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[A.M. No. RTJ-02-1708.

July 23, 2002]


CYNTHIA RESNGIT-MARQUEZ, SHIELAH J. RAMOS, ROSALINDA L. ROQUILLAS and VICKY F.
RAMOS, complainants, vs. JUDGE VICTOR T. LLAMAS, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch
56, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, respondent.
DECISION

would harass them. He loved drinking Carlsberg beer as he claims that it made him feel his young urges
again.
When complainants husband was in Saudi Arabia, respondent Judge would insinuate that it was better for
her to have an old car she could use everyday rather than a new car that she could not use. Aside from the
drinking, respondent Judge would also engage in singing and dancing in the courtroom even during office
hours. The complainant identified the pictures (Exhibits D, E, F and G) showing the recreation area
behind the Justice Hall and the corridor leading to the courtroom where respondent Judge conducted his
drinking sessions.

PER CURIAM:
A magistrate has to live by the example of his precepts. He cannot judge the conduct of others when
his own needs judgment. It should not be do as I say and not what I do. For then the court over which he is
called to preside will be a mockery, one devoid of respect. [1]
We are called upon to reiterate this dictum in the administrative matter before us.
In an affidavit-complaint[2] dated March 27, 1998, complainants court employees Cynthia ResngitMarquez, Shielah J. Ramos, Rosalinda L. Roquillas and Vicky F. Ramos charged respondent Victor T. Llamas,
Jr., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, with immorality and
gross misconduct. They alleged that respondent judge, though married, maintains an illicit relationship with a
married woman, Lourdes Muoz-Garcia, and both are living together as husband and wife under one roof; that
the court sala of respondent Judge, as well as the office of his personnel, have been utilized as dancing halls
and drinking wine rooms on office hours; that respondent Judge is drunk almost everyday; that respondent
Judge is living a highly immoral and disgraceful life, and this is of open and public knowledge, and his mistress
fondly calls him Daddy, thereby trumpeting their affair in open view; that the complainant have been
subjected to the intimidation and harassment by respondent Judge.
In his Answer[3], dated July 30, 1998, respondent Judge emphatically denied the accusations against
him.
In a Resolution dated June 16, 1999, the affidavit-complaint was referred to Associate Justice Romeo
A. Brawner of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
Justice Brawner, after conducting the necessary investigation, submitted his Report and
Recommendation dated September 14, 2001. Lengthy hearings were conducted on the case. Complainants
Cynthia Resngit Marquez and Shielah J. Ramos and their witnesses Angelito Dixon Dispo, Engr. Librado C.
Moises, Manuel Marquez, Atty. Leopoldo C. Tulagan, Sr., Atty. Omega Lacandola Moises and Mario Resultan
testified in support of the complaint. On the other hand, respondent Judge himself testified as well as Lourdes
Garcia, Angelica Muoz, Joseph Muoz, Gaudencio Sabangan, Benigno Abalos, Jr., Dolores Daligdig, Maura
Doctolera, Andrew Mapanao and Rica Cabaccan.
We reproduce the following findings of fact and conclusions of the Investigating Justice:
Complainant Cynthia Resngit-Marquez is the Court Interpreter of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos
City, Pangasinan, Branch 57 until she requested for a transfer sometime in 1994. The presiding judge of
Branch 56 at the time she was the Interpreter was respondent Judge. During that time, respondent Judge
already had a drinking habit that started sometime in 1991.
In February 1997, after his assignment in Dagupan City respondent Judge went back to San Carlos City. In
March 1997, she saw respondent Judge again resume his drinking habits and he was always seen with a
glass of wine in his hands roaming the Justice Hall premises even during office hours. He usually drank with
lawyers and litigants and he would force his staff to drink with them. Should his staff refuse to join him, he

After respondent Judges return to San Carlos City, complainant saw Lourdes Muoz Garcia almost everyday,
as respondent Judge would drop her at her place of work at City Hall every morning. Lourdes Muoz Garcia
would usually appear again every lunchtime to join respondent Judge and would come back again in the
afternoon after office hours and they would leave walking side by side with their arms sometimes touching
each other. During the occasions that Lourdes Muoz Garcia was in the office of respondent Judge, she would
address him as Daddy or Masiken (Pangasinense for old man).
All the time that respondent Judge had been assigned in San Carlos City, he resided near the cemetery in
Karaengan, San Carlos City then near the school in Bulingit, San Carlos City and after his stint in Dagupan
City, he stayed at Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan. In all these places, respondent Judge lived with Lourdes
Muoz Garcia.
During her cross-examination, she admitted that a previous case was filed against respondent Judge
charging him for the same offenses as this present case. Although she states that she had nothing to do with
the case it appears that the Motion to Dismiss said case (Exhibit 14) was signed by her and her father, which
motion paved the way for the dismissal of Administrative Matter No. 95-3-88 (Exhibit 15).
Angelito Dixon Dispo is employed as Clerk III in the Office of the Clerk of the Regional Trial Court in San
Carlos City, Pangasinan since October 3, 1993. Almost everyday, part of his duties included buying liquor for
respondent Judge at the nearby grocery that the judge and some lawyers partook of in the courtroom. Aside
from his drinking, there was singing with the use of the sing-along machine in the courtroom of RTC Branch 56
where the respondent Judge was presiding. Some private practitioners and prosecutors would join in the
merrymaking that happened as often as thrice a week in the courtroom of respondent Judge. During these
times, the noise emanating from his courtroom could be heard downstairs.
At that time, respondent Judge was residing at Barangay Kariinan, San Carlos City. There was a time that the
house of respondent Judge was flooded and Angelito Dispo was ordered to go there to pile sandbags. At
respondent Judges residence, he came upon Lourdes Muoz Garcia attired in shorts and undershirt (sando)
supervising the piling of sandbags.
On December 1, 1994, he was again at the house of respondent Judge butchering a goat in preparation for
the birthday celebration of Lourdes Muoz Garcia the following day. That afternoon, while he was washing the
dishes, respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz Garcia were embracing and kissing each other on the lips.
It was March 28, 1995 or a day before respondent Judges birthday party that found Angelito Dispo again at
his (Judge) residence where he was helping in the preparations for the birthday celebration. Again, Lourdes
Muoz Garcia was present and again she was attired in her shorts and undershirt without anything beneath
her shirt. He noticed that the respondent Judge and this woman were very sweet with one another.
He would always see Lourdes Muoz Garcia in the office of respondent Judge at RTC Branch 56 almost four
times every week and they would intimately refer to each other as Daddy and Mommy.
At the time he testified in this investigation on September 14, 1999, Angelito Dispo stated that respondent
Judge lives in Barangay Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan with Lourdes Muoz Garcia and the latters daughter.

On September 3, 1999, respondent Judge went to Angelito Dispos house and told him not to testify against
him (Judge) in this case. Angelito had this incident recorded in the police blotter (Exhibit B).
Engr. Librado C. Moises took up the tale and testified that sometime in December 1997, he went to the
house of respondent Judge in Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan to attend a party held there in honor of some
sisters of respondent Judge who had just arrived from the United States. He was with some court personnel
as Clerk of Court Atty. Omega Lacandola Moises is his wife. At the party, it was Lourdes Muoz Garcia, attired
in a housedress, who was attending to their needs and serving as hostess for respondent Judge. When they
left, Lourdes Muoz Garcia stayed behind.
Manuel Marquez testified that while he was in the employ of the Central Pangasinan Electric Company from
1995 to 1998, he would often visit his wife, complainant Cynthia Marquez, in the court where she was working
and he would see respondent Judge singing and dancing with some of his female staff as early as 3:00 or
4:00 oclock in the afternoon for as many as 4 times a month. Pointing to the picture marked Exhibit A and
Exhibit 1, he described that the benches were moved towards the table of the Presiding Judge in the
courtroom thus creating more space for their dancing.
As stenographer of RTC Branch 57 in San Carlos City, complainant Shielah Ramos stated that she has
known respondent Judge since 1989 when she first entered the courts employ. Since 1996 she has seen
respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz Garcia together both in the old building housing the courtrooms as well
as in the new Justice Hall. She would see them eat their meals together at lunchtime and go home together
after office hours. During the singing and dancing sessions conducted by respondent Judge in the courtrooms
almost everyday and during special occasions, Lourdes Garcia would always be with respondent Judge.
Sometime in January 1998, she saw them together at respondent Judges rented house in Gabon, Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Respondent Judge was with his dog while Lourdes Garcia was dusting his car. Confronted with
pictures of the rented house, the two cars and the dog (Exhibits 3-A to 3-C), Shielah Ramos pointed to the
new car as the one being dusted by Lourdes Garcia when she happened to pass by.
Atty. Leopoldo C. Tulagan, Sr. took the witness stand and manifested that as law practitioner with an office
in San Carlos City, he knows respondent Judge ever since he came to preside over RTC Branch 56.
Sometime in 1995, there was what he called a happy hour every Thursday in the courtroom of respondent
Judge. Proceedings would be suspended and all lawyers then appearing would be invited to a drinking spree
right in the courtroom. The lawyers would contribute to buy wine and finger food. There would be singing with
even the court personnel participating. This practice stopped when respondent Judge was transferred to
Dagupan City. However, when he returned to San Carlos City in 1997, the drinking and singing sessions
resumed. This time there was even dancing and these all happened sometimes once or twice a week.
On one birthday occasion of respondent Judge, a Vice-Governor Llamas of Tarlac was present. Two ladies
were requested to give a number and they were both introduced as Mrs. Llamas and Mrs. Llamas, one of
them was the lady companion of Vice-Governor Llamas and the other was Lourdes Garcia.
When respondent Judge went back to San Carlos City in 1997, Atty. Tulagan often saw Lourdes Garcia going
to his courtroom for as many as five or six times a week. Further, on several occasions, he saw them together
in respondent Judges car as the Judge would bring her to City Hall where she was employed and fetch her
again in the afternoon.
In an earlier case filed by Atty. Antonio Resngit and complainant Cynthia Marquez, Atty. Tulagan executed an
affidavit (Exhibit C) before the National Bureau of Investigation supporting the allegations of the
complainants.
Atty. Omega Lacandola Moises, another witness for the complainants testified that sometime in November
1993, Lourdes Muoz Garcia fetched her and together they went to respondent Judges house in Karaenan,
San Carlos City. Again, during an office day in May 1994, she went to respondent Judges rented house as
there was a celebration of some sort and that was where she had lunch. Respondent Judge had just arrived
from the United States and Lourdes Muoz Garcia who was also there gave her pasalubong.

On December 2, 1994, she again went to respondent Judges house and had lunch there, as it was the
birthday celebration of Lourdes Muoz Garcia. Present during the occasion were the relatives of Lourdes
Garcia as well as her officemates and wife of former San Carlos City Mayor Douglas Soriano. Sometime in
June 1997, she, her husband and her brother went to respondent Judges house in Gabon, Calasiao as the
latter had just arrived from another trip to the United States and Lourdes Muoz Garcia was again at the
house.
In December 1997, she was invited to respondent Judges house, as it was the birthday celebration of
Lourdes Muoz Garcia as well as a welcome for respondent Judges brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces
who had just arrived from the United States for a visit. As they arrived early, Lourdes Muoz Garcia was still in
her housedress but she eventually changed into something suitable for the occasion. Pictures (Exhibits N
and O also Exhibits 18 and 19) of the persons present at the occasion were presented to her and she
identified them.
Another birthday party for Lourdes Muoz Garcia took place in an apartment rented by respondent Judge and
Lourdes Garcia in Bonoan, Dagupan City. Atty. Moises together with Atty. Geraldine Baniqued and Geraldines
husband were in attendance but as it was a workday, they only stayed long enough to finish their lunch.
On the occasion of respondent Judges birthday on March 29, Lourdes Muoz Garcia fetched her at
lunchtime and brought her to that same rented apartment in Bonoan. She soon left after lunch but she went
back alone, Lourdes remaining behind to attend to the guests of respondent Judge.
Mario Resultan testified that as sheriff of RTC Branch 56 at San Carlos City presided by respondent Judge,
he is aware and knows that Judge Llamas and Lourdes Garcia have been living together as husband and wife
since 1990 up to the present. They first stayed at Valerio Hall, Mabini Street then they transferred to Balingit
Street, followed by Kareanan Street, all in San Carlos City. They also stayed together in Calasiao, Pangasinan
and Dagupan City.
In all these places of residence, Mario Resultan was usually invited by respondent Judge and they would
drink and sing. During these sessions, Lourdes Garcia would always attend to their needs, sometimes in her
street clothes but oftentimes in her house clothes.
On February 19, 1994, Mario Resultan went along with respondent Judge to Manila to confirm his flight as
Judge Llamas was leaving for the United States the following day. With them on this trip were Lourdes Garcia
and respondent Judges sister, Evelyn Llamas. They spent the night in the house of the brother of respondent
Judges sister-in-law. He slept in the living room while respondent Judge and Lourdes Garcia shared one
room.
As he would be out of the country, respondent Judge executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Mario
Resultan authorizing him to receive all his checks covering his salaries and allowances, encashing these and
delivering the money to Lourdes Garcia. He did what was asked of him and each time he would deliver the
money to Lourdes Garcia, he would indicate the dates and the amounts in his diary (Exhibit P).
Against all these evidence, respondent Judge denies the charge.
Judge Llamas claims that complainant Cynthia Resngit Marquez has an ax to grind against him for objecting
to her application as Legal Researcher of his court, RTC Branch 56, and instead endorsing Aldrin Lee who
was eventually appointed to the position. Because he did not accede to her request, complainant and his
father filed several charges against him ranging from immorality to harassment of court employees to highhandedness and arrogance. However, these cases were eventually dismissed by the Supreme Court (Exhibit
15) on motion of complainant Cynthia Marquez and her father, Atty. Antonio Resngit (Exhibit 14). But the
trouble between respondent Judge and complainant did not stop there as could be seen in several cases filed
by complainant against him before the Office of the Ombudsman. These cases were again dismissed (Exhibit
20-A). He therefore considers this present charge as another form of harassment employed by complainant
in her avid desire to oust him from his present position.

Further, he denies ever drinking and dancing in his courtroom as he claims there are several restaurants
outside the office equipped with the necessary facilities for his pleasure. Besides if ever he drinks with a
visitor, it was part of his hospitable nature and it was always done after office hours.

stayed at their house and never lived with respondent Judge. She claims that her daughter is married to a
soldier but admits that her son-in-law does not stay with his family as in fact she has not seen him for a long
time now.

As to the charge of immorality, he emphatically denied that he has an amorous relationship with Lourdes
Garcia. He is a married man and his family lives in Dagupan City. However, he is estranged from his wife due
to irreconcilable differences in the rearing of their children. This does not mean however that he maintains an
illicit relationship with Lourdes Garcia. He does admit that he knows the woman as she is an employee at the
City Legal Office and it is her responsibility to look into the status of cases filed by San Carlos City pending in
the courts.

Amidst all these conflicting testimonies given by all those who took part in these very lengthy proceedings, it
behooves upon the Investigating Justice to determine whether or not the complainants have been able to
prove their charges against respondent Judge.

Respondent Judge claims that all the testimonies of the complainants and their witnesses in so far as they
saw him and Lourdes Garcia always together on several occasions, either walking side by side or riding in his
car together or him dropping and fetching her at her place of work are all impossible and figments of their
fertile imagination. They did not live together in all the places mentioned and definitely he would not be
celebrating Lourdes Garcias birthdays for her in his own residence. If ever he was seen in the company of the
woman, it was on social occasions when they would either be guests or she was a guest at a party he tenders.
His emphatic denial is supported by his witnesses, Lourdes Garcia, Angelica Muoz, Joseph Muoz,
Gaudencio Sabangan, Benigno Abalos, Jr., Dolores Daligdig, Maura Doctolera, Andrew Mapanao and Rica
Cabaccan.

Respondent Judge is charged with Immorality and Gross Misconduct. According to the complainants and their
witnesses, his misconduct consists in his drinking, singing and dancing with lawyers and court personnel in his
courtroom during office hours almost everyday.
The Investigating Justice believes that indeed respondent Judge used his court to indulge his drinking,
singing and dancing habits to the detriment of the other courts within the building who were disturbed by all the
noise coming from his courtroom. This conduct unbecoming of a Judge deserves a reprimand but this
administrative misdemeanor may be relegated to the background in the face of the more serious charge of
Immorality.

Lourdes Garcia states that she first knew respondent Judge when she was detailed at the City Prosecutors
Office and it was her responsibility to get the court calendars for the guidance of the Court Prosecutors.

The complainants and their witnesses all gave positive testimonies of how respondent Judge flaunted his
mistress in the eyes of the public. Bringing and picking her up from work, dancing and singing with her in
public, living with her in different places, celebrating her birthdays with parties in her honor, authorizing her to
receive his salaries and being seen around with her and behaving as if they were husband and wife are all
manifestations of how respondent Judge acted towards Lourdes Garcia as seen in the eyes of the
complainants and their witnesses.

It was Gaudencio Sabangan who introduced respondent Judge to her formally on November 30, 1990 during
the occasion of the birthday of Normida Sabangan, Lourdess niece and Gaudencio Sabangans
granddaughter. They were both guests at the party and from then on whenever they would see each other
they would engage in casual conversations.

What more proof would one need to show an immoral relationship other than these straightforward
statements of the complainants and their witnesses? Both respondent Judge and Lourdes Garcia admit being
married to other persons but the way they behaved in front of the public is as if they were married to one
another.

Aside from this, it was respondent Judge who helped her get her permanent appointment as Administrative
Officer in the City Legal Office at San Carlos City. Respondent Judge being close with then Mayor Soriano, he
paved the way for her being detailed at that office where she was given a permanent position.

Against these positive testimonies is respondent Judges denial. But it is axiomatic in the law of evidence that
positive statements prevail over negative statements.

In 1993 respondent Judge asked her whether she could recommend somebody to do his laundry. She
volunteered her mother and thus the relationship between her family and respondent Judge became closer.
When her mother became sick and could not do the laundry anymore, her younger sister and brother stayed
with respondent Judge and did the household chores for him in exchange for allowances and tuition fee.
Lourdes Garcia further stated that she is a married woman who has stayed all her life in Barangay Roxas,
San Carlos City except for that year in 1982 when she went to live in Victoria, Tarlac, her husbands place but
when she was about to give birth, she went back to San Carlos City and has remained there. She absolutely
denies living with respondent Judge and states that the only time she went to respondent Judges place was
when she tagged along with her superior to attend the party given by the Judge in honor of his nephews and
nieces who arrived from the United States.
As for her presence at the Justice Hall, she admits going there but her visits are all in connection with her
work and since she has a lot of friends there, she drops on them for a chat before going back to the City Hall
where she has her office.
She states that she was likewise charged with immorality at the Civil Service Commission in May 1998 but
the case was dismissed in April 1999.
Her mother Angelica Muoz confirms her story and states that she did the laundry of respondent Judge but
subsequently turned it over to her younger daughter. Also, she says that indeed her daughter Lourdes always

A look at the denials of respondent Judge and his witnesses remain denials. Although they would attempt to
explain that the presence of respondent Judge and Lourdes Garcia together on several occasions were due to
circumstances or plain coincidences, it would appear to the Investigating Justice that these coincidences are
one too many.
In his Memorandum, respondent Judge questions the motives of the complainants and their witnesses stating
that all of them had something against him and would lie through their teeth just to oust him out of his position.
Respondent Judge claims that the testimony of Atty. Omega Moises Lacandola is biased and fraught with
exaggerations and distortions. He traces Atty. Lacandolas prejudice against him to the fact that she was
getting back at him for his act of filing an administrative case against Judge Bienvenido R. Estrada.
Judge Estrada was her Presiding Judge when she was a Branch Clerk of Court. Now that Atty. Lacandola is
the Clerk of Court, Judge Estrada is the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in San Carlos City.
Respondent Judge claims that as Judge Estrada and Atty. Lacandola have a very close working relationship,
the latter would go to all lengths to destroy him (respondent Judge) including fabricating stories against him
just because he filed an administrative case against Judge Estrada.

This theory is too far-fetched to be believed. First, the case filed by respondent Judge against Judge Estrada
came after this case had already been filed. If at all, it appears that respondent Judge in filing the case against
Judge Estrada after this case was filed was the one who was trying to even the score between him and the
latter.

Respondent Judge readily concludes the motives of complainants and their witnesses as suspect. But could
not their motives also be the desire to tell the truth? Much as respondent Judge would like to portray them all
as pathological liars, their lies border more on the truth and appear to be more convincing than respondent
Judges bare-faced denials.

Second, the testimony of Atty. Lacandola does not appear to be improbable or impossible despite what
respondent Judge believes. She testified on what she saw and observed and she may have been hostile and
stubborn at times but this does not mean that she was making up a story.

As the Investigating Justice heard this case personally from the beginning to its conclusion, he has observed
the demeanor of all those who swore to tell the truth and nothing but the whole truth. And while this oath may
have appeared to be meaningless for some, it was clearly noticeable that the complainants and their
witnesses were the ones who valued its meaning and honored their oath to tell the truth.

As far as the testimony of complainant Cynthia Marquez is concerned, respondent Judge in his Memorandum
claims that it was polluted by hate, desire for revenge, and for personal gain.
It appears that respondent Judge filed an administrative case against her for dishonesty and falsification of
daily time record in 1994 but he himself had it dismissed in 1995. Not only that.
Respondent Judge did not indorse Cynthia Marquez for the position of Legal Researcher of his court and
instead recommended somebody else. Her displeasure at respondent Judges actions and her desire to get
back at him motivated Cynthia Marquez to weave an incredible story against him.
But respondent Judges conclusion seems to be illogical. Since respondent Judge himself had the case
dismissed, why would Cynthia Marquez still be bent on getting back at him?
In fact, it is respondent Judge himself who got back at Cynthia Marquez by filing another administrative case
against her while this case was being heard. That case stemmed from the earlier case and this time
respondent Judge was charging Cynthia Marquez with falsification of her personal data sheet and procuring
her appointment as Interpreter under false pretenses.
As far as her non-endorsement is concerned, the Investigating Justice believes that this is not sufficient
ground to doubt the testimony of Cynthia Marquez. She gave her story replete with details and events that
showed the immoral acts of respondent Judge. If her testimony were contrived, she would be one great
storyteller.
Respondent Judge also states in his Memorandum that the reason why Atty. Leopoldo C. Tulagan testified
against him is because said lawyer wanted his pound of flesh as he lost several cases in respondent Judges
court. This is incredible. Following this reasoning we will come to the conclusion that all lawyers who lost their
cases before judges would readily testify against them at the expense of committing perjury. The Supreme
Court would be clogged with administrative cases against judges filed by lawyers who take offense for the
defeat of their cases.
All told, respondent Judge attacks all the testimonies of the complainants and their witnesses as improbable
and motivated by ill will and desire for revenge. He states that they could not have seen what they claim to
have seen because it was impossible to see through a closed window, the parking spaces for jeeps was not
located at a place where the Justice Hall or the City Hall could be seen, or that goats are not butchered nor
fishes cleaned a day before cooking.
But if we look closely at what respondent Judge calls impossible stories, these are minor, even
inconsequential details that do not detract from the truth of what the complainants and their witnesses saw and
testified on.
Not contented with accusing complainants and their witnesses as telling improbable stories, respondent
Judge states that all of them were prejudiced against him as they all had their respective reasons for wanting
to get back at him. This encompassing conclusion is more imagined than real. Respondent Judge would like to
portray that he is the victim of an elaborate plot concocted by the complainants to get him out of office. But
using as defense this delusion of persecution is not enough to overthrow the persuasive and convincing
evidence mounted against respondent Judge.

From the evidence presented, there can be no denying that indeed respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz
Garcia are maintaining an illicit relationship. The details of such relationship are clearly and unequivocally
outlined by the complainants and their witnesses, who have nothing to gain by pitting themselves against a
powerful figure.
Moreover, Lourdes Garcia admitted herself that she owes her present position to respondent Judge who
helped her secure a permanent appointment at the City Legal Office in San Carlos City. Why would
respondent Judge do that for her if according to both of them they were merely casual acquaintances? What
motive would respondent Judge have in helping her get that position were it not for the fact that they had an
intimate relationship?
Admitting that he is estranged from his wife, respondent Judge himself has made possible the circumstances
that could have led to his present situation. He may be a judge but he is still a man with the same feelings and
urges as any other man. Lourdes Garcia is a married woman who appears to be also estranged from her
husband as nowhere in her testimony can be seen what happened to her husband except for the testimony of
her own mother who stated that she never saw her son-in-law for a long time now.
Hence, we have here a man and a woman both living away from their respective spouses and being thrown
together has brought out in them the fulfillment of their desires not to be alone. True it may be human nature to
feel needed and not be alone but in this case the man happens to be a Judge.
A judge is expected to be above himself, to transcend basic human urges if it is in conflict with the
responsibility he swore to uphold when he took his oath.
xxx xxx

xxx

In his Memorandum, respondent Judge states that he has been previously charged with Immorality by
complainant Cynthia Marquez but she herself had it dismissed. Also, Lourdes Muoz Garcia had already been
charged with immorality before the Civil Service Commission in 1998 but the charges were dismissed in 1999.
Citing the case of Felicisimo San Luis, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80160, June 26, 1989,
respondent Judge now claims that the dismissal of the first case against him operated as a bar to this instant
case because of res judicata and that he would be twice in jeopardy of being convicted of the same offense.
The case cited by respondent Judge finds no application to his case. The fact that the previous charges were
dismissed against both him and Lourdes Garcia should not be taken to mean that they have been exonerated
entirely. Immorality is a continuing offense and the first charge should have at least warned him to mend his
ways. But he failed to do so and now that there is another charge he labels it an act of persecution. Further,
the complainants and their witnesses testified on acts of immorality of respondent Judge from 1991 until this
present charge was filed in 1998. Angelito Dispo even went to the extent of stating that at the time he testified
in this case on September 14, 1999, respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz Garcia were living together under
one roof in Barangay Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Thus, granting that there was a previous charge of immorality in 1994 but was dismissed in 1995, this
dismissal would only operate to absolve him of immoral acts until 1995. As this case was filed in 1998, it
shows that despite the dismissal in 1995, respondent Judge continued his illicit relations with Lourdes Muoz
Garcia for which he faces this present charge of Immorality.

xxx xxx

xxx

Respondent Judge has shown that he is not worthy to don the robe of justice much less dispense justice
when he himself transgresses the law which he has sworn to uphold. His blanket denial of the charges has not
served to cause a dent in the positive evidence against him, neither has it portrayed him an innocent victim of
malicious persecution, as he would want the Investigating Justice to believe.
As the evidence presented definitely shows a lack of circumspection and delicadeza on the part of the
respondent judge in displaying before the public his immoral relationship, the extreme penalty of dismissal is
believed to be in order.
Immorality is a very serious charge that cannot be penalized by a mere fine or even suspension, as these
light penalties would be tantamount to a tacit approval of the immoral act.
xxx xxx

xxx

Respondent Judge has failed to live up to these exacting magnitude of how a judge should behave. His
disregard for common decency and morality has made him unfit to discharge his present position and thus his
dismissal is in order. His retirement benefits should likewise be forfeited but his wife who has never appeared
on the scene should now be his saving grace against such forfeiture.
Indeed it is the wife of Judge Llamas who is the aggrieved party in the infidelity of her husband but she was
not the one who initiated this complaint nor did she participate in its prosecution. This factor should be
considered in respondent Judges favor and therefore he should be spared the forfeiture of his earned
benefits.[4] [emphasis supplied]
Justice Brawner thus recommended that respondent Judge be dismissed from service but without
forfeiture of his earned benefits.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. We find no room to
accommodate doubts on Justice Brawners findings of facts, which we find to be a result of a meticulous and
dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainants and the respondent as well as their respective
witnesses. Thus, we adopt Justice Brawners recommendation of dismissal.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence.[5] He should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary,[6] and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. [7] His
personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be
beyond reproach, for he is, as he so aptly is perceived to be, the visible personification of law and of justice. [8]
Regrettably, respondent Judge failed to live up to these standards. He brazenly flouted judicial ethics
and betrayed judicial standards by using his court to indulge his drinking, singing and dancing habits to the
detriment of the other courts within the building who were disturbed by all the noise coming from his
courtroom; and, especially, by maintaining an illicit relationship with Lourdes Muoz Garcia, a married
woman. A judge suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public office when he
labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same time have a mistress in defiance of the
mores and sense of morality of the community.[9]
A judge traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for
occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. [10] No position is more
demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench.
[11]
Thus, a judge ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness. Certainly,
keeping a mistress is not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to posses the highest standard
of morality and decency.[12]

Respondent Judge shamelessly mocked the dignity of his office and tainted the image of the entire
judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at all time unsullied and worthy of the peoples
trust. Respondent Judge has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe and the place of honor reserved for
the guardian of justice in a civilized community. On this occasion, therefore, the Court metes upon respondent
Judge the severest of administrative penalties. He is hereby stripped of his judicial robe.
However, we are unable to agree with the reservation of Justice Brawner on the forfeiture of earned
benefits due respondent Judge based on the fact that respondent Judges wife was not the one who initiated
this complaint nor did she participate in its prosecution. The non-participation or non-appearance of the wife in
the administrative proceedings for immorality is not a factor in the imposition of penalty. Neither should it be
beneficial to respondent Judge.
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of
Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross misconduct and immorality are classified as
serious charges, each of which carry with it a penalty of either (a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or
part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (b) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.
In Carina Agarao vs. Judge Jose J. Parentela, Jr., [13] we dismissed respondent judge on ground of
immorality and we ordered the forfeiture of one-half of all the retirement benefits of respondent Judge,
excluding the monthly equivalent of his accrued leave credits.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Victor T. Llamas, Jr. guilty of the charge of immorality, he is
hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of 50% of all his retirement benefits excluding any earned
leave credits; and, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1224. December 12, 2002]
P/SINSP. OMEGA JIREH D. FIDEL, complainant, vs. JUDGE FELIX A. CARAOS, Municipal Trial Court,
Candelaria, Quezon, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
An Affidavit-Complaint[1] was filed by P/SInsp. Omega Jireh D. Fidel, Chief of Police of Candelaria,
Quezon, charging Judge Felix A. Caraos of the Municipal Trial Court of Candelaria, Quezon with Grave Abuse
of Authority, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.
Complainant avers that at 10:45 in the evening of February 29, 1996, respondent judge, who was
heavily drunk, went to the Municipal Police Station of Candelaria and attempted to forcibly release one
Natividad Braza from detention without any preliminary investigation or written order for the latters release.
Natividad Braza was charged before the MTC of Candelaria, Quezon with violation of Article 151 of the
Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. 4878. While at the police station, respondent judge shouted
invectives at the policemen on duty, PUTANG INA NINYONG MGA PULIS KAYO, NASAAN SI HEPE? HOY,
ILABAS NINYO ITO NGAYON DIN, PUTANG INA NINYONG MGA PULIS. SINONG MASUSUNOD DITO,
MAYOR, PULIS, O JUDGE?

To support the allegation, complainant submitted the joint-affidavit [2] of the policemen on duty and the
affidavits of two detention prisoners who witnessed the incident.
In his Comment,[3] respondent judge narrated that on February 29, 1996, at 5:30 in the afternoon, while
he was watching his friends play lawn tennis at Tiaong, Quezon, a group of seven market vendors approached
him. The market vendors pleaded with him to order the temporary release of a certain Natividad Braza, also a
market vendor.
Respondent judge averred that after reading the complaint against Braza and finding that the case was
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, he acceded to their plea. He tried to get in touch with the Chief
of Police of Candelaria, Quezon by telephone but to no avail. He then tried to contact the Candelaria Public
Market Police Detachment and was able to talk to a certain Police Officer Limbo. Respondent judge asked
Officer Limbo to convey his message to the municipal jail warden for the temporary release of Braza pending
the preliminary examination of the latters case scheduled the following day.
Respondent judge further narrated that at around 10:00 that evening, his wife woke him up and told him
that there were two men outside their house. Seeing that they were among the vendors who approached him
earlier at the tennis court, he let them in. The two men complained that Braza was not allowed to be released
and that the jailer told them, walang puedeng magpalabas nito kundi si Mayor.
Respondent judge disclosed that after he failed to get in touch with the Candelaria Chief of Police
through telephone, he decided to proceed to the police station in Candelaria, Quezon that same
evening. When he arrived there, he noticed that a telephone was located beside the policemen who were
then busy watching television and who did not even pay attention to him. Respondent judge admitted that this
irritated him, considering that earlier the policemen failed to answer his telephone call, so he uttered the
words: Bakit hindi ninyo sinasagot and telepono? Putangina! Kailangan pa ba nating dagdagan yan? O alisin
na dahil walang silbi, putangina! Paano na kung may emergency? O sunog? Nasaan na si Hepe? When he
was told that the Chief of Police was out, he again asked: Bakit ayaw ninyong palabasin si Braza? At bakit
wala daw puwedeng magpalabas sa kanya? Eventually, respondent judge was able to facilitate the release
of detention prisoner Braza.
This case was referred to Executive Judge Ricardo O. Rosales, Jr., RTC, Lucena City, for investigation,
report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records. [4]
After due investigation, Judge Rosales found no evidence to support complainants claim that
respondent judge was intoxicated when he arrived at the Candelaria Police Station. The mere appearance of
respondent judges hair in disarray and reddish eyes is inadequate to prove the claim since, admittedly,
respondent judge was roused from sleep and immediately went straight to the police station. Judge Rosales
opined that the admission of respondent judge about being irritated that evening and his utterance of putang
ina, putang ina connotes that he did not intend to curse any particular policemen at the scene. Judge
Rosales thus recommends that respondent judge should only be reprimanded with the stern warning that a
repetition of the same act would be dealt with more severely.[5]
On August 18, 1997, this case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA found that the actions committed by respondent judge fell
beyond the norms expected of members of the bench, and recommended that respondent judge be meted a
fine of P1,000.00 and sternly warned that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the recommendation of the OCA.
A judge, as an advocate of justice and visible representation of the law, must not only apply the law but
must imbibe it in his everyday living. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, both his personal and
public life have been set apart from the average citizen. A judges assumption of office is viewed with utmost
respect and reverence compatible with his position as dispenser of justice. From him the people draw their
will and awareness to obey the law. He must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others
to follow.[6] The peoples confidence in the judicial system, however, is founded not only on the competence
and diligence of the members of the bench, but also on their integrity and moral uprightness. [7] The public will

have faith in the administration of justice only if they believe that the occupants of the bench cannot be
accused of arbitrariness in the exercise of their powers both in and out of the court. Accordingly, he must at all
times avoid even the slightest infraction of the law.
By losing his cool and uttering intemperate language at the policemen on duty regarding the release of
detention prisoner Braza, respondent judge has overstepped the norm demanded of a member of the
bench. The Canons of Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.[8] When he took personal action in ensuring
the temporary release of detention prisoner Braza even in the unholy hours, he has cast his integrity in a
serious doubt.
As the OCA aptly observed:
The atypical interest of respondent in the release of Braza is manifested by the fact that he went out of his way
to travel from Tiaong to Candelaria, Quezon despite the lateness of the hour. His explanation is that he was
piqued by his failure to get in touch with the Candelaria police by phone. We however perceive that he was
only angered by the fact that his verbal order was defied by the Candelaria police which is why he proceeded
to the next town to assert his authority. That he shouted and cursed the policemen did not speak well of his
judicial comportment. Aside from the fact that his behavior and language were undignified, his impartiality and
neutrality in question became suspect. [9]
Although, respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position
in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded
to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language. In Judge Antonio J. Fineza v.
Romeo P. Aruelo,[10] we said:
As a member of the bench he should have adhered to that standard of behavior expected of all those who don
the judicial robe: that of being a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely
personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals.
While it may be true, as complainant claims, that he meant no malice nor was he moved by evil intent, the
absence of malice or purity of motive is not a license for him to resort to inflammatory words to articulate his
grievances. Complainant should bear in mind that he and, for that matter, all judges, should always observe
courtesy and civility. He should be temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language.
The observance of the Canon of Judicial Ethics does not end at the close of office hours nor is limited
within the performance of his official duties. The Canon of Judicial Ethics commands that a judges behavior,
official or otherwise, should be free from the appearance of impropriety in all activities [11] and should be beyond
reproach. For a judges official life can not simply be detached from his personal life. [12] We do not, however,
call on judges to live Saintly lives when they don their judicial robes, for the Saintly lives exhibited by men
of old are not the sole parameter of the conduct of a magistrate. In commanding respect for the law, we stated
in Cynthia Resngit-Marquez, et al. v. Judge Victor T. Llamas, Jr.,[13] a magistrate has to live by the example of
his precepts. He cannot judge the conduct of others when his own needs judgment. It should not be do as I
say and not what I do. For then the court over which he is called to preside will be a mockery, one devoid of
respect.
Time and again, we have emphasized that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the sheriff and to the lowliest clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.[14] For every court personnel must be
constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official
functions must be avoided. [15] They should always be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. The
reminder applies all the more to trial court judges because they are the judicial front-liners. They have the
direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
embodiment of the peoples sense of justice.[16]Thus, their official conduct should be beyond reproach.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Felix A. Caraos of the Municipal Trial Court
of Candelaria, Quezon, is found GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming a Judge, and is ordered to pay a FINE of

Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999]
LUALHATI M. LIWANAG, complainant, vs. JUDGE PATERNO H. LUSTRE, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, respondent.
DECISION

8. As requested, on December 16, 1994, one day after the hearing, at about 7:00 A.M., I went to
see Judge Lustre at his chamber. There, he told me that he prepared an order for the
accused. I thanked him and I told him that if the accused will pay us, my husband and I will
give him five (5%) percent of it as token of gratitude. At that point, he stood up and told me
he does not need money. While he was giving me a copy of the order, he touched my
shoulder, down to my breast. I froze and could not do anything. He was telling me that he
acceded to my request. Later, he told me that he is available during Mondays and Fridays
as there are no scheduled hearings and for me to come back to him before the hearing on
January 17, 1995.
9. I did not go back to see Judge Lustre as per his request before the hearing on Jan. 17, 1995
because of what he did to me, he took advantage of the situation to molest me.

QUISUMBING, J.:

10. Came the date of the hearing on Jan. 17, 1995. Despite the previous order setting the case
for hearing for Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995, he cancelled hearings on all dates as per request of
the counsel for the accused. Instead, he reset the same on Feb. 22, 28 and March 7, 1995.

On September 19, 1995, complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag sent a letter to the Court [1] prayingthat
respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre be dismissed from the service due to gross immorality and grave
misconduct unbecoming of his profession. [2] Attached to her letter was a sworn statement,
reproduced verbatim hereunder, which details how respondent allegedly molested her sexually.

11. When the hearing on Feb. 22, 1995 came, Judge Lustre cancelled the one set on Feb. 28,
1995.

SWORN STATEMENT
I, LUWALHATI LIWANAG, of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Karunungan Road, Pamana Homes,
Calamba, Laguna, after being duly sworn, according to law, hereby depose and state:
1. Prior to July, 1994, my husband, Jose B. Zafra filed twelve (12) counts of violation of B.P. 22
against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua for issuing checks amounting to
approximately 3.5 million pesos, that were dishonored when presented for payment.
2. On July 22, 1994, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed twelve (12) informations
for violation of BP 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua, charging each
of them with three (3) counts of Violation of BP 22. Copies of the informations are hereto
attached for reference.
3. The said cases were assigned at the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided by
Judge Paterno Lustre.
4. After the informations were filed, the accused posted bail. However, their arraignment were
(sic) postponed several times at the instance of the accused.
5. The case was set for hearing for November 16, 1994. However, when the date came, Judge
Lustre was not present. Hence, the hearing was reset to December 15, 1994.
6. On November 17, 1994 at about 8:30 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber to
inquire about the case filed by my husband, why the accused have not yet been
arraigned. At that point, I asked Judge Lustre if it is possible to schedule hearings in
January and February, 1995 and every month thereafter and to order the arraignment of the
accused. He responded in the affirmative and told me to come back after the hearing on
December 15, 1994, at about 7:00 A.M. in his chamber.
7. The date of the hearing arrived, Dec. 15, 1994 at 1:30 P.M. The representative of Atty. Buted,
counsel for the accused, arrived with a Motion to Transfer the scheduled hearing. Judge
Lustre then reset the hearing on Jan. 17, Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995.

12. By the way things were going, I could sense that Judge Lustre is delaying the case, granting
postponement after postponement, despite objections from our lawyer. The case was
already dragging and nothing was happening. We were running out of money and we
needed to have the case terminated right away in order to get paid for the money the
accused have swindled us. Because of this dilemma, I decided to see Judge Lustre.
13. On March 6, 1995, Monday, at about 10:00 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre. I asked him
why he cancelled the hearings. He responded that I fooled him since I did not come to him
as per his request, whereas he acceded to my earlier request. He then told me that I must
obey his wishes if I want our case to go smoothly since he is the only one who will decide
our cases. After that, he told me that he was already free and for me to wait for him outside
the courtroom. We boarded his white Toyota car, with Plate No. PLN-513 and he brought
me to Canlubang Tollway. While in the car, he kissed me on the lips and caressed my
breast. I was repulsed and disgusted but I could not do anything since our cases are with
him and he was deliberately delaying the hearings. At that instant, I told him to set hearings
for April and May, 1995 since according to his staff, there would be no hearings in May and
in April. He told me, he will take care of it and ordered me to come to his office on March
13, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. and we will talk about the settings.
14. On March 13, 1995, Monday, as ordered, I went to see Judge Lustre at his office at around
7:10 A.M. There was no one there except him. I saw him waiting just outside his
chamber. He ushered me inside, but I had barely entered the room, when he kissed me on
the lips and caressed my body, particularly my breast. He exposed his penis and ordered
me to masturbate him. I could not do anything but obey. There was a fluid that oozed from
his penis, which was somewhat bloody. I felt dirty. While doing that, he told me to tell my
lawyer to file a motion to set hearing for April and May, 1995. He then asked me to go with
him to Laguna de Bay Inn. I refused, he got angry. He retorted that the fate of our case is
on his hands and told me to see him on March 23, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. at Laguna de Bay Inn
in Sucat since his house is near the area.
15. After that, my lawyer filed a Motion to Set Case for Hearing. But I did not go and see Judge
Lustre at Laguna de Bay Inn. Thus, on March 28, 1995 hearing, no schedule was set for
April and May. Instead, he made the setting in June, 1995.
16. On April 10, 1995 I received a new subpoena for pre-trial and arraignment of the new cases
we filed, scheduling the same for May 3, 1995. The following day, April 11, Tuesday, I went
to see Judge Lustre to inquire why our case was not scheduled on May 3, at any rate, there

is arraignment of our new case filed on the same date. He responded that he was early at
Laguna de Bay Inn on March 23, and he waited for me at 7:00 A.M. but I did not come. He
told me not to fool him, "masama daw siyang magalit."

because of fear and the possible consequence to their cases. As for me, I am emboldened
by disgust and frustration. I now seek the intervention of the Honorable Supreme Court to
give justice to the victims and rid the judiciary of the likes of Judge Paterno H. Lustre.

17. The June 6 hearing proceeded, that of June 13 was cancelled at the instance of the
accused's lawyer.

27. I know the shame I have to bear but I have to expose the wrong doings of a judge who is
supposed to uphold the law and morality. But instead, he preys on hapless and those who
are not learned in law as his victims.

18. On June 15, 1995, Thursday, at around 7:00 A.M., I went to Judge Lustre in his office
because I was told that our next hearing would be in September despite previous settings. I
requested Judge Lustre to give us monthly hearings, in July and August. He told me that he
would oblige if I would follow his wishes. As he was saying that, he was already touching
my breast. He exposed his penis at told me to perform "fellatio." I refused. I was then told
to return the following day, the same time and he will wait for me.
19. I came back on June 16, around 7:00 A.M. As ordered, I proceeded to the Calamba Church
to wait for Judge Lustre. He fetch (sic) me from there on board his white Toyota car and he
brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex in Crossing, Calamba, Laguna. I
could not refuse because of the threat about our case. Inside the room at Riverview, he told
me there will be a setting for July and August. Then he undressed himself and ordered me
to do the same. I knew I was selling myself to the devil but our blood money is at stake. It
is for the future of my son and I was willing to do anything for my family. Perhaps I was too
stupid to do it, but at that time, I felt helpless. He ordered me to perform "fellatio" on him
and I obeyed. There was blood that oozed from his penis. I also saw black rashes on his
body, especially on his legs. Before we left, he told me to see him again on July 10 in his
office.
20. On June 23, 1995, the same thing happened. I went to his office at 7:00 A.M. Judge Lustre
brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex and I was again ordered to perform
"fellatio" on him.
21. The June 28 hearing proceeded. But I did not go and see Judge Lustre on July 10 as
requested. I just called him and presented an alibi. He told me to just come the following
day, July 11 at 7:00 A.M. at Jollibee, Calamba and he will wait for me. As parting words, he
told me not to fool him.
22. I did not see him on July 11 because I already felt so dirty and used. I never realized before
I was capable of doing such a thing for my family, until the time came. But I could not take it
anymore.
23. On July 27, the hearing proceeded. But the previous schedules were cancelled and instead
hearing was set in November, 1995.
24. On August 15, 1995 at 7:00 A.M., I went to his office to get an order for the referral of the
specimen signatures of Rowena Chua to the NBI. Again, he kissed me and touched me. I
could not refuse for fear of retaliation.
25. I could see that Judge Paterno H. Lustre is deliberately delaying the prosecution of our
cases to prolong his abusive acts towards me. As can be seen from the transcript of the
hearings, he is not leaning in our favor. What we are asking only is for the continuous
setting of the trial because we cannot afford a long drawn out proceedings. But instead, he
is delaying the trial. He has even shown hostility towards my husband when he was
testifying and towards my lawyer, allegedly because he was jealous.
26. This kind of judge gives the judiciary a bad name. There must be a stop to this evil doings. I
am not the only victim of Judge Lustre. I know at least two (2) other women who are
similarly situated are being used and abused by him. But they do not want to complain

28. What I have narrated here are true, which I would never have revealed were it not for my
better sense of judgment. I know I made a mistake by becoming a willing victim. But I did it
for my family as I thought that is the only way I can help my husband get back his money for
our future.[3]
Apart from the letter and the sworn statement, complainant also sent the Court 11 photographs
showing her and respondent together in various places. Five of these were allegedly taken at the Riverview
Resort in Calamba, Laguna. She also submitted a receipt issued by said resort dated June 23, 1995 and two
transcripts of phone conversations she had with respondent. [4]
Respondents defense is anchored on denial. In a 2nd Indorsement[5] he sent to the Court, by way of
answer to the complaint, he strongly denie(d) [6] the charges leveled against him and dismissed them as the
vile products of (complainant's) malicious and prejudiced mind. [7] According to him, complainant and her
common-law husband thought of filing charges against him when he refused to bend to, and accommodate,
(their) haughty and arrogant demands to hastily schedule, try continuously, finish and decide arbitrarily
within a very short period of time [8] the B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) cases filed by complainants
husband. The complaint was, according to respondent, likewise prompted by respondents refusal to accept
complainants offer to reward him with five percent of the P3.5 million her husband seeks to recover.
Respondent claimed that he could not have been in his chambers as early as 7:00 in the morning as
alleged by complainant since he usually arrives for work some five to ten minutes before 8:00 in the
morning. Moreover, he said the door to his room is never locked -- thus, the impossibility of him engaging in
illicit sexual conduct within its confines -- since the only comfort room in the courtroom is inside his room and
anyone who wants to use it may enter his room freely.
Respondent further pointed out that at age 67, with a heart ailment and diabetes, (s)ex is beyond (his)
physical capacity.[9] He said he is no longer capable of what ordinary men indulge in, lest (he) die in the
attempt.[10] He sought the dismissal of the complaint filed against him.
In support of his claims, respondent submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) affidavit
executed by Rodelio A. Alcaraz, a utility worker, stating that respondent usually arrives at the office at 7:45 in
the morning; (2)affidavit executed by Atty. Benjamin A. Alonzo, Sr., a private practitioner based in Calamba,
attesting to respondents fine work ethics and moral uprightness; and (3) certification from Dr. Elmer S. Sayoc
stating that respondent is being treated for coronary artery diseases, atrial fibrillation, and diabetes mellitus. [11]
In response to respondents averments, complainant alleged that respondent had set their meetings at
7:00 in the morning since he knew that nobody from his staff reported for work that early. She said respondent
was very particular about the time she left his office, which must be before 7:30 in the morning. As for
respondents health condition, complainant pointed out that, indeed, he did not engage in sexual intercourse
with her but only engaged in foreplay and asked her to perform oral sex on him; and while diabetes might have
diminished respondents sexual urge, it did not totally erase the same. [12]
In a resolution dated January 17, 1996, this Court resolved to refer the matter to Judge Norberto
Geraldez, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, for investigation, report and
recommendation. In the same resolution, respondent was directed to inhibit himself from hearing the B.P. 22
cases filed by complainants husband.

On January 8, 1997, Judge Geraldez requested that he be allowed to inhibit himself from hearing the
case because complainant raised the matter of his friendship with respondent. [13] The Court, however, in a
Resolution dated June 9, 1997, denied his request and directed him to resolve the case with dispatch. [14]
In his report dated October 6, 1997, Judge Geraldez recommended dismissal of the complaint against
respondent since complainant failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Judge Geraldez observed that:
In the B.P. 22 cases pending before Judge Lustre, Jose Zafra was never assured that he could recover the
amount of P3.5 million even if the sexual demands were satisfied. Jose Zafra and Ms. Liwanag were aware of
this. Consequently, it is surprising why the complainant, no matter how desperate she may have been, would
submit to oral sex. And, why Jose Zafra allowed it.
The B.P. 22 cases are simply not classic cases where the courts decision would be so vital, that the judge can
demand his price.
There is a rather large disparity in the value of the B.P. 22 cases vis-a-vis the seriousness and mess of the
sexual demand. Ms. Liwanags allegations are beyond comprehension. It borders on the very credibility of
the sexual allegations. This is specially true with respect to the allegations of oral sex with its blood
secretions. And, according to her she did it more than once. If indeed there were blood secretions the first
time, the claim of a second time is beyond relief (sic).
Ms. Liwanag claimed that Judge Lustre, on August 15, 1995, simply kissed and touched her. But human
nature would demand another oral sex as they had done before. Moreover, in her complaint dated September
19, 1995, Ms. Liwanag failed to advance any reason why they stopped at oral sex. [15]

suspicion of wild imagining or other similar fictive handiwork. It is an essential baring of rage, revulsion and
disgust: xxx
The OCA recommended that the case be formally docketed as an administrative complaint and that
respondent be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and -controlled corporations.
Clearly, we have to review the records of this case for a comprehensive view of the entire
controversy. Moreover, it is essential to lay stress on basic canons of conduct applicable to judges, in
whatever level of the judicial hierarchy they may be.
As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only
substantial evidence is required,[16] as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence: [17]
Sec 5. Substantial evidence. -- In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Given this requirement, we find that there is enough evidence on record to sufficiently establish
complainants case against respondent.
The photographs submitted by complainant to this Court show her and respondent in various
places. The first two show them talking beside an outlet of Andoks Litson Manok, another shows
respondents car parked by a sidewalk, its front passenger door open. The car is seen leaving in the next
photograph. In the next two photographs, the car is seen in the driveway of what appears to be one of a row
of rooms. On top of this rooms doorway is the letter "D". Next are five photographs which show complainant
and respondent coming out of the room together and heading towards respondents parked car. [18]

Judge Geraldez concluded that the evidence presented by complainant is not credible in itself.
Moreover, Judge Geraldez pointed out that complainant merely relied on the photographs showing her and
respondent together, which, however, do not establish the acts complained of. Despite having the opportunity
to do so, according to the report, complainant failed to testify to substantiate her claims, thereby depriving
respondent of his right to cross-examine her.
Judge Geraldez recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence.

Complainant claims that the photographs were taken when respondent took her to the Riverview
Resort in Calamba, Laguna.
In a Manifestation dated September 2, 1996, respondent pointed out that nothing indecent is portrayed
in the photographs. They did not show any act constituting immorality or grave misconduct. He denied that
the pictures showing him and complainant leaving a room together were taken at the Riverview Resort. He
added that the receipt issued by the resort did not indicate that he was with complainant at said resort.

The Court thereafter referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report,
and recommendation.

Respondent took his own set of photographs at the Riverview Resort. [19] On the basis of his own
pictures, he concluded that complainants photographs could not have been taken at that resort. When he
testified on his behalf, he said:

The OCA, in its Memorandum dated September 1, 1998, took a position directly opposite that of Judge
Geraldez.

" when I went to the place those letters were not there, I have photographs there because I personally went
there to have these photographs but this (sic) sign boards were not there, sir." [20]

The OCA noted that:

A sign prohibiting vandalism, noticeable in complainant's pictures, was missing in respondents


pictures.

xxx we cannot help discerning here an effort to gloss over a charge against respondent which the
investigating judge himself admitted to be serious. His investigative work and his subsequent report reveal a
perfunctory treatment and analysis of the submissions of the parties, particularly the complainant herein, and
an egregious misapplication of the law and jurisprudence.
xxx
We find credible the allegations of complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag. Her narration bears the earmarks of
truth, for the incidents giving rise to the acts complained of are so finely etched by her as to preclude any

Respondent avers that the real intention of complainant in filing the complaint -- which she has denied
-- is to extort money from him as she allegedly made an outrageous demand [21] for P3.5 million to settle the
case.
We are not convinced, however, that respondents conduct in this case is entirely blameless, nor that
complainants alleged intent would excuse respondents wrongdoing.

It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and complainant actually engaging in any form of
sexual congress. However, this is understandable since by their very nature, such acts are not proper subjects
of photographs. Often, as in this case, what is available to us is only the narration of the parties involved.
Respondent denies that the photographs were taken at Riverview. He took pictures of the resort
himself to prove his contention. He said his pictures are different from those of complainants.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby find respondent GUILTY of gross misconduct. As
he has already retired from the service and thus could no longer be dismissed nor suspended, we hereby
order that a FINE of P40,000.00 be imposed upon him, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. Further,
he is hereby barred from any employment in all branches of the government including government-owned and
-controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

We note, however, that respondent does not deny that he is the one appearing with complainant in the
photographs. He conveniently testified that somebody else had posed for the photograph, [22]but this is
obviously an afterthought. Respondent made this assertion almost a year after complainant filed her
complaint. He could have done it as early as October 1995 in his comment to complainants charges.
If the pictures were not taken at Riverview, where were they taken and why was respondent with
complainant at that time? If, indeed, there was a legitimate reason for complainant and respondent to be seen
together at the time and place depicted in the photographs, respondent would have wasted no time explaining
where they were taken and under what circumstances, in order to extricate himself from his present
predicament. This, he failed to do. The reason for this, we believe, is that he could not simply offer any
plausible explanation why he was seen with complainant coming out of what is apparently a private room.
Respondent claims that the charges hurled against him are products of complainants
vindictiveness. Again, this claim raises more questions than it answers. It opens the door to undue
speculation. Thus, why should she resent his actions? Was it only because of repeated postponements of
the hearing of her cases?
Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent due to the unjustifiable delays in the
hearing of their B.P. 22 cases. But would she falsely accuse respondent with sexual molestation only to get
back at him? This goes against the grain of human nature and therefore unlikely. She should know that by
revealing her sexual misadventures with respondent, graphically describing each and every detail, she would
only be exposing herself and her family to shame and ridicule. She would stand to gain nothing from the
exercise, save the hope that her dignity may somehow be vindicated in the process.
As for complainants failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of no moment. Complainants affidavit
stands in lieu of her testimony; the investigating judge even had her re-subscribe and re-affirm her sworn
statement and let the same be adopted as part of complainants evidence. [23]
Complainant could have been cross-examined based on her affidavit. That she was not crossexamined by respondent is not her fault but respondents.

[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1864. December 16, 2004]


Atty. ANTONIO D. SELUDO, complainant, vs. Judge ANTONIO J. FINEZA, Regional Trial Court, Branch
131, Caloocan City, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety[1] and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge.
[2]
A judge should be the last person to be perceived as petty, sharp-tongued tyrant . Sadly, respondent
judge failed to live up to such standards of judicial conduct.
In a complaint[3] dated July 24, 2003 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Atty. Antonio
D. Seludo charged Judge Antonio J. Fineza of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In his complaint, Atty. Antonio D. Seludo alleged inter alia that on June 28, 2003, respondent judge filed
with the same court (Branch 128), a complaint for revocation of notarial commission against him
(complainant), docketed as Revocation of Commission No. C-001-(2003).
During the hearing on July 8, 2003, respondent judge uttered vulgar and insulting words against
complainant, thus:
Court:
Do you have anything to say Atty. Seludo?

As the records now stand, we are constrained to agree with the Court Administrators assessment that
respondent has failed to live up to the high standard of conduct required of members of the bench. He grossly
violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety not only in his public but in his
private life as well.[24] All to the grave prejudice of the administration of justice, indeed.
The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every level in the
administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the publics faith and trust in the
judiciary. Respondents disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has already retired as of
November 1, 1998.[25] For the serious misconduct of respondent, the penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section
10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine in the maximum amount should be imposed. [26]
We are not in accord with the OCAs recommendation, however, as regards forfeiture of allretirement
benefits due respondent. We note that implementation of this penalty, while directed at respondent, might
adversely affect innocent members of his family, who are dependent on him and his retirement gratuity. It is
our considered view that, given the circumstances of this case, the maximum fine of P40,000.00 would be
sufficient penalty.

Atty. Seludo:
Yes, Your Honor. May we know also, under what authority is the complainant appearing in this
case, Your Honor? Is he going to prosecute this case?
Court:
He is appearing for himself as petitioner.
Atty. Seludo:
Under what authority, Your Honor?
Judge Fineza:

If the respondent knows how to read English, he would find in the petition itself that under
the rule, we are obligated to bring to the court any anomaly or dishonesty or dereliction in
the performance of a duty of a Court Officer. And may I point out and make it on record
that this time, despite the fact of respondents answer, last paragraph of page 1 states
and I quote; I think page 2, and I read: That the undersigned has taken steps to prevent
a recurrence of the lapses in the notarial registry. An informal inquiry made by this Judge
this afternoon from the Office of the Clerk of Court, the reply was that the respondent has
not filed any notarial report for the year 2003, x x x.

Court:

Court:

No, Your Honor. It is in accordance with my petition, that during the pendency of this case, the
respondent should be suspended.

Judge Fineza, are you making an additional manifestation or additional charge against the
respondent because of the information that you got now from the Office of the Clerk of
Court?
Judge Fineza:

You want to put that on record?


Court:
Judge Fineza:
He should be suspended because of the non-compliance?
Not only to put on record . . . , and courtesy calls that when someone is speaking, a courtesy
should require. May I ask the Judge to remind him . . .

Judge Fineza:

Court:

Yes, Your Honor. He promised in his answer, that he has remedied the situation.

Let him finish first, Atty. Seludo.

xxx

Atty. Seludo:

Atty. Seludo:

Yes, Your Honor.

Yes, Your Honor. I just want that all the manifestations of the complainant be put on record, Your
Honor.

Judge Fineza: (continuation)


Judge Fineza:
Before the Executive Judge or Investigating Judge finally inhibits himself, he should order the
Office of the Clerk of Court to issue a certification to the effect that for the year 2003, no
notarial report has been made by the respondent which is a ground for cancellation of his
notarial commission. Thats why I raised this, so that while the case is pending, he
should be suspended from the practice of . . . . and may I ask that he be declared in
contempt for laughing?
Court:
Judge Fineza, will you please stay calm.
Judge Fineza: (to respondent)
Putang-ina mo eh!
Court:
Please be just civil with each other, Judge Fineza.
Judge Fineza:
Why is he laughing? Let it be put on record that he has a moronic attitude. Thats why he
was laughing.

If Your Honor please, I dont know if this guy is really stupid. This is a court proceeding and
everything that is being taken is recorded. If you want to use that for libel, you cannot.
This is a Court proceeding, we should have privileged communication.
Court:
Judge Fineza, will you please refrain from calling the other person, who is a brother in
profession?
Judge Fineza:
Im just telling the truth, Your Honor.
Court:
But I would like to ask you to use temperate words. You are brother lawyers. If you have
nothing more to say, I would like to adjourn this preliminary conference. I will indorse all
the records to the 1st Vice Executive Judge who will notify you of the schedule for the
continuation of the investigation.
continuation . . .

We will prepare the minutes and we will let you sign, Judge Fineza.
Judge Fineza:
Where is the minutes? This is not the prescribed form for minutes, Your Honor? Okay.

Respondent further admitted in his answer that he is aware that there is no justification for his use of
improper language, and for this, he is sincerely contrite and penitent. But as a member of the bench for over
twenty years, he expected the complainant to respect him, to treat him with politeness, dignity and courtesy,
and to give him his due as a magistrate.
On January 9, 2004, complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint[6] on the ground that he is no
longer interested in pursuing the case since respondent has retired from the judiciary. [7]

Court:
I have not yet adjourned, Judge Fineza? I hope you will be more civil to everybody here just like
anybody who is civil with you.
Judge Fineza:
Okay, okay. My apologies, Your Honor.
Court:
Accepted.
Judge Fineza:
And now you adjourn?
Court:
You are requesting for that? I will give you copy so that you can be satisfied. What do you say,
Atty. Basa? You are the collaborating counsel. Probably, you are being more civil with
us.
Atty. Basa:
May we just ask for the adjournment of the session, Your Honor.
Judge Fineza:
You will give me the minutes now?
Court:
We will provide you including with the copy of the Order of the Court inhibiting itself. [4]
In his comment[5] dated September 8, 2003, respondent judge admitted that he uttered derogatory
words during the proceeding held on July 8, 2003. He, however, explained that he has been suffering from a
heart ailment and diabetes since November, 2002, causing him considerable anxiety and pain. This must be
the reason why he could not control his outburst. Besides, the incident was precipitated by the conduct of the
complainant and the Executive Judge. Complainant was unkind and impolite to him. He kept on interrupting
him. In fact, after his oral manifestation, complainant began to laugh and ridicule him. Moreover, when he
(respondent) asked the Executive Judge to cite complainant in contempt of court, the latter stood up with
clenched fists and acted in a menacing manner.

In his Report and Recommendation, [8] Court Administrator Presbitero Velasco made the following
evaluation:
EVALUATION: We will dwell first on the issue of desistance of complainant to pursue instant complaint. The
settled rule is that the complainants withdrawal of his complaint, or desistance from pursuing the same, does
not necessarily warrant the dismissal of the administrative case. The outcome of an administrative action
cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who, for reasons of his own, may condone what may
be detestable. Certainly, complainants desistance cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction, under Section 6,
Article VIII of the Constitution, to investigate and decide complaints against erring employees of the judiciary.
Otherwise stated, such unilateral act does not bind this Court on a matter relating to its disciplinary power.
As to the fact that respondent has already retired from the service, the Court has pointed out in several cases
that the retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.
Proceeding thereon with the issues, we find ourselves in accord with complainants observation that
respondent has indeed consciously ignored to heed the Courts advice and warning when he was
admonished for using intemperate language in A.M. No. P-01-1522. A careful scrutiny of the
transcripts taken on that unfateful day reveals that respondent has precisely uttered the following
vitriolic language against complainant:
a) Putang ina mo!
b) If respondent knows how to read English.
c) Let it be put on record, that he has a moronic attitude.
d) If Your Honor plese, I dont know if this guy is really stupid.
As shown by the records, respondents attention was called several times by the Investigating
Executive Judge to stay calm and be civil. In fact, his attitude was generally antagonistic not only to
complainant but also to the Executive Judge who dared to question his motives/oppose his view.
Such, is a glaring display of haughtiness and arrogance of respondent. His disgraceful behavior
reflected adversely on the good image of the judiciary and fell short of the standards expected of a magistrate
of the law. His justifications of provocation (which we found none), discourtesy of complainant and the
various illnesses he professed to be suffering should not be viewed to exculpate him from liability. As a
member of the bench he should have adhered to that standard of behavior expected of all those who don the
judicial robe. His choice of words, aside from being inflammatory and uncalled for, betrays a lack of
judicial decorum. The respect and dignity of the court has to be upheld hence, respondent should not have
acted with anger and shouted at complainant who must have suffered embarrassment in front of many
people. He should have maintained his composure for patience and courtesy are marks of culture and goodbreeding.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of official duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. The Code dictates that a judge must behave with propriety at all times.

Because respondent has already retired from the service, dismissal or suspension is no longer feasible as a
penalty for the present charges. Therefore, we opine that a fine is appropriate under the circumstances.
Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, the penalty of which is either dismissal, suspension for 3 to 6 months without salary and benefits or a
fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00. Considering that this is not the first offense of
similar nature committed by respondent, we believe a penalty of P20,000.00 is commensurate, to the acts
complained of, which amount should be taken from his retirement benefits.

respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench
nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be
always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language.
Respondent judges behavior is incompatible with judicial temperament expected of him. He was
discourteous, not only to complainant, but also to the trial judge. His actuation constitutes palpable violation of
Canon 2, Rule 2.01, and Canon 3, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Court Administrator Velasco recommended that (1) the instant administrative case be re-docketed as
an administrative matter; and that (2) respondent judge be fined in the amount ofP20,000.00 for violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, the amount to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

This is not respondent's first offense. In A.M. No. P-01-1522,[17] we reprimanded him for failing to
exercise prudence and restraint in his language. Obviously, he has not reformed.

In our Resolution[9] dated June 21, 2004, we required the parties to manifest whether they are
submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and records filed.

We thus find respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, this administrative offense is
considered serious,[18] punishable under Section 8, paragraph 1(3), and Section 11, paragraph A(3), thus:

On August 12, 2004, respondent submitted a Manifestation [10] requesting a formal hearing of this case.
In our Resolution dated September 20, 2004, [11] we denied his request for lack of merit.

Sec. 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include:

For his part, complainant, in his Manifestation dated August 12, 2004, [12] stated that he is submitting the
matter to our sound discretion.

1.

Bribery, direct or indirect;

2.

Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);

3.

Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;

Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide:
Canon 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.

4.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate
proceeding;
5.

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

x x x.
x

x
Canon 3

A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBLITIES
x

Sec.11. Sanctions.- A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1.
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;

Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to
litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the
attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
In ascribing the words "moronic attitude," "stupid", "if he knows how to read English" andputang
ina mo to complainant during the proceeding before the Executive Judge, respondent displayed a conduct so
unbecoming of a magistrate. The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and outrageous. That respondent
was suffering from heart ailment and diabetes is not an excuse. He could have asked the assistance of a
lawyer to represent him in prosecuting the case. As correctly observed by the Court Administrator, his
disgraceful behavior tainted the good image of the judiciary he is expected to uphold at all times.
We have admonished judges to observe judicial decorum which requires that they must at all times
be temperate in their language, [13] refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric [14]or from
resorting "to the language of vilification."[15] In the same vein, in Fidel vs. Caraos,[16] we held that although,

2.
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or
3.

A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonio J. Fineza is hereby found GUILTY of gross violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00)
to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1876. February 23, 2005]

NORA C. PEREZ and ENGRACIA G. RONQUILLO, complainants, vs. JUDGE JOVEN COSTALES, RTC,
Branch 45, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan,respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Nora C. Perez and Engracia G. Ronquillo, professors of the
Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University, South La Union Campus (DMMMSU-SLUC), against Judge
Joven Costales of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City (Branch 45), charging him of violating
Canons 2 and 3, and Rules 2.04 and 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and for Harassment.

We pity the professors that is why we held in abeyance the filing of administrative cases against them.
We are not to be blamed for this but the 4 professors themselves. We are only exercising our rights under our
laws.
May I know what course of action you would undertake considering that these 4 professors of your well-known
and prestigious university where innumerable graduates have shown excellence in their chose endeavors,
have been convicted with a crime involving moral turpitude?
Thank you.
Very truly yours,

Complainants Perez and Ronquillo are two of the four professors accused by respondent Judges wife,
Perla F. Costales, of the crime of Estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2722-BG pending before RTCBranch 33, Bauang, La Union. Ronquillo is also an accused in a case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
filed by Perla F. Costales, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4338. The following are the acts complained of
against respondent Judge:

(Signed)
JUDGE JOVEN F.
COSTALES

1) On June 24, 2002, respondent Judge was with his wife during the hearing of Criminal Case
No. 4338 (B.P. Blg. 22 case);

Husband of the
Complainant

2) On October 15, 2002, respondent Judge testified in behalf of the prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 2722-BG (Estafa case);

Perla F.
Costales

3) Respondent Judge pressured and made follow-ups on the case with the public prosecutor;
4) Respondent Judge wrote a letter dated October 10, 2003, addressed to the President of the
Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University, quoted as follows: [1]
I wish to call your attention regarding your four (4) professors, namely: ENGRACIA G. RONQUILLO,
MERCEDES V. TAVAS, CLARITA S. VALDEZ and NORA C. PEREZ, all of DMMMSU, South La Union
Campus, Agoo, La Union, who were convicted with the crime of ESTAFA/SWINDLING on July 22, 2003, a
xerox copy of the Decision is hereto attached and marked as Annex A.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed by the accused thru their counsel but was denied, Annex
B. Thru counsel, the 4 accused appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, Annex C.
Prof. Ronquillo is also charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (or the Bouncing Checks Law)
which case is pending trial before the Municipal Trial Court of Naguilian, Annex D and Annex E.

Required by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to comment on the complaint, [2]respondent
Judge denied the allegations. According to respondent Judge, there was no hearing held on June 24, 2002 in
Criminal Case No. 4338 (B.P. Blg. 22 case), and granting that there was any hearing in which he attended, he
was there in his private capacity as he was a witness for his wife, although he was not presented anymore.
Respondent Judge stated that he filed a leave of absence and did not use his official time to attend the
hearings of the case. Respondent Judge also believed that there was no impropriety in his act of writing a
letter to the university officials. It was done with the consent of his wife, and he did not use his position to
influence the officials. He merely asked what course of action has been taken against the four professors
involved. Respondent Judge also denied that he pressured the public prosecutor and if ever he went to the
prosecutors office, it was on leave of absence.[3]
Per recommendation of the OCA, the case was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, [4]with
the parties manifesting their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. [5]
In its Evaluation, the OCA found that respondent Judge should be reprimanded for having written the
university officials, thus:

Incidentally, the complainant in these cases is my wife PERLA F. COSTALES.


.
It is unfortunate that you have 4 professors who are supposed to be the molders of the mind of the youth and
paragon of virtue, yet they have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, which is worst than other
crimes. What if the Court of Appeals affirms their conviction which is imprisonment from 4 to 20 years at the
Womens Correccional, Manila.
We heard that the 4 professors are intending to apply for early retirement because of this. We have no
objection provided they have to pay first their money obligations to my wife.

3. Finally regarding the third alleged act of impropriety, that is, writing the universitys administrative officials
inquiring as to what actions have been taken or would be taken against the complainant, we find enough basis
for the charges of violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent ought to have known that such a
letter from one occupying the position of judge will not be treated as a mere ordinary inquiry. Respondent
should have realized that his letter can be regarded as tending to influence the outcome of the investigation
being conducted by the university about the matter. Said act of respondent is a clear violation of Rule 2.04,
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that A judge shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
Respondent in making the said letter had abandoned his duty that A judge should be embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. That respondent opted to write the letter himself instead of his wife
indicates improper use of his judgeship. [6]

With regard to the other alleged acts of impropriety, it was the OCAs finding that respondent Judge
cannot be held administratively liable therefor for the following reasons:
In the present case, respondents participation in the criminal cases filed by his wife was limited to being a
witness. As can be deduced from the above-cited case, a member of the judiciary is not prohibited from being
a witness to a case. Note should be taken that respondent did not give an opinion nor participated (sic) in any
proceeding that could slant the evaluation and resolution of the case in favor of the party he identifies himself
with.
There is no clear act of impropriety or appearance of impropriety that can be imputed to the respondent.
Respondents act of assisting his wife in his private capacity, being privy to the transactions, does not
necessarily signify that he is using his authority in influencing the outcome of any proceeding or investigation.
2. As to the second alleged act of impropriety, the act of the judge in going to the prosecutors office, which
respondent did not deny in his comment contending that the criminal case was regularly filed and prosecuted,
we find his presence in the said office insufficient basis for an administrative sanction. There was no showing
that the prosecutors office was pressured into having the said criminal cases prosecuted in court. Nor was it
shown that the respondents presence was intended to influence the action of the prosecutors office on the
matter.[7]
The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct decrees that a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. Specifically, Rule 2.01 mandates that a judge should so behave at
all times as to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. This includes a judges behavior in
the performance of his judicial duties, outside of it, and in his private capacity.[8]
The Court cannot find fault in respondent Judges appearance as a witness in Criminal Case No. 2722BG (Estafa case). He had personal knowledge of the events that led to the filing of the case, and he cannot
be blamed for protecting his wifes interests. He did not utilize official time and resources in doing so. There is
nothing on record, aside from complainants bare allegations, that respondent used his judicial position to

influence the proceedings before the trial court or the outcome of the case. Likewise, respondent Judges
presence in the office of the prosecutor, by itself, is not sufficient evidence to conclude that he exercised any
influence or pressure on the public prosecutor.
However, in writing to the administrative officials of the DMMMSU-SLUC, respondent judge obviously
sought to influence or put pressure on them with regard to the actions to be taken against the four professors.
His wife could have written the letter herself, as she is the complainant in the criminal cases against the four
professors. Instead, it was respondent judge who did, and he even used and stated his judicial position in his
letter, thereby insinuating that it should not be ignored or trifled with. It cannot be gainsaid that respondent
Judge is aware that his judicial position alone could exert influence or authority over the university officials,
and he took advantage of such authority.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not
only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a
private individual. x x x. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary must behave with propriety at all times. (Castillo v. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75,
83 [1991]) [O]ne who occupies a position of such grave responsibility in the administration of justice must
conduct himself in a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office. A judge's private as well as official
conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach. (Dysico v.
Dacumos, 262 SCRA 275, 283 [1996]). In the case at hand, the respondent judge has failed to conduct
himself in the manner prescribed by the provisions of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which Canon 2
directs the avoidance of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. (Arcenio v. Pagorogon,
224 SCRA 247, 255 [1993])[9]
WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge Joven F.
Costales of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City (Branch 45) is REPRIMANDED with warning that a
repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

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