A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a

justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so

that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value.
Posted on February 19, 2012by Erineus

Nevertheless, even providing that the petition was not filed prematurely, it must still be
dismissed for having become moot and academic.
In Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The Commission on Elections,[16] the Court defined a
moot and academic case as follows:
With the conduct of the 2010 barangay elections, a supervening event has transpired
that has rendered this case moot and academic and subject to dismissal. This is
because, as stated in Fernandez v. Commission on Elections,[17] whatever judgment is
reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, can no longer be enforced. Mendozas term of office has expired with the
conduct of last years local elections. As such, Special Civil Action No. 08-10, where the
assailed Orders were issued, can no longer prosper. Mendoza no longer has any legal
standing to further pursue the case, rendering the instant petition moot and academic.

Locus Standi
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition
for failure to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that
the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining
any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the
subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its
creation or as a result of its proceedings.[20]
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitionerslegislators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes
usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members.
This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution
and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of
the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez,[21]
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In
such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are

allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on
their prerogatives as legislators.[22]
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to
question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations.[23] It emphasizes
that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be
taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and
disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will
simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in
danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation
of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may
justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over
presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v.
Arroyo[24]explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as
contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the
relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a
citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in
public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was
held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a
citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds,
while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the
New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public
right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of
every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and
punished, and that a public grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers
suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an
action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be
denied.
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any
official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of
governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid

down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed
inTileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must
show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is
not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the
public.
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such
as,Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De
la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter
of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter
is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.[25]
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26] the Court held that in
cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
firstEmergency Powers Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance[28] laid down
inCREBA v. ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court, however,
finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental
and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar,
they should be resolved for the guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are
more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a
promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to
overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but
because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal
controversies with overreaching significance to society.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/december2010/192935.htm
Petitioner, through its three party-list representatives, contends that the issue of the
validity or invalidity of the Agreement carries with it constitutional significance and is of
paramount importance that justifies its standing. Cited in this regard is what is usually
referred to as the emergency powers cases,[12] in which ordinary citizens and taxpayers
were accorded the personality to question the constitutionality of executive issuances.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.[13]

Specifically, it is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result[14] of the act being challenged, and
calls for more than just a generalized grievance.[15] The term interest refers to
material interest, as distinguished from one that is merely incidental.[16] The rationale
for requiring a party who challenges the validity of a law or international agreement to
allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[17]
Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it has been recognized that,
in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, or
voters who actually sue in the public interest.[18] Consequently, in a catena of cases,
[19]this Court has invariably adopted a liberal stance on locus standi.
Going by the petition, petitioners representatives pursue the instant suit primarily as
concerned citizens raising issues of transcendental importance, both for the Republic
and the citizenry as a whole.
When suing as a citizen to question the validity of a law or other government action, a
petitioner needs to meet certain specific requirements before he can be clothed with
standing. Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.[20] expounded on this requirement, thus:
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a
statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or
any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.[21]
In the case at bar, petitioners representatives have complied with the qualifying
conditions or specific requirements exacted under the locus standi rule. As citizens,
their interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal. At the very
least, their assertions questioning the Agreement are made of a public right, i.e., to
ascertain that theAgreement did not go against established national policies, practices,
and obligations bearing on the States obligation to the community of nations.
At any event, the primordial importance to Filipino citizens in general of the issue at
hand impels the Court to brush aside the procedural barrier posed by the traditional
requirement of locus standi, as we have done in a long line of earlier cases, notably in
the old but oft-cited emergency powers cases[22] and Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.

[23] In cases of transcendental importance, we wrote again in Bayan v. Zamora,

[24] The Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even
where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.

A JUSTICIABLE QUESTION calls upon the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
wherein there are rights (property or personal rights) involved which are legally demandable
and enforceable. It is one which is proper to be examined or decided in courts of justice
because its determination would not involve an encroachment upon the legislative or
executive power.
A POLITICAL QUESTION is one which under the Constitution is to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the validity or legality, of a particular measure or a
contested act.

Blog Lecture No. 20: Political Question

Now
Today,

back

to

let

us

What

the

real

world

and

its

discuss

the

doctrine

of

political

is

political

problems...
question.
question?

When faced with a justiciable controversy, the Philippine Supreme Court could dismiss the case because the issue
involves
a
political
question
and
necessarily
begs
off
deciding
it.
In the case of Sanidad vs. Comelec (G.R. L-44640, 12 October 1976), the Philippine Supreme Court had the
occassion to define it as such:
At the threshold, it is necessary to clarify what is a "political question". It must be noted that this device has been
utilized by the judiciary "to avoid determining questions it is ill equipped to determine or that could be settled in any
event only with the effective support of the political branches." According to Weston, judges, whether "personal
representatives of a truly sovereign king, or taking their seats as the creatures of a largely popular sovereignty
speaking through a written constitution, derive their power by a delegation, which clearly or obscurely as the case
may be, delineates and delimits their delegated jurisdiction. . . . Judicial questions . . . are those which the sovereign
has set to be decided in the courts. Political question, similarly, are those which the sovereign has entrusted to the
so-called political departments of government or has reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action."
Reflecting a similar concept, this Court has defined a "political question" as a "matter which is to be exercised by the
people in their primary political capacity or that has been specifically delegated to some other department or
particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act." In other words, it refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government.

What

the

h@%%

does

this

mean?

Just focus on the last sentence. A political questions are those which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or those issues that belong exclusively to the other branches of government.
To the layman, it may be a simple question of politics. It may be a very loose definition but if you want to see it this
way,
so
be
it.
What

could

be

examples

of

these

"political

questions"?

Constitutional amendments, impeachment grounds, legislative wisdom in enacting some law, the choice of a
particular official to fill a post are possible issues which the Supreme Court can beg off deciding because they are
political
questions.
Is

this

doctrine

still

applicable?

Unfortunately (or fortunately, depending on which side you are on) not anymore, with the 1987 Constitution.
With the landmark case of Oposa vs. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993), the Supreme Court has already
said:
It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that: "Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

How

is

this

relevant

now?

(And
this
is
just
an
opinion
only.)
I believe that with the junking of the poltical question doctrine, even the wisdom of all legislative and executive actions
(including the finding of guilt by the Senate in an impeachment case, even the stubborn will of a sitting president to
hold on to power) CAN be reviewed and overturned by the Supreme Court, for as long as a petitioner can show an
actual
controversy.
What

is

justiciable

controversy,

then?

According to the Constitution, it is an actual controversy involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of
jurisdiction
on
the
part
of
any
branch
or
instrumentality
of
the
Government.
Hence, a petitioner has to show either 1) his legally demandable and enforceable right or 2) a grave abuse of
discretion
on
any
government
agency
(including
Congress
or
the
Executive
Branch)
What

does

this

mean?

You can just imagine the immense power the judiciary has. With this all-encompassing jurisdiction, it can easily be
considered as most powerful all the other branches of government. This jurisdiction, coupled with its inherent power
to interpret laws (hence, possibly engage in "judicial legislation"), makes the judiciary mightily powerful, indeed. I
realized
this
early
in
my
law
studies.
It
is
only
now
that
I
put
it
in
writing.
Ok, but what about that case where the substantial propriety of the Estrada Articles of Impeachment was not resolved
or that case where Congress was prepared to defy the Supreme Court's ruling that that Davide impeachment was
unconstitutional?
On the first case, it was Senate (as the impeachment court) not the Supreme Court that denied this move by the
Estrada lawyers to junk the articles of impeachment. Here, the Senate cited courtesy of a co-equal body. This was
not a case of the Supreme Court bowing to Congress. It was a case of the Senate giving courtesy to the House, as a
co-equal
body.
On the second case, the constitutional impasse was resolved when Congress itself junked the impeachment move
against
Chief
Justice
Hilario
Davide.
But
You

with

these
better

"powers,"
ask Atty.

who

will
Alan

check
Paguia that

the

Judicary?
question...

Seriously, though, Supreme Court Justices could be impeached. But then again, the Supreme Court, could
theoretically
review
this
impeachment...
Moreover, it's one thing to have such jurisdiction. It's another thing to actually enforce any decision the Judiciary may
come
up
with...
Oh, well!
transcription by Punzi @ 7:09 PM

In my more than 40 years of being a lawyer, I have never seen a busier Supreme Court than the present
one, more specifically the Supreme Court after the 1987 Constitution. So many controversial issues have
seen their way into the halls of this highest court in the land which in the past should have been initially
resolved by the lower courts. Government contracts and transactions of public interests have been
brought for scrutiny at the first instance before this supposed court of last resort by just about any
individual or juridical entity having doubts as to their factual validity and regularity. The emerging belief,
though erroneous, is that the Supreme Court’s approval is required in government deals or in any
government action; a belief that has engendered the tendency to run to the Supreme Court for all sorts of
grievances or disagreements with certain government decisions. A case in point is the recent filing by two
lawyers of a petition questioning the controversial appointments of two commissioners to the recently
vacated posts in the Comelec.

To be sure, the Supreme Court seems to be "busier" now not because it wants to dip its finger into every
pie. It really has more work to do now because the 1987 Constitution expanded its power of judicial
review not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Section 1,
Article VIII). The new provision clearly "did not just grant the court the power to do nothing". It gave the
court greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent such grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government (Estrada vs. Desierto 353 SCRA 491). But can the
Supreme Court use this expanded power to review the presidential power to appoint, particularly of the
two Comelec commissioners?

Under the "political question" doctrine arising from the principle of separation of powers, the Judicial
Branch cannot decide questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government" (Taada vs. Cuenco 103 Phil.1068). In the matter of
the power of appointment, there is no question that it is executive in nature (Gov’t vs. Springer 50
Phil. 259). It is essentially a discretionary power of the president performed according to "his best lights".
(Luego vs. CSC 143 SCRA 327). The selection of the appointee–taking into account the totality of
his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality – is the prerogative
and a matter addressed solely to the discretion of the appointing authority (Lapinid vs. CSC 197 SCRA
106). Thus both the Luego and Lapinid cases categorically declare that "this is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide".

The 1987 Constitution has indeed limited the scope of the political question doctrine when it expanded the
power of judicial review. Thus in the case of the president’s appointing power, judicial review may
be done if grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has been committed. This
means that the president’s exercise of the discretionary power to appoint according to his best
lights is subject to the condition that the appointee "should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred" (Luego, Supra). If he does not, then the appointment may be questioned as
a grave abuse of discretion.

In the case of the two Comelec Commissioners, there is clearly no grave abuse of discretion, not even
any abuse of discretion. It is unquestionable that the President has the power to appoint them (Sec.1[2]
Art. IX C, Sec. 16, Art. VII). Apparently, nobody has also questioned their qualifications for the position
fixed by the Constitution (Sec.1[1] Art. IX C). Questions have been raised only as to their character and
personality and their alleged partisan inclinations which have nothing to do with the minimum qualification
requirements for the position. The Supreme Court should therefore junk the petition for it merely raises
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of their appointment. The wisdom or folly of their
appointment, or any appointment for that matter, is the sole responsibility of the President to the
sovereign people. This is purely a political question.

Ripeness

The mandate contained in Article III of the Constitution that requires an appellate court to consider wheth
er a case has matured into acontroversy worthy of adjudication before it can hear the case.
An actual, current controversy worthy of adjudication must exist before a federal court may hear a case. T
he court determines if acontroversy between parties with adverse legal interests is of sufficient immediacy
and reality to warrant judicial intervention (Lake Carriers'Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 92 S. Ct. 174
9, 32 L. Ed. 2d 257 [1972]).
The rationale behind the ripeness limitation is to prevent the courts from entering a controversy before it h
as solidified or before otheravailable remedies have been exhausted. In disputes involving regulations or
decisions promulgated by administrative agencies, acontroversy is not considered ripe until the agency's
decision has been formalized and the challenging parties have felt its effects. Similarly,if a state court rem
edy is available, a controversy is not ripe for federal court review until all state court remedies have been
exhausted.

The courts generally apply a two-part test to determine if a controversy is ripe for judicial intervention. The
first criterion is whether thecontroversy is fit for judicial decision, that is, whether it presents a Question
of Law rather than a Question of
Fact. Secondly, the courtsdetermine the impact on the parties of withholding judicial consideration. In Abb
ott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967), the Supreme Court ex
amined whether a regulation that required drug manufacturers to use labels showing both thegeneric and
the proprietary drug names was ripe for review before it was actually enforced. The Court held that the co
ntroversy was ripebecause the regulation had an immediate and expensive impact on the plaintiffs' dayto-day operations and the plaintiffs risked a substantialsanction if they did not comply with the regulation.
Ripeness is a major consideration when parties seek injunctive or declarative relief before a statute or reg
ulation has been applied. Courts arereluctant to enter an abstract disagreement over administrative polici
es (Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 104 S. Ct. 2862, 81 L. Ed.2d 815 [1984]). However, in some
cases, the courts will hear a request for an Injunction or Declaratory
Judgment if the question presentedis entirely or substantially legal and if postponing a decision until after
a statute or regulation is applied would work a substantial hardship onthe challenging party (Pacific Gas a
nd Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 103
S. Ct. 1713, 75 L. Ed. 2d 752 [1983]).
Investigations conducted by SSS do not violate a persons right to privacy
The power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is
otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the
nature of the office involved

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the

Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
requisites are present
Posted on March 3, 2012by Erineus

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of
an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on
the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is
made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case.[30]
Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents
appointments in light of E.O. No. 2 and the subsequent filing before the Court of several
petitions questioning this Executive Order. The parties, however, appear to have
overlooked the basic principle in constitutional adjudication that enjoins the Court from
passing upon a constitutional question, although properly presented, if the case can be
disposed of on some other ground.[31] In constitutional law terms, this means that we
ought to refrain from resolving any constitutional issue unless the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.
Lis mota literally means the cause of the suit or action. This last requisite of judicial
review is simply an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and
legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government. Ultimately, it is rooted in
the principle of separation of powers. Given the presumed validity of an executive act,
the petitioner who claims otherwise has the burden of showing first that the case cannot
be resolved unless the constitutional question he raised is determined by the Court.[32]

In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents appointments is not the lis
mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of
whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present
petition a quo warranto against respondent Urro. If the petitioner fails to establish
his cause of action for quo warranto, a discussion of the constitutionality of the
appointments of the respondents is rendered completely unnecessary. The inclusion of
the grounds forcertiorari and/or prohibition does not alter the essential character of the
petitioners action since he does not even allege that he has a personal and substantial
interest in raising the constitutional issue insofar as the other respondents are
concerned.