4d

Topic

Facts

Issue

Held

10. Ong v.
Republic

Petitioner Charles Ong in behalf of his brothers filed for an

application of Registration of Title over Lot 15911.
Ong alleged that his brothers and him are the co-owners of
the land, which they purchase from the spouses Tony
Bautista and Alicia Villamil. And they and their predecessor
in interest have been in Open, peaceful, and continuous
possession of the lot in the concept of owners for more
than 30 years.
Only respondent Republic of the Phil represented by the
OSG, opposed the application for registration.
Respondents contend that:
Neither the applicants nor their predecessor in interest
have been in open continuous exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lot since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
The trial court favored petitioner Ong and declared the land
in the name of the applicant. Respondent appealed before
the Court of Appeals and the appellate court reversed the
trial courts ruling.

WON petitioner together

with his brothers have
registrable ownership
over the real property
subject matter?

The SC held in this case that although there is no question that the
land has been declared as alienable and disposable. Possession
alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public
domain because the law requires possession and occupation. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify his possession must not be a mere fiction.
Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such nature as a party would naturally exercises
over his own property.
Petitioners admitted that after they bought the said lot neither of them
actually occupied the lot. No improvements were made thereon and
the most that they did was just to visit on several occasions.
The burden of proof in land registration cases rest on the applicant
who must show CLEAR/POSITIVE/CONVINCING evidence that his
alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and
duration required by law.
Unfortunately, petitioners evidence do not constitute the well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence necessary in cases of this nature.

11. Escritor v. IAC

Petitioner Escritor registered a parcel of land and was able WON petitioners Escritor No. As Art 534 of the Civil Code explicitly provides, " One who
to secure a title over it.
be liable for damages
succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the consequences of the

1. Abuan v. People
2. People v. Tira
3. Ramirez v. Dir.
Of Lands
4. Rep. v. Hon.
Vera
5. People v. Torres
6. Ramos v. Dir. Of constructive
Lands
possession
7. Rep. v. IAC
8. Bogo Medellin v.
CA
9. Cequene v.
Bolante

Respondent Acuna, filed a petition for review of the

adjudication of the lot to Escritor contending that it was
obtained by claimant Escritor through fraud and
misrepresentation.
After 13yrs,the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
Acuna ordering petitioners Escritor to vacate the land.
After 4 yrs, respondent Acuna filed a complaint for recovery
of damages against petitioners for the coconut fruits
benefitted by the latter unlawfully for thirteen years.

wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is shown that he was aware

of the flaws afffecting it;"
The reason for this article is that bad faith is personal and
instransmissible. Its effects must, therefore, be suffered only by the
person who acted in bad faith; his heir should not be saddled or
burdened with such consequences.
Under Art 527 of the Civil Code, " good faith is always presumed, and
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rest the
burden of proof. If no evidence is presented proving bad faith, like in
this case, the presumption is good faith remains"
A view of the record, however, does not indicate the existence of any
such fraud (of Escritor's predecessors to Acuna ). It was respondent
Acuna failed to prove fraud and bad faith on the part of petitioners.
We sustain the trial court's finding that petitioners were possessors in
good faith and should, therefore, not be held liable for damages.
Art. 526 of the Civil Code provides that " he is deemed a possessor in
good faith who is not aware that there exist in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

12. Roman
Catholic Church v.
Familiar
13. Mun. Of
Moncada v.
Cajuigan

The municipality Moncada and defendant entered into a

contract of lease whereby the plaintiff leased to defendant
certain fishponds situated within the jurisdiction of the
municipality for term embracing July 1, 1908 to June 30,
1909, for which the defendant agreed to pay a rental of
P3,710. By virtue of this lease, defendant took possession
of the fishponds and forthwith began placing therein nets,
corrals and other accessories necessary for the conduct of
a fishery. The lessee failed to pay the rentals on time, but
he was allowed extensions. Defendant was later forcibly
evicted from the fishponds by plaintiff. This action was
brought to collect damages for the breach by the defendant
of the contract of lease. Defendant in turn asks for
damages for the forcible ejectment.

The lease failed to comply with the provisions of the contract of lease.
The lessor had thereafter a right to have the contract rescinded. If the
plaintiff had gone to court and prayed for a rescission of the contract,
he could have no doubt obtained not only this relief but also a judgment
for the amount of the rents during the time the lessee occupied the
premises, together with penalties, interest, costs, and for the forfeiture
of deposits. The plaintiff did not, however, apply to the courts for this
redress, but attempted to rescind the contract itself by forcibly ejecting
the lessee, who has in peaceable and quiet possession. The lessee, on
the other hand, did not obtain nor seek a re-entry to the premises.
Consequently, the plaintiff must be held responsible in damages for its
illegal acts in forcibly ejecting the lessee, but such damages must be
limited to the simple trespass. Thus, defendant is entitled to recover for
all the necessary and natural consequences of the plaintiffs illegal act,
which in this case, according to the proof, amounts to P210, this being

the value of the corrals, etc. placed upon the leased premises by the
lessee and appropriated by the plaintiff.
14. Rockville Excel
Int'l v. Oligario
Culla
15. Heirs of
Arzadon- Crisologo
v. Ranon

The case involved a parcel of unregistered residential lot in Was the MCTC correct?
a barangay up north originally declared for tax purposes in
the name of Paeng. On May 2, 1936, Paeng sold the land
to a childless couple, Tomas and Matilde who built their
conjugal home thereon. Residing with the couple in said
house was Tomas sister Tina. Since the couple died
without any issue, the siblings of Tomas, Tina and Tibo
acquired successional rights over the property.
But Tina and Tibo did not take any action to have the said
property adjudicated in their favor. When Tibo also died
without any known heir the property was left solely in favor
of Tina who had two daughters Lina and Maura. Even with
the death of Tina, Lina and Maura did not take any
concrete action in exercising their successional rights over
the property, although Bernie, the son of Maura, continued
to live in the property.
Sometime in 1947, the spouses Tino and Pinang also
started staying in the property according to Bernie himself.
Then in 1962, Tino declared the subject property in his
name for taxation purposes. Thus the tax declaration which
was still in the name of Tomas was cancelled and a new
tax declaration was issued in the name of Tino who paid
the corresponding taxes thereon. In subsequent years,
upon the death of Tino, Pinang declared the same in her
name for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding
taxes thereon. In 1977, Pinang even mortgaged the
property with the PNB. It was only by this time or on August
31, 1977 when Lina finally executed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim and Notice of Ownership and made known to others
their supposed successional rights over the property.
Except for this adverse claim nothing has been done by
Lina or Maura or their children.
Pinang and her children on the other hand continued to

No. The notice of adverse claim filed by Lina in 1977 is nothing more
than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt or toll the
running of the prescriptive period. Under the Civil Code (Article 1123)
the interruption that tolls the running of the period is the filing of the
complaint or civil action against the possessor and his receipt of the
judicial summons. Moreover even with the receipt of the judicial
summons, the running of the period of prescription is not interrupted if
the summons is void for lack of legal solemnities; if the plaintiff should
desist or allow the proceedings to lapse ; or if the possessor should be
absolved from the complaint (Article 1124).
Hence the Notice of Adverse claim cannot take the place of judicial
summons which produces the civil interruption provided by law
because there remains, as yet, a necessity for judicial determination of
its validity in a civil action filed for that purpose. In this case, no action
was in fact filed by Lina and Maura or their heirs against Pinang and
her children. As a consequence no judicial summons was received by
Pinang or her heirs.
Nothing was done by the heirs of Lina and Maura from the time their
predecessors in interest died. It was only in 1977 when they attempted
to call the attention of Pinang and her children which did not even
operate as an interruption on the latters possession. From 1962 to the
time they filed the complaint before the MCTC in 1995 and until the
present time, Pinang and her children occupied the property without
interruption in the concept of an owner thereby acquiring ownership via
extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Plainly the heirs of Lina and
Maura slept on their rights. The law comes to the succor only of the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.

stay in the house until 1985 when fire gutted the property
and they had to transfer to Manila. Even then they
continued to exercise acts of dominion over the property by
visiting and looking after it and paying the taxes thereon.
Later on, one of Pinangs daughter learned that a tax
declaration was already issued in the name of still another
person who apparently bought the property from the heirs
of Lina and Maura.
Hence on October 18, 1995, Pinang and her children filed
an action against the new owner. They claimed they owned
the property since 1962. They asked the Municipal Trial
Court (MCTC) to remove the cloud of doubt over their title
and ownership. It was only in this case that the heirs of
Lina and Maura and her son Bernie finally intervened and
finally asserted their ownership over the property against
Pinang and her children.
After trial, the MCTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Lina and
Maura. The court said that the adverse possession by
Pinang and her children which started in 1962 did not ripen
into ownership because it was interrupted in 1977 due to
the filing of the adverse claim. Such possession from 1962
to 1977 could not ripen into ownership because it was in
bad faith which requires possession of 30 years.

16. Castillo v.
Francisco
17. Dizon v. Suntay

The owner of a diamond ring entrusted same to Clarita

Sison for the latter to sell upon promise of a commission.
Instead of selling, Clarita pledged the ring with a
pawnshop. As aoon as he learned of the pledge, the owner
tried to get back the ring from the pawnshop owner, but the
latter refused.

Can the owner

successfully get back
ring? If so, does thw
owner have to pay the
pawnshop owner the
amount borrowed by
Clarita?

18. Wee v.
Republic

Respondent FelicidadMardo was granted a registered Free Whether Petitioner is

Patent No. (IV-2) 15284, dated April 26, 1979, covering the entitled to the subject
Lot No. 8348, situated in Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite. On property.
February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to

Under Art. 559 of the Civil Code, the owner can successfully get back
the ring, and he does not have to reimburse the pawnshop owner the
money lent to Clarita. This is because the ring owner had been
unlawfully deprived of the same, and this right to recover cannot be
defeated even if the pawnshop had acquired possession of the ring in
good faith.
Court of Appeals decision is sustained. CIVIL LAW: registration of title
Based on the legal paramaters, applicants for registration of title under
Section 14(1) must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that

petitioner Josephine Wee, through a Deed of Absolute Sale

a portion of the said lot known as Lot No. 8348-B, for a
consideration of P250,000.00 which was fully paid.
Respondent however refused to vacate and turnover the
subject property claiming that the alleged sale was falsified.
Petitioner file an Application for Original Registration of a
parcel of land claiming that she is the owner of said
unregistered land by virtue of a deed of absolute sale.
Respondent filed a Motion to dismiss the application
alleging that the land described in the application was
different from the land being claimed for titling. The motion
was however, denied. A motion for reconsideration and
second urgent motion for reconsideration were
subsequently filed by respondent, but both were denied by
the RTC. Upon presentation of evidence by the parties, the
RTC granted the application of the petitioner. Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC, hence, respondent appealed to the CA. The CA held,
among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with
the requirement of possession and occupation under
Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her admission that the
subject lot was not physically turned over to her due to
some objections and oppositions to her title suggested that
she was not exercising any acts of dominion over the
subject property, an essential element in the requirement
and occupation contemplated under Section 14 (1) of P.D.
No. 1529. Hence, this petition.

the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier. Republic v. Manimtim, G.R. No. 169599, March 16,
2011 The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land.
It was of the view that she could not have complied with the
requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529 considering that she admitted that it was not physically turned
over to her. A more important consideration, however, is that the
subject land is already registered under OCT No. OP-1840 (Patent No.
042118-03-6111) of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, under the name of
respondent Felicidad Mardo. The Petition is DENIED

19. Galvez v. CA
20. Yu v. Pacleb

Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife Angelita Chan are
registered owners of an 18,000-square meter parcel of land
in Barrio Langcaan,Dasmarias,Cavite, covered by TCT
No. T-118375 (Langcaan Property).On Feb. 27, 1992,
Spouses Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan sold the
property to Rebecca del Rosario. On May 7, 1992, the lot
was thereafter sold to Ruperto Javier. On Nov. 10, 1992, a
Contract to Sell was entered into between Javier and
Spouses Yu wherein petitioner spouses agreed to pay
JavierP200,000 as partial payment and P400,000 to be
paid upon execution of the contract, and Javier undertook
to deliver possession of the Langcaan Property and to sign

Whether or not petitioner

spouses are innocent
purchasers for value and
in good faith.

Petitioner spouses are not innocent purchasers for value, and they are
not in good faith. Several facts should have put petitioner spouses on
inquiry as to the alleged rights of their vendor, Javier, over the
Langcaan property. First, the property remains to be registered in the
name of respondent despite the 2 Deeds of Absolute Sale from
respondent to Del Rosariothen from the latter to Javier, and both deeds
were not even annotated in the title of the subject property.
Second, the 2 deeds of absolute sale were executed only 2 months
apart containing identical provisions. Third, the fact that the Langcaan
Property is in the possession of Ramon, son of the registered owners,
this should have made petitioner spouses suspicious as to the veracity
of the alleged title of their vendor, Javier. Petitioner spouses could have

a deed of absolute sale within 30 days from execution of

contract. All the aforementioned sales were not registered.
In 1993, spouses Yu filed a complaint with the RTC for
specific performance and damages against Javier,
contending that Javierre presented to them that the
Langcaan Property was not tenanted, but after they already
paid P200,000 as initial payment and entered into the
agreement of sale on Sept. 11, 1992, they discovered that
it was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb, son of Baltazar Pacleb.
Subsequently, spouses Yu demanded for the cancellation
of the agreement and for the return of their initial payment.
On March 10, 1995, spouses Yu, Ramon, and the latters
wife executed a
Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at
Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan
, where spouses Yu paid Ramon P500,000 in exchange for
the waiver of his tenancy rights over the subject property.
But on Oct. 12, 1995, Baltazar Pacleb filed a complaint for
annulment of the deed of sale to Javier, alleging that the
deed of sale executed between him and his late first wife
Angelita was spurious as their signatures were forgeries.
Meanwhile, on Nov. 23, 1995, spouses Yu filed an action
for forcible entry against respondent with the MTC alleging
that they had prior physical possession of the Langcaan
Property through their trustee Ramon until the latter was
ousted by respondent in Sept. 1995. MTC ruled in favor of
spouses Yu, affirmed by the RTC, but set aside by CA. His
first action for annulment of deed of sale having been
dismissed, respondent filed action for removal of cloud
from title on May 29, 1996, contending that the deed of sale
between him and his late first wife and Rebecca del
Rosario could not have been executed on Feb. 27, 1992,
because on said date, he was residing in the U.S. and his
late first wife died 20 years ago. During pendency of the
case, respondent died, succeeded by his surviving spouse
and representatives of children with his first wife. RTC held
that spouses Yu are purchasers in good faith, but on
appeal, CA reversed and set aside lower courts decision
and ordered for the cancellation of the annotation in favor
of spouses Yu on the TCT of Langcaan Property.

easily verified the true status of the subject property from Ramons
wife, since the latter is their relative.
The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the
registered owner himself.
Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys
from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land object
of the transaction is registered.
While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look
behind the certificate of title,
one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to
examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances
necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the
transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land.
Therefore, petitioner spouses cannot be considered as innocent
purchasers in good faith, and respondent has a better right over the
Langcaan Property as the true owner thereof

21. Green Acres v.

Cabral

Property Quieting of title

Victoria Cabral was the original owner of a parcel of land in

Barangay Pandayan, Meycauayan, Bulacan. The land was
placed under the coverage of PD No. 27, and on March 23,
1993, three Emancipation Patents were issued to the
Spouses Moraga.
Cabral then filed a complaint before the PARAD seeking
the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to the
Spouses Moraga on the grounds that these were obtained
through fraud and that the land is not suitable for rice and
corn production and has long been classified as residential,
commercial, industrial and nonagricultural land by the
Zoning Administrator of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. The PARAD rendered a decision
denying the petition for cancellation of the Emancipation
Patents and dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
Cabral appealed the decision to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
While the appeal was pending, the Spouses Moraga
subdivided and thereafter sold the subject lots to Filcon
Ready Mixed Inc.
Green Acres then purchased lots from Filcon and among
those purchased were the lots in question. The titles were
free from any annotations, liens, notices, claims or
encumbrances, except for an already cancelled annotation
of a real estate mortgage in favor of PCI Bank. That being
said Green Acres went ahead and used the land by
building warehouses on it.
A few years later Cabrals appeal was resolved by the
DARAB and ordered the cancellation of the titles of the
Spouses and Filcon for having been acquired illegally.
Green Acres found out about the DARAB decision and
informed Filcon, Filcon then assured Green Acres that it is
coordinating with its predecessor, the Spouses Moraga, to
make sure that Green Acres interest over the property is
protected.

1. WON the January 17,

2001 DARAB
decision(cancellation of
the titles of the Spouses
Moraga and Filcon) may
be enforced against
Green Acres(Writ of
Execution)?

1. NO! That decision was for a case between Cabral and the Spouses
Moraga and Filcon. The fact that Green Acres was not a party to the
case makes it clear that Green Acres could not be subject to a writ of
execution stemming from that decision because Green Acres was a
buyer in Good faith. If that were to be allowed it would be tantamount to
trampling of ones constitutional right to due process. So, hell no.

2. WON the DARAB

Decision in favor of
Cabral constitutes a
cloud on Green Acres
title over the subject
properties?

The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered

in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms
to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

The Supreme Court stated as follows:

It is beyond dispute that Green Acres was not made a party in the
DARAB case. Consequently, the January 17, 2001 DARAB decision
cannot bind Green Acres.
No one shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,
and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by
the court.
a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against
one who did not have his day in court.
2. Yes, the SC ruled in favor of GAs arguments that there was indeed a
cloud on the properties that makes it imperative in the interest of GAs
to file for Quieting of Title.
GA argued that the DARAB decision is among those enumerated in
Article 476.
Art. 476. .... by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title...
The Supreme Court stated and i quote;
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property...

Green Acres then sought to quiet its title and alleged that it
is a purchaser in good faith and for value, claiming that it
had no notice or knowledge of any adverse claim, lien, or
encumbrance on the properties. Green Acres claimed that
the DARAB decision casts a cloud on its titles.
In the meantime the decision of the DARAB became final
and executory which the prompted Cabral to file with the
PARAD a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution against
Green Acres. On January 25, 2006, the PARAD issued a
Resolution denying the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution for lack of merit.

...In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the

respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to
place things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no
rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled,
but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see
every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can
thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as
use, and even abuse the property.
Noteworthy tidbits in the SC rulings (merely additional details about the
case):
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur:
1.) The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and
* There is no dispute as to the first requisite since Green Acres has
legal title over the subject properties.
2.) The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
* A cloud on title consists of (1) any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective;
(3) but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may be
prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted.
* This Court holds that the DARAB decision in favor of Cabral satisfies
all four elements of a cloud on title.
* As Green Acres correctly points out, the DARAB decision, a final one
at that, is both an "instrument" and a "record." Blacks Law Dictionary
defines an instrument as a document or writing which gives formal
expression to a legal act or agreement, for the purpose of creating,
securing, modifying or terminating a right. A record, on the other hand,
is defined as a written account of some act, court proceeding,

transaction or instrument drawn up under authority of law, by a proper

officer, and designed to remain as a memorial or permanent evidence
of the matters to which it relates. It is likewise a "claim" which is defined
as a cause of action or a demand for money or property since Cabral is
asserting her right over the subject lots. More importantly, it is a
"proceeding" which is defined as a regular and orderly progress in form
of law including all possible steps in an action from its commencement
to the execution of judgment and may refer not only to a complete
remedy but also to a mere procedural step that is part of a larger action
or special proceeding
* the DARAB decision is apparently valid and effective. It is a final
decision that has not been reversed, vacated or nullified. It is likewise
apparently effective and may be prejudicial to Green Acres titles since
it orders the cancellation of the titles of the Spouses Moraga and Filcon
all from which Green Acres derived its titles.
22. Acre v. Yuttiki

Sofronio Acre, Jr. Married Evangeline Yuttikki while his prior

marriage with Beatriz Acre was still subsisting. Sofronio
and Evangeline acquired properties where one parcel of
land was registered in the name of Evangeline Yuttikki,
married to Sofronio Acre Jr. The other parcel of land was
registered in the name of Evangeline Yuttiki, married to
Sofronio Acre, and Nellie Y. Del Mar, married to Jose del
Mar.
Sofronio died after more than 24 years of union with
Evangeline.

Whether or not
Evangeline is the owner
of the contested
properties.

The Acres filed a complaint for reconveyance and recovery

of properties and/or partition with damages. They alleged
that Sofronio alone acquired the subject properties with his
fund.

23. Spouses Cruz

v. Spouses Cruz

Yes. Evangeline is the exclusive owner of the contested properties.

The property regime of Evangeline and Sofronio falls under the Article
148 of the Family Code, considering that their marriage is bigamous.
Under Art 148, properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. If
there is no contribution from either or both of the spouses, there can be
no co-ownership.
The Acres failed to present any evidence to establish that Sofronio
made an actual contribution in acquiring the contested properties.
Clearly, co-ownership does not exist here.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed

the decision of the trial court.

The certificate of title on its face show that the one property were
exclusively owned by Evangeline, and the other was co-owned by her
with her sister. The rule is well-settled that the words "married to"
preceding Sofronio Acre, Jr are merely descriptive of the civil status of
Evangeline.

Sometime in 1999, Petitioner Spouses purchased a parcel Whether or not the RTC
of land from a relative. The property was situated in Pulong has jurisdiction over the
Yantok, Angat, Bulacan. They paid real estate taxes but
case.
never occupied the property. Petitioners sold portions to
third parties. Petitioners discovered sometime in 2000 that
Respondents were occupying a section of the land.

No; RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case. It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegations in the complaint and
not by evidence adduced during trial. One cannot advert to anything
not set forth in the complaint. In this case, the complaint alleged that
the Petitioners tolerated the occupation of the Respondents and filed
the case with the RTC in less than 1 year from the demand to vacate.

Petitioners offered to sell the land to them. Since they could

not agree on the price, Petitioners demanded that
Respondents vacate the land. Petitioners filed a case for
recovery of possession of the land in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in 2001. Respondents
filed a motion to dismiss claiming, that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case as it should have been filed in the
MTC since it was a summary action for ejectment under
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. RTC denied the motion to
dismiss and eventually decided in favor of Petitioners. On
appeal, the CA ruled in favor of Respondents and
dismissed the complaint. It held that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the action for recovery of possession
because petitioners had been dispossessed of the property
for less than a year. It held that the complaint was one for
unlawful detainer which should have been filed in the MTC.

24. Villegas
Bernardo v.
Villegas

Respondents alleged in the Complaint that their father,

Eusebio Villegas, is the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 46891
with; that petitioner, by stealth and in the guise of merely
grazing his cattle, surreptitiously entered into possession of
a portion of respondents land; that petitioner conspired and
confederated with Gaza and Francisco by illegally
constructing their own houses on the subject land; that the
issue of possession was brought to the barangay for
conciliation but no settlement was reached by the parties;
and that petitioner, Gaza and Francisco had forcibly,
unlawfully and unjustly possessed and continue to possess
the subject property and had refused to vacate the same.
In his Answer, petitioner denied taking possession of any
portion of the property of respondents.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents
and ordered petitioner, Gaza and Francisco to vacate the
subject land and to pay jointly and severally respondents
the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and the cost
of suit. The trial court held that the suit, being an accion
publiciana, falls within its jurisdiction. It found that the

When the case was filed in 2001, Congress had already approved
Republic Act No. 7691 which expanded the MTCs jurisdiction to
include other actions involving title to or possession of real property
(accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria) where the assessed value of
the property does not exceed P20,000 (or P50,000, for actions filed in
Metro Manila). The complaint did not contain any allegations as to the
value of the property. Thus, the Court could not determine where
jurisdiction lies.

WON the trial court had

jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the
action for failure of
respondents to allege the
assessed value of the
property involved in their
complaint. WO the
respondents owned the
subject property.

Ruling: With respect to the argument that being indispensable parties,

all of the heirs of Eusebio Villegas should have been impleaded as
parties, the appellate court disagreed and invoked Article 487 of the
Civil Code, which provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an
action for ejectment. The appellate court construed said provision to
cover all kinds of actions for recovery of possession.
The appellate court sustained the trial courts finding that the portions
of the land occupied by petitioner and Gaza are owned by respondents.
The appellate court likewise ruled that respondents could not be guilty
of laches considering that Estelito Villegas, upon seeing for the first
time in 1996 that petitioner was already building his house on the
premises, verbally asked him to discontinue the construction.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the plenary action of accion
publiciana must be brought before the regional trial courts. With the
modifications introduced by Republic Act No. 769114 in 1994, the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts was limited to real actions where
the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00, and P50,000.00 where the
action is filed in Metro Manila
Significantly, the Technical Report on Verification Survey by Engineer
Robert C. Pangyarihan, which was attached to and formed part of the

houses of petitioner and Gaza were inside the titled

property of respondents. The trial court noted that petitioner
failed to present any title or tax declaration to prove
ownership or possessory right.

records, contained a tax declaration indicating that the subject property

has an assessed value of P110,220.00. It is basic that the tax
declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the
presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper
government agency. Under Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC in fact has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the

trial court.
25. BF Citiland v.
Otake
26. Cabral v. Prov.
Adjudicator
27. Heirs of Juanita co ownership
Padilla v.
Dominador
Magdua

Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through

misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his name
without the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs.
Juanita, the mother of the heirs had allegedly executed a
notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property (Affidavit)
in favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole
owner of the land. (2) The land was subsequently sold by
Ricardo's daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia BahiaAbas, to respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador).
RTC: The case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30
years since the Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC
explained that while the right of an heir to his inheritance
is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs
appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of
all other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC
added that since prescription had set in to question the
transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it would seem
logical that no action could also be taken against the deed
of sale executed by Ricardo's daughters in favor of Domi

The main issue is

whether the present
action is already barred
by prescription.

art 494 no prescription shall run against co owner.

No, it has not prescribed. Since possession of co-owners is like that of
a trustee, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following
requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other coowners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the
evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. In the present case, all
three requisites have been met. After Juanita's death in 1989,
petitioners sought for the partition of their mother's land. The heirs,
including Ricardo, were notified about the plan. Ricardo, through a
letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he
adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardo's interest in
the land had now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after
repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land. In Generosa v.
Prangan-Valera, we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of
one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had repudiated
the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period begins
to run. However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to
run only from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice of
Ricardo's repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners filed
an action for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and
damages with the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years
had lapsed. This three-year period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year
acquisitive prescription period required by law in order to be entitled to
claim legal ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke

acquisitive prescription. In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the

principal evidence relied upon by the RTC to dismiss the case on the
ground of prescription, insufficiently established Dominador's rightful
claim of ownership to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case
on the merits to determine who among the parties are legally entitled to
the land.
28. Heirs of
co ownership
Figuracion v. Emilia
Figuracion- Gerilla

29. Fuentes v.
Conrado Roca

The Petitioners, heirs of Figuracion claim that the whole

lot is solely owned by Hilaria and Felipa Figuracion by
virtue of the title they acquired under their name.

WON Emilia had a right

to demand for partition

Yes, respondent Emilia can compel the partition of the lot.

The respondent, Emilila Figuracion-Gerilla, who had a

Deed of Quitclaim, has built a house over the 1/2 portion
of the disputed land.

The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of
ownership.
It is a given fact that Agripina and carolina are the 2 legal heirs of the
late Eulalio Figuracion. As such heirs, they became co-owners of the
disputed land.

Now the petitioners argued that respondent Emilia has no

valid claim of ownership because the Deed of Quitclaim
executed in her favor by Agripina was in fact a Deed of
Donation that contained no acceptance and thus void.
Futhermore, they argue that the instrument is not
registered in the ROD.

The heirs' contention is solely base on technicalities on the validity of

the Deed of Quitclaim. The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication which Carolina
executed is void for one cannot adjudicate an entire property he was
not the sole owner of. And the sale of the lot of Carlolina to Hilaria and
Felipa will only affect her share in the co-ownership, in accordance with
Art. 493 of the Civil Code.

In 1994, Hilaria attempted to demolish Emilia's house,

prompting her to file a case for the partition of the lot,
annulment of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by
Carolina, Deed of Absolute Sale and the TCT of Hilaria
and Felipa, reconveyance of the 1/2 portion, quieting of
title and damages.

Since co-ownership was successfully established by Emilia, she can

therefore demand for a partition under Art 494 of the Civil Code.

On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square

meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later in
1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners
Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who
would prepare the documents and requirements to
complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano
and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down
payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal
of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the
consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would
be attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete

Furthermore, the contention of the petitioners (heirs of Figuracion) that

Emilia is barred by prescription is untenable. It is stated under Art. 494
of the Civil Code that " No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner
or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as she expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
1. Whether or not
Rosarios signature on
the document of consent
to her husband
Tarcianos sale of their
conjugal land to the
Fuentes spouses was
forged;
2. Whether or not the
Rocas action for the

1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the
signatures of Rosario in the document giving consent and another
document executed at the same time period. The SC noted that the CA
was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the document which
stated consent was completely different from the sample signature.
There was no evidence provided to explain why there was such
difference in the handwriting.
2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil
code, the sale was done in 1989, after the effectivity of the Family
Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already

such tasks and claimed that he went to Manila to get the

signature of Rosario but notarized the document at
Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11,
1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while
the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the
lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and
Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the
property on the ground that the sale was void since the
consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios
signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim
that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a
sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.

declaration of nullity of
that sale to the spouses
already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only
Rosario, the wife whose
consent was not had,
could bring the action to
annul that sale.

3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse,

Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the validity of the sale but
given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the action
anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated
above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land
remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When
the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their
heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right,
under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its
enjoyment and disposal.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that

there was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata
who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given
weight, and that the action has already prescribed.
On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA
stating that the action has not prescribed since the
applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that
the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the
other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought
within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989
and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well
within the prescriptive period.
30. Eland Phil v
Garcia, Fajardo,
Heirs of
Malabanan

Respondents filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title with

Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC against Eland
Philippines, Inc. claiming ownership in fee simple title, of a
parcel of land by occupation and possession.
Respondents stated that they were not aware of any
person or entity that had a legal or equitable interest or
claim on the lot until they requested that the lot be
declared for tax purposes. They found out that a decree of
ownership has been issued to Eland without being notified
of the registration case, they claimed the presence of
misrepresentation amounting to actual or extrinsic fraud
and so entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction in order
to restrain or enjoin petitioner, its privies, agents,
representatives, and all other persons acting on its behalf,
to refrain from committing acts of dispossession on the

established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal

property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely
void under Art 124 of the family code. With that, it is a given fact that
assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument that the
action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that
prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them
who should have assailed such contract due to the fraud but they failed
to do so. On the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no
consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void
contract.

WON a summary
judgment is proper in an
action for quieting of title
and is applicable to the
present case. WON the
RTC has jurisdiction to
cancel petitioner's
original certificate of title
(OCT) in an action to
quiet title

Any action can be the subject of a summary judgment with the sole
exception of actions for annulment of marriage or declaration of its
nullity or for legal separation. This Court finds that the grant of
summary judgment was not proper. A summary judgment is permitted
only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment
is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the
affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party
show that such issues are not genuine. It must be remembered that the
non-existence of a genuine issue is the determining factor in granting a
motion for summary judgment, and the movant has the burden of
proving such nonexistence. The trial court found no genuine issue as to
any material fact that would necessitate conducting a full-blown trial.
However, a careful study of the case shows otherwise. By granting the
summary judgment, the trial court has in effect annulled its former

31. HEMEDES vs
CA

subject lot. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming

that theres no cause of action and were not entitled to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Said motion
was denied ruling that the allegations in the complaint
established a cause of action and enjoined petitioner
Eland to file its answer to the complaint. Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied. Meanwhile,
respondents filed a Motion to Declare Eland in Default.
The trial court issued an Order declaring the petitioner in
default and allowed respondents to present evidence ex
parte. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the
trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss and in declaring
it in default. The trial court denied the former and granted
the latter. The trial court also admitted petitioner's Answer
Ad Cautelam. Respondents countered by filing a Motion
to Expunge Eland's Answer from the Records and filed a
Motion to Set Presentation of Evidence Ex Parte which
was granted. Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings since it had filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA, asking for the nullification of the Order of the trial
court and for the affirmation of its earlier Order denying
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. The petition for certiorari
was subsequently denied, hence, the trial court ruled that
the reception of evidence already presented by the
respondents remained as part of the records of the case,
and that the petitioner had the right to cross-examine the
witness and to comment on the documentary exhibits
already presented. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but was denied by the trial court in an
Omnibus Order. The trial courts resolution favored
respondents, declaring them as the absolute owners and
rightful possessors of the subject lot, subject to the rights
of occupancy of the farm workers on the one-third area
thereof; that the judgment in land registration in favor of
Eland be set aside & decree of registration is null and
void. Thus, the Original Transfer Certificate of Title is
ordered to be canceled, as well as tax declaration
covering the subject lot.

ruling based on a claim of possession and ownership of the same land

for more than thirty years without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The
fact that the respondents seek to nullify the original certificate of title
issued to the petitioner on the claim that the former were in possession
of the same land for a number of years, is already a clear indicium that
a genuine issue of a material fact exists. This, together with the failure
of the respondents to show that there were no genuine issues involved,
should have been enough for the trial court to give the motion for
summary judgment, filed by respondents, scant consideration. Trial
courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do
so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to
be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy. Anent the propriety of the filing of an action for the quieting of
title, the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the decree of
registration come into question. Under Sec. 32 of P.D. No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree: Section 32. Review of decree of
registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration
shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or
other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to
the right of any person, including the government and the branches
thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such
adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in
the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of
the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the
date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall
such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser
for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may
be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or
an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value.

The disagreement involves a question of ownership over Whether or not the

an unregistered parcel of land. The late Jose Hemedes
conveyance by Justa
originally owned the land, father of Maxima Hemedes and Kausapin in favour of

The Supreme Court held that petitioner R & B Insurances assertion of

ownership over the property in dispute, as evidenced by TCT No.
41985, subject to the usufructuary rights of Justa Kausapin, which

Enrique D. Hemedes. On March 22, 1947 Jose Hemedes Enrique D. Hemedes

executed a document entitled Donation Inter Vivos With
transferred ownership
Resolutory Conditions whereby he conveyed ownership
over the subject land?
over the subject land, together with all its improvements,
in favor of his third wife, Justa Kausapin. Maxima
Hemedes, through her counsel, filed an application for
registration and confirmation of title over the subject
unregistered land. Subsequently, an Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) was issued in the name of Maxima Hemedes
married to Raul Rodriguez by the Registry of Deeds of
Laguna on June 8, 1962, with the annotation that Justa
Kausapin shall have the usufructuary rights over the
parcel of land herein described during her lifetime or
widowhood. However, Enrique D. Hemedes
subsequently sold the property to Dominium Realty and
Construction Corporation (Dominium). Justa Kausapin
also executed and affidavit confirming the conveyance of
the subject property in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes as
embodied in the Kasunduan dated May 27, 1971, and at
the same time denying the conveyance made to Maxima
Hemedes.
A complaint was filed by Enrique D. Hemedes for the
annullment of the TCT issued in favor of R&B Insurance
and/or the reconveyance to Dominium of the subject
property. Specifically, the complaint alleged that
Dominium has become the absolute owner of the subject
property by virtue of the February 28, 1979 deed of sale
executed by Enrique D. Hemedes, who in turn obtained
ownership of the land from Justa Kausapin, as evidenced
by the Kasunduan. The Plaintiffs contend that Justa
Kausapin never transferred the land to Maxima Hemedes
and that Enrique D. Hemedes had no knowledge of the
registration proceedings initiated by Maxima Hemedes.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes. Both R&B Insurance
and Maxima Hemedes appealed from the trial courts
decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed
decision in toto. Hence, this petition.

encumbrance has been properly annotated upon the said certificate of

title.
The finding of the public respondents that the Deed of Conveyance of
Unregistered Real Property By Reversion executed by Justa Kausapin
in favor of Maxima Hemedes is false and not supported by the factual
findings in this case. It is grounded upon the mere denial of the same
by Justa Kausapin.
A party to a contract cannot just evade compliance with his contractual
obligations by the simple expedient of denying the execution of such
contract. If, after a perfect and binding contract has been executed
between the parties, it occurs to one of them to allege some defect
therein as a reason for annulling it, the alleged defect must be
conclusively proven, since the validity and fulfilment of contracts cannot
be left to the will of one of the contracting parties. In upholding the deed
of conveyance in favor of Maxima Hemedes, the Court must
concomitantly rule that Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee,
Dominium, did not acquire any rights over the subject property.
Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had
earlier transferred to Maxima Hemedes the ownership of the subject
property pursuant to the first condition stipulated in the deed of
donation executed by her husband. Thus, the donation in favor of
Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof
did not exist at the time of the transfer, having already been transferred
to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the subject property by Enrique D.
Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire
more rights than its predecessor-in-interest and is definitely not an
innocent purchaser for value since Enrique D. Hemedes did not
present any certificate of title upon which it relied.

32. Secuya v. Vda.

De Selma

33. NHA v CA,

Bulacan Garden

Before the grant of her application for private sale of Lot

5679, a friar land, the beautiful Maxima Caballero
executed a document entitled "Agreement of Partition,"
wherein she stipulated to transfer one-third (1/3) of the lot
to and accepted by Paciencia Sabellano, her aunt. When
the application was approved, Maxima failed to transfer
the agreed portion to Paciencia who took possession
thereof. Paciencia thereafter sold the same to Dalmacio
Secuya. When Paciencia died, her only heir, Ramon
Sabellano, executed a private document, "Deed of
Confirmation of Sale," confirming the sale between
Paciencia and Dalmacio. The document was, however,
lost. Meanwhile, Maxima sold the entire lot to Silverio Aro,
husband of Cesaria Caballero. Upon Silverio's death, the
lot was transferred to Cesaria from whom respondent
bought the lot. Respondent was assured that petitioners
who were occupying a portion of the land were tenants. A
clean title to the whole lot was transferred to respondent.
Petitioners, heirs of Dalmacio Secuya, filed an action for
quieting of title on the ground that respondent's title is a
cloud on their title as owners and possessors of the
property subject of litigation. They claimed that they had
been occupying the property for forty-seven years though
they did not pay the land taxes. The trial court rendered
judgment against respondent. It was affirmed, on appeal,
by the Court of Appeals.

1. Whether or not the

Agreement is one of
partition
2. Whether or not there
was a repudiation of the
Express Trust

(1) NO. It was an express trust. Trust is the right to the beneficial
enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It is
a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the
property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between
parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is created
by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. An implied trust comes
into being by operation of law. The present Agreement of Partition
involves an express trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o
particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it
being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." That Maxima
Caballero bound herself to give one third of Lot No. 5629 to Paciencia
Sabellona upon the approval of the former's application is clear from
the terms of the Agreement. Likewise, it is evident that Paciencia
acquiesced to the covenant and is thus bound to fulfill her obligation
therein. As a result of the Agreement, Maxima Caballero held the
portion specified therein as belonging to Paciencia Sabellona when
the application was eventually approved and a sale certificate was
issued in her name. Thus, she should have transferred the same to
the latter, but she never did so during her lifetime. Instead, her heirs
sold the entire Lot No. 5679 to Silvestre Aro in 1955.
(2)YES. While no time limit is imposed for the enforcement of rights
under express trusts, prescription may, however, bar a beneficiary's
action for recovery, if a repudiation of the trust is proven by clear and
convincing evidence and made known to the beneficiary. There was a
repudiation of the express trust when the heirs of Maxima Caballero
failed to deliver or transfer the property to Paciencia Sabellona, and
instead sold the same to a third person not privy to the Agreement. In
the memorandum of incumbrances of TCT No. 3087, issued in the
name of Maxima, there was no notation of the Agreement between
her and Paciencia. Equally important, the Agreement was not
registered; thus, it could not bind third persons. Neither was there any
allegation that Silvestre Aro, who purchased the property from
Maxima's heirs, knew of it. Consequently, the subsequent sales
transactions involving the land in dispute and the titles covering it
must be upheld, in the absence of proof that the said transactions
were fraudulent and irregular.

Corp
34 Sps Apostol v
CA, Sps Chua
35 Heirs Torbela v
Sps Rosario,
Banco Fil Savings
36 Communities
Cagayan Inc v Sps
Arsenio, Nanol
37 Galvez, Tam,
Tycoon Properties
v CA
38 Saberon v
Ventanilla
39 Iglesia ni Cristo
v Hrs of Enrique
Santos
40 Republic v
Leyco