AKBAYAN vs.

Aquino Re: JPEPA

(July 16, 2008)
[V1.0]
Facts:
The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the
sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
as a milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of
strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).
JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up
of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments.
It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by
the Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by
Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the
committee heard Governments rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on
the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious
concerns about the country being turned into Japans toxic waste basket. The discussion in
the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations
with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns.
Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity
as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress
2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of
the instant petition.
3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted
from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine
government is justified in denying access thereto.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of Akbayan
Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest
Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel
respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to
furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to
the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the
said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court

lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for
access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while
the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be
'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the
parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It
is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers
could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations
would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a
process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of
lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national
interest.
In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno. It said: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to
protect our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal
that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of
executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point
that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.
AKBAYAN vs. Aquino Re: JPEPA
(July 16, 2008)
[V2.0]
Facts:
Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the
Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a
broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures,
paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government
procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual
recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and
general and final provisions.
Issues:
a. Whether or not the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information.

b. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at certain stages
of the negotiation process.
c. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege.
d. Whether the Respondents failed to claim executive privilege on time.
Ruling:
Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following reasons:
1. To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test
which can be applied. Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine
on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates
to or affects the public.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are
matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic
negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception
to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to
information, a specific showing of need for such information is not a relevant consideration,
but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has
claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by
the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that
the information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to
effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.
2. Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information includes official information
on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.
3. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a
sufficient showing of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case,
ad hoc basis. "[E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is asserted the district court
must undertake a fresh balancing of the competing interests," taking into account factors such
as "the relevance of the evidence," "the availability of other evidence," "the seriousness of the
litigation," "the role of the government," and the "possibility of future timidity by government
employees.

In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong and sufficient showing of
need. The arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall
short of this standard stated in the decided cases.
There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The
Court has earlier concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any
specific need shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an international
trade agreement.
Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this
Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decisionmaking unless the initial offers are also published.
4. When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the
present petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited.
Respondents failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not,
however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. What respondents
received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests
for information. The House Committee refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a
subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecias alleged request to
Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.
While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to
executive officials out of respect for their office until resort to it becomes necessary, the
fact remains that such requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do
not strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege.
Estrada v. Desierto; Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo
(353 SCRA 452) (356 SCRA 108)
[V1.0]
Facts:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his
term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On
October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner,
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
The expose immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker
Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3
of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000,
the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a
vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account

under the name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that
hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their
support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant
secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press
statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter
stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and
duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall
be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate
President Pimentel on the same day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several
cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President
Ruling:
Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.
Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent
to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be
given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal
letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after
Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an
authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive
Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between
Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of
power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation,
the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at
that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition
period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1)
he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to

reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude
to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on
his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The
inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres.
Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed
a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also
passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of
Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon
petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The
question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a
political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers.
Estrada v. Desierto; Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo
(353 SCRA 452) (356 SCRA 108)
[V2.0]
Facts:

This is a petition to question the legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos

assumption of the presidency of the Philippines, filed by her immediate predecessor
Joseph Estrada.

What actually happened:

o
o
o
o

May 11, 1998: Estrada wins the presidency with an overwhelming lead.
Arroyo is elected as Vice-President.
October 4, 2000: Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson starts publicly
accusing Estrada and his family of receiving jueteng payoffs.
October 5, 2000: Echoes of Singsons accusations resound in both the
Senate and House of Representatives, mainly through opposition
members / members of the Minority.
October 11-November, 2000: Several advisers resign, including
Department of Social Welfare and Development Secretary Arroyo.
Estradas allies in the Majority defect to the other camp. Past presidents
and Archbishop Cardinal Sin call for Estradas resignation.
November 13, 2000: House Speaker Manuel Villar transmits the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.

o
o

o
o
o
o

o
o
o

November 20, 2000: the Impeachment Process formally starts, with 21

Senators as judges, and Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.
presiding.
December 7, 2000-January 11, 2001: the Impeachment trial proper.
Presentation of evidence. On January 11, 11 senators vote against the
opening of the second envelope, which allegedly contains evidence to
prove that Estrada indeed kept a secret bank account worth 3.3 billion
pesos under the name Jose Velarde. These 11 outnumbered the 10
senators who wanted to have the envelope opened.
January 17, 2001: Public prosecutors resign, and the impeachment
proceedings, postponed indefinitely.
January 18, 2001: Hundreds of people march to EDSA in a mass
movement calling for Estradas resignation (dubbed the EDSA II
Movement).
January 19, 2001: the Military withdraws support from Estrada, and more
members of the Executive branch resign. Estrada agrees to holding a
snap election for President where he would not be a candidate.
January 20, 2001: Estradas and Arroyos advisers start negotiations on a
peaceful and orderly transfer of power, only to be cut short by Arroyos
oathtaking as the 14th President of the Philippines. That same day,
Estrada and his family leave Malacaang. Estrada releases a statement
which said that he was leaving Malacaang for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of our nation. He also sends a letter to
both chambers of Congress saying that he [is] unable to exercise the
powers and duties of [his] office.
January 22, 2001: Congress issues a Resolution recognizing and
expressing support for the Arroyo presidency. Other countries expressed
the same.
February 6, 2001: Sen. Teofisto Guingona is nominated by Arroyo to be
her Vice-President
February 7, 2001: Senate passed Resolution No. 83 terminating the
Impeachment Court.

What the parties to this case did:

o

February 5, 2001: Estrada files a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a
writ or preliminary injunction to enjoin Ombudsman Desierto from
continuing the probe on the criminal cases filed against him (OMB Case
No. 0-00-1629, 1754-1758), supposedly until his term as President is over.
February 6, 2001: Estrada files another petition, this time a quo warranto
petition, against Arroyo. He wanted to be confirmed as the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines and Arroyo only as
temporary / acting president until he is able to resume his duties.
February 24, 2001: Respondents file their replies to Estradas
consolidated petitions.
1. Petitioners Arguments:

2.

He has not resigned as President yet, and so Arroyos

presidency was void since the position was not vacant
at the time she was sworn in.
He is only temporarily unable to fulfill his duties as
President, and that he is merely on leave.
Given the above arguments, Estrada is still President,
especially since he was never impeached, and he
thus enjoys Presidential Immunity from all kinds of
suit.
The Ombudsman has to stop the investigation since
he had already developed a bias against him
(Estrada) from the barrage of prejudicial publicity on
his guilt.
Respondents Argument:
The cases pose a political question ( the legitimacy
of the Arroyo administration ) and are therefore out of
the Courts jurisdiction, especially since Arroyo
became president through people power, and has
already been recognized as such by other
governments. They compare the present case with
Aquinos revolutionary government (Lawyers League
for a Better Philippines v. Aquino).

Issue:
Whether or not Estrada is merely a President on leave, which makes Arroyo just an
Acting President. (Whether Estrada resigned from his position)

Ruling:
Estrada resigned from his position. There are two elements that must be present to
consider someone to have resigned: first, the intent to resign, and second, the act/s of
relinquishment. Both elements were evident in Estradas actuations before he left
Malacaang, and so he must be considered to have resigned.

Using the Totality Test (i.e., the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material relevance on
the issue), the Court found that Estradas acts to be tantamount to his
resignation.

For intent: the Court mainly used Angaras Diary, Final Days of Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, in order to intuit Estradas intent. The Diary, which was
published in a major publication, described Estradas acts following the
massive withdrawal of support by former Estrada allies. Here, Estrada is
quoted to have proposed a snap election of which he would not be a part.
He was also shown to have conceded to the idea that he had to resign.
For acts of relinquishment: the Court enumerated five.
a. Estrada acknowledged Arroyos oath-taking as President of the
Republic.
b. He said he was leaving the seat of presidency for the sake of
peace but did not say that he would return or that he was
leaving only temporarily. He did not specify what kind of inability
it was that prevented him from discharging his presidential
duties at that time.
c. He thanked the people for the opportunity to serve them. The
Court took this as a past opportunity.
d. He also said he was ready for any future challenge, and the
Court took to mean a future challenge after occupying the
[presidency].
e. He called on his supporters to join efforts at reconciliation and
solidarity. The Court said that these would not be possible if
Estrada refuses to give up the presidency.
Estrada also argues that he could not have resigned as a matter of law,
since Section 12 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)
prohibits the resignation or retirement of any public officer pending a
criminal or administrative investigation for any case filed against him
under RA 3019 or the Revised Penal Codes provisions on bribery. The
Court interpreted this provision according to the intent of the lawmakers,
and that is that the provision was included supposedly to prevent the act
of resignation or retirement from being used as a protective shield to
stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against
him and to prevent his prosecution under [RA 3019] Estrada therefore
cannot invoke this provision to violate the very practice it was supposed to
prevent.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396 - May 3, 2006
(Pres. Proclamation No. 1017)

FACTS:

"Take Care" Power of the President

Powers of the Chief Executive
The power to promulgate decrees belongs to the Legislature

These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national
emergency) and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the
cases are pending, President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist, thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to
enact laws and decrees
If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
RULING:
Take-Care Power
This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based
on Sec. 17, Art. VII: The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President
is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees
to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before
assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of
the Philippines, he will, among others, execute its laws. In the exercise of such function, the
President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-inChief of all the armed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under the
Department of Interior and Local Government.
The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees?
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292. President
Arroyos ordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision.
She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP
1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as
statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power
during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition.

But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that
these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot
call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing
family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only
order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.
Francisco v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
[V1.0]
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices.
The complaint was endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least onethird (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Issues:
1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense?
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article
XI of the Constitution.
Ruling:
1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the
sound discretion of the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution
enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and

2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from
"filing."
3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the
second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
Francisco v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
[V2.0]
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Fuentabella, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada held an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public
trust and other high crimes. The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Suplico,
Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003 in accordance with Section 3 (2) of Article XI of the Constitution, which provides the
substantial rules in initiating impeachment cases.
The House on Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for
being insufficient in substance.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint, or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives
Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentabella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by the abovementioned House Resolution.

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint was unconstitutional as
it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.
On their comments on the petitions, respondent House of Representatives through Speaker
De Venecia and/or its co-respondents, submitted a Manifestation asserting the Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an
independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the
performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases.
The Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Drilon, also filed a Manifestation
stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in
law or in fact, adding that as of the time of filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was
presented before it.
Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a Petition for Leave to Intervene, questioning the status quo
Resolution issued by the Court on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and
the Court in a constitutional deadlock and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the
matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination. Several motions for intervention
were filed and were granted thereafter.

only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them
This moderating power to determine the proper allocation of powers of the different
branches of the government and to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself,
which is the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government And the judiciary
in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative
acts void if violative of the Constitution. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission)
Ensuring the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by any
branch or instrumentalities of government, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner
Roberto Concepcion, in his sponsorship speech, even states that such power is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

Ruling:
The matters will be discussed in seriatim.

2. Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

The courts power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is
subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.

1. Judicial Review
The Supreme Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Sec. 1, Art. VII of our present 1987 Constitution, the second paragraph of
which states:

a.
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Citing the case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Court expounded on the power of
judicial review stating that in cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof when
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do
not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal
injury. On the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since
this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
legislators in cases involving paramount public interest and transcendental importance.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on
standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure while the latter has constitutional
underpinnings.

Issue:
Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can
invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether or not it should be exercised by the
Court at this time.

Standing is a special concern of the constitutional law because in some cases suits are
brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of law or by official
action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters who actually sue in the public
interest. Hence, the question is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.

An association has legal personality to represent its members, especially when it is composed
of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests. In class suits filed in
behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the
interests of all concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the
suit, for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the
res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the
court.

On the other hand, the question as to real-party-in-interest is whether he is the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

With respect to motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court of an officer thereof.
While intervention is not a matter of right, the courts may permit it when the applicant shows
facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners asserts a
violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the
vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in
a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were supposedly
violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific
requirements have been met have been given standing in this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine,
when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that pubic money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and
that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of
the public.
As for the legislator, the Court allowed him to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office.

In this case, the Court granted motions to intervene except that of intervenor Soriano, who
asserts an interest as a taxpayer but failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing
taxpayers suit. In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that
the act of petitioners would result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money
being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the
Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
b. Ripeness and Prematurity
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture. Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the
latter is challenged in an appropriate proceeding.
The instant petitions raise the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts
having been carried out, i.e. the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been promulgated and enforced,
the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed
before suit, has been complied with.
c. Justiciability
Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner: The
powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative,
the Executive, and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent
of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or

not is vested in courts of justice courts of justice determine the limits of powers of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers.
The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any
of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.
This is not only a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature
a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of the political law doctrine.
The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court thus now applies this standard to the present controversy.
The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second
impeachment complaint. More importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation.
On the other hand, issues regarding the constitutionality of Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of
the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, as a result thereof, barring the
second impeachment complaint under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution, constitute
the very lis mota or crux of the instant controversy.
3. Conclusion
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned.
The Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its
constitutionally vested power and duty of the judicial review over an issue whose resolution
precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of
the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this
Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut
allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face with a matter or problem
that squarely falls under the Courts jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it
to pass upon that problem head on.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits
only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief
Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did
not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable
issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it not at all the business of this Court to
assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

The Court, therefore, held sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings, which were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001, are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which was filed on October 23, 2003, is barred
under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.