1.

Fundamental principles
1. Lacson v. Executive Secretary, GR no. 128096, Jan. 20, 1999
2. Denio Teves v. Vamenta, GR. No. L-38308, Dec. 26, 1984
3. Dacer v. Lacson, GR. No. 196209, June 8, 2011
a) Definition of Criminal Law
(i) Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita
1. People v. Villareal G.R.No. 151258, Feb. 1, 2012
2. Garcia v. COMELEC (dagdag bawas has proved good faith; mala in se)
3. People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 183891, Aug. 3. 2010 (violation of non-remittance of SSS;
good faith is immaterial)
4. People v. dela Rosa, G.R. NO. 84857, Jan. 16, 1998
5. Manahan v. CA
(ii) Construction of penal laws
1. Aguirre v. DOJ, G.R. NO. 170723, March 3, 2008
2. People v. Astorga, G.R. No. 11097, Dec. 22, 1997
3. People v. Ignas, G.R. No. 145514-15, Sept. 30, 2003
4. Naya v. Abing, G.R. No. 146770, Feb. 27, 2003

Lenity Rule
1. Intestate Estate Vda. De Carungcung v. People, G.R.No. 181409, Feb. 11, 2011
2. People v. Beth Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, Dec. 17, 2008
3. Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 (Malversation of Funds)

SANDIGANBAYAN: accused Generoso Corpuz y Padre, guilty beyond

reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and
there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment ranging
from Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SC: The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where
the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no
such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not
been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and
conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive
finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public
whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.
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Equipoise Rule

1. Ursua v. CA, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996

2. Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 74259, Feb. 11, 1991 (estafa)

3. Cosep v. People, G.R. No. 110353, may 21, 1998
Philosophies/Schools of thoughts behind Penal System

Classical Theory
1. People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, Sept. 29, 2000

Positivist Theory

Eclectic/Mixed Theory

Utilitarian Theory
1. Magno v. CA, G.R. No. 196132, June 26, 1992 (Violation of BP 22; accused acted

without malice)
To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as
it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an
unjust debt since he did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was
in the safekeeping of the financing company which is managed by the officials and
employees of LS Finance.
The Supreme Court acquitted Magno of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 when he
acted without malice. The wrongdoer is not Magno but the lessor who deposited the checks.
He should have returned the checks to Magno when he pulled out the equipment. To
convict the accused would defeat the noble objective of the law and the law would be
tainted with materialism and opportunism.
b) Scope of application and characteristics of Philippine criminal law
(i) Generality
1. Minucher v. CA and Scalzo, GR No. 142396, Feb. 11, 2003
2. Schnecknburger v. Moran, GR. No. L-44896, July 31, 1936
3. Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, March 26, 2001
The petitioners case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to
the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no
binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the
accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the
Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in
official capacity. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.
Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such
as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only
when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

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(ii) Territoriality
1. People v. Wong Cheng, G.R. No. L- 18924, Oct. 19, 1992 (illegally smoking of opium)
The crime is committed in our internal waters thus our court have the right of
jurisdiction over the offense committed. The court said Having the opium smoked within
our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign mechant ship, is a breach of the public
order, because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory.
2. Evangelista v. People, G.R. No. 163267, May 5, 2010 (Constructive Possession of
firearms)
No doubt that the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which
he was charged was committed in the Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the
Customs Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was
already in possession of the subject firearms in the Philippines.
In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that
the present charge happened in Dubai. It may be well to recall that while in Dubai,
petitioner, even in a situation between life and death, firmly denied possession and
ownership of the firearms. Furthermore, there is no record of any criminal case having been
filed against petitioner in Dubai in connection with the discovered firearms. Since there is no
pending criminal case when he left Dubai, it stands to reason that there was no crime
committed in Dubai. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegation applies.
3. People v. Tulin, et. Al., G.R. No. 111709, Aug. 30, 2001
The attack on and the seizure of MT Tabangao and its cargo were committed in
Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore,
where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred and sold. Such transfer was done under Hiongs
supervision. Although the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo was
not done in Philippine waters, it is still deemed part of the same act. Piracy falls
under Title 1 of Book 2 of the RPC. It is an exception to the rule on territoriality in
criminal law. The same principle applies to the case, even if Hiong is charged with
violation of a special penal law, instead of the RPC. Regardless of the law
penalizing piracy, it remains to be a reprehensible crime against the whole world.
4. Calme v. CA, et. Al., G.R. No. 116, Aug. 30, 1996 (Petitioner impugned Oroquieta
RTCs jurisdiction over the offense of murder against him)
The vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the captain was informed
of the incident, which does not necessarily prove that the alleged murder took place in the
same area. In any case, where the crime was actually committed is immaterial since it is
undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was in transit. In transit simply means on the
way or passage; while passing from one person or place to another. In the course of
transportation. Hence, undoubtedly, the applicable provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now
Section 14), Rule 110 which provides that (w)here an offense is committed on board a
vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the
proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the
vessel passed during such voyage subject to the generally accepted principles of
international law.
5. People v. Simon, (Modifying Cricumstances for penalties of Special Penal Law)

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6. Asaali v. Comm. Of Customs, G.R. No. L-24170, Dec. 16, 1968

The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its applicability and enforceability not
only within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its
jurisdiction against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship. The ships
intercepted were of Philippine registry.
Further, it has been an establish principle that a state has the right to protect
itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the
high seas. The authority of a nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. The
seizure of a vessel within the range of its cannon by a foreign force is an invasion of that
territory, and is a hostile act which it is its duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from
injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory.
(iii) Prospectivity
1. People v. Avecilla, G.R. No. 117033, Feb. 15, 2001 (Illegal Possession of Firearms)
Originally he could have been convicted of illegally possessing a firearm separately
from his conviction on the killing that occurred as a consequence thereof, which happened in
1991. With the passage of RA 8294 in 1997 amending PD1866, the possession of an
unlicensed firearm has become merely an aggravating circumstance to a murder or
homicide charge. As a general rule, penal laws have prospective effect EXCEPT where the
new law will be advantageous to the accused, as in this case, sparing him of two separate
convictions.
2. Tan v. Barrios, G.R. No. 85481-82, Oct. 18, 1990

murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally possessed

firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Section 1, par. 6 of General Order No. 49, for the killing on August 25, 1973 of
Florentino Lim of tile wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City; and
unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in relation
to Presidential Decree No. 9.
MILITARY COMMISSION: 1. Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan, Mariano Velez, Jr.,
Antonio Occaciones, and Leopoldo Nicolas guilty of MURDER. Each of them was
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months, and twenty-one (21) days, to twenty (20) years.
A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both MURDER and
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of death by electrocution
A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both MURDER and
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death by electrocution.
Oscar Yaun, Enrique Labita, Eusebio Tan, Alfonso Tan, Go E Kuan, William Tan
(petitioner herein), Joaquin Tan Leh (petitioner herein) and Vicente Tan (petitioner
herein) were acquitted of the charges, and released on June 11, 1976
SC: The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the
petitioners and their co-accused before Military Commission No. 1. The principle of
absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not
be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of the
petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of their
constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military
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commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of
martial law.
Furthermore, depriving the petitioners of the protection of the judgment of acquittal
rendered by the military commission in their particular case by retroactively
divesting the military commission of the jurisdiction it had exercised over them
would amount to an ex post facto law or ruling, again, in sharp reality if not in strict
constitutional theory. An ex-post facto law or rule, is one which
1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense;
5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful;
and,
6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he
has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
(a) Effects of repeal/amendment of penal law
1. Tuates v. Bersamin, G.R. No. 138962, Oct. 4, 2002
2. Benedicto v. CA, G.R. No. 125389, Sept. 4, 2001
3. People v. Lacson
4. Lacson v. Executive Secretary
5. People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, Oct. 30, 2006
6. Gumabon v. Director of Prison, G.R. No. L-30026, Jan. 30, 2011
Judicial decisions favorable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied
on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional
right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they
have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by
the retroactive character of a favorable decision.
c) Constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to enact penal laws
(i) Equal protection
(ii) Due process

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(iii) Non-imposition of cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines

1. Harden v. Director of Prison
2. People v. Limaco
3. People v. Camano
4. People v. Puda
5. People v. Marcos
6. Nipomoseno Case (Homicide & Firearms; Acquittal of homicide will not acquit
firearms)
(a) Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines (R.A. No.
9346)
1. People v. Echegaray
2. People v. Bon (Effect of withdrawal of imposition of Death penalty
(iv) Bill of attainder
1. People v. Ferrer
2. People v. Bilosis (Anti-Subversion Act)
3. People v. Velasco, G.R. NO. 127444 (Double Jeopardy/Writ of certiorari is dismissed)
4. Wright v. CA, G.R. No. 113213 (Extradition Treaty
(v) Ex post facto law
Penal Laws are not subject to Facial Challenge
1. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001 (Unconstitutionality of
Plunder; void for vagueness, overbreath doctrine)

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law." 13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand,
decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application
only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
2. Romualdez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011
3. People v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364, Sept. 18, 2009 (Vagrancy case; vintage law to be
unconstitutional; power of the state to prescribe, define crimes)

Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged

with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code which states
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that "any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of
support" in two separate Informations . Filed a Petition for Certiorari and declaring
paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code unconstitutional.
RTC: the law is vague and it violated the equal protection clause. It held
that the "void for vagueness" doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of
penal statutes.
SC: Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither
does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order
laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for
conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace
or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is
not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a
constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with
grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed
valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.36 The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain,
this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments.
The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a
law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
2. Felonies
a) Classifications of felonies
1. Manuel v. People
b) Elements of criminal liability

c) Impossible crime
1. Intod v. CA
RTC: convicted Intod of Attempted Murder.
CA: The decision of RTC was affirmed
SC: Intods petition was granted, the crime committed by Intod was modified from
AttemptedMurder to an Impossible Crime.
Article 4 Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code States:Criminal Liability shall be
incurred:b. By a person committing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were itnot for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment, or on account of
the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
The case at far constitutes an inherent impossibility to perform the act due to factual
or physicalimpossibility, that is, extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor beyond his
controlprevent the consummation of the intended crime.

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Impossible Crime is recognized and punished here in the Philippines, as compared to,
UnitedStates, thus, judgment rendered by the US in similar nature with the case at bar
should not applied.
Impossible Crimes constitutes a criminal liability, in order to, punish the criminal
intent
Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4,
paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social
danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months ofarresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided
by the law, and to pay the costs.
2. People v. Gemma Jacinto
RTC: petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto together with Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline
Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofCaloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime
of Qualified Theft for conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then all employees
of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such
had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed
upon them with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De
Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00, representing payment made
by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.
CA: MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4
months arresto mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SC: This constitute as an impossible crime. The requisites of an impossible crime:
1. That the act performed would be an offense against pesons or property (all acts to
consummate the crime of qualified theft was consummated crime against property)
2. That the act was done with evil intent (mere act of unlawful taking showed intent to
gain)
3. That its accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual or the extraneous circumstances that constituted it as a
factual impossibility (that fact that the check bounced)
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if compared, would not
amount to a crime. (Impossibility of killing dead person)
Factual impossibility when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent consummation of the crime. (Like the example in the case of Intod)
From the time the petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she
had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case.
Replacement for the check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime
since the crime of theft is not continuing offense, petitioners act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. The fact that the
petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to
strengthen of her intent to gain.
The Decision of the CA, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is
found GUILTY of anIMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2,
and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.

3. People v. Valmores
d) Stages of execution

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e) Conspiracy and proposal

1. People v. Peralta
2. People V. Guevarra (implied conspiracy)
3. People v. Escalanti
3. Circumstances affecting criminal liability
a) Justifying circumstances
1. People v Narvaes (incomplete Self-defense; privilege mitigating by voluntary surrender;
defense of property)
2. People v. Abarca (Complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical
injuries; Absolutory cause Art. 247)
RTC: Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder.
SC: ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances.
Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the
penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from
punishment.
Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an
exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the
penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation,
i.e., that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional circumstances
which practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral elements of the offense,
and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the
information. The accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle
upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We
cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by
the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any
responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired
shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that
before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") that is
not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We
nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part,
second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple
imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for
one and one-half months; there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the
extent of her injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to
fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery period.)
The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of
arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the
service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina
Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of
P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement
as to costs.

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3. Nacnac v. People, March 2012 (Guilty of homicide-acquitted; Self-defense)

4. People v. Gatual (Self-Defense of a relative/Stranger)
(i) Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. No. 9262)
(a) Battered woman syndrome
1. People v. Genosa (Violence Against Women and Children; no self-defense)
defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from battered
woman syndrome, to wit:
a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized
at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life.
c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable--not
necessarily immediate and actual--grave harm to the accused, based on the history of
violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.
Treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or argument that
preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant's aggression.
Rape Cases:
1. People v. Jose, Feb. 6,1971 (Complex Crime of Abduction with Rape)
2. People v. Larranaga
3. People v. Campuhan, March 30, 2000 (Attempted Rape)
RTC: Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by
the court a quo to the extreme penalty of death.
SC: carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an
essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the
external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to
constitute carnal knowledge. But the act of touching should be understood here as
inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere
touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus,
a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is
not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis,
there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted
"touching of the female organ," but has also progressed into being described as "the
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum," or "the bombardment of the
drawbridge." But, to our mind, the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of
orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion."
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both
should in all respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence

10 | P a g e

alone, in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be
productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain
whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ
to accurately conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that
separates attempted rape from consummated rape will significantly disappear.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted
when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted
rape - and only of attempted rape - are present in the instant case, hence, the accused
should be punished only for it.
Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO
guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He
is instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term
of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium
as maximum. Costsde oficio.
4. People v. Collado, March 1, 2001 (one count of rape & three Counts Acts of
Lasciviousness)
RTC: accused-appellant Jessie Ventura Collado guilty of statutory rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
SC: Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere
epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on
the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis x x x x There must be sufficient
and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ,
and not merely stroked the external surface thereof for the accused to be convicted of
consummated rape x x x x
x x x Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.
touching of either the labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated
rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
In other words, "touching" of the female organ will result in consummated rape if
the penis slid into or touched either labia of the pudendum. Anything short of that will only
result in either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.
Inasmuch as the touching of the victims organ by the penis of accused-appellant
on 5 June 1993 was but a mere incident of the "rubbing against or between the victims
thighs" which in no way manifests an act preliminary to sexual intercourse, accusedappellant should only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness instead of consummated rape.
accused-appellant is found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness (instead of Statutory
Rape) under Art. 336 of The Revised Penal Code, aggravated by obvious ungratefulness. In
G.R. Nos. 135668-70 (Crim. Cases Nos. 106258-106260), accused-appellant is likewise
found guilty of three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness under the same Art. 336, also
aggravated by obvious ungratefulness in each count.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant JESSIE VENTURA
COLLADO is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and twenty (20)
days of arresto mayormaximum as minimum, to four (4) years six (6) months and ten (10)
days of prision correccional maximum as maximum, in each count of Acts of
Lasciviousness. Accused-appellant is further directed to pay the private complainant
Messeah
M.
Dumaoal P30,000.00
as
civil
indemnity, P40,000.00
for
moral
damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, in each of the four (4) counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness, and to pay the costs.

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5. People v. Garcia, Feb. 28, 2002 (Complex Crime of Forcible Abduction with rape and
three counts of Rape; Art. 312)
6. People v. Mirandilla, July 27, 2011 (Special Complex Crime of Kidnapping and Illegal
Detention with Rape)
RTC: convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping, four counts of rape, and one count of rape
through sexual assault
CA: Affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, convicting Mirandilla. It found him
guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape (instead of kidnapping as the
RTC ruled), four counts of rape, and one count of rape by sexual assault. [27] It rejected
Mirandillas defense that he and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual encounters
were consensual.
SC: no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime
of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. [73] This is
because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No.
7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the
seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the
present case, there is only one crime committed the special complex crime of kidnapping
with rape.
SC AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, by R.A. No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay the offended party AAA, the amounts
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages.
7. People v. Saheron (Rape & Marriage)
Drugs Case
1. People v. Marcos
2. People v. Doria (Entrapment v. Instigation)
3. Udtohan Talaba v. People

Other cases:
1. People v. Goya (Life imprisonment v. reclusion perpetua)
2. People v. Lucas (Even if reclusion perpetua has a range is still indivisible)
3. People v. Cedeno, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994 (4 counts of murder & another
crime of arson)
RTC: Pedro Cedenio, Felipe Antipolo and Jurito Amarga guilty of "Arson with

Multiple Murder as defined and penalized under Section 5 of Presidential

Decree No. 1613 (amending the law on Arson)" 8 and sentenced them to
reclusion perpetua.
SC: Appellants PEDRO CEDENIO, FELIPE ANTIPOLO and JURITO AMARGA are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of murder and
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another crime of arson. Consequently, appellants are sentenced each to four

(4) terms of reclusion perpetua for the murder of Hilario Dorio, Flora Dorio,
Maria Dorio and Nicanora Tabanao, and another reclusion perpetua for arson
for the burning of the house which resulted in the death of infant Dioscora
Dorio, to be served successively in accordance with Art. 70 of The Revised
Penal Code. In addition, appellants are jointly and severally held liable to the
heirs in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of each victim.
4. People v. Villanueva (no receipts for temperate damages)
5. People v. Isabelo Puno, G.R. No. 97471, Feb. 17, 1993
6. People v. Jeanette Yanson-Dumangcas, G.R.No. 133527-28, Dec. 13, 1999
RTC: Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas (was swindled in a fake gold

bar
transaction losing P352,000 to Danilo Lumangyao and his cohort), Charles
Dumancas, (both as principals by induction), police Col. Nicolas M. Torres (as
principal by induction and by direct and/or indispensable cooperation),
police inspector Adonis C. Abeto, police officers Mario Lamis y Fernandez, Jose
Pahayupan, Vicente Canuday, Jr., Dominador Geroche y Mahusay, Jaime Gargallano,
Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, all as principals by
participation, Cesar Pecha, and Edgar Hilado, both as accessories, of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder.
SC: In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement,
the following must be present: (1) the inducement be made with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime, and (2) such inducement be the determining
cause of the commission by the material executor (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203
[1913]). To constitute inducement, there must exist on the part of the inducer the
most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of
the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very
strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime.
By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to "take care of the
two" does not constitute the command required by law to justify a finding that she
is guilty as a principal by inducement.
WHEREFORE, JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS and ADONIS ABETO are
hereby ACQUITTED and forthwith ordered released from detention unless there may
be reason for their further detention on other criminal cases. The case and appeal of
NICOLAS TORRES is DISMISSED by reason of his death. The convictions of all the
other accused-appellants for each case filed are AFFIRMED except for the
modification that accused-appellant CESAR PECHA is sentenced for each case to an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as minimum up to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Joint and several
civil liability for the accused-appellants found guilty as principals, is reduced to
P50,000.00 for each case, as indemnity for the death of each victim, P50,000.00 for
each case, by way moral damages, and P25,000.00 for each case, by way of
exemplary damages. The civil liability of accused-appellant Cesar Pecha is
maintained at one-tenth of the above amount.
7. People v. Chowdury (G.R. No. 129577-80) (Illegal Recruitment in a large scale;
acquitted)
RTC: Bulu Chowdury and Josephine Ong were charged with the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale

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SC: As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may
be held liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. An
employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as
principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously
participated in illegal recruitment. It has been held that the existence of the corporate
entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally
causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, and can act, only
by and through its human agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter. The
employee or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in
the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the
business, its purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and
promotion, however slight his contribution may be.
A mere employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legal
requirements for its operation. The evidence at hand shows that accused-appellant carried
out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the
POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the applicants in its
behalf. Furthermore, he performed his tasks under the supervision of its president and
managing director. Hence, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt accused-appellant's conscious and active participation in the commission of the crime
of illegal recruitment. His conviction, therefore, is without basis. Accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED.
8. Isabelita Reodica v. CA, G.R.N O. 125066, July 8, 1998 (Quasi Offense of Reckless
Imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries)

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