ELIGIO T. LEYVA, petitioner, vs. COURT of APPEALS, FRANCISCO Laiz and MANUELA JANDOC, respondents. Petitioner claims he executed a Compromise Agreement in 1963 with Manuela Jandoc. Respondent Laiz reasoned that a private Agreement of Sale was executed in 1959.
ELIGIO T. LEYVA, petitioner, vs. COURT of APPEALS, FRANCISCO Laiz and MANUELA JANDOC, respondents. Petitioner claims he executed a Compromise Agreement in 1963 with Manuela Jandoc. Respondent Laiz reasoned that a private Agreement of Sale was executed in 1959.
ELIGIO T. LEYVA, petitioner, vs. COURT of APPEALS, FRANCISCO Laiz and MANUELA JANDOC, respondents. Petitioner claims he executed a Compromise Agreement in 1963 with Manuela Jandoc. Respondent Laiz reasoned that a private Agreement of Sale was executed in 1959.
ELIGIO T. LEYVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO LAIZ and MANUELA JANDOC, respondents. Facts: Respondent LAIZ filed before the Court of First Instance of Cotabato a petition for Cancellation of adverse claim annotated on the back of his Transfer Certificate of Title covering a parcel of land registered in the name Manuela Jandoc. Petitioner Levya claimed that he executed a Compromise Agreement in 1963 (notarized in 1972) with Manuela Jandoc where the former will withdraw his opposition in the Land Registration case in the condition that certain properties automatically belong to him in case of favorable judgment for Jandoc. Respondent Laiz reasoned that a private agreement of sale was executed in 1959 between him and Respondent Jandoc. The Court of First Instance of South Cotabato ruled against petitioner and confirmed the sale between Laiz and Jandoc pertaining to the parcel of land. The CFI also denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed in toto the lower courts decision. Hence a petition for review on certiorari was filed by petitioner contending that the IAC committed grave error in ruling that Laizs deed of absolute sale prevailed over Levyas compromise agreement. Issue: WON petitioner Levya, basing his claim on a Compromise Agreement, has a better right over the parcel of land than respondent Laiz, who executed a Deed of Sale with respondent Jandoc. Held: The instant petition is without merit. Upon consideration of the foregoing, the Court of appeals concluded that the Compromise Agreement whether executed in 1963 or 1972 between Leyva and Jandoc cannot prevail over the Agreement of Sale between Laiz and Jandoc and that Laiz has a better right over the property in question than Leyva. But Leyva lays much stress on the findings of Francisco Cruz, Jr., a handwriting expert of the PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame who testified that the purported signature of Jandoc appeared to be of another person and of Col. Crispin B. Garcia, formerly Chief of the Chemistry Branch in the PC Crime Laboratory who testified that the Agreement could have been written within the years 1964 to 1967. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave more weight to the testimony of Fiscal Sarinas as corroborated by Catolico, one of the signatories in the Deed of Transfer, and Versoza, a notary public, upholding the validity of the assailed Sale Agreement. This Court has ruled in the case of Vda. de Roxas v. Roxas, that "the positive testimony of the three attesting witnesses ought to prevail over the expert opinions which cannot be mathematically precise but which on the contrary, are subject to inherent infirmities." In
any event, it is well established that the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court for the latter is in a better position to gauge credibility of witnesses.
Gwendolyn Marie Wilson v. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration and First Security Bank, 156 F.3d 1245, 1st Cir. (1998)