ABELA vs GOLEZ

FACTS:
- This is a direct appeal by City Fiscal Abela (petitioner) from a decision by respondent judge compelling
him to file a proper action for estafa arising from a bouncing check exhibit (evidence).
- Dec. 28, 1968, private respondent Almalbis filed with the Office of the City Fiscal (Roxas City) a
complaint for estafa against Virginia Anisco.
- FACTS OF THE ESTAFA CASE:
o Almalbis and Anisco were engaged in a business arrangement wherein the former, as owner and
operator of several fishing boats and fishponds, sends fish to the latter to be sold at the Manila
Divisoria Market. Anisco was obligated to remit the balance of the proceeds to Almalbis and
would get 4% commission from the sales.
o Anisco then became irregular in her remittances. These remittances were mostly done by Anisco
sending personal checks. When she became late in remitting, she proposed that she begin using
checks that were presigned in blank, the blanks to be filled with the value of the sales (the
checkbook was provided by Almalbis after agreeing).
o Five (5) checks were then dishonored by Prudential Bank and Trust Company of Manila for lack
of funds.
o The foregoing were based on the testimony of Almalbis and his presented exhibits. Respondent
failed to appear and was deemed to have waived her right to present evidence.
- After a preliminary investigation, petitioner dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
- Almalbis commenced at action for mandamus in the CFI of Roxas City against petitioner, which resulted
in the assailed decision rendered by respondent judge.
ISSUES:
1. W/N accused has committed estafa as defined under Art. 315 (2-d) of the RPC by giving presigned
blank checks which were late dishonored by the bank for lack of funds
2. W/N petitioner can be compelled to file the case for estafa by mandamus.
RULING:
- The decision by respondent judge is SET ASIDE.
1. NO. Deceit is an essential element in estafa. Such is not present in this case.
Almalbis had agreed to the arrangement and had provided by the checkbook, all the checks
therein already signed by Anisco and the amounts and payee to be filled in by Almalbis. Deceit
cannot be attributed to Anisco if the checks were under the control of Almalbis, prepared and
filled by the latter. Anisco had no hand in the preparation of the checks other than signing,
giving her no chance to determine the sufficiency of the funds (since Almalbis would indicate
the amount after she had signed).
2. NO. The public prosecutor is entitled to use his judgment and discretion in the appreciation of
evidence and in the exercise thereof, he may not be controlled by mandamus. Whether or not
an information should be filed is a matter of sound discretion of the fiscal. The fiscal cannot be
compelled to act in a distinct manner whether to prosecute or not, reserving only to the
Secretary of Justice to impel a different course of acition when he believes it to be in line with
public interest (Sec. 1679, 1989 of the Resvised Administrative Code).
What are the remedies of the complainant when the prosecuting officer refuses or fails to file an
information or to prosecute even when there is sufficient evidence?
The offended party may take it up with the Secretary of Justice who may take measures as necessary
under Sec. 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The complainant may also file with the proper
authorities or courts criminal and administrative charges against the prosecuting officer. He may also file a
civil action for damages under Art. 27 of the Civil Code.
While it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons who, according to the evidence are shown to be guilty
of a crime, said officers is likewise bound by his oath of officer to protect innocent persons from
groundless, false or malicious prosectuion. It would be a dereliciton of duty if he were to file a case when
he is not convinced of the sufficiency or strength of the evidence. This duty involves discretion and hence,
it cannot be controlled by mandamus unless there has been grave abused thereof (no showing of such in
the case).

BROCKA vs ENRILE
FACTS:
Lino Brocka et al were arrested due to forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy
with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO). So they were
charged with ILLEGAL ASSEMBLY. Brocka was charged as a leader of such demonstration. While others
were released on bail, Brocka was not. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent
petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 17, 1985 were held. But despite the order for
release, Brocka et al remained in detention. This is due to PDA otherwise known as Preventive Detention
Action. But Brocka and his fellow accused were not given an original copy or certified true copy of such
PDA (SC said in the Ilagan Case "individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished
with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official
custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension")
They were released on February 14, 1985, Brocka contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or
harassment are sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the
second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the same act of attending
and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while there may be a complex crime from
a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing
two informations therefor, further, that they will be placed in double jeopardy. Until such time that their
appeal reached the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON Criminal Prosecution of Cases Against Brocka et al may be enjoined?
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second
offense of inciting to sedition. Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained
or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are however exceptions, among which are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions.
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a Motion to quash on that
ground has been denied
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful
arrest of petitioners
In the case at bar, criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, have been undertaken by state
officials in bad faith:
1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et als release from detention BUT this PDA was
issued on Jan.28 85 and invoked only on Feb.9 85 upon receipt of TCs order of release a violates
guideline that PDA shall be invoked within 24 hrs in Metro, Manila or 48 hours outside Metro, Manila
Despite subpoenas for PDAs production, prosecution merely presented a purported xerox copy of it a
violates Court pronouncement that individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished
with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official
custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile)

2. SolGens manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to quash the information instead of a
petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Court agreed with the contention of the SolGen. However, it noted that such course of action would
have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing:
1. Spurious and inoperational PDA
2. Sham and hasty Preliminary Investigation
Clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention until the second offense
could be facilitatedand justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew.
Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for
the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and
vexatious prosecution.
If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as in this case where
petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed) and
where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted THEN charges that are filed as a result
should lawfully be enjoined.
PETITION GRANTED (a petition was filed on February 19, 1985 to implead the Presiding Judge, and to
enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 illegal assembly as heads and Q-38025
inciting to sedition and the issuance of warrants for their arrests, including their arraignment.)

LEGADOS vs DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
Before the passage of BP 129, in 1911 a case was decided which does not grant jurisdiction to MTC on
cases involving simple seduction (even though arresto menor) because of the liability imposed to the
offender to support the offspring without taking into account various possibilities (e.g. WON there will be
an offspring, etc.).
In the case at bar, long before the passage of B.P. Big. 129, a complaint for simple seduction was filed with
the then City Court of Dipolog (Branch 11, I believe MTC ni) against Vilmor Icao.
The complaint was presented by the offended girl, Cora Legados, represented by her mother, Rosa, and
was subsequently made the basis of an information filed by the First Assistant City Fiscal. After entering a
plea of not guilty on arraignment, Icao moved to quash the information on the ground that the City Court
had no jurisdiction to try the offense, and the fiscal who filed the information bad no authority to do so.
Motion denied.
Icao thereupon instituted an action of prohibition with the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City
which, in due course, granted the petition and permanently enjoined the proceedings in the City Court. It is
this Order which is now assailed in this Court as having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC may enjoin MTC from proceeding with the case due to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD:
No more, because of BP 129 (remember remedial laws are curative).
The writ of prohibition was, of course, correctly issued by the respondent Judge, being consistent with the
doctrine obtaining at the time, i.e., that an inferior court had no jurisdiction over the crime of simple
seduction. But, as already pointed out, the doctrine has since been changed. Now, the offense is explicitly
declared by law to be within the exclusive original jurisdiction, no longer of Courts of First Instance (since
abolished and replaced by Regional Trial Courts), but of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

VDA DE IGNACIO vs SUNGA

FACTS:
The lease contract entered into between petitioner and private respondent provides, among others, that
the lease would be for 15 years and that private respondent would construct a building on petitioners land
and, in case of destruction, the former would have the option to reconstruct another building the same
terms and conditions for the remaining period of the lease. On the twelfth year, the building was totally
burned. Private respondent insisted on reconstructing another building worth P14,000 to P16,000 on
condition that petitioner would shoulder the amount in excess of P6,000, the amount fixed in the lease
contract. Petitioner refuses and moves to enjoin private respondent from reconstructing, petitioner filed in
the lower court a petition for injunction.
Court of First Instance: Respondent judge denied petition in favor of the private respondent.
Court of Appeals Ruling: On certiorari, CA reversed the decision of CFI in favor of the petitioner and issued
a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the lease contract had expired on October 1, 1970.
Supreme Court Ruling: On certiorari, SC in a minute resolution denied the petition (in favor of the
petitioner) for lack of merit and because it involved factual matters.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an action for ejectment. The city court rendered a decision ejecting Private
Respondent. On appeal, respondent judge remanded the case to the city court for reception of private
respondents evidence that the lease had not expired. Petitioner moves to reconsider alleging that it is
elementary rule that an inferior court has no legal authority to set aside a final and executory judgment of
the Supreme Court and grant new trial. The motion was denied by respondent judge on the ground that
the question as to the expiration of lease could still be litigated. Thus, petitioner filed this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an inferior court (CFI) has the legal authority to set aside the ruling of the CA
HELD:
No. It is beyond the power of the lower court to alter or set aside a decision of a superior court although it
may be erroneous. The finding of the Court of Appeals which is found in the body of its decision as well as
in the dispositive portion of fallo thereof, is res judicata or is the law of the case between the parties. It is
conclusive between them.
Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in not giving effect to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals. He could express his honest conviction that it was an erroneous ruling but he could not refuse to
give it effect. By not applying that ruling, he virtually nullified the decision of the Court of Appeals.
As regards the expiration of lease:
The lower court erred in remanding the ejectment suit to the City Court for the purposes of receiving Tans
evidence in support of his defense that the lease had not yet expired. The lease contract is the best
evidence on the expiration of the lease. Its provisions reveal that during the two-year period from the date
when the building was ready for occupancy (sometime in 1956 according to Mrs. Ignacio), no rentals were
due because, obviously, the building, which would become the lessors property, served as the
compensation for Tans use of the lot.
During the remaining thirteen years, the subject matter of the lease was the building for which a monthly
rental of three hundred pesos was due. Upon the expiration of the fifteen-year period (which could have
been in 1971 but which the Court of Appeals in its final judgment found to be October 1, 1970), the lease
would continue for another ten years (up to September 30, 1980) but only with respect to the easements
of right of way and light and view for which a monthly rental of one hundred fifty pesos would be paid by
Tan to Mrs. Ignacio.

CRESPO vs MOGUL
FACTS:
April 18, 1977, Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed
information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.

When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that
there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. The presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul,
denied the motion. Accused appealed to CA.
On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the CA granting the writ of preliminary injunction and
perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the
case until the final resolution of the petition for review.
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr. reversed the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information
filed against the accused.
A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the trial court. The
reason is that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the
ability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.
However, the Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment contending that the evidence was not
presented before it, but only before the undersecretary of Justice.
Upon appeal of the accused to CA, the issued a restraining order against the arraignment but later lifted
the same.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the
motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
HELD:
It is a cardinal principle that criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, according to
whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the
fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information
in the proper court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage,
the permission of the Court must be secured. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion
to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been
brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be
addressed for the consideration of the Court.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal
or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court
in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits
proceed for the proper determination of the case.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition
of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while
the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the
Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the

complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MABUYO

Section 10, RULE 110 of the RPC,
Place of the commission of the offense.
The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged
or is necessary for its identification.
Principle in this case:
Unless place of commission is an essential element of the crime, the accused may be convicted of a crime
committed in a place other than the place alleged in the information, as long as such other place is still
within the jurisdiction of the court.
SYNOPSIS:
Mabuyo was convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua on the basis of the testimonies of
the victims widow the lone eyewitness who positively identified him as the person who fatally shot her
husband and 2 other witnesses. Mabuyos alibi, corroborated by several witnesses, was that at the time of
the commission of the crime, he was detained in the municipal jail of Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, from which
town it would take 10 hours by bus to reach the scene of the crime.
On appeal, the SC ruled that the appellants alibi cannot be sustained because he had been clearly and
positively identified by the widor. Moreover, Mabuyos alibi was found to have the aspect of fabrication
after the Court examined the evidence in support thereof.
Decision affirmed, P6k indemnity increased to P12k.
FACTS:
1. On June 18, 1966, at about midnight, Norberto Anillo was shot dead at the doorstep of his house in Bo.
Ambulong, Tanauan, Batangas.
2. On June 20, 1966, 2 days after the tragic event, Agaton Anillo (father of the deceased) and Adelaida
Mirania (widow of the deceased) went
to the Office of the Chief of Police of Tanuan and submitted themselves to a formal investigation.
3. They both named Domingo Mabuyo as the triggerman and alluded to a certain Juan Mendoza as the
instigator of the crime (the latter charged in a different docket number, not in this case: Criminal Case
2388, Juan Mendoza principal by inducement for murder).
4. On June 21, 1966, a complaint for murder was filed in the Municipal Court of Tanauan against Mendoza
and Mabuyo.
5. A warrant of arrest was issued against both, but Mabuyo was nowhere to be found.
6. Juan Mendoza, was subsequently acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt in a decision promulgated on
January 7, 1967.
7. On March 27, 1967, Mabuyo presented himself at the Office of the Chief of Tanauan, fingerprinted and
posted his bail bond.
8. Through counsel, Mabuyo waived his right to the second stage of the preliminary investigation.
9. On April 5, 1967, the case was elevated to the CFI of Batangas, the Provincial Fiscal filed the
corresponding information for murder against Mabuyo, alleging the circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, Mabuyo pleaded not guilty and the case went to trial.
Witnesses:
10. The widow of the deceased testified that at about midnight her husband knocked on the their door,
when she heard 2 gun shots, and her husband cried out Aray, followed by successive shots and a sound
of a falling object. When she opened the door, with a kerosene lamp on her hand, she saw Domingo
Mabuyo. She immediately closed the door, and shouted for help. Shortly, her father-in-law, whose house
was nearby, arrived.
11. Agaton Anillo, the father of the deceased, testified for the prosecution, corroborating to the statements
of her daughter-in-law.

12. Aniceto Sumarraga, Domingo Mabuyos friend, the former witnessed for the prosecution, stating that
the latter inquired if he would go with him to kill Norberto Anillo, in which he refused instantly, and Mabuyo
left.
Respondent:
13. Mabuyos defense was alibi.
14. He claimed that early morning of June 3, 1966 he left Tanauan and only returned on March 27, 1967.
15. He claimed that in the evening of June 18, 1966 until 8 AM the next day he was detained in the
municipal jail of Gabaldon for drunkenness.
16. That he only knew of the charge against him on March 23, 1967.
Trial Court:
17. TC: convicted Mabuyo guilty of murder.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in convicting Mabuyo of a crime committed in a place other than the place alleged in
the information.
HELD:
NO. The trial court did not err in convicting the accused of murder committed in Bo. Ambulong, Tanauan
Batangas, even if the information alleged that the crime was committed in Bo. Bagumbayan, some 12
kilometers away in the same municipality and province.
It is a well settled rule that unless the particular place of commission is an essential element of the offense
charged, conviction may be had even if it appears that the crime was committed not at the place alleged
in the information, provided that the place of actual commission was within the jurisdiction of the court.
In the instant case the place of commission does not constitute an essential element of the offense charge
and the evidence discloses that said offense was in fact committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court.

UNITED STATES vs ARCEO

FACTS:
Nicolas Arceo Tanuco was charged in the City of Manila with the crime of illegal marriage in violation of
Article 471 of the Penal Code. He married Tranquilina Arcilia on February 3, 1897 in a church at Bacolor,
Pampanga in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church. On May 1, 1901, by virtue of a
decree from the archbishop of Manila, which had suppressed the ban in his church and his declaration of
being unmarried before the pastor of Tambobong, he married Teodora de Guia in the Province of Rizal. The
crime was committed in Tambobong, which was formerly part of Manila and is now included in the Province
of Rizal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila had the jurisdiction to hear and
determine the case.
HELD:
The rule is that the place where a crime is committed should be first ascertained in order to determine the
jurisdiction of the court and judge. Territorial jurisdiction of courts including the CFI of Manila is fixed by Act
No. 140. Section 3 of Act No. 183 may extend it for police purposes but it was never intended to give the
CFI of Manila jurisdiction.
The Court of First Instance of the City of Manila had no jurisdiction over crimes committed in the Province
of Rizal even within the five mile limit for police purposes set forth by section 3 of Act No. 183.
Therefore, the judgment of the lower court is set aside and the case dismissed. In the event of a filing of
new complaint, the CFI of Rizal shall proceed in accordance with law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DE GUZMAN

Petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People of the Philippines, praying for the reversal,
annulment and setting aside of the Orders which ruled the case in the negative as well as the MR of the
Judge de Guzman. Petitioner prays that the Judge will assume jurisdiction and proceed with the criminal
case.
FACTS:
A robbery was committed in Queszon City in the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where various pieces of
precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos were taken. An information was instituted against
the perpetrators in RTC of Quezon City.
Another information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise
known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 42433, against herein respondent Sps. Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita
Esguerra-Alcantara, from whose possession the jewelries stolen were recovered in Antipolo, Rizal.
Sps. Alcantara filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to try the offense.
The trial court acted on the motion and issued the questioned order:
Since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal, outside the territorial jurisdiction of
this Court, and considering that all criminal prosecutions must be instituted and tried in the
Municipality or Province where the offense took place or any one of its essential elements took
place, this Court, necessarily, does not have jurisdiction over the instant case.
Wherefore, the above-entitled case is hereby QUASHED, without prejudice to the filing of the
corresponding action against the accused in the Court having proper jurisdiction.
The private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was denied in the court's order of 21 March 1986.
The Solicitor General argues that since an essential element of the crime of fencing is the commission of
robbery, in this case committed in Quezon City, the information therefor filed in said City accords with the
provisions of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, and the refusal of the Court a quo to
assume and exercise jurisdiction thereover constitutes a serious error of law and a grave abuse of
discretion. He theorizes that fencing is a "continuing offense." He explains that the Anti-Fencing Law has
been enacted for the purpose of imposing a heavier penalty on persons who profit from the effects of the
crime of robbery or theft, no longer merely as accessories under Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Revised
Penal Code, but as equally guilty with the perpetrators of the robbery or theft itself.
In People vs. Ledesma:
. . . A "continuous crime" is a single crime consisting of a series ofacts arising from a single criminal
resolution or intent not susceptible of division. For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed
separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; unity of criminal
intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one
and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.
Robbery
the taking of personal property belonging to
another, with intent to gain, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any
person, or using force upon anything

Independent from fencing

ISSUE:

Fencing
is the act of any person who, with intent to
gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell
or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
other manner deal in any article, item, object
or anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft.
Law does not require participation of
accused in the robbery or theft

WON the crime of "fencing" a continuing offense that could allow the filing of an information therefor in the
place where the robbery or theft is committed and not necessarily where the property, unlawfully taken is
found to have later been acquired.
RULING:
Court allows change of venue in criminal cases "whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and
there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction
over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice."
In this case, the SC does not see any attendance of reasons for changing the venue. There is no grave
abuse of discretion in the order of the lower court.
Certiorari and Mandamus DISMISSED. Order of RTC to Quash information and deny MR is AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs OPEMIA

FACTS:
An information was filed in CFI of Camarines Sur charging 4 persons with theft of large cattle alleged to
have been committed on or about June 18, 1952. After arraignment which defendants pleaded not guilty
and in the course of trial, the fourth witness for the prosecution (caretaker of the stolen carabao), testified
that the theft occurred sometime in July 1947. Thus, the fiscal asked for the amendment of the alleged
date of commission so as to conform to the evidence.
An objection was raised on the ground that it would violate defendants substantial rights for the reason
that the case had already been pending for a long time and the trial had progressed to such an extent that
their defense had already been revealed to the prosecution.
RTC: sustained the objection since amendment would really prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.
And defense also asked for quashal of information on the ground that there is variance on allegations and
the evidence. SO, it dismissed the information and therefore the case.
SolGen: appealed and contended that instead of dismissing, the lower court should have allowed the
amendment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not if the amendment would violate the rights of the accused?

HELD:
Yes, it would violate their constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against
them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves.
It is a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that the precise time at which an offense was committed need
not be alleged in the complaint or information, but it is required that the act be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information
or complaint would permit (Rule 106, section 10). It is to apprise the accused of the approximate date
when the offense charged was committed in order to enable him to prepare his defense and thus avoid a
surprise.
In the case, it shows that the carabao was lost on July 25, 1947 and not on June 18, 1952. The variance is
certainly unfair to them, for it violates their constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the
specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover, they
cannot be convicted of an offense with which they are not charged.
It is also a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that after the Defendant has entered his plea, the
information or complaint may be amended only as to all matters of form when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the Defendant. An amendment that would change the date of the
commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form. It is apparent that the

proposed amendment concerns with material facts constituting the offense, and consequently it would be
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the Defendants.
Since prosecution could not contradict the testimony that created the necessity for the amendment,
the Defendants in the present case should be deemed to have already been acquitted and may not be
tried again without being put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

ROCABERTE vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

UNITED STATES vs LAHOYLAHOY

Accused Madanlog was charged with robbery of properties of one person but was convicted of
robbing the property of another.
SC reviews RTC's decision charging defendants Pedro Lahoylahoy and Marcos Madanlog with a
crime of robbery with multiple homicide punishable with death penalty.

FACTS:
One dark night in 1912 at the small island of Sicogon, Iloilo, accused Lahoylahoy and Madanlog
appeared in the house of aged couple Francisco Seran and his wife Juana. Inside the house sleeping
during the incident were Juana and his two grandchildren, Miguela and Brtolome aged 14 and 9
years old.
Accused men demanded P100 from Juana, so Juana gave. Then they asked the three to leave the
house and go to the sea. When they were near the sea, accused men demanded money again but
Juana was not able to provide.
Lahoylahoy struck Juana with a bolo below her breast, killing her instantly. The 2 children,
frightened, ran away separately and hid in the bushes.
The next morning the 2 children stopped by their sister's house, the wife of Madanlog. Then they
went later to the house of their parents, Roman Estriba and Rosa, and found out that their
grandfather and parents were all killed.
All the bodies were collected and buried early in the morning by the accused men, assisted by
Eugenio Tenedero, son-in-law of Lahoylahoy.
During the next day, Madanlog went to the house where Francisco and Juana had lived and carried
away some palay, some dawa, three pigs, and a trunk containing wearing apparel.
The children were threatened with death should they complain and for some time stayed with their
sister and Madanlog's house.
Afterwards, the children were then taken to the home of another sister, Dionisa Escalante, at Panay
Island where then the children revealed the facts of the crime.
Dionisia files complaint in RTC-Iloilo.
Pedro Lahoylahoy was arrested first; and when he was examined before the justice of the peace, he
made a confession in which he stated that the four deceased persons had been killed by Madanlog,
with his assistance.
At the trial the two children gave a very consistent account of the robbery and of the murder of
their grandmother; but the boy said that he did not remember that Madanlog was present when
Lahoylahoy struck the fatal blow.
Another important witness for the prosecution was Eugenio Tenedero, the son-in-law of Lahoylahoy.
This witness testified that the defendants killed the four deceased persons, and that early in the
morning they came to his house and required him to help them bury the dead, which he did.
According to the proof the person robbed was Juana; while the complaint charges state that the
property taken (P100, palay, dawa and wearing apparel) belonged to Roman Estriba.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of the variance of the complaint charges and proof?
RULING:
Both accused guilty with respect to the sufficiency of evidence but RTC judgment reversed. Accused
to suffer reclusion temporal not to exceed 40 years, to pay accessories and to indemnify heirs of
deceased for P1,000.
Court believes that the asportation of the things Madanlog took should not be considered as a
continuation of the acts of robbery and murder previously committed, but rather as a spoliation of

the estate of a deceased person. It results that the only property taken in the act of robbery was the
P100 obtained from Juana.
It is elementary that in crimes against property, ownership must be alleged as matter essential to
the proper description of the offense. Though an allegation that the ownership is unknown is
allowed, a variance in the ownership as specifically alleged and ownership as proven is fatal.
By reason of the lack of conformity between the allegation and the proof respecting the ownership
of the property, it is impossible to convict the two accused of the offense of robbery committed by
them in this case; and therefore they cannot be convicted of the complex offense of robbery with
homicide.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs UBA

FACTS:
On August 1, 1952, Demetria Somod-ong filed a complaint in the justice of the peace court of Oroquieta,
Misamis Occidental, charging above-named Juliana and Calixta Uba with having uttered in public against
complainant certain defamatory words and expressions.
The complaint was supported by the affidavits of Pastora Somod-ong, Marciano Calibog and Anacoreta
Rocaldo. The court found the existence of probable cause and the provincial fiscal filed the information
charging the accused Juliana and Calixta Uba of serious oral defamation.
However, instead of mentioning the complainant Demetria Somod-ong as the offended party, the
information named Pastora Somod-ong as the person offended.
When the case came for trial both Demetria and Pastora testified for the prosecution. Demetria is the
daughter of Pastora and when the latter testified she declared that it was her daughter Demetria who was
insulted by the accused. When Demetria testified she declared the accused insulted her corroborating her
mothers testimony. Two other witnesses testified that the accused insulted Demetria Somod-ong calling
her lascivious and a prostitute.
When the prosecution had rested, counsel for the accused promptly moved for the dismissal of the case on
the ground that all the defamatory statements supposed to have been uttered by the accused were
against Demetria, not against the offended party, Pastora. The judge sustained the motion to dismiss and
entered decision acquitting the accused of the charge. Hence, this appeal.
The Solicitor General contends in this appeal that the trial court should have ordered the fiscal to amend
the information by changing the name of the offended party so as to make it conform with the evidence. It
is claimed that the change would merely be one of form, permitted by Section 13 of Rule 106.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo err in dismissing the case for variance between the allegations of the
information and the proof.
HELD:
While it is probably true that the fiscal or his clerk made a clerical error in putting in the information the
name of Pastora Somod-ong instead of that of Demetria Somod-ong, as the offended party, the mistake
thus committed was on a very material matter in the case, such that it necessarily affected the
identification of the act charged.
Note that the pleading that give the court jurisdiction to try the offense is not the complaint of the
offended party, but the information by the fiscal, because the charge is the utterance of insulting or
defamatory language, not the imputation of an offense which can be prosecuted only at the instance of the
offended party.
The Court should have, therefore, ordered the fiscal to file another information with Demetria Somod-ong
as the offended party and hold the accused in custody to answer the new charge.
The order of dismissal is hereby affirmed, but the provincial fiscal of Misamis Occidental is hereby ordered
to file a new information charging the same accused with the offense of serious oral defamation against
Demetria Somod-ong. There is no double jeopardy. Judgment modified.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COSARE

ENRILE vs AMIN
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ROMAGOSA
FACTS:
1. This case is related to the People vs. Federico Geronimo alias Comdr. Oscar, et al. which was
already decided by the Supreme Court on 1956. In said case, Geronimo was charged with five
counts of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings.
2. In the present case, Abundio Romagosa was, by virtue of his being a ranking officer/member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the Hukbalahaps, accused in the CFI of Camarines Sur of
the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, under three counts that
are the last three of the five counts charged against Federico Geronimo.
3. As stated in all the Information, Romagosa, together with others, attacked the Government and its
agents as well as innocent civilians in furtherance of the crime of Rebellion. They also committed
wanton acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, kidnappings and planned destructions of private
and public property and plotted the liquidation of government officials, to create and spread
disorder, terror, confusion, chaos and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid
purpose, among which are follows to wit:
a. That on or about the years 1951 to 1952 in the municipality of, Pasacao, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, a group of Armed Huks under Commander Rustum raided the house
of one Nemesio Palo, a Police sergeant of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and as a result,
said HUKS were able to capture said Nemesio Palo and once captured with evident
premeditation, treachery and intent to kill, stab, shot and cut the neck of said
Nemesio Palo thereby causing the instantaneous death of Nemesio Palo.
b. That on or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of Santa Rita, Del Gallego, Camarines
Sur a group of HMBS with Federico Geronimo alias Commander Oscar ambushed and
fired upon an Army Patrol headed by CPL Bayrante, resulting in seriously wounding of
PFC Pancracio Torrado and Eusebio Gruta, a civilian.
c. That on or about February 1954 at barrio Cotmo, San Fernando, Camarines Sur,
Abundio Romagosa, one of a group of four HMBS led by accused Commander Oscar
with evident premiditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously killed one Policarpio
Tipay, a barrio lieutenant.
4. As in the case of Federico Geronimo, Romagosa, upon arraignment, entered a plea of guilty to the
information.
5. Because of Romagosas guilty plea, the prosecution recommended that the penalty of life
imprisonment be imposed on the accused, on the ground that the charge being a complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, the penalty provided for by law is the maximum
of the most serious crime which is murder.
6. Counsel for the accused, on the other hand, argued that the proper penalty imposable upon the
accused was only prision mayor, since there is no such complex crime as rebellion with murders,
robberies, and kidnappings, because the latter being the natural consequences of the crime of
rebellion, the crime charged against the accused should be considered only as simple rebellion.
RTC Ruling: Romagosa was found guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappings; and giving him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay a fine of P10,000; to indemnify the heirs
of the two persons killed named in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each; and to pay the cost of the
proceedings.
ROMAGOSAS CONTENTION: There is no crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, and
that he should have been convicted only of simple rebellion and imposed the penalty of prison mayor in its
minimum period, in view of his voluntary plea of guilty.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is a complex crime of rebellion with murder, robbery, and kidnapping under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. Whether Romagosas plea of guilty to the information should be deemed that he has admitted the
commission of the simple crime of rebellion alone, or of rebellion and other separate crimes, if any
of the counts of the information charges crimes independent of and not constituting essential acts
or ingredients of the rebellion charged (particularly the murder of Policarpio Tipay).
RULING:
Issue No.1
There is no such thing. We hold that the lower court erred in holding appellant Romagosa guilty of the
complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, and in imposing upon him the
penalty for such crime. As already held in People vs. Hernandez, et al. and People vs. Geronimo - where
the crimes of murders, robberies, and kidnappings are committed as a means to or in furtherance of the
rebellion charged, they are absorbed by, and form part and parcel of, the rebellion, and that therefore, the
accused can be convicted only of the simple crime of rebellion.
Issue No.2
The same majority of six justices of this Court maintain their view express in the Geronimo case that by his
plea of guilty, Romagosa has admitted the commission of the independent crime of murder alleged in
count 3 of the information, the averment that said crime was perpetrated "in furtherance" of the rebellion
being a mere conclusion and not a bar to his conviction and punishment for said offense, Romagosa having
failed, at the arraignment, to object to the information on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged.
Therefore, he must be held guilty, and sentenced for the commission, of two separate offenses, simple
rebellion and murder.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that appellant Abundio Romagosa is
convicted of the crimes of simple rebellion and murder.
SEPARATE OPINION:
CONCEPCION, J., concurring and dissenting:
In the light of the specific allegation to the effect that the killer of Policarpio Tipay a barrio lieutenant, was
committed by Abundio Romagosa "in accordance with" his conspiracy with other persons "to commit the
crime of rebellion" . . . and "as necessary means to commit the crimes of rebellion in connection therewith
and in furtherance thereof . . . so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose," I find it
difficult, not to say impossible, to conclude that said killing is "not related" to the charge of rebellion and
constitute in itself an "independent offense." Besides, there is nothing, absolutely nothing, in the record
before us, to show that this allegation of the information is inaccurate. What is more, inasmuch as
appellant is being sentenced upon his plea of guilty, we should confine ourselves, strictly to the allegations
of said information, in the determination of the crime or crimes committed by him and in the imposition of
the corresponding penalty.
In fact, had he entered a plea of not guilty, appellant would have been entitled to object to any evidence
tending to prove that the killing of Policarpio Tipay was "independent" of and "not related" to the crime of
rebellion charged in the information. Indeed, had he moved to quash the information upon the ground that
it charges more than one offense, it would have been proper to deny the motion for the reason that only
one offense was meant to be, and is actually, alleged in said information. In other words, appellant had
never been advised that he is being accused of more than one (1) offense, and, hence, his conviction for
murder of Policarpio Tipay, as if it were a completely distinct offense, independent and separate from that
of rebellion, would be a denial of due process of law, one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MONTENEGRO

On 20 September 1976, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, thru Assistant Fiscal Virginia G, Valdez, filed an
Information for "Robbery" before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV-B, Quezon City, docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-6821, against Antonio Cimarra, Ulpiano Villar, Bayani Catindig and Avelino de Leon.
Said accused (now private respondents) were all members of the police force of Quezon City and were

charged as accessories-after-the-fact in the robbery committed by the minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who had
already pleaded guilty and had been convicted in Criminal Case No. QF-76-051 before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. Ricardo Cabaloza was convicted for the robbery of the same
items, articles and jewelries belonging to Ding Velayo, Inc. valued at P 75,591.40 and enumerated in the
original information against herein private respondents.
Upon arraignment on 25 October 1976, all of the accused (now private respondents) entered a plea of "not
guilty" to the charge filed against them. Accordingly, trial on the merits was scheduled by the respondent
court. However, before the trial could proceed, the prosecuting fiscal filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Information, dated 28 December 1976, seeking to amend the original information by: (1) changing the
offense charged from "Robbery" to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place," (2) alleging conspiracy among all
the accused, and (3) deleting all items, articles and jewelries alleged to have been stolen in the original
Information and substituting them with a different set of items valued at P71,336.80
Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended Information. The respondent court resolved to
deny the proposed amendments contained in the Amended Information in the previously referred to order
dated 10 February 1977. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the respondent
court, on 22 February 1977, denied said motion; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amended information is permissible?
HELD:
Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (formerly,
Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be made at any time before the accused
enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the trial, amendments to the information may also be
allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test
as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is
when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to
the complaint or information as amended.
On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction
for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.
The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, are clearly substantial and
have the effect of changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable under Article 209 to "Robbery in
an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private
respondents-accused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty imposable for the offense charged in
the original information to which the accused had already entered a plea of "not guilty" during their
arraignment.
Moreover, the change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen into entirely different articles
from those originally complained of, affects the essense of the imputed crime, and would deprive the
accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of
their defenses to the charge filed against them. It will be observed that private respondents were accused
as accessories-after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery of
the items listed in the original information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime
different from that committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the
Court.
The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not previously
included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the
need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court.
In People v. Zulueta, it was held that:
Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original charges will have to be
radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly the allegation of conspiracy enables
the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions
and even omissions of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The
amendment thereby widens the battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered

weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would seem inequitable to
sanction the tactical movement at this stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused is
only guaranteed two-days' preparation for trial. Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases, the
liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper that he be fully
apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution
has too many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared adversaries.
To allow at this stage the proposed amendment alleging conspiracy among all the accused, will make all of
the latter liable not only for their own individual transgressions or acts but also for the acts of their coconspirators.

CATINGUB vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Pedrito L. Catingub, was charged with the crime of malversation.
The said accused(petitioner), being then a Sales Supervisor of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,
Cagayan de Oro Branch, an instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, duly
qualified, appointed and acting as such, and as such is responsible and/or accountable for public funds
received by him by reason of his said office and position for the proper discharge of his duties and
functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, with grave abuse of
confidence, misappropriate, embezzle, and take away from the said funds the total amount of P12,314.50
which he thereupon appropriated and converted to his own personal use and benefit
Counsel de oficio Atty. Ramon Academia during arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial commenced on August 30, 1965 during which petitioner appears to have submitted to the
court a paper purporting to be a Motion to Quash. This motion, however, was withdrawn by petitioner,
through counsel, on the ground that the facts to support lack of jurisdiction "are not yet apparent or they
do not yet appear on record.
The prosecution evidence established that petitioner was appointed in Manila on April 13, 1960 as
Salesman I, Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, with compensation at the rate of Pl,800.00 per annum,
effective upon assumption of office (Exhibit "A") which he assumed on May 9, 1960 after taking his oath of
office in Manila on May 5, 1960. Thereafter, he was designated Temporary Sales Supervisor of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) assigned at the Cagayan de Oro Branch.
The Information filed in the trial court specifically alleges that the crime imputed against petitioner, was
committed "in the City of Manila, Philippines." Such an averment would be sufficient if "the offense was
committed or some of the essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction" of the Court
of First Instance of Manila.
ISSUE:
Can he be charged in Cagayan de Oro City only or in Manila as well?
HELD:
Either. Indeed, petitioner could have been charged and tried in Cagayan de Oro City for it is not disputed
that he received the sweepstakes tickets from the PCSO, Cagayan de Oro branch. The essential ingredient
of receiving the sweepstakes tickets took place in Cagayan de Oro City. He could also be charged in the
City of Manila since the final accounting must be rendered in the Central Office, Manila. This is therefore, a
case of concurrent jurisdiction by the proper court of the place wherein "anyone of the essential
ingredients thereof took place." But the choice of venue lies with the prosecuting officer and not with the
accused.