach a deliberative insight, to pass a
judgment of value, to decide and to implement. The dynamic is the question of value;
we can call it the transcendental imperative, to be responsible. Very few people espouse
the ideal of being irresponsible. There is something fairly basic and incontrovertible in
affirming the norm of responsibility. It is true, of course, that we sometimes behave
irresponsibly, but it is a rare person who sets this [474] out as the ideal for all human
beings to follow. We recognize this dynamic operating in ourselves; we intend values,
we respond to values, we work our way painfully to the knowing and implementation of
508
a scale of values, we become more or less sensitive to values, as we progress or regress

in moral development we learn to recognize values when we see them.
We identified the components involved in the judgment of value. The cognitive
component involving reasoning, arguing, inferring, comparing, weighing evidence, a
heuristic structure we follow as we move to a conclusion. The affective component by
which we intend value, we seek value, we want to do the right thing, we want the best
for our kids, we would like to leave the world a better place by our passing contribution.
At the same time we are suspicious of glib arguments, of persons whose motives are
self-interested, where evidence is not convincing, we feel uneasy about the course of
action. The volitional element recognizes free and responsible decisions operating all
through the process, before the process and after the process; it is in virtue of this free
deciding that we are responsible or not responsible for our action. The element of selftranscendence recognizes the human condition as a being on the way; it is the total
human context understood from a moral point of view; for deliberation is purposive, it
is heading to a goal, to a final end, to happiness, to self-transcendence. We showed how
these components unite in a judgment of value, either on the analogy of structure and
content, or on the analogy of the four causes.
Although we focused on the role of these components in the deliberative insight
and judgment, they can be generalized into the totality of the moral life our life as
persons in relation to others, the life of action, the drama of living and dying,
developing and declining. They encapsulate a notion of the human person as feeling,
thinking, knowing, deciding and doing; a notion of the human person as psyche, as
intellectual, as volitional, as an acting human being; a notion of a human person who
operates at five levels of intentional consciousness, experiencing, understanding,
judging truth, judging value, and loving; a human person who is free and responsible at
all levels of activity; a human person who is obliged, to be attentive, to [475] be
Value Ethics
509
intelligent, to be reasonable, to be responsible, to be in love; a human person who

operates in terms of a scale of values which line up as vital, social, cultural, personal
and religious.
As well as the immanent and operative norms pushing the process of moral
development, there is also a criterion operating to judge, whether we have reached the
goal or not. Proximately, we look to the evidence, the arguments, the justification for
the goodness of the course of action; we look to the good of the consequences, the
motivation of the action, our gut feelings about the proposal. More remotely, we look to
our own openness to ask further questions, to our sensitivity to the values involved, to
our habitual willingness to do the right thing for the right reason, at the right time and in
the right manner. We similarly acknowledge our inclination to bias, our weakness in
willing, our deficient intellects, our learning by mistakes, our unruly feelings, our
readiness to substitute pleasure for the good. Finally, we recognize the total context
where all the parts come together and we are guided by conscience: the standard and
criterion of goodness is the authentic, competent person endowed with a happy
conscience. The authentic person is the one who knows about authenticity.
Finally, we recognized that the struggle involved in the process of moral
conversion will always be with us. Our desires are in need of discernment. As well as
those sensitive desires for satisfaction, there are the desires for knowledge, for truth, for
goodness, for development, for infinite goodness, goodness without qualification. But
we are involved in a dialectical struggle between the more palpable, sensitive desires
and deeper, more spiritual aspirations. We are free to choose either path.
Surely, we have now answered the question, where do values come from? We
can answer that values are the goods we desire in questions for deliberation, grasp in
deliberative insight, affirm to be true in judgments of value, decide in favour of and
implement in our lives. We are the source of value. We do not choose values out of the
510
sky, but recognize the imperatives of, who we are, and what we are, and what we are to
become. We recognize a scale of values, which can be [476] affirmed in comparative
judgments of value. We recognize our struggle for authentic values and our frequently
falling short of the ideal. We can see through the naivety of the theory that claims that
we know values by some simple, direct, immediate, intuition or perception of a value
out there now real. We recognize the one-sidedness of saying that we know values by
feeling or sentiments of approval or disapproval. We can recognize the abstractness of
claiming that knowledge of values is attained by reason alone, by some natural law
syllogism, by come conceptualist definition, by some a priori categorical imperative, or
by some new theory of justice.
Above all we recognize where the absoluteness of moral value comes from. The
absolute lies in the activities, the norms, the components, the criteria, the products of
these, in the good life of the authentic person. This is the transcultural, ahistorical
source of moral absolutes. The absolute is not to be found in the law; it is not to be
found in a list of virtues; it is not to be found in authority; it is not to be found in a
proposition, or in a formulation, or in a philosophical theory, or in commandments
carved on stone tablets.
I think we can now claim to have found the kind of ethics we were looking for in
our discussion of method in ethics. We have found an ethics that is transcultural,
universal, invariant; that is based on the invariant structures of personal intentionality.
We have found a personalist ethic, centred on the supreme value of the person,
recognizing the richness of the many-sided reality of being a human growing person.
We have found an ethics that is verifiable; everything we have said is verifiable in
relation to our own experience of moral behaviour. We now have an ethics that is
maximalist, that looks to the infinite possibilities of growth and conversion, appeals to
the deepest and best inclinations of the heart. We have an ethics that is creative, able to
Value Ethics
511
tackle the challenges and possibilities of new technologies, new medicines, evolving
economies, to make the world a better place to live in. We have an ethics that is not only
personal, but also social and global; we become persons in relationship to others. We
have an ethics that can be taught, that identifies the elements needed in teaching, the
stages of appropriate pedagogies. We have an ethics that is foundational, goes to the
root of the problem, finds the [477] source of values and can mount a critique of
inadequate theories of value.
1.2 Self-Affirmation as a Responsible Subject
It might be possible to read all the foregoing and still remark, So what? What
has that got to do with me? I acknowledge the facts but intend to continue with my life
unchanged. We might acknowledge moral obligation as applying to humans in general,
but not to myself in particular. It might be helpful to note a parallel with the procedure
in terms of cognition. We noted that the first part of Insight, the first ten chapters,
concerned the activities of knowing, knowing considered simply as an activity of the
mind.2 The only question being considered in this first part was, What are these
activities and can I identify them in my own mind? It was a pure phenomenology of
knowing, in the sense of an accurate description of what actually takes place. It could be
called a psychology of knowing in the same sense. The question being asked was, what
am I doing when I am knowing?
But this first descriptive part was followed by a crucial transitional part where
the question shifted to, Why is doing that knowing? Here we have self-affirmation, then
the notion of being, and objectivity. This involved taking a fundamental, personal stance
on What is knowledge, being and the real? This we named epistemology. This was
followed by an elaboration of the content of the known, which we named metaphysics.
Our procedure in ethics has followed a similar pattern. We have first identified
the activities of deliberating, judging, deciding and acting from a moral perspective. Up
512
to now we have simply asked the questions, Do these activities occur? In what order?
Are we including all the relevant activities? We have been doing a psychology of
morals or even a phenomenology of moral activity. We have simply been attending to
the facts of moral experience. What are the activities we all perform? What are the
norms operating through these activities?
Now we come to a turning point. It is time to take a stand. It is time not just to
acknowledge the fact of moral obligation but accept [478] all that that implies. It is a
shift from neutral empirical psychology, to taking moral responsibility for our
behaviour. We accept the fact of moral responsibility as it applies to us, as we are
bound by it, as we are obliged to implement such obligations. We are to take a stand on
what we are as moral subjects with the fullness of responsibility that this involves. It is
not just accepting a fact but a commitment to a position.
The judgment will be a value judgment, which we can express as I am a person
who judges, decides and acts according to the precept to be responsible. I am a
responsible subject. This is a judgment each person has to make for himself. It is rather
fundamental; decision and action should normally follow. This expresses our
fundamental position. In epistemology it was the judgment, I am a knower. Now in
ethics it is, I am a responsible person.
What justifies us in taking this moral stance? Knowledge of human moral reality
that we have reached in identifying the activities of moral behaviour, indicate that this is
what it is to be human; there is an imperative; to be human we must freely follow that
imperative. We have not just ananlzed it, but we have identified it in our lives. We feel
obliged by it. That is sufficient ground for our basic value judgment that moral living is
the best way for a human person to live.
1.3 Not Open to Basic Revision
Value Ethics
513
Again we have recourse to a parallel from cognitional theory. There we clearly

distinguished between the facts of cognitional activities and the theories that were
invoked to explain human knowing. The facts about cognition are discovered by selfappropriation. We attend to the data of consciousness, identify the activities involved in
knowing, line up the activities in the sequence in which they occur, identify the norms
that are immanent and operative in the activities. These activities as performed are the
same for everybody: this is how Aristotles mind worked, how Einsteins mind worked,
how your mind works, how my mind works. We all perform the same basic activities, in
the same order, well or badly according to the same immanent and operative norms. All
human beings have a common starting point in performing the activities of knowing. It
is when we come to [479] theories of knowing that divergence begins to occur and we
need to distinguish position from counterpositions.3
Any theory of knowledge that is coherent with the performance of the basic set
of activities will be a position. Any expansion of such a theory of knowledge into a
metaphysics will also be a position, if it is coherent with the set of activities.
Cognitional structure and all that is implied in that, is coherent with the set of activities
and is a position and is correct and is not open to basic revision. Obviously, any theory
of knowledge it open to improvement, to minor adjustments, to additions, qualification,
further differentiation and sophistication. But cognitional structure is not open to basic
revision because any attempt at basic revision will simply invoke the same pattern of
activities, experience new data, understand new theory, and verify new theory in
judgment.
Contrariwise, any theory of knowledge that is not coherent with the performance
of the basic set of activities in knowing will be a counterposition there will be an
incoherence between performance and content. It is not hard to show that Hume claimed
that all human knowing was a variation of sensation, but in writing his book he was
514
presumably understanding, and in rejecting contrary opinions he was judging about

truth and falsehood. It is not hard to show that Descartes account of human knowing
emphasized understanding, but in performance he was also experiencing and judging
truth and error. So there is a test that we can apply to any theory of knowledge, namely,
coherence between performance and content, to decide which is positional or
counterpositional, which is true, which is false.
We can use the same procedure to show that our account of the activities of
knowing value is coherent with our theory of values and that it is not open to basic
revision.
The activities as performed are what everybody has in common. If you are a
human person then you are one who questions the worth of ways of living; who
deliberates and feels in relation to values; who judges values as true or false; who
decides in accordance with true values and implements such decisions in human praxis.
This is true of human persons of all times, and all places, and all cultures, and all [480]
continents. This is what it is to be a human person. But, of course, we do not perform
these activities perfectly; we often fall short in some or all of these activities. But
strangely we can recognize our mistakes; we can rectify our defects. We can do so
because of the immanent and operative norm to be responsible operating through all
these activities. Everybody can learn from their mistakes. Everyone is endowed with a
conscience. All these activities we share with everyone else at the level of performance.
But when it comes to objectifying these activities and formulating a theory of
moral behaviour, wide divergences occur. We can recognize the position in that it is
coherent with performance of the basic set of activities. The basic position is not open to
basic revision. There is much room for improvement in identifying the activities and
norms more accurately; there is room for additions, further differentiation and
sophistication, further elaboration and explanation; and all that needs to be done and
Value Ethics
515
hopefully will be done. But our position is not open to basic revision, because that
would involve an incoherence between the theory and the activities, between the content
and the performance.
As there is only one position, where there is coherence with performance, so
there are many theories that are incoherent with the basic position. The test of whether a
theory is true or not is to ask whether it is coherent with the basic set of activities, is
there coherence between content and performance. Freud claimed that conscience was
just the superego, the expectations of the society internalized; but was he acting as a
slave to such determinism when he debated with himself and finally decided to publish
his Interpretation of Dreams? A.J. Ayer claims that all moral imperatives are simply
expressions of emotional approval or disapproval; but is this what he taught his
children? Is this how he judged his own conduct? Is this how he judged, praised and
blamed others? G.E. Moore claimed that we know the good by a special, immediate,
direct intuition; but why did he deliberate at such length to refute naturalism, hedonism
and metaphysical ethics, and develop his own theory of intuition of the simple,
indefinable good? Relativists claim that all moral statements are relative; except this
privileged discovery of their own. So we do [481] have a criterion for the adequacy,
comprehensiveness, truth, of any moral theory and it lies in the coherence between
content and performance, between theory and the basic set of fundamental activities that
we perform.
We use this procedure, not to browbeat those who disagree with us, but to show
that we have reached something very basic, unrevisable and foundational in recognizing
the activities and norms of moral behaviour as the starting point for a moral philosophy.
Moral philosophy can be fully critical. There is an empirical principle by which you can
verify all moral laws, virtues and values. Just as metaphysics can be checked against the
516
facts of cognitional activities, so also an ethics can be checked against the facts of moral
activities.
2 Value Ethics in Practice
2.1 Making True Value Judgments
We have noted how we are constantly, unavoidable, making value judgments.
We may be passing judgment on the price of groceries in the store, on a new tax
regulation, on a new neighbour, on the behaviour of our children, even on the weather.
Our moral judgments are aroused when the subjects of discrimination, marriage,
abortion, war and peace, sexual abuse, and the like, are raised or we encounter them in
daily life. We dont have much training in evaluation; we may not even be aware that
we are valuing. So it is no wonder that our value judgments are sometimes arbitrary,
emotionally biased, irresponsible and haphazard.
We have also noted that theories as to how to make good value judgments are so
diverse and contradictory. We have noted those who appeal only to emotions you pass
judgments by venting your feelings. We noted the exclusive appeal to reason in terms of
deductions, applications, definitions and divisions. We noted the prevalence of those
who say that all judgments are relative, subjective, expressions of personal preference,
opinions having no cognitive status whatever. Our current high culture does not give us
much help in learning how to value well. [482]
What might things be like, if we could reverse the trend? What could happen if
persons were taught how to make good value judgments and the high culture of the
society defined and promoted a healthy, balanced, comprehensive value philosophy?
Our claim is that we now have an explicit, correct, comprehensive, foundational account
of where values come from and hence can launch a critique of false valuing and
incomplete philosophies of value. We are not so nave as to expect this to happen
overnight and but surely an explicit recognition of the process of valuing is a significant
Value Ethics
517
contribution. Imagine if persons understood values, not just as opinions or preferences,

but as the true good sought in questions for deliberation, grasped in deliberative insight,
affirmed in true judgments, decided for freely and implemented responsible. Imagine if
we had a heightened awareness of the deepest and best inclinations of our hearts the
transcendental imperatives and make them the central thrust of our life. Imagine if
debates about public policy were conducted with respect for true values, the good for
all, equally, and not in terms of my constituency, my self-interest, my hidden agenda.
Imagine if the words conscience, autonomy, self-realization, freedom, tolerance,
happiness were understood, used and lived in their authentic meaning. Imagine if we
had a society of persons who knew how to make value judgments, truly and
responsibly! Imagine if our educational system knew how to teach moral values!
The first baby step towards this dream of transformation is surely the
foundational task of identifying the activities and norms, the components and the unity
of the process of knowing true values. This is what our text has achieved. It is not a
theory imposed from above but a map of the human mind as it strives to know good and
evil. It is a guide to reading yourself, to acknowledging your potential, to recognizing
the deepest and best inclinations of your heart. It is a guide to true happiness, the
happiness of authenticity, or realizing potential in the exercise of the activities of
knowing and deciding for the good of all. What we are promoting in this text can be
summed up in the clarion call, Develop the position, Reverse the counterposition:
Promote authenticity and Reverse inauthenticity. [483]
Aristotle discovered and elaborated understanding form in images, and
elaborated a metaphysics of matter and form, act and potency. Aquinas discovered and
elaborated the difference between direct insight and reflective insight, between simple
apprehension and judgment, between the first and second act of intellect. He elaborated
a metaphysics of matter and form, act and potency, essence and existence. The early
518
Lonergan combined all these in the three levels of cognitional structure, with a
consequent metaphysics of proportionate being, potency, form and act. The later
Lonergan realized that the good of value is a distinct intentionality, known through
deliberating and judging, deciding and acting and so he objectified a fourth level of
intentional consciousness. We have clarified the stages, the activities, the components
operative at this fourth level into a coherent, critical, foundational account. True
knowledge of good and evil is no small achievement. It is dreamed of in many cultures
and myths including the tree of knowledge of good and evil in the Garden of Eden. Now
we seem to have the structure of the activities of knowing good and evil in place. The
implications and possible applications of this discovery are vast; one becomes
speechless at the possible horizons opening up for education, politics, ethics, law,
institutions, community life, global ethics, economics, relationships and more. All we
can do here is pick out some pointers where value ethics might make a significant
difference and needs to be applied and implemented.
2.2 Generalists and Specialists: Foundations and Application
If you tell someone you are working on ethics, they often ask a specific question
about genetics or economics, and they are very surprised when I tell them I do not know
the right answer. There was a time when one person could be expected to know all the
answers, but those times have long passed. In the traditional method of teaching ethics
the aim was to give answers, to all questions of what is right or wrong, in every area of
life. In the natural law tradition you formulate the laws and then apply them to concrete
situations. In virtue ethics you define the virtues and with a little bit of prudence know
how to apply these virtues. In the twentieth century the distinction began to be made
between practical ethics and meta-ethics. We are working in [484] we do not and cannot
aim to give specific answers to all questions of ethics. So the question arises as to what
Value Ethics
519
contribution our foundational approach makes to actually providing answers to specific

questions. How can foundations be practical?
There is a parallel here, in the Lonergan context, between metaphysics and a
value ethics. Lonergan's metaphysics is conceived as a whole in knowledge but not the
whole of knowledge.4 Metaphysics is about method and the general structure of the
universe consequent on the very structure of knowing. So if knowing is constituted by
the activities of experiencing, understanding and judging, then reality is constituted by
the elements of potency, form and act. If there are two fundamentally different kinds of
insights one that grasps a unity identity whole in an aggregate of data, and one that
grasps a similarity between this data and that data, then there will be central forms and
conjugate forms (substances and accidents). If there is a process of successive higher
viewpoints, insights that build on one another, then there will be a hierarchy of genera
and species. If there is a finality operating in unfolding of intelligence, then, there will
be a finality operating in the world of proportionate being. Hence, you can define
metaphysics as the anticipation of the structure of the universe of proportionate being.
That is of course very empty; it does not give any specific answer to any
particular question about the universe. What is called for here is collaboration between
the metaphysician and the scientist. The metaphysician provides the method, the
framework, the critique, the knowledge of the whole; what the scientist supplies is
specific content on determinate aspects of reality. If you want to know about quasars ask
the scientist; if you want to know about the criterion of the real, ask the metaphysician.
The scientist needs the metaphysician to distinguish between the real as the correctly
affirmed and the real as the unquestioned imaginative assumption of out there now real.
The metaphysician needs the scientist to flesh out the empty structure of his view of the
whole.
520
Something similar occurs in a value ethics. We have not given answers to

specific moral questions, but we have outlined a method of [485] finding the correct
answer. We have specified the activities that must be performed, the dynamic operating
in the activities, the criteria operating throughout the process. We have clearly identified
the components in knowing values in general and the same components will be involved
in any specific answer to particular questions. We have formulated a general
anticipation of what an authentic human person might look like. This is a meta-ethics,
an outline of a method, a general heuristic structure of the universe of proportionate
value. We are generalists not specialists. So how is a value ethics to be fleshed out in
the concrete? Can we offer at least some guidelines?
To a certain extent everybody can do this for themselves. It is not very difficult
to appreciate the value of honesty, to realize that lying is being dishonest, and to know
that this particular statement is a lie. In many examples of daily life we have sufficient
knowledge of what is involved, sufficient awareness of the moral values at stake, a
vague realization that if I tell lies I make myself a dishonest person, and a realization
that we are free to decide for ourselves one way or the other. We perform the activities,
we do them well or badly according to our lights. In this sense nothing has changed
since the time of Aristotle.
However, we are now living in a highly differentiated world. There are areas
where commonsense knowledge is inadequate to the task of moral discernment. There
are many specialized areas of knowledge and application of knowledge where the
individual non-specialist is incompetent to judge. So ethics has spawned a slew of
specializations, business ethics, medical ethics, ethics of genetics and stem cell research,
justice and peace issues, terrorism and security, war and peace, distribution of wealth,
ecology and environment, endemic poverty, discrimination of race, gender, and the like.
Each of these could be further divided into sub-specialties. All this in a world of
Value Ethics
521
interconnectedness, a global world, where there are all sorts of unforeseen

interconnections and consequences. We have a proliferation of courses on ethics, ethics
committees, research on ethical questions; but if we do not have an explicit way of
proceeding, we have the blind leading the blind. [486]
It is here that there is need for collaboration between the generalists of value
ethics and the specialists of distinct disciplines. Each has a contribution to make. The
value ethics provides a framework, a set of activities, a list of components and
identification of criteria to use. The specialist provides the content, the information, the
specialized understanding of what is possible here, what is happening there, what are the
likely consequences, and so forth. The specialist might be working from an inadequate
notion of value, a confusion between satisfaction and value, an inability to distinguish
means from ends, a presumption that values are arbitrary, private preferences.
Certainty about foundations can be coupled with uncertainty about particular
applications. Because our approach to values is based on self-appropriation and is
basically unrevisable, one can be quite certain about the activities and components that
constitute knowledge of values. But particular applications, in specific circumstances
can be quite uncertain. We might be uncertain of the facts, have incomplete information
and understanding; we might have mixed feelings, be not sure of our motivation, be not
so resolute in our decision-making. No one can claim to be the perfect standard and
criterion of the self-transcending subject. Judgements of value can be tentative,
provisional, probable, ambiguous, or plain mistaken. This is nothing new. Aristotle
warns us that politics and ethics are not exact sciences; that he is aiming at clarifications
and a broad outline of topics, rather than a list of specific conclusions; that it is a sign of
a trained mind not to expect more precision than the nature of the subject allows.5
2.3 Laws, Virtues, Rights, Values
522
A value ethics is not intended to replace all other terminologies, codifications,

priorities and expressions of other approaches to moral philosophy. It is intended to
make clear the foundations, the method and the criteria of all moral judgments and
actions. The specification of this framework in each situation must be undertaken by
responsible competent persons, individuals or groups, on the spot. We still need specific
rules, laws, norms, regulations, command-[487]ments, relating to concrete actions. A
foundational ethic of value does not make such specific rules redundant.
Is it enough to tell students to be responsible and to presume that they know
what that means in the concrete? I made this mistake myself in setting up a new
computer laboratory for the use of the students. They were instructed in the use of
computers in a special course, I explained how much the computers cost, how fragile
they were, how difficult it was to get them fixed, and urged the student to be responsible
in the use of the computers. Fine. But after a week of use, there was chaos, students
complaining, computers broken, files lost, and that kind of thing. I realized that rules
have to be made, order has to be maintained, punishments have to be threatened; the
meaning of being responsible has to be specified in such rules as, do not delete files
that do not belong to you, do not change default settings in programmes, do not execute
commands at random, close all programs properly before turning off the computer, do
not format C: drive. General exhortations need to be specified in relation to concrete
situations. The general exhortations remain in place; for sometimes the rules need to be
broken, sometimes they are not applicable, sometimes they conflict. In such a manner,
you can relate the general precept of the Bible to love God and your neighbour, to the
specification of the Ten Commandments and the elaboration of these in the Law.
The specification of what is right or wrong can be expressed in terms of
commands, rules, laws, regulations, moral laws, civil laws, traffic laws, tax laws, and so
forth. These usually specify what is the right thing to do in certain well-defined
Value Ethics
523
situations. It is very convenient to have these rules of thumb available. The intent is to
make it easier to behave morally and to teach the next generation what is expected of
them. Parents lay down the rules for the orderly running of the family. Schools specify
what is expected of students, rules regarding marks, discipline, clothing, attendance at
classes, respect for teachers, and so forth. An ethics of moral laws still has a valid role
to play in specifying behaviour that is right or wrong and to be clear as to what is
expected of children and students and citizens. The mistake commonly made is to
absolutize the laws, the propositions, the [488] formulation, the commandments
themselves. But moral laws can be unjust, contradictory, out-dated, overly general, and
always still require wisdom and goodness in their application to specific situations.
Moral laws are an expression of moral value judgments. The absolutes are to be found
not in the law itself but in the good and competent person, deliberating, judging,
deciding and action, responding to the transcendental imperatives and acting in accord
with a good conscience.
We can also specify moral behaviour in terms of virtues and vices. We exhort
our children to be brave, to be patient, to be kind. We define and divide our list of
favoured virtues and put them forward as the ideal way to live and to be. We specify the
kind of person we admire, the kind of person we would like to become. We advocate
character formation, discipline, and training in the virtues. We praise and blame; we
reward and punish; we approve and we disapprove. We put forward models to be
imitated, saints, heroes, incarnations of moral virtue. We choose a career because we
want to be like so and so. We imitate our parents, our admired teachers, our peers, our
leaders. All this is noble and good but again the absolutes are not in the lists or
definitions of the virtues, but in the activities and norms immanent and operative in each
person. No list of virtues is definitive. There is no human ideal that is not open to
change. The magnanimous man of Aristotle, the servant of the gospel, the virtues of
524
Aquinas, the English Gentleman, the autonomous modern, are ideals of human
behaviour subject to cultural variations.
Nowadays, we speak of human rights, the inalienable rights of persons,
infringements of privacy. In so far as these are formulated with a view to defending the
freedom, dignity, and equality of all human persons, it is very noble and good. Such
protections are important. But again such statements about rights are value judgments.
The absolutes lie not in the formulation of the rights but in the intention to defend the
authentic, freedom and dignity of the human person. Rights are not out there now real.
Formulations of rights develop and vary; they are expressions of increasing sensitivity
to issues of justice and equality and freedom. Rights talk can be perverted for the benefit
of one group over against the rights of another. [489]
3 Teaching Moral Values
If you do not know the source of moral values, then indeed it will be difficult to
formulate an effective pedagogy for the teaching of correct values. If you have a skewed
notion of where values come from, then, you will probably have a similarly distorted
method of teaching them. For the emotivists, who hold that values are simply a matter
of emotional approval or disapproval, it is hard to think of any effective pedagogy other
than the manipulation of emotions to bring them into line with actions or vice versa. For
the rationalists, for whom values are simply a matter or rational argument, then
instruction, argumentation, reasoning, will be the only effective pedagogy. Plato seems
to have equated virtue and wisdom, so if wisdom could be imparted in lectures, so could
virtue. For those who say that values come from choices, then, the pedagogy will simply
present the alternatives for choice. For dogmatists, who say that values are imposed by
the authority of God, the State, or the Parent, then, their pedagogy will be to impose
their values on the students. For those who claim that all academic institutes should be
value-free, they will continue to foster the illusion that they are not teaching values,
Value Ethics
525
while they are in fact teaching the supposed value of a neutral factual value-free
secularism. How can we contribute to an authentic pedagogy of values?
3.1 Pedagogy of Four Components
We have been at pains to identify and distinguish the components operating in
the judgment of value and so we identified the cognitive, the affective, the volitional
and the context of self-transcendence, which coalesce in the judgment of value. We
have answered the question, where do values come from, in terms of these elements. We
have seen how the process of self-transcendence involves developmental stages and a
process of conversion. If we are correct, then, we have a firm foundation on which to
base our moral pedagogy. Obviously, a pedagogy will be adapted to the age and stage of
the student, but it seems that these four elements must always be present to some extent.
[490]
When we think of the cognitive component we realize that there must always be
some element of reasoning and inference present in moral teaching. The child might
ask, why is it wrong to tell a lie? and deserves an answer appropriate to his level and
stage. It is a question for understanding, and must be answered in terms of
understanding. 'Just do what I tell you and don't ask foolish questions' is not a positive
contribution to moral understanding and maturity. Laws and rules have a cognitive
content; definitions of virtue have a cognitive content. Working out which rule applies,
which has priority, how the rule applies to the concrete situation is a matter of
intelligence. Seeing through fallacies and rationalizations is, similarly, a task for
understanding. Later stages of moral reasoning can involve sophisticated reasoning
about ends and means, direct and indirect consequences, culpable and inculpable
ignorance, distinguishing between circumstances that alter or do not alter essential
cases. Values depend on facts; values are at least partly a matter of sufficient evidence:
526
instruction and understanding are an intrinsic constituent component of any true

pedagogy.
Aristotle states that moral education is wholly a matter of emotional training.
We would prefer to be more precise and state that all moral education will involve some
element of feeling. By feeling we are not necessarily referring to those emotions, which
come and go almost beyond our control, but those deep-seated feeling dispositions
towards what is good and true. We recognized a symphony of feelings, but the deepest
seems to be the pure, detached, unrestricted, desire to know the truth, to know what is of
value, to decide and realize the value and to become a valuable person. We saw this as
very close to the intentional response to value, which we held to be innate, a spiritual
disposition to seek the true and the good, something on the analogy of Aristotle's active
intellect. This intentional disposition is a component of our pedagogy, because young
people need to be taught to take pleasure in doing good; that immediate gratification can
be postponed and channelled into a deeper and more satisfying pleasure the pleasure
of doing the right thing and becoming virtuous. Punishments and rewards, parental
approval and disapproval, [491] openness about feelings, expression and talking about
feelings, play a part in the education of the feeling life of the growing subject.
Training in decision-making is indeed a delicate task in moral education. You
can bring a horse to the water, but you cant make him drink. You cannot force a person
to freely decide what you want him to do. So we allow children to make decisions about
clothes, food, leisure, in matters appropriate to their age and ability and discernment.
We encourage good decision-making; we point out consequences, give input on
possibilities, encourage being considerate of others. We point out mistakes, correct
aberrant behaviour, approve of success, and punish failures appropriately. We
encourage children not to act blindly out of feeling alone, to reflect on their choices, to
consider the good of others, to understand what they are doing and why. Training in
Value Ethics
527
decision-making and taking responsibility for our actions continues all through life. We
are perpetually faced with the choice between true value and satisfaction and few of us
have fully and completely negotiated this hurdle.
We acknowledge the component of self-transcendence present in the growing
pupil. We recognize the role of aspiration and inspiration in teaching moral values.
There is a desire to grow, to become, to develop, to pass on to the next stage, to be more
mature and autonomous; there is a desire to know the good, to do the good and to
become a good person. At a certain stage young people aspire to be like certain role
models, teachers, uncles, pop stars, football players, humanitarians, doctors, firefighters, and the like. Stories of heroes and villains help to define the kind of person
they want to become. Biography and history present real live heroes and villains. Good
pedagogy works on these aspirations. This recognizes that there is a process of moral
development; we want to be like them, but we know we are not at present like them. We
aspire to moral authenticity but do not always succeed.
If we have a foundational grasp of where values come from, we can utilize this
knowledge to formulate appropriate pedagogies for all stages of moral development.
Values can be taught once we grasp the dynamics of where they come from. Four
components are in-[492]volved and none can be neglected. Pedagogy will be geared to
the infant, the child, the adolescent, the teenager, the youth, the adult, the mature adult,
the seniors. It should avoid the two extremes of laissez-faire liberalism, leaving the
pupil to choose their own values; or the extreme of indoctrination, imposing by force
your views and values.
None of the counterpositions that we noted on the question of values provide a
basis for a good pedagogy of moral values. Rationalists would claim that moral
education is just a matter of explanation, understanding the reason, logically working
out the principles and the application. Emotivists hold that values are an arbitrary
528
emotional preference and this hardly provides a basis for any moral pedagogy.
Intuitionists hold that values are intuited in single, simple direct intuitions: it is a puzzle
to me how you can produce these in others, when I have no evidence of their existence
in myself. Proponents of value-free education claim to eliminate values from the
curriculum; but in fact they are substituting their set of values for values that are
deliberated up, judged, decided and implemented by good people. Value clarification
methods and philosophy help us to be conscious of our actual values, are very effective
in promoting discussion and participation, but in the end have no critique of values and
no sound philosophy of where values come from or how they can be promoted.
3.2 Way up, Way down
From studies in epistemology, we might be familiar with the difference between
immanently generated knowledge and belief.6 Immanently generated knowledge is
knowledge which you have personally worked out for yourself, seen the evidence for
the hypothesis reflected on the sufficiency of the evidence and posited the judgment as
true. Belief is a short cut to knowledge based on accepting something on trust from
some authority, teacher, and author or media source. Much of our knowledge is based
on belief rather than immanently generated. We simply do not have time to repeat all
the experiments, see all the evidence, repeat all the insights and mistakes of history,
reconstruct the technology and the instruments. We have [493] trust and it is reasonable
to do so. We have a criterion to judge the truth of immanently generated knowledge. We
have also a criterion to judge what is reasonable to believe, what is credible or
incredible, what sources are trustworthy or not.
There is a parallel in the field of moral philosophy. We have to live before we
have an opportunity to learn how to live well. We have to distinguish good and bad
behaviour long before we can reflect about the difference between good and bad
behaviour. What we have been doing so far in identifying the activities of value
Value Ethics
529
judgments and decisions and actions has been analyzing the way up, the way of
immanently generated value judgments. But this activity is difficult, complicated,
requires a mature mind and careful analysis and distinctions. It is not option for those
who have no educational opportunities. But on what principles are we operating before
we indulge in this rational analysis? Uneducated people can distinguish good and evil,
without sophisticated rational analysis. How do they do it and is it legitimate?
So, as well as the way of immanently generated value judgments, there is also
the way from Above Downwards. It is also called the way of heritage, or of tradition, or
of receiving. We are socialized, educated and inculturated, before we develop our
immanently generated knowledge of values. For the most part as children we accept
our tradition, the values of the culture, the values accepted in the family, the values
expected of us. It is only slowly that we begin to question the foundation of such values,
we begin to assert our independence, we demand to understand the reason for moral
behaviour, we begin to move from heteronomy to autonomy.
We concentrated on the way of immanently generated knowledge of values in
the interests of doing one thing at a time and doing it well. But let us acknowledge this
prior context of values accepted through belief, through the culture, through heritage.
Let us look at (1) the judgments born of love, (2) the judgments accepted by belief,
which represent the way from above downwards. These we will discuss in turn. [494]
Lonergan regularly listed the transcendental precept to be in love as a fifth
precept, which we have been avoiding until now. We left it out in the interest of
focusing on the Way up as explicitly and exclusively as possible and concentrated on
how we attain immanently generated knowledge of values. The way of being in love
seems to me to represent one aspect of the Way Down. Lonergan defines faith as
knowledge born of religious love. Belief could be defined as knowledge based on trust
530
in some other person. Love seems to go beyond the bounds of immanently generated
knowledge of moral values in a religious sense and even in a human secular context.
Love in a text on Method in Theology is usually understood as referring to
divine charity, the love poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit: it is taken in a
religious sense. As such we discuss the relationship between charity and faith, Gods
love for us, our love for God, grace, forgiveness, God is love and so forth. Invoking the
transcendental precept to be in love would seem to be invoking this religious meaning
and this seems to be what Lonergan intended. Be in love would normally be
associated with religious conversion and the infused habit of charity. In a person who is
religiously converted and espouses authentic religious values, there is a very favourable
context for the affirmation of true moral values as well. This influence of religious
beliefs on moral values would represent on example of the Way Down
However, we cannot presume that context; we cannot take for granted that
beneficial influence. There are non-religious persons who are passionately interested in
moral values and the betterment of our human condition. We have tried to work out a
philosophy of moral values, exclusively from the Way Up, depending only on our
human capacities and not invoking religion in any way. So this religious context of the
meaning of love we leave aside for the moment as outside our scope.
But to be in love need not necessarily be interpreted in a religious context: it can
be understood and experienced as a purely human love. Secularist, humanists, moralists
can be, and often are, loving people. Philanthropy after all means a lover of mankind.
Love has a [495] role to play in human life as human. We are brought into existence in a
context of married love. It is the love and attention and care of parents that draws us out
to respond, to talk, to act, to relate, to become human persons. We start our lives
surrounded by affective love and trust. We learn to trust the world, to affirm and to
return love.7
Value Ethics
531
We do not reason ourselves into this love; we feel it, we accept it; we respond to
it; we return it. In this sense, love takes the initiative, it gives direction to our lives, it
inspires us to love our family, our friends, our countrymen, all of humanity. It is a
transcendental precept even in this human sense and so it will be an aspect of the
affectivity of spirit as inquiry; it will be spiritual like the other transcendental precepts, a
priori, permanent and deep desire of the human heart. It is an expansion from the desire
to know truth, goodness and value, to loving the good and becoming loving persons.
The presence of such a human love of family, friends and humanity provides a very
favourable context for knowing moral values, deciding in favour of values and
implementing them freely and responsibly. However, we cannot invoke this love
directly as a justification for immanently generated knowledge of values. It does
provide the context, it does influence out value judgments for better or for worse, it is an
aspect of moral conversion, but does not give us knowledge of values.
We associate love with the good and presume that loving is always a good thing.
However, there is a love of darkness, there is a love of evil, there is a love of destruction
and death. Love by itself, of itself, points to, normally indicates, recognizes goodness,
and rejoices in goodness. But that presumes a context of deliberation, judgments of
value, good and competent persons, wisdom and desire for the good. In the spiral of
decline, distortion of thought and perversion of feeling can bring about a love of
darkness rather than light, of evil rather than good. An ethics that is based on love as its
generating principle needs to be complemented with a way of knowing good and evil.
Another sense in which we can talk of the Way Down is by appropriating our
traditions in belief and trust. The first part of our lives is spent appropriating the heritage
of the past. We are socialized into [496] the common way of life of our family, our
country and society. We are inculturated into the beliefs and values of our society, by
learning the language, accepting the meaning, living the priorities, celebrating the
532
successes. We are educated into our tradition formally in schools and universities. We
learn from history about our roots, the struggles and successes from the stone age to the
present day. We appropriate the great achievements of the past in literature, science,
philosophy, art, technology. We live in an infrastructure that we did not build. We learn
from the past, so that we will not be condemned to repeat their mistakes and so that we
can build on their achievement to build a better future.
The first part of our lives is spent receiving, accepting, believing and
appropriating the achievements of the past, each in our own area of specialization. Not
to do this work of appropriating is to condemn ourselves to reinventing the wheel, to
struggle unnecessarily to discover what is already known, to condemn ourselves to
primitive barbarism.
But when we have appropriated and critiqued then it the time for criticism and
creativity, for going beyond, for new discoveries. Traditions are not dead but alive. A
tradition either develops or declines. The second part of our lives is for the Way Up of
immanently generated knowledge of values. We can no longer accept the past on the
basis of trust and belief; we must be able to understand, and judge for ourselves. We
become no longer receivers, but teachers, communicators, innovators, parents, and
philosophers. We shift our gaze from the past to the future. Our building of personal
foundations in ethics gives us a platform to launch into this noble task.
Lonergan divides his functional specialties into two phases, the first phase of
receiving the tradition in research, interpretation, history and dialectics; a second phase
of looking to the future, handing on the authentic message in foundations, doctrines,
systematics and communications. This is a mirror image of what we do in any discipline
and it is what we have tried to do in value ethics. In our first chapter we did a brief
dialectical analysis of the ethical tradition; what we inherit from the past is a mixed bag.
What are the genuine [497] achievements? What are the colossal blunders? In the main
Value Ethics
533
body of the work we have been laying the foundations of an approach to values based
on intentionality analysis. In this last chapter we are simply indicating what needs to be
done in terms of formulating a value philosophy, applying a value critique in practice
and communicating true moral values to future generations.
3.3 Teaching Moral Philosophy
Moral philosophy presumes a context of a person of sufficiently cultured
consciousness making the transition from receiving laws and virtues from outside, to
discovering the values as immanent and operative in his own consciousness. It presumes
a context of a student questioning the basis of a moral life, asking what is the best kind
of life to live, seeking to make himself a better person and the world a better place to
live in.
The first task would seem to be learning from history. It would be rather
presumptuous to think that we have nothing to learn from our predecessors or that we
can do better than they without even evaluating their achievements or failures. Lonergan
used the phrase the permanence of genuine achievement. The phrase seems particularly
apt for a text such as the Nicomachean Ethics, which has hardly been surpassed to the
present day. One could think also of the writing of Plato, Aquinas, and Kant as in the
same category. But we learn not only from the successes but also from the failures, the
incomplete, the inadequate, the flawed attempts, that have been made to systematize
principles and data on ethics.
Study of history gives the broad background. It provides the material, the
concepts, the possibilities, the alternatives. The study of historical systems is relatively
easy. It is indirect speech. What did Kant say about obligation? What did the early
Kierkegaard say about choice? These are factual questions. Read the text, interpret the
text, summarize the text, and you have your answer. No personal commitment or
transformation is called for; whether you agree with Kant or Kierkegaard is another
534
question altogether. A vast amount of energy is poured into the study of the history of
ethics, sometimes under the illusion that this is ethics. There is no end to the material in
this [498] field to be studied. The printing presses continue to churn out texts, studies,
summaries, evaluations of all this historical data in an endless stream. This provides
knowledge about ethical systems. But the further question remains, as to taking a stand
on what is right and wrong for yourself.
Most professors of philosophy will embrace a particular system of ethics, accept
it as the best and endeavour to communicate this to students. The system may be natural
law, virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, or existentialist ethics, or any variation of
contemporary positions. This hopefully will be a coherent system of principles, leading
to practical conclusions as to what is right or wrong. This gives some coherence to the
questions, the principles and the conclusions. It provides a framework for discussion,
makes sense of most of the data on ethics, and generally helps to guide behaviour in the
concrete. If the students understand and accept the validity of the system, presumably it
can help them in their personal life. In these systems questions can be asked about
applications to the concrete and it might be called an applied ethics.
A foundational approach to ethics calls for a different pedagogical approach. It
would not be teaching theoretical systems but foundations. It starts with persons as they
are. It looks not to systems but to activities. It looks not to the authority of law, or
reason, or Church, or coherence, but to intentionality analysis. It proceeds pedagogically
in terms of solving moral dilemmas, identifying cognitional, affective volitional
components in personal experience. It recognizes the person in self-transcendence as the
standard and criterion of goodness. It recognizes that ethics is not just about the
coherence of systems but is about becoming an ethical person, responding to the
immanent and operative norms, becoming originating value at the same time as
producing terminal values. It recognizes that the absolutes in value ethics are to be
Value Ethics
535
found, not in the propositions or statements of laws, but in the set of interrelated
activities and the norms by which they unfold. A foundational approach is quite
difficult, as it does call for self-examination, taking a personal stand, being responsible,
and recognizing the implications of responsibility. It is difficult for the [499] professor
because he too is on the way; he too is still learning; he too is struggling with moral
development and conversion.
The purpose of teaching foundational ethics, is not to give answers to all
conceivable moral questions, but to empower students to find the answers responsibly.
It is to encourage the move from heteronomy to autonomy. It is to promote sensitivity to
moral values. It is to invoke the interior elements involved in intentions, motivations,
feelings, valuing, rationalizing, and so forth. It is to make moral development and
conversion a topic; ethics is not only about doing, but about becoming and being.
Foundational ethics is about training the generalists; those who provide the framework
and background for the work of the specialists and the application to concrete questions.
The foundationalist will be more sensitive to the inadequacies of particular systems and
the possibly mistaken assumptions of other systems and provide a critique of both.
4 What is at Stake?
Are we just involved in an academic exercise of professors quibbling over
minutiae of an arcane corner of an academic discipline? Or are we involved in an
argument of substance, an argument about the value of the human person, an argument
about how we think and value human persons? I think something very central is at
stake. It is not just for academics but for the whole of society. It is the foundation on
which human society is built. It concerns how we think of the value of the human
person, how the person relates to the universe and to society.
4.1 Value of the Human Person
536
We can assert that the human person is the most valuable being in the universe
that we know. The person emerges out of the processes of the universe, represents the
highest achievement of the universe, does things that no other being can do. The human
person integrates the levels of atoms, molecules, cells, organisms, senses, intelligence,
truth, value and openness to God into one unitary person. The person represents the
highest development of the finality of being, the [500] culmination of a process of
emergent probability. The person is distinct from all other beings in the ability to
understand, to know truth and value, to decide for truth and value, and to be open to
religious experience. We have concentrated on the persons ability to know good and
evil, to decide for moral values, to become a person of value.
The value of the human person, over against other valuable things, is not just a
matter of degree. It is somehow incommensurable, non-negotiable, and inalienable. It is
not that we are slightly more valuable than animals there is no comparison between
the value of an animal and of a human person. You cannot put a monetary value on
human life; there is just no proportion between the value of money and the value of a
human life. In principle, we have to assert the dignity of the human person, respect for
the human person, and the equality of all human persons as valuable.
Aristotle was probably the first to assert the equality of human persons as
substances; substances cannot be differentiated from one another by degree; if it is a
horse, it is a horse; and one horse is no more a horse than another.8 If this is a human
person, then this is equal in principle to all human persons. Persons differ in health, in
colour, in sex, in age, in culture, in education, in intelligence, in goodness; but in
principle every person is of equal value to every other person. You can legitimately say
that this person is more intelligent than that; they differ in intelligence, but they do not
differ in equally being human persons. You can say that this person is morally better
than that; but again they differ in acquired moral habits but remain equal as human
Value Ethics
537
persons. Such must be the principle underlying law, society, and the distribution of
goods and services in society.
If persons are equal, they are equal from beginning to end. We develop or
decline in terms of health, or education, or intelligence, but we do not develop in terms
of what we are as human beings. In the modern sense our personality develops; but in
the sense that we are human persons, by definition and in principle, we remain equally
valuable throughout our life. One can argue about when we become human persons,
about when does human life start but I find no rea-[501]son not to accept that we start
at conception. One can argue about the definition of death, the death of the brain, the
stopping of the heart but death would seem to be the death of the whole, not of a part
thereof. So in principle the fetus, the unborn, the child, the youth, the adult, the elderly,
the sick, the terminally ill, are all of equal value as human persons.
But this does not deny that human persons are developing persons and realize
their being over time and space. We develop physically, psychologically, intellectually,
morally and religiously. We become intelligent or stupid; we become either morally
responsible or irresponsible. We can become mature or remain in the immaturity of
adolescence. Moreover we are obliged to grow, to develop, to realize potential, to pass
through the stages of lifes passage. We are obliged to do so hierarchically, to be
attentive, to be intelligent, to be responsible and to be in love.
If we kept the value of the individual person in mind, we have a possibility of
organizing a human society whose purpose is the fostering of human life in all its
fullness. We could recognize that the economy is for the purpose of promoting human
life and not the other way round. We could build a society where the law is geared to the
promotion of human life as an end in itself. We could create institutions that are for the
people and not the people for the institutions.
4.2 Formulation of Laws, Virtues, Values
538
We have seen how general moral principles need to be specified in order to

apply to the concrete situation. This specification can be in terms of laws, or in terms of
virtues or in terms of values.
In the context of cognitional theory we realized the importance of formulating
your hypothesis or definition or concept in a sufficiently differentiated and correct
manner. In order to be able to judge accurately the truth of the explanation, you have to
have a clear formulation of the hypothesis. Something similar occurs when it comes to
formulating concepts and definitions of values. There is a need for a precise,
sophisticated, correct formulation of what is intended in affirming a value. Much of the
confusion in our moral life comes [502] from vague and deformed notions of freedom,
equality, justice, tolerance, truth, self-fulfilment, desires, success, and the like. Being
clear and distinct is as important in ethics, as it is in cognitional theory.
Let us indicate very briefly how some core values should be formulated. Much
elaboration is called for, but we can at least indicate how some of these core values are
misunderstood in contemporary culture and how an authentic formulation is needed. It
is not a question of working out a calculus of values to be applied as a ruler, but a guide
to value judgments and their priority.
The prime value in a value ethics will be the human person, the dignity and
respect due to each and every human being, as the centre of moral value. The human
person represents the highest value in this universe, the peak of the universe, the most
valuable thing in the universe; it is only in the context of free and responsible human
persons that moral values have meaning. In the human person we recognize a scale of
values that can be affirmed both as originating value and as terminal values. It is a
hierarchy with the most important at the top and the least important at the bottom. So
we have identified vital values, social values, cultural values, personal values and
religious values. All are values; all in general are to be affirmed, but in comparative
Value Ethics
539
judgments of value the higher values are more valuable than the lower values. We
recognize the individual person as the centre of obligations, and rights. The obligations
emerge from the transcendental precepts, which are one aspect of what we are as human
persons. Rights spring from obligations; we have an obligation to live a moral life;
therefore, we have a right to live a moral human life.
(1) Happiness. Aristotle argued that we live for a purpose and the overriding,
supreme, single, purpose of human life is happiness. Everything else is chosen for the
sake of happiness and so happiness must be the supreme, single, final end of human life.
This is part of our nature and not a result of choice; we cannot avoid seeking happiness
as the supreme good. The main ingredients of this good are living well, according to the
intellectual and moral virtues, activity of the highest potentialities of the mind,
particularly, the contemplation [503] of eternal truths. Happiness is not to be found in
pleasure, nor in wealth, nor in politics, nor in honour. It is to be found in a complete life
it is something long-term. By happiness he seems to have meant a genuine selffulfilment, or what we have called a process of self-transcendence. Nowadays, the word
happiness has come to mean, having fun, being joyful, achieving your own interests,
being successful, experiencing satisfaction or pleasure. But I think Aristotle was right in
his analysis and his understanding of human happiness. In our terminology, happiness is
to be found in the process of self-transcendence, in living according to an authentic
scale of values, in seeking the good of all and not just your own selfish, apparent good.
Happiness is the affective state reached through the activities of understanding, judging
truth and value, deciding for value and realizing value in a life well-lived.
(2) Freedom. Freedom is to be understood as self-determination, self-control,
taking responsibility for making good decisions. Freedom is not arbitrary choice; it is
not license to do as you please. Freedom is not to be understood as freedom from
constraint, freedom from laws, freedom from obligations; it is freedom to do the right
540
thing, make true judgments of fact and value, decide well in terms of seeking objective
value, implementing values consistently, positively, habitually. Freedom is not to be
identified with the range of choices offered by a society, or economy. Freedom is the
achievement of a mature, authentic person seeking terminal values and becoming
originating value at the same time. Nowadays freedom is usually used in the sense of
freedom from constraints, not being bound by obligations, freedom to do as you like.
Again unfortunately our culture suffers from a truncated view of the human person and
the great gift of freedom.
(3) Responsibility. This word is used in many senses with many nuances of
meaning. We use it in the sense of to be responsible, the transcendental imperative of
moral obligation, which is at the foundation of ethics. It calls us to responsible choice
and not arbitrary choice. Responsible choice means choice based on good value
judgments. It means choice based on a habitual willingness to do the good, the right
thing, to choose value and not satisfaction for its own [504] sake. Freedom and
responsibility go together like two sides of a coin. We are responsible for ourselves, to
be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and in love of the good. We are
responsible for our families, our work environment, the groups and communities to
which we belong. We are responsible for our governments, for our societies, for the
nations in which we live. We are responsible for our leaders in democratic societies, we
are responsible for the quality of public life, the decisions of governments taken in our
name. We are responsible for the laws passed by our governments, the wars fought in
our name, the policies implemented, the priorities that are in place.
(4) Equality. Aristotle stated that substances do not differ from one another in
degree. He did not realize the revolutionary implications of his statement. If this is a
horse and that is a horse, then they are equally horses. One may be young the other old,
one may be healthy the other sick, one may be worth a fortune the other worth a tub of
Value Ethics
541
soap, one may be male the other female. They differ in many respects but are equal in
simply being horses. One is not more of a horse than the other. So you have the
principle of human equality affirmed in principle. All human persons, as human
persons, are equal in substance, in principle, in essence. There may be differences in
colour, age, sex, education, status, roles, nationality goodness or badness, skills, ability,
and so forth but these all belong to the accidents and not the substance. Any legal or
political system has to recognize this as their starting point. Being a human person starts
from conception and ends with natural death.
(5) Justice. Justice is the implementation in practice of the principle of equality
of each and every human person. If every person is equal in principle then in principle
there should be equal availability of education, rewards for labour, medical services,
involvement in political process, involvement in economic institutions, involvement in
the making of the culture, the values and truths of the society. The legal system has to
be based on recognizing the obligation of each person to become a full human person
and hence his right to do so. Cooperation is the basis of human society and not
competing self-interests. [505]
(6) Tolerance. In a pluralist society we need to distinguish between legitimate
and illegitimate forms of pluralism. Legitimate sources of pluralism derive from
differentiations of consciousness, level of education, age of participants, specialization
of work, diversity of language and cultures, communications to different persons of
different times and places, varieties of common sense, and so forth. Unity in diversity is
surely the motto of most modern democratic societies. The richness and diversity of
cultures, languages, ways of living, ways of celebrating, cooking, dressing, need to be
embraced. Illegitimate forms of pluralism derive from the absence of intellectual, moral,
and religious conversion. Untruths, distortions of the truth, dishonesty, criminality, are
not a legitimate part of the richness of cultural pluralism. Moral deviance, moral
542
decline, moral disvalues, are not part of the richness of culture; they are not to be valued
equally with moral development, moral values, moral self-transcendence. Personal
moral evils will inevitable effect the society in which the individual person lives.
Tolerance means respect for other opinions even though they may be considered
wrong. Tolerance does not mean that every opinion is of equal value. Tolerance is not
the same as indifference; to tolerate untruths is not to be indifferent to the truth. We
work to promote values and reverse disvalues. It is counterproductive to do this by
force, by compulsion, by the exercise of superior power. If our moral stance cannot be
made persuasive, then, there may be something wrong with it.
4.3 Global Ethics
It may seem that the approach taken in this text has been very individualistic.
We have constantly appealed to awareness of your own personal moral experience; our
method of self-appropriation might seem to leave out the social dimension; the process
of self-transcendence might seem to be an ideal of personal self-absorption little
different from navel gazing of other self-help psychologies of self-fulfilment. Some
might argue that we are putting the cart before the horse; that it is the social conditions
that determine the possibility of being a moral person and of doing a moral philosophy.
So let us [506] try to show that what we have been doing is simply a foundation for a
process leading to a global ethic.
Although we have relied mostly on a method of self-appropriation, we have
always presumed a context of the individual in the society, a person who becomes a
person because of social relations, a person who inherits from the past by socialization,
acculturation and education and at the same time makes a contribution to handing on
this legacy to future generations. The terms moral and personal are interchangeable.
To be moral means to be an authentic human person and to relate to others as a moral
human person. To decline morally the individual is not only personally on the road to
Value Ethics
543
becoming an immoral individual, but is also inevitably having a like influence on his
family, his relations, his friends, his groups, his community, his work place, his society.
The person who is developing morally is inevitably having a beneficial effect on his
family, friends, associates, students, community and society. This context we have taken
for granted. Man is a social or political animal, as Aristotle put it.
It is easy to see how the method of analysis suggested in this text can be
transposed and applied to a group context. Many decisions concerning our future are
taken by institutions, companies, government agencies, corporations, tribunals, Senates,
parliaments, and assemblies of various kinds. Many corporate groups set up ethics
committees to deal with their value priorities, relations between employees, service to
the customer, quality of service, and the like. What we looked for in terms of four
components of a good judgment of value, we can now look for in the deliberations of
groups, and the procedures of decision-making of institutions and companies. Very
often if there is a difficult decision to be made, a committee will be set up to investigate,
to report and to make recommendations. As experts in the decision-making process,
what would we look for in this committee that would favour it making good
recommendations?
We would surely look for a cognitive component. Are these people competent in
this area of specialization? Do they know the facts, are they experienced? Are they
taking all relevant material into ac-[507]count? Are they aware of the possible
consequences of certain recommendations, are they aware of environmental impact, are
they open to all possibilities, are they ready to learn from previous experience? One
looks for competent, knowledgeable, experienced persons to serve on such a committee.
But you also look for an affective component, in terms of what are these
individuals intending in participating in this process? You might have persons who are
only interested in furthering their careers, making a name for themselves, pushing their
544
own ideas, belittling and ignoring the expertise of others. You might have persons who
are only interested in how this will impact on their own constituency, how their class or
ethnic group or geographical area will profit from decisions made by the group. Or you
might have persons who just do not care what decisions are reached; they are not
interested in the matter, are not prepared to do the work, are on the committee just
because of the salary and the perks. If these kinds of attitudes are predominant in the
group, it is hard to imagine the group reaching a good judgment and a responsible
decision. They will work out some mish-mash of a compromise and pass it on to higher
authorities.
What you are looking for in such a group is an intention of the good, not just for
one interest group but for all; not just in the short-run, but in the long-run. You are
looking for detachment from personal gain or career advantage and devotion to the
cause, the purpose, the aim of the committee. You are expecting some form of
commitment, a willingness to do the work, a readiness to listen to others, a
determination to finish the task assigned in a reasonable and responsible manner. Given
those kinds of intentions you can visualize the group working together with some kind
of cohesion, sorting through the possibilities with some kind of unanimity, and reaching
responsible recommendations together.
We are presuming that the participants are free and responsible; that they are not
just spokespersons for special interests; that they are free to speak their minds, to seek
the best solution, to be open to new possibilities. Are they willing to make good
decisions? Have they the [508] habitual willingness to seek true values and not personal
satisfaction? Knowledge and competence is one thing, but deciding is another. Are they
good deciders? Not too timid as to be afraid of trying new procedures. Not too rash as
to ignore the potential for disastrous consequences.
Value Ethics
545
We are presuming that the persons on the committee are developing and selftranscending persons. We presume that in some partial way they constitute the criterion
and standard of goodness. Authentic individuals will make for an authentic wellfunctioning group. Their shared competence, reasonableness and responsibility will
ensure that their vision of improving the human lot will be wholesome for themselves,
for all in the society. We want good people on such a committee and usually exclude
criminals, degenerates, drunkards and the like.
If we have a good grasp of how we reach knowledge of good and evil followed
by responsible decisions, this not only helps in our personal lives, but helps us to
understand group process, group judgments of value, group decisions. Not only do we
as individuals have to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, but we can
see the same imperatives operating in a group context. Hence, although we worked
mainly in terms of self-appropriation, now we are in a good position to transpose this
from an individual perspective to that of a group, a society, or the whole of mankind.
Lonergan helps us again when we ask, what is community? Again he has a
simple but effective and accurate way of defining a community.9 Again it involves an
extension from the individual to the group. We understand the human person as
operating on five levels of intentional consciousness, with the transcendental precepts
operating at each level, with a consequent scale of values being objectified. By
extension, we can understand genuine community as common experience, shared
understanding, agreed truths and values permeating a common way of life.
Common experience is the prerequisite for community. Without some common
basis in experience nothing more can happen. An aggregate of people sharing a bus trip
from one city to the next will not form a community; but if the bus breaks down and
they are forced to [509] share their water and food, wait together for spare parts, help
one another, they slowly interact and begin to form community. If tribes are cut off
546
from one another by oceans or mountains, they become strangers and often enemies.
Nowadays, global communications allows everybody on the planet to share in the same
common experiences, the United Nations, the Olympics, global economy, Internet,
World Cup, and the like. We are becoming a global village. We realize that we share the
same resources, we live in the same time and space, the actions of one impact on all.
Common understanding is a prerequisite of community. A common way of life,
a shared language, a set of customs, established ways of doing things, constant
interaction, ensure that members understand one another. A good of order presumes
that, although different tasks are assigned to different individuals, all share in the
benefits. Misunderstanding gives birth to mistrust and the breaking up of community.
The more persons understand one another, the stronger the basis for community.
Common truths and beliefs are a prerequisite for community. Each culture has
its traditional beliefs, its myths of origin, its common history, and its beliefs about itself.
It has its way of dealing with sickness, its mode of production, its system of justice, who
it praises and who it blames. Each community shares common truths about the human
person, rights, laws, marriage, politics, education and the like.
Each community has shared values, common values, accepted and implemented.
They may be traditional values such as respect for the elders, obedience to the law and
the tradition, punishments for breaking the law, respect for those who uphold the law
and preserve the traditions. They may be more modern values such as freedom of
initiative, upward mobility, individual rights, liberal capitalism, freedom of religious
belief, and the like. But a community has to have some common values, priorities, and
ways of making common decisions.
It is shared experience, common understanding, shared truths and values that
constitute the core of a community of persons relating to one another. Just as the
integral scale of values applies to the [510] individual, so it also applies to the local
Value Ethics
547
community, the ethnic community, the nation state, and the world community. Values
are not a matter for the individual but for the family, the community the society and the
global community.
Nowadays, we have to think in terms of a global community; such is emerging
from the common experience of living in the same time and place; the common
understanding of resources, rights, purpose of human life, the economy and it
functioning or non-functioning. The global community is emerging in shared beliefs and
values such as freedom, rights, justice, peace, rule of law, proper procedure,
international law, international criminal court, the United Nations, and other
international bodies regulating trade, health matters, climate, the environment, peace
and the like. Where do these values come from? Who is going to enforce the moral
values of such a global community? Or is it going to be a global community of Might is
Right?
Hans Kung has written eloquently on a global ethic for a global society.10 He
hopes that the world religions will have a positive impact in formulating and
propagating such an ethic. His work led to the Declaration toward a Global Ethic,
approved by the Parliament of the World Religions in 1993. But the ethic itself is not
based on the authority of religious systems but on human principles of morality. He
holds that there are universal principles of moral conduct, which should regulate
relations between peoples of different nations in the line of cooperation, basic principles
of justice and rights and freedoms.
The foundations for ethics that we have discovered in the context of individual
persons, are equally applicable to a global ethic. If our foundations are universal,
transcultural, based on what it is to be a human person, then, they are applicable, not
only in Europe and America, but all over the world. Not only is it valid in the context of
a Christian religion, but also in the context of Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and
548
indigenous traditional religions. It does not invoke the authority of religion but the
authority of what it is to be a human person. Just as we can appeal to the transcendental
precepts [511] operating in each individual, so we can appeal to the precepts operating
in all persons, of all communities, societies, nations and international bodies. What can
we all agree on? On what basis do we make our international agreements? How do we
distinguish between development and decline? Surely on the basis of what it is to be a
good human person. We appeal again to Aristotle, who said that the good person is the
standard and criterion of goodness. If we have understood from this text what it is to be
a good human person, then, we have a basis for a global ethic, a community of
development, a world of self-transcending persons. [512]
Endnotes
1
B. Lonergan, Topics in Education, 100.
B. Cronin, Foundations, Chapter ten, sections one and two.
Insight, 411-4. On positions and counterpositions.
Insight, 416.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b10 1094b30.
Insight, The Notion of Belief, 703-18(725-39). B. Cronin, Foundations, Belief

208-14; The Way Up and the Way Down, 263-67.
7
See Eric Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1963) and Identity:
Youth and Crisis (New York: Norton, 1968). He emphasizes this aspect of trust and love
as the beginning of moral development.
8
Aristotle, Categories, 3b33.
10
Hans Kung, Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic, (New York:
Continuum International, 1993); A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics,
(London: SCM press, 1997).
Epilogue
Now that we have objectified the components, activities and processes in an
explicit, correct and comprehensive manner, we can only hope that this will lead to
better value judgments, better moral persons and healthier societies. This does not
happen automatically. Knowing how to make a good moral judgment, does not
automatically lead to making good moral judgments. It remains a struggle between
understanding and misunderstanding, true judgments and mistaken judgments, the will
for satisfaction or value, the tension of development and conversion. But hopefully, it
will be easier. Now that we have the map in place and it seems to be accurate, precise
and clear hopefully, we can find our way to following it.
In the introduction we raised the question of the relation between a moral
philosophy and religious system teaching moral behaviour. Our conviction was that we
can and should base our investigation of moral behaviour on philosophy and exclude
any explicit influence from theology. I hope this text has shown the value of such an
approach. We can know good and evil, simply as human persons experiencing,
understanding, judging truths and values. There is an integrity to the method, the
activities, the feelings, the deciding and the process of self-transcendence. At no point
did we need to appeal to religious justification or reinforcement. As Paul wrote about
the pagan Romans, they should have known that their corrupt practices were immoral;
they were culpable even though they had not the benefit of Christian Revelation; you do
not need Christian faith in order to condemn immoral practices.
However, that is not to deny the existence and value of a religious perspective.
We stepped very delicately around the questions of human suffering, sickness and
death; we did not ask any questions about the ultimate value of human life; we were
unable to deal with a person's deepest longing for union with God; we have to admit that
[514] the happiness achieved in any human life is somehow limited, conditioned and
Epilogue
550
fragile. There is a wider perspective that these aspects of human life lead us into. The
religious dimension introduces notions of sin and redemption, faith, salvation, ultimate
destiny, ultimate happiness, worship, prayer, knowledge and love of God, grace, and
revelation. But all that is another story, another level of consciousness to be explored. It
is in that context that the deepest and best inclinations of the human heart find their
ultimate fulfilment.

Value in Ethics: Lonergan Perspective

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Value in Ethics: Lonergan Perspective

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Brian Cronin

Chapter 1 Why A Value Ethics? / [21]

Method in Value Ethics / [77]

1 Method and Methods / [78]

2.1 Invariant Set of Interrelated Cognitional Activities / [83]

The Question of Value Arises / [123]

5.2 Vital Values / [145]

Deliberative Insight / [171]

5.7 Link between Evidence and Conclusion / [200]

Lonergan on Feelings / [209]

Up to Insight (1953) / [221]

The Desire to Know / [221]

Interference of the Biases / [225]

The Possibility of Ethics / [228]

From Insight to Method and Beyond / [232]

Influence of Max Scheler (1874-1928) / [233]

Influence of Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977) / [237]

Feelings in Method A Summary / [239]

4 Broadening our Notion of Feeling / [245]

Chapter 6 Self-Appropriation of Feelings and Values / [255]

3.3 Third Approximation: Transcendental Precepts / [267]

Deciding Free and Responsible / [325]

2.3 Emergence and Differentiation / [338]

Chapter 8 Moral Self-Transcendence / [383]

3.4 Critique of Kohlberg / [405]

Chapter 9 Judgments of Value / [427]

4.3 Development and Decline of Conscience / [458]

Promoting Moral Value / [471]

1.3 Not Open to Basic Revision / [478]

Brian Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy: Lonergans Cognitional Theory and

knowledge of cognitional theory is not an absolute prerequisite for understanding this

tradition to answer moral questions. Although the influence of religious teaching is

cognitional theory in Insight. Yet he has made valuable contributions to an ethics in

Brian Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy: Lonergans Cognitional Theory and

Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, (London: Longmans,

Bernard Lonergan, Topics in Education: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 10

The word 'morality' is the sort of thing that can be systematized in

Why a Value Ethics?

Why a Value Ethics?

Why a Value Ethics?

Why a Value Ethics?

The intellectualist tradition of natural law, defining law in general as an

Why a Value Ethics?

Why a Value Ethics?

(5) Continued adherence to the mentality of obedience to laws actually hinders

Why a Value Ethics?

He defines virtue as "a purposive disposition, lying in a mean, that is relative to

Why a Value Ethics?

Why a Value Ethics?

devoted to the virtues. He elaborates considerably on Aristotle while accepting most of

Why a Value Ethics?

Why a Value Ethics?

Why a Value Ethics?

Why a Value Ethics?

Why a Value Ethics?

Why a Value Ethics?

Why a Value Ethics?

imperative declares an action to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to

Why a Value Ethics?

5.2 Evaluation: Advantages

Why a Value Ethics?

person. Considerations of the good often lead in the direction of metaphysical

Why a Value Ethics?

Why a Value Ethics?